S. P. JAIN versus KALINGA TUBES LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 January 1965 | [1965] 2 S.C.R. 720 | 1965 INSC 6
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 January 1965
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, S.M. SIKRI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 734/1964
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1965] 2 S.C.R. 720
- Neutral citation
- 1965 INSC 6
Text of the judgment
720
S. P. JAIN
A
v.
KALINGA TUBES LTD.
lanllary 14, 1965
[1>. B. GAJENDkAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO AND
S. M. SIKru, JJ.]
Companies A.ct (A.ct 1 of 1956), :rs. 397 and 398-Scope of.
B
In July 1954, two groups of shareholders led by P and L, who, together held an equal number of shares· of the value of Rs. 21 lakbs out
of a total share capital of Rs. 25 lakbs in the respondent company (then
a private companJC), entered into a private agreement with the Appellant, c
whereby, (i) the share capital of the company was to be increased by
Rs. 10! lakhs and shares of this value allotted to the appellant so that
the total shares held by him would be equal to the holding of each of
the other two groups; (ii) each of these three groups of shareholders
would have an equal number of representatives on the Board of'Directors;
(iii) the appellant undertook to arrange certain credit facilities for the
company; and (iv) the appellant was to be the Chairman of the Board. In
accordance with this agreement, the appellant was made the Chairman D
and though various resolutions were passed by the company to implement
the agreement, these resolutions did not in terms refer to the agreement,
and no change was made in the Articles of Aasoclation of the company
so as to embody the terms of the agreement. Some time later, the subscribed capital of the company was increased to Rs. 61 lakbs and the
new shares were so allotted as to maintain the parity in the shareholdings
of the three groups. When one of the two minority shareholders sold
250 shares, these were equally divided between the three groups and one E
odd share was held by P, L and the Appellant jointly.
In 1956-57, the company desired to raise a·toan from the Industrial
Finance Corporation and as this Corporation made advances only to
1>Ublic limited companies, in January 1957 the company was converted
mto a public company. Appropriate amendments were made in its
· Articles of Association, but ·even on this occasion, no attempt was made
to incorporate into the Articles tlie terms of the Agreement of July 1954. I'
After sanction had been obtained of the Controller of Capital Issues
for the issue of additional share capital, the appellant suggested at a
meeting of the board of directors in March 1958 that the new shares
should be issued proportionately to the existing shareholders in
accordance with the provisions of Section 81 of the Companies Act,
1956. On the other hand, those representing the P and L groups proposed that the new shares should be offered privately in the best interests of the company at the sole discretion of the directors; this proposal G
was made because these two groups did not have money to subscribe for
the new capital and they feared that if shares were offered in the first
instance to existing shareholders, the appellant could get all of them
and thus acquire control of the company. In view of the majority of
the P and L groups in the .Board, their proposal was adopted and subsequently a resOlution to that effect was also accepted at a General Meeting
of the shareholders held. in March 29, 1958. The appellant thereafter
instituted a suit to have the resolution declared illegal and void and H
obtained an ex parte injunction against the coml?anY from allotting sliares
pursuant to thjs resolution. On July 13, 1958, the appellant's suit was
dismissed by the Subordinate Judge and the injunction vacated by him
s. P.' JAIN 11. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, J.)
721
A
at 11 A.M. The Board of Directors at a meeting held on that date,
immediately on reoeiving the news that the injunction had been vacated,
allotted the new shares to seven persons who had previously applied
for them. On the same day, the appellant filed an appeal and applied
for an~ obtained an order staying the operation of the order of tbe
Subordinate Judge. Eventually these appeals were also dismissed and
the stay vacated.
B
In September 1960 another General meeting of the company was
called to approve a proposal to increase the share capital of the company
from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 3 crores. It was also intended that these new
shares should be offered to outsiders with a view to making the company
more broad-based.
C
D
At that stage the appellant filed a petition in the High Court under
Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, complaining ;,.!er
alia, that the issue of new shares was in furtherance of a continuing
oppression of the appellant's minority group; that by allotting such shares
to benamidars of P and L in disregard of the agreement of July 1954,
it was intended to exclude the appellant from all control of the affairs
of the company; that the resolutions passed in March 1958 as to the
manner of allotment of new shares contravened s. 81 of the Companies
Act, 1956 and this resolution as well as the hasty allotment on July 30,
1958 were in abuse of the power of the P and L groups and oppressive
of the minority. The petition was allowed by the single Judge but this
decision was reversed tn appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court.
On appeal to the Supreme Court.
HELD : ( i) On the facts no case had been made out, of oppression
within the meaning of section 397.
E
F
G
H
For a petition under section 397 to succeed, it is not enough to
show that there is just and equitable cause for winding up the company,
though that must be shown as preliminary to the application of section
397. It must further be shown that the conduct of the majority shareholders was oppressive to the minority as members and this requires,
that events have to be considered not in isolation but as a part of a consecutive story. There must be continuous acts on the part of the majority
shareholders, continuing up to the date of tho petition, showing that the
affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner oppressive to
some part of the members. The conduct must be burdensome, harsh
ar i wrongful and mere lack of confidence between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders would not be enough unless lack
of confidence springs from oppression of the minority by a majority in
the management of the company's affairs, and such oppression must
involve at least an element of lack of probity, or fair dealing to a member
in the matter of his proprietary rights as a shareholder. [937 C-F]
Elder v. Watson, (1952) S.C. 49; George Meyer v, Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. (1954) S.C. 381; Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society Ltd. v, Meyer and another, [1958] 3 All. E.R. 66:
Re. H. R. Harmer Ltd., [1958] 3 All E.R. 689; discussed and applied.
(ii) The agreement of July 1954 on which the case of oppression
was based was not binding even on the private company and much less
so on the public company when it came into existence in 1957. It wa.•
really an agreement between a non-member and two members of the company and although for some time the agreement. was in t~e main carri_ed
out clearly some of its terms could not be put m the arttcles of assoc1atio~ of the public company. As the company was not bound by the
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
agreement, the mere fact that it was decided at the meeting in March
1958 to offer the· new shares to outsiders and not the existing shareholders
did not necessarily amount to an oppression of the minority shareholders.
The majoricy shareholders were not bound to accept a proposal of the
minority shareholders that the new shares should be allotted .only to
the existing shareholders. Furthermore the general meeting having decided that new shares should not be issued to the existing shareholders
but to others, there was no contravention of s. 81 of the Companies Act
1956 and the resolution of March 28, 1958 was in accordance with law
as it stood at the time. (739 B.C; 740 G-H; 741 C-E; 745 D-F]
(iii) It could not be said thal the allottees of new shares were
benamidars or stooges of the P or L group and that by allotment of
.bares to them, the majority shareholders were oppressing the minority.
These allottees were independent persons and the fact that the P and L
groups might be able to get the support of the holders of the new shares
did not necessarily mean oppression of the appellant, for the new sharoholders may support the P and L groups on the ground that such support
would be for the benefit of the Company. (744 C-E]
(iv) The haste in issuing new shares upon the vacation of the injunction of July 30, 1958 could not be held to be a part of the design
to oppress the minority. The company was in need of money for expansion and its ability to obtain a loan from the Fmance Corporation
depende4 upon the increase of its subscribed share capital. Tlie haste
became necessary because the injunction wlls vacated on that day and
it was felt that if immediate action was not taken and the new shares
allotted, there might be a further injunction and consequent delay.. The
haste in the allotment of shares arose out of circumstances brought about
by the appellant's conduct. (743 A-El
Held also, that no case had been made out for action under section
398 on the ground that the affairs of the company were being conducted
in a manner prejudicial to its interests. [749 CJ
A
8
C
D
i;
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 734-747
of 1964.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated April 18, 1963
of the Orissa High Court in A.H.O. No. 13 of 1961 and A.H.O.
Nos. 2 to 14 of 1962.
r
N. C. Chatterjee, S. Ray Chowdhury, M. L. lhunjhunwa/a,
S. Murty and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant (in all the
appeals).
M. C. Seta/vad, A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Ranadeb Chaudhri,
M. K. Banerjee, I. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder G
Narain for respondent No. 1.
Ranadeb Chaudhuri and /. B. Dadachanji, for respondent
No. 2.
G. S. Pathak, B, Dutta and /. B. Dadachanji, for respondent
~1
H
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and/. B. Dadachanji, for respondent
No.4.
=~
.
s. P• .JAIN v. KALINGA TUBBS (Wanchoo, /.)
A
•
723
Sachin Chowdhury, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.
Yohra, for the respondent Nos. 9, 10, and 12.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, /. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. 13.
Sachin Chowdhury, B. Sen, Dipak Dutta Chowdhury, for respondent No. 14.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General and Rajinder Narain &:
Co. for respondent No. 15.
S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General and Rajinder Narain, &: Co. for
n:spondent No. 16.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, 1. J'hese fourteen appeals on certificates granted
by the High Court of Orissa raise common questions of law and
fact and will be dealt with together. They are a consequence of
~ fight between two groups of business magnates for the control
D al Messrs. Kalinga TuJ>es Limited (hereinafter referred to as the
Company). They arise out of an application under ss. 397, 398,
402 and 403 of the Indian Companies Act, No. 1 of 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) made by the appellant in the High
Court. Most of the facts are not seriously in dispute and it is
PeCeSsary to set them out in detail in order to decide the main
E point raised on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the affairs
al the Company were being conducted in a manner oppressive
to him and his group of members.
The Company was floated as a private limited company on
December 1, 1950 with an authorised capital of Rs. 25 lacs. Ori:r ginally, the shares were held by two groups of shareholders
equally, except a few shares. These groups of shareholders lllllY
for our purposes be taken to be represented by Patnaik and Loganathan. The Company raised a sum of Rs. 36 lacs by the issue
of two series of debentures which were guaranteed by the Government of Orissa between 1952 to 1954. In 1954, the appellant
G was approached by Dr. Mohanty, then Secretary to Government
.of Orissa (Industries Department) which was naturally interested
in the Company having guaranteed debentures to the tune of
Rt. 36 lacs, for helping the Company which was in financial and
administrative difficulties. The appellant was requested to help
the Company by providing finance and by arranging loans from
H banks _and other sources and further by providing the necessary
administrative guidance. The appellant agreed to do so and
comequently on July 27, l 9S4, an agreement was entered into
7.24
SUPIUIME
COURT
llPOJlTS
(1965) 2 S.C.ll
between the appellant, and Patnaik and Loganathan. To this A
agreement, the Company was not a party. We shall refer in
detail to the various terms of the agreement later. In brief.
however, the agreement provided that the appellant wouid be
allotted shares in the Company equal to those held by Patnaik
and Logan_athan after in.creasing the share capital of the Co!npany. Thus the Company would have three groups of share- B
holders represented by the appellant, Patnaik an<l Loganathan
holding equal number of shares, besides a French company and
one Rath, who between themselves held shares worth Rs. 4 lacs.
These shareholders however were not paity to the agreement.
It was also provided that these three groups of shareholders C
would have equal number of representatives on the Board of
Direc:tors of the Company, namely, two each for the time being.
The appellant also undertook to arrange for cash credit facilities
to the limit of Rs. 50 lacs on the security of raw materials and
finished goods of the Company. And finally, the appellant Jain
was to be the chairman of the Company. This agreement was D
followed by certain resolutions passed by the Company on August
16, 1954 by which some of the terms of the agreement were
stibstantially carried out, the authorised capital was increased to
rupees one crore (though it was issuecl later in instalments), and
the appellant was made the chairman of the Company. It may
however be noted that the resolutions did not refer to the agree' E
ment in terms and no change was made in the Articles of Association of the Company to bring them in conformity with all the
terms of the agreement. In January 1955, Narayanswami who
had been appointed Managing Director resigned and Patnaik was
appointed the Managing Director. In April 1955, the Company
started production. Sometime thereafter the share capital was I'
further subscribed up to Rs. 61 lacs and the three groups, namely,
the appellant Jain, Patnaik and Loganathan held one-third of the
shares leavuig out shares held by the French company. Mr. Rath
had sold his shares numbering 250 and these shares were equally
divided .between the three groups and the one odd share was held G
by all the three namely Jain, Patnaik and Loganathan, jointly.
In September 1956, a resolution was passed by the Board of
Pirectors referring the question of conversion of the Company
to a public limited company to a sub~ommittee consisting of the
appellant, LOganathan and Patnaik. About the same time, an
application was made to the Controller of Capital Issues for the H
sanction of the issue of further shares to the extent of Rs. 39 lacs
out of the authorised capital of rupees one crore and for the
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, J.)
725
A issue of debentures to the extent of Rs. 64 lacs. In this application it was stated that the shares were intended to be issued
privately to the existing shareholders and/ or their nominees. In ,
December 1956 a resolution was p~sed by the Board of Directors for converting the Company into a public limited company
and for amending the Articles of Association in consequence at
B the next annual general meeting. This was necessary as the Company wanted to borrow from the Industrial Finance Corporation
which however made advances only to public limited companies.
On January 11, 1957, the Company was converted into a public
company and the Articles of Association were amended. Even
so, no attempt was made to incorporate the terms of the agreeC ment dated July 27, 1954 in the Articles of Association so
amended.
D
E
F
G
H
Trouble however seems to have arisen between the appellant
and the other two groups as early as September 1955 in consequence of an advertisement issued by the appellant in newspapers
suggesting that his group was engaged in the manufacture of
black and galvanised steel tubes and in this advertisement the
emblem of the Company was also printed, as if the Company
was part of the appellant's group. This led to strong protests
by Patnaik and Loganathan and eventually the appellant withdrew the advertisement. However, the appellant continued to
be the chairman of the Company in spite of growing differences
between him and Patnaik and Loganathan. Articles of Association were further amended in November 1957. At that time also
nothing was put therein on the basis of the agreement dated
July 27, 1964. In December 1957, the Controller of Capital
Issuet> sanctioned the issue of shares of the face value of
Rs. 39 lacs and debenutres of the face value of Rs. 64 lacs subject
to the provisions of s. 81 of the Act. Real trouble started after
this sanction for the issue of fresh shares. We shall have occasion to refer to s. 81 of the Act. later; it is enough to say here
that that sanction provides that the new shares would be offered
in the first instance to the existing shareholders in p.roportion, as
nearly as the circumstances admit, to the capital paid up on
the existing shares at that date "subject to any direction to the
contrary which may be given by the Company in general
meeting". So unless the Company decided otherwise at a general
meeting, the new issue of shares to the tune of Rs. 39 lacs would
have had to be offered under s. 81 of the Act to the existing
shareholders in proportion to their existing shares. At that time
as already indicated, the appellant group held one-third share
726
SUPREMI!
COURT
JlEPOllTS
[1'65) 2 S.C.R
and Loganathan and Patnaik groups held two-thirds share except
for certain shares held by the French company and therefore in the
absence of a direction to the contrary at a general meeting, the
new shares would also have gone in equal shares to the three
groups subject to the shares which would go to the French Company.
The question of the issue of new shares came up before a
meeting of the Board of Directors on March l, 1958, and the
differences between the three groups which had already begun
came to the surface at that time. The appellant proposed to the
Board of Directors that the new shares should be issued to the
existing shareholders as provided in s. 81 of the Act. Patnaik on
the other hand proposed that a general meeting should be called for
the purpose of passing a resolution for the issue of new shares and
for the manner and proportion in which shares were to be offered
privately to the shareholders and other persons and for such other
incidental matters as provided in the section. It is apparent from
this conflict between the appellant grcmp and Patnaik and Loganathan groups in this meeting that the groups of Patnaik and
Loganathan did not want the appellant's group to get roughly
one-third of the new shares. The fear of Patnaik in this connection was that if shares were offered privately to the existing shareholders, the appellant might get all of them, for the groups of
Patnaik and Loganathan did not have the money to subscribe to
the new shares if offered in the first instance to the existing shareholders. Thus if the appellant got all the new shares, his group
would become the majority shareholder and would thus get control of the Company. Consequently, Patnaik put forward the
resolution already referred to at the meeting of the Board of Directors on March 1, 1958 which provided for calling a general meeting for directions as to the issue of new shares, which directions
it was hoped would override the provisions of s. 81 of the Act.
Patnaik's resolution was passed and the appellant's proposal was
outvoted for the obvious reason that the Patnaik and Loganathan
groups held the majority of shares. In consequence a general meeting of shareholders was called for the purpose on March 29, 1958.
The appellant did not attend the meeting of March 29, 1958
though he was present by proxy. Patnaik presided at that meeting.
Two resolutions were put · forward at that meeting,
one on behalf of the appellant's group and the other on behalf
of Patnaik and Loganathan groups. The appellant's resolution
proposed that the new shares should be offered to the existing
shareholders of the Company in the proportion of their share-
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, /.)
,
727
holdings and the offer should remain open for a period of fifteen
days with the right to accept or renounce the whole or part of
the offer in their names or in the names of their nominee or
nominees and if a shareholder did not accept within that period
the offer should be deemed to have been declined. The second
resolution on behalf of the Patnaik Loganathan groups proposed
B that the new shares should not be offered or allotted to the existing sliareholders or to the public and that they should be allotted
privately in the best interest of the Company at the sole discretion
of the directors to such persons as might have applied or thereafter apply on the condition that atleast 5 per centum of the face
C value of shares applied for was paid as application money and
IO per centum of the face value was paid on allotment and the
balance paid as and when called upon in accordance with the
Articles of Association of the Company. As was to be expected,
the resolution put forward on behalf of the appellant was lost and
the resolutions put forward on behalf of Patnaik and Loganathan
D groups as to the allotment of new shares were passed. Thus in
that meeting there was a complete breach between the three groups.
A
This was followed on April 18, 1958, by a suit by the appellant
and some other shareholders of his group for a declaration that
the resolutions dated March 29, 1958 were ultra vires, illegal, void
i: and not binding on the appellant, the Company and its shareholders with a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the
defendnats in the suit (namely, the other two groups) and their
~ervants and agents from giving effect to or acting in any way in
pursuance of the said resolutions and further restraining each of
the defendants, their servants and agents from issuing and alloting
F the new shares in terms of the impugned resolutions. That suit
was filed in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuttack. It is
unnecessary here to refer to the details of that suit. It is enough
to say that an ex parte interim injunction was obtained on the same
day restraining the Company and other. defendants from issuing
and allotting the new shares to persons other than the existing shareG holders and giving effect to the resolutions in that regard passed
at the meeting held on March 29, 1958. The Company then made
an application for setting aside the ex pane interim injunction.
This matter came up before the court on May 15, 1958. At that
time an offer was made on behalf of the Company that in view of
the urgent necessity for funds, the Company might be permitted
ff to issue two-thirds of the shares, keeping back one-third which
would have gone to the appellant if the shares had been offered to
t!ie existing shareholders; but this was not accepted on behalf of
728
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[ 1965) 2 S.C.ll.
the appellant. The hearing of the injunction matter was postponed
on several dates and it appears that the Patnaik and Loganathan
groups continued to call meetings of the Board of Directors on
the dates fu>ed in the suit, and the agenda always provided for
the allotment of the new shares. Eventually on July 30, 1958
the Subordinate Judge delivered judgment and vacated the injunction at about 11 a.m. A meeting of the Board of Directors was
being held on the same day from 10-30 a.m. and as soori as a
message was received that the injunction had been vacated the
new shares were allotted to seven persons who had applied for
the same along with the application money. This happened about
midday and the return as required by the Act was duly filed with
the Registrar of Companies at 12-40 p.m. The same day, an
application was made at 12-40 p.m. on behalf of the appellant
before the Subordinate Judge praying that the order vacating the
injunction be stayed till the appellant obtained orders from the
High Court where he wished to appeal. The Company's lawyer
however intimated to the court that the shares had already been
allotted. Even so, the court passed an order staying the operation
of its judgment delivered earlier for two days. The matter was
then taken in appeal to the High Court by the appellant. The
appeal was dismissed in September 1958. There was a Letters
Patent appeal following the dismissal but that was not pres>ed and
was eventually dismissed in November 1960.
A
B
C
D
E
The case of the appellant was that the seven persons to whom
the new shares were allotted were nominees or benamidars of Pat- ,
naik and Loganathan and therefore these groups really allotted
the new shares to themselves through their benamidars. It was
also alleged that these seven persons only paid 5 per centum of F
the share money and this showed, even though it was said that
the Company was in urgent need of money, that the shares were
allotted to persons who were not in a position to pay the share
money in full. The appellant contended that the allotment of the
new shares was made surrei}titiously and deliberately with the sole
idea of defeating the rights of shareholders represented by him and G
his group and this amounted to oppression of the minority shareholders.
To continue the narrative, it appears that an extraordinary
general meeting of the Company was called on S~tember 21, 1960
to consider increasing the share capital froin rupees one crore on
which it stood after the increase in 1958 to rupees three crores H
by issue of additional equity shares numbering one lac of the value
of rupees one crore and the issue of another one lac cumulative
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBBS (Wanchoo, J.)
729
A redeemable income-tax free preference shares of the value of rupees
one crore subject to such rights and privileges attaching to such
preference shares as might be specified in the new Article to be
inserted in the Articles of Association. It was also intended that
these new shares should be offered to outsiden (i.e. other than the
existing shareholders) with a view to making the Company more
B broad based. This meeting was called by a notice issued on August
25, 1960.
It was the calling of this meeting which led to the application
under s. 397 etc. on September 14, 1960 by the appellant. It was
urged in the application that this issue of new shares was in furtherC ance of the continuing and continuous process of oppression of the
appellant and his group being the minority shareholders and was
designed for the purpose of completely excluding the appellant
and his group from all control in the affairs of the Company and
to deprive the financial advantage to be gained by them by the
issue of new shares at par and to retain such advantage exclusively
0
to the Patnaik and Loganathan groups so that the appellant and
his group might be forced to sell their holdings to the Patnaik
and Loganathan groups at a nominal value. That was why the
new shares were being offered to outsiders and not to the existing
shareholders, the object being to offer the shares to nominees
I: and/ or benamidars of the Patniak and Loganathan groups and to
such persons who would be within their control. The result of
this would be that Loganathan and Patnaik groups would acquire
more than 75 per centum of the voting strength of the Company
and would be in complete control of it and so gain enormous
financial advantage for themselves. This would cause irreparable
' loss and prejudice to the rights of the appellant and his group of
minority shareholders. It was alleged that · this was being done
by the Patnaik and Loganathan ,groups who were in control of
the majority of shares. Finally it was urged that the affairs of
the Company were conducted in a manner prejudicial to the
interest of the Company by Loganathan and Patnaik groups and
G there was mismana~ment in conducting such affairs. It was
further alleged that the conduct of Loganathan and Patnaik groups
towards the minority shareholders was oppressive, burdensome,
harsh and wrongful and the entire manoeuvre was that these groups
should be able to control over 75 per centum of the voting strengt!J
in the Company. Further it was alleged that the conduct of thest
H groups involved a visible departure from the standard of fair dealing and violation of the conditions of fair play to which the appeHant
and his group as minority shareholders were entitled. In particular
730
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965) 2 S.C.1'.
the denial to the existing share holders to subscribe<. to the new A
shares in proportion to their respective holdings and the issue of
such shares to benamidars of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups
was oppressive to the appellant and his group of minority shareholders and also amounted to mismanagement of the affairs of the
Company. This was also in breach and violation of the agreement dated July 27, 1954 to which the Patnaik and Loganathan B
groups were parties. Further it was said that although in form
the Company was a public company in reality it was a partnership consisting of the three groups namely, the appellant's group,
and of Loganathan and Patnaik groups. The last two groups
had combined together against the appellant group which had C
resulted in justifiable lack of confidence on the part of the appellant and his group in the conduct of the affairs of the Company
by the other two groups. Such lack of confidence had been caused
by lack of probity in the conduct of the affairs of the Company by
these two groups, which were acting to benefit themselves personally and were not concerned with the welfare of the Company. D
The appellant and his group would not get any relief by calling a
general meeting of the Company, and the facts and circumstances
aforesaid would justify the making of a winding-up order on the
ground that it was just and equitable that the Company should be
wound up. Therefore the appellant prayed for directions under
s. 397 of the Act, as the winding-up of the Company which was in E
a prosperous condition would unfairly prejudice the appellant
and other members of the minority group and redress against
such oppression could be given by the High Court by making
suitable directions in that behalf. The affairs of the Company
were _being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of
the Company for reasons already stated and there had been F
a material change in the management or control of the Company
by alteration in its Board of Directors and by fraudulent changes
introduced in the ownership of the Company's shares and by
reason of the wrongful act and conduct of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups. The appellant therefore prayed for the removal G
of the present Board of Directors, for re-constitution of the Board
of Directors with at least two permanent representatives from his
group and for ensuring equal representation in the Board of the
three groups of shareholders, and for alterations in the Articles
of Association to incorporate therein the provisions of the agreement dated July 29, 1954. The appellant also sought a declara- H
tion that the resolutions passed by the Board of Directors on
March 1, 1958 and at the general meeting dated March 29, 1958,
s. P, JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, /.)
731
were null and void and were passed in abuse of the power of
Patnaik and Loganathan groups and in oppression of the minority
shareholders and prayed that the said resolutions be set aside in
so far as they related to the issue and allotment of 39,000 new
shares. '11te allotment made on July 30 should be declared
illegal and null and void as it was made in abuse of the powers
B of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups and in oppression of the
minority shareholders and was not binding upon the Company,
the appellant and his group. It was prayed that directions be
given to sell the said 39,000 shares by the allottees to the Company upon payment of the amounts actually paid thereon so far
C and the Company be permitted to offer the same to the shareholders as on July 29, 1958 in proportion to their respective
shareholdings. An injunction was also prayed for restraining the
Company from holding the meeting on September 21, 1960.
Finally it was prayed that orders be passed for investigation into
the conduct of the affairs of the Company by the Loganathan
o and Patnaik groups and suitable directions be made with a view
to regulating the affairs of the Company in future and if necessary
an administrator of the Company be appointed for carrying out
such directions as the High Court might be pleased to make for
purposes of removing the oppression and the acts of misconduct
and mismanagement and for regulating the conduct of the affairs
E of the Company. The seven persons to whom the new shares
were allotted in July 1958 were also made parties and injunction
was prayed for restraining them from transfering those shares.
A
The application was opposed on behalf of the Company, and
its main contention was that the Company was not a party to the
F agreement dated July 27, 1954 and was not bound by it. It was
further contended that there was no mismanagement and the
Company and its affairs were not being conducted in a manner
prejudicial to it. It was also contended that there was no oppression on the undisputed facts in the present case. The application
was also opposed on behalf of Loganathan and Patnaik groups
G and their case was that they had not acted in any manner which
could be said to be oppressive of the rights of the minority shareholders represented by the appellant. They also contended that
the affairs of the Company were not being mismanaged nor were
they being conducted prejudicially to the interest of the Company. Further the seven persons to whom the shares had been
H allotted on July 30, 1958 contended that they were not benarnidars
of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups. Their case was that they
were independent persons of substance and had applied for the
732
SUPllEME
COUllT
IEPOitTS
(1965) 2 S.C.ll
new shares themselves and not as benamidars of Loganathan and
Patnaik groups. They denied that there was any oppression of
the minority shareholders as alleged or that there was any mismanagement of the affairs of the Company or any conduct which
was prejudicial to the interest of the Company. They contended
that the resolutions of March 1, 1958, March 29, 1958 and July
30, 1958 were perfectly legal ~d proper and they were entitled
to the shares which had been allotted to them.
The application was heard in the first instance by a learned
Single Judge of the High Court. He came to the conclusion that
the way in which the Patnaik and Loganathan groups had acted
in the matter of the issue of new shares was oppressive of the
minority shareholders represented by the appellant and the subsequent conduct of the two groups amounted to continuing and
continuous process of oppression of the minority shareholders
and also amounted to mismanagement likely to be prejudicial to
the interest of the Company. He came to the conclusion that the
persistent acts of the Loganathan and Patnaik groups showed that
their motive was to oust the minority group of shareholders completely and the sole object of convening the meeting of September 21, 1960 and to pass the proposed resolutions was in furtherance of the continuing and continuous process of oppression of
the appellant and his group, being the minority shareholders.
Finally it was held that in view of the oppression there was just
and equitable cause for winding-up the Company. The learned
Judge therefore allowed the petition and granted certain reliefs to
which it is unnecessary to refer.
This was followed by fourteen appeals to a Division Bench
by the Company and the various shareholders. These appeals
were consolidated and heard together. The Division Bench came
to the conci'Jsion that the agreement of July 27, 1954 was not
binding on the public company which came into existence after
July 11, 1957, whatever might have been the position under the
agreement when it was a private company. It also came to the
conclusion that the seven persons to whom the new shares were
offered were not benamidars of Loganathan and Patnaik groups
but were independent persons of substance, even though they
might be friends of the majority group of shareholders. · But
there was nothing to show that they were under the control of
the majority group and therefore it could not be said that 75 per
centum of the voting strength was concentrated in the hands of
Loganathan and Patnaik groups except where these new allottees
chose to vote with these groups. On a careful consideration of
A
B
C
D
:r.
I'
G
H
s. P. JAIN v. KAI.INGA TUBES (Wanchoo, J.)
733
A the facts, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that no
such oppression had been established as would justify an order
under s. 397 of the Act. As to mismanagement under 5. 398, the
Division Bench came to the conclusion that no case had been
made out under that section. On this view of the matter, the
appeals were allowed and the application of the appellant was
B dismissed and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
Thereupon the appellant applied for and obtained certificates to
appeal to this Court and that is how the matter has come up
before us.
We shall first take up the case under s. 397 of the Act and
C proceed on the assumption that a case has been made out to
wind-up the Company on just and equitable grounds. This is
a new provision which came for the first time in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 ass. 153-C. That section was based on s. 210
of the English Companies Act, 1948, which was introduced therein
for the first time. The purpose of introducing s. 210 in the
D English Companies Act was to give an alternative remedy to
winding up in case of mismanagement or oppression. The law
always provided for winding up, in case it was just and equitable
to wind up a company. However, it was being felt for sometime
that though it might be just and equitable in view of the manner
E in which the affairs of a company were conducted to wind it up,
it was not fair that the company should always be wound up for
that reason, particularly when it was otherwise solvent. That is
why s. 210 was introduced in the English Act to provide an
alternative remedy where it was felt that though a case had been
made out on the ground of just and equitable cause to wind up
F a company, it was not in the interest of the shareholders that the
company should be wound up and that it would be better if the
company was allowed to continue under such directions as the
court may consider proper to give. That is the genesis of the
introduction of s. 153-C in the 1913-Act and s. 397 in the Act.
G
Section 397 reads thus :-
H
L4Sup./6 -
.• , -
"Application to Court for relief in cases of oppress11in-(1) Any members of a company whQ complain
that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a
mallner oppressive to any member or members (including any one or more of themselves) may apply to the
Court for an order under this section, provided such
members have a right so to apply in virtue of section
399.
734
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
A
(2) If, on any application under sub-section (1),
the Court is of opinion( a) that the company affairs are being conducted
in a manner oppressive to any member or members; and
(b) that to wind up the company would unfairly
prejudice such member or members, but that otherwise
B
the facts would justify the making of a winding up
order on the ground that it was just and equitable that
the company should be wound up;
the Court may, with a view to bringing to an end
the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks
c
fit."
It gives a right to members of a company who comply with the
conditions of s. 399 to apply to the court for relief under s. 402
of the Act or such other reliefs as may be suitable in the circumstances of the case, if the affairs of a company are being conducted
in a manner oppressive to any member or members including any
one or more of those applying. The court then has power to D
make such orders under s. 397 read with s. 402 as it thinks fit,
if it com~s to the conclusion that the affairs of the company are
being conducted in a manner oppressive to any member or members and that wind up the company would unfairly prejudice such
member or members, but that otherwise the facts might justify E
the making of a winding up order on the ground that it was just
and equitable that the company should be wound up. The law
however has not defined what is oppression for purposes of this
section, and it is left to courts to decide on the facts of each case
whether there is such oppression as calls for action under this
section.F
We may in this connection refer to four cases where the new
s. 210 of the English Act came up for consideration, namely, (1)
Elder v. Elder and Watson,('), (2) George Meyer v. Scottish
Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd.('), (3) Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer and another(•), which was an
appeal from Meyer's case('), and (4) Re. H. R. Harmer G
Limited('). Among the important considerations which,. have
to be kept in view in determining the scope of s. 210, the following matters were stressed in Eider's case(') as summarised at p.
394 in Meyer's case(') : " (l) The oppression of which a petitioner complains
H
must relate to the manner in which the affairs of the
(I) (1952) s. c. 49:
(3) (19581 3 All. E.R. 66:
(2) (19541 s. c. 381:
(4) (19581 3 All. E.R. 689.
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, 1.)
A
D
E
F
735
company concerned are being conducted; and the conduct complained of must be such as to oppress a minority
of the members (including the petitioners) qua shareholders.
(2) It follows that the oppression complained of
must be shown to be brought about by a majority of
members exercising as shareholders a predominant
voting power in the conduct of the company's affairs.
( 3) Although the facts relied on by the petitioner
may appear to furnish grounds for the making of a
winding up order under the 'just and equitable' rules,
those facts must be relevant to disclose also that the
making of a winding up order would unfairly prejudice
the minority members qua shareholders.
( 4) Although the word 'oppressive' is not defined,
it is possible, by way of illustration, to figure a situation
in which majority shareholders, by an abuse of their predominant voting power, are 'treating the company and
its aff'llrs as if they were their own property' to
the pre111dice of the minority shareholders--and
in which just and equitable grounds would exist for the
making of a winding up order. . . . but in which the
'alternative' remedy provided by s. 210 by way of an
appropriate order might well be open to the minority
shareholders with a view to bringing to an end the oppressive conduct of the majority.
( 5) The power conferred on the Court to grant a
remedy in an appropriate case appears to envisage a
reasonably wide discretion vested in the Court in relation
to the or<ler sought by ·a complainer as the appropriate
equitable alternative to a winding-up order."
Meyer's case was between a parent company and a subsidiary
company and it was held that "(1) when a subsidiary company
G is formed with an independent minority of shareholders, the
parent company must, if engaged in the same class of business,
conduct the affairs of the subsidiary, even though these are in a
sense its own, in such a way as to deal fairly with the subsidiary;
(2) that, if the parent company deliberately pursues a course
calculated to destroy its subsidiary, with resulting loss to the
H minority shareholders, this may amount to oppression within the
meaning of sec. 210;' (3) that the conduct of a majority shareholder may amount to oppression notwithstanding the fact that
IASup./65-
736
SUPREME
COURT
REPOllTS
[1965) 2 S.C.R.
his own shares depreciate in value pro rata with those of the
minority; and ( 4) that, even if the majority shareholder has
A
virtually destroyed the substratum of the company by his oppreesive conduct and it is conceded by all parties to be just and equitable that the company be wound up, the oppressed minority may
nevertheless be entitled to a remedy under sec. 210."
B
These observations were approved by the House of Lords in
appeal and it was held that "whenever a subsidiary is formed as
in this case with an independent minority of shareholders, the
parent company must, if it is engaged in the same class of business, accept as a result of having formed such a subsidiary an
obligation so to conduct what are in a sense its own affairs as to C
deal fairly with the subsidiary."
In Harmer's cal'e( 1 ), it was held that "the word 'oppressive'
meant burdensome, harsh and wrongful". It was also held that
"the section does not purport to apply to every case in which the
facts would justify the making of a winding up order under the D
'just and equitable' rule, but only to those cases of that character
which have in them the requisite element of oppression". It was
also held that "the result of applications under s. 210 in differe~t
cases must depend on the particular facts of each case, the circumstances in which oppression may arise being so infii:titely various that it is impossible to define them with precision". The circum- E
stances must be such as to warrant the inference that "there had
been, at least, an unfair abuse of powers and an impairment of
confidence in the _probity with which the company's affairs are
being conducted, as distinguished from mere resentment on the
part of a minority at being outvoted on some issue of domestic
policy". The phrase "oppressive to some part of the members" F
suggests that the conduct complained of "should at the lowest
involve a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and
a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.
. . . But, apart from this, the question of absence of mutual
confidence per se between partners or between two sets of G
shareholders, however relevant to a winding up seems to have
no direct relevance to the remedy granted by s. 210. It is oppression of some part of the shareholders by the manner in which
the affairs of the company are being conducted that must be
averred and proved. Mere loss of confidence or pure deadlock
does not come within s. 210. It is not lack of confidence between H
shareholders per se that brings s. 210 into play, but lack of confi(1) (1958] 3 All. E.R. 689.
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wancl100, J.)
737
A dence 5pringine from oppression of a minority by a majority in the
management of the company's affairs, and oppression involves at
least an element of lack of probity or fair dealing to a member in
the matter of his proprietary rights as a shareholder."
These observations from the four cases referred to above apply
• to s. 397 also which is almost in the same words as s. 210 of the
English Act, 11nd the question in each case is whether the conduct
of the affairs of a company by the majority shareholders was oppressive to the minority shareholders and that depends upon the
facts proved in a particular case. As has already been indicated,
it is riot enough to show that there is just and equitable cause for
c winding up the company, though that must be shown as preliminary to the application of s. 397. It must further be shown that the
conduct of the majority shareholders was oppressive to the minority as members and this requires that events have to be considered
not in isolation but as a part of a consecutive story. There must
be continuous acts on the part of the majority shareholders, conn tinuing up to the date of petition, showing that the affairs of the
company were being conducted in a manner oppressive to some
part of the members. The conduct must be burdensome, harsh and
wrongful and mere lack of confidence between the majority shareholder~ and the minority shareholders would not be enough unless
the lack of confidence springs from oppression of a minority by
E
a majority in the management of the company's affairs, and such
oppression must involve at least an element of lack of probity or
fair dealing to a member in the matter of his proprietary rights as
a shareholder. It is in the light of these principles that we have
to consider the facts in this case with reference to s. 397.
F
The main plank of the appellant's case to prove oppression is
the agreement of July 27, 1954 between himself and Patnaik and
LoganaLan. At that time he was not a member of the Company. It is not disputed that the Company was not a party to
that agreement and is thus strictly speaking not bound by its
terms. But even apart from this strict legal aspect of the matter,
G let us see what exactly the agreement provides. At that time
Patnaik and Loganathan groups held shares of the value of Rs. 21
lacs in the Company, and the main provision of the agreement is
that the share capital would be increased and the appellant would
be given shares of the face value of Rs. 10,50,000 so that his.
holding should be equal to the holdings of the other two groups.
H It also provides that the three groups would have an equal number of representatives on the Board of Directors and the appellant
would be its Chairman. Other provisions of the agreement refer
738
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
to matters of detail to which it is unnecessary to refer. It will be A
seen, however, that there is no provision in the agreement as to
what would happen if and when the share capital was actually
increased beyond the increase envisaged at the time of the agreement. There is also no provision in the agreement to the effect
that the Articles of Association of the private company as it then
was would be amended suitably to bring the provisions of the B
.agreement with respect to shareholding and the Board of Directors
into line with the agreement. Thus there is nothing in the agreement about the future in the matter of allotment of shares in case
capital was actually increased thereafter. In this connection our
attention is drawn to the fifth term of the agreement which is in c
these terms :~
"Ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 4 lacs held
by the French company (Rs. 3,75,000) and Mr. Rath
(Rs. 25,000) will continue to be held by them as heretofore, and none of the parties hereto will have any
interest therein so that the shareholding in the Company
of all the three parties hereto will remain equal and in
the same proportion."
D
It is urged that this term shows that the intention was that the
shareholding of the three groups would remain equal for ever. We
.are not prepared to read this implication in this term. It was E
easy to provide in the agreement that whenever capital was actually
increased, it would be divided equaily between the three parties
thereto. In the absence of such a provision we do not think that
the fifth term is capable of the interpretation which js put on it
on behalf of the appellant. It only deals with the shares worth
Rs. 4 lacs held by the other two persons and provides that besides F
those shareholdings capital shares would be held equally by the
three parties. Therefore as we read the agreement we cannot
come to the conclusion that it provides that if in future there was
an actual increase in capital that will necessarily be shared equally
by the three parties.
G
However, it is said that the conduct of the three parties later
on shows that when there was actual increase of capital to Rs. 61
lacs sometime after July 1954, this increase was shared equally
by the three parties and further when Mr. Rath sold his holdings
in the Company they were purchased equally by the three parties
so much so one odd share out of 250 shares was held by the
three parties jointly. This is undoubtedly so, and does give some
colour to the argument that the three parties concerned in the
H
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, I.)
739'
A agreement intended that their shareholdings should remain equal
even later. But this intention cannot be said to bind the Company, muchless so when the Company was not bound strictly
speaking even by the express terms of the agreement. So far as
the Company is concerned, it was free to dispose of shares as the
directors or the shareholders in general meeting considered proper
B without regard to this agreement.
Another element came into the picture in January 1957 when
the Company was converted into a public limited company. It
is obvious that a public limited company was even much less bound
by the agreement of July 1954 as compared to the private come pany. We have already pointed out that even when the Company
was private its Articles of Association were not amended to bring
them into line with the agreement and that shows that the agreement was only between two groups of shareholders and Jain with
respect to the state of affairs as it was at the time of the agreement.
When the Company became a public limited company and it was
D decided to issue new shares of the value of Rs. 39 lacs the question
of allotment of these shares arose. By then some differences had
developed between the three groups. The appellant wanted the
shares to be allotted to the existing shareholders while the Patnaik:
and Loganathan groups wanted the matter to be decided by a
general meeting as evidenced by what happened in the meeting of
B the Board of Directors dated March l, 1958. It appears that the
decision to issue new shares was taken sometime in 1956 when the
Company was a private company. At that time the authorised
capital was rupees one crore. though only Rs. 61 lacs had been
issued. The fresh issue of Rs. 39 lacs worth of shares was thus
intended to bring the subscribed capital up to the limit of the autho1' rised capital. The application to the Controller of Capital Issues
was made for that purpose on September 17, 1956. At that time
the intention was that the issue would be private and would be
made to the existing shareholders, directors and/ or their nominees.
This was bound to be so as the Company was then private. As,
G however, the Company wanted a loan from the Industrial Finance
Corporation and as that Corporation would only grant loans to a
public company, the Company was converted into a public company, as already indicated, in January 1957.
The contention of the appellant, however, is that when the
share capital was decided to be increased by fresh issue within the
H limit of rupees one crore, regulation 42 of the First Schedule to
the 1913 Act was in force and that regulation required that
direction to the contrary as to allotment of shares should be given
740
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
by the resolution sanctioning increase of share capital. This was
however not done at the time when the authorised share capital
was decided to be increased in 1954 and consequently the new
shares had to be allotted to the existing shareholders under regulation 42. At that time, however, the Company was private and
the shares had to be issued to the existing shareholders and no
question of any direction to the contrary arose if the Company
was to retain it~ private character. The sanction of the Controller of Capital Issues came in December 1957 when the Company
hlld become a public limited company, and the question of allotment arose thereafter. Bv that time the Act (i.e. the 1956 Act)
had been passed and regmation 42 of the First Schedule to the
1913 Act was no longer in force. Instead it had bee1. replaced
by s. 81 of the Act, which provides that ''where at any time subsoquent to the first allotment of shares in a company, it is proposed
to increase the subscribed capital of the company, by the issue of
new shares, then, subject to any direction to the contrary which
may be given by the company in general meeting and subject only
to those directions, such new shares shall be offered to the persons
who at the time of the offer are holders of equity shares of. the
company, in proportion as nearly as circumstances admit, to the
capital paid up on those shares at that time". Further sub-s. (3)
of s. 81 provides that the section shall not apply.to a private company. Thus s. 81 specifically applies to public companies only
and comes into play when subscribed capital (as distinct from
authorised capital) has to be increased. Therefore when the
question of actually issuing new shares arose after the sanction of
the Controller, regulation 42 was no longer in force as it had been
repealed, and action had to be taken in accordance with s. 81 of
the Act. Section 81 does not require that. direction to the contrary must be given by the resolution sanctioning the increase of
share capital as under regulation 42 of the.· First Schedule to the
1913 Act. Consequently it was open to the public company in
1958 when it proposed to increase the subscribed capital after the
sanction of the Controller to act under s. · 81 and this was what
was done by the resolution of March 28', 1958 at the general
meeting. The general meeting decided that new shares should
not be issued to the existing shareholders but should be. issued to
others privately. The resolution of March 29, 1958 was in
accordance with the law as it stood when it was passed and cannot
be said to be vitiated in any way.
It is however urged that the notice for the general meeting of
the 29th March, 1958 was not in accordance with s. 173, and so
A
B
c
D
E
'f
G
H
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, /.)
741
the proceedings of the meeting must be held to be bad. This
objection was however not taken in the petition and we have
therefore not pcnnitted the appellant to raise it before us, as it 15
a mixed question of fact and law. We may add that, though the
objection was not taken in the petition, it seems to have been
B urged before the appeal court. Das J. bas dealt with it at length
and we would have agreed with him if we had permitted the question to be raised. This attack on the validity of what happened
on March 29, 1958 must thus fail.
A
C
D
E
F
G
H
We have already said that the public company which came
into existence in 1957 was not bound by the agreement of 1954
and could offer shares to such persons as it decided to do in
general meeting in accordance with s. 81. The mere fact that in
the meeting of March 29, 1958 it was decided to offer shares to
others and not to the existing shareholders would not therefore
necessarily mean oppression of the minority shareholders. The
majority shareholders were not bound to accept the view of the
minority shareholders that new shares should be allotted only to
the existing shareholders. It also appears that the Patnaik group
wli afraid at the time when the new shares were being issued that
as they had no money the appellant group would take up the entire
new issue and would thus obtain majority control of the Company. This they wanted to avoid and that is why the new issue
was resolved in general meeting to be issued to others and not to
the existing shareholders. If this was the reason why new shares
were not issued to the existing shareholders it can hardly be said
that the action of the majority shareholders in passing the resolution which they did on March 29, 1958 was oppressive to the
minority shareholders. The matter would have been different if
the seven persons to whom shares were eventually allotted in July
1958 were benamidars or stooges of the Patnaik or Loganathan
group, for in that case it may be said that these two groups forming the majority in the general meeting had acted fraudulently and
unfairly by depriving the appellant of what he would have got
under s. 81. But there can be no doubt that the seven persons
to whom the shares were eventually allotted are respectable persons of independent means. There is nothing to show that they
were stooges or benamindars of· the Patnaik and Loganathan
grcups. The action of the majority shareholders in a !lotting the
new shares to outsiders and not to the existing shareholders cannot
therefore in the circumstances be said to be oppfCl\,5ive of the
appellant and his group.
742
SUPREME
COUJ.T
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
It is true that by the beginning of 1958 there were differences .It.
between the appellant and the Patnaik and Loganathan groups
and there was loss of confidence between them. But mere loss of
confidence between these groups of shareholders would not come
within s. 397 unless it be shown that this lack of confidence sprang
from a desire to oppress the minority in the management of the
Company's afiairs and that there was at least an element of lack B
of probity and fair dealing to a member in the matter of his proprietary right as a shareholder. It cannot be said on the facts on
record of this case that there was any lack of probity or fair dealing towards the appellant in the matter of his proprietary right as
a shareholder. It is true that he did not get any part of the new c
issue; but equally the Patnaik and Loganathan groups also did
not get any part of it, for there is no doubt that the persons to
whom the shares were allotted eventually in July 1958 were not
benamidars or stooges of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups. If
the new allottees were benamidars or stooges of the Loganathan
and Patnaik groups there might have been lack of probity or fair I>
dealing in allotting the shares to them. Further the allotment of
shares even at par did not in our opinion seriously affect the proprietary rights of the appellant as a shareholder. It is urged that
the issue of new shares at par to others would depress the value of
the existing shares. But the evidence shows that by 1958 the
Company which had gone into production in 1955 was mak.Tng J:
profits and there is no reason to suppose that the same rate of
profit would not have continued with the expansion envisaged by
the increase in share capital. Besides, as the shares of the Company were not quoted on the Stock Exchange, it is impossible to
say what impact the issue of new shares had on tbe value of the
existing shares and whether the value of existing shares was de- F
pressed, if at all, by the issue of new shares. It is not a case
where new shares were issued as bonus, for the issue of bonus
shares does necessarily affect the value of existing shares. But
these were issued on payment of ca8h for the purpose of expansion. In the circumstances we cannot neces~arily infer that the G
value of the existing shares would have been seriously affected by
the issue of new shares at par. So it cannot be said that this was
done in order to afiect the proprietary rights of the appellant as a
shareholder. The issue of new shares which was done in March
and July 1958 cannot therefore in our opinion amount to oppression of the appellant as a minority shareholder.
H
It is however urged that the haste with which the new shares
were issued on July 30, 1958 shows a design to harm the appel-
'"""'': <-::-'
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, J.)
743
A !ant as a minority shareholder. It is no doubt true that the shares
the
were issued in haste. But as we have already indicated,
Company was in need of money for expansion and its getting the
loan from the Industrial Finance Corporation also depended upon
the increase of subscribed share capital. . Therefore, the haste
with which the shares were allotted on July 30, 1958 cannot really
B be said to be a part of a design to oppress the minority. The
haste became necessary because the interim injunction was vacated
on that day and it was felt that if immediate action was not taken
and the new shares allotted, there might be further injunction
which would further delay the issue of shares and getting the
C loan from the Industrial Finance Corporation. The haste therefore appears to have occurred because of the action taken by the
appellant in bringing a suit and getting a temporary injunction. It
was feared that even after the vacation of the temporary injunction
the appellant would go in appeal and get another injunction from
the appeal court. This fear was justified because the Subordinate
D Judge's court two hours later withheld the operation of its order
vacating the temporary injunction. The haste in the particular
circumstances of the case in allotment of shares cannot therefore
lead to any inference of oppression but arose out of circumstancc5
brought about by the appellant's conduct.
But it is urged that even though the Company was in urgent
E need of money it accepted only 5 per centum with the application
and 10 per centum on allotment and that the remainder of the
money did not come for a long time. Again it is true that the
remainder of the money did not come for sometime. It also
appears that out of the seven persons who had applied to take
F shares six had to take loans from the Central Bank of India
Limited to pay up the remainder of the money and that a part of
the new capital (i.e. Rs. 7,65,000) was not received even till
the time when the application under s. 397 was made. But that
again in our opinion does not necessarily lead to the inference
that there was oppression by the majority shareholders of the
G appellant, once it is held that the seven persons to whom the new
shares were allotted were not stooges or benamidars of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups. There might be reasons why those
persons were not in a position to pay the entire money at once
and therefore borrowed money from the Bank to make up the
full amount of the shares taken by them. Further it appears that
H there was a fight between the appellant group on the one side and
the Patnaik and Loganathan groups on the other for the control
of the Company. If the fear of Patnaik was correct that the
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R
appcllant would have purchased all the shares worth Rs. 39 lacs A
for want of money on the pan of Patnaik and Loganathan groups
and would thus have obtained a dominating position in the Company, the action of the majority shareholders in preventing such
domination by one group only and taking action for that purpose
cannot in the circumstances be said to be oppressive of the
minority shareholders. It is well to remember that if the appellant JI
had got the entire new issue of Rs. 39 lacs because of the inability
of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups to take up their two-thirds
shares, the majority control would have vested in one group. But
the action of the majority shareholders in issuing new shares to
others and not to the existing shareholders has brought about a c
position where, after the issue of new shares even the Patnaik and
Loganathan groups have no longer a majority and they have to
carry tbe holders of the new shares with tbem in order to carry on
the work of the Company. The new holders are not the stooges
and benamidars of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups and therefore after the action taken in March and July 1958 the Company D
cannot be said to be dominated by any group but has become
more broad-based as a public company should really be. The
fact that the Patnaik and Loganathan groups may be able to get
the support of the holders of new shares doe> not necessarily mean
oppression of the appellant, for the new shareholders may support
the Loganathan and Patnaik groups on the ground that such sup- E
port would be for the benefit of the Company.
Finally it is urged that the whole object of the Patnaik and
Loganathan groups was to get control over 75 per centum of
shares of the Company, for a voting strength of 75 per centum l
is required to pass a special resolution without wl:iich complete
control of a company is impossible. Therefore it is said that
Loganathan and Patnaik groups so manoeuvred the affairs t~at
they should be able to get over 75 per centum of the ~o.ang
strength. It is urged that if the new shares had been d1V1ded
equally between the three groups the Patnaik and Loganathan G
groups would not have been able to control over 75 per centum
shares. This argument again would have some force if the new
shares had been allotted to stooges and benamidars of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups. But as the shareholdings stand,
after the action of March and July 1958, the position is that
roughly Patnaik and Loganathan groups between themselves have ff
got shares worth Rs. 38 lacs, the appellant has got shares worth
Rs. 19 lacs and shares worth Rs. 39 lacs are held by the new
s. P• .JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, J.)
A
JI
c
745
a.llottees and shares worth about Rs. 4 lacs by the French company. So unless the Patnaik and Loganathan groups are able to
persuade the new a.llottees always t.o vote with them they would
not be in control of over 75 per centum of shares. The argument
that all this was done to give the Patnaik and Loganathan groups
control over 7 5 per centum of shares in the Company does not
therefore .appear to be well-founded when we remember that the
new allottees are not stooges or benamidars of these two groups.
The fact that the shares were issued presumably to the friends of
Patnaik and Loganathan groups is hardly of any ·significance in
the matter of oppression, for if shares are issued privately they
are bound to go to friends of the direct.ors.
The case 'of oppression therefore based on the agreement of
July 1954 as the sheet-anchor of the appellant's case must fail. In
the first place that agreement was strictly speaking not binding
even on the private company-it was muchless binding on the
public company when it came into existence in 1957. The agrecD ment did not contain any specific provision as to future issue of
capital. Further at the time when the agreement took place the
appellant was not even a member of the private company and it
was really an agreement between a non-member and two members
of the Company, which would go to show that the agreement
E could in no circumstances bind the Company. It is true that for
sometime the agreement was in the main carried out when the
capital was actually increased up t.o Rs. 61 lacs, the appellant
getting one-third of it barring the French company's share3.
When, however, the Company was made into a public company,
some of the terms of the agreement could not be put even in the
F Articles of Association ·of the public company. But it is said that
if the Patnaik and Loganathan groups had behaved like hqnourable men, the agreement could still have been carried out after the
Company became a public company and that these two groups
did not behave honourably when they gave the go-by to the agreement completely. There is some force in the contention that
G Loganathan and Patnaik groups, when they were· in need of the
appellant, took his help; it also docs appear that when the Company had turned the comer and it was felt that the apoellant's help
was not absolutely necessary, these two groups thought it unneceiaary to carry out lhe spirit of the agreement (though not the terms
for the terms had nothing to do with the future increase of capital
H and its distribution).. But can it be said that the conduct of the
affairs of the Company was carried on oppressively merely.
because these two groups which in March and July 1958 were in
746
SUPREME
COURT
llEPOllTS
[1965] 2 S.C.ll.
majority did not carry out the spirit of the agreement? We have A.
given anxious consideration to this aspect of the matter and we feel
that, though the Patnaik and Loganathan groups did take advantage of the help given by the appellant when the Complll)y was
in a difficult situation. the fact that when new issue was made on
behalf of the public company, they decided to make it more broadba..00 and issue the shares to others and not to the existing share- B
holders, cannot be said to be oppressive of the then minority
shareholders, namely, the appellant's group. We have already
pointed out that it cannot be said to have been proved in this case
that the appellant suffered in his proprietary rights as a shareholder and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the action C
taken in March and July 1958 in the allotment of the new shares
amounted to such oppression of the appellant as would justify an
order under s. 397.
Reference then may be made to the proposed increase of
shares for which a meeting was called on September 21, 1960
and which gave further cause to the appellant to move the appli- D
cation which he did on September 14, 1960. In that meeting it
was proposed to increase the share capital by rupees two crores,
one crore of which was to be in equity shares and the other crore
in preference shares. It is said that this was part of the design to
fur.her reduce the shareholdings of the appellant in the Company E
so that he may be driven out of it, for after the issue of the new
proposed capital the appellant's holding of equity shares would be
hardly 10 per centum of the entire equity capital. In the first
place, as the meeting of September 21, 1960 was never held because of the injunction obtained by the appellant, we cannot say
how the new shares would have been issued and whether they F
would have been offered to the public for subscription to make the
Company even more broad-based than it was then. If that was
the intention that could hardly be called oppression of the appellant. Apart from that we fail to see why the appellant should
be driven out of the Company and should be compelled to sell his
shares simply because his proportion of equity capital is only 10 G
per centum of the entire equity capital, for it is not in dispute that
the Company is doing well and the appellant will get his dividends
as any other shareholder. But if the appellant means that it is
not worth his while to invest his money in a company in which
he is unable to have; an important-if not a controlling-voice,
this shows that the real basis for the application in the present H
case was not the oppression of the appellant as a minority 'hareholder but the feeling that the appellant who hoped to get control
s. P. JAIN V. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, J.)
747
A of 'the Company had been thwarted by what took place in March
and July 1958. If that is the real position, then it cannot be
said that the Loganathan and Patnaik: groups acted with lack: of
probity or fair dealing in thwarting the desire of the appellant to
get control of the Company; nor can such conduct be said to
be oppressive of a minority shareholder. The case of the appelB !ant based on the agreement of July 27, 1954 therefore must fail
and it must be held that even if that agreement was not carried
out by the Company, which was not bound by it, there can be
no case of oppression of the appellant.
We now come to the case under s. 398. It provides that any
C members of a company who have rights to apply in virtue of s. 399
may complain (i) that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company, or
(ii) that a material change has taken place in the management or
control of the company and that by reason of such change, it is
likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted in a manner
D prejudicial to the interests of the company. On such application
being made, if the court is of opinion that the affairs of the company are being conducted as aforesaid or that by reason of any
material change as aforesaid in the matter of management or
control of a company, it is likely that the affairs of the company
will be conducted as aforesaid, the court may, with a view to
E bringing to an end or preventing the matters complained of or
apprehended, make such order as it thinks fit. This section only
comes into play as the marginal note shows, when there is actual
mismanagement or apprehension of mismanagement of the
affairs of the company. It may be contrasted with s. 397
F which deals with oppression to the minority shareholders, whether
there is prejudice to the company or not. In the present case,
the appellant relies on the following three circumstances to show
that the affairs of the Company were being conducted in a manner
prejudicial to its interests, namelyG
H
( i) that when the new shares worth Rs. 39 lacs
were issued in July 1958 only a small part of the sharemoney was received in the beginning;
(ii) that the Patnaik and Loganathan groups removed
Rs. 7 lacs from the coffers of the Company;
(iii) that the Company lost the_ support of the
appellant.
It is true that when new shares of the value of Rs. 39 lacs were
issued, the Company received only 15 per centum of the share
748
SUPREME
comT
REPOJlTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
money to begin with, namely, 5 per centum with the application
and 10 per centum on allotment. But the evidence shows that
though there was some delay in the receipt of 85 per centum of
share money, shares worth Rs. 30 lacs were fully paid up in the
financial year 1959-60, and the only amount outstanding in that
year was Rs. 7,65,000 (i.e. 85 per centum of shares worth Rs. 9
lacs). The slight delay in the payment of the full value of the
shares cannot therefore in the circumstances be said to be so
prejudicial to the interests of the Company as to call for any action
under s. 3 98 of the Act.
As to the removal of Rs: 7 lacs from the coffers of the Company by the Loganathan and Patnaik groups, it does not appear
from the application of the appellant that his complaint was that
this sum was wrongfully removed by the two groups and there was
any fraud with respect to its removal. The real complaint of the
appellant in this connection appears to have been that he was
entitled to one-third of this amount of Rs. 7 lacs under the agreement, and his share of this amount was not given to him. This
on
appears from a letter written by the appellant to Patnaik
October 16, 1957 in which he asked that he should be paid his
one-third share of this sum of Rs. 7 lacs with interest. It is not
in dispute that the sum of Rs. 7 lacs was due from the Company
to the Kalinga Industrial Development Corporation Limited and
therefore the withdrawal of this amount from the Company by
the Patnaik and Loganathan groups which controlled the
Kalinga Industrial Development Corporation which was the
managing agent of the Company before July 1954 cannot be said
to amount to conducting the affairs of the Company prejudicially
to its interests, whatever may be the rights of the appellant in the
matter of getting one-third of this amount from the Loganathan
and Patnaik groups. If he has any right under the agreement of
July 27, 1954 in this matter he can enforce it in such way as
may be open to him; but it cannot be said in the circumstances
that this withdrawal from the Company was in any way prejudicial
to the affairs of the Company, when it is clear that the Comp2ny
owed the amount to the fonner managing agent.
The last point that has been urged in this connection is that
the Company lost the support of the appellant in view ·of the
action taken by the Patnaik and Loganathan grouns in March
and July 1958. Here again it is true that the appellant was dissatisfied with what had happened in March a:nd July 1958 with
regard to the allotJllent of shares worth Rs. 39 lacs and withdrew
his support from the Company. If the Company was able to
A
B
C
D
E
p
G
H
s. P. JAIN v. KALINGA TUBES (Wanchoo, I.)
749'
A carry on without this support as it apparently was in 1958, it cannot be said that the action which resulted in the loss of the appellant's support to the Company was necessarily prejudicial to it,
it may be that the appellant was sore inasmuch as he must have
felt that his assistance w.is taken when the Company was in need
of such assistance; but later the Patnaik and Loganathan groups
B acted in the manner in which they did when they felt that the
appellant's support was no longer necessary to the Company. But
if the appellant's support was no longer necessary to the Company by 1958 the action of the Patnaik and Loganathan groups
which resulted in the loss of such support cannot be said to be
C prejudicial to the interests of the Company. We therefore agree
with the High Court that no case has been made out for action
under s. 3 9 8 on the ground that the affairs of the Company were
being conducted in a manner prejudicial to its interests.
Nor is there·any ground \1r holding that because of the change
which took place in the mam gement after July 1958 it was likely
D that the affairs of the Company would be conducted in a manner
prejudicial to its interests. The change that took place after
July 1958 was that the appellant no longer remained the chairman of the Company and the Fatnaik and Loganathan groups
practically managed the Company without the appellant. But as
E the High Court has pointed out there were no facts before the
court to come to the conclus.ioa. that the change in management
was likely to result in the affairs of the Company being conducted
in a manner prejudicial to its interests. In this
connection
reliance is placed on certain matters which transpired after the
application was filed on September 14, 1960. These matters
F however cannot be taken into account for the application has to
be decided on the basis of the facts as they were when the application was made. Besides, as the High Court has pointed out, it
has not been shown that in view of certain actions taken by the
new management without consulting the appellant, the Company
was landed in any difficulty and loss of profit which would show
G mismanagement of its affairs .
H
. Lastly it was stated in the application that accounts had not
been shown to the appellant and his group and in consequence of
this t11e appellant was not able to give full particulars of the
several acts of fraud, misfeasance· and other irregularities committed by the new management. But as the High Court has
pointed out, the appellant asked for production of certain documents in April 1961 and those documenti; were made availabfo for
inspection by the appellant and were produced in court. It was
750
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965) 2 S.C.R.
for the appellant to take inspection ot those documents if he so
desired and the appeal court was right in pointing out that the
learned Single Judge was not correct in drawing an adverse inference against the Company that it had disobeyed the orders of
the court and had not produced the documents called for and had
given no opportunity to the appellant for their inspection. It
.seems to us that the appeal court was right in this view and no
case has been made out even prima facie for action under this
part of s. 398 of the Act.
The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed with cost~,
.one set of hearing fee.
· Appeals dism;.ncd.
A
B
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org