A. VENKATA SUBBA RAO versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 December 1964 | [1965] 2 S.C.R. 577 | 1964 INSC 288
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 December 1964
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR*, R.S. BACHAWAT
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 101/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1965] 2 S.C.R. 577
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 288
Text of the judgment
577
A. VENKATA SUBBA RAO
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
(With Connected Appeals)
B
c
December 14, 1964
[A. K. SARnll, N. RA.JAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND
R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.)
&1ential Supplle• (Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946)Procuring ag<nts--Appointed for procuring foodgraiM-lf agents of
Government-Profit of procuring agent-Increased by action of Goventment in ••ttl(ng pricu--Obligation of procuring agent to pay ovu lo
Government.
In the years 1947 and 1948 there WS! rice scarcity in certain distridl
in Madras and Government took action under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and passed various Orders for procurement
and distribution. The appellants were appointed procuring agents under
that system. Their duty was to procure rice from specified areas at pricet
D apecificd by the Government and to deliver it to the Government, or to
per10ns nominated or to other licensed purch&!ers. The procurement
price was lower than the selling price and the appellants were entitled to
the difference between the two prices, under a contract entered into between the appellants and the Government. Io July and December 1947
and in November 1948, the Government passed orders increasing the
prcies of sale. On the dates on which those orders came into force, the
appellants had with them stocks of rice procured by them earlier and which
I: they could aell at the higher sale price. Government thought that the
appellants were not entitled to the increased profit derived on the sale ol
111ch stocks at the increased sale price, because the enhancement in the
appellants' profit was entirely due to Government action; and Government
insisted that the excess awns which they deocribed .., "surcharges" lhould
be paid over to the Government by the appellants. The Government
employed three methods for realising the excess amounts. They were
(i) threat of cancellation of the licences, (ii) deduction of the amounts
11 from moneya payable by the Government to the appellants and (iii) in
the case of the incre&!e in November 1948, by requisition of the stock of
rice lying with the appellants on the day immediately preceding the
coming into force of the increased price, at the rate then obtaining, and
releasing the stocks to the appellants upon their paying the surcharae or
executing an agreement to pay it.
G
II
Having paid the amounts under protest, the appellants filed suits for
their recovery. Some of the suits were decreed and others dismissed. On
appaal to the High Court by the aggrieved parties, the High Court decided
all the appeals in favour of the State. In appeal to the Supreme Court,
the appellants contended that the amounts collected by the respondentState were in the nature of an unlawful tax imposed by the executive. The
res~ndeirt sought to support the judgment of the High Court, contending
that (i) the appellants were agent• of the Government and liable to
~unt for the profits; (ii) ihe appellants, if not-agents, stood in a fiduciary capacity to the Government with the obligation to account; (iii)
The Government W8! authorised to issue the direction to pay the sur.chargea to ii; (iv) in those cues where the amounts were realised by re-
578
SUPRBMB
COURT
REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
quisitioning and release, the appellants could not recover because, (a)
the Government had the power to requisition the stock and direct the sale.
and (b) by reason of the agreements to pay, the payments were \"Oluntary;
and (v) some of the suits and claims were barred by limitation.
HELD (Per Ayyangar and Bachawat, JJ) : (i) The appellants w~re
not the agents of the Government and were therefore, not liable to
account to the Government for the profits which they derived over and
above those fixed for them by the relevant notifications of the Government.
[604-EF]
The purchases were made by the appellants out of their own funda;
stored at their own cos~ any deterioration, driage or shortfall fell on them,
and they were the full owners of the paddy procured. The basis' of the
agreement to sell the rice which was with them, at the controlled price, was
that they were the full owners of paddy. Sales-tax was payable by them
on the sales, which would not have been the case if they were merely
holding the foodgrains as commission agents on behalf of the Government;
Further, the licence granted to them referred to the foodgrains in their
possession as their stocks. All that the Government desired and implemented by its several orders was mere regulation and control of the
trade in foodgrains by rendering every activity connected with it in the
ordinary trade channels, subject to licensing and to directions to be
issued. [601 B-F; 602 DJ
B
c
D
(ii) In the circumstances there is no basis for the suggestion of a
fiduciary obligation de hors a principal and agent relationship. [605 FJ
(iii) The direction to pay the amounts was not a direction contem·
plated by the Procurement Scheme, nor was it a direction as regards the
sale, and so, the direction to pay "surcharges" was illegal. [606 H; 607BJ
(iv) If the theory that the appellants WC1'e the agents of the Govern·
ment be discarded as untenable, there would be no legal basis at all for
the "surcharge". It would be then in effect a tax imposed by an executive fiat without any legislative sanction. They were imposed compulsorily by the executive and sought to be collected inter alia by coercive
statutory powers. It could hardly be contended that the payments were
voluntary in the sense understood, and the fact that agreements were taken
would be no defence to the claim for refund. [612 B-DJ
E
r
Attorney General (N.S.W.) v. Homebush Flour Mill• Ltd. 56 C.L.R.
390, Attorney General v. Wills United Dairies, 127 L.T. 822 and Lower
Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy,
Limited, [1933J A.C. 168, referred to.
(v) The period of limitation for a suit for making a claim for recovery of a tax illegally collected is governed by Art. 62 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and as the period of limitation is three years from the date
of the receipt of the money by the respondent, the claims would not be
barred in those cases where the suits in respect of them were filed within
the time specified. [619 B; 621 B, DJ
It is not necessary in order to attract Art. 62, that at the moment
of the receipt, the defendant should have actually intended to receive it
for the use of the plaintiff and it is sufficient if the receiot was in such
circumstances that the law would impute to him an obligation io retain
~-t'J' the use of the plaintiff and refund to him when demanded. [616
G
H
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Sarkar, J.)
A
B
579
Mahomed Wahib v. Mohomed Ameer (1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal, 527,
Rajputana Malwa Railway Cooperative Stores Ltd. v. The Ajmer Municipal Board, (1910) 1.L.R. 32 All, 491, Municipal Council, Dindigul v.
The Bombay Co. Ltd. Madras. (1929) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 207, India Sugar
cl Refinery Ltd. v. The Municipal Council. Hospet. (1920) I.L.R. 43
Mad. 521, The Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Amar Dass. A.I.R.
1953 Punj. 99 and The State of Madras v. A.M.A.A. Abdul Kader, A.I.R.
1953 Mad. 905. approved.
Anantram Bhattacharjee v. Hem Chandra Kar. (1923) I.L.R. SO Cal.
475 and Lingangouda v. Lingandouda. I.L.R. [1953] Bom. 214, disapproved.
c
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Per Sarkar, J : (i) No relationship of principal and agent or of a
llduciary character bad ever come into existence between the appellants
and the Government. Even if the appellants were the Government's
agents the appellants would under the contract be entitled to keep the
larger difference caused by the selling price having been increased after
the procurement. [582 E-F, HJ
(ii) The question of limitation with respect to the claims where the
moneys were collected by Government by methods other than by requisition and release, has to be decided under Art. 62 of the Limitation Act
only. (583 A]
Mahamed Wahib v. Mohomed Ameer. (1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 527,
approved.
E
F
G
(iii) (Dissenting) : Where, as a result of the requisition and release,
Government had obtained moneys from the appellants, the realisation was
legal and did not amount to unauthorised levy of tax, and the appellants
were not entitled to recover the amounts from the Government. In res·
pect of such requisitions and release, where the appellants had not paid
the moneys but entered into engagements to pay, those engagements
would be legal and enforceable. (584 G-H]
Government could requisition the stock of rice in possession of a
procuring agent at the price previously prevailing and have done so, it
could sell the rice so requisitioned back to the same procuring agent at
the price subsequently fixed. The Governrmnt's acts would be perfectly
within its statutory powers and legal, as the appellants were free not to
pay and to obtain or not to obtain the release. [584 B-D]
Attorney General v. ·Wilts United. Dairies, 127 L.T. 822, Attorney
General v. Homebush Flour Mills Ltd. 56 C.L.R. 390 and Lower Main·
land Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy Ltd.
(1933] L.R. A.C. 168. distin11Uished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 101,
131, 168 to 171, 259 to 260, 302 to 303, 306 to 309, 310, ~44
and 837 to 857 of 1962 and 325, 437 to 441 and 996 of 1963.
H
Appeals from the Judgments and Decrees dated 8.3.58
18.2.59, 15.7.58, 22.2.60, 22.8 .. 58, 25.8.58 and 1.7.59 of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suits Nos. 33 and 62 of
580
.nl'lll!Mll COUllT REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
1953, 672 to 675 of 1954, 29 and 30 of 1953, 956 of 1953,
551 of 1954, 201, 45, 822, 823 and 54 of 1953, 470 of 1955,
368, 34, 821, 766, 650, 764, 769, 631, 646, 647, 648, 649, 765
and 892 of 1953, 352, 353, 354 and 346 of 1954, 644, 700 and
701 of 1953 and 321 of 1954 respectively.
K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. As.
168, 169, 171and310 of 1962 and 438 of 1963).
Nos.
101,
A
B
A. V. Viswanatha StLftri, A. R. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam,
for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 131 and 170 of 1962).
T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 259 to
260 of 1962, 325, 437, 349, 440, 441 and 996 of 1963).
c
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 302 and
303 of 1962).
A. V. Viswanatha Srutri and T. V. R. Tatachari, for
appellants (in C.A. Nos. 306 to 309 of 1962).
the
D
Lakshmi Devi and T. Satyailarayana, for the appellants (in
C.A. No. 644 of 1962).
A. V. Viswanatha StLffri, N. R. Rao and B. Parthruarathy, for
the appellants (in C.A. No. 837 to 857 of 1962>.
E
C. B. Agarwala, R. Ganapathy Iyer and B. R. G. K. Achar,
for the respondents (in C.A. No. 306 to 309 and 837 to 857 of
1962).
F
R. Ganapathy Iyer, Yogeshwar PrtLfad and B. R. G. K. Achar,
for the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 101, 131, 168 to 171, 259260, 302 and 303, 310 and 644 of 1962 and 325, 437 to 441
and 996 of 1963).
Sarkar J. delivered a separate Opinion. The Judgment of
Rajagopala Ayyangar and Bachawat JJ was delivered by Ayyangar J.
Sarkar, J. These appeals arise out of suits filed for recovery
of money from the Government. The appellants were the plainti1fs and the respondent in each appeal is a State, the defendant
in the suits.
G
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Sarkar, I.)
581
In the years 1947 and 1948 there was rice scarcity in certain
distincts in Madras as it was then constituted. These districts
are now in Andhra Pradesh. The Government of Madras took
action under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
1946 and passed various orders for the procurement and distri·
bution of rice. Rice thereafter could be procured only by the
B Government or by the procuring agents appointed by it and disposed of according to the orders of the Government. Under these
orders licensed wholesalers and retailers were also appointed.
The appellants were procuring agents and wholesalers under this
system. They entered into various agreements with the Government for the purpose. Their duty was to procure rice from specie fied areas at prices specified by the Government from time to
time and to deliver it at prices so specified, to the Government or
to persons nominated by it or to other licensed purchasers. The
procurement price was in each case lower than the selling price
and the procuring agents were under the contract entitled to the
D difference between the two prices.
A
During the period with which we are concerned, three
successive orders were made by the Government specifying the
prices and in each case there was an increase. The first increase
in prices took effect on July 27, 1947, the second on or about
E December 6, 1947 and the third on November 21, 1948. On
the dates on which each of these orders came into force, each
appellant had lying with him in stock certain quantity of rice.
This had been procured by the agents earlier and therefore at the
then prevailing lower purchase price. The appellants had to sell
this rice at the new increased price and hence became autoF matically entitled to a larger sum than they were before the
increase. The enhancement of the procuring agents' profit was
entirely due to the Government action in increasing the prices
and the Government thought that they were not entitled to it and
insisted that the excess sums should be paid to it by them. The
appellants paid these moneys to the Government under protest
G and it is for the recovery of the moneys so paid that, broadly
speaking, the suits were filed.
Now various methods had been employed by the Government
for realising these excess amounts which have been described in
these proceeding as 'surcharges'. Thus in some cases the proH curing agents or wholesalers refusing to pay were threatened with
cancellation of their licences and to avoid this they made the
payments. In other cases, these surcharges were deducted from
582
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
moneys payable by the Government to them for rice supplied by A
them. The third method which concerned the increase made in
November 1948 was to requisition the stock of rice lying with
the procuring agents on the day immediately preceding the com·
ing into force of the increased price at the rate then obtaining
and thereafter releasing such rice to the procuring agents only
upon their paying the surcharge or on their executing an agree- B
ment to pay the same.
It is clear that if the Government was not entitled to the
amount of the surcharge, it could not retain the moneys paid by
the appellants to it on that account. The principal question is,
Was the Government entitled to those moneys ? In regard to the
moneys collected cxc~pt by the method of requisition and release,
the Government's contrn<ion was that the appellants were its
agents and that being so, any excess amount which was coming
to them as a remit of the . orders was profit made by them in
connection with the business of the agency for which they were
liable to account to the Government. It was also said that if the
appellants were not the Government's agents strictly speaking,
they at least stood in a fiduciary relationship to it which made
them liabl0 to account for the extra profit. My learned brother
Ayyangar has dealt with this question and there is nothing that
I have to add to that. I am in full agreement with his view that
no relationship of principal and agent or of a fiduciary character
had eve.r come into existence between the appellants and the
Government. I wish, however, to observe that I do not see how,
even if the appellants were the Government's agents, Government was entitled to the extra profit. Admittedly under the
contract between a procuring agent and the Government, even
if that contract was of agency, the procuring agent was to
procure and sell rice at the prices fixed and prevailing at the
time respectively of the procurement and sale. It is not disputed
that the difference belonged to him. It was in fact said that was
the commission to which he was entitled under the contract as an
agent. If this is so, the procuring agent would under the contract
be entitled to keep the larger difference caused by the selling price
having been increased after his procurement. Hence it seems to
me that under the contract, irrespective of whatever kind it was,
the difference. even though it became larger, belonged to the
proc\iring agent and the Government had no right to it.
/Another question that arises in these appeals in regard to the
moneys collected by the methods other than requisition and
C
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A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Sarkar, /.)
583
A releases is whether the claims of the appellants for the refund
were not barred. I agree with my brother Ayyangar that Art. 62
of the Limitation Act governed the case· and the claims were not
barred if the suits in respect of them were filed within the time
there specified. With regard to the meaning of the words
"Money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff's use" in that
B article, I think, as Ayyangar J. pointed out, the correct view was
taken in Mahomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer( 1 ). The suits in
which the claims arose in circumstances other than those described
hereafter the question on limitation has to be decided under Art·
62 only. I do not feel called upon on the present occasion to
C decide to what other cases, if any, Art. 62 might apply.
D
E
p
G
H
It remains to deal with the amounts realised by the method
of requisitioning the rice in stock and releasing k It was contended on behalf of the appellants that this was really taxation by
executive fiat and was therefore an illegal leyy of tax. I am
unable to accept this contention. Support for it was sought by
the appellants from Attorney-Genera/ v. Wilts United Dairies(').
It does not seem to me that that case furnishes any basis for the
contention. There the Ministry of Food Production had granted
a licence to a trader to buy milk on payment of a certain charge
and it was held that the charge could not be levied except on the
authority given by statute and that no such authority had been
given. Another case to be considered in this connection is
Attorney-General v. Homebush Flour Mills Limited("). There it
was held that a certain statute which had been passed by the
Parliament of New South Wales, though purporting to require
payment upon the exercise of an option by a trader in fact left
him no choice and compelled him to make the payment and therefore in reality imposed an excise duty which only the Commoniyealth Parliament could impose and for this reason the statute
was ultra vires the legislature. The last case on this point which I
have to notice is Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy, Limited('). There the provincial legislature of British Columbia had passed an Act which
authorised a committee constituted under it to impose a certain
leyy and it was held that the leyy was a tax which the legislature
had no power to impose.
The Australian case and the Canadian case were cases of levy
under ultra vires statutes and the English case was of a charge
(1) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 51:7.
(3) 56 C.L.R. 390.
(2) 127 L.T. 822.
(4) (1933) L.R. tea.
.584
SUPUIO
OOUR.T
JlBPOilTS
[196S] 2 S.C.R.
made without any statutory backing at all. It seems to me that
the present case is not of any of these kinds. There is here no
dJallenge to the legality of the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act under which the requisition and release had been
made. Nor was it contended that under the Act the Government
(X)uld not requisition the stock of rice in the possession of a procuring agent at the price previously prevailing, nor that having
done so, it could not sell the rice so requisitioned at the price
•ubsequently fixed. If it could so sell the rice requisitioned to
an outsider, it could equally sell it back to the procuring agent
from whom it was taken. This is precisely what was done in this
.case. The Government's acts were perfectly within its statutory
powers and legal. It is not a case where the appellants had been
compelled to obtain the release on payment to avoid going out of
trade as was held in the Australian case to have happened. The
appellants were free not to pay and to obtain or not to obtain
1the release. If they had not, it has not been said that their trade
would have stopped. The ratio decidendi of the Australian case
that the trader had been compelled to pay, which was why the
payment was held to have amounted to a tax, does not apply to
the case in hand.
There is not the slightest doubt that the extra profit with
which we are concerned had not come to the proc11ring agents by
reason of any merit of their own; it had come into existence only
because the exigencies of the circumstances prevailing had com·pelled the Government to increase the price. The Government
had apparently felt doubtful if its earlier methods of realising the
extra profits were legal and to avoid the consequences of any
illegality, it followed this procedure and t~ the legality of it I find
no objection. If the procedure was legal, as l think it was, it
could not have resulted in an illegal levy. I would, therefore,
hold that where as a result of the requisition and release the Gov·emment had obtained moneys from the appellants, the realisation
bad been legal and did not amount to unauthorised levy of tax
and the appellants are not entitled to recover them from the Government. For the same reason where in respect of such requisition and release the appellants had not paid money directly, but
had entered into engagements to pay moneys, those engagements
would be legal and enforceable. The question of payments and
of agreements of this particular kind are immlved in appeals Nos.
840, 842, 845, 850, 853 and 855 of 1962. I would dismiss
those appeals so far as they concern claim for the recovery of
moneys realised by the Government by requisition and release
It.
JS
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A. V. SUBBA RAO v. STAtE (AY)IQ1Zgar, /.)
A.
a
C
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G
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585
md the enforceability of the agreements in respect of them. The
other appeals except where the auits were barred as stated by
Ayyangar J. should be allowed.
·
Ayywigar, I. This batch of 44 appeals have been heard
together because most of the points of law raised in them aro.
common. They are before us by virtue of certificates of fitness
granted for each appeal by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
The facts leading to the suits out of which these appeals arise
are briefly these : The appellants are owners or lessees of rice
mills in the districts of West Godavari, East Godavari and
Krishna. Their business consisted in purchasing paddy from
producers, milling their purchase in their mills and in selling the
rice so milled to wholesale dealers in rice and others. While so,
in or about 1946-47 and even before, severe restrictions were
imposed in the State of Madras on the trade in foodgrains in order
to maintain their supplies and ensure their proper and equitable
distribution to the community. Action in that behalf was taken
in respect of two matters; ( 1 ) Procurement of paddy and rice,
and (2) Dealing in them. For this purpose the power vested in
the State Government under the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946 was utilised and two orders "The Foodgrains
Procurement Order, 1946" (later modified by the Foodgrains
Intensive Procurement Order, 1947) and the Foodgrains Licensing Order, 1946 were issued. Under the former the procurement
or purchase of foodgrains including paddy was placed under control and the right to purchase was restricted to the Government
and to the Procurement agents appointed and notified by them.
The appellants were among those who were appointed as "Procuring agents" under that order. The sales to be effected by the
procuring agents of the n;iilled rice were also placed under control
by virtue of the Licensing Order which prohibited all trade or dealing in foodgrains including rice except by those who held licences
and subject only to the tenns and conditions of the licence. The
appellants were each one of them licensed to deal in rice under
this Licensing Order. It might be mentioned that the Prices at
which paddy could be procured as well as the orice at which oaddy
and rice could be sold by the licensed dealers were also fixed by
orders, notifications issued under the Essential Supplies Act. While
the 11.poellants were thus carrying on their business subject to the
provisions of the two "Orders" we have mentioned earlier, the
prices at which th~ a1>0ellants could sell rice which they milled out
of the paddy procured by them were enhanced on three occasion~
-July, 1947, December, 1947 and November 1948 and, on each
586
SUPllB.MB
COUllT
llBPOllTS
{1965] 2 s,c.&.
occasion, they were directed to submit statements regarding the
stocks of paddy and rice held to them on the day just previous to
that on which the increased prices were to .come into effect and
they were directed to pay as a "surcharge" the amount representing
that increase on the stocks held by them. The appellants demur. red, but payment was insisted on and the same was either paid
under protest or recovered from them in several modes to which
we shall refer in detail later. The suits out of which these appeala
arise were brought by ·these miller-procuring agents for recovery
Df the amounts of one or more of the three surcharges that were
collected from them, on the ground that the "surcharges" were
virtually taxes which had been illegally imposed and levied on
them. These suits were filed in Courts of different Subo'rdinate
Judges having territorial jurisdiction over their places of business.
Some of these suits were decreed while others were dismissed.
Appeals were filed to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by the
aggrieved parties and most of these appeals were heard together
by the High Court and a common judgment was delivered directing
the dismissal of all the suits. A few of them came on for hearing
subsequently, but the learned Judges following the judgment of
the Court in the main batch disposed of them in accordance with
that decision. On applications made by the several plaintiffs
certificates of fitness were granted by the High Court and that is
how the appeals are now before us.
A
B
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D
E
As would be seen from the foregoing, the main point in controversy in these appeals is the legality of the collection by the
Government of amounts which are termed "surcharges" in these
proceedings from these several plaintiffs who are the appellants
before us. In order to appreciate how the surcharge came to be F
imposed and the circumstances attending their collections as also
the defences raised to the suits, it is necessary briefly to advert to
the statutory provisions which furnish the background in which
this levy came to be made and collected.
As is well-known, at the end of the Second World War the
country was faced with a scari:ity of foodgrains with the result that G
statutory rationing had to be resorted to in most urban areas; and
for the purpose of enforcing rationing stocks of paddy and rice
had to be made available. Power in this behalf was originally
exercised under the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed
thereunder and by subordinate legislation undertaken by virtue of
powers conferred by .the Defencd of India Rules. When the H
Defence of India Act ceased to be in force on the expiry of six
1Donths after the termination of the war and· as this scarcity still
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, l.)
f;87
A. continued the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
repleading and replacing the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Ordinance, 1946 (XVill of 1946) was enacted to be in
force originally for 5 years till April 1, 1951 to deal with the
probelm of maintaining supplies essential to the community. Under
s. 3 of this statute "The Central Government, so far as it appears
B to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable
distribution and availability at fair prices, may by order provide
for regulating or prohibiting the production,, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein". Without prejudice
C to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1), sub-s. (2)
empowered Government by order to provide inter alia for :
" ( c) for controlling the prices at which any essential
commodity may be bought or sold;
( d) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise
the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition,
D
use or consumption of any essential commodity;
( e) for prohibiting the withholding from sale of any
essential commodity ordinarily kept for sale;
(f) for requiring any person holding stock of an
essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part
E
of the stock at such prices and to such persons or class of
persons or in such circumstances, as may be specified in
the order;
( i) for requiring persons engaged in production,
supply or distribution of, or trade or commerce in, any
essential
commodity to maintain and produce for inspecF
tion such books, accounts and records relating to their
business and to furnish 11uch information relating thereto, as may be specified in the order;"
Under the powers thus conferred a scheme was devised for (a)
the procurement of foodgrains (we are here concerned with paddy
G and rice) from producers, (b) for their sale to wholesalers, ( c) a
further sale to retailers and ( d) ultimately the sale to the consumers, the last of which was, rui stated already, based on a system
of rationing to secure equitable distribution. The appeal is concerned with the machinery and procedure employed for
the
procurement of foodgrains in the districts of East Godavari. We~t
H Godavari and Krishna which were reck'.oned as surplus districts.
Though legislation or that of a similar type was also applicable to
certain other areas, these appeals are only concerned with the
588
SUPllBMB
COU&T llBPOB.TS
11965] 2 S.C.R.
events that happened in these three districts. The plaintiffs who A
filed the several i>uits which have been directed to be dismissed by
the High Court and who are the appellants before us were owners
of rice mills or lessees or licensees of such mills in these three
districts. They were appointed as procurement agents for buying
up paddy from the producers i.e., cultivators or landholders. They
were also licensed under several Control Orders to which reference B
will be made later, to deal in the paddy which they procured or the
rice into which they converted the paddy in their mills. The prices
at which they could procure the paddy from the producers was
fixed by executive order issued under the powers contained in
1>. 3(2)(c) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act.
Similarly, the price at which they could sell to wholesalers was C
likewise fixed.
While things were going on in this state with he prices fixed
operating to determine the purchase and the sale price of these
procuring agents, Government raised the purchase and sale price
of paddy and rice in or about July, 1947. They then directed D
these procuring agents to pay over to them as a "surcharge the difference between the original and the enhanced price on the stock
of paddy held by them on the day previous to the rise in price.
These miller-merchants resisted the levy but were forced to make
the payment which they did under protest. There were similar
rises in prices on December 7, 1947 and on November 21, 1948 E
and in a similar manner the amounts of these surcharges were
collected from the several millers, the amount payable by each
being calculated on the stock of paddy or rice remaining with
them on December 6, 1947 and November 20, 1948 respectiv~lv.
A very large number of suits were filed by these merchanlq F
against the Government in the Courts of Subordinate Judges of
l"!luru, Narasapur, Amalapuram, Kakinada, Rajahmundry and
Masulipatnam for the repayments of these sums which they alleged
had been illegally collected from them. The main defence of the
Government was that the millers were really the agents of the
Government and so were accountable to them for the extra t'roftt G
taey would have made by reason of the increase in the price effected by Government. Besides, it was also asserted that the demand
for the "surcharge" was authorised Qr pennitted by the terms of
the "procuring agreement" entered into with them as also by the
conditions of the licences which were granted to them under which H
they were pennitted to trade in paddy or rice. There was also a
minor point raised that the suits were barred by s. 16 of the
Essential Supplies Act, 1946. As stated earlier, i>uitll filed in
A. v. SUBBA RAO
v. STATE (Ayyangar, J.)
589
some of the Courts were clis~d-~cceptlng ·the defence raiaed
·by the Goveffiment while those filed in other Courts succeeded and
decrees were passed for the repayment of the several sums collected
by the Government. Appeals filed to the High Court from these
decrees and then those filed by the Government were allowed while
~ose by the miller-pl~tiffs were directed to be dismissed by a
B co=on judgment from which most of the appeals before us arise.
· We should, however, mention even at this stage that besides this
co=on question there have been other defences raised to some
of these suits to which it would be necessary to advert but we shall
defer stating them until after we have finished with the points that
C are common to all these appeals.
·
We shall first take up for consideration the main point urged
before us by Mr. Agarwala for the respondent-State that the
appellant-millers were "agent" of the Government or, in any
·event, stood in a fiduciary capacity to the Government, so thl.t the
latter had a right to call on them to disgorge any profit they might
D make in their busines5 of procuring and selling foodgrains over
and beyond the remuneration permitted to them by the relevant
agreements, · ncences, notifications etc. For this purpose it is
necessary to set out the various statutory provisions under which
tl:e appellants functioned ·as well as the terms and conditions of
the agreements entered into by them with the Government. We
E shall also narrate in some detail the circumstances in which the
"surcharge" were imposed and collected as they bear on the points
urged before us in these appeals.
·The first relevanf statutory provision to which it is necessary
to advert in this connection is the Madras Foodgrains Procurement
F Order, 1946 dated the 15th June, 1946 issued under Rule 81 (2)
of the Defence of India Rules by the Government of Madras. It
applied to several clistricts in the State, among them East Godavari,
West Godavari and Krishna with which these appeals are concerned. Paragraph 1 of this Order required "every person who whether
as holder, occupier, tenant, sub-tenant or licensee or in any othu
G capacity cultivates any land with paddy during the Fasli 1355 or
Fasli 1356 or who receives any portion of such paddy or rent or
interest or repayment of Joan in kind" "to sell the surplus of such
paddy as determined by the District Collector to be available with
such person after each harvest either as paddy or rice to the District
Collector or an agent appointed by him and to no one el!le". The
H Dist.Jct Collector and those authorised by hilil in that behalf were
' • thus to have the monopoly of purchasing surplus paddy or rice
from cultivators. The formula for the determination of the snrplo;
A
IASup./65-4
SUP:&J!ME
590
COUllT
REPORTS
[1965) 2 s.C·R.
was laid down in the same paragraph but to this it is unnecessary A
to refer. Under Paragraph 2 delivery of the paddy and rice bad
to be made to the Collector or his agent in the village in which
that paddy or rice was cultivated or at some place within the District in which the cultivation took place, the price varying with the
place of delivery i.e., taking into account the transport charges.
The provision that the procurement by the Government or their B
authorised agents and at the prices fixed by the Collector on a
monopoly basis was reinforced by Para 3 of this Order which
prohibited any person from selling or otherwise disposing of any
quantity of paddy or rice to any person other than the District
Collector or an agent notified in that behalf. We are omitting
reference to the other paragraphs of this order as unnecessary for C
our purposes. This Order was, among several others, continued
in force by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
when the Defence of India Act lapsed and ceased to be in operation. Slight variations were made in this Order by subsequent
notified ordem-vide for instance, the Intensive Procurement
0
Order dated March 26, 1947 but these change; or modifications
related mostly to the formula or basis for determining the surplus
available for purchase, but as these made no material variation for
our present purpose we arc not setting them out.
Several millers in the three districts of East and West Godavari
and Krishna .whose busiat& consisted in buying paddy, milling
them and selling the rice, applied to the Government for appointment as procuring agents in accordance with this notification.
Before however they could be appointed as procuring agents each
of them had to execute an agreement in a form prescribed by rules
and as the terms of this agreement from the core of the case of
the State Government on the question of Agency it is necessary to
refer to them in some detail. The heading of this model agreement which was signed by each one of the appellants reads :
E
F
"Agreement executed by Procuring Agent/ Authorised wholesale Distributor."
G
It then proceeds :
"I. . . . . . having been appointed a dealer for the
purchase, storage and distribution of paddy, rice or ...
under the Intensive Procurement Scheme and or Informal Rationing Scheme, shall abide by all the provisions
prescribed from time to time by or under the said
schemes and any directions issued thereunder
H
'
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, J.)
591
A In particular-
B
c
D
E
F
! undertake to purchase paddy, rice .... that are
available for purchase in the area allotted to me at the
rates prescribed from time to time by the Commissioner
of Civil Supplies, Madras, or any officer authorised by
him in this behalf.
I undertake to store paddy, rice or millets purchased
by me in proper godowns and to be responsible for their
safe custody.
I also undertake to sell the stocks of paddy, rice or
millets with mo to the pe™>m to whom I am directed to
sell it at such rates as may be prescribed from time to
time. I agree to deposit with the District Supply
Officer ........ District Rs. 2,000/- against the fulfilment of this undertaking.
I agree to the forfeiture by the District Supply
Officer . . . . . . . . District of this deposit for any breach
by me or by any person acting on my behalf for failure
on my part to comply with or to secure compliance with
the aforesaid provisions, regulations and dutiel! prescribed from time to time under the Intensive Procure- ·
ment and or Informal Rationing Scheme."
On: the execution of this agreement they wore appointed as agents
for purchasing paddy and rice determined as surplus with the ryots.
This appointment was notified in tho District Gazette and as against
each group of agents the area in which they were authorised to
procure was set out.
This was, however, not the only statutory provision regulating
the conduct and dealings of the appellants. Under the Madras
Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 issued under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946 which was in supersession of the Madras Foodgrains Control Order, 1945 promulgated under Rule 81 (2) of
G the Defence of India Rules though containing substantially the
same terms, the business of dealing in foodgrains was subjected to
statutory control. Clause 3 of this Order prohibited any person
from engaging in any undertaking which involved the purchase.
sale or storage fer sale in wholesale quantities of any foodgrains
"exceot and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf bv
H an officer authorised by the Government". Purchase and sale of
1
10 maunds and more in one tran,action was defined by the Order
as beinir in wholesale and. similarly. stora~e of 15 maunds and
592
SUP.REME
COURT
.REPO.RTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R
more was so treated. Each one of the appellants before us held
licences to deal in foodgrains under this Order. Two of the
clauses of the licence issued under this Order are of some relevance
to the points arising in these appeals and have been referred to
during the course of the arguments and it would be convenient to
set them out at this stage :
"Clause 8. The licensee shall give all facilities at all
reasonable times to any authorised officer of Government, for the inspection of his stocks and accounts at
any shop, godown or other place used by him for the
storage or sale of any of the foodgrains mentioned in
paragraph l and for the taking of samples of such foodgrains for examination.
Clause 9. The licensee ·shall comply with any direc·
tions that may be given to him by the Government or by
the officer issuing this licence in regard to the purchase,
sale or storage for sale of any of the roodgrains men1ioned in paragraph I .......... "
A
B
c
D
Of course. these licenses were granted on applications made in
statutory form by the several applicants and a paragraph in this
application read :
"I have cerefully read the conditions of licence given
in Form A of the Second Schedule to the Foodgrains
Control Order and I agree to abide by them."
E
It need hardly be pointed out that the prices at which purchasel:
'aid sales by the. procuring agents, wholesalers and retailers could
take place were all determined by orders issued from time to time. F ·
under ss. 3(1) and 2(c) of the Essential Supplies Act, and these
dealers were enjoined strictly to adhere to them on pain of pm:ecutions and cancellation of their licences. The prices fixed varied·
from district to district and, of course, between several varie1ies of
paddy and rice. In their fil!:ation allowance was made for trar-sport charges by adding the freight to the prime cost. It i• not G
nece•sarv to go into· the d~ .llils of these prices but it is sufficient to
~tale thnt they were ''aried ·from time ro ti!Jle.
Pausing here. it is necessary to refer to the manner in which
the miller-procuring agents disposed of the stock which they had
procured from the producers. Thcv could sell onlv to cl~~Jcr~
whn had licrnces to purchase fro•n them, these buyers mfont b~
either wholesalers or retailers. It is in evidence that in Eome
H
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, I.)
A
593
lhc procedure followed (particularly where the purchasers
aut.hoiiscd 10 buy from the millers were outside their district) was
i.ilat the purchasers were directed to pay the value of the grain
whlch they were authorised to purchase into the Government
Treasury. Intimation was thereafter given to the millers of the
deposit an:l of the quantity which the purchaser was permitted to
B obtain. The specified quantity of grain would then be delivered
to the auchorised purchaser and the millers would then be paid by
Government. This, however, was not the only method by which
the miller-procuring agents could or did effect sales. They were,
besides, pem1itied and authorised to sell to dealers of their choice
C provided suc11 dealers were licensed dealers and so authorised to
buy. Needless to add that the price which the millers could charge
the dealers had to be the controlled price.
D
E
ca:,e;,
Procurement, however, was. as would be evident from what
we have stated earlier, confined to particular areas of the Province
which were surplus in that type of foodgrain. There were deficit
districts which the Government had to supply with the requisite
quantity of foodgrains. The foodgrains necessary for this purpose was obtained by the Government by purchases from the procuring agents. For this purpose agreements were entered into
with the miller-procuring agents to which it is now nece.ssary to
refer. That agreement ran, to quote only the material tenns :
"This agreement made the ...... day of. ...... .
between His Excellencv the Governor of Madras of
the one part and .... (hereinafter called the supplier .. )
of the other part.
F
Wherea~ the District Smmlv Officer .......... has
been authorised to buy paddy and rice on behalf of the
Government of Madras.
G
-\\<'hereas the District Supply Officer has agreed to
buy and the supplier has agreed to sell paddy/rice as
detailed in the schedule below.
Now these presel)ts witness and the parties hereto
hereby mutually agree as follows : -
H
1. The suppt:cr shall deposit a sum of Rs ...... .
(ru,..ees .... only) with the District Suoply Officer. The
deposit shall unless it is forfeited under the terms of
tr'' a"reement be returned to the suoolier unon the
compiete fulfilment of this agreement 'by the supplier.
SUPllEMJI
594
OOURT
JlBPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
2. Tho District Supply Officer will have the right to
reject the whole or any portion of the paddy or rice supplied under this agreement on the ground that the paddy
or rice supplied is different from or inferior to the
1W11D.ple tendered by the supplier and accepted
by the District Supply Ottifiicer or that the
packing is defective or
that there is undue
delay "and default in supplying or on any other ground
whatsoever. He will also have the right to accept the
supply and to reduce the rate within six weeks from the
date of despatch of the consignment, in case he considers
either suo motu or otherwise the paddy or rice supplied
to be inferior in quality to the sample tendered. The
decision of the District Supply Officer regarding the
quantity and quality. shall be final and binding and on
the supplier.
3. In the event of the District Supply Officer rejecting the whole or any portion of paddy or rice, the supplier shall be bound to supply paddy or rice of the
proper quality and quantity within such extended time,
if any, as may be given to him by the District Supply
Officer. If no time is given or if the time is given and
tho supplier fails to supply the balance or the whole of
tho paddy or rice within the time originally fixed or
such extended time, the supplier shall be bound to µay
such damages as may be fixed by the Commissioner of
Civil Supplies, Madras (hereinafter called the Commissioner). The award of the Commissioner shall be final
and binding on the suvvlier and shall not be open to
question in any Court of law.
A
n
c
D
E
4. Tho District Supply Officer shall have the right
to cancel the whole or any portion of this agreement at
any time without assigning any reason whatsoever.
5. When paddy or rice is required to be delivered
at any station/port the paddy or rice shall be considered
to be at the risk of the supplier till it is foaded into
railway wagons/steamer.
{
G
.
(I) The supplier will not hold the District Supply
Ofiker responsible personally for any loss sustained by
!
\
6. It is distinctly agreed by and between the parties
that-
l
H
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, !.)
A
595
the .mpplier by reason of any act, deed or thing; done
by him touching this agreement; and
( 9) The supplier shall pay the general sales tax."
B
To this agreement was a Schedule and the quantity in tons of
what was contracted to be purchased was set out in it as also the
rate as well as the place and dated fixed for delivery.
Paddy was thus being procured from the producers by the
millers appointed so to procure under the Procurement Order we
have set out earlier and they were disposing of the rice after
milling the paddy procured to wholesalers and retailers at the
c prices fixed by the Government. Similary those Mil.lers who had
entered into contracts to supply rice to the District Supply Officer
were duly fulfilling the terms of the contract and were being n~id
the prices stipulated in the agreements subject to any deductions that were made on account of inferior quality, deterioration of goods etc. While things were in this state, the GovernD ment of Madras promulgated, on the 17th of July, 1947, what is
termed "a bonus scheme" for subsidizing cultivators to induce
them to increase their production so as to have more surpluses for
enabling procurement of larger quantities. The amount of the
bonus was Re. 1 per maund of surplus paddy. Out of this
one-half was to be passed on to the consumers by enhancing by
E eight annas a maund the wholesale and retail prices and the other
half was to be paid to producers by the Government themselves.
This increase in price was to take effect from July 27, 1947.
Instructions were issued to the Collectors and revenue officials to
ascertain the quantity of rice and paddy lying with procuring
agents as also wholesalers at the end of the day's transactions on
r July 26, 1947 i.t., the stock remaining unsold which had been
obtained by them at prices prevailing before the enhancement of
price which was to have effect from the next dav and to require
them to pay over to the Government as "a surcharge" the enhanced prices at which they were oermitted to sell after that date,
G namely, eight annas per maund of paddy and twelve annas per
maund of rice. Demands were made on some of the appellants
for the payment of this surcharge. When they failed and neglected to pay surcharge demanded they were threatened with the
cancellation of licences which they held under the Licensing
Order and by reason of this threat, it is stated that, they made the
H payments demanded from them.
A similar and further increase in price was effected in the first
week of December, 1947. The increase was Rs. 2 per maund
596
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1965) 2 S.C.R.
of rice and Re.1 j6j- per maund of paddy. The procuring agents, A
wholesalers and others who had stocks were, by the orders of
Government issued on that occasion, directed to disclose. the stock
of paddy and rice with them as on the evening of December 6,
1947 and in respect of the stock on that date, they were directed
to pay to the Government "the surcharge" at the rates specified
earlier. Demands were made on this basis on several of the B
appellants and when they refused to do so, two methods of recovery were adopted in order to enforce the demand. In the case
of some of them where there were amounts owing by Government
on account of rice supplied under the contract for supply referred
to earlier or by reason of the Government having collected the c
amounts from purchasers who were authorised to lift stocks from
the procuring agents, the Government deducted the "surcharge"
from the amounts due by them and paid only the balance. This
was one method. The other method was that which had been
adopted for the realisation of the "surcharge" levied in Julv, 1947,
namely, by threatening them with cancellation of their licences to D
deal in paddy and rice.
Before proceeding further and for the sake of completeness
and to avoid having to revert to it later it would be convenient to
mention here the ground upon which the surcharge was justified
in the G.O. dated December 6, 1947 by which it was imoosed. In
paragraph 8 after setting out the quantity of rice and paddv on
which the surcharge would be levied and collected. the G.O.
continued:
"Increased ·prices at the rate of Rs. 2 per maund
of rice ........ will have to be collected as surcharge
on the quantity available with the wholesalers anr! r~
tailers on the evening of 6th December, 1947, as directed
in Government Memo No ..... .
The collection of this surcharge will be unearned
profit to Government. The Government direct that this
profit should be utilised to set off the amount recoverable as surcharge."
E
F
,~
•
!
G
Pausing here, it may be pointed out that it apnears from the
evidence that even with the adoption of these methods the Government were unable to realise the surcharges from every one of the
procuring agents or other dealers wholesale and retail on whom
these surcharges had been levied. We are mentionin'! this in H
order to indicate the chan~e in the methods adon•ed for the
recovery of tht: surcharge when it was imoosed on the next occasion
''
I'
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyarigar, !.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
597
and this was on the 2lst of November, 1948. By a G.0 ..of that
date the Government ·directed the Collectors to levy on alf stocks
of paddy and rice with the procuring agents, wholesalers and
retailers on. the-eve.ning of November 20, 1948, a funher surcharge
and recover· the same from them. Some of the appellants paid this
amount under, protest; in the case of others the amount of the
surcharge was deducted from the sums payable to them by Government for the. supply bY· tbe1ri of rice. In the case q!..certain
others the Board of Revenue which had found that there were
some merchants wh~ had failed to pay the two earlier surcharges
that had been impos~d. suggested the adoption. of a new method in
order to realis•) the sum. This was that the Collectors should
issue orders of requisition qf paddy in the possession of these
merchants in respect of the quantities which were ascertained as
being with them on the 20th of November, 1948, and release the
stocks by cancelling the requisition order only on their payment
or th:! surcharge::; or on their excc-;,1tinf! a \vritlng agreeing to make
the payment. We shall have occasion to refer to the special
defence raised by Government in respect of this class of stocklwlders in the proper place.
With tl1is narration we are now in a position to deal with the
arguments ac'dre,«:d to us in these appeals. As would be ~een
from whM we have stated earlier, the contention urged bv the
State of Andhra Pradesh was that the avoellants were the ar>:ents
of the Government and were. therefore, liable to account to them
for the profits which they deriv·'d over and ?.bove the commission
or rcmun~ration which was fixeil for them by the relevant notification of Government fixing t!;ie nrices which rnirrht be char~ed.
The learned JuMcs of the High.~ourt were not nrepare<l to accept
this submi•sion that the an!1ellants were a.zents of the Govem<nent.
but they nevcrth"'1csc. held that 0n a proper constrnclion of the
Intensive Procurement Order, 1947. read in conjunction with
the terms of· the Notification aopointin.~ the several plaintiffs as
"procuring agents" coupled with the agreement which th~v exe·
cured to who~c ·clauses we have already adverted, the plain•iffs
were under a fiduciary obligation to Government which was akin
to, though not exactly the same as a:i ag~ncy, by reason wh~reof
they were bound to pay over to the Government the extra profit
which they had made by the enhancement of the prices effected
by !he Government on the lhree occasions. The contention raised
on behalf of the plaintiffs that the "surcharge" was. in reality a
tax which was illegally levied by executive order was rejected by
them.
598
SUPREME
COUllT
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
As the principal point in controversy between the parties
related to the precise legal relationship between the Procuring
agents and the Government, we shall take that up first. Before
considering the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Agarwala it
would be convenient to set out certain facts relevant to this matter
which are not in dispute. It is common ground that the procuring
agents had to buy and bought the grain from the producers with
their own money. The grain purchased was transported to the
godowns at their cost and stored by them at their own risk the
godown rent being paid by them. In other words, there was no
dispute that the property in the goods purchased by the procuring
agents vested in them. If there was any depreciation in the quality
or if there was any short-fall owing to driage, action of rodents,
insects, moisture, theft, etc., the loss would be theirs. In order to
raise the necessary funds and to finance themselves for the purchase
the procuring agents pledged their goods including the foodgrains
purchased by them and obtained loans from banks and other
financing institutions. They could effect a sale of the grain with
them subject, however, to two conditions : ( 1) the purchaser must
be one authorised to buy, (2) the price should not exceed that
fixed under the notification and orders issued from time to time,
i.e., sales at free market rate were not permitted. Prima facie,
therefore, it would appear that the procuring agents were merely
conducting their business in the purchase of paddy and the sale of
rice, on their own account, subject however to the regulation and
restrictions imposed by the statutory orders and the licences issued
thereunder which enabled Government to effectively control in the
acquisition amd distribution of foodgrains through the usual trade
channels to the ultimate consumer in an orderly and equitable
manner. Learned Counsel for the State, however, urged that the
true legal relationship had to be determined on other considerations.
First, there was the obligation cast by para 1 of the Foodgrains
Procurement Order on producers of foodgrains to sell the surplus
of their paddy as determined by the authorities to the District
Collector or "an agent appointed and notified by him in this behalf"
and to no one else. In the subsequent paragraphs of the same
Order, the persons to whom the foodgrains were to be delivered
were referred to as "the agents of the Collector" authorised or
app6inted by him in that behalf. Next was the description of these
procuring agents in the notification regarding their appointment.
There also the same terminology of referring to them "as agents"
for procurement·was employed. Thirdly, in the agreements executed
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyongar, J.)
599
A by the "procuring agents" reliance was placed on the following
clauses specifying the obligations undertaken by them :
B
( 1) They undertook to purchase paddy that were
available for purchase in the areas allotted to them.
( 2) They undertook to store the paddy or rice purchased in proper godowns and made themselves
responsible for the safe custody of the grain.
( 3) They undertook to sell the stocks of paddy or rice
with them to persons to whom they were directed to
sell at such prices as might be prescribed.
C It was urged that their description as "agents" which prima facie
had to be taken as having meaning as indicative of their real
position, was established as a fact by the duties wh.ich they were
called on to perform and which they undertook to perform under
their agreement. · In particular it was stressed they were constituted
D the "agents" of Government to buy up the surplus paddy made
available for them, to store the grain purchased on behalf of the
Government in secure godowns, and to sell the goods purchased
on behalf of Government and also stored on behalf of Government
to such persons who might be nominated in that behalf and at
prices fixed by Government. It was, therefore, submitted that they
I: were "agents" who would on the one hand be entitled to indemnity
from the Government for any loss that they might sustain in their
engaging in the business of the agency of purchase and storage and
sale on behalf of Government and, on the other, were bound to
make over to the Government such profit that they may obtain out
of the business of the agency. It was the further case of the
F Government that the difierence between the procurement price
and the price which was fixed for sale by them constituted the
commission or remuneration which would belong to the agents.
In further support of these submissions learned Counsel referred
us to the fact that in the Notification appointing some of the
plaintiffs as procuring agents, published in the Krishna District
G Gazette they were referred to as "village procuring agents for
paddy or rice on behalf of Governmenf' in their respective villages.
Our attention was also drawn to a communication by the Collector
of Karinada dated April 26, 1947 in which he referred to the
purchases of paddy by the procuring agents as having been made
"on Government account". It may be pointed out that the order
H last referred to was to direct these "agents" not to engage in
private trade apparently in connection with the sale of the paddy
procured. This last document might be ignored as it emanated
600
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from the Collector and, as is clear from the context in which it
occurred, that it was meant as a warning to the procuring agents
not to sell the procured paddy or rice except to those authorised
to purchase them.
The point that has now to be considered is whether the description of tl1e plaintiffs as ''procuring agcntg" and the undertaking
by them in the agreements which they executed to purchase the
paddy offered, to store them in proper godowns and to sell them
at prescribed prices to persons who had obtained requisite permission to purchase rice or paddy, would make them agents of the
Government so as to (a) render Government liable to indemnify
them for any losse:, which they might sustain in the business. and
(b) conversely in a situation of immediate relevance, enable the
Government to claim :my profit made by them over and above the
"remuneration" permitted to them.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify two
matters. First, though Mr. Agarwala referred to the margin
between the procurement price and the price at which the procured
paddy or rice could be sold as "remuneration". a contention which
found favour with the High Court, we do not find it possible to
accept the submission. There was a similar margin between the
price at which a wholesaler could buy rice and that at which he
could sell and similarly, in the case of the retail dealer, but it is
hardly possible to call these as "remuneration". This margin or
difference in the purchase and sale price was necessary in order
to induce any one to engage in this business and was of the essence
of a control over procurement and distribution which utilised
nonnal trade channels. It would, therefore, be a misnomer to call
it "remuneration" or ''commission" allowed to an agent and so
really no argument can be built on it in favour of the ralationship
being that of principal and agent.
,
The second matter to which we would like to refer is that in
the present case the direction "to account by the agent" adopting
the theory contended for by the respondent, was given and
enforced even before the agent made any profit i.e., on the basis
of an anticipated profit. We are drawinis attention to this feature
to emphasise the fact that the several orders of Government imposing the surcharge and enforcing the levy did not proceed on any
theory that the procuring agents were "a~ents" who were called on
to account for profits which they made in the business of the
agency. It is only necessary to add that not merely procuring
agents but wholesalers and retailers who could on no argument
be called "agents" were directed to pay the surcharge.
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•'
We shall now proceed to deal with the argumfots advanced
·io establish that the procuring agents were, in fact and in law, ·
- agents.
'
·
No doubt, the description in the Procurement Order and. the
agreement as "agent" is of some value, but is not decisive and one
has to gather the real relationship by reference to the entire facts
B - and circumstances. To start with, it is clear that as the purchases
were made by the procuring agents out of their own funds, stored
at their own cost, the risk of any deterioration, draige or shortfall
fell on them, they were· the full owners of the paddy procured and
they pledged the goods for raising funds. This· aspect of their
C full ownership of the grain purchased is highlighted by the fact
that they entered into agreements with the Government itself to
sell the rice with them to District Supply Officers at the controlled
market prices. Any contention that the procuring agents were not
full owners of paddy or rice procured by them· must manifestly
fail as being inconsistent with the basis upon which this agreement
D by them to sell to Government was entered into. If fllrther eonfirmation were needed if is provided by the fact that on the sales
by procuring agents to Government under their Supply agreement
sales-tax was payable which on the terms of the Madras General
Sales Tax Act in force at the relevant time would not have been
payable if the paddy and rice were that of Government and which
E they were holding merely as commission agents on behalf of the
Government.
A
•
A. V. SUBBA RAO
, ..
Next, it may be pointed out that these plaintiffs held licences
under the Licensing Order under the Madras Foodgrains Control
Order, 1947 in order that they might deal in the rice in their
possession. In the licence which was granted to the plaintiffs
F which was in statutory form the foodgrains in their possession
were referred to as their stocks. It may be pointed ·out that the
form of the licence. granted to procuring agents, wholesalers and
retailers was the same.
·
Learned Counsel urged that even assuming that the property in
G the goods purchased passed to the procuring agents that would not
by itself negative the ·relationship of principal and agent. FoL
this purpose reliance was placed on Article 76 of Bowstead on
Agency which runs : - '
"Where an agent, by contracting personally, renders
himself personally liable for the price of goods bought -_ ·
H
on behalf of his principal, the property in the goods,
as between the principal and agent, vests in the
agent, and does not pass to the principal until he pays
602
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for the goods, or the agent intends that it shall pass."
He also referred us to certain decisions of the Madras and Punjab
High Courts in which the principle laid down in this passage had
been applied. We do not consider it necessary to examine this
question in its fulness because we are satisfied that the procuring
agent, when he bought the goods, was purchasing it for himself
and not on behalf of the Government. The acceptance of the
argument addressed on this aspect would mean that if the procurement agent so desired he might contract in the name of the
principal, namely, the Government and thus establish privity
between the Government and the purchaser and make the Government liable to pay for the price of the goods at which he had
purchased. This situation would, in our opinion, be unthinkable
on the scheme of the Procurement Orders and generally of the
Food Control Orders under which the procurement and distribution of foodgrains was placed under statutory control. What the
Government desired and what was implemented by these several
orders was merely the regulation and control of the trade in foodgrains by rendering every activity connected with it subject to
licensing and to the directions to be issued in pursuance thereof
and not directly to engage in the trade in foodgrains.
The respondent can derive no advantage from the obligation
on the part of the procuring agents to store the paddy or rice
properly-a stipulation on which Mr. Agarwala laid con.<ciderable
s(ress--and this for two reasons : ( 1) The purpose of tho clause
was to ensure that there was no loss of foodgrains which wore
tnen a scarce commodity. That this is so would be apparent from
the terms of s. 3(2)(d) of the Essential Supplies Act which was
effectuated by cl. 9 of the licence granted under the Madras
Foodgrains Control Order, 1947 which applied to all dealers in
foodgrains, be they procuring agents (who also, as stated earlier
had to obtain and obtained these licences). wholesalers or retaile".
This clause reads :
"9. The licensee shall comnly with any directions
that may be given to him by the Government or by the
officer issuing this licence in regard to the purchase sale
or storage for sale of any of the foodgrains mentioned in
paragraph ( 1) .............. "
The second reason is that the agreement executed by the prosuring
agents in which this clause as regards storage in proper godowns
and undertaking responsibility for the safe-custody of the grain
A
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occurs. is one which was a form intended for execution not merely
by procuring agents but also authorised wholesale distributors i.e.,
those who purchased their requirements from procuring agent~;
admittedly the authorised wholesale dealers were not "agents" and
the fact that this condition was insisted on even in their case is
clear proof that it has no relevanoo to the question now under
discussion. It therefore, appears to us that the expression "agent•·
was used in the Intensive Procurement Order as well as in the
agreements merely as a convenient expression to designate this
class of dealers.
Before proceeding further it is necessary to advert to the
decision of the High Court of Assam in Bhowrilal Mahesri and
Ors. v. State of Assam(') on which Mr. Agarwala placed considerable reliance in support of this contention regarding agency. The
Government of Assam had passed an ad hoc order directing certain
foodgrain dealers to lift certain quantities of foodgrains from a
Government. Depot with a view Jo its being sold to perSons
nominated in that behalf by the Government. The deale:n; complied with this direction but when they tried to sell it to the persons
nominated by the Government the latter refused to purchase or
to accept the goods sold on the ground that the stnlf was unfit
for human consumption. At the time when the dealers took
possession from Government gt'ldowns they had paid the price fixed
by the Government and they filed a suit for the recovery of the
price and the damage suffered by them on foot of indemnity
claimable by an agent from a principal. The High Omrt of Assam
upheld their claim and held that an agency had been constituted
between the parties under which an obligation had been cast on
the Government to make good the loss suffered by the dealer. We
do not see how this decision assuming it is correct, on which we
pronounce no opinion. bears any resemblance to the case on hand.
There the dealers were required by Government to acquire from
Government foodgrains which was Government property on the
basis that they would be able to sell the same to purchasers
desi~nated. The terms of the contract were that thev should pay
the ~·alue in the first instance and recover it from the purchasers
specified by Government. It was in such a situation that an agency
was held to arise. The position in the case before us is totally
different. By reason of the exercise of st:atutory power trade in
foodgrains was controlled and placed under a licen.sing system.
No persons could buy or sell rice or paddy exceeding specified
limits of quantity unless he held a licence to do so. Dealers W"'.re
(I) A.l.R. 1961 Assam 64.
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[l 965] 2 S.C.R.
classified into three classes, procuring agents. wholesalers :ind
retailers. We are now concerned with procuring agents. Bcfor,~
the introduction of the· licensing system, the miller.s as rart of their
business used to purchase paddy from growers, hull them in their
mills and sell the rice obtained to wholesalers who in their turn
sold to· retailers from whom the consumers obtained their requirement. This method of trading and the same trade channels were
utilised by the Government for the purpose of exercising control
over the acquisition and distribution of foodgrains. In the first
instance, the supplies available with producers for procurement
was determined bv Government so as not to leave with them more
than what could ;eason:ibly be needed for their use. The producer
w:1s required to sell -the quantity thus detennined so as to make
it av~ilable to the general public. The quantity having thus been
dc;ermined the millers were brought under the Control Orders by
requiring them to take out licences for purchase or sale of paddy
an<l it is in the context of this method of utilising the trade
channels for the purpose of procuring and distributing supplies
of essential foodgrains that the legal relationship between the
parties hns to be viewed. As pointed out earlier, the agreement
executed by procuring agents was in the same fonn and contah'!ed
the same stipulations as that executed by. "wholesale authorised
distributors". These wholesale dealers thu;i undertook the same
obligations as procuring age.nts to purchase, store and distribute
paddy and rice in acrnrdimce with the licensing orde··, and the
directions Jssueable ur.der them. Obviously this could not tum
the wholesalers into "agents", . 1l!e argument that the prornring
agents wen: agents because · they . were remunerated · by the
allowance of a commission in the shape of the margin or difference
between the price fixed. for· procurement and for sale bv them
ha~ already been dealt with and need not be repented.
·
Mr. Agarwala next submitted that as~;UJilling that even if he
not right in th~e contentions· that t)le plaintiffs were the
agents of the Government still they were under a fiduciary obligation to Government. Reference was, in this connecnon. made to
.,.. ·88 of the Indian Trrists Act which reads :
·
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wer~
"Where a trmtec, executor, partner. agent, d!rector
of a company, lcg:tl adviser. or other person bound in a
fiduciary character to protect the interests of another
Derson. by agailinr.: hi1melf of his character. ~ains for
himself any pccaniary advantage, or where any person
w bound enters into any dealings under circumstances
in which his own interest~ are. or may be, adverse to
G
A. v. SUilBA RAO v. STATB (Ayyangar, J.)
&05
those of such other person and thereby gains for himself
a pecuniary advantage, he must hold for the benefit of
such other person the advantage so gained."
The relevance of this provision was explained by saying that even
though the plaintiffs might be legal owners of the paddy and
B rice procured by them, the beneficial interest in these goods
vested in Government and that thus the plaintiffs being persons
bound in a fiduciary character to protect the interest of Government had obtained a pecuniary advantage by availing themselves
of their position. We must plainly confess that we are unable to
appreciate this argument. A fiduciary relationship would, no
C doubt, have arisen if the plaintiffs were agents, but if this were
rejected we do not see on the basis of what relationship the
fiduciary obligations can be rested. The purchase of paddy and
rice by them was not as benamidan for Government, for their
purchases were on their own aCC01111t with their own monies though
at prices fixed by the Government because of the control orders;
8 they could sell their goods to others, only the buyers bad to be
licensed as also to the Government. · The control exercised under
statutory laws in respect of these matters caMot obviously render
the trade of the plaintiffs one which they carried on for the benefit
of the Government. If so, we fail to perceive the legal basis upon
E which the plaintiffs could be said to bold the stocks of grain with
them for the benefit of Government. We have already pointed out
that all risks of loss, deterioration, interest charges, godown rent
etc., were all their responsibility. In the circumstances, we consider there is no basis for the suggestion of a fiduciary obligation
de hors a principal and agent relationship.
then said that assuming that the plaintiffs were not
' agentsIt was
and that they were the full and absolute owners paddy
of
and rice with them and which they held on their own account
and for their benefit, still the direction to pay the surcharges wu
a direction which the Government was authorised to issue under
G the terms of the licence granted to the plaintiffs to deal in the
stocks procured by them. For this submission reliance was placed
on cl. (9) of the Licence under Foodgrains Liceming Order
issued to them which ran :
H
"1be licensee shall comply with any directions that
may be given to him by the Government or by the
officer issuing this licence in regard-to purchase, sale
or storage for sale of any of the foodgrains mentioned
in paragraph( 1)."
l.Mlap.CJ.165-5
606
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[1965] 2 S.C.R.
It was said that the direction to pay a surcharge was a direction
in regard to the sale of the stocks. Further support was sought
on a similar clause in the agreement executed by the procuring
agents under which they agreed "to abide by all the provisions
prescribed from time to time by or under the said scheme or any
directions issued thereunder." We do not see any substance in
this argument. The direction to pay such amounts as might be
demanded by Government is certainly not a direction contemplated or provided for by the scheme, namely, the Procurement
Scheme nor is it a direction as regards the sale. Indeed, learned
Counsel did not, when this was pointed out, seriously press this
submission for our acceptance.
A
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Before proceeding further it would be convenient to ascertain
the precise legal category into which the surcharge would fall.
The dealers including the procurement agents were dealing on their
own account in the matter of purchase and sale of paddy.and rice.
The price at which they could buy was fixed and the {elevant
licensing orders specified that they were to sell at the p~ices which ll
were in force from time to time. While things were in this state,
the price at which the procuring agents, wholesalers and others
could sell was raised. Of course, in respect of the stocks purchased by them after that date they would have paid a higher
price whlch would be compensated by the higher price at whieh
they were permitted to sell, but we are concerned with the stocks- E
on-hand already purchased and remaining with them on July 26,
1947, December 6, 1947 and November 20, 1948. Under the
Foodgrains Control Order under whlch they were licensed to deal
in foodgrains, they were entitled to sell the stocks with them at the
prices· fixed under the Price Control Order and prevailing on the F
date of the sale. They would, therefore, have, on an increase in
the selling price, the benefit of the enhanced _prices. It was this
that was sought to be mopped up by Government by the three
impugned orders by which the difference between the old and
the new prices was directed to be collected as "surcharge".
It was not suggested that the surcharges could be justified
under any of the provisions contained in the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act. They were not imposed by notified
orders promulgated under s. 3 of that enactment and if they were,
the question would have to be seriously considered whether such
orders would be within the rule making power under that Act.
We have already pointed out that they could not be justified as
authorised directions whlch were permitted to be issued either
under the Procurement Order, the agreement executed in pur-
G
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v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, J.)
607
suance thereof or the Foodgrains Control Order and the licences
issued thereunder. That was why the only serious argument that
was raised was an attempt to justify them on the ground of the
same being a liability to account on behalf of an agent and this
contention we have already negatived as lacking substance. There
was thus no legal basis upon which the surcharge could be justified
and it would, therefore, follow that subject to any argument based
upon the claim being barred by limitation, the claim to the refund
of the same could not be resisted.
We shall be dealing with the claims arising in the individual
appeals later, but at this stage it is sufficient to point out that as
C regards the claim for the refund of the surcharge collected on
the stocks of paddy and rice in July, 1947, Lliere was no defence
to the claim except that the same was barred by limitation. We
should, however, add that in all the suits a defence that they were
barred by reason of s. 16 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946 was raised, but the plea was wholly untenable
D and learned Counsel very properly did not seek to urge it before us.
When demands for these sums were made they were either paid
under protest, or when they were not so paid, the amounts were
recovered by threats that the licences of the merchants should
be cancelled.
As regards the surcharge levied in De:ember on the stocks
held by the plaintiffs on December 6, 1947, we have already
pointed out that two methods were employed for making this
collection. They were (1) by withholding the amounts due to
them from Government for rice supplied; and (2) by threats of
cancellation of licences. It would follow from what we have stated
F earlier that if the surcharge was not legal or justifiable, the claim
for refund could not be resisted subject again to the question
whether the claims therefor in the various suits were within the
period of limitation. When we come to the third surcharge
imposed in November 1948, as already indicated, three methods
were utilised for the purpose of making the collection. ( 1) Threat
G of cancellation of licences, (2) Withholding the amount of the
surcharge from the amounts payable by Gov.ernment for rice
supplied to them by the procuring agents, and (3) requisition from
them of paddy or rice of a quantity equal to the stocks held by
them on the evening of November 20, 1948 and release of the
same after they executed a writing agreeing to pay the amount
H of surcharge which agreements they honoured by making the
payment demanded. Mr. Agarwala conceded that if the surcharges were illegal, such amounts as were paid on demB.nd under
E
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[1965) 2 S.C.R.
protest, the amounts collected by withholding sums due from A.
Government, as well as sums collected on threats of cancellation
of licences would all be recoverable by the several plaintiffs. He,
however, contended that in those cases where the foodgrains
were requisitioned and released on the execution of agreements to
pay the surcharges which were implemented the plaintiffs could
not recover, and for two reasons : ( 1) That the Government had B
the power to requisition the stock and direct the traders to sell
the foodgrains to Government and it might therefore be taken
as if the requisition had been made on terms of paying for the
·stock the price payable on an earlier day, and (2) That by reason
of the agreements which they executed, as a condition of the C
release of the stocks, they had bound themselves to make the
payment, and their payment in accordance with their agreement
was a voluntary payment which could not be recovered. This
point based on the agreements arises only in Civil Appeals 840,
842, 845, 850, 853 and 855 of 1962.
To appreciate this argument it would be necessary to advert D
to the terms of the agreement. By way of sample we might refer
to the one taken from the Manager of Kanyaka Parameshwari
Rice Mill-appellant in Civil Appeal No. 840 of 1962. It reads :
"As regards the first quality paddy of 8,220 maunds,
second quality of 1,545 maunds, rice first quality 866,
second quality 254, which you have requisitioned in our
mill this day i.e., to say 23rd November, 1948, l am
hereby declaring myself liable to pay the amount of
difference in prices fixed by the Government for the
aforesaid items on the 21st November, 1948, and the
prices prevailing previously. As you have released the
goods on my liability I am in receipt of the same."
E
F
This was signed by the Manager of the Mills with an endorsement
by the Taluk Supply Officer "released for sale". These agreements were, as already indicated taken in pursuance of the
directions by the Board of Revenue. It prescribed this method G
of obtaining agreements as the one to be pursued for recovering
the surcharge imposed on this occasion. In their communication
to the Collectors the Board of Revenue stated :
"The stock with all stock-holders (whether millers
wholesalers or retailers) on the evening of 20th Novem:
ber, 1948, should first be assessed with reference to the
5tock register. These stocks should be formally requisi-
Hi
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609
tioned at the old prices from July 19, 1948 ..•..... It
is not necessary that the requisition notices should be
issued on the 21st of November itself; those may be
issued as early as possible after that date there being no
delay at any stage, but only in respect of the quantity
which was held in stock on the evening of November 20,
1948. If the stockholders agree in writing to pay the
difference in price due to the increase in price sanctioned
by the Government the stocks should be released from
requisition otherwise the stocks in question should be
seized and sold to other merchants including quota
holders at the revised prices; the difference being the
old and the new prices being credited to Government."
The argument that was addressed to the High Court was that
whatever might be the position as regards those plaintiffs who
had made the ·payments under protest or on account of the threats
to cancel their licences or by deducting the amount due from the
Government, merchariis who voluntarily entered into agreements
of the type we have just set out, stood on a different footing and
that in their case they could not legally claim a refund of the
amount thus paid in pursuance of these agreements. The High
Court was apparently inclined to accept this submission. With
great respect to the learned Judges we consider that there is no
substance in this argument. If the theory that the plaintiffs were
the agents of the Government be discarded as untenable, there
would be no legal basis at all for the surcharge. It would then
be in effect a tax imposed by an executive fiat without any
legislative sanction on the capjtal value of the stocks of foodgrains
held on a particular date. In this connection reference may be
made to Attorney General (N. S. W.) v. Homebush Flour Mills
Ltd. ( 1 ) where a scheme by which flour was expropriated by the
State at a "declared" price and subsequently sold by the Crown
at a "standard" price, the former owner being given the option
of buying back flour at the latter price was held to constitute a tax.
Mr. Agarwala had to concede that if the surcharge was in
substance a tax he could not successfully resist the claim of the
plaintiffs to the recovery of the amount collected even in cases
where the agreements were taken, for the agreements merely set
out the nature of the surcharge and expressed the willingness of
the executant to pay it. In this connection it has to be borne in
mind that the Government was armed with coercive powers to
enforce any d~mand which was legal and in the circumstances,
--·--- - - · - - - - - - - (!} S6 C.L.R. 390.
610
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(1965] 2 S.C.R.
it could hardly be contended that these payments were voluntary
in the sense understood in this context.
In support of the submission that the surcharge was in essence
a tax, learned Counsel for the appellants referred to the decision
of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Wilts United
Dairies.(') The Food Controller was empowered by the Defence
of the Realm Regulations to make orders regulating Gr giving
directions with respect to "the production, manufacture, treatment, use, consumption, distribution, supply, sale or purchase
or other dealing in any article as appears to him to be necessary
or expedient" for the purpose of encouraging or maintaining the
food sUpf'lY of the country. It was found that there was disparity
in· the price:; of milk prevailing in different areas and in order to
equalise these prices the Food Controller purporting to exercise
powers conferred on him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations, entered into agreements with the defendant-company by
w:lich the latter were permitted to purchase milk within certain
defined areas on terms that they should pay him a sum of two
pence per gallon for this privilege. The defendant-company who
was required to make this payment, refnsed to do so and to the
information laid against it raised the contention that the charge
amounted in effect to a tax levied in an unconstitutional manner.
The company succeeded in the Court of appeal and the AttorneyGeneral brought the matter in appeal before the House. In
dismissing the appeal, Lord Buckmaster after accepting the
argument based upon the extreme difficulty of the situation in
which the country found itself owing to the war, and the
importance of seeming and maintaining vital supplies essential
for the life of the community, proceeded to consider the question
whether a power to make such a levy was granted. The statute
had confined the duties of the Food Controller to regulating the
supply and consumption of food and taking the necessary steps
for maintaining proper supplies.
It was observed :
"The powers so given are no doubt very extensive
and very drastic, but they do not include the power of
levying upon any man payment of money which the
Food Controller must receive as part of a national fund
and can only apply under proper sanction for national
purposes. However, the character of this payment may
be clothed, by asking your Lordships to consider the
(I) 127 Law Times 822.
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611
necessity for its imposition, in the end it must remain a
payment which certain classes of people were called
upon to make for the purpose of exercising certain privileges and the result is that the money so raised can
only be described as a tax the levying o( which can
never be imposed upon subjects of this country by anything except plain and direct statutory means."
Lord Wrenbury expressed the same idea in slightly different
language when he said :
"The Crown in my opinion cannot here succeed
except by maintaining the proposition that where statuc
tory authority has been given to the executive to make
regulations controlling acts to be done by His Majesty's
subjects, or some of them, the Minister may, without
express authority so to do, demand and receive money
as the price of exercising his power of control in a
particular way, such money to be applied to some public
D
purpose to be determined by the Executive."
Pausing here, we might advert to two matters : ( 1) Thejast
words of the learned Lord we have just quoted sufficiently answer
an argument addressed to us based upon the use to which the
amount of surcharge collected was to be expended, namely, as
:t bonus to the producers. Secondly the fact that the company
obtained licences from the Food Controller on the stipulation
that they would pay him the two pence per gallon was not considered material for determining their obligation in law to make
the payment.
While on this topic reference could usefully be made to the
decision of the Privy Council in Lower Mainland Dairy Products
Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy, Limited.(') The
case was concerned with the legality of certain adjustment levies
imposed on farmers by an adjustment Committee created by an
enactment of British Columbia by which the disparity in the proG duction of fluid milk as compared with milk products was sought
. \0 be countered. It was contended on behalf of the State that the
levies were not taxes but merely a scheme for pooling profits in
a provincial trade. Lord Thankerton speaking for the Board said :
"The main issue of this appeal is whether the adjustment levies are taxes, .... In the opinion of their LordH
ships, the adjustment levies are taxes. They are
compulsorily jmposed by a statutory committee .•. They
1
(l) (1933] A.C. 168.
GU
SUPlU!MB
COUllT
IU!PORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.ll.
are enforceable by law. Compulsion is an essential
feature of taxation. The Committee is a public
authority, and the imposition of these levies is for a
public purpose. The fact that moneys so recovered or
distributed as bonus among the traders in the manufactured products market does not affect the taxing
character of the levies made."
A
B
Besides, if there is no legal basis for these demands by the
Government we consider that it is not possible to characterise them
as anything else than as taxes. They were imposed compulsorily
by the executive and are sought to be collected by the State by
the exercise inter alia of coercive statutory powers, though these . C
latter are vested in Government for very different purposes. We
are clearly of opinion that the fact that agreements were taken
from some of these merchants affords no defence to their claim
for refund.
What remains for consideration is the defence based upon the D
claim being barred by limitation. The contention urged on behalf
of the State is that the claim for a sum not legally due but illegallY.
wllected by Government which was the basis of these suits was
governed by Art. 62 of the.Indian Limitation Act which provides
a period of three years from the time when the money is received.
That Article reads :
E
u Dticription of si4,it1
Period of limitation
Time from which period
beg ins to run
62. For money
payable by the
defendant to the
plaintiff. for monoy
received by the ~efendant
for the plaintiff's use.
Three
years.
When tho money
is received."
If this Article were applied- the portion of the claim in Civil
Appeal No. 306 of 1962 relating to the refund of surcharge
imposed in July, 1947 and the entirety of the claim in Civil Appeal
No. 644 of 1962 would be barred.
G
The suit out of which Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1962 arises,
namely, 0.S. No. 2 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judge,
Rajahmundry made a claim for the refund of the surcharges
collected from him in July, 1947, December, 1947 and November, 1948. The claim in regard to the surcharges of December,
1947 and November, 1948 were within the 'three year period H
of limitation provided by Article 62, but the claim as regards what
was collected in July, 1947 was beyond that period. The learned
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, I.)
A
B
613
Subordinate Judge who negatived the defence based on the plaintiff
being the agent of the Government decreed the suit in its entirety
holding that it was not Article 62 that applied but Article 120
of the Indian Limitation Act which prescribes a period of six years.
The learned Judges of the High Court having dismissed the ~uit
on the merits had no occasion to consider the proper Article of
Limitation that would govern the different claims contained in the
1uit
The other appeal in which the question of limitation arises is
Civil Appeal No. 644 of 1962. That arises out of original
Suit No. 18 of 1954 filed before the Subordinate Judge of
C Rajahmundry which claimed repayment of sums paid in July,
1947, December 1947 and November, 1948. In the plaint the
dates on which payments were made by him were stated as
November 29, 1947, June 3, 1948, November 30, 1948 and
August I, 1949. The suit was filed on November 27, 1953 and
unless therefore the period of limitation for the claims in the suit
0 was the six years period specified in Article 120 the entirety of the
claims in the suit would be barred. The learned Subordinate
Judge upheld the claim of the plaintiff to refund on the meritl
but dismissed it on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
The plaintiff filed an appeal to the High Court but as his claim
was rejected on the merits it becomes unnece!lsary to decide
E whether the suit was also barred by limitation. In view of our
decision that the surcharges were not legally levied and that the
Government was not authorised to collect them, the question
whether the suit is barred by limitation necessarily arises for consideration.
F
It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellantl
that it was not Article 62 that applied to a suit making a claim
of this nature but the residuary Article 120 which runs :
•• De1cription of su#
G
H
12·l. Suit for which
no period of limitation
is provided elsewhere
in this scbed ule.
PeriOd of limitation
Time from which period
begin1 to run
Six years.
When the right to sue
accrues"
As Article 120 can apply only if no other specific Article were
applicable, we have to examine the question whether there is any
other specific Article applicable and in particular whether the
language of the first column of Article 62 covers a suit making
a claim of the nature made in the plaints before us. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeals 306 and
614
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[ 1965] 2 S.C.R.
644 of 1962 was that the Article refers to "money payable by the
defendant to the plaintiff" only in those cases where "the money
was received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use". The latter
condition that the money which is sought to be recovered must
have been received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use should,
it was urged, be literally satisfied before that Article could be
applied. In other words, the contention was that that Article
could not apply unless at the moment when a defendant received
the money, he received it specifically for pie use of the plaintiff.
On the other hand, the rival construction suggested by the
respondent was that the language of the Article had reference to
the action "for money had and received" as known to the English
Law, and that the reference to the receipt being for the plaintiff's
use was a technical term of English pleading and law which
imposed upon a defendant who received money in circumstances
which in justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff rendered its
receipt a "receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff''.
Here, it was pointed out, the money was received by the defendant
from the plaintiff which the plaintiff was not bound in law to pay
but which he was compelled or forced to pay because of the
threats or apprehension of legal process. The circumstances,
therefore, in which the money was received were, it was said,
'uch that notwithstanding that tlie receipt by the defendant
purported to be for his own benefit still it was money which at the
very moment of the receipt in justice and equity belonged to the
plaintiff, and that was the whole basis of the plaintiff's claim on
the merits.
·
A
B
C
D
E
The questions for consideration, therefore, are : ( 1) Does
Article 62 embody the essential elements of the action known in F
English Law and pleading as the "action for money had and
received to the plaintiff's u8e ?" (2) Does the fact that at the
moment of receipt the defendant intel)ded to receive the money
for his ·own benefit and not for the use of the plaintiff render
the Article inapplicable ? Stated in other terms is a literal compliance with the words that the money must have been received G
by the defendant for the plaintiff's use necessarily before the
Article applies, or is it sufficient that the circumstances of the
case are such that the plaintiff being entitled in equity to the
money, the law would impute to the defendant the intention to
hold it for the plaintiff's use and compel a i;efund of it to the
plaintiff.
H
-Therehas been diflerence of opinion on the exact rationale on
which that obligation was rested. One view was based on imputed
A. v. SUBBA II.AO v. STATE (Ayyangar, I.)
615
promise or a quasi contract which cast an obligation on the conscience of the party to restore benefits unjustly obtained. That
quasi contract was necessitated by the allegations, necessary in the
ancient writ of indebitatus assumpsit. There has been some
.difference of opinion observable in the cases decided by the several
High Courts as to the circumstances in which Article 62 could be.
B invoked. The controversy has ranged on the point as to whether
there ought to be a literal compliance with the last part of the
first column of the Article before it could be applied. This in its
tum, as we shall show presently, stems from a dill'erence of
opinion as to the rationale on which the action for money had and
C received rests in the. English Law.
A
The doctrine on which the action for "money had and received"
was based was propounded by Lord Mansfield in Moses v.
Macfer/an( 1 ) where it was explained that it lay "for money which
ex aqua et bona the defendant ought to refund" and in a later
case( 2 ) as "a liberal action, founded on large principles of equity,
D where the defendant .cannot conscientiously hold the money". In
later decisions it was said to be based not merely on an equitable
doctrine but was a Common Law right("). The jural basis on
which the action was originally supported, was a promise to pay
by the defendant implied or imputed by law. Lord Mansfield
explained:
E
"If the defendant be under an obligation from the
ties of natural justice to refund the law implies a debt
and gives this action, founded on the equity of the
plaintiffs case, as it were upon a contract."
Moses v. Macferlan( 1 ) itself was an action of assumpsit and the
F imputed promise was. an extension of the principle on which it
was in its origin based a,s stated in Cheshire & Fitfoot. In the
third Edition of Bullen and Leake published in 1868 they said : (')
G
"The action for money had and received is the most
comprehensive of all the common counts. It is applicable wherever the defendant has received money, which,
in justice and equity, belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances which render the receipt of it a receipt by
the defendant to the use of the plaintiff."
"But, despite this formidable measure of unanimity,
the abolition of Ute forms of action in the middle of the
H
(1) (1761) 2 Burr.. 1005,
(Z) Sadler v. Eva11r (1'16J) 4 Bµrr. 1984.
(3) See for instance RoylJJ Bank of Ca11ada v. Rth.' [1913! A. C. 283.
(4} Cheshire & Fitroot, Law of Contract, Stb Edp. p. SSS-SS6.
616
SUPRBMJI
CX>lll.T
RBPOllTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
nineteenth century and the temptations of a new analyti·
. cal jurisprudence gradually underqlined Lord Mansfield's position. So long as the common lawyers thought
in terms of procedure and associated quasi-contract with
·the writ of Indebitatus Assumpsit, they were content to
accept the implications of unjust benefit. But when they
abandoned their traditional forms and substituted a
dichotomy of tort and contract, the old explanation
:seemed no longer to suffice. The various actions
·grouped under the insidious title of quasi-contract were
·clearly not tortious : if the new antithesis of the common
law was inevitable, they must perforce be contractual.
And, as they were equally clearly not based upon any
.genuine consent, they must rest upon an implied or
hypothetical agreement."
•
c
Various bases have been suggested in modern times as tho
rationale and proper foundations on which to rest this action.
But we are not concerned with these theories or their history and D
evolution in England. What is of relevance is the content and ·
significance of the words "received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use". Article 62 in its present form was first enacted in the
Limitation Act of 1871 as Art. 60 and it has continued in the
same terms since then with only a change in its number. We
have, therefore, to see what exactly the draftsmen of this Article a
"!lleant when it was first introduced in 1871. In Mohomed Wahib
-v. Mohomed Ameer( 1 ) Mookerjee, J. explained the basis of
-Article 62 in these terms :
"The Article, when it speaks of a suit for money
received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, points
to the well-known English action in that form; consequently the Article ought to apply wherever the defendant has received money which in justice and equity
belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances which in
law render the receipt of it, a receipt by the defendant
to the use of the plaintiff."
r
G·
.
In other words, the learned· Judge held that it was not necessary
in order to attract Article 62 that at the moment of the r~
the defendant should have actually intended to receive it for· the
use of the plaintiff and that it was sufficient if the receipt was in
· such circumstances that the law would impute to him an obligation to retain it for the use of the plaintiff and refund to him when
(I).L.R. 32 Cal. 527 at p. 533.
H
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, /.)
617
A demanded. In Biman Chandra v. Promotho Nath(') it was said,
following the decision in Mohomed Wahib v. Mohomed Ameer(')
that Article 62 ·most nearly approaches the formula of 'money
had and received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, if read
as a description and apart from the technical qualifications imported in English Law and Procedure'.
B
A' different note was, however, struck by the Calcutta High
Court in Anantram Bhattacharjee v. Hem Chandra Kar('). It
was npt a case where the defendant directly received the money
from the plaintiff but where a defendant withdrew frOJp the office
of the Collector an amount which in law belonged to the plaintiff.
c The learned Judges held that there was no reason why the artificial
form of action of money had and received should be imported ta.
<lecide a question whether the suit would come under Article 62.
Ghose, J. with those judgment Walmsley, J. agreed, took the·
view that the Article would apply only to a case where the defen-dant in terms received the money for the benefit of the plaintiff.
D The learned Judge observed:
1
G
H
"The Common Law form of action for money had
and received grew out of the circumstance that at
Common Law in England an action in personam is
maintainable only on contract or on tort. Where therefore an action was not based on tort and the plaintiff was
unable to establish any contract by evidence, it was.
found necessary to have recourse to a fiction of a promise to pay "implied in Jaw" in order to give relief to
the plaintiff and to meet the justice of the case. The
history of this form of action and the reasons which Jed·
to its extension are set forth in the case of Sinclair v.
Brougham (1914 A.C. 398). Speech of Lord Haldane,
L. C. at pages 415--417, and of Lord Sumner at pages
454-456. It is pointed out by Lord Sumner that this
was •said to be a 'liberal' action in that it was attended·
by a minimum of formality, and was elastic and readily
capable of being adapted to new circumstapces. There
does not appear to be any sufficient reason why this
artificial form of action shpuld be imported in this
country in order to decid~ whether a suit would come
under Article 62 of the Ljmitation Act. In India Jaw
and equity are administerell by the same Courts, which
are untrammelled by any technical riiles as to the form
(I) J.L.R. 49 Cal. 886.--(2) J.L.R. 32 Cal. S27 at p. 533":
3 ) I.L.R. SO Cal. 475 at p. 480.
'618
SUPIUlMB
COURT
lUlPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
of an action in giving relief to the plajntiff, where the
A
defendant has received money which according to the
justice of the case he ought to refund. The observations
of the Judicial Committee in the case of John v. Dodwell
(1918 A.C. 563) furnish an illustration of this view.
In my opinion the plain meaning of the words in Article
B
62 of the Limitation Act should be given effect to
without having recourse to any technical rules of English
Law regarding forms of action."
He then cited the decision of the Privy Council in Gurudas Pyne v.
Ram Narain Sahu(') where Article 120 was applied to a claim
against a person in a fiduciary position as supporting his views. C
A similar view was adopted by Chagla, C. J. in Lingangouda v.
Lingangouda( 2 ) where the learned judge preferred to follow
Anantram's( 3 ) case in preference to Mahomed Wahib's(') case.
In the case before him he held that the claim of the plaintiff was
an equitable claim and not a contractual claim thus attracting not
Article 62 but the ,residuary Article 120. One of the main D
reasons why Chagla, C. J. held that Article 62 should not apply
to a case where the terms of the section were not literally complied
with was that such a construction would result in plaintiffs losing
a large number of cases on the ground of limitation, whereas if
Article 120 were held applicable they would b~ safe. There arc
a few other decisions of the High Courts taking a similar view E
but as these merely follow the Calcutta and the Bombay cases
we have referred to, it is unnecessary to detail them.
Having considered the matter carefully we are inclined to
prefer the interpretation of the Article by Mookerjee, J. in
Mahomed Wahib's(') case. What we are solely concerned with
is the meaning of the words employed in the first column of the F
Article which specifies the nature of the suit dealt with. That they
were derived and adopted from the terminology employed in the
English action for money had and received is not disputed. The
Courts in India being courts administering both law and equity,
no doubt we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English
forms of action which originated at a time before the Judicature G
Acts when law and equity were administered by different Courts.
But that is only as regards the merits of a claim and its maintainability in a Court. With great resooct to the learned Judges who
decided Anantram's(') and Lingangouda's(2) cases, we are
unable to agree that the changes which the doctrine has under- H
gone in E_nglan~ _ha_v!_!_ny bearing on what the Article meant in
11) T.L.R. 10 Cal. 86'1.
(3) I.L.R 50 Cal. 4 .,5 at p. 480.
(2) I.L.R. 1953 Bom. 214
(-\) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 527 at p. sn.
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
619
1871 when the legislature lifted the words descriptive of a form
of an English action and incorporated it in the Indian statute. Nor
are we impressed with the argument that if the terms of a specific
Article do apply to a specific case, one could ignore it and seek
a general Article merely on the ground that the latter affords a
longer period of limitation for the filing of a suit.
So far as the present claim for recovery of a tax illegally
collected is concerned the authorities are fairly uniform that the
period of limitation for a suit making such a claim is governed by
Article 62: Rajputana Malwa Railway Co-operative Stores Ltd.,
v. The Ajmer Municipal Board(') arose out of a suit against a
Municipal Board for refund of certain octroi duty which they
were not legally entitled to levy. The suit for that claim was held
to be governed by Article 62, the learned Judges stating :
"The language of Article 62 is borrowed from the
form of count in vogue in England under the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1852. Prior to the passing of the
Supreme Court of Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875,
there was a number of forms of pleading known as the
common indebitatus counts, such as counts for money
lent, money paid by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant at his request, money received by the defendant for
the use of the plaintiff, & co. . . . . . . . . The most comprehensive of the old common law counts was that for
money received by the defendant for the use of die
plaintiff. Thi5 count was applicable where a defendant
received money which in justice and equity belon".ed to
the plaintiff under circumstances which rendered the
receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff ....
It was a form of claim which wa5 applicable when the
plaintiff's money had been wrongfully obtained by the
defendant."
A similar view was taken of claims of a like nature in Municipal
Council Dindigul v. The Bombay Co. Ltd., Madras('), India
Sugar and Refinery Ltd. v. The Municipal Council Hospet( 1 ),
State of Madras v. A.M.N.A. Abdul Kader('), and The Municipal
Committee, Amritsar v. Amar Dass('). Learned Counsel submitted that these cases proceeded, in great part, on the inapplicability of the shorter periods of limitation provided in the particular
statutes for amounts improperly collected thereunder. We do not,
however, consider that this militates, in any manner, from the
(I) I.L.R. 32 All. 491.
(3) I.LR. 43 Mad. 521.
(2) I.LR. 52 Mad. 217.
(4) A.l.R. 1953 Mad. 995
(S) A.l.R. 1953 Punjab 99.
620
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R..
reasoning upon which the decisions are based, for they all refer
to the terms of Article 62, to its ·scope and their applicability in
terms to cases of suit for refund of tax illegally collected. In addition, we might point out that in India Sugar and Refinery Ltd. v.
The Municipal Council, Hospet(') the claim for some of the
years for which the suit was filed was dismissed as barred by
limitation by applying the. three year rule. In fact, learned Counsel
conceded that save a solitary decision in Govind Singh v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh ( 2 ) to which we shall presently refer, the
decisions were uniform in applying Article 62 to cases of suits for
refund of taxes illegally collected. We consider that these decisions
are correct and they have applied the proper article of limitation.
Before referring to Govind Singh's(2) case it would be
convenient to clarify the position as regards certain circumstances in which the Article would be applicable without making
any exhaustive list. Where the defendant occupies a fiduciary
relationship towards the plaintiff it is clear that Article 62 is inapplicable. Next even if the claim could have been comprehended
under the omnibus caption of the English "action for money had
and received", still if there are other more specific articles in the
Limitation Act-vide e.g., Article 96 (mistake), Article 97 (consideration which fails) Article 62 would be inapplicable. Lastly,
if the right to refund does not arise immediately on receipt by the
defendant but arises by reason of facts transpiring subsequently,
Article 62 cannot apply, for it proceeds on the basis that the plaintiff has a cause of action for instituting the suit at the very moment
of the receipt.
It is this last point that was involved in Govlnd Singh v. Th~
State of Madhya Pradesh ( 2 ) on which learned ·Counsel relied as a
decision which had refused to apply Article 62 and applied
Art. 120 to a claim for refund of tax overpaid. There the assessee
deposited along with his return certain sums. He had overpaid
and so was entitled to obtain a refund when the assessment was
completed. A suit for the amount of that excess was held to be
governed by Article ~20. It is clear that at the time when the
assessee made the deposit of the tax he was not entitled to the
refund. That right accrued to him only after the comnletion of the
assessment. We consider, therefore, that this decision does not
assist the appellant in the construction _which he seeks to persuade
us to adopt of Article 62.
If Article 62 were the proper Article of limitation applicable,
Civil Appeal 644 of 1962 has to be dismissed as the suit was filed
(I) t.L.R. 43 Mad. S21
(2) 12 S.T.C. 8:ZS.
A
B
c
D
E:
F
c
H
A. v. SUBBA RAO v. STATE (Ayyangar, ].)
621
A admittedly beyond three years after the receipt of the money by
the respondent. There should also have to be a modification in
the decree passed in Civil Appeal 306 of 1962. The claim in that
suit included the amounts collected from the appellant as surcharge in July, 1947, in December, 1947 and November, 1948
i.e., for all the three surcharges. It is common ground that if the
B three years' period of limitation under Article 62 was applied the
claim for the refund of the surcharge imposed in July, 1947
would be beyond time. The appellant is, therefore, entitled Qnly
to his claim for the refund of the amounts collected for the surcharges imposed in December, 1947 and November, 1948.
C
As a result of the foregoing Civil Appeal 644 of 1962 shall
stand dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs as the
appellant has succeeded on the merits of his claim, though the
appeal fails on the ground of limitation.
All the other appeals excepting Civil Appeal 306 of 1962 will
D be allowed and the judgment of the High Court set aside. In
Civil Appeals 101, 131, 168 to 171, 259, 260, 302, 307 to 310,
838, 839 of 1962 and Civil Appeals 325, 437-441 and 996
of 1963 the decrees of the trial court shall be restored with co&ts
here and in the High Court.
In Civil Appeal 306 of 1962 the amount decreed by the trial
Court shall be modified by deducting therefrom a sum of
Rs. 2,725/14/- made up of Rs. 2,261/8/- paid for the surcharge
in July, 1947 together with Rs. 464/6/- being the interest claimed
on the said sum. Subject to this modification the decree of the
trial Court shall be restored with costs here and in the High Court.
F
In Civil Appeals 303, 837, 840-857 of 1962 the suits will
be decreed for the amounts prayed for with costs throughout.
In the computation of the costs in this Court two sets of
hearing fees shall be a1Iowed---0ne sp,t to be shared by the appelG lantc. in Civil Appeals 131, 170, 307 to 309 and 837-857 of
1962 and the other set by the successful appellants in the other
anpeals to whom we have awarded costs.
ORDER
H
In accordance with the majority judgment, appeals are dismissed with costs.
IASup./65-6
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