GULABCHAND CHHOTALAL PARIKH versus SIATE OF BOMBAY (NOW GUJARAT)
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 December 1964 | [1965] 2 S.C.R. 547 | 1964 INSC 287
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 December 1964
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 670/1963
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1965] 2 S.C.R. 547
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 287
Text of the judgment
'
547
A
GULABCllAND CBHOTALAL PARJKll
v.
SI'ATE OF BOMBAY (NOW GUJARAT)
8
December 14. 1964
(A. K. SAlutAR., K. SullBA RAO, RAGHUBAA DAYAL,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAA AND J. R. MUOHOLKAll, JJ.]
Practice and · Procedun-Dtcisltm on writ application under Art.
226--Suit /or same re/leJ-1/ '-!ed by res judicata.
1be appellant prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus and a writ
of prohibition against the respondent-state in a writ application filed
C io Ifie High Court, on the ground that bis liability as surety for some con·
~ stood cfucbarged on account of a particular action of the State.
1be High Court diS!Dissed the petition on merits after full contesL He
thereupon filed a suit against the respondent and raised the same plea
that be was discharged from liability as surety on the same grounds. The
1rial court, the first appellate Court and the High Court held that the
suit was barred by ru judicata in view of the judgment of the High Court
D on the writ petition. In appeal to the Supreme Court,
HELD (Per Sarkar, Raghubar Dayal, Rajagopala Ayyangar and
Mudbolkar JJ.) : On general principles of res ;Wlicata, the decision of
the High Court on a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, on
the merits, on a matter, after full contest, will operate as ,., judlcata in a
...._._,t regular suit between the same parties with respect to the
matter. [574 E-F]
E
The provisions of s. 111 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, are not ezhaus·
dw with nospec:t tO an earlier decision operating as ru judicata between
the llDle parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular
lllit and, on the general principle of r<• judlcata, any previous decision
on a matter in controversy decided after full contest or after affording
fair "l.'portunity to tho parties to prove their case by a court competent
to decide it, will operate u ru judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is
not - . y that the court deciding the matter formerly be competent
F to decide the subsequent suit or that the former 1,>roceeding and the subsoqumt suit have the same subject matter. The nature of the former pro-iing is immaterial. There is, therefore, no good reason to preclude
anch clCcisions on matters In controversy in writ proceedings under Arts.
226 or 32 from operating 81 ru judicata in subsequent regular suits on
the l8llle matters in controversy, between the same parties, and thus to
aiYo limited dfect to the principle of finslity of decisions after full com-.
['73 11-E]
G
H
Cue law reviewed.
Per Sobba Rao, J. (dbmulng) : The decision given by the High Court
in the writ petition would not preclude the court, before which the suit
was filed, from deciding the amo quation on merits in the suit. [576 FJ
This view, while it does not mate s. 11 of the Code an unneceswy
proftsioo, doee not lead to any practical difficulties, for, the decision of
die Hijh Court on a question of law will be binding as an authority on
Subordiflll1e Courts and its decision on a question of fact will rarely be
dilfsed from by the said courts. [576 B-F]
Ome law CCllllidcml.
548
CIVIL APPELIATB hlmDcnoH: Civil Appeal N>_ 670 m A
1963.
Appeal by special )caw: from tbc jndgmma and dcm:e dmd
Man:b 31, 1958 of 1hc Bombay High Comt in Second Appeals
No. 1480 of 1957.
S. '[. Demi and I. N. SlrTOfJ, b' the !lppdlant
S. G. PlllWm'dhan and R.H. Dhebar, b' tbe rap•ideut..
'lbti Judgment of Sarbr, Ragladm Da.Jal, ~
Ayyangar and Mndbolbr., H. w dditued by Rag1mlJar DaJnI J.
Subba Rao, J. ddDeml a dj 11iHg Opi11iom
DaJlll, L This appeal.. by special lr:avc. mn tllc
question whether a clrv:isjng ~ tllc High Comt llll nx:.rifs m a
certain Dlllltel' aftec aa1k:&f in a wDt pd)IMm undrL Ait. 226 of
the Constitution opcatt:s as ra ;w&r11a in a regullu: suit with
respect to the same matter berwrm 1hc S1111JC pmirs.
Rad '
The facls k:adjgg to the ll{lllClll me tfJae.. The ll(lpCllw
stood SURlly foc a nmnbcr of n•d• • t•s -.ID &ad tUr:n oonfrw:IS
in 1947 for .fdliDg timbec mes ml tQllOfing limbet in warious
fomsts in the eutwbilc Slate of Baria. The u•d•am 1l'ae tab::a
as a i:esult of auctions which took pbce Ulllllll: 1bl: "Owliti1ts of
Auction Sale of Fonds in the Baria Slate in tbc S:mmrt JQr 2002"
com:spondiDg to 194>46 A.D.. dlough in the plaint tbc:e llODditious wen: 1efencd to as Forest Aw:tinn Ruk:s. On April 1.
1948, the appellant pu" 11m an applM ati., to the Dam. Sll!fe
stating tberl:in that celliliii bmtas - i mmey to the +arious
contiacton meatiou:d in 1hc iip}iJio ••i• and ptajing that they be
restrained to pay the amouut due to the ClllJlr.M:lOm 1IDlilt futtlltl
Oidcrs and that those btotas and CIODba:bs be ai;o IQIUaintd
from directly removing the cioubadlllll' ~ goods stmed in. the
godowns at Piplod. Baria and Jimu....Ja without the pe111tri•;m of
the State Govu mnmt It w.n fmdtt DM\ldM.....t in the 8{IPlica.
lion that if those wntraclols would aniWt at an ammgemeot Wit
him and carry out tho Ya11ivat. be would do the needful in that
behalf. 0n 1his applii ;alM.. it appeais. the Slate GoVt:OHllJO;nt
issued nolioes to the COidiaclDis slzling dlerein that the sutety.
i.e., the appellant, &ad moved. uodel" cl. 8 of tbc Conditions of tile
Auction Sale of jungle goods b' a!la lmcnt m their goods that be
lying in the godowns at Baria. Piplocl ad l.iin\lvda in the Slate
and the debts or odtt movable or immoo¥3ble proflCllj bebtgiug
to them and for delivering the same to Jlim and diieclf:d the cm,tractors not to sell, mortgage, gift away oc odnwise diq1ose of
B
c
D
E
Jr
G
H
GULABCHAND v. STATE
(Dayal, I.)
549
whatever movable or immovable property they had in the State
without the permission of the State.
Subsequently, the State of Baria merged with the State of
Bombay on June 10, 1948. Thereafter, the contractors were
allowed by the Government to remove the materials on certain
conditions.
8
The appellant presented a writ petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution to the High Court of Bombay. That petition is not
printed in the appeal record. It was Civil Application No. 261
of 1952. It, along with two other applications, C.As. Nos. 260
and 376 of 1952, was disposed of by a common judgment in C.A.
C 260 of 1952 which is Exhibit P. 194. The parties agree that
what was alleged and what was prayed for by the appellant in his
petition could be gathered from the order Exhibit P. 194. The
reply filed by the parties in that petition is Exhibit P. 196 and
gives the case of the opposite party with respect to the allegations
of the appellant in his petition. It however appears from the
D order of the High Court on that writ petition that the reliefs claimed were a direction to the respondents i.e., the State of Bombay
and the Mamlatdar of Baria Taluka to raise the attachment levied
on Municipal Nos. 728 and 642 of Deogad Baria, the issue of a
writ of mandamus or directions under Art. 226 of the ConstituE tion prohibiting them from selling those Municipal numbers and
from proceeding with the auction sale of properties on February
15, 1952 or on any other date. The appellant had alleged in that
petition that the attached properties of the contractors were allowed to be sold by the contractors without the knowledge and consent
of the appellant, that the sale was unauthorised and contrary to
F the terms of the attachment levied by the State and that therefore
it had put an end to the liability of the appellants uTJ.der their
surety bonds.
it.
It was urged for the appellant at the hearing of that petition
that since the State allowed the contractors to sell their own propertia; the appellant had been discharged from his suretyship in
G respect of the said contractors and that the State could no longer
claim to recover from him the balance due from the said contr~c
tors. The writ application was presented because, in default of
tbe contracts to pay the balance amount due from them the Forest
Office.rs of the Government of Bombay had moved the Revenue
Officers to recover the said amount from the aprellant who was the
H surety as an arrear of land revenue. The revenue authorities took
steps to attach the immovable properties of the appellant and that
led the appellant to present that petition.
•
550
SUPREME
COURT
llEPORTS
[1965] 2s.c.R.
The contentions for the State of Bombay and the Ma.mlatdar in A
the writ proceedings were :
1. The petition was misconceived as not maintainable and there was no case for the issue of a writ of
man4amus because the proper course for the appellant
was ·to redress his ~ailed grievance by proceeding
B
according to the ordinary law through the Municipal
Courts.
2. There were no Baria State Forest Auction Rules.
What the Baria State Authorities laid down were· the
conditions of such auction sales and the appellant's
c
reference to those conditions as rules was not correct.
3. The contractors had to furnish a surety who also
had to execute a separate and independent agreement
with the State in the Form approved by it. The appellant
stood surety for the contractors and executed the neces-
sary a~ents.
4. The said agreements stipulated three important
conditions : ( i) that the surety will pay the instalment
amount as stipulated; (ii) that if the instalments were
not paid on due dates, he will pay interest at one pie
per rupee per day and (iii) that if he fails to pay the
instalment amounts and the intei:est, the State will be at
liberty to recover the same from any of his properties and
from his successors and assignees.
5. Condition No. 8 of the conditions for auction
sales of forests was :
"So long as the contractor has not paid the deposit or
the confirmed sale price in full into the Treasury or
to the Surety, the Surety shall, at any time present
an application to the Treasury Officer for the recovery
of an amount required to discharge his liability in connection with the confirmed sale price or of the amount
paid by him without filing a suit for the same in a civil
Court. In that case the property, effects and debts of
the contractor that may be within the territory of the
State shall, as in the case of land revenue, be attached
and auctioned at the cost and risk of the contractor
and out of the sale proceeds realised at the auction,
the amount due to the surety or .an amount equivalent
to the amount required to discharge his liability shall
be paid to the Surety."
D
E
F
G
H
GULABCHAND 11. STATE
B
c
D
E
r
G
(Dayal, /.)
551
6. The appellant had not applied for attachment and
sale of all the properties and outstandings of the con·
tractors but had requested the State to see that the brokers
did not pay their dues to the contractors that the materials in the depots were not directly disposed of by the
contractors and that the contractors carried on the busi·
ness after settling with the petitioner.
7. The State issued the necessary injunction orders
of attachment, even though the appellant's request dated
April 7, was not at all consistent with the provisions of
sale condition No. 8.
8.. In order to obviate the complete hold up of the
timber trade, a system was devised whereby the contractors were allowed to dispose of the stock of timber, if the
sureties consented to its removal and the contractors
guaranteed to pay the price realised to the sureties concerned.
9. According to the record, the appellant had request·
. ed the State to release the goods of certain contractors by
his letters dated May 19, and 22, of 1948. This scheme
adopted by the State of Baria was solely motivated in
view of the inevitable delay on account of the sureties
first realising the amount and then depositing the amount
in the Government treasury and the appellant was aware
of that slight modification in the procedure.
10. At a meeting convened by the Divisional Forest
Officer, Panchmahals, Godhra, on August 1, 1948, the
appellant was present and it was decided that the contractors be permitted to remove the material on payment
of the price of the materials sold.
11. It was denied that as a result of the alleged
action of the Forest Officers, the petitioner's security was
considerably disminished and the eventual remedy of the
petitioner against the contractors was very much impair-,
ed and the petitioner was discharged fr6m his suretyship
in respect of the said contracts.
The High' Court dismissed the writ petition on July 22, 1952
holding that there was no substance in the contention that the
H petitioners had been discharged from their liability as sureties.
The sole basis on which the contention was raised was that the
contractors were permitted by the State to sell their properties
552
SUPRBMB
COURT
REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
which were under attachment contrary to the terms of the attach- A
ment, in view of the sales being held without the knowledge and
consent of the appellant. The High Court held that it was a wrong
assumption of the appellant that the attached goods were not to be
sold without his knowledge and consent. The prayer made by
the appellant in his application dated April 7, 1948 did not include
a prayer to the effect that the attached goods be not sold without B
his knowledge and consent. The High Court therefore held that
the plea that the sales absolved the appellant from his liability
as surety could not be accepted.
We are no more concerned with the other point raised by the
writ petition to the effect that the revenue authorities were not
entitled to recover the amount due from the appellant under the
summary procedure prescribed by the Land Revenue Code. The
High Court did not accept this contention.
On August 29, 1952, the appellant instituted the suit which
has given rise to this appeal. It was alleged that the Baria State
had its own laws and rules and regulations, that the contractors of
that State were bound to act according to them, that the Baria
State had rules known as Forest Auction Rules for the auction of
timber of the forests and auctions were held according to those
rules and that the people acted on the understanding that the
auctions and the surety bonds were in pursuance of the said Rules.
Auctions were held in September-October 1947. The appellant
stood surety with respect to the 11 contracts mentioned in para 2
of the plaint. The alleged rude No. 8 (condition No. 8 of the
Forest Auction Conditions) was quoted in the plaint. The appellant executed all the surety bonds on the understanding that the
Baria State Forest Auction Rules were the basis of the auction
sales and that the surety bonds were in accordance with those rules.
Due to certain reasons mentioned in para 5 of the plaint, the
appellant. on or about April 13, 1948. applied to the Baria State
praying for the assets and pronerties of the contractors to be taken
in attachment and sold and for facilities being made available to
him to fulfil his liabilities under the surety-bonds. , The Baria
State authorities attached the assets and-properties of the Contractors as prayed. It may be mentioned here that in his deoosition
the armellant admitted the application, Exhibit 195, dated Aoril
7, 1948 to be the application he had nresented for the aforesaid
purpose.
It was further alleged in the plaint that subsequent to the
merger of the Baria State with the Bombay State on October 6,
C
D
E
F
G
H
GULABCHAND v. STATE
(Dayal, /.)
553
1948, the Bombay State Forest Authorities, without asking the
plaintiff or without his consent, allowed the said contractors to
remove and sell their respective teak and sundry goods which were
taken in attachment and thus behaving in contravention of the
attachment made in his interest and put an end to his security and
that acConling to law the plaintiff thus became discharged of
B liability as surety for the said contractors. Another reason for his
alleged discharge from liability was alleged to be that even fresh
sureties had been obtained from some contractors. It was also
mentioned in the plaint that the appellant had to make a petition
to the High Court in order to prevent his property from being sold
C and that he had been informed that the said petition had been
dismissol on the ground that he could lawfully get his reliefs in
the Civil Court.
A
D
E
E
On the above facts the appellant prayed inter alta as follows :
"I. It may be declared that I have become discharged
from all liability as surety for the contractors mentioned
in para 2 of this plaint and a decree may be passed against
the defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1 herein and
their servants, officers and agents, in · the form of a
permanent injunction prohibiting them for all times from
attaching my property, selling or causing it to be sold.
2. A permanent injunction may be issued to the
defendant No. 1 herein and their servants, agents and
officers that these defendants, under the facts mentioned
in this plaint shall not, unless in execution of a decree
in their favour obtained from a proper and authorised
court, attach any property of this plaintiff and sell it in
the revenue manner or cause it to be sold."
The State of Bombay contested the suit mostly repeating what
they had urged in their reply affidavit filed in the proceedings on
the writ application. It did not admit that the writ application
filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the High Court because
G another remedy was open and stated that his contentions were not
upheld.
H
Several issues were framed. Issue No. SA was :
"Is the suit barred by res judicata in view of the High
Court's judgment in Civil Applications No. 260, 261
and 376 of 1952 ?"
The Trial Court held on this issue that that judgment operated as
res ftulicata in the suit It recorded its findings on the other issues
554
SUP.lUIMB
COtlllT
llBPORTS
(1965) 2S.CR.
as well, but we are not concerned with those findings.
missed the suit.
It dis-
A.
On appeal by the appellant, the District Judge agreed with the
Trial Court that the suit was barred by res judicata in view of the
judgment of the High Court on the writ petition. He accordingly
dismi•sed the appeal. He also recorded his findings on the other B
points urged before him.
On second appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
agreed with the courts below that the decision of the High Court
on the question whether the plaintiff was absolved from liability
under the surety agreement must be regarded as res judicata and c
could not be opened in the suit. He further considered the question whether in the circumstances of the case the appellant was
entitled to the injunction prayed for and held that it was open
to the appellant to maintain the suit for the determination of the
amount due from him as that had not been considered and determined in the writ petition. He therefore allowed the appeal, set D
aside the order of the District Judge and passed a decree in favour
of the appellant declaring that he was liable to pay the amount
due under the surety agreement less the amount paid by the contractor and such amount as had been recovered by the State by
sale of the property of the contractor attached under condition
No. 8. He further ordered issue of an injunction restraining the E
State from enforcing the liability for the amount in excess of the
amount declared to be due' from the appellant.
,
The appellant's application for leave to file an appeal under
cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court was rejected. Thereafter, the appellant filed this appeal after obtaining F
special leave from this Court.
· Mr. Desai, for the appellant, has urged two points. The first
is that a decision in a writ application under Art. 226 for the issue
of a writ of mandamus does not operate as res judicata in a regular
suit subsequently filed for a declaration of the plaintiff's rights and G
for the issue of an order of injunction against the defendant. The
other is that the doctrine of constructive res judicata cannot be
applied when the dispute was first decided in a writ petition and
is to be later decided in a regular suit It has been said that it
would be very dangerous to hold that the decision' in the writ
application operates as res judicata in the re~ar suit even if H
ide~~cal r~liefs on identical grounds were prayed for in a writ
petition, with those prayed for in the later regular suit
GULABCBAND v. STATB
(Dayal, /,)
551
Tiie first question is really the main question for decision in
dlil appeal as it is not a case for the application of the principle
cl &ODstructive res judicata. It is clear from what has been stated
~that the appellant prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus
and a writ of prohibition in the writ application on the ground that
his liability as surety for the several contractors stood discharged
I CJD account of the State, without the knowledge and consent of
the appellant, allowing the contractors to dispose of the goods
which had been attached on the application of the appellant, an
application which he could present in view of Condition 8 of the
Conditions of Auction Sale. The reliefs sought in the plaint
me the same and. are sought on the same grounds. The High
C Court had !IJ determine in the writ petition whether the appellant's
liability as surety stood discharged in view of what he had alleged.
Tbc samo point has to be directly and substantially decided in th~
suit also. The orders to be passed if the appellant's contention is
upheld would be the same as that which would have been passed
D if his contention had been accepted in the writ petition. In both
c-. on both occasions, the Court had first to hold that his liability as a surety stood discharged, and that as a coruequence of
lllCb a finding, it had, in the writ proceedings, to issue a writ of
mandamus and a writ. of prohibition as prayed for in the writ petition, dmlcting the State of Bombay not to enforce any liability
s which the appellant had undertaken under the agreements execut- eel· as a surety and not to proceed with the realisation of any amount
the State .allel?ed to be due from him and in the suit to pass a
decree prolu'biting the defendants by a pCn:nanent injunction for
aD time from attaching his property, selling or causing it to be
IOld and also a pennanent injunction to the State of Bombay
I' ttatraining them from attaching and selling any pronerty of the
appellant unless a proper decree is obtained from the Court in the
manner provided for the recovery of land revenue.
A
It is urged for the appellant that in the writ petition the
c:onteDtion about the appellant's liability as a surety having come
G to an end was based on the terms of the contract, which was based
CJD the conditions of auction sales, between the appellant and the
State of Baria while in the pttSent suit the contention with respect
to the .c i sion of his liability as a surety was based on the auction
rules. The distinction sought to be made has no substance. It
is denied in the tei>ly' affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent in
B the writ petition that there were any Baria State Forest Auction
Rllles. We have not been refen:ed to any rules. In fact, when
we asked for the rules, we were pl'OVided by learned cotmsel fO!
•
'556
SUPllEME
COUllT
llEPORTS
{1965) 2 S.c.Il.
the appellant with a booklet by the name 'Conditions for the A1!ction Sale of Forests'. Further, the order of the High Court on the
writ petitiop mentions in the early part of the order :
A
"It would appear that the Baria State had auctioned
the teak wood trees ... on the terms and conditions c:oatained in the said Forest Auction Rules."
B
It may be said that these conditions for the auction sale of forests
have been referred to sometimes as rules, probably in view of
their binding nature.
It cannot therefore be disputed that if the decision which bad
been given in a writ petition had been given in a regular suit that
decision would have operated as res judicata in the later suit 'lbe C
question which arises for consideration is whether swh a decision
in a writ petition can also bar a later suit on account of its operating as res judicata.
Before we deal with the question, we may dispose of the short
points urged for the appellant. It is urged that if a decision in a D
writ application on merits be held to operate as res judicata in a
regular suit, the provisions of 0.2, r. 2 C.P.C. would also be applicable to the institution of the subsequent suit with respect to such
part of the cause of action for which no relief was sought in the
writ petition. The contention is not sound as the provisions of
r. 2, 0.2 apply only to suits. Sub-r. ( 1) requires that every suit E
shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is Cllltitled
to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintilf may
relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within
the jurisdiction of any Court. Sub-rule (2) then provides that
where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relin- F
quishes any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in
r~pect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. By its very
language, these provisions do not ap'ply to the contents of a writ
petition and consequently do not apply to the contents of a subsequent suit. Such a view was indicated by this Court in Devendra
Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh( 1 ) when it G
was said at p. 324 :
"The bar of 0.2, r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on
which the High Court apparently relied may not apply
to a petition for a high prerogative writ under Art. 226
of the Constitution, but the High Court having disallowed the claim of the appellant for salary prior to the date
II
·of the suit, we do not think that we would be justified in
{1) [1%2) suPP. 1 S.C.R. 31s:
GULABCHAND V. STATB (Daya/, /.)
557
interfering with the exercise of its discretion by the High
Court."
The contention that a decision on a writ petition even on merits
should not operate as res judicata as it is discretionary for the
Court to pass any order it considers fit on a writ petition and not
B to decide it after considering all the points urged by the parties,
was negatived in Daryao v. The State of U.P. ( 1 ) With regard to
the point that the issue of a writ by a High Court was discretionary
as it may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 as for
instance when the party applying for the writ was guilty of laches
but the Supreme Court could not refuse to issue the appropriate
c writ once it was shown that a fundamental right had been infringed,
it was said, at p. 589 :
A
" ... and that may be said to constitute a difference
in the right conferred .on a citizen to move the High
Court under Art. 226 as distinct from the right conferred
on him to move this Court. This difference must
inevitably mean that if the High Court has refused to
exercise its discretion on the ground of !aches or on the
ground that the party has an efficacious alternative
remedy available to him then of course the decision of
the High Court cannot generally be pleaded in support
of the bar of res judicata. If, however, the matter has
been considered on the merits and the High Court has
dismissed the petition for a writ on the ground that no
fundamental right is proved or its breach is either not
established or is shown to be constitutionally justified
there is no reason why the said decision should not be
treated as a bar against the competence of a subsequent
petition filed by the same party on the same facts and
for the same reliefs under Art. 32."
D
E
F
In this connection, reference may be made to what was said, about
G
the contention that a previous judgment was not to operate as
res judicata against a party as it was oased on certain statements
recorded before that party was impleaded, in Krishna Behari Ray
v. ~Brojeswari Chowdranee(') :
"It was suggested by Mr. Cave that the former
judgment ought not to be binding, because certain witnesses having been examined before the present Appellant
intervened in the suit, he was refused the opportunity
of cross-examining them. Their Lordships think that
11
(I)
[1962] I S.C.R. 574.
IASup.C.I./65~ 2
(2) L.R. 2 lA. 283, 286.
558
SUPRBMB
COURT
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
such an objection is no answer to the defence arising from
the former judgment. If there had been any miscarriage
of that kind, the matter was one for appeal in that suit.
The objection does not appear to have been raised in the
appeals which were successively made in that suit to the
Civil Judge and to the High Court; but whether it was
so raised or not, their Lordships think that that cannot
affect the operation of the final judgment, which must be
taken to have been rightly given."
A
B
Another reason urged in support of the contention is that the
petitioner in a writ petition had no right to apply for the issue of
the appropriate writ and it is a matter of discretion for the High C
Court to entertain any application or to grant it and that a decision
in one proceeding can operate as res judicata in a subsequent
proceeding only when the party initiating the first proceeding had
a right to initiate both the proceedings when the nature of both the
proceedings be the same. This is the same contention as the
earlier one, put in a different form, and does not merit further D
consideration.
It is further submitted for the appellant that a writ of mandamus, according to its nature, is to be issued mainly to compel the
performance by a public servant of his duty of a public nature,
while in a suit the plaintiff prays for the enforcement of his personal E
rights. The declaration of a personal right is not an essential
characteristic in the issue of a writ of mandamus. The difference
in the nature of the two proceedings is immaterial if the matter
decided inter parties in one proceeding is the same which is to be
determined in the subsequent proceedings and the parties to the
suit were also parties to the writ petition.
F
It has also been contended, and support is sought from the case
reported as L. /anakirama Iyer v. P. M. Nilakanta Iyer,(') that
the general principles of. res judicata are not to be applied in
considering whether a decision in a previous suit bars a later suit
on the ground of res judicata.
G
On the other h31td, it is contended for the respondent that the
doctrine of res judicata is not confined to the provisions of s. 11
C.P.C. but is of a general application on grounds of public policy,
that the fact that the proceedings on a writ petition are conducted
summarily is no reason to reduce the value of the decision arrived
at in those proceedings especially when a solemn decision is given H
after affording an opportunity to the parties to put before the
(!) (1962) Supp. t S.C'.R .. 206.
GULABCHAND V. STATE
A
B
C
:::>
E
F
G
H
(Dayal, /.)
559
Court all the relevant matters and after fully considering the merits
of the matter in controversy and that it would be really dangerous
if it be held that a decision so arrived at in proceedings in a writ
petition does not bar a subsequent suit for the decision of the same
matter in controversy. It is pertinently pointed out that if the
writ application presented by the appellant had been allowed by
the High Court on a finding of fact that the liability of the appellant as a surety stood discharged and a writ of prohibition had been
issued against the State as prayed for by the appellant in the writ
proceedings, the State could not have sued for a declaration that
these orders of the High Court were bad and that a decree be passed
in its favour declaring that the appellant's liability as the surety
still continued and that the State was free to take any action open
to it under law for the recovery of the amount due from him.
It is not necessary to consider in any detail whether all orders
made on a writ petition would bar a subsequent suit. We would
limit the consideration of the contentions raised before us to two
main points : whether s. 11 C.P.C. is exhaustive with respect to the
application of the principle of res judicata in a suit and whether in
a subsequent suit general principles of res judicata can bar the
consideration of matters directly in issue and identical. with those
which had been earlier and after full contest, decided on merits
by a competent Court in any other proceeding including proceedings on a writ petition.
Before discussing the law of res judicata as laid down in the
Code of Civil Procedure, we may refer to the opinion of the Judges
expressed in 177.6 in the Duches of Kingston's Case(') to which
reference has been invariably made in most of the cases to be
considered by us. It was said in that case :
"From the variety of cases relative to judgments being
given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions
seem to follow as generally true : first that judgment
of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the
point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclusive,
between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly
in question in another Court; secondly that the judgment
of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the
point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter,
between the same parties, coming incidentally in question
in another Court, for a different purpose. But neither
the judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is
(I) l Smith's L. C. 13th edn. 644, 64S.
560
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[1965] 2 s.c.R.
evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of any matter
incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred
by argument from the judgment."
It is to be noticed that the opinion does not take into account
whether the earlier judgment was in a suit or any other proceeding
md whether it was used as res judicata in another suit or proceeding. The emphasis is that the judgment be of a Court and that
it is relied upon as res judicata in another Court. Of course, the
essential conditions that the judgment be directly upon the same
point which is for determination in the subsequent suit and be
between the same parties are also to be satisfied. It is obvious
that the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction is to be
treated as res judicata upon the same matter in another (',aurt
which will not be a Court having jurisdiction over the matter.
A
B
c
Jt would be helpful to consider how the various Codes of Civil
Procedure have dealt with the question of the second suit being
barred on account of an earlier decision by a Court. The first D
Code of Civil Procedure was Act VIII of 1859. Its section 1
gave jurisdiction to the civil courts over all suits of a civil nature
with the exception of those of which cognizance was barred by any
Act- of Parliament or by any Regulation of the Codes of Bengal,
Madras and Bombay or by any Act of the Governor General of E
India in Council. Since then Civil Courts had jurisdiction to try
all suits of a civil nature except those whose cognizance was barred
by any enactment in force. Section 2 provided that the 'Civil
Courts would not take cognizance of any suit brought on a cause
of action which had been heard and determined by a Court of
competent jurisdiction in a former suit between the same parties or F
between parties under whom they claimed. 'fhe bar to the second
suit was based on the identity of its cause of action with that of the
earlier suit which had been heard and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction between the same parties. '
The language of s. 2 of the Code of 1859 seems to be in pursuance of the principle recognised in common law that a cause of
action on which a decree has been based merges in the decree and
ceases to be a cause of action for any future suit. Parke, B said
in King v. Hoare(') at p. 210 of the English Reports:
"If there be a breach- of contract, or wrong done, or
any other cause of action by one against another, and
judgment be recovered in a court of record, the judgment
(1) 153 E.R. Exch. W6, 13 M & W 494_
G
H
GULABCHAND V. STATE
A
B
c
(Dayal, J.)
561
is a bar to the original cause of action, because it is thereby reduced to a certainty, and the object of the suit
attained, so far as it can be at that stage; and it would be
useless and vexatious to subject the defendant to another
suit for the purpose of obtaining the same result. Hence
the legal maxim, 'transit in rem judicatam,'-the cause
of action is changed into matter of record, which is of a
·higher nature, and the inferior remedy is merged in tbe
higher. This appears to be equally true where there
is but one cause of action, whether it be against a single
person or many. The judgment of a court of record
changes the nature of that cause of action, and prevents
its being the subject matter of another suit, and the cause
of action, being single, cannot afterwards be divided into
two."
This principle had the approval of the House of Lords in Kendall
v. Hamilton.(') It may be noticed that, in special cases, this
D principle is applied when even parties to the subsequent suit are
not the same who were parties in the first suit. The finality of
the judgment is based on the fact that the cause of action had
merged in a decree and therefore no other action can be based
on the same cause of action.
In Khugawlee Sing v. Hossein Bux Khan( 2 ) the Privy Council, after quoting the opinion in Duchess af Kingston's Case(')
said :
"There is nothing technical or peculiar to the law of
• England in the rule as so stated. It was recognised by
the civil law, and it is perfectly consistent with the second
F
section of the Code of Procedure under which this
case was tried ... "
In Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund Mohapatter(') the Privy
Council held that the term 'cause of action' in s. 2 of Act VIII
of 1859 be construed with reference rather to the substance than
G to the form of action, and that even if such an interpretation of
the expression be not correct, the provisions of s. 2 of the Code
would by no means prevent the operation of the general law relating to res judicata and observed, at p. 218 :
"This law has been laid down by a series of cases in
this country with which the profession is familiar, and has
H
probably never been better laid down !han in a case which
(I) (1879) 4 A.C. S04.
(3) Smith's L.C. 13th edn. 644.
(2) (1871) 7 Beng. L.R. 673, 678.
(4) (1872-73) I.A. Supp, 212.
562
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(1965] 2 S.C.R.
was referred to in the 3rd volume of Atkyns (Gregory
v. Molesworth), in which Lord Hardwicke held that
where a question was necessarily decided in effect though
not in express terms between parties to- the suit, they
could not raise the same question as between themselves
in any other suit in any other form; and that decision has
been followed by a long course of decisions, the greater
part of which will be found noticed in the very able notes
of Mr. Smith to the case of the Duchess of Kingston."
In Krishna Behari Roy's Case(') the Privy Council again stated
that the expression 'cause of action' in s. 2 of Act VIIl of 1859
could not be taken in its literal and most restricted sense, and
observed at p. 285 :
·
"But however that may be, by the general law where
a material issue has been tried and determined between
the same parties in a proper suit, and in a competent
Court, as to the status of one of them in relation to the
other, it cannot, in their opinion, be again tried in another
suit between them."
c
D
It appears that s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877
was enacted in view of what was said about the general law of
res judicata in Krishna Behar! Roy's Care. ( 1 ) That section reads :
"No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the
matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard
and finally decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction, •
in a former suit between the same parties, or between
parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating
under the same title."
E
F
In Misir Raghobardial v. Rajah Sheo Baksh Singh(') the Privy
Council had to construe s. 13 of the 1877-Code (Act X of
1877). It referred to s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859 and then observCd
at p. 202:
"It is clear that this section would not have applied
to the present case, the causes of action in the two suitsthe non-payment of interest in one and the non-payment
of principal in the other-being different. In fact, when
the first suit was brought the cause of action in the second
had not arisen. But independently of this provision
in the Code of Procedure, the Courts in India have adopted the rule laid down in the Duchess of Kingston's
---------11) L.R. 2 I. i\. 283.
(2) (1882) L.R. 9 I.A. 197.
G
H
GULABCHAND v. STATE (Dayal, /.)
A
563
Case('), and have applied it in a great number of cases.
It was recognized as the law in India by this Board in
Khugowlee Singh v. Hossein Bux Khan( 2 ) ••• • "
The expression 'Court of competent jurisdiction' was construed
to mean 'a Court which had juri'>C!iction over the matter in the
B subsequent suit in which the decision was used as conclusive' or,
in other words 'a Court of concurrent jurisdiction'. In considering this matter, the Privy Council referred to the fact that in this
country there were Courts of various grades with different pecuniary
limits of jurisdiction, that a suit had to be instituted in the Court
of the lowest grade competent to try it and that it would be
C improper if a judgment of an inferior Court was to operate as
res judicata in a suit in a superior Court, and observed at p. 203 :
D
E
"By taking concurrent jurisdiction to mean concurrent
as regards the pecuniary limit as well as the subject
matter, this evil or inconvenience is avoided; and although
it may be desirable to put an end to litigation, the ineffi. ciency of many of the Indian Courts makes it advisable
not to be too stringent in preventing a litigant from proving the truth of his case. It appears to their Lordships
that if this case had arisen before the passing of Act X of
1877, the High Courts in India would have rightly held
that the decision of the Extra Assistant Commissioner in
the first suit was not conclusive as to the amount of the
principal sum due on the bond."
and, after quoting s. 13, said :
F
G
"The intention seems to have been to embody in the
Code of Procedure, by sects. 12 and 13, the law then in
force in India, instead of the imperfect provision in sect.
2 of Act VITI of 1859. And, as the words of the section
do not clearly shew an intention to alter the law, their
Lordships do not think it right to put a construction upon
them which would cause an alteration."
This shows that the general law of res judicata was applied to
suits in this country despite a specific provision about it in s. 2
of Act VIIl of 1859.
H
The scope of the bar was extended by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1882 (Act XIV of 1882). It~ s. 13 dealt with res
judicata.
(I) 2 Smith's L.C. 13th edn. 644.
(2) (1871) 7 Beng. L.R. 673.
SUPRBMB
564
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REPORTS
[196~) 2 S.C.R.
·Section 11 of the present Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of A
·1908) deals with res judicata and is in these terms :
"No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the
matter directly and substantially in issue has been
substantially in issue in a former suit
directly
between the same parties, or between parties under
whom they or any of them -claim, litigating under the
same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent
suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided
by such Court.''
·
and
B
c
The above-quoted main part of s. 11 is, identically the same as
the corresponding part of s. 13 of the ~ode of 1882. Section
11, by its terms, can be applicable only to a subsequent suit
when the same matter in controversy had been heard and decided ·
in an earlier suit by a Court competent to try the subsequent suit. D
There is nothing, however, in its language to exclude the application of the general principles of res judicata to suits.
· The general principle of res judicata, has been applied to
suits even though the decision on the same matter in controversy
had been previously given by a competent Court in proceedin~
which were not suits under the Code of Civil Procedure. The
case law on the subject will be discussed later. It is urged that
there seems to be no good principle behind applying the general
principles of res judicata to suits in circumstances which do not
bring the previous decision within the language of s. 11, and
that the legislature's restricting the application of the general
principles of res judicata to the circumstances mentioned in s. 11
must be deemed to indicate that the general principle of res
judicata be not apptied to bar a subsequent suit if the earlier
decision of the same controversy between the same parties had
been arrived at in proceedings other than suits and in which the
entire procedure provided for the decision of the dispute in a
regular suit might not have been followed. It appears to us that
the reason for the specific provisions of s. 11 is not that the legislature intended to bar the application of the general principles of
res judicata to suits when the previous decision is arrived at in
proceedings other than suits. The legislature was providing in
the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of suits over which the
civil Court was given jurisdiction under the provisions of the
Code. The preamble of the Code of 1908 reads :
E
F
G
H
GULABCHAND V. STATE
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
(Dayal, ]. }.
565
"Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend
the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil
I udicature; It is hereby enacted as follows :-"
The Code was dealing with procedure of the civil Courts only
and had therefore not to consider what would be the effect on the
trial Of suits in view of the provisions of other enactments or
of general principles of res judicata or of any other kind. It
had to restrict its provision about res judicata to the effect of.
deci'\ions in a civil suit on a subsequent civil suit and therefore
enacted s. 11 in the form in which we find it. It made one of the
conditions for the application of a previous de<;ision to operate
as res judicata to be that the previous decilion is made not only
by a Court competent to make it but by a Court which be competent to try the subsequent suit. This condition must have been
considered necessary in view of the observations of the Privy ..
Council in Misir Raghobardial's Case( 1 ) and on account of the
hierarchy of Courts under the various Acts constituting Courts of
civil judicature and it could have been felt that a decision by a
Court which is not competent to decide the subsequent suit be
not treated of a binding nature. Such an exceptional procedure
seems to have been provided as a· matter of precaution as the
Court not competent to try the subsequent suit must necessarily
be a Court of inferior jurisdiction and therefore more liable to
go wrong. Whatever the reason may be, the provisions of s. 11·
will govern a previous decision in a suit barring a subsequent suit
with respect to the same matter in controversy and general principles of res judicata in such particular circumstances will neither
be available to bar a subsequent suit nor will be needed. It is in
such context that the remarks of this Court in Janakirama Iyer's
CaJe( 1 ) at p. 224 are to be considered. In that case, the decision
in a previous suit could not operate as res judicata in accordance
with the provisions of s. 11 of the Code, because the parties in
the .two suits could not be said to be the same parties or parties
who claimed through one another. It was then said :
"Where s. 11 is thus inapplicable it would not be
permissible to rely upon the general doctrine of res
judicata. We are ~ealing with a suit and the only
ground on which res }udicata can be urged against such
a suit can be the provisions of s. 11 and no other.',
H The observations are to be read in the c ontext in which they
are made, the context being that the question of res judicata was
(I) (1882) L.R. 9 I.A. 197.
(2) (1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 206.
566
SUPllEMl!
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( 1965] 2 S.C.R.
being considered in connection with the decision in a previous A
suit and the parties in the two suits being not the same. In fact,
general principles of res judicata also require that the earlier decision be between the same parties. A decision not inter parties
cannot, even on general principles of res judicata, operate as
res judicata in a subsequent suit.
B
We may now refer to some of the decided cases having a
bearing on the applicability of the general principles of res judlcata to suits, when the previous decision is not in a suit but in
other proceedings.
In Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal(') the question
was whether a previous order in an administration suit could
operate as res judicata with respect to matters which had been
decided in the subsequent administration suit instituted for decision of certain matters left open in the previous suit. It was
said at p. 193 :
"The question as to the perpetuity had been definitely
and properly before him on the former hearing, and
was, in fact, decided without any reservation, as is made
plain by the terms of the judgment itself, which show
that the determination of the dispute as to the perpetuity
was the foundation of the whole judgment. . . It is not,
and indeed it cannot be, disputed that, if that be the
case, the matter has been finally settled between the
parties, for the mere fact that the decision was given
in an administration suit does not affect its finality :
see Peareth v. Marriott (22 Ch. D. 182). The appellate
Court, however, took a different view, and regarding
the question as still open decided it against the appel!ant, but the error in their judgment is due to the fact
that they regarded the question as completely governed
by s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
and then reference was made to what has been said in Ram
Kirpal Shukul v. Musammat Rup Kuari( 2 ) :
"The binding force of such a judgment depends not
upon sect. 13, Act X of 1877, but upon general principles of Jaw. If it were not binding there would be no
end to litigation."
Jn Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao( 3 ) the question
arose about the decision about the title to compensation under
L.R. 48 I.A. 187.
(3) L.R. 49 I.A. 129.
(I}
(2) L.R. II I.A. 37, 41.
C
D
E
P
G
H
GULABCHAND V. STATE
A
B
C
(Daya/, J.)
567
proceedings in Land Acquisition operating as res judicata in a.
subsequent suit with respect to the rights of the parties. It was
said at p. 136 :
"When once the award as to the amount has become
final, all questions as to fixing of compensation are then
at an end; the duty of the Collector in case of dispute
as to the relative rights of the persons together entitled
to the money is to place the money under the control of
the Court, and the parties then can proceed to litigate in
the ordinary way to determine what their right and title
to the property may be. That is exactly what occurred
in the present case. How the proceedings were commenced is a matter that is not material provided that
they were instituted in the manner that gave the Court
jurisdiction, for they ended in a decree made by the
High Court and appealable to this Board."
D The Court then referred to what was said in Badar Bee v. Habib
Merican Noordin(') and in Hook's Case(') and said that the principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of
general application, and is not limited by the specific words of
the Code in this respect.
ll
F
Ka/ipada Dev v. Dwijapada Das( 3 ) the Privy Council held
that a decision in contentiou~ proceedings under tM Probate
and Administration Act, 18 81, was binding in a subsequent suit
upon the parties to the earlier suit, including a party whose name
had been omitted from the formal order made and reiterated
that the terms of s. 11 were not to be regarded as exhaustive in
regard to what decisions could operate as res judicata.
In Mst. Bhagwati v. Mst. Ram Kali(') a decision about title
in Land Acquisition Act proceedings was held to be res judicata
in a subsequent suit about the title between the same parties.
These decisions of the Privy Council well lay down that the
G provisions of s. 11 C.P.C. are not exhaustive with respect to an
earlier decision in a proceeding operating as res judicata in a
subsequent suit with respect to the same matter inter parties, and
do not preclude the application to regular suits of the general
principles of res judicata based on public policy and applied from
ancient times.
H
(I) (1909) A.C. 615, 623.
(2) L.R. 48 I.A. 187..
(3) L. R. S1 I.A. 24.
(4) L.R. 66 I.A. 14S.
568
SUPREME
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REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
In Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh (1) it was said :
"But in view of the arguments addressed to them
their Lordships desire to emphasize that the rule of. res
judicata, while founded on ancient precedent, is dictated
by a wisdom which is for all time. 'It hath been well
said,' declared Lord Coke, 'interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium, otherwise great oppression might be done
under colour and pretence of law' : 6 Coke, 9a. Though
the rule of the Code may be traced to an English source,
it embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit
of the law as expounded by the Hindu commentators.
Vijnanesvara and Nilakantha include the plea of a
former judgment among those allowed by law, each.
citing for this purpose the text of Katyayana, who describes the plea thus : "If a person though defeated at
law sue again he should be answered, 'You were defeat·
ed formerly.' This is called the plea of former judgment." [See the Mitakshara (Vyavahara), bk. II, ch. i.,
edited by J. R. Gbarpure, p. 14, and the Mayuka, ch. i.,
s. 1, p. 11 of Mandlik's edition]. And so the application of the rule by the Courts in India should be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by
matter of substance within the limits allowed by law."
A
B
c
D
E
This. Court had to consider the question of the applicability
of the general principles of res judicata in several cases and has
repeatedly held that this principle is not .based on a rule of
technicality but is based on high public policy to bring about an
end to litigation by giving finality to judgments inter parties and
to save a litigant from harassment a second time. The principles F.
laid down by the Privy Council have been generally accepted. In
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen( 2 ) this Court aj)proved of
what was said by the Privy Council in Hook's Care('); Ramachandra Rao's Care( 4 ) and Mst. Bhagwati's Case(") and said at
p. 166:
G
" ... and in these circumstances it has to be held
that the question of title to the four anna share was
neces•arily and substantially involved in the land acquisition proceedings and was finally decided by a court
having jurisdiction to try it and that decision thus
operates as res ;udicata . .. "
H
(2) [1953] S. C. R. 154.
(4) L.R. 49 I.A. 129.
(I} L.R. 43 I.A.91. 98.
(3) L.R. 48 I.A. 187.
(5) L.R. 66 I.A. 145.
GULABCHAND l'. STATE
A
B
c
D
E
r
G
H
(Dayal, /.)
569
In Pandit M. S. M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha(')
the question arose for the first time about applying the principle
of res judlcata in writ applications under Art. 32 of the Constitution and this Court said at p. 103 :
"This Court has laid it down in the case of Raj
Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen(') that the principle
underlying res judicata is applicable in respect of a
question which has been raised and decided after full
contest, even though the first Tribunal which decided
the matter may have no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit and even though the subject-matter of the
dispute was not exactly the same in the two proceedings. In that case the rule of res judicata was applied
to litigation in land ·ac'quisition proceedings. In that
case the general principles of law bearing on the rule
of res judicata, and not the provisions of s. 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, were applied to the case. The
rule of res judicata is meant to give finality to a decision arrived at after due contest and after hearing the
parties interested in the controversy."
This case made the decision in a former petition under Art. 32
of the Constitution res judicata in the subsequent petition under
tho same article with respect to the same matter.
In Daryao's Case(') this Court had again dealt with the question of the applicability of the principle of res judicata in writ
proceedings. The matter was gone through very exhaustively
and the final conclusions are to be found at p. 592. We may
summarise them thus :
I. If a petition under art. 226 is considered on the
merits as a contested matter and is dismissed, the
decision would continue to bind the parties unless it is
otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate procoo:fui.gs permis&l>le under the Constitution.
2. It would not he open to a party to ignore the said
judgment and move this ·Court under art. 32 by an original petition .made on tho same facts and for obtaining
the same or similar orders or writs.
3. If the petition under art. 226 in a High Court is
dismissed not on the merits but because of the !aches of
the party applying for the writ or because it is held that
(i}(t96i I S.C.R. 96.
(2) [19S3J S.C.R. 1S4.
(3) [1962] I S.C.R. 574.
.570
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1965] 2 s.c.a..
A"
the party had an alternative remedy available to it, the
dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar
to a subsequent petition under art. 32.
4. Such a dismissal may however constitute a bar ·
to a subsequent application under art. 32 where and
if the facts thus found by the High Court be themselves
B
relevant even under art. 32.
5. If a writ petition is dismissed in Iimine and an
order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the
dismissal would constitute a bar would depend on the
nature of the order. If the order is on the merits, it
c
would be a bar.
6. If the petition is dismissed in limine without a
speaking order, such dismissal cannot bei treated as
creating a bar of res ;udicata.
7. If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn, it cannot
D
be a bar to a. subsequent petition under art. 32 because,
in such a case, there had been no decision on the merits
by the Court.
In arriving at the above quoted conclusions the Court made
-certain observations which are helpful in determining the ques1ion in this case about the decision on a writ petition operating E
as res ;udicata in a subsequent regular suit. The basis for the
rule is described thus at p. 582 :
"But, is the rule of res ;udicata merely a technical
rule or is it based on high public policy ? If the rule
p
of res ';udicata itself embodies a principle of public
policy which in tum is an essential part of the rule of
law then the objection that the rule cannot be invoked
where fundamental rights are in question may lose much
of its validity. Now, the rule of res ;udicata as indicated in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no
G
doubt some technical aspects, for instance the rule of
constructive res ;udicata may be said to be technical;
but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on
considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of
the public at large that a finality should attach to the
binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent
H
jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that
·fudiv:iduals should not be vexed twice over with the same
kind of litigation."
'
GULABCHAND V. STATE
A
B
(Dayal, /.)
571
Again, it was said at p. 584 :
"The binding character of judgments pronounced
by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential
part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is
the basis of the administration of justice on which the
Constitution lays so much emphasis."
Limitations to the applicability of this general rule of res judicata are indicated at p. 585 :
c
D
"It is true that the general rule can be invoked only
in cases where a dispute between the parties has been
referred ,to a court of competent jurisdiction, there has
been a contest between the parties before the court, a
fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove
their case, and at the end the court has pronounced its
judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a
court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the
parties unless it is modified or reversed by adopting a
procedure prescribed by the Constitution. In our
opinion, therefore, the plea that the general rule of
res judicata should not be allowed to be invoked cannot
be sustained."
The Court also said earlier at p. 585 :
''In other words, an original petition for a writ
under Art. 32 cannotl take the piace of an appeal against
the order passed by the High Court in the petition filed
before it under Art. 226."
It can be said with equal force that a regular suit for the deterF mination of the matter which had been decided on merits by
the High Court or this Court on a writ petition cannot be given
the status of a de facto appel!l against the order of the High Court
or of this Court. A solemn declaration and order by the Court
in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction is not to be set at nought by a
Court of ordinary jurisdiction whose decisions are subject to the
G appellate or revisional jurisdiction of that Court.
E
The contention that the remedies available to the petitioners
to move the High Court under art. 226 and this Court under art.
32 are alternate remedies and so the adoption of one remedy
· cannot bar the adoption of the other, which was urged in the
H aforesaid case, was negatived, and it was observed at p. 591 :
"In such a case the point io consider always would
be what is the nature of the decision pronounced by a
572
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965) 2 S.C.R.
Court of competent jurisdiction and what is its effect.
Thus considered there can be no doubt that if .a writ
petition filed by a party has been dismissed on the merits
by the High Court the judgment thus. pronounced is
binding between the parties and it cannot be circumvented or by-passed by his· taldng recourse .to Art. 32
of the Constitution. Therefore, we are not satisfied
that the ground of alternative remedies is well-founded."
In The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. The Janapada Sabha,
Chhindwara( 1 ) this Court reiterated that the general principle of
res ;udicata applied to writ petitions filed under arts. 226 or 32
and expressed the opinion that constructive res ;udicata which is
a special and artificial form of res judicata enacted by s. 11
C.P .C. should not generally be applied to writ petitions filed under
arts. 226 or 32 of the Constitution and that it would be reluctant
to apply this principle to the appeals under decision because they
dealt with cases where the impugned tax liability were for different
A
B
C
D
years.
In the later case of Devi/al Modi v. Sales Tax Officer,
Ratlam( 2 ) this Court has held that the principle of constructive
res ;udicata also applies in writ proceedings when the decision of
a former writ petition was on merits. It was said :
''This rule postulates that if a plea could have been
taken by a party in a proceeding between him and his
opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea
against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which
is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even
this view is founded on the same considerations of public
policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata
is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to
the party to take one proceeding; after another and urge
new grounds every time; and that, plainly, is inconsistent
with considerations of public policy to which we have
just referred."
The Court further observed :
"As we have already mentioned, though a Court
dealing with the questions of infringement of fundamental rights must consistently endeavour to sustain the
said rights and should strike down their unconstitutional
invasion, it would not be right to ignore the principle
(!) (1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 172.
(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 686.
E
F
G
H
GULABCBANI} v. STATl! (Dayal, /.)
•
573
of res judicata altogether in dealing with writ petitions
filed by citizens alleging the contravention of their funda•
mental rights. Considerations of public policy cannot
be ignored in such cases, and the basic doctrine that
judgments pronounced by this Court are binding and
must be regarded as final between the parties in respect
of matters covered by them, must receive due consideration."
These remarks can apply with greater force when in a regular
suit a party desires to obtain an order which may be at variance
with the orders pronounced by the High Court in a writ petition
C on matters not concerning fundamental rights under the Constitution.
The appellant relies on the case reported as Smt. Bimla
Chopra v. Punjab State( 1 ) in support of its contention that a
decision on a writ petition cannot operate iis res judicata on tho·
D points in dispute between the parties in the civil suit. The
decision was based on two grounds : ( 1 ) that the jurisdiction of
the High Court 11nder art. 226 and of the Supreme Court under
art. 32 iJ almost co-extensive, while the jurisdiction of the High
Court under art. 226 and of the civil Court in a regular civil suit
cannot be said to be almost co-extensive and ( 2) that the High
E Court in disposing of writs is not required to go into the detailed
examination of facts while in regular civil suits facts can be·
examined meticulously. It was further held that the plaintiff can
take such grounds in the civil suit which he could take in a writ
petition. A decision of the Court in a writ petition can be res
F judicata only with respect to the matters which have been decided
on merits by the High Court or by this Court. Courts do not
usually enter into disputed questions of fact but there is no bar
to their doing so if they feel disposed to enter into such facts and
arrive at a conclusion with respect to them. We do not see why
all the grounds which can be urged in support of or against a
G matter raised for decision in a writ petition cannot be urged in
the proceedings on it. It is true that the jurisdiction of the civil
Court and the High Court or this Court cannot be said to be
=tensive, but it iii plain that the civil Court, in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, is subject to the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and this Court. We do not consider
H the reasons for holding tha1 a decision in a writ"petition cannot
operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit to be sound
(1) (1963) 65 Punj. L.R. 945.
L4Sap/65-3
574
IUPJlBMB
COURT
llBPOllTS
{1965) 2 s.C.i.
and are of opinion that the Punjab Case has been wrongly A
decided.
On the other hand, the Bombay High Court has held in
Manahem v. Union of India(') that a decision on merits in a
writ petition would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit
As a result of the above discussion, we are of opinion that
the provisions of s. 11 C.P.C. are not exhaustive with respect to
an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same
parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular
suit and that on the general principle of res judicata, any previous
decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or
after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case
by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in
a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court
deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit
have the same subject matter. The nature of the former proceeding is immaterial.
·
We do not see any good reason to preclude such decisiom
on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under artS. 226 or
32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in cC)ntroversy between
the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle
of the finality of decisions after full contest We therefore hold
· that on the general principle· of res judicata, the decision of the
High Court on a writ petition under art. 226 on the merits on a
matter after contest will operate as res judicata in a subsequent
regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same
matter.
· We may make it clear that it was not necessary, and we have
not considered, whether the principles of constructive res judicata
can be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground
that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the
earlier proceeding was not so raised therein.
B
C
D
E
F
G
We therefor dismiss this appeal with costs.
Sobba Rao, J. I have persued the judgment prepared by my
I regret my inability to
learned brother Raghubar Dayal, J.
agree. I shall briefly give my reasons.
Raghubar Dayal, J., has stated the facts fully in his judgmentI need not restate them. The few facts relevant to the question
(I} A.I.ll. 1960 Bom. 196.
H
GULABCHAND
v. STATE (Subba Rao, J.)
575
A raised are these : The appellant filed a petition in the Bombay
High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution raising the question that he was discharged as surety, and the High Court
negatived his contention· In the suit from which the present
appeal arises he again raises the plea that he was discharged as
surety : in other words, he seeks to reopen in the present suit the
B finding given by the High Court in the writ petition. The question
is whether the appellant is barred by res judicata to raise the said
question in the suit.
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the
doctrine of res judicata in the context of a suit. It says, inter
C alia, that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter
directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit. To invoke this doctrine, the
section lays down many conditions. The most essential condi·
tion is that the matter in question should have been directly and
D substantially in issue in a former suit. The expression "suit"
has not been defiued in the Code, but s. 26 thereof says that every
suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such
other manner as may be prescribed. It is not argued that an
application under Art. 226 of the Constitution is a suit within
the meaning of s. 26 or s. 11 of the Code. It follows, and
E indeed it is not disputed, that s. 11 of the Code does not bar the
appellant from raising the question of the discharge of his suretyship again in the present suit.
But it is said that under the general principles of res judlcata
the Court would be barred to try his suit on the said issue. When
F the Code of Civil Procedure enacted s. 11 prescribing precisely
when an earlier decision would be res judicata in a suit, it is not
open to invoke the general principles of res judicata in the con-,
text of a subsequent suit, though the conditions laid down in the
section were not satisfied, for otherwise the section
would become nugatory : it would also introduce anomaG Hes. A decision in a previous suit would not be res judicata in
a subsequent suit unless the stringent conditions laid down in s. 11
of the Code were satisfied; whereas a decision in a proceeding
which was not a suit would be res judicata whether or not the
said conditions were comolied with. If the fundamental requisites
of res judicata were satisfied, a decision, if it fell under s; 11 of
H of Code, would be res judicata in a subsequent suit; and even if it
did not fall thereunder, it would equally be res judicata. That
could not have been the intention of the Legislature·
578
SUPRBMB
COUil.T
JlBPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
The cases cited at the Bar do not compel me to accept the
construction which would lead to that result. The decisions of
the Judicial Committee in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra
Rao( 1 ) and Mst .. Bhagwati v. Mst. Ram Kali(') and of this
Court in Ra; Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen(") may be explained
on the ground that the proceeding under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act in the District Court wherein the title of the
claimants would be put in issue were in substance a suit. The
decision of this Court in Pandit M. S. M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree
Krishna Sinha('), Daryo v. The State of U.P.("), The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. V· The lanapada Sabha, Chhindwara(')
. and Devi/al Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Rat/am(') can be distinguished on the footing that the. question of res iudicata arose in
an application either under Art. 226 or Art. 32 of the Constitution and not in a suit. On the other hand, in L. lanakirama
Iyer v. P. M. Nilakanata Iyer(") this Court definitely ruled :
"Where s. 11 is thus inapplicable it would not be
permissible to rely upon the general doctrine of res
;udicata. We are dealing with a suit and the only
ground on which res ;udicata can be urged against
such a suit can be the provisions of s. 11 and no other."
These observations, in my view, correctly represent the law on
the subject. · This view, while it does not make s. 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure an unnecessary provision, does not also
lead to any practical difficulties, for the decision of a High Court
on a question of law will be binding as an authority on subordinate Courts and its decision on a question of fact will rarely be
differed from by the said Courts.
I would, therefore, hold that the decision given by the High
Court in the writ petition would not preclude the Court from
deciding the same question on merits in the present suit. The
order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is remanded
to the High Court for disposal on merits in accordance with
law. Costs will abide the result.
A
a
C
D
I:
r
F
') -
G
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion of the Majority the Appeal
is dismissed with costs.
· (I) (1922] L.R. 49 I.A. 129.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 154.
(S} (1962] I S.C.R. 574.
(7) (1965] I S.C.R. 686.
(2) L.R. 66 I.A. 145.
(4) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 96.
(6) [1963] SupP. (I} S.C.R. 172.
(8) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 206.
H
r
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