CORPORATION OF CALCUTA AND ANOTHER versus LIBERTY CINEMA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 December 1964 | [1965] 2 S.C.R. 477 | 1964 INSC 286
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 December 1964
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 26/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1965] 2 S.C.R. 477
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 286
Text of the judgment
477
A
CORPORATION OF CALCUTIA AND ANOTHER
v.
LIBERTY CINEMA
December 14, 1964
B
c
[A. K. SARKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, RAGHU.BAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.]
Calcutta Municipal A.ct (33 of 1951), ,. 413 and 548-Licen.re fee
on cinema houses-whether tax or fee for rendering service-Validity of
levy and s. 548.
Under a. 413 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, no person shall
without a licence granted by the Corporation of Calcutta, keep open any
cinema house for public amusement in Calcutta. Under s. 548(2), far
every licence under the Act, a fee may be charged at such rate as may
from time to time be fixed by the Corporation. In 1948, the appellant
(Corporation) fixed fees on the basis of annual valuation of the cinema
house. The respondent, who was the owner and licencee of a cinema
theatre, had been paying a licence fee of Rs. 400 per year on that basil!.
In 1958, the appellant, by a Resolution, changed the basis of assessment
D of the fee. Under the new method the fee was to be assessed at ratee
prescribed per show according to the sanctioned seating capacity of the
cinema house; and the respondent had to pay a fee of Rs. 6,000 per year.
The respondent, therefore, moved the HiJ!h Court for the issue of a writ
quashing the resolution and the application was allowed.
In the appeal to the Supreme Court the appellant contended that :
(i) the levy was a tax and not a fee in return for services and (ii) •·
E 548 ( 2) does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation; while the
respondent contended that ( i) the levy was a fee in return for services
to be rendered and not a tax, and as it was not commensurate with the
costs incurred by the Corporation in providing the services, the levy was
invalid; (ii) if s. 548 authorised the levy of a tax, as distinct from a fee in
return for service rendered, it was invalid, as it amounted to an illegal
delegation of legislative functions to the appellant to fix the amount of
a tax "without any guidance for the purpose and (iii) the levy was invalid
F as violating Art. 19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitute.
HELD (per Sarkar, Raghubar Dayal and Mudholkar JJ) : (i) The
levy was not a fee but a tax. (490 Fl
1k Act does not intend to use the word "fee" as referring only to
a levy in return for services, for, the levies authorised by some other sections of the Act are really "taxes", though called "fees". Besides, the
words used are "fee for the licence" and these words do not necessarily
G mean a "fee in return for services" as is apparent from Arts. 110(2)
and 199(2) of the Constitution, where both expressions are used indicating that they are not the same. [483 G-H]
The word "fee" in s. 548 must be read as referring to a tax as any
other reading would make the section invalid, and in interpreting a statute,
it ought to be made valid if possible. [484 B-C]
The decisions of this Court establish that in order to make
H a levy a fee for services rendered, the levy must confer special benefit on
the persons on whom it is imposed. The levy under s. 548(2) ill not a
"fee in return for services" as the Act does not provide for any services
of a special kind being rendered, resulting in benefits to the person on
478
SUPREME
COURT
Jll!PORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
whom it is imposed. S. 527(43) permits by-laws to be framed for regulating the inspection, supervision and control, amolli others, of cinema
houses; but it is not obligatory to make such by-laws and therefore, there
may be no services to render. Even the by-law made provides only for
inspection, and the work of inspection done by the appellant was only
to see that the terms of the licence were observed by the licensee. It waa
not a service to him, and so, no question arises of correlating the amount
of levy to the coots of any service. The levy therefore is not a fee and
must be tax. (485 B.C, F; 488 E; 490 P,.F]
A
B
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Y. Shrl
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sirur Mutt, (1954) S.C.R. 1005, H. H.
Sudhindra Thirtha SwarnJar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowments, (1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 302 and The Hinglr
Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. The State of Orissa and Ors. (1961] 2 S.C.R.
537, referred to.
Whether a particular levy is a fee or a tax has to be decided only by
C
reference to the terms of .the section. Its pooition in the Act cannot
determine its nature ; an imposition which is by its terms a tax and not &
fee, cannot become a fee by reason of its having been placed in a certain
part of the Statute. (489 BJ
It is not right to say that s. 443 does not impose any duty on the
appellant and that therefore, the licence fee leviable under s. 548, should
be fixed only with reference to rendering of services. The Corporation D
has been set up only to perform municipal duties and its powers are for
enabling it to perform those duties. But, since there is no provision for
aeivice being rendered, the levy cannot be a fee and would indisputably
be a tax. (490 B, C, DI
(ii) The fixing of the rate of a tax is not of the essence of legislative
fOWer and the fixing of rates may be leftto a non-legislative body. When
it is so left to another body the legislature must provide guidance for such y
ftxation. Since there is sufficient guidance in the Act as to how tho rate
of the le\-y under s. 548 is to be fixed, the 1ection is valid. (492 D, F; ·
.
493 G-H; 497 B]
The appellant is an autonomous body. It has to perform vario111
atatutory functions. It is given power to decide when and in what manner
the functions are to be performed. For all this it needs money and it&
needs will vary from time to time with the prevailing exigencies. Its
power to collect tax is necessarily limited by the expenses required to
discharge the functions. It has, therefore, where rates have not been
apecified in the statute, to fix such rates as may be neceosarv to meet it&
needs, and that would be sufficient guidance to make tho exercise of it&
power to fix the rate, valid. , (496 D-F]
Case law reviewed.
(iii), The challenge to the levy on the ground that it amounts to expropriation is wholly unfounded.
•
No doubt the increase in the rate of fee was large but considering
the available seating capacity of the respondent, it cannot be said to be
unreasonably high. (482 E-F]
The contention of the appellant that even if no guidance for taxation has been prescribed the section would still be valid, because, the Act
may be said to have been passed under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution and that, that Entry authorises the passing
of a law concerning the powers of a municipal corporation and that such
powers must necessarily include the power to levy a tax, was left open.
(497 D-E, H]
F
G
H
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Sarkar, J.)
A
•
c
D
479
Per Sobba Rao and Ayyangar, JI. (dissenting) (i) If on a proper
construction of the Act one reached the conclusion that Part IV of the
Act w.. not exhaustive of the range of levies permitted by the Act, and
the fees permitted to be levied by s. 548(2) were also taxes, there would
be nothing in a. 127(3) or (4) to militate against that construction. But,
an examination of the provisions of the Act lnakes three matters abundantly .clear; (a) that the Act draws a sharp and clear distinction between
taxes properly so called and fees; (b) that the division into Parts and
Chapters is logical and clear-¢Ut and no matter which properly falls under
a subject set out under a Part or Chapter heading, is dealt ~th in any
other; and ( c) that taxes, by whatever designation they might be called,
arc all comprehended and dealt with by Part IV and by Part IV alone,
and that what ia permitted to be imposed by s. 548(2) is only a fee as
distinguished from a tax. As admittedly there is no correlation between
the fee charged and the service rendered, the impugned levy was not
authoriaed and the High Coun was right in granting relief to the
respondent. (525 B-C; 526 D-G]
To say that to enable a fee strictly so called to be levied, an immediate advantage measurable in terms of money should be conferred on the
payer is to take too narrow a view of the concept of a fee. The word
"services" in the context has to be understood in a wide sense, as including supervision and control over the activities for the excess of which
the fee is charged. The judgements of this Court in the Shlrur
Mutt case, (1954] S.C.R. 1005, and the cases following it, do not lay
down that where an activity is regulated by licenses, the imposition of
charges for the inspection, supervision and control of the activity to ensure
compliance with the regulation is not a benefit conferred on the licensee,
so as to render the amount char11ed for such a licence not a fee in the
real sense, but a tax, whose constitutional validity could be sustained by
reference to the taxation entries in Lists I and II. [508 A; 515 F-G; 517 H;
518 Al
ea.. law considered.
:r
G
H
Also, Art. 110(2) of the Constitution far from supporting the appellant's contention, negatives it. If pure taxation measures, employing the
machinery of licences and fees, would be money-bills, then the fees for
licences which are outside the definition, would be those fees which are
imposed to meet tho cost of regulation and supervision of an activity which
ii controlled by the requirements of a licence and compliance with its
terms. Besides, if the levy of such licence-fees on various activities which
form the subject of legislative control or regulation under the various
non-taxation entries in the Lists were treated as tax, Entries 96 and 66
in the respective Lists would have to be read as taxation entries, because,
such a levy is permitted only by those entries. This however would be contrary to the entire scheme on which the several entries in the Lists are
made, namely, setting out the exclusive general legislative powers the
enumeration of taxes which could be imposed and finally the power to
impose fees in respect of any of the matters in the List. (502 C; 519 B-C,
E, G]
(ii) Viewed as a tax the delegation in s. 548(2) is unconstitutional,
u essential legislative functions are parted with to the municipality, a
subordinate law-making body, and therefore the provision is unconstitutional. (546 Bl
Essential legislative functions cannot be delegated but where the law
lays down the principles and affords guidance to the subordinate lawmaking authority details may be left for being filled up by the executive
or by other authorities vested with quasi-legislative power. The power
480
SUPREME
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(1965) 2 S.C.R.
to fix a rate of tax is an essential legislative function and therefore, unless
the subordinate law-making authority is afforded guidance by the policies
being formulated, principles enunciated and standards laid down, the
legislation will suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and would be
void as arbitrary and unconstitutional. The provisions of the Act do not
afford any guidance to the Municipal Corporation to fix the rate of levy.
No doubt, the municipal government of Calcutta was vested in the Cor·
poration under s. 24 of the Act, but the expression "government" does
not gather within its fold all powers necessary for administration nor does
it create an independent sovereign body entitled to legislate in any manner
it likes for the. purpose of carrying on civic government. The Corporation
is still a subordinate body which is the creation of the legislature and can
only function within the framework of the powers conferred upon it by
the Act. No assistance is derived in this regard from the powers of supervision which. the State Government has over the municipal affairs under
ss. 42 and 47 . If no standards have been laid down by the Act for the
Corporation to afford it a guidance for the fixation of a rate, the fact that
A
B
c
supervi.sory power is conferred upon the executive would not obviate that
objection, for the Government itself would have no guidance from the
legislature as to the policy to be adopted in exercising the supervision. [541
E-G; 542 C-G; 545 A]
It cannot be said that as a result of ss. 115, 117 and. 126 no taxes
could be raised ei<cept such as were needed for the expenditure for which
provision had been made in the budget and the rate of tax was, .therefore,
determined by the needs of the Corporation. If the amount of money
which a municipality needs for discharging its functions, affords any
auidance, tlren the needs of a State or the Union ought to afford sufficient
guidance to sustain the validity of any skeleton legislation. [545 A.CJ
The .Orissa Ceramic Industries Lttl. v. Executive Officer, lharsuguda
Municipality AI:R. 1963 Orissa 171 disapproved.
The quantum of power which a law could bestow upon an institution
D
E
or body of its creation is detennined, first, by the view of the legislature
as to what are necessary for achieving the purposes for which the institu·
lion or body is created and, secondly, by the overall limitations imposed
by the Constitution by the distribution of legislative power. Nothina
therefore turns on the use of the word "powers" in Entry 5 of the List II
which deals. with the Constitution and powers of municipal ~orpora!iOM
for the purpose· of local self-government.
The State Legislature cannot,
therefore, authorise a municipal body which it creates, even though, it
be for the purpose of local self-Government, to exercise a power higher
than what it itself possesses. Any legislative practice prevailing before
lat April, 1937 when India was under a unitary form of government or
prevailing before the Constitution, does not serve as a guide for i)1!erpreting the legislative entries in the Constitution and any such legislative
practice cannot prevail over the limitations imposed by the distribution
of legislative power in respect of post-Constitution legislation. [527 F-0;
530 D, G; 532 F-G; 533 E-F; 534 CJ
The analogy d American decisions also cannot afford any guidane9
for th,tf application of a different rule as to what constitutes excessive delegati<Jfi in the case of legislation creating municipal ;bodies.
F
G
The rule to
limits of delegation by the legislatures constituted in India, by the Constitution, has been the subject of elaborate consideration by this Court and
the decisions have not laid down that a different rule applies when the
delegation of legislative power is in favour of a municipal corporation. [535
CD,E]
Case law considered.
H
CALCUTTA CORP, V. LIBEllTY CINEMA (Sarkar, /;)
....
'81
CmL APPELLATE JUlllSDicTION : Civil Appeal No. 26 . of
1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 26, 1961 of
the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 67.
of 1959.
G. S. Pathak, A, N. Sinha and P. K. Mukherjee, for the
appellants.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, N. C. Chatterjee, S.
Ghosh, I. B. Dad!IChanji and 0. C. Mathur, for the respondent.
D. N. ¥ukherjee, for the intervener No. 1.
Naunit Lal, for the intervener No. 2.
The Judgment of SAllAR, RAGHUBAll DAYAL and MUDHOLIAR. JJ. was delivered by SAllAR J. The dessenting Opinion of
SuIIBA RAo and AYYANGAll JJ. was delivered by AYYANGAll J.
»
Subr J. The appellant Corporation was constituted by the
Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, an Act passed by the Legislature
of the State of West Bengal. The Act was intended to consolidate
and amend the law relating to the Municipal affairs of Calcutta
and it defined the duties, powers and functions of the Corporation
in whose charge those affairs were placed. The respondent is a
;S firm owning a cinema house and carrying on business of public
cinema shows.
Section 443 of the Act provides that no person shall without
a licence granted by the Corporation keep open any cinema-house
for public amusement. It, however, does not say that any fee is
:r to be paid for the licence. But sub-s. ( 2) of s. 548 says that for
every licence under tlie Act, a fee may, unless otherwise provided,
be charged at such rate as may from time to time be provided.
In 1948 the Corporation had fixed the scale of fees on the basis
of the annual valuation of the. cinema-homes made by a method
which does not appear on the record. The respondent had under
G these sections obtained a licence for its cinema house and had
been paying a licence fee calculated on the aforesaid basis. The
fee as calculated was Rs. 400 per year.
By a resolution passed on March 14, 1958 the Corporation
changed the basis of assesment of the licence fee with effect from
April 1, 1958. Under the new method the fee was to be assessed
JI at rates prescribed per show acording to the sanctioned . seating
capacity of the cinema houses. The respondent's cinema house
had SS 1 seats and under the changed method it became liable to a
482
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[1965] 2 S.C.JL
fee of Rs. S per show. In the result it became liable to pay a fee
of Rs. 6,000 per year.
The respondent then moved the High Court at Calcutta under
Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ quashing the resolution.
The application was first heard by Sinha J. who allowed it. ThiS
order was confirmed by an appellate Bench of the same Court
consisting of Bose C. J. and C. K. Mitter J. on appeal by tho
Corporation. Hence the present appeal.
A
a
In this Court the levy was challenged on three grounds the.
first of which may be disposed of at once. That ground was that
the levy amounted to expropriation and was, therefore, invalid as C
violating els. (f) and (g) of sub-Art. (1) of Art. 19. Sinha J.
rejected this contention as on the materials on the record it could
not be said that the new rate was so high as to make it impossible
for the respondent to carry on its business. The learned Judges
of the appellate Bench do not appear to have taken a different
view of the matter. It seems to us that a fee at the rate of Rs. -' D
per show in a house with a seating capacity of 551 cannot in any
sense be said to be unreasonably high. With that seating capacity
the respondent would at a reasonable estimate be collecting about
Rs. 1,000 per show and paying the sum of Rs. 5 per show. No
doubt the increase in the rate of fee from Rs; 400 to Rs. 6,000
per year was large. But at the same time the circumstances I!:
obtainin~ Jn our aountry had undergone an immense change
between 1948 when the fee was earlier fixed and 1958. The
challenge to the levy on the ground that it amounted to expropriation is wholly unfounded and was rightly rejected in the High
Court. Substantially the same argument was advanced from a
different point of view. It was said that Art. 19(1 ), (f) and (g) r
were violated in any case as s. 548 gave an arbitrary power of
taXation. This contention found favour with the learned Judges
of the High Court but, with respect to them, we are unable to
agree. In our view, for reasons to be later stated, no arbitrary
power of taxation was conferred by s. 548.
G
The second challenge to the levy was put in this way. The
levy authorised by ss. 443 and 548 was a fee in return for services
to be rendered and not a tax and it had therefore to be commensurate with the costs incurred by .the Corporation in providing
those services. The present levy of. Rs. 6,000 per year was far
in excess of those costs and was for that reason invalid. The H
Corporation's answer to this contention is that the levy was a tax
and not a fee taken in return for services and no question of its
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Sarkar, /.)
A
II
C
-'83
being proportionate to any costs for services arose. The Corporatiop. d,.oes not dispute that if the levy was a fee in the sense
mentioned, it would be invalid. The only question on this part
of the case, therefore, is, was the levy a fee in return for services?
Another subsidiary question is, what is the nature of the services
which makes a levy in respect of them, a fee ? It is not disputed
that a levy made in return for services rendered would be a fee.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider what a fee is or the tesfi
by which it is to be determined. Nor is it necessary to discuss
whether in order that a levy may be a fee the statute imposing it
must intend primarily to confer the benefits of the services on those
who pay it and benefits received from those services by the public
at large, if any, must be secondary. A discussion of these aspects
of fees, will be unprofitable and will only cloud the point really in
iisuo.
Now, on the first question, that is, whether the levy is in return
for services, it is said that it is so because s. 548 uses the word
D "fee". But, surely, nothing turns on words used. The word
''fee" cannot be said to have acquired a rigid technical meaning
in the English language indicating only a levy in return for
iervices. No authority for such a meaning of the word was cited.
However that may be, it is conceded by the respondent that the
E Act uses the word "fee" indiscriminately. It is admitted that
some of the levies authorised are taxes though called fees. Thus,
for example, as Mitter J. pointed out, the levies authorised by ss.
218, 222 and 229 are really taxes though called fees, for no
services are required to be rendered in respect of them. The Act,
therefore, did not intend to use the word fee as referring only "to
I' a levy in return for services.
This contention is not really open to the respondent for s. 548
does not use the word "fee"; it uses the words "licence fee" and
those words do not necessarily mean a fee in return for services.
In fact in our Constitution fee for licence and fee for services
G
H
rendered are contemplated as different kinds of levy. The former
is not intended to be a fee for services rendered. This is apparent
from a consideration of Art. 110 ( 2) and Art. 199 ( 2) where both
the expressions are used indicating thereby that they are not the
same. In Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board(')
it was observed at pp. 721-722, "if licences are granted, it appears
to be no objection that fees should be charged in order either to
defray the costs of administering the local regulation or to increaso
(1) [1938] A. C. 708
484
SUPllBM'.11 COtmT llBPOllTS
Ll96S] 2 S.c.R.
the general funds . of the Province or for both purposes ...•.. It
cannot, as their Lordships think, be an objection to a licence plus
a fee that it is direeted both to the regulation of trade and to the
provision of revenue." . It would, therefore, appear that a provision for the imposition of a licence fee does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that the fee must be only for services rendered.
'
It may also be stated that a statute has to be read so as to make
it valid and, if possible, an interpretation leading to a contrary
position should be avoided; it has to be construed ut res magil
valeat quam pareat: see Broom's Legal Maxims (10 ed.) p. 361,
Craies on Statutes (6th ed.) p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th
ed.) p. 221. Therefore again, the word "fee" in s. 548 should be
read as meaning a tax, for as we shall show later, it made no
provision for services to be rendered; any other reading would
make the section invalid. A construction producing that re5ult
has to be avoided. We do not also think that by reading the
word as referring to a tax we would be doing any violence to the
.language used.
If the word "fee" is not conclusive of the question that it must
be in return for services, as we think it is not, then the question
whether the fee contemplated in s. 548 is a fee in return for
services, can only be decided by reference to the terms of the
section and for this purpose we have to consider that section
along with s. 443. We have earlier summarised the sections but
now propose to set them out so far as material·:
S. 443. No person shall, without or otherwise than
in conformity with the terms of a licence granted ....
keep open any .....• cinema house ...•.
S. 548. (1) Every licence ...... granted unCler this
Act ...•.... shall specify,
A
B
c
D
J:
F
.............................
.. ...... ... . ... . . . .. .. .. .... .
( 1) the tax or fee, if any, paid for the licence. . . . . . .
(2) Except when it is ........•. otherwise express~
ly provided, for every such licence .......... a fee
may be charged at such rate as may from time to time
be fixed by the Corporation ......... .
G
The sections do not refer to the rendering of any service by the 11
Corporation. Looking at them we do not find anything to lead
to the conclusion that they make it incumbent on the Corporation
CALCUTTA COllP. v. LmBllTY OJNBMA (Sarkar, J.)
485
A to render any service. in return for the fee imposed. Stopping
here, therefore, tll,ere is no reason for saying that the levy is a
fee ,in return for services.
But it was said that the services to be provided for the levy
of the fee are set out in the by-laws made under s. 527, item 43'.
a Item 43 permits by-laws to be framed regulating the inspection,
supervision and control, among others, of cinema houses. It
does not however make it obligatory on the Corporation to make
any by~law. If the by-laws are not made, there would, ex
lrypothesi, be no services to render. No doubt s. 443 contemplates that the cinema shows shall be conducted in conformity
C with the terms of the licence but it again seems to us that it is
optional· for the Corporation to impose terms; it is not bound to
do so. In any case, those terms need not be for rendering of
ICI'liccs by the Corporation. They may, for example, provide
that the shows will not be continued after a certain hour in the
11Vening.
D
In fact, however, certain by-laws, called Theatre By-laws,
were framed by the Corporation. Those by-laws were not
produced before us excepting one which· states, "The Chairman
may cause all such premises to be inspected at least twice yearly
and if as the result of such inspection any defect or disorder be
11: 11oticed in such premises in connection with and relating to any
of the matters or things referred to in these by-laws, the Chairman may by written notice require the owner or lessee of such
premises to make good such defects." It is quite clear that the
words ''the matters or things referred to in these by-laws" occurring in the by-law quoted, contemplate things to be done by the
F licensee and not by the Corporation. Those matters or things
cannot be services which the Corporation is required to render. It
would, therefore, appear that even the by-laws the terms of which
might have been incorporated in the licence do not contemplate
the rendering of any service by the Corporation to the licensee.
G It may be stated that the licence granted to the respondent does
not appear in the records of this case.
It is however said that the by-law earlier quoted requires inspection of the cinema houses by the Corporation and that that
was the service ~ the Corporation had to render in return for
the licence fee. We are unable to accept this contention. The
H inspcctioii wils not certainly a senice to the licensee; it was
necessary only to make sure that he carried out the conditio~ on
which the licence had been granted to him. It was something to
•
486
SUPREME
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(1965] 2 s.c.~
be done to control the licensee's activities and to make him
observe the conditions of the licence on pain of cancellation .of
the licence. This is clear from sub-s. (3) of s. 548 which states
that "any licence ........ granted under this Act ........ may
at any time be suspended or revoked ........ if any of its restrictions or conditions is infringed or evaded by the grantee." This
non-observance of the conditions of the licence would expose the
licensee to penalty under s. 537 of the Act. The inspection was
therefore necessary also for enforcing ·the conditions of · the
licence by penalising a breach of them by the licensee. We
cannot imagine that an inspection by the Corporation for such
purposes can at all be said to be rendering of service to the
licensee.
The nature of services to be rendered in return for a levy so
as to make it a fee has been considered by this Court in several
cases and in all of them it has been said that the services must
confer some benefit on the person paying the fee. The earliest
case on the subject appears to be The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt( 1 ), where it was said at p. 1042,
'a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege .... Public
interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it
is some special benefit which the individual receives". It was
again said at p. 1043, that in the case of fees for services "the
Government does some positive work for the benefit of persons
and tho money is taken as the return for the work done or
services rendered." This case was concerned with .a statute
which imposed a levy on religious institutions expressly said to be
in return for services. The services mentioned in the. statute
consisted among others in the Government supervising the
management of the institutions, auditing their accounts and seeing
that their income was duly appropriated to the purposes for
which they were founded. Though it did not expressly say so,
this Court was presumably of the view that these were services to
the institutions making the levy a fee, for it declared the levy
invalid on the ground that it was not correlated to the costs of
those services and therefore was a tax which was beyond the
competence of the Madras Legislature which had enacted the
statute. It would appear that the services here considered were
not for controlling the institutions but for doing work which
secured to them their funds and the proper application of them.
The statute might have involved a check on the conduct of the
(I) [l<J54] S.C. R .
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
CALCUTTA CORP. 11. LIBERTY CINEMA (Sarkar, /,)
487
A Mathadipatis who managed the institutions but that control alllO
was for the benefit of the institutions. It has to be remembered
as was said in another case to which we shall presently refer, that
the Mathadipatis were in the position of trustees of the institu·
tions. It would follow that control of their wrongful activities
must result in special benefits to the institutions for their funds
B would not then be frittered away.
After this judgment, the section imposing the levy wu
amended but the amended section was also challenged on similar
grounds. The matter again came up to this Court in the case of
H. II. Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu
C Religious & Charitable Endowment$, Mysore('). This time the
validity of the section was upheld. The reasons for this decision
are not relevant to the present discussion. As to the nature of
services however, this Court reiterated the view stated in the
earlier case. It said at p. 323, "If with a view to provide a
specific service, levy is imposed by law and expenses for mainD taining the service are met out of the amounts collected there·
being a reasonable relation between the levy and the expenses.
incurred for rendering the service, the levy would be in thit
nature of a fee and not in the nature of a tax." It was further
said, "A fee being a levy in consideration of rendering service of
I. a particular type, correlation between the expenditure by the
Government and the levy must undoubtedly exist." The act waa
the same as the earlier one in regard to the services to be rendered
by the Government and the view expressed in the earlier judg·
ment as to the nature of the services required by the statute to be
performed was endorsed in this judgment. It was said at p. 312,
r that the Mathadipati "is by virtue of his office under an obligation to discharge the duties as a trustee and is answerable aa
such". It would follow that a service resulting in the control of
the Mathadipati would confer special benefit on the institution
which alone paid the levy.
Both these cases discµssed other tests bltsides the require·
G ment of the rendering of services for determining whether a levy
is a fee, but with these· we are not concerned in the present case.
These cases also discussed the correlation of the costs of the
services to the levy but with that also we are not concerned as it
is not sought to uphold the present levy on the ground of such
B correlation. We have referred to these cases only for showing
that to make a levy a fee the services rendered in respect of it
(I) (1965) Supp. 2 S. C. Jl. 302
USup./65-15
<&88
SUPREMB
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(1965] 2 S.C.R.
must benefit, or confer advantage on, the person who pays the A
levy..
The other case to which we wish to refer in this connection
ia The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. The State of Orissa and
ors.('). There the imposition by a certain statute of a levy on
lessees of coal mines in a certain area and the creation of a fund
with it, was called in question. It was held that the levy was a
fee in return for services and was valid. It was there said at p.
549, "If the special service rendered is distinctly and primarily
meant for the benefit of a specified class or area, the fact that in
benefitting the specified class or area the State as a whoie may
ultimately and indirectly be benefitted would not detract from the
character of the levy as a fee." It may be mentioned that the
levy there went to meet expenditure necessary or expedient for
providing amenities like communication, water supply and electricity for the better development of the mining area and to meet
the welfare of the labour employed and other persons residing or
working in the area of the mines. Here again there is no element
of control but the services resulted in real benefit specially
accruing to the persons on whom the levy was imposed. These
decisions of this Court clearly establish that in order to make a
levy a fee for services rendered the levy must confer special
llenefit on the persons on whom it is imposed. No case has been
brought to our notice in which it has been held that a mere
control exercised on the activities of the persons on whom the
levy is imposed so as to make these activities more onerous, is
.service rendered to them making the levy· a fee.
B
C
D
E
It was also contended that the levy under s. 548 must be a
tee and not a tax, for all provisions as to taxation are contained F
in Part IV of the Act, while this section occurred in Chapter
XXXVI headed "Procedure" in Part VIII which was without a
heading. It was pointed out that Part V dealt with "Public
Health, Safety and Convenience" and s. 443 which was included
in Chapter XXVI contained in this Part was headed "Inspection G
and R~gnlation of Premises, and of Factories, Trades anc! Places
of Public Resort". A cinema house, it is not disputed, is included
in the words "places of public resort". It was, therefore. contended that a levy outside Part IV could not be a tax and hence
m~st be a fee for services. This contention was sought to be
supported by the argument that s. 443 occurred in a Part con- H
.cerning public health, safety and convenience and therefore the
(I) [1961] 2 S. C.R. 537
r
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Sarkar, /.)
489
A intontion was that the levy authorised by the section would be in
return tor work done for securing public health, safety and
coiivenience and was hence a fee. We are wholly unable to
accept this contention. Whether a particular levy is a fee or tax
has to be decided only by reference to the terms of the section
a~ 'l\e have earlier stated. Its position in the Act cannot deterB minf. its nature; an imposition which is by its terms a tax and not
a fee, which in our opinion the present imposition is, cannot
become a fee by reason of its having been placed in a certain part
of the statute. The reference to the heading of Part V can at
most indicate that the provisions in it were for conferring benefit
C On the public at large. . The cinema house owners paying the levy
would not as ·such owners be getting that benefit. We are not
concerned with the benefit, if any, received by them ~s members
of the public for that is not special benefit meant for them. We
are clear in our mind that if looking at the terms of the provision
authorising the levy, it appears that it is not for special services
n rendered to \he person on whom the levy is imposed, it cannot
be a fee wherever it may be placed in the statute. A consideration of where ss. 443 and 548 are placed in the Act is irrelevant
for determining whether the levy imposed by them i~ a fee or a
tax.
E
The last argument in this co!IIlection which we have to notice
was based on ss. 126 and 127 of the Act. Section 126 deals with
the preparation by the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation
called Commissioner, of the a!IIlual budget. The budget has to
include an estimate of receipts from all sources. These receipts
would obviously include taxes, fees, licence fees and rents. Under
. F s. 127 (3) the Corporation has to pass this budget and to determine, subject to Part IV of the Act, the lrvy of consolidated rates
and taxes at such rates as are necessary to. provide for the
purposes mentioned .in sub-s. ( 4). Sub-section ( 4) requires the
Corporation to make adequate and suitable provision for such
services as may be required for the fulfilment o(the several duties
G imposed by the Act· and for certain other things to which it is not
necessary to refer. The first point made was that these sections
showed that the Act made a distinction between fees and taxes.
It does not seem to us that anything turns on this as the only
question now is whether the levy under s. 548 is a fee. The other
paint was that els. (3) and ( 4) of s. 127 showed that the CorpoH ration could fix ·the consolidated rates and taxes and that the
determination of rates for these had to be in accordance with tho
11ceds for carrying out the Corporation's duties under the Act.
SUPUME
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[196S] 2 s.c.n. '
It was said that as the licence fee leviablo under s. 548 did not A.
relate to any duty of the Corporation under the Act, it . being
optional for the Corporation to impose tenns for grant of licen~
for cinema houses, the rate for that fee was not to be fixed ~
reference to anything except rendering of services. We are
unable to accept this argument and it is enough to say in regard •
to it that it is not right that s. 443 does not impose a duty on the
Corporation.. We think it does so, though in what manner an~
when it will be exercised it is for the Corporation to decide. It Ii
impossible to call it a power, a8 the respondent wants to do, for
it is not given to the Corporation for its own benefit. The Corporation has been set up only to perform municipal duties and its c
powers are for enabling it to perform those duties. Furthermore
there is no doubt that an estimate of the licence fee has to be
included in the budget and therefore the word "tax" in s. 127 (3)
must be deemed to include the levy under s. 548. The words
"subject to the provisions of Part IV" in s. 127 (3) must be read,
with the addition of the words "where applicable". If that levy I)
cannot be a fee because there is no provision for service being
rendered in respect of it, it would indisputably be a tax. As such
again, its rate can be determined under s. 127 (3) to provide for
the discharge of at least the other undisputed duties of the Corporation. We would, therefore, reject this last argument also.
The conclusion to which we then arrive is that the levy under E
s. 548 is not a fee as the Act does not provide for any services of
special kind being rendered resulting in benefits to the person on
whom it is imposed. The work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to see that the t11nns of tiie licence are
observed by the licensee is not a service to him. No question hero F
arises of correlating the amo\lllt of the levy to the costs of any
service. The levy is a tax. It is not <!isputed, it may be stated,
that if the levy is not a fee, it must be 3 tax·
It was then said that if s. 548 authorised the levy of a tax as
distinct from a fee in retuni for services rendered, it was invalid
as it amounted to an illegal delegation of legislative fuactions to G
the Corporation because it left it entirely to the latter to fix the
amount of the tax and provideq no guidance for that purpose.
We wish to point out here that the contention now is that the
section is invalid while the contention that we have just dealt with
proceeded on the basi&'I thl\t the section was valid as it provided
for the levy of a fee in return fo~ services and as this nec;essarily ff
implied a limit of the lev.y, m1mel}(, that it had k> be c:Ommensurate to the amount of the costs of the services, no guidance. Jar
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA
(Sarkar, I.)
491
A furing the amount of the fee to be levied was required to be provided. That argument only challenged the resolution on the
ground that it fixed the amount of the fee at a figure much in
excess of the costs for the services rendered.
Here again there is no dispute that a delegation of essential
• legislative power would be bad. It was so held by this Court first
in Jn re The Delhi Laws Act. ( 1 ) The principle there laid down
has been summarised by Bose J. in Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna( 2 ), in these terms:
"In our opinion, the majority view was that an executive authority
can be authorised to modify either existing or future laws but not
c in any essential feature. Exactly what constitutes an essential
feature cannot be enunciated in general terms, and there was some
divergence of view about this in the former case, but this much i1s
clear from the opinions set out above: it cannot include a change
of policy."
b
On the basis that s. 548 is a piece of delegated legislation,
it has been contended on behalf of the Corporation that the rate
of a tax is not an essential feature of legislation and the power
to fix it was properly delegated to the Corporation as sufficient
guidance for that purpose was given in the Act. It is not in
controversy, and this indeed has been held by this Court, that if
:I that is so, the section would be unexceptionable. The question
first is whether the power to fix the rate of a tax can be delegated
by the legislature to another authority; whether it is of the essence
of taxing legislation. The contention of the Corporation that
fixation of rates is not an essential part of legislation would seem
to be supported by several judgments of this Court to some of
F which we now proceed to refer.
First, there is Pandit Benarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh( 8 ). That case was concerned with a Sales Tax
Act which by s. 6 (l) provided that no tax would be payable on
any sale of goods specified in a schedule to it. Item 33 of that
G Schedule read, "goods sold to or by the State Government".
:Section 6(2) of the Act authorised the State Government to
amend the schedule by a notification. In exercise of this power
the Government duly substituted by a notification for item 33
the following: "Goods sold by the State Government". The
amendment of the schedule by the notification was challenged on
II the ground that s. 6(2) was invalid as it was a delegation of the
(I) [195l)S. C. R. 747
(2) [195511 S. C.R. 290, 301,
(3) [!959j S. C. R. 427.
SUPllBMB
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(1965) 2 S.C.R...
essential power of legislation to the State Government. Venkata- A
1ama Aiyar J. delivering the judgment of the majority of the
Court sitting in a Constitution Bench, rejected this contention
and after having read what we have earlier set out from the
judgment of Bose J. in Rajnarain Singh's case( 1 ), observed at p.
435: "On these1observations, the point for determination is
whether the impugned notification relates to what may be said a
to be an essential feature of the law, and whether it involves any
change of policy. Now, the authorities are clear that it is not
unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to tbe executive to
detennilie details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as
the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates C'
at which it is to be · charged in respect of different classes of
goods, and the like.'' The Act was a statute imposing taxes for
revenue purposes. This case would appear to be express authority for the proposition that fixation of rates of taxes may be legitimately left by a statute to a non-legislative authority, for we see
no distinction in principle between delegation of power to fix .D
nites simpliciter; if power to fix rates in some cases can be delegated then equally the power to fix rates generally can be delegated.
No doubt Pandit Banarsi Das's case(') was not concerned with
fixation of rates of taxes; it was a case where the question was on '.
what subject mater, and therefore on what persons, the tax could
be imposed. Between the two we are unable to distinguish in r.
principle, as to which is of the essence of legislation; if the power
to decide who is to pay the tax is not an essential part of legislation,
neither would the power to decide the rate of tax be so. Therefore,
• we think that apart from the express observation made, this case on
principle supports the contention that fixing of the rate of a tax is
not of the essence of legislative power.
~
In regard to the observations in Pandit Benarsi Das's case(']
earlier quoted, it has been said that the authorities on which they
appear to have been based do not support it. It has been contended that as the observations do not form part of the actual G
decision in the case, they need not be giveri that weight which
they would otherwise have been entitled to. In the High Court
this contention appears to have been accepted. The acceptance
of the contention would result in by-passing a judgment of this
Court and that, is something which cannot in any case be supported. We are furthermore of opinion that the authorities to H
(I) [19SSJ I S. C. R. 290.
(2) [19S9j S. C. R. 427.
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Sarkar, I.)
493
A which Venkatarama Aiyar J. referred fully support his observations. The first case relied upon by him was Powell v. Appollo
Candle Co. Ltd.('). That case upheld the validity of a statute
passed by the legislature of New South Wales which conferred
power on the Governor of that Province to impose duty on certain
anides in the circumstances prescribed. The Governor under
B thJs power imposed the tax and this was challenged. The Judicial
Committee rejected the contention that the tax had not been
imposed by the Legislature which alone could do it in the view
!hat '"lhe duties levied under the Order in Council are really
levied by the authority of the Act" seep. 291. Here, therefore, a
C power conferred on the Governor by the Legislature to levy a tax
was upheld. It would follow that a power conferred to fix rates
of taxes has equally to be upheld. The next case was Syed
Mohamed v. State of Madras("). There a power to an authority
to determine who shall pay the tax was upheld. On the same
principle a power to determine at what rate he will have to pay
D the tax has to be upheld. The last case was Hampton Jr. ii
Co. v. United States('), in which the power conferred by a
statute on the President to make an increase or decrease in the
rate of customs duty was upheld. There it was said at p. 630,
"It is conceded by counsel that Congress may µse executive
officers in the application and enforcement of a policy declared
E in law by Congress and authorise such officers in the application
of the Congressional declaration to enforce it by regulation
equivalent to law. But it is said that this never has been permitted to be done where Congress has exercised the power to levy
taxes and fix customs duties. The authorities make no such
distinction. The same principle that permits Congress to exercise
F its rate making power in inter-state commerce by decfaring the
rnle which shall prevail in the legislative fixing of rates, and
enables it to remit to a rate-making bopy created in accordance
with its provisions the fixing of such rates, justifies a similar
provision for the fixing of customs duties on imported merchanG disc." This therefore is clear authority that the fixing of rates
may be left to a non-legislative body.
H
No doubt when the power to fix rates of taxes is left to
another body, the legislature must provide guidance for such
fixation. The question then is, was such guidance provided in
the Act? We first wish to observe that the validity of the guidance
I) I 0. A. C. 282
(2) [1952] 3 S. T. C 367
(3 1 [1927] 72 L. ed. 624.
49(
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[1965) 2 S.C.ll.
cannot be tested by a rigid uniform rule; that must depend A
on the object of the Act giving power to fix the rate. It is said
that the delegation of power to fix rates of taxes authorised for
meeting the needs of the delegate to be valid, must provide the
maximum rate that can be fixed, or lay down rules indicating that
maximum. We are unable to see how the specification of the
maximum rate supplies any guidance as to how the amount of the
tax which no doubt has to be below the maximum, is to be fixed.
Provision for such maximum only sets out a limit of the rate to be
imposed and a limit is only a limit and not a guidance.
It seems to us that there are various decisions of this Court
c
which support the proposition that for a statutory provision for
raising revenue for the purposes of the delegate, as the section
now under consideration is, the needs of the taxing body for
ca1rying out its functions under the statute for which alone the
taxing power was conferred on it, may afford sufficient guidance
to make the power to fix the rate of tax valid. We proceed now D
to refer to these cases.
The Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation
of the City of Poona(') was concerned with a statute under
which the respondent Corporation had been set up and which
gave that Corporation power to levy "any other tax". It waa
contended that such a power amounted to abdication of Jegisla- •
tive function as there was no guidance provided. This contention was rejected. One of the grounds for this view was that the
statute authorised the municipality to impose .'taxes therein
mentioned for the purposes of the Act and that this furnished
su!llcient guidance for the imposition of the tax. Again, no ir
doubt, this was not a case dealing with rates of taxes, but if a
power on the Corporation to impose any tax it liked subject to
th~ guidance mentioned was valid, that would include in it the
power to fix the rates of the tax, subject of course to the same
guidance. Such a power has to be held to be good. It is true,
as was pointed out by learned advocate for the respondent, that G
other 3rounds were mentioned in support of the view taken in
the Western India Theatres case(') but that surely is irrelevant,
for it cannot make the ground of the decision there which we
have earlier set out devoid of all force.
Then there is Vasantlal Manganbhai Sanjanwala v. The
State of Bombay( 2 ). The provision of the statute there. attacked 8
(I) (1959) Supp. 2 S. C.R. 71.
(2) [1961] IS. C.R. 341.
CALCUTTA CORP. 11. LIBERTY CINEMA (Sarkar, /.)
4
B
495
gave the Government power to fix a lower rate of maximum rent
payable by the tenants. The validity of this provision was upheld on the ground that the material provisions of the Act including its preamble were intended to give relief to tenants by fixing
tht· maximum rent payable by them. It was in the light of this
policy of the Act that the validity of the impugned provision was
really upheld.
The last case which we wish to notice in this connection ia
the Union of India v. Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal('). Section 3 of
the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 came up
c for consideration there. That section gave power to the Government to make necessary orders for maintaining or increasing
supplies of any essential commodities or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. In Harishankar
Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh( 2 ) the validity of the delegation of power contained in that section had been upheld as it
D laid down the policy as to how that power was to be exercised
by the delegates, that is, the Government. In Bhana Mal Gulzari
Mal's case(') the validity of an order made under s. 3 reducing
the price at which steel could be sold was challenged. This
challenge was rejected on the ground that the order fixing the
price carried out the legislative objective prescribed in s. 3. It
JI: was observed at p. 638, "It is not difficult to appreciate how and
why the Legislature must have thought that it would be inexpedient either to define or describe in detail all the relevant tactors
which have to be considered in fixing the fair price of an essential
commodity from time to time. In prescribing a schedule of
maximum prices the Contr<!ller has to take into account the
If position in respect of production of the commodities in question,
the demand for the said Commodities, the availability of the said
commodities from foreign sources and the anticipated increase or
decrease in the said supply or demand. Foreign prices for the
said commodities may also be not irrelevant. Having regard to
Q the fact that the decision about the maximum prices in respect of
iron and steel would depend on a rational evaluation from time
to time of all these varied factors the Legislature may well have
thought that this problem should be left to be tackled by the
delegate with enough freedom, the policy of the Legislature having
been clearly indicated by s. 3 in that behalf." Again it was said
H at p. 640, "In deciding the nature and extent of the guidance
which should be given to the delegate Legislature mu&t inevitably.
(I) [19601 2
s: c. R. 627.
(2) [19SS] I SC. R. 380.
496
SUPREME
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1~65] 2 S.C.R.
take into account the special features of the object which it intends to achieve by a particular statute. . . . . . Having regard to
the nature of the problem which the Legislature wanted to attack:
it may have come to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient
to limit the discretion of the delegate in fixing the maximum
prices by reference to any basic price."
The portions in the judgment in Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal's
case (1) quoted in the preceding paragraph will show that the
validity of the guidance required to make de~egation of power ~ood
cannot be judged by a stereotyped rule. With respect, we entrrely
agree with this view. The guidance furnished must be held to be
good if it leads to the achievement of the object of the statute
which delegated the power. The validity of the power to fix rates
of taxes delegated to the Corporation by s. 548 of the Act must
be judged by the same standard. Now there is no dispute that
all taxes, including the one under this section, can be collected
and used by the Corporation only for discharging its functions
under the Act. The Corporation, subject to certain controls
wuh which we are not concerned, is an autonomous body. It
has to perform various statutory functions. It is often given
power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be
performed. For all this it needs money and its needs will vary
from time to time with the prevailing exigencies. Its power to
collect tax, however, is necessarily limited by the expenses required to discharge those functions. It has, therefore, where rates
have not been specified in the statute, to fix such rates as m:iy be
necessary to meet its needs. That, we think, would be sufficient
guidance to make the exercise of its power to fix the rates valid.
The case is as if the statute had required the Corporation to
perform duties A, B & C and given power to levy taxes to meet
the costs to be incurred for the discharge of .these duties and then
said that, "provided, however, that the rates of the taxes shall be
such as would bring into the Corporation's hands the amount
necessary to defray the costs of discharging the duties." We
shauld suppose, this would have been a valid guidance. We think
the Act in the present case impliedly provides the same guidance
see s. 127 ( 3) & ( 4). It would be impracticable to insist on a
more rigid guidance. In the case of a self-governing body with
taxing powers, a large amount of flexibility in the guidance to
be provided for the exercise of that power must exist. It is hardly
neco::ssary to point out that, as in the cases under Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, so in the case of a big
{I) [19601 2 S. C. R. 6'};1,
A.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBBllTY CINEMA ($or/car, J.)
497
A municipality like that of Calcutta, its needs would depend on
various and changing circumstances. There are epidemics, inllux of refugees, labour strikes, new amenities to be provided, ~or
such as hospitals, schools and various other such things may be
mentioned which make it necessary for a colossal Municipal Corporation like that of Calcutta to have a large amount of flexibility
B in its taxing powers. These considerations lead us to the view
that s. 548 is valid legislation. There is sufficient guidance in
!he Act as to how the rate of the levy is to be fixed.
We may point out at the end that entry 62 in List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution gives power to the State
C Legislatures tO impose taxes on entertainment and amusement
and therefore on cinema shows. It was hence not said-if the
question was relevant-that the State Legislature delegated a
power to the Corporation which it itself did not possess.
D
E.
F
•
G
H
It remains now to notice an argument advanced by Mr. Pathak
on behalf of the Corporation. It is that even if it be assumed
that no guidance for-the taxation has been prescribed, the provisir n foi taxation in the Act would be valid. He said that the
Act may be said to have been passed under entry 5 of List II in
the Seventh Schedule to our Constitution. That entry authorises
the passing of a law concerning the constitution and powers <
a municipal corporation. Mr. Pathak c<intended that the powe1
of a corporation contemplated in this entry must necessarily iL
elude power to levy tax, for no municipal corporation could work
without its own funds. He pointed out that this has been the case
with the municipal corporations created before and after the
Constitution. He, therefore, said that the present was not a case
of delegation of taxing power which might be bad if no guidance
to the exercise of that p(Jwer had been furnished by the Act; it
is a case where under the Constitution independent power to tax
had been conferred on the Corporation. · The conferment of such
power did not require any guidance for its exercise to. make it
valid. He pointed out that delegation of power necessarily meant
delegation of the power of the delegator. On such delegation
the delegated power could only be exercised by the delegates for
the use of the delegator. That was not the case of power conferred under entry 5. ·In such a case the power of taxation conferred was for the purpose of the corporation itself. The amount
collected by taxation belonged to the corporation. This is what
had happened here. As at present .advised, we think that this
£Ontention of Mr. Pathak deserves consideration. It is unnecessary,
<198
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[1965] 2 S.C.R.
however, for us to . pronounce finally on it, for in either A
view the talling power ci\allenged must be held to be good.
In the result we would allow the appeal with costs through·out.
Ayyangar, J. Section 443 of the Calcutta Municipal Act,
1951 (West Bengal Act XXXIII of 1951) which will hereafter be •
referred to as the Act enacts :
"No person shall, without or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of a licence granted by the
Commissioner in this behalf, keep open any theatre,
circus, cinema-house, dancing hall or other similar place
c
of public resort, recreation or amusement :
Provided that this section shall not apply to private
performances in any such place."
and s. 548(2) :
D
"Except when it is in this Act or in any rule or byolaw made thereunder otherwise expressly provided, for
every such licence or written permission a fee may be
charged at such rate as may from time to time be fixed
by the Corporation and such fee shall be payable by
the person to whom the licence or written permission is
granted.
The respondent before us is the owner and licensee of a cinema
theatre known as the Liberty Cinema situated in Calcutta within
the Municipal limits of the city· Under the provisions of the
Calcutta Municipal Act 1923 which had been repealed and reenacted with modifications by the Act of 1951, the respondent F
was paying for his theatre Rs. 800 per annum as licence fee
under provisions corresponding toss. 443 and 548(2) of the Act.
While so, by a resolution of the Municipal Council dated Marc.It
14, 1958, the licence fee payable by theatres under s. 443 was
raised with the result that instead of Rs. 800 which the respondent was paying previously he was required to pay a sum of G
Rs. 6,000 per year. As the Corporation insisted upon the amoilQt
being paid and threatened to cancel the licence and take appropriate penal action in the event of the demand not being met, the
respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Art. 226
of the Constitution praying for appropriate writs of certiorai,
mandamus etc. to quash the said resolution and to prevent the C'.or- H
poration from enforcing the said demand. It was stated in the
petition that the respondent had been paying besides the con8oli-
I'
''.
r.ALCUTTA CORP. v. LmERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, 1.)
49&
A dated rate for the property, a fee of Rs. 250 as profession tax for
carrying on the trade or calling of cinema exhibitor as well as other
taxes and fees. He characterised the licence fee which was
demanded from him as not in rciality a fee which alone the Municipal Corporation was entitled to charge. Stating that it was
out of all proportion to the. service rendered or the costs involved
B in ensuring the observance of the conditions of the licence, he
contended that the fee demanded from him was really a tax which
the Corporation was not entitled to levy under the provisions
quoted and therefore sought the relief ,which he prayed for in the
petition.
c
The learned Single Judge who heard the petition in the first
instance held on an analysis of the provisions of the Calcutta
Municipal Act that what the Municipality was entitled to levy
under s.548(2) read withs. 443 was really "a licence fee" and not
a tax and that viewed as a licence fee it did not pass the test of
legality on account of there being no correlation between the.
D amount charged on the theatre owners and the services rendered
to them or the expenses incurred by the Municipality in regard to
the issue of licences. Dealing with the alernative contention urged
before him by the Corporation thats. 548(2) of the Act authorised
the Corporation to levy a tax, the learned Judge held that the
section would be unconstitutional as suffering from the vice of
:I excessive delegation in that it laid down no principle, indicated no
policy and afforded no guidance for determining the basis or the
rate on which the tax was to be levied and was therefore void. In
consequence he, allowed the petition saving however the right of
the Corporation to recover the fee. at the rate in force prior to
I' March 14, 1958 on the ground that the levy at this rate was saved
by Art. 277 of the Constitution. The Corporation preferred an
appeal to a Division Bench and the learned Judges on practically
the same line of reasoning as the learned Single Judge dismissed
the appeal. Their conclusions were as follows : The imposition
permitted to be made bys. 548(2) read with s. 443 of the Act is
G charged was only a fee as distinguished from a tax. Regarded as
a fee the levy was invalid as there was no quid pro quo. If, however, it be held tliat the provisions cruoted authorised the levy of a
tax, the provisions were unconstitutional because they involved an
improper delegation of legislative power. They also held that th~
levy was not to any extent saved by Art. 277 of the Constitution.
H The Corporation desiring to prefer an appeal sought a certificat&
of fitness from the learned Judges and the same having been.
granted, the appeal is now· before us.
500
SUPREME
COUR.T
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.CR..
As one of the questions involved in the appeal related to the
constitutional validity of the provisions of a State enactment, notice
of this appeal was served on the State.
'
A
Mr. Pathak learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation did
not contest the finding and decision of both the learned Single
Judge as well as the learned Judges in appeal, that if what B
s. 548(2) of the Act authorised was only a fee in the technical
sense, viz., a payment for service rendered as distinguished from a
tax, the impugned levy was invalid in as much as there was
admittedly no correlation between the amount of the levy and the
cost of the service, if any rendered to the fee-payer. His submissions in support of the validity of the impugned levy were : ( 1) . C
An analysis of the several provisions of the Act showed that the
Act employed the word "fee" and particularly in ihe context of
a fee for licences granted for carrying on an activity, in the sense
of a tax., (2) the fee permitted to be charged for licences by
s. 548 (2) of the Act was not a fee but a tax as it was not a quid D
pro quo for services which the Corporation was required by or
under the Act to render or did render to the licensee., ( 3) A fee
<:barged for a licence other than a fee for services rendered is in
reality a tax and no quid pro quo is necessary to sustain its validity
beyond the grant of the licence and a permission to carry on the
activity which the licence authorises., ( 4) If what was permitted E
to be charged bys. 548(2) were a tax, the provision is not unconstitutional for the reason that the rate of the fee was not specified in the Act. The non-specification · in the Act of the rate of
the . licence fee to be charged is not open to the objection of
excessive delegation of legislative power for two reasons : ( 1 )
For considering whether there· has been an excessive delegation, F
regard must be had not merely to the section conferring the power
but to the other provisions of the Act as well which might throw
light upon the topic and from which sufficient enunciation
of
principle or guidance could be gathered. In the present case
there was sufficient guidance available and proper standards laid
down in the other provisions of the Act as to uphold the validity G
of the delegation., (2) When a delegation of legislative power
including legislative power to impose a tax is conferred upon a
Municipal Corporation, no question of excessive delegation arises
as the Constitution itself permits and authorises such devolution
of legislative power.
H
In view of these submissions it is necessary to consider and.
ascertain principally 4 matters : ( 1) the precise nature of a fee,
CALCUTTA COllP. v. LmEllTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
A
501
as distinguished from a tax., (2) Whether on an examination of
the several provisions of the Act the charge authorised to be
levied by s. 548(2) read with s. 443 of the Act, is a fee in that
aeDSe or is it a tax., ( 3) If what is permitted to be levied by ·
s. 548 ( 2) is not a fee out a tax whether the various provisions of
the Act read idependently or together enunciate the principles,
B prescribe the standards, and affords sufficient guidance to the
Municipality to fix the rate so as to render the conferment of the
power free the from the vice of excessive delegation; and ( 4) .
lastly, whether the .rule as to excessive delegation of legislative
power is inapplicable in those cases where the devolution or cone ferment of pbwer is on a municipal corporation, or, in any event,
whether the rule as to excessive delegation needs substantial modi- ·
fication before the same is applied to a case where the donee of
the power is a municipal corporation entrusted with local SFlf
government.
D
We shall take up these questions in that order.
I. The Nature of a Fee as distinguished from a taJC.
E
F
G
H
Mr.
Pathak did not dispute that the Constitution had drawn a distinction between "fees" and "taxes", and that while "fees" could be
charged as incidental to the exercise of legislative power on topics
set up in the several entries in the three legislative lists in Schedule
VIl, the power taxation by the Union or by the State was confined
to particular species or types of taxes distinctively specified as such
in lists I or II respectively. In the context of such a distinction
the question necessarily arose as to what were the ingredients or
characteristics of a "fee" as distinguished from a "tax". Mr.
Pathak submitted that "fees" as envisaged by the Constitution
was the exaction of compensation permitted by a statute to be
imposed for a special service rendered to the payer. In other ·
words, unless by or under an enactment it was obligatory on an
authority, be it a municipal authority or any other to render some
special service to the payer of the fee as distinguished from the
benefit conferred on every member of the general public by the
performance of statutory duties, and the levy is permitted to be
made for meeting the cost of such service, the charge imposed
would not be a "fee". In all other cases, where no special service
is directed to be or is rendered to a particular individual out of
the ordinary, the fee imposed for the licence or permission granted
for the carrying on of any activity il; really in the nature of a tax
in regard to which no question of quid pro quo arises.
502
SUPJU!MB 'COU.T
UPOl.TI
(1965] 2 ~.c.a
It is common ground that the Constitution recognises a clear A
distinction between a tax and a fee. The several entries in tho
Lists in the Seventh Schedule which enumerate the legislative
powers and distribute them between Parliament and lhe .Stl!ID
Legislatures point to this distinction. The scheme underlying the
Lists may shortly be summarised thus.. Each of the Union and
the State Lists which are Lists I and II start by enumerating fint •
the Entries conferring general legislative powers as distinct from
taxation powers. In other words, the taxation entries, that ii
entries conferring taxing power, are separately enumerated after
entries conferring general legislative power.. Thus items 1 to 81
of List I deal with the exclusive general legislative powers of C
Parliament while 82 to 92 enumerate the taxes which
Parliament may impose. Item 96 empowers Parliament to legislate in respect of "fees in respect of any of the matters in this List,
but not including fees taken in any Court." This would clearly
demonstrate that while "fees" may be levied in respect of or as
incidental to legislation on the topics set out in the other entries D
in the list, the power to levy a tax is not to be taken as conferred
by entries conferring general legislative power. Thus though a
fee may be levied as incidental to legislation be it general as in
· respect of entries 1 to 81 or the entries conferring taxing powers
--entries 82 to 92, or in respect of the miScellaneous matters
enumerated by such an entry like 94, no taxes may be imposed •
by virtue of the general legislative power under entries 1 to 81.
This matter has been the subject of consideration by this Court
though from a slightly different angle in M.P. V. Sundararami~
& Co. v. The State of Andhra PradeJh.( 1 ) Venkatarama Aiyar,
I. speaking for the Court said : "In List I, Entries 1 to 81 mention the aeveral
matters over which Parliament has authority to legislate.
Entries 82 .to 92 enumerate the taxes which could bo
imposed by a law of Parliament. An examination of
these two groups of Entries shows that while the main
subject .of legislation figures in the first group, a tax in
relation thereto is separately mentioned in the second.
Thus, Entry 22 in List I is "Railways", and Entry 89 is
"Terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by
railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights".
If Entry 22 is to be construed as involving taxes to be
R
imposed, then Entry 89 would be superfluous. Entry
41 mentions "Trade and commerce with foreign coall-
.
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 1422, 1479-80.
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
A
B
•
c
D
E
F
G
ff
503
tries; import and export across customs frontiers". U
these expressions are to be interpreted as including
duties to be levied in respect of that trade and commerce, then Entry 83 which is "Duties of customs
including export duties" would be wholly redundant.
Entries 43 and 44 relate to incorporation, regulation
and winding up of corporations. Entry 85 provides
separately for Corporation tax. Turning to Li~t 11,
Entries 1 to 44 form one group mentioning the sullj~ts
on which the States could legislate. Entries 45 to 63 in
that List form another group, and they deal with taxes.
Entry 18, for example, is "Land" and Entry 45 is "Land
revenue". Entry 23 is "Regulation of mines" and Entry
50 is "Taxes of mineral rights". The above analysisand it is not exhaustive of the Entries in the Listsleads to the inference that taxation is not intended to be
comprised in the main subject in which it might on an
extended construction be regarded as included, but is
treated as a distinct matter for purposes of legisiative
competence. And this illstinction is also manifest in
the language of Art. 248, Cls. (1) and (2), and of
Entry 97 in List I of the Constitution."
The same pattern of classification and conferment of general
·legislative as illstinguished from taxing power is adopted in the
State List, List II. Entries 1 to 44 of this List deal with general
legislative power while items 45 to 63 deal with specific taxes
which might be imposed exclusively by the State Legislatures.
The last entry in this List is in the same terms as Entry 96 of
List I and reads "fees taken in respect of any of the matters in this
List but not including fees taken in any Court". So far as the Concurrent List is concerned, it contains no entry conferring the
taxation power but by its last entry, Entry 47, it enahle~ the
Legislatures to impose "fees in respect of any of the matters in
that List but not including fees taken in any Court" and this is
in terms identical with Entries 96 of List I 'ind 66 of List II. It
is, therefore, quite obvious that the Constitution proceeds on a
basis of clear line of demarcation between the power to ta'!: and
the power to levy a fee.
Before proceeding further, one other matter arising out of this
~cheme might also be noticed. When entries 96 of List I or 66
of List II speak of "any of the matters in this List" they necessarily
include also the entries relating to taxation. In other words, a
fee may be levied even under an enactment relating to the imposi-
L3Sup./6S-l6
104
SUPREME
COUllT
REPORTS
. (1965) 2 S.C.L
tion of a tax. Merely by way of illustration of this type of fco · A.
we might refer to fees which are charged for licences which are
required to be taken by dealers under the Sales Tax Act in tho
various States. The exact amount of the licence fees to be charged
is most often left to the executive determination, the maximum
being sometimes prescribed by the relevant sales tax enactment B
and sometimes even this maximum is not prescribed. Theso
licences are issued in order to ensure the orderly administration of
tax legislation and the proper collection of the tax imposed thereby. The distinction between the tax imposed under Entry 54 of
List II "taxes on the sale or purchase of goods" and the fees charged
for the licences issued to dealers as a condition of their being per- C
milted to carry on business of buying and selling goods is too
obvious to need explanation. The significance of illustration of
this kind and its impact upon the submissions of Mr. Pathak as
regards the nature of a fee under the Constitution we shall reservo
for consideration later.
Recognising this well marked distinction which the Constitution D
makes as between a fee and a tax, the submission of Mr. Pathak
was that "fees" in entry 66 of List II were fees for services
specially rendered to the payer, and for this construction· he relied
on two separate lines of reasoning (1) that this had been the sP.nse
in which this Court had understood the content of the word "fee";
( 2) that this construction was required or reinforced by Art. g
110(2) [and the corresponding Article 199(2)].
We shall first consider the decisions of this Court, which it is
stated have thus interpreted the term "fee" as used in the Constitution. The first case referred to in this connection was The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri F
Lakshmindra Thlrth Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(') where this
Court had to consider the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 in its application to Mutts. Among the provisions considered in that context was s. 76 of that enactment, which
directed every religious institution to "pay to the Government G
annually" such contribution not exceeding 5% of its income as
might be prescribed. The validity of this provision was challenged
on the ground that what was authorised to be levied was not a
fee but a tax, and that as a tax it could not be brought within any
of the particular taxes enumerated in List II which the State Legislature was empowered to impose. This Court agreed with this H
contention, and based its conclusion on the following circumt(1) 119'4) S.C;Jl. 1005.
•
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
505
tances. It recognised that a clear distinction existed between
taxes and fees under the Constitution. As to what was meant
by a tax, Mukherjea, J., who delivered the judgment of the
Court adopted the definition of the term by Latham, C.J ., in
Mathews v. Chicory Marketing Board(') : "a tax is a compulsory
exaction of money by a public authority for public -purposea
B enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered". The
learned Judge enumerated the characteristic of a tax from other
forms o( compulsory payments, and these were summarised
thus :- (I) that taxes were imposed by a statutory power with-.
out the tax-payer's consent the payment being enforced hy law,
(2) that a tax is an imposition made for public purpose without
C reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of
the tax ( 3) that a tax was levied for the purposes of general
revenue which when collected formed part of the public revenues
of the State. "As the object of a tax is not to confer any special
benefit upon any particular individual there is no element of quid
D pro quo between the tax-payer and the public authority''. On
the other hand, a fee was generally stated to be defined to be a
charge for special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. "The amount of fee levied is supposed to
be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily
E assessed". The learned Judge then went on to observe ''the distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a
tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. Fee confers a special
capacity although the special advantage as for example in tho
case of registration fees for documents or marriage licences is
F secondary to the primary motive /of regulation in the public
interest. Public interest seems to be the basis of all impositions,
but in a fee it is some special benefit which the individual
receives". In holding that the contribution imposed bys. 76(1)
was really a tax and not a fee regard was also had to some other
factors, viz., ( 1) ihe percentage of contribution leviable was
G graded according to the income derived by the institution, and
(2) the entire collections went into the Consolidated Fund of
the State and the expenses for the upkeep of the Board which
was a statutory corporation created for the · administration of
religious endowments in the State was ·also directed to be met
H out of the monies in the Consolidated Fund. Reliance was also
placed on similar observations of this Court, in other cases of
A
(l) 60 C.LR. 263.
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
fees charged on religious endowments under other enactments A
which were heard along with the Shirur Mutt case, ( 1 ) already
referred to, though in them the validity of the levy was upheld.
The validity of a contribution levied under the. Orissa Hindu
Religious Endowments Act was considered by this Court in
Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanu; Das and Anr. v. The State of
Orissa and Anr. ( 1 ) and ·of a similar levy under the Bombay B
Public Trust Act (Ratial Panchand Gandhi v. The State of
Bombay and Ors.(')). In these two cases, the validity of the
contribution levied under their respective charging provisions
was. as stated already, upheld. The ground on which s. 76(1)
of the Madras Act which was S\I'UCk down in the Shirur Mutt C
case was distinguished was, that under the other two enactments,
a special fund was created to which the collections were to be
credited and that the expenses of the administration of the Act
were directed to be met out of this fund. Though the concept
of a fee as a quid pro quo for particular services rendered to the
fee payer as explained in the Shirur Mutt case are also repeated D
in these two decisions, it is worth noticing that the service to
be rendered to the Religious Endowment or public trust by the
Orissa and the Bombay Acts were exactly similar to the service-which was by way of supervision, regulation and control over
the way in which the management by the trustees was conducted
under the Madras Act. This consideration is highlighted when E
one examines the decision of this Court in the Udipi Mutt cas~
H. H. Sudhundra, Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner /pr Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore(')-which was
a sequel to the Shirur Mutt case,('). Afters. 76(1) was struck
down by this Court in the Shirur Mutt case( 1 ) the Madras Legislature by Act 27 of 1954 effected certain amendments to that F
section with a view to rendering it ·constitutional. Section 76
had been held to be ultra vires of the legisture on the ground that
what it imposed was not a fee which was the only thing permitted
by Entry 66 but in reality of tax. This decision was based upon
several grounds of which the principal were : ( 1) that no special
service had been rendered to the Mutts and other religious insti- G
tutions so as to justify its being a fee for services rendered, (2)
that it was graded according to the capacity of the payer based
upon the annual income derived by the institution which rendered it somewhat like an income tax, and (3) that it was paid to
the Government and _became part of the Consolidated Fund of the H
.State, the expenses incurred in administering the Act being paid
(I) [1954] S.C.R. l(l()S,
(3) [1963) 2 Supp. S.C.R. 302.
(2) [1954) S.C.R. 1046.
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, I.)
507
A out of the General Revenues. Section 76 as amended by Act 27
of 1954 was held to be intra vires and sustained as a fee. The
changes that were effected by the Madras Legislature were : ( 1)
the graded system was abolished and the maximum percentage of
the contribution being fixed by the statute, (2) the contributions
payable were collected by the Commissioner and not by the State,
B ( 3 ) that a separate Fund was created into which these collections
were credited and moneys for meeting the expenditure for the
administration of the Act were drawn from this Fund. One other
point to be mentioned is that the services rendered to the institution,
as set out in s. 76 and the other relevant provisions of the Act
remained exactly the same. This Court held the contribution to
C be a fee principally for the reason that the moneys that were being
paid into a separate Fund were collected not by the Governm•!nt
and were being paid to a different Fund. If one proceeded on the
footing that unless the service rendered was a specific service in
the sense of a benefit conferred specially upon the payer, the
0 charge levied would be a tax, the contribution levied under s. 76
even after the amendment would have been held to be a tax. No
doubt, the fact that a separate Fund is segregated from the Consolidated fund of the State and the moneys are received not. by the
Government as such but by a public authority might show that it
is not a tax, still these are not decisive, for as was held by the
11: Privy Council in Attornt1y-Gt1neral for British Columbia v. E. cl
N. Railway Co.(') which has been approved by this Court in Tht1
Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. The State of Orissa and
ors.(') to which we shall refer later the payments were credited
to a Fund known as the Authorised Protection Fund to which
advances were made from Consolidated revenues. Lord Greene
F after saying that the levy had the characteristics of taxation,'
observed:
G
H
"It is suggested, however, that there are two circumstances which are sufficient to turn the levy into
what is called a 'service charge'. They are, first, that the
levy is on a defined class of interested individuals and,
secondly, that the fund raised does not fall into the
general mass of the proceeds of taxation but is applicable
for a special and limited purpose. Neither of these
considerations appears to their Lordships to have the
weight which it is desired to attach to them."
The segregation of the Fund, theref9re, could not have been a
decisive factor for determining the nature of the levy. This
[ (I) [19SO] A.C. 87.
(2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 537.
508
SUPllBMB
COURT
REPORTS
[1965) 2 S.c.R..
decision as well as the Orissa and the Bombay cases already cited A
are, therefore, authority for. the position ·that the word 'services'
in this context may have to be understood in a wide sense as
including supervision and control over the activity for the exercise
of which the fee is charged.
AB contrasted with these three cases, Mr. Pathak submitted that B
when fees were Jevied for licences they were taxes. In support
he referred.to Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner
& the Commissioner, Ajmer and others. (1 ) Under the legislation
before the Court viz. The Excise Regulation Act 1950 licences
were granted to regulate the trade in liquor. The fee to bo
charged for the grant of the licence was not prescribed by the c
Act or the rules but the licence was sold in public auction, the
highest bidder being granted the licence the amount of the licence ·
fee thus being the amount of the highest bid. This Court held
that the fee collected from the highest bidders to whom the licences
were granted was really in the nature of a tax though described as
a licence fee. It was held that the legislative power for enacting D
this legislation was to be traced to the Entries in the Seventh
Schedule, List II, of the Government of India Act, 1935, "for
111ak.ing laws regarding intoxicating liquors, i.e. the production,
manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxi:
eating liquors, and under the powers conferred for raising duties E
of excise on alcoholic liquors for human consumption; and the
pith and· substance of the regulation was that it raised excise
revenue by imposing duties on liquors". Dealing with the contention that as it was described in the Excise Act as a licence fee
the same was invalid as excessive was repelled in these terms :
"The next contention that the charge of fee by· public auction F
is excessive and is not in the nature of a fee but a tax ignores the
fact that the licence fee described as a licence fee is more in the
nature of a tax than a licence fee. One of the purpos~s of the
Regulation is to raise revenue .... The grantee is given a licence
on payment of the auction price. The Regulation specifically
authorises this". We do not see how this decision helps the appel- G
lant. The description of the levy as a fee does not of course
determine whether it is a fee or a tax. That taxes may be imposed
for effectuating other purposes than raising revenue-for protecting
somt activity which is not subject to tax or to inhibit one which
is so subject or to regulate some activity cannot also be disputed.
That fees for licences may be by way of taxes does not, however, H
mean Iha t every fee for a licence is or must be a tax.
(l) (19,4] S.C.ll. 873.
CALCUTTA CORP. "· LmEllTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
I.
509
Reference was next made to The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.
Ltd. and others v. The State of Orissa and ors.('). which consi-
dered the validity of a cess imposed on owners, among others, of
coal-mines by the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act,
1952. The amount of cess was to be determined by the Government but it was not to exceed S % of the value of the minerals
• extracted at the pits-mouth which was to be paid into a fund out
of which was to be derived the monies for providing the amenitiea
to the mining areas. It was contended for the petitioner coal
company who moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution that this cess was really a duty of excise on coal within
C Entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. · On the other hand,
it was cohtended by the State who opposed the petition that the
cess was a fee and not a duty of excise. This Court upheld the
validity of the cess on the ground that it was really a fee, and in
so. holding observed "it is true that between a tax and a fee there
is no generic difference. Both are compulsory exactions of
D money by public authorities; but whereas a tax is imposed for
public purposes and is not, and need not, be supported by any
consideration of service rendered in return, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered and as such there is an element of quid
pr<' quo between the person who pays the fee and the public
authority which imposes it. If specific services are rendered to
It a specific area or to specific class of persons or trade or persons
in any local area and as a condition precedent for such service
cess is levied against the said area or the said class of persons or
trade or business the cess is distinguishable from a tax and is
described as a fee. Tax recovered by public authority invariably
goes into the consolidated fund which ultimately is utilised for all
r public purposes, whereas cess levied by way of fees is not intended
to be, and does not become, a part of the consolidated fund. It
is earmarked and set apart for the purpose of services for which it
is levied. . . . . . In regard to fees there is, and must always be,
co-ordination between the fee collected and the service intended to
G be rendered. . . . . The distinction between a tax and a fee is,
however, important and it is recognised by the Constitution.
Several Entries in the Three Lists empower the appropriate
Legislatures to levy taxes, but apart from the power to levy taxes
thus conferred each List specifically refers to the power to levy
H "fees in respect of any of the matters covered in the said List
excluding of course fees taken in any Court". Reference was then
---------11) (1961) 2 S.C.R. 537.
510
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS .
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
made to the decisions in the Shirur Mutt ccue( 1 ) the Orissa(') Ji.
and· the Bombay(") cases to which we have already adverted.
Mr. Pathak: placed considerable reliance on the reference in the
Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.(') to the decision of the Privy Council
in Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Esquimalt and Nana·
imo Railway Co.(') and to the explanation of the rationale of
those decisions of this Court :-"It would thus appear that this a
decision proceeded on the basis that what was claimed to be a
special service to the lands in question was in reality an item in
public service itself and so the element of quid pro quo was absent
It is true that when the Legislature levies a fee for rendering
specific services to a specified area or to a specified class of C
persons or trade or business, in the last analysis such services may
indirectly form part of services to the public in general. If the
special service rendered is distinctly and primarily meant for the
benefit of a specific class or area the fact that in benefiting the
specified class or area the State as a whole may ultimately and
indirectly be benefited would not detract from the character of D
the levy as a fee. Where, however, the specific service is indistinguishable from public service and in essence is directly a part of
it different considerations may arise".
These decisions according to the learned counsel established
( I ) that a fee for a licence was prima facie a tax and was a mode 1t
of raising revenue, (2) the fact that under the licence the trade,
business or other activity of the licensee is controlled and regu·
lated where such control and regulation is imposed in the interest
of the general public is not sufficient to negative the licence fee
being a tax; ( 3) it was only in those cases where an impost was
made either as an ad hoc cess or a fee for the grant of a licence F
as a charge for services rendered to the fee-payer that the impost
-could be characterised technically as a fee which for being valid
would have to stand the test of correlation with the costs entailed on
the public body for rend~ring the service. Besides the requirement as to special service to the payer being required, the argu·
ment continued that on the authorities cited any fee would be tax G
if there was no segregation of its proceeds for the general revenues
and a requirement of the law that the collections should be used
only for the purpose of rendering the service. This last requirement, however, the learned counsel did not press seriously, seeing
that even charges for services rendered, for instance, charges for
(1) (1954) S.C.R. 1005.
(2) (1954) S.C.R. 10.
(3) [19S4J s.c.R. toss.
(4) [t96tJ 2 s.c.R. 537.
(S) [ 1950) A.C. 87.
H
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
A
511
extra water supply also went into the general municipal fund and
figured in the consolidated annual budget prepared for the Corporation.
Learned counsel is no doubt right in the submission that the
impost described as a "fee" does not decisively determine that it
B is not tax. He is also right in urging that the fact that the fee
is imposed for the grant of a licence, is equally not determinative
of its true nature. It is common knowledge that in the United
Kingdom duties of excise are often collected as licence fees and
an illustration of a similar practice in India is seen in the Ajmere
Excise Licence case. (1) As observed by Gwyer, C.J., in Re :
C Central Provinces and Berar Act 14 of 1938 (2) "The licenee
fees payable by persons who· produced or sold excisable articles
also became known (in U.K.) as duties of excise". In the context of the problem before us, however, the question is whether in
order to constitute a fee in the strict sense it is not sufficient that
D it is imposed in order to raise funds for ·ensuring due compliance
with· the activity which it is the object of the licence, to place
under supervision, inspection and control. In this connection
reference may be made to paragraph 7 of the affidavit by the Corporation in answer to the Writ Petition filed by the respondent.
There the appellant Corporation stated "the new scale of fees as
E fixed by the Corporation is reasonable for effective inspection,
supervision and control of cinema houses in Calcutta at present
numbering 75 in accordance with the provisions in the relative
bye-law framed under the Calcutta Municipal Act having regard
to the public health, safety and convenience ...... I say that in
order to effectively discharge the statutory duties imposed on the
F Corporation in regard to the inspection, regulation, supervision
· and control of cinema houses in Calcutta it is necessary to provide for a more suitable machinery and establishment involving
employment of a much larger staff and consequently very large
additional expenses in order to exercise a better, fuller and more
G effective control and supervision of the cinema houses, having
regard to the additional burden imposed by the cinema business
at present times and the evergrowing needs of precautions regarding the health, safety and convenience of the public the new scale
of fees is reasonable to cover necessary expenses involved in the
said control and supervision of the cinema houses as hereinbefore
H stated". Mr. Pathak urged that the ooint that he was rai~ing was
one of law and therefore the appellant was not confined to sup-
a
(I) [19S4J S.C.R. 873.
(2) [1939! F.C.R. 18.
SUPREME
512
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(1965] 2 S.C.R.
porting the levy as a fee in the strict sense. He is right there,
but we are drawing attention to this defence only for the reason
that this plea was taken because of the accepted position as to the
concept of a fee on the authorities to which we shall refer presently and the elements of "service" needed the rendering of which
would constitute a quid pro quo for the fee imposed. These
authorities have taken the view that where a licence is granted,
the fee to be charged for such a licence might bear a reasonable
relation to the cost of providing the inspection, supervision and
control imposed on the licensee both in his own interest as well
as in the interest of the general public. In other words a fee in
the strict sense--as distinguished 'from a tax could be charged,
for the cost involved in (a) the iµachinery employed for granting
the licence, (b) the supervision, regulation and control to which
the licensee renders himself liable under the licence, and subject
to which he is granted the licence. Thus in The Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. The Cooratee Bara Bazar Co. Ltd. ( 1 )
the validity of a licence fee imposed for keeping a private market
was questioned hy a suit filed on the original side of the High
Court. Section 178(3) of the City of the Rangoon Municipal
Act ran : "For every such licence· or permission a fee may be
charged at such rate as shall from time to time be fixed by the
Corporation". Under this provision fees amounting to substantial sums were charged for licences granted for these private
markets. This fee was challenged as unreasonable and ultra
vires. Cunliffe, J. who tried the suit observed at pp. 219 and
It.
B
C
D
E
220:"A licence is merely a permission granted to a
particular person to do a particular thing at a fixed
place during a determinate period. The fee attached
to such a permit is a specific sum of money to be
collected from the licensee for the purpose of covering
the expenses of the licence, its registration, inspection
and supervision. Fees levied on licenses of premises
ought not to be greater than a sum to cover the cost~
of the regulation."
r
G
A. similar view was taken by the Division Bench on appeal. They
said at p. 228 : "Was it the intention to give the Corporation power
to impose on the owners of private markets a charge for
a licence which might extend to any amount for which
(I) [1927] Ll.R. 5 Rangoon 212
H
'
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LmEllTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, 1.)
•
513
the sanction of the Local Government could be
obtained? Or was the intention merely to give power
to charge a fee which would save the Corporation from
being out of pocket by reason of the duties and liabilities imposed on it by the Act of the supervision and
regulation of private markets ?
As the amount charged bore no relationship to the expenses inYolved in the inspection, supervision and control whioh1 the
Corporation might exercise over the licensed premises, the fee
was held to be ultra vires. This decision was followed in Corporation of Madras v. Spencer & Co. ( 1 ). The licence fee for
C storing spirits levied under the Madras City Municipal Act was
raised from Rs. 25 to 200 by a resolution of the Corporation
after observing the necessary formalities. This was challenged
as excessive becausi: of want of correlation between the cost of
inspection, supervision and control of holders of the licence and
D the total amount recovered as fees. The pattern of the Madras
City Municipal Act was the same as the Act before us. The
contention . urged before the Court was the same as th at now
urged viz. that what was permitted to be levied by s. 365(2) of
the Madras Act [corresponding to our s. 548(2)) was a taxparticularly seeing that what was being regulated and .controlled
E was a noxious or dangerous trade or activity. The Court repelled it
by pointing out that taxes were dealt with in Part 3 while the
power to levy fees fot licences was conferred by a section occurring in a part headed Miscellaneous and Procedure. Phillips J.
observed at p. 57 :
F
H
"Beasley, J., has held that the fees are leviable as
compensation to the corporation for the expenses incurred in the issue of licenses and the general regulation
of the trades and other occupations which are Iicen<ed
and there must be some relation between these expenses
and the amount of fees leviable. This was the view
which was adopted by the Rangoon High Court in
Municipal Corporation Rangoon v. Cooratee Bara
Bazar Co. Ltd. (A.LR. 1927 Rangoon 183-5 Rangoon
212) . With all respect, I think this is a very reasonable view to take and, although possibly the above is
not the sole consideration which may be taken into
account in fixing the amount of fee, it is the main
(J) A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 5'.
514
SUPREME
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[1965] :rs.c.R.
consideration. The license fees are in respect of what are
called dangerous and offensive trades, that is to say, it is
necessary in the interests of the city that the corporation shall know where such trades are being carried on
and shall be in a position to see that they are carried on
in a proper manner without causing unnecessary
nuisance to other people or danger to the public
generally."
A.
•
B
Reilly, J., the other learned Judge, added at p. 59 :
· "It is suggested that the fixing of fees for those
licenses may be used by the council as method of
taxation. Surely, if that was intended, that power
would have been provided for in the part of the Act
which deals with taxation. What could be the reason
for bringing it in as mere matter of procedure at the
end of the Act ? . . . . If we accept the proposition that
the power of charging license-fees cannot be used for
taxation, then we must say that as a whole the fees
charged by the corporation must not be very much in
excess of what the duties cast upon them and their staff
in connexion with the licenses cost them. There is the
cost of issuing the licenses; there is the cost of inspecting the premises to ·see whether they are suitable for
the purpose proposed; and there is the subsequent cost
of inspecting the premises to see that they· are being
used properly and that the conditions and restrictions
imposed by the Commissioner are observed."
c
a
D
These decisions wero followed in Municipal Council of Kumba- F
konam v. Ralli Bros. ( 1 ) where a fee for a Municipal licence
granted for storing ground-nut was increased and its validity was
questioned. Section 321(2) of the Madras District Municipalities Act was in terms identical withs. 54!t(2) of the Act. Dealing with the nature of the fee permitted to be charged under that
G
provision Curgenvan, J. said : "The wording undoubtedly suggested that the fee
should be commensurate with the extra cost entailed by
granting the licence and exercising such supervision
as is necessary to see that its terms are complied with.
It may be that in order to promote the health, etc., of
the public, with which this part of the act specially
-(I)-A.I.R.
---1931 Mad. 497.
H
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
515
deals, higher fees should be chargeable in the case of
dangerous or offensive occupations."
The High Court of Orissa( 1 ) followed these decisions and adopted
the same construction of the fee permitted to be levied by s. 321
of the Madras District Municipalities Act, whose provisions were
11 also applicable to parts of the State of Orissa, besides decisions on
the same lines by the High Court of Allahabad in Lala Raj
Kishore v. District Board of Saharanpur(').
We have, therefore, to consider whether there is anything in
the decisions of this Court referred to earlier and relied on by the
learned counsel which militates against holding that the cost
C involved in the inspection, supervision and control of an industry,
trade or activity is not a quid pro quo to the payer so as to constitute a fee levied for that purpose as always a tax. Reference
may here be made to the terms of s. 431 of the Act with which
Chapter XXVI, in which s. 443 occus, opens.
n
"Inspection and Regulation of Premises.
431. Subject to the provisions of this Act, land and
buildings shall respectively be inspected, cleansed,
secured, repaired, drained or otherwise regulated in
accordance with the rules contained in Schedule XVII."
E It is, therefore, not as if powers or duties are not cast on tbs
Corporation to be discharged for which the fee to be charged
under s. 548(2) would be a quid pro quo.
The placing of an activity, industrial or commercial, under
regulation and control is no doubt done in furtherance of public
interest, but so are most of the activities of public bodies. NeverF theless the supervision, inspection and regulation is from a Ion~
term point of view considered to be and is in the interest of the
industry or the activity itself. To say that to enable a fee strictly
so called to be levied, an immediate advantage measurable in
terms of money should be conferred on the payer, is to take too
G narrow a view of the concept of a fee. We do not consider that
the decisions of this Court in the Endowment cases lay down such
a proposition or compel us to adopt this construction. On the
other hand the Orissa Endowments Act and the Bombay Public
Trusts Act cases, as also the Orissa Mining Area Development
Fund case support a broader view of what constitutes service to
H the fee-payer.
A
(I) Sivaparvatamma v. Executive Officer, A.I.R. 1957 Orissa, 28.S.
(2) A.J.R. 1954 All. 67S.
il8
SUPllBMB
COUllT
llBPO!lTS
'[1965] 2 S.C.Jl.
We are also satisfied that the narrow construction suggeated
would not accord with the scheme of the entries in the lists in
Schedule VII to the Constitution. To illustrate the point, we
would refer to a legislation like the Industries Development and
Regulation Act, 1951 (Central Act 65 of 1951). It is an Act to
provide for the Development and Regulation of certain industries.
Under-the provisions of s. 11 of that enactment no new industrial undertaking could be established by any person or authority
other than the Central Government after the commencement of tho
Act "except under and in accordance with the licence issued in that
behalf by the Central Government". The inspection, supervision
and- control to be exercised over the licenses is provided for in
detail by various sections of the enactment. Under s. 30(2)(j)
the Central Government is empowered under the rules made under
the Act to determine the fees to be levied in respect of licence1
and permissions issued under the Act. Now, let us see the constitutional power to empower the fee to be charged. Entry 52
of List I reads "industries, the control of which by the Union ill
declared by law to be expedient in the public interest", and s. 2
of the enactment contains this declaration. Coming now to tho
entries relating to taxation it will be found that none of these
entries, 82 to 92, would cover the fees charged for licences issued
under the enactment. It is obvious, therefore, that the legislativo
power for charging fees is to be derived from Entry 96 of List I,
"fees in respect of any of the matters in this List". If the learned
counsel's submission that the expression quid pro quo should bc
read in the sense of a special and particular benefit conferred
upon particular licensees (benefit again in the sense suggested)
is correct the licence fees levied under the rules made under s.
30(2)(j) 'read with s. 1 l would be invalid as a fee and it could
not be sustained as a tax either, for the tax there levied could not
be brought within the rubric of any of the Entries, 82 to 92. It,
therefore, appears to us that the word quid pro quo should be read
not in the narrow and restricted sense submitted by the learned
counsel for the appellant but in a somewhat wider sense 115
including cases where the function of the licence is to imposo
control upon an activity the cost incurred for effectuating that
control, and this on the basis that the industry or activity is placed
under regulation and control not merely' in public interest but in
the interest and for the benefit of the licensees as a whole as well.
Coming nearer to the present case we niight take another
instance. Take the case of a licensing of factories and tradee
which are the other matters dealt with in the fasciculus of sections
A
B
C
D
•
'f
\ ..
c
R
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, 1.)
517
A of the Act in which s. 443 is to be found. Section 436 runs, to
quote the material words "no person shall, without the previous
written permission of the Commissioner establish in any premises
or materially alter, enlarge or extend any factory, workshop or
workplace in which it is intended to employ some electricity, water
or other mechanical power [436(1)] ands. 437(1) reads: "No
B person shall use or permit or suffer to be used any premises for
any of the following purposes without or otherwise or in conformity with the terms of the licence granted by the Commissioner in
this behalf, viz. (a) any of the purposes specified in Schedule 18,
(b) any purpose which is in the opinion of the Corporation
dangerous to life, health or property or. ..... ". Schedule 18
C contains a list of the purposes for which premises may not be used
without a licence and contains a long list of goods or articles
which could not be packed, stored etc. in such premises. Under
s. 548(2) a fee might be charged both for a written permission
as well as for the grant of a licence. It must be assumed that if
D the learned counsel is right in his submission as to what constitutes a fee, the fee charged for a written permission under s. 436
and for licence under s. 437 which we have extracted above would
in reality be taxes though called fees. Now, let us sec whether
there is any taxation entry in 'List II which could support the validity of the impost. The only Entry under which it could possibly be
i: brought in if at all would be Entry 60, "taxes on professions,
trades, callings and employments". It is hardly possible to sustain this interpretation because there is also Ch. 13 of Part IV
headed "taxes on professions, trades, callings and the exact figure
of the taxes which might be imposed are laid down in Schedule 4.
It cannot of course be said to be "a tax on land buildings" because
F it is not on the land or building that the tax is levied but on the
activity pursued therein, and besides "taxes on lands and buildings" are specifically dealt with under Ch. II of Part IV where the
permissible "consolidated rates" are laid down. The licence fee
for the written permission and licence fee under ss. 436-37 can
only be supported as referable to legislation under Entries 5-.
G "constitution and powers of the municipal corporations" and 6"public health and sanitation" and 24-"industries" read with
Entry 66 of the State List. We have taken these two illustrative
cases at random but an examination of the entire body of statute
law in India would bear this out. We are not, therefore, disposed
H to read the judgments of this Court in the Shirur Mutt case(') and
the cases following as laying down that where an activity is regulated by licences the imposition of charges for the inspection,
(i)lt954J s.c.R:" 1oos:---
518
SUPREME
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REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
supervision and control of the activity to ensure compliance with A
,the regulation is not a benefit conferred on the licensee so as to
render the anlount charged for such a licence not a fee in the real
sense but a tax, whose constitutional validity could be sustained
only by reference to the taxation entries in Lists I and II. Mr.
Pathak submitted that so far as the fee charged with reference to
entertainments in theatres under s. 443 of the Act might be sus- B
tained with reference to Entry 62 of List II, but that would hardly
be an answer, because we are examining the entirety of the group
of cases to which s. 548 (2) of the Act would apply.
It will now be convenient to consider the argument of learned
Counsel based on Art. 110(2) as supporting the narrow construe- c
tion of the word "fee" as used fa the entries in the legislative lists.
Article 110(2) deals with the definition of Money Bills for the purposes of that Chapter. Clause (1) defines in positive terms what
shall be deemed to be a money bill and cl. (2) negatively defines
what shall not be deemed to be a money bill. That provision reads :
D
"110. (2) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money
Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of
fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or
payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered,
or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition,
remission, alteration regulation of any tax by any local
authority or body for local purposes."
Learned Counsel pointed out that here a distinction was drawn
between a payment of fees for licences and fees for services rendered, and so a payment for fees for licence's was treated differently
from fees for services rendered. The argument based upon it was
that Entry 66 of List II and the similar Entries in Lists I & III were F
confined to fees for services rendered and that "a payment of
fees for licences" were really not fees within those Entries. Referring to the present case he urged that as no special services for
the benefit of the theatre owners had either been required to be
rendered by the Act or the bye-laws made thereunder or had actually been rendered, .it could not fall under the category of "fees for G
services rendered". The Constitution, therefore, it was urged contemplated imposts by way of fees for licences which were not for
services rendered and it was this category of impost that was permitted to be charged by s. 548(2) of the Act. We are unable to
agree in this construction of Art. 110(2).
In the first place, all municipal taxation is outside the definition H
of a money bill, so that in regard to municipalities and the imposts
made for purposes of local administration, no distinction is drawn
or
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBBllTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
519
A
between taxes and fees. The "fees" therefore which are specifically
excluded from the definition are fees imposed by the State Government or its administrative agencies other than by instruments of
Local Self-Government. The exclusion from the definition is as
regards two categories : (1) fees for licences, and (2) fees far services rendered. It is obvious that a tax which is collected as ·a
B licence fee such as in the Ajmere Excise case considered earlier,
would not fall outside this definition of a money bill merely because
the tax was imposed and collected as a licence fee. H therefore
pure taxation measures would be money bills then, it is obvious
that the fees for licences which are outside the definition would be
those fees which .are imposed to meet the cost of regulation and
C supervision of an activity which is controlled by the requirement of
a licence aiid compliance with its terms. Thus a contribution under
s. 76(1) of the Madras Religious Endowments Act as amended
in 1954, would be a fee for services rendered because there is no
question of licences being .taken out in these cases and fees for
D regulating an activity such as the fees payable for licences under
the Regulation of Industries Act, 1951 or for licences for trading
in essential commodities under the Essential Commodities Act,
1955 would on the other hand fall under the head "payment of fees
for licences". Thus we consider that Art. 110(2) far from supporting Mr. Pathak, negatives the construction for which he conE tends.
Any other construction of Art. 110 ( 2) would hardly fit in with
the schl:me of the Article itself or even with the lists in Sch. VII.
Thus if every fee for a licence were outside the definition of a
money bill, legislation for the levy of excise duties which are very
F often collected by adopting the machinery of licences and fees
therefor, would not be money bills, and seeing that "excise duties"
are a taxation entry fu Lists I & II such a position cannot be reconciled. Besides, as already pointed out, Entry 66 itself would
have to be read as a taxation entry in order to sustain the levy of
licence fees on various activities which might form the subject of
G legislative control or regulation under the various non-taxation entries in the lists. Such a construction. would be contrary to the
entire scheme on which the several entries in the lists are arranged
and differentiated. As additional illustrations of the anomaly that
would result if Mr. Pathak's construction of entry 66 of List II
were accepted ·we would refer to other sectionil of the Act which
ff enable the issue of licences and the charging of fees therefor. We
have already referred to s. 436 and s. 43 7 of the Act. Under Section 449 the Commissioner is empowered to license vendorS in
L3Sup./6S-17
520
SUPRJ!MB
COURT
llPORTS
· [1965] 2 S.C.R.
municipal markets, under s. 451-he has power to license private A
markets, slaughter houses and stock-yards, and under s. 460-to
license butchers and those who sell meat. We are not making aa
exhaustive list but are merely pointing out that in order to sustain
these levies as fees, because they do not fall under any of the
heads of taxation permitted to the State, the word 'fee' has to be
read as including fees charged for supervision, control and regula- S
tion of an activity which the legislature dllSires to control. On
this part of the case We are clearly of the opinion that the legislative
· power as regards "fees" under Entry 66 as well as the corresponding entries in the other Lists is really in the nature of an incidental
power to effectuate the main head of legislation empowered to be C
enacted by the other entries in the List. Item 66 is not an entry
in relation to taxes which, on the scheme of the Constitution as
we have analysed earlier, are grouped together serially in Lists I
& II. This construction is confirmed by the fact that in the Concurrent List which contains only entries in relation to legislative
power as distinguished from entries conferring taxing power, the D
last entry enables fees to be levied as ancillary to the legislative
power conferred by the other entries in that list.
Even assuming that learned Counsel is right in his submission
r<?garding the manner in which the decisions of this Court in the
Religious Endowment group of cases have to be understood, the E
appellant would be in no better position; in fact, its position would
be worse, for if a fee withir;t Entry 66 is confined to payments for
particular and specific services rendered to the fee payer, the constitutional validity of s. 548(2) of tho Act would be open to challenge on the ground that it authorises the Municipal Corporation
to impose taxes which are not within the State's power to impose F
for its own purposes. This would be an additional reason for
reading the word "fee" in Entry 66 in the sense which we have
indicated earlier and which is in consonance with the uniform
course of decisions already referred to rendered on the meaning of
that word.
(2) ls the fee permitted to ·be charged bys. 548(2) a ft!e or
a tax ?
This brings us to a consideration of the provisions of the Act
for the purpose of determining whether the impost permitted to
be charged by s. 548(2) of the Act is a fee understood in the sense
in which we have explained earlier as used in Entry 66 of List II
or is it a tax. For this purpose it is necessary to examine the
scheme of the Act. The Act contains 61 S sections and these are
G
H
..
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
521
A divided into 38 chapters each with a heading indicating the subject dealt with in it. These several chapters are themselves grouped
under 8 Parts. Part I in which Ch. I alone occurs is preliminary
and docs not require mention. Part II which C?mprises Chaptert
II to VI deal with the constitution and government of the Municipal
Corporation. The several chapters of this Part enumerate and
11 specify the powers and functions of the several municipal authorities and the manner in which the business of the Corporation has
to be transacted. This Part also is not relevant to the matter on
hand and may be passed over. Part ill deals with Finance and
is made up of Chapters VII, VIII, IX and X. It is sufficient to
C refer to the headings of the several chapters which are Ch. VIIThe Municipal Fund, Ch. VIII-Budget Estimates, Ch. IXLoans and Ch. X-Accounts. We shall have to refer to some of
the provisions of these chapters in dealing with certain arguments of
Mr. Pathak: relying on them for the purpose of showing that the
legislature had laid down the principles and afiorded sufficient
D guidance for determining the rate at which a fee should be levied,
on the basis that such a fee was a tax. To these, however, we
shall revert later.
Part IV is headed 'Taxation' and Chapters XI to XVII are in
this Part and each of these chapters deal with separate heads of
taxes which the Corporation is authorised to levy and collect
Section 165 of the Act with which Ch. XI opens empowers the
Corporation to impose "a consolidated rate" on lands and buildings
situated within the municipal area. The section prescribes the
maximum percentages of the annual value at which the tax may
be levied and grades them into several categories dependent on the
y total annual valuation. Section 166 prescribes the manner in
which the particular percentage to be charged is to be determined
by the Corporation. The percentages, subject to the maxima laid
down in s. 165, have to be fixed annually having regard to the
requirements of the Corporation with reference to the obligations
imposed upon it by the Act. Elaborate procedure is laid down
G by the other sections of this Chapter ending with s. 207 for the
manner in which the annual value of lands and buildings on which
the specified percentages may be levied may be determined, with
appeals provided to Civil Courts for the aggrieved tax-payer in the
event of the annual value as determined by the Corporation being
disputed. The next Chapter-Ch. XII comprising ss. 208 to 217
H is headed 'Taxes on Carriages and Animals'. When the tax leviable
under this chapter whose rate is prescribed by the Sch. VI of the
Act, is paid, a licence is issued to the owner of the Carriage or
J:
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965) 2 S.C.R,
Animal. Next, we get to Ch. XIlI headed "Tax on professions, A
trades and callings" and comprises ss. 218 to 221. Section 218
directs that "every person who exercises or carries on in Calcutta
any profession, trade or calling indicated in Sch. IV shall annually
take out a licence before the 1st July each year ........ and pay
for the same such fee as is mentioned in that behalf in the said
Schedule. Schedule IV, it might be mentioned, contains the rules B
as to the quantum of the profession etc. tax to be charged by the
Corporation. The persons to be taxed under this head are divided
into 10 classes depending upon the amount of business carried on
and in the case of companies, their paid-up capital and in the case
of individuals, of their annual income and in respect of each class C
the fee to be levied is specified. Chapter XIV headed "Scavenging
Tax" comprises ss. 222 and 223. This tax is to be levied on per·
sons who exercise a calling_ specified in Part I of Sch. VIl and is
·dependent on either the average number of animals kept by the
persons for the exercise of such calling, or in the case of the
-owner or occupier of a market, the average quantity of offensive D
matter and rubbish removed daily. A licence is to be taken by the
person liable to pay the tax and the rates to be charged are to
be those specified in Part II of Sch. VIl. Next, we have a tax on
.carts under Ch. XV. The tax is to be imposed for the registration
<!nd the numbering of carts and by charging of a fee for such
registration. Section 225 prescribes the fee that might be charged E
for the several varieties of vehicles which are classified under that
section. Section 229 which is the first section in Ch. XVI provides
for the imposition of a licence fee for advertisements. It is the
-0nly provision for taxation as regards which a rate is not specified
or the maxima laid down by the Act. Chapter XVIl which is the
last chapter in this Part is concerned with making provision for the F
recovery of the consolidated rate and the other taxes and for certain
supplementary provisions in relation to taxes permitted to be
levied under this Part.
The next Part-Part V is headed the Public Health, Safety and
Convenience and Chapters XVlll to XXXI are included in this G
Part. Chapter XVill relates to water supply, XIX to drains, privies and other receptacles for filth, Chapter XX to licensed plumbers, XXI to Streets and Public places, XXII to buildings, XXIlI
to Bustees, XXIV to demolition, alteravon and stopping of unlawful work, XXV to lighting and scavei;iging, and regulation of
public bathing and washing, XXVI to inspection and regulation of H
premises, and of factories, trades and places of public resort and
this is the chapter in which s. 443 finds a place. Chapter XXVll
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
523
A deals with markets and slaughter places, Ch. XXVIII with Food
and Drugs, Ch. XXIX with milk-supply, Ch. XXX with restraint
of infection and Ch. XXXJ with registration of births and deaths
and disposal of the dead. The next chapter in this Part deafa with
acquisition, disposal and general improvement of land and ·buildings
and the last one-Ch. XXXIII with the special powers of the CorB poration. The next part-Part VII contains provisions for enabling the Municipal Corporation to make bye-laws and rules. Part
VIII which is the last Part has four chapters-Ch. XXXV deafa
with penalties to be imposed for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Act and the bye-laws made by the Corporation, Ch.
XXXVI is headed 'Procedure', and s. 548 is the first section in this
C Chapter, and the other sections deal with the incidental powers of
the Corporation and with procedure. The next two chapters are
headed "Supplemental provisions & Transitory provisions".
Mr. De for the respondent urged that the scheme of the Municipal Act proceeded on a clear demarcation between taxes and
D fees, and that all the taxes which the Corporation was empowered
to impose were grouped together under various heads in Part IV
of the Act headed "Taxation". Section 443 occurs in the Chapter
relating to the inspection of places of entertainment and public
resort and s. 548(2) in one headed "Procedure" and that the framers
of the Act, the_refore, could not, by these provisions, intend that
E the fee to be levied would be a tax. In other words, the argument
was that all taxing power and the heads of taxation were to be
exclusively found in Part IV of the Act. This argument deserves
serious consideration, but before we proceed to do so, we might
notice and dispose of an additional submission which was made
F to reinforce this argument based on the terms of s. 127(3) read
withs. 127(4) of the Act. Section 127 occurs in Ch. VIII dealing
with Budget estimates. Section 126 requires the Commissioner
to prepare and submit to the Standing Finance Committee on or
before December 15 each year, "the annual estimates of expenditure, receipts and balances and the statements of proposed taxes".
G Section 127 is concerned with requiring the Corporation to frame
budget estimates of the year. Sub-s. (3) on which he relied reads :
"(3). The Budget Estimates prepared by the Standing
Finance Committee shall be laid before the Corporation
on the 15th February or as soon as possible thereafter
and the Corporation shall consider the same. It may refer
H
the estimates back to the Standing Finance Committee
tor further consideration and resubmission within a specified time and shall-.
524
SUPllEMB
COURT
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[1965] 2 S.C.ll.
(a) ............................. .
(b) determine, subject to the provisions of Part IV
the levy of the consolidated rate and taxes for the said
year at such rates as are necessary to provide for the purposes mentioned in sub-section ( 4) ......••.•.•.••.
..
and sub-s. ( 4) reads :
"(4). In the Budget Estimates the Corporation shall,
among other things(a) make adequate and suitable provisions for such
services as may be required for the fulfilment of the
several. duties imposed by tl;tls Act,
(aa) make adequate provisions for depreciation of
machinery belonging to the Corporation, as far as may
be possible,
(b) provide for the payment as they fall due of all
instalments of the principal and interest for which the
Corporation may be liable in respect of loans contracted
by it,
.
(c} allow for a cash balance at the end of the year of
not less than twelve lakhs of rupees, and
'
(d) allot sums of money to each Borough Committee
to enable it to exercise and discharge its powers, dutie5
and functions."
-
B
c
D.
..
The argument was that in the budget estimates in s. 127(3) what
is to be considered is the levy of the consolidated rate and the
taxes and these are subject to the provisions of Part IV and the .,
obligatory expenditure imposed by sub-s. (4) is to be met out of
the consolidated rates aMd taxes which are to be determined subject to the provisions of Part IV. It was, therefore, submitted that
the rates and taxes had to be determined subject to the provisions
of Part IV and as the· expenditure under· sub-s. (4) was to be correlated to the receipt from the rates and taxes it was an indication G
that all rates & taxes were only under Part IV. We consider.that
this argument proceeds upon a mis-construction of these provisions. Sub-s. (4) of s. 127, of course, deals with obligatory expenditure but from this it does not follow that expenditure which the
Corporation could lawfully incur for the optional amenities which
it could provide for the citizens would not find a place in the II
budget. · Sub-s. (4), it would be seen, opens with the words "shall,
among other things, make ........ ". Under·s. 126 the budget
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (A.yyangar, J.)
A
'I
<:
D
11:
f!
G
H
525
W'ill cover all the expenditure which it is proposed to incur-both
that which is obligatory upon the Corporation under s. 127(4)
and those which it could lawfully incur. On the receipt side would
be included also fees and all receipts from every other source.
No doubt, s. 127(3) would appear to suggest that so far as consolidated rates and taxes are concerned, it would be subject to the
provisions of Part IV but that by its very nature can only apply
to the rates and taxes listed in Part IV. H on a proper construction of the Act one reached the conclusion that Part IV was not
exhaustive of the range of levies permitted by the Act and that the
fees permitted to be levied by s. 548(2) were also taxes, there would
btnothing in s. 127(3), either by itself or read with s. 127(4), to
militate against that construction. We do not, therefore, consider
that these provisions advance the case of the respondent if on a
cpnstruction of the Act one reached a different conclusion.
We are thus left with the assistance afiorded to us by the
scheme underlying the provisions of the Act for determining whether the levy permitted by s. 548(2) is of the nature of a tax. The
submission of Mr. Pathak was that Part IV, no doubt, dealt with
rates and taxes but merely on that account one cannot draw the
conclusion that taxes are not dealt with or permitted to be imposed
by other provisions of the Act. No doubt, if a power to make a
levy occurred in a part outside Part IV and it clearly and unequivocally pointed to the imposition being a tax its effectiveness could
not be denied merely because the provision did not appear in Part
IV. But on the scheme of the Act we have at least to start with
a presumption that Part IV is exhaustive of the taxes which are
permitted to be levied by the Corporation. In this connection
Mr. Pathak laid some stress on the fact that the nomenclature employed to designate taxes in Part IV was not uniform and that a
tax was sometimes called a consolidated rate (vi de s. 165) and,
though called a tax in the case of taxes on carriages and animals
under ss. 208 and 216, a licence was granted on the payment of a
tax, it was called a fee under s. 218 in the case of tax on professions, trades and callings, and, similarly, in the case of scavenging
tax under s. 222, was designated as a fee and a licence fee on
advertisements by s. 229. In the face of this difference in the
terminology employed learned Counsel stressed that the framers
of the Act did not proceed on the differentiation that every fee Permitted to be imposed for the grant of a licence was always not a
tax. Learned Counsel is, no doubt, right in the submission that
Part IV headed 'Taxes' uses the expression "fee" to designate taxes
to be imposed upon particular articles or activities but the provisions of the Act and the way the relevant sections are framed make
526
SUPRB.Ml!
COUl.T
1.EPOllTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
it clear that what is permitted to be charged by these provisions in A.
Part IV is really in the nature of a tax. Besides, in the case of all
these imposts, whether called a tax or a fee, except in the case of
a fee on advertisements under s. 229 either the amount of the tax
was prescribed or criteria laid down on the basis of which the rate
of the levy was to be determined. In some cases, as the case of
profession tax, tax on carts etc., the tax to be imposed is determin- •
ed by the Act itself. In the case of others like the Consolidated
rate the maximum percentages are fixed and what is left to bed&termined by the Municipal authorities are the fixation of the percentages within the maxima prescribed and the determination of
the annual value of the premises for fixing which elaborate pn!!»
dure is laid down which includes appeals to Courts where persons C
are aggrieved by action of the municipal authorities. One exception
.to this method of prescribing the tax or its permitted limits is, as
already pointed out, s. 229. It is called a licence fee on advertisements but, in the context, gives no room for controversy as to whether it is a tax or a fee. We are satisfied that an examination of D
the provisions to which we have referred makes three matters ,
abundantly clear : (1) that it draws a sharp and clear distinction
between taxes properly so called and fees, (2) the division into
Parts and chapters is logical and clear cut and no matter which
properly falls under a subject set out under a Part or chapterheading is dealt with in any other. Mr. Pathak was not able to E
point to any instance in which a subject which fell under one Part
or even chapter was included in and dealt with in another, and (3)
that taxes, by whatever designation they might be called, are all
comprehended and dealt with by Part IV and by Part IV alone and
that what is permitted to be imposed by s. 548(2) is only a fee as
distinguished from a tax. H one has reference to the entries in I'
the legislative list in Sch. VII, what is permitted to be imposed
under s. 548 ( 2) is a fee "in respect of the matters in the list" viz.,
Entry 5, Entry 6-Public Health and Sanitation, 16-Prevention
of cattle trespass, 24--Industries, 28-Markets and Fairs, 33~
Sports, entertainments and amusements. In this view as admittedly
there is no correlation between the fee charged and the service G
rendered in the sense discussed earlier, we must hold that the impugned levy was not authorised and that the learned Judges of the
High Court were right in granting relief to the respondent.
(3) Assumings. 548 permits the levy of tJ tax, is the provision
Constitutional ?
H
In this view no other question would arise. In view, however,
of the elaborate arguments addressed to us by Mr. Pathak on the
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
527
A
other parts of the case and particularly since the learned Judges
of the High Court have devoted considerable parts of their judgment to dealing with them we propose to examine the submissions
of learned Counsel under that head also. On the footing that what
was permitted to be levied by s. 548(2) was a tax the submission of
learned Counsel was, as already stated, two-fold : (1) that in the
B case of devolution of legislative or quasi legislative power to a
· Municipal Corporation a different criteria for determining excessive delegation has to be adopted and that having regard to the
terms of Entry 5 of List II no conferment of a power in favour
of a municipality which is germane to municipal administration or
C local self government can be held to be beyond the legislative
power of the State., and (2) that even if the above were not accepted, the Act itself laid down in sufficiently definite terms the principles upon which the rate of fee was to be determined and afforded
sufficient guidance for its determination, that the provision did not
suffer from the vice of excessive delegation.
D
E
F
We shall deal with them in that order. For the submission
under the first head, Mi. Pathak relied on two lines of reasoning
based respectively on the terms of Entry 5 of List II of Sch. VII
and on certain American decisions which he said supported such
a view.
Entry 5 reads :
"Local government, that is to say, the constitution
and powers of municipal corporations, improvement
trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and
other local authorities for the purpose of local selfgovernment or village administration".
On the terms of this entry emphasis was laid on the words "powers
G
,,
H
of municipal corporations'' and "for the purpose of local selfgovernment" for which the municipal 'Corporations and other
bodies- specified were to be constituted. Relying on the words
underlined he urged: (l ) that the Constitution empowered the
devolution on municipal corporations of all powers which were
needed for the purpose of local self-government. If, therefore, a
power of taxation was conferred upon a municipal corporation,
that devolution of power was sanctioned by the Constitution and so
was outside the rule against excessive delegation of legislative
power. The argument was even pitched higher and it was said
that the expression "powers" occurring in the entry enabled the
State Legislature to confer upon municipal corporations not merely
528
SUPJlBMB COUJlT JlBPORTS
[1965) 2 S.C.Jl.
all the powers which the State Legislature itself could exercise · A
under the several legislative entries in Lists II and Ill, but even
powers outside those Lists provided they were ner..essary for the
purposes of local self-government. It was suggested that Jiaving
regard to the great object of decentralisation of power which wa1
achieved by setting up institutions for the purpose of local selfgovernment the Constitution had vested in the 'State Legislatures B
complete and plenary powers necessary for effectuating the setting .
up of such bodies and endowing them with the capacity to achieve
their object. H entry 5 was construed in this manner the conferment of power to tax by s. 548 (2) of the Act could not be challenged as unconstitutional.
c
To examine this argument closely it would be convenient to
split it up into two parts : (1) whether by reason of a provision
for legislation as regards the "power" of municipal coiporatioDJ
the rule as to unconstitutionality arising from excessive delegation
of legislative power becomes inapplicable, and ( 2) whether the
powers which were permitted to be conferred on munidpal cor- D
porations extend beyond those open to the State Legislatures themselves to exercise under the relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule.
We shall take up the second question first. Learned Counsel
was driven to put forward an argument in this form that powers to
be conferred upon municipal corporations need not necessarily be :r.
confined to the legislative powers of the State Legislatures under
other entries, because of the difficulty he experienced in sustaining
the plea that every fee for a written pennission or for licence permitted bys. 548(2) of the Act could be related to particular entriea
as to taxation which alone a(e permitted to the States by the distribution of legislative power under the Seventh Schedule. For .,
instance, it was pointed out during the course of the argul)lent that
the purposes for which a written permission was necessary and a
licence was required to be taken embraced a wide variety of sub- .
jects and ifs. 548(2) were held to authorise the levy of a tax in
respect of each of those activities for which a permission was
needed or a licence was required to be taken, it would not be G
possible to relate such a tax to any of the taxation entries in List
II, that is, entries 45 to 63. Thus s. 297 of the Act provides that
without the written permission of the Commissioner no private
streets sha!I be constructed and under s. 548(2) a fee may be
charged fer the granting of the written permission. It is not
possible to relate the fee to be charged for this permission under H
any of the heads of taxation in List II. Of course, if it were a
fee under entry 66, it would fall under that entry read with entry
•
',
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
529
J.
S, entry 6-public health and sanitation-as well as entry 13Communications, that is to say, roads, bridges etc. Very many
more illustrations of this sort to some of which we have adverted
earlier, were pointed out during the course of the argument and
learned Counsel suggested that some of them might fall under the
head of "lands and buildings". But the regulation of an activity
11 for carrying on a business in certain premises and which are dealt
with in Chapter XXVI of the Act-"Inspection and Regulation of ·
Premises, and: of Factories" cannot be equated with the subjectmatter of a tax on land and buildings which are specifically dealt
with by s. 165 which reads :
-Cl:
"A graduated consolidated rate on the annual valuation determined under this Chapter may be imposed
by the Corporation upon all lands and buildings in Calcutta for the purpose of this Act .......• "
· Similarly, restrictions are imposed in the interest of public health
and sanitation on the carrying on of certain trades which are
specified in Schedule XVIII. The licence fee levied to secure
permission to carry on such an activity could not, on the scheme
of the Act, be called a tax on professions, trades, callings and
employments referred to in entry 60 of List II. It was by reason
of these difficulties that learned Counsel was forced to make this
J: submission relying on the words "powers" and "for the purpose of
self-government" in entry 5. We consider that this submission is
entirely without force. In the first place, it could not be disputed,
though learned counsel did so somewhat hesitantly at one stage,
that the legislature cannot confer larger powers upon a body which
y it creates than what it itself possesses. We should have considered
that this was too elementary for any elaborate exposition but for
submission of counsel in this case. . The position is really incontrovertible. In the Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Poona(') the learned Chief Justice
speaking for the court said :
D
-0
"In the first place, the power of the municipality
cannot exceed the power of the provincial legislature
itself and the municipality cannot impose any tax, e.g.
income tax which the provincial legislature could not
itself impose."
H
If the State Legislature cannot confer a power upon the State
Government it is not easy to see how it could' confer a wider power,
(I} (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71, 75.
530
SUPllBME
COUllT
REPORTS
[1965]\2 S.C.R.
which it could not otherwise exercise, upon a municipality.
Besides, it was not suggested that without a power being conferred
by the legislature in the Municipal Act, by the mere constitution
of a Municipality, the latter can lay claim to any inherent power
either of local self-government or as ~cidental thereto of a power
to levy taxes and fees. If the powers of a municipality are derived
from legislation and if the legislature has not, under Art 246 of
the Constitution read with the entries in the Legislative List which
are relevant, the authority to confer such a power it appears to us
to be self-evident that the State Legislature can confer no higher
powers on the municipality than it has itself. If Mr. Pathak is
right it would mean that though a State cannot levy income tax
or impose customs duties on imports and exports for the purpose
of augmenting State Revenues, it can however confer power to
levy these taxes on a municipality for the "purpose of local self
government". The proposition has only to be stated to be rejec~
Nothing, therefore, in our opinion depends upon the use of the
"powers" in entry 5, as that expression can refer only to (a) such
powers as are actually conferred by the enactment in question
and ( b) powers which the Legislature can by law comer on the
executive Government of the State or on any other instrumentality of its creation.
A.
B
C
))
The answer on behalf of the respondent to this submission E
was based upon two grounds: (l) That s. 548(2) is really an
exercise of legislative power under entry 66 of List II and that
under the power so conferred what the Corporation has a right
to impose is not to impose a tax but to charge a fee correlated to
the expenses involved in the administration of that law; (2) What
the legislature can confer by a provision of the type found in s. r
548 ( 2) is merely a power to levy a fee and not a tax as otherwise, the tax itself which is permitted to be levied would be beyond the competence of the State Legislature. We consider this
submission well-founded. A stream can rise no higher than its
source, and this is so self-evident as not to need elaboration, it
would follow that the State legislature canl).ot authorise a muni- G
cipal body which it creates even though it be for the purpose of _
local self-government a power higher than what it itself possesses.
In this connection one cannot forget that the government of the
entire territory forming the State is vested in the State and what
the legislature cannot do for the purpose of the government of
that area cannot obviously be done by conferring powers upon a ff.
municipal authority, whose jurisdiction extends to defined limits
in that territory.
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, /.)
531
It was next urged that the terms of entry 5 were sufficient to
clothe the State Legislature with authority to endow municipal
corporations at least with such powers as they possessed on the
date the Constitution came into force. We do not see any legal
basis for this argument. It would be noticed that entry 5 in List
II reproduces in terms entry 13 of List II of the Provincial LegisB lative List in Schedule VII to the Government of India Act, 1935.
If the argument had any validity it would follow that one should
go back not merely to the state of circumstances and the law as
to distribution of legislative power which prevailed under the
Government of India Act but to a period anterior thereto, namely
C before the lst of April, 1937 when the Government of India Act,
1935 itself came into force. At that time there was no distribution of legislative power in the sense in which we have under the
Government of India Act and the Constitution. India was then
under a unitary form of Government;) the legislatures were not
confined to enumerated powers and the distribution of legislative
D power between the provinces and the centre was determined with
a view to administrative convenience and not on foot of an allocation of areas of exclusive legislative competence. No legislation of a State Government which trenched on a central subject
was unconstitutional (See proviso to s. 80A ( 3) introduced by
the Government of India Act, 1919). No assistance therefore
I:. can be derived by reference to the powers exercised by local
authorities and municipal corporations at a time when there was
no distribution of legislative powers leading to unconstitutionality.
A
It is precisely because the Government of India Act made a
change in this respect that a provision was inserted in s. 143(2)
F of that Act by which taxes, duties, ces&lS or fees which immediately before the commencement of the Government of India Act,
1935 were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government,
municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of
the province, municipality, district or other local area etc. may
notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees mentioned
G in Federal Legislative List continue to be levied and to be applied
to the same purposes until provision is made to the contrary by
the Federal Legislature". In other words, the framers of the
Government of India Act proceeded on the basis that the powers
of the Provincial Legislatures as regards taxation were not the
same and that it was, therefore, necessary for making a prqvision
H for continued realisation of those taxes subject to any central law
on the topic and we have a provision exactly on the same lines
with practically the same phraseology in Art. 277 of the Consti-
532
SUPREME
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llBPOllTS
(1965] 2 S.C.ll.
tution. If the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant .Ii.
is right, there would have been no need in Art. 277, for a reference to taxation by Municipal and other local bodies because on
the argument the State Legislature ·could validly confer upon a
municipal corporation all powers which it had enjoyed before,
including the power to impose taxes, nothwithstanding that that
B
power is not in the State Legislative List.
As "power" could be conferred on a Municipal Corporation
only by law, we consider that the nature or quantum of power
that could be vested by a law of the State Legislature, cannot
transcend the limitations prescribed by the Constitution on the
State legislature. In the context therefore of the law being one C
in relation to municipal corporations, the State legislature can
confer on the corporation created only those powers which are
within its legislative power and relevant to the topic.
Pausing here, it would be convenient to refer to the submission of Mr. Naunit Lal appearing for tho Intervenor who address- D
ed us in further support of the appellant's case. His argument
was that entry 5 was to be understood in the light of the legislative practice which prevailed prior to the Constitution and he
placed before us the report of the Local Finance Enquiry COmmittee published in 19 51 in which the history of taxation powers
exercised by municipal and other authorities from early times has E
been traced. He also referred us to the provisions in several preand post-Constitution enactments in which provision had been
made enabling the municipal or other local authorities to levy
and collect taxes some of which, he stated, did not fall within the
State List or even within any of the three Lists. It is not necesaary to examine the details of the instances referred to by learned Jl'
Counsel. But assuming learned Counsel is right in the illustration it would not help him in the least. In the first place, so far
as legislative practice is concerned, it cannot prevail over the
limitations imposed by the distribution of legislative power in
respect of post-Constitution legislation such as the Act before us.
What the legislature cannot do dirCctly by legislating !!Pd con- G
ferring power upon the State Government or the instruments
which it creates, it cannot obviously confer upon a municipal
corporation merely because it has authority to confer power upon
a municipality in express terms. The power to impose taxes
which it cannot impose for the augmentation of the revenues of
the State it cannot manifestly confer upon a municipality or other H
organ of a Joe : self-government. Besides, as pointed out by
Lord Tomlin in dealing with a contention as to the meaning of
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
/I.
533
the word "fisheries" in "Sea coast and inland fisheries" iri s. 91 of
the British North America Act, 1867 in Attorney General for
Canada v. Attorney General for British Columbia and ors('):
"He (the appellant) supports his contention by
referring to fishery legislation prior to 1867 affecting
territories now part of the Dominion, pomting out that
in this legislation there are to be found numerous provisions relating to the curing and marketing of fish,
and he urges that the British North America Ac_t, 1867,
must be construed in the light of the earlier legislation,
and that the word 'fisheries' must be given such a meaning as is wide enough to include at any rate the operations affected by the impugned sections.
B
C
Their Lordships arc of opinion that the appellant's
contention in this respect is not well-founded. The
fact that in earlier fishery legislation raising no question of legislative competence matters are dealt with
not strictly within any ordinary definition of "fishery"
affords no ground for putting an unnatural construction
upon the words. "Sea coast and inland fisheries".
D
Lastly, it may be pointed out that the territory of India now cm1: braces what were formerly the territory of ruling princes in which
there .were no limitations on the powers which might be vested in
Municipal bodies. It is not, therefore, possible to refer to an
uniform legislative practice, prevailing before the Constitution to
serve as a guide for interpreting the legislative entries in the
Constitution. That is so far as reliance was placed on legislative
w ·practice.
We do not, therefore, consider that anything material turns on
the use of the word "powers" in entry 5. Authority to confer
power on institutions or bodies created by legislation, to enable
them to fulfil their purposes and achieve their objects is implicit
G in every entry conferring legislative power. Thus, for instance
under entry 47 of List I reading "Insurance" Parliament has
created the Life Insurance Corporation under the Life Insurance
Corporation Act and has clothed it with sufficient powers to
enable it to function and carry out the purposes for which it was
created. Similarly, by legislation under the head 'Banking' the
H Reserve Bank Act has been enacted and the Reserve Bank created with sufficient powers conferred upon it necessary to regulate
-
(I) (1930) A.C. Ill, 121.
534
SUPREME
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[1965] 2 S.C.R.
the funotioning of the Banking system in the country. By legisA
lation under the entry "Future markets" (entry 48 List I) the
Forward Markets Commission has been created and p(Jwers and
duties vested in it. From these examples it would be clear that the
authority to confer power upon the bodies created by legislation
is inherent in the power to legislate on the topic. The express
mention of an authority to confer power on Municipal Corpo- B
rations, therefore, introduces no novel principle or rule of con11truction as regards the conferment of powers. The quantum of
the power which a law could bestow upon an insl!lution or body
of its creation is determined, firstly, by the view of the legislature
as to what are necessary for achieving the purposes for which the C
institution or body is created and, secondly, by the over-all limitations imposed by the Constitution by the distribution of legislative power. Nothing, therefore, turns on whether the authority
to confer "power" is express or is a necessary incident of legislative power. If the very nature of a legislative power is such that
the legislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions the D !
fact that the authority to confer power is express & not implicit
makes no difference to the application of the principle. In either
event, as the law conferring power even when expressly authorised is a Jaw, the rule against excessive delegation, applies to it
as much to cases where the aut'!_ority to confer power is implicit.
E
TJ;te next head of argument on this point was based on
invoking the principles stated to have been laid down by certain
American decisioils to which we were referred. The principal
authority on which reliance was placed was the formulation of
the law by Fuller C.J. in Soutenburgh v. Hennick(') Speaking
for the majority of the Court he said : F
"It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local
authorities, and general affairs by the central authority;
and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the
power to make laws cannot be delegated, the.creation of
municipalities exercising local self government has never
been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is
not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power,
but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local
regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject
of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of
nece8sity".
.
(I) 129 U.S. 142=32 L.Ed. 637.
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CALCUTTA COllP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
535
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there are similar passages in ·judgments in other cases to which
also our attention was drawn. But we do not, however, see the
appositeness of the American rule to the interpretation of the
Indian Constitution, particularly in the context of the criteria there
indicated. Besides the rule as to limits of delegation by the
legislatures constituted in India by the Constitution has been the
B subject of elaborate consideration by this Court iii the Delhi Laws
Act case,(') and in the .later decisions in V asantlal Maganbhai
SanjQnwala v. The State of Bombay and others('); Jyoti Pershad
v. The Aministrator For the Union Territory of Delhi(') to
mention a few and these decisions bind this Court. These deciC sions have not laid down that a different rule applies where the
delegation of legislative power is in favour of municipal corporation. We, therefore, consider that the analogy of the American
decisions affords no guidance for the application of a different
rule as to what constitutes excessive delegation in the case of
legislation creating municipal bodies.
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If then the same tests have to be applied to determine the
liinits of pennisst"ble delegation of quasi legislative power whether
the same be in fayour of Municipal bodies or in favour of other
administrative agencies, the question next to be considered is
whether the Act affords sufficient guidance to the municipal
authority for the levying of the rate. The subiect of the limits of
the delegation of legislative power has been fue subject of consideration in several decisions of this Court including the Delhi
Laws Case(') mentioned above. It is, however, sufficient to
refer to a few of them. As regards the principle itself we do not
understand that there is any controversy. In V asant Lal Maganbhai Sanianwala v. The State of Bombay and Ors.( 1 ) Sobba
Rao, J. though he dissented from the judgment of the majority
of the Court on the facts, summarised the decisions of this Court
on this topic, which Mr. Pathak did not dispute correctly states the:
law. He said at pp. 356-357 of the report : "The law on the subject may be briefly stated thus:
The Cons~tution confers a power and imposes a duty
on the legISlature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of
another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a
welfare State, it cannot prcsumabiy· work out all the
(1) (19Sl] S.C.R. 747.
(2) 11.96111 S.C.R. 341 •.
(3) [1962) 2 $.C.R. J2S.
L3Sup 6S-U
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[1965] 2 s.c.R
details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It must necessarily delegate the working out of
details to the executive or any other agency. But
there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An overburdened legislature or one controlled by
a pow~ul executive may unduly overstep the limits of
delegation. It may not lay down any policy at all; it
may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it
may not set down any standard for the guidance of the
executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the
executive to change or modify the policy laid down by
it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of legislative
power in favour of another agency either in whole or in
part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It
is for a court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal
construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits. But the said liberal construction should not be carried by the courts to the
extent of always trying to discover a dormant or latent
legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities. It is the duty of this
Court to strike down without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature".
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The same principle was expressed in slightly different language in
Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of
Delhi(') at p. 145 : "In the context of modern conditions and the variety
and complexity of the situations which present themselves for solutions, it is not possible for the Legislature
to envisage in detail every possibility and make provision for them. The Legislature therefore is forced to
leave the authorities created by it an· ample discretion
limited, however, by the guidance afforded by the Act.
This is the ratio of delegated legislation, and is a process which has come to stay, and which one may be
permitted to observe is not without its advantages. So
long therefore as the Legislature indicates, in the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the
policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact
(I) (1962] 2 S.C.R. .125.
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CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
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that the legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is left to those entrusted with administering the
law, affords no basis either for the contention that there
has been an •xcessive delegation of legislative power
as to amount to an abdication of its functions or that
the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as
to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate."
The matter may possibly be stated more simply by adopting
the language of Bose, J. in Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman,
Patna Administration Committee, Patna and another(') 'is it the
delegation of essenti~ legislative power", or unessential details
C the principle being that if the legislature lays down a policy, prescribes the standards and affords sufficient guidance to the rule
making or subordinate legislative authority it is a proper delegation, but not if the legislature confers on the subordinate law
making authority powers to determine its own policy without any
guidance in that regard. In the one case it would be a canalised
D power and in the other uncanalised and would amount, in effect,
to transferring its basic power to another body.
If the validity of s. 548 (2) of the Act be judged by this test
the questions that arise are : ( 1) Whether the power to determine the rate of a tax is an essential legislative function or is it
E merely a minor and incidental matter, (2). Assuming it is an
essential legislative function, whether the Act has indicated with
reasonable certainty the principles upon which that power has to
be exercised or laid down the standards for the fixation of the
rate. Now, on the first point as to whether it is an essential
legislative function or not, the submission of Mr. Pathak was
F that it was not, and for this purpose he relied principally on three
decisions of this Court-The first one Banarsi Das v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh( 2 ) was concerned with the constitutional
validity of a provision in the C.P. & Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947
which conferred upon Government power to withdraw certain
G exemptions from the tax as levied by the Act. It was urged
before the Court that the conferment of this power to withdraw
the exemption on the Executive was unconstitutional as suffering
from the vice of excessive delegation. This argument was repelled by this Court for more than one reason. The passage relied
on in this connection is at p. 435 : H
"The point for determination is whether the impugned notification relates to -what may ·be said to be
(I} [1955] I S.C.R. 290.
(2) (1959] S.C.R. 427.
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an essential feature of the law, and whether it involves
any change of policy. The authorities are clear that it
is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to
the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation Jaws, such as the selection of persons
on Whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is. to
be charged in respect of different classes of goods, and
the like".
As to the meaning of the words "such as .... the rates at which
it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods" there
was controversy before us. Mr. Pathak submitted that this was
an explicit decision holding that the determination of a rate at
which a· tax might be levied was not an essential legislative
function. On the other hand, Mr. De urged that the emphasis in
the passage was really on "different cll!sses of goods"-and not
on the determination of a rate simpliciter and in support pointed
out that the three decisions from which the principle underlying
the passage quoted above was extracted did not support such a
wide proposition. The three decisions relied on for the proposition were--0ne of the Privy Council, one of this Court and one
of the United States Supreme Court. In all those cases the
amount of the rate had been prescribed by the legislature and the
delegation to the external authority-the Government or the
President', in the United Sates, was merely the determination of
certain external facts for rendering the tax applicable to the
commodi~. Thus in Powell v. Apollo Candle Company, Limited(') the rate of the custom duty was laid down by an enactment
of the New South Wales Legislature. Section 133 of the Customs
Act enacted:
"Whenever ;my article possesses, in the opinion of
the collector, properties in the whole or in part which
can be used for a similar purpose as a dutiable article,
, the Governor is authorised to levy a duty upon such
article at a .rate to be fixed in proportion to the degree
in which such unknown article approximates in its
qualities or uses to such dutiable article".
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Candles were expressly named in thti. Act as subject to the r<ite
of duty specified and on the application of the Collector the
Governor, by an order in Council notified "stearine" as liable to
a similar duty. It is in that context that the Privy Council stated
in a passage which is extracted in the judgment of this Court :
(I) 10 A.C. 282,
H
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINBMA (Ayyangar, /.)
A
539
"But the duties levied· under the Order in Council
are really levied by the authority of the Act wider
which the order is issued''.
The two other decisions do not lay down a wider principle. For
this reason Mr. De submitted that the judgment of this Court
B shoUld be understood in the context in which it occurs and with
reference to the authorities cited in support and if so read the
rates referred to are in relation to those "to be charged in respect
of dilferent classes of goods", as in Powell's case. We see considerable force in this argument and as we shall show by a reference to later decisions of this Court, this passage has not been
C understood in the sense in which Mr. Pathak desires us to understand viz., that a legislation which leaves the rate of taxation
entirely to the executive does not suffer from the vice of excessive
delegation. If Mr. Pathak is right, in order to impose an income
tax, it would be sufficient for the legislature to pass a single
section empowering the executive to levy the tax at such rates as
D they might consider appropriate on the different classes of persons
whom they consider proper and with ·reference to such income as
they might choose to tax. This illustration of what his argument
would lead to-was put to Mr. Pathak but his only answer was
that that was not the case before us.
The second case that Mr. Pathak referred to was the Western
India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Poona. (1) Section 59 of the Bombay District Municipalities Act
1901 empowered municipalities to impose for the purpose of the
Act certain taxes. By the first ten entries in sub-s. !1) particular
taxes were specified and this was followed by a general head readF ing "any other tax". The second sub-section of s. 59 read :
E
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"Nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any tax which the State Legislature has no
power to impose in the State under the Constitution."
G
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The Municipal Corporation of Poona imposed a tax, after following the procedure prescribed by the Municipal Act on theatres
within the city, of Rs. 2 per day as a licence fee. This tax was
imposed from October 1, 1920 and there was enhancement of this
tax in 1941 and 1948. It was the constitutional validity of this
levy which came from pre-Constitution times that was challenged
by a civil suit filed in the' Bombay High Court by the appellantcomp'any. Several points were urged in support of this conten-
(1) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 71.
L3Sup/6S-19
540
SUPREME
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[1965] 2 S.C.R.
tion. The first was that the Provincial Legislature under the A
Government of India Act, 1935 did not itself have the power to
levy the said tax; (2) that the residuary category set forth in cl. 11
"any other tax" was unconstitutional, the point urged being that
thereby "the Jegiilature had completely abdicated its function and
delegated essential legislative power to the municipality to determine B
the nature of the taxes to be imposed on the rate payers. Such omnibus delegation could not, on the authorities, be supported as constitutional". The grounds upon which this second' argument was
rejected was the main point on which Mr. Pathak relied in support of this case. These were: ( 1) that the taxes authorised to ,
be imposed were taxes "for the purposes of the Act" i.e., taxes. C
could be raised only for implementing the purposes for which
the municipality was constituted and for no other purpose, ( 2)
though strictly speaking the rule as to ejusde171 generis could not
be invoked, the kind and the nature of the tax which the municipality was ,authorised to impose were indicated by the specified
items 1 to 10, (3) the taxing power of the municipality was made D
~ubject to the approval of the Governor-in-Council which, at the
date when the Act was passed, viz. 1901, meant the Governor-inlegislative Council, and ( 4) finally it was observed the impugned
section did lay down a principle and fix a standard which the
municipalities had to follow in imposing the tax and, in the circumstances, the legislature was held not to have abdicated its E
powers.
No doubt, this decision does support learned counsel to some
extent but a question in the form in which it arises now was not
before the Court. The only point was whether there was sufficient formulation of policy for determining the nature of the tax F
which a municipality might impose. The answer was in the
affirmative, based principally on two grounds: (1) that by sub-s.
(2) of s. 59 as well on general principles of Jaw the power of the
municipality to levy taxes was confined to those on which Provincial Legislature could legislate. In fact, from the arguments
;is reported it would appear that one of , the points urged by G
learned counsel for the appellant was that under head 11 of s. 59
(I) municipality might levy an income tax. It was this extreme
contention that was answered and rejected by the learned Judges.
This was, in a sense, negative as it merely prevented the municipality from levying particular kinds of taxes. Coming to the
positive aspect, the learned Judges held that the other, specified H
items of taxes coupled with ~e purposes for which tax was to be
levied, indicated the riature of the tax that was to be levied. We
CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
A
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541
are unable to agree that this case decides that the fixation of a rate
of tax is not an essential legislative function but a mere matter of
detail which could be delegated to a subordinate law making body.
The last of the decisions relied on in this connection was in
Vasantlal v. The State of Bombay( 1 ). It was not a case regarding
the determination of a rate at which tax could be levied out of the
rent which a tenant might be required to pay under the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948. Section 6(2) of
that Act enacted :
"The Provincial Legislature may, by notification in
the official Gazette, fix a lower rate of maximum rent
payable by the tenants of lands situate in any particular
area or may fix such rate on any other suitable basis as
it thinks fit. "
By a notification issued under that section the Government l
Bombay prescribed the rate of rent and this was much lower than
D the one previously fixed. By petitions under Art. 226 filed in the
Hi~h Court of Bombay the appellants who were landholders
challenged the constitutionality of this fixation on the ground that
the legislature had delegated its essential legislative function without laying down policy or principles affording guidance to the
delegatcc for implementing the legislation. This Court, by a
E majority, answered this question in the negative. The decision proceeded on the basis that the fixation of rent was an essential legislative function. It was, however, held that the legislature had
enunciated the principles subject to which the delegatcc could
exercise its subsidiary powers. Gajendragadkar J. as he then was,
F observed:
G
H
"The extent to which delegation is permissible is also
now well settled. The legislature cannot delegate its
essential legislative function in any case. It must lay
down the legislative policy and principle and must afford
guidance for carrying out the legislative policy laid down
before it delegates its subsidiary power in that behalf."
The enunciation of the principle in this manner does not help
Mr. Pathak. His contention, however, was that ins. 6(2) extracted
earlier, no policy had been laid down but that this Court had
upheld the constitutional validity of that delegation. A close
examination of the decision, however, does not support this submission. The basic reasoning on which that _decision rests is that
(I) [1961] I S.C.R. 341.
542
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[1965] 2 S.C.R.
for the fixation of a reasonable rent under s. 12 by the Mamlatdar A
the necessary factors bad all been specified and on a construction
of the Act the learned Judges of the majority reached a conclusion that the exercise of powers under s. 6(2) had to be effected
on the same basis and with reference to the same factors which
were specified in s. 12(3) of the Act. It is precisely on this question of the construction of the Act and the correlation between B
the power to fix the rent conferred upon the State Government by
s. 6(2) and the power of fixation of fair rent conferred on the
Mamlatdar by s. 12 that there was the difference of opinion
between the learned Judges. It would, therefore, be seen that far
from Vasantlal's ca~e being an authority.for the position that the
fixation of a rate of rent is not an essential legislative function but C
a mere matter of detail which could be left wholly to the executive or subordinate law making authority the decision clearly
lays down that it is an essential legislative function and it coul(I
not be delegated without sufficient guidance.
.
There were a few other decisions which were referred to by
the learned counsel on the question of excessive delegation but the
principles laid down there are general ones and related to the
particular point about the fixation of rates. We do not, therefore,
consider it necessary to refer to or to deal with them. The final
result of this analysis of the decisions as laying down the law so
far as the Constitution is concerned, .may be thus summarised :
(1) Essential legislative functions cannot be delegated but where
· the law lays down the principles and affords guidance to the subordinate law making authority details may be left for being filled
up by the executive or by other authorities vested with quasilegislative power, (2) The power to fix a rate of tax is an essential
legislative function and therefore unless the subordinate lawmaking authority is afforded guidance by the policies being formulated, principles enunciated and standards laid down the legislation will suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and would be
void as arbitrary or unconstitutional.
This leads us to the last of the points urged by Mr. Pathak
that the Act itself affords sufficient ·guidance and fixes standards
by which it could determine the rate at which a tax could be
levied. It is not, and cannot be disputed that the guidance co:uld
be afforded not merely by the provision enabling the tax to be
levied but by other provisions of the Act including the preamble.
But the question is whether there are any such provisions in the
Act which could serve to determine the standard upon which the
rate of tax to be levied is to be determined. Mr. Pathak first
D
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543
A referred us to the preamble where it is recited that the Act enacted
was one relating to the municipal affairs of Calcutta. We are
unable to see how this affords any assistance in this regard. He
next referred us to s. 24 reading, to quote the material words : B
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"Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules,
bye-laws and regulations made thereunder the municipal
government of Calcutta shall vest in the Corporation."
and to ss. 42 to 47 which deal with the supervision of the State
Government over the affairs and activities of the Corporation. As
regards s. 24, we are unable to see how this helps learned counsel
in the present argument. No doubt, the municipal government of
Calcutta is vested in the Corporation but the question is what
powers are vested in that government. If by describing the powers
of administration of the city of Calcutta vested in the Corporation, as "a government" every power necessary to effectuate governmental functions was involved there would have been no necessity
at all for the other provisions of the Act. It is not, therefore, as
if the expression 'government' gathers within its fold all powers
necessary for administration or creates an independent sovereign
body entitled to legislate in any manner it likes provided the same
is necessary for the purpose of carrying on civic government. It
is obvious that that is not the sense in which the word 'government' is employed in s. 24. The Corporation is still a subordinate
body which is the creature of the legislature and can only function
within the framework of the powers conferred upon it by the
Municipal Act. Nor are we able to appreciate how any assistance
is derived in this regard from t)le powers of supervision wbicb the
State Government has over municipal affairs under ss. 42 to 47.
The supervision is only by· the Executive Government and the question relating to the vice of excessive delegation is as much appli·
cable to powers exerciseable by the Executive Government as tc
the Corporation. If no standards have been laid down by the
Act for the Corporation to afford it a guidance for the fixation of
a rate the fact that supervisory power is conferred upon the execulive would not obviate that objection for the Government itself
would have no guidance from the legislature as to the policy to
be adopted in exercising the supervision. As was pointed out by
this Court in Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union
Territory of Delhi( 1 ) though in a slightly different context speaking of an appeal provided against orders of an authority where it
was complained tha:t an arbitrary power had been vested in the
original authority :
(1)'(1962) 2 S.C.R.. 125.
544
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(1965) 2 5.C.R.
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"If learned counsel is right in bis submission that the
power of the 'competent authority' is unguided and that
he had an unfettered and arbitrary authority to exerciae
his discretion 'at his sweet-will and pleasure' the existence
of a provision for appeals might not impart validity to
such legislation. The reason for this is that the appellate
B
power would be subject to the same vice as the power
of the original authority and the imposition of one's
'sweet-will and pleasure' over another ·of a lower
authority, would not prevent discrimination or render
the restriction reasonable".
Principal reliance, however, was placed by learned counsel on c
ss. 115 and 117 of the Act as affordin~ the requisite guidance.
These read : Section 115 : "There shall be one Municipal Fund
held by the Corporation in trust for the purposes of this
Act to which all moneys realised or realisable under this
D
Act (other than fine levied by Magistrates) and all
moneys otherwise received by the Corporation shall be
credited".
Section 117 : "(1) The moneys from time to time
credited to the Municipal Fund shall be applied in payment of all sums, charges and cost necessary for carryE
ing out the purposes of this Act, or of which the payment is duly directed or sanctioned by or under any of
the provisions of this Act.
(2) Such moneys shall likewise be applied in payment of all sums payable out of the Municipal Fund
F
under any other enactment for the time being in force."
Reference was also made in this connection to s. 126 under which
annual budget estimates have to be prepared for the Corporation
in which a statement of the proposals as to taxation which would
be necessary or expeclient to impose in the said year and the
expenditure to be incurred would all have to be set out. It was, G
therefore, submitted : (I) that· there was a municipal fund into
which all collections were deposited, & (2) \the amount of the
£ollection was determined by the expenditure which it was either
obligatory or permissive for the Corporation to incur. Thus no
taxes could be raised except such as were needed for the expenditure for which provision had been made in the budget and the H
rate of tax was, therefore, determined by the needs of the Corporation. In 5Upport Of the submission that this was sufficient
'
•. CALCUTTA CORP. v. LIBERTY CINEMA (Ayyangar, J.)
. :;
__
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545
-
guidance learned Counsel referred us to the decision of the High
Court of Orissa in Tht! Orissa Ceramic Industries Ltd. v. Executive Officer, Jharsuguda Municipality(') where reference is made
to these very provisions as affording sufficient guidance to enable a
power to fix the rate being delegated to a· municipal authority.
.We do not consider that ss. 115 and 117 afford any guidance for
B the fixation of a rate. If the amount of money which a municipality needs for discharging its functions, affords any guidance it
would appear to follow that the needs of a State for the expenditure which it has to- incur for its manifold-activities and again of
the Union for the activities which it might undertake ought to
afford sufficient guidance to ~ustain the validity of a skeleton Iegisc .
C lation of the type we have indicated earlier. · Thus, if learned
Counsel is right in his submission as regards ss. 115 and 117 read
with s. 126 as affording sufficient guidance a legislation by a State
Legislature or Parliament enacting that the State Government might
raise such taxes as. it considers necessary and at such rates as it
D might consider -proper for meeting the expenditure of Government could be constitutional and there would be no need for a
parliamentary scrutiny and legislation as regards the rates of the
several taxes to be levied within the State or the Union, as the
case may be. As Mr. Pathak himself realised, this would be
plainly unsupportable. If this were so, merely because the area
E of Government was restricted to a municipality we do not consider
how these provisions afford guidance to the subordinate law making
authority -viz., the Municipitl Corporafion to fix the rate of the
levy. Pausing here, learned Counsel said that even if a maxima
were prescribed still it left an amount of discretion to the Municipal Corporation or the Executive, as the case may be, and that
F even such a "guided" power could be attacked, as ultra vires. This,
however, does not follow. The unconstitutionality arises out of
the discretion being wholly uncanalised and unguided. The argument on the other side is not that no discretion could be left to
the legislature -to determine within permissible limits the precise
rate that would secure the purposes which it seeks to achieve but
G rather that no guidance is at all afforded and a blank cheque given
to the subordinate authority. Where a maxima is fixed and the
limit of discretion is thus controlled the legislature has exercised
its legislative power on that topic viz., the particular tax. In the
other case, where it merely authorises the subordinate law making
authority to levy the tax without indicating the essential legislaH tive features of such a tax it is not really legislation on the taxation
A
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•
(I) A.I.R. 1963 Oriua 171.
546
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entry but is merely authorising the subordinate legislature to ma« A
a law on that topic. If these provisions, referred to earlier, do not
afford any guidance to the Municipal Corporation to fix the rate
· of the levy it was not suggested that there were any others in the
Act which performed that function. Sections 443 and 548(2), it
is admitted, do not afford any help for this purpose. It has, therefore, to be held that viewed as a tax, the delegation is unconstitu- B
tional as the essential legislative functions are parted with to the
subordinate law making body and the provision is, therefore, unconstitutional.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
ORDER
In accordance with the majority judgment, the . appeal is
allowed with costs throughout.
·C
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