PATEL CHUNIBHAI DAJIBHAI ETC. versus NARAYANRAO KHANDERAO JAMBEKAR AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 3 December 1964 | [1965] 2 S.C.R. 328 | 1964 INSC 275
Key facts
- Decided
- 3 December 1964
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, R.S. BACHAWAT
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 791/1964
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1965] 2 S.C.R. 328
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 275
Text of the judgment
328
PATEL CHUNIBHAI DAJIBHAI ETC.
A
v.
NARA YANRAO KHANDERAO JAMBEKAR AND
ANOTHER
December 3, 1964
(A. K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND
R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.]
B
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (67 o/ 1948), as a111~naed
by Act 38 of 1957, ss. 32 and 76A-Scope of.
In May 1956, the respondent ga·;e a notice under s. 14 of the llombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, to the appellants, who were c
his tenants, terminating the tenancy on the grounds of non-paymeut of
rent. In December 1956, he gave another notice to the appellants, under
a. 31, terminating the tenancy on the ground that be wanted to personally
cultivate the lands. In March 1957, be filed an application before the
Mamlatdar, on the basis of the notice under s. 31 for recovery of posses·
aion of the land. In July 1957, he filed another application for
the same relief on the basis of the notice under s. 14. On Septembor 28,
1957, s. 32 of the Act was amended by Act 38 of 1957 as a result of D
which, in certain circumstances, a tenant would be deemed to have purchased, on 1st April 1957, the lands held by him, from the landlord. In
December 1957, the Mamlatdar allowed the respondent's application based
on s. 14. In March 1958, he withdrew his application based on s. 31.
The appellants did not tile an appeal against the order of the Marnlatdar
of December 1957, but applied to the Collector in August 1958, for
revision of that order under s. 76A. The Collector called for the records,
but before the receipt of the records, rejected the application. The appel- E
lants again applied and the Collector again rejected the application. The
orders of rejection were passed in October 1958. In November 1958,
the appellants once again applied to the Collector. In December 1958,
the Collector received the records. He gave notice to the parties, heard
them and on 17th February 1959 passed an order setting a<ide the
Mamlatdar's order of December 1957. The respondent moved the Ro\·enue
Tribunal but without success. He then applied to the High Court under
Art. 227 of tho Constitution. The High Court held that the Collector had F
power to make the order of 17th February 1959, but that the amended s.
32 gave no rights to the appellants, as it could not affect the eviction
application filed in July 1957 and pending when the Amending Act came
into force, and therefore decided in favour of the respondent-landlord.
_In appeal to the Supreme Court by the tenants, the appellants contended
that the High C<>urt's view as to the applicability of s. 32 was erroneous.
The respondent, while supporting the High Court's decision on s. 32,
contended that the High Court's view of s. 76A was wrong and that the G
Collector had no power to review his earlier orders of October 1958 by
his order of February 1959.
HELD (Per Ayyangar and llachawat, JJ.) : The provisions in s.
32(l)(b)(i), (ill and (iii) do not lay down alternative conditions on the
satisfaction of any one of which, the appellant could be deemed to have
purchased the land on 1st Aoril 1957. The word "or" between sub-ss. (ii)
and (iii), in conjunction with the succeeding negatives is equivalent to,
and should be read as "nor". Therefore, under the section, the appellants, who were not permanent tenants but were cultivating the land
personally, could become purchasers of the lands on ht April 1957, if
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CHUNmHAI v. NAllAYANllAO (Sarkar, I.)
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329
on that date, neither an application based on a. 31, nor an application
based on 1. 14 waa pending. If an application of either type was pending
on that date, the tenants could not become purchasers on that date,
though, if the application were rejected later, they could become purchasers on such postponed date under the proviso to. the section. Since,
on 31st March 1957, the respondent's application baaed on s. 31 waa
pending, the appellants could not be deemed to have purchased the land.
on ~pril 1, 1957. [343 F-0, H; 344 A]
But the respondent's application based on s. 14 was not maintainable
as it was filed after 31st March 1957. Section 32, as amended, saves
all application pending on 31st March 1957 and by necessary implication
it bars all applications filed after that date. The fact that the application
under s. 31 was pending, and the appellants continued to be tenanta
would not make any difference. The High Court was therefore jn error
in quashing the Collector's order on the ground that the amended s. 32
had no effect on pending applications for eviction. However, since the
Mamlatdar allowed the application, the appellants had ceased to be tenants
and so, even ·though the respondent withdrew bis application under s. 31,
and such withdrawal amounted to rejection in law, the appellants could
not claim the benefit of the proviso to s. 32 and become purchasers of the
lands on the postponed date. [344 B; 345 B, D-B, H; 349 CJ
The Collector's order of February 1959 under s. 76A, reversing the
Mamlatdar's order, did not affect the position because, that order was
illegal, ultra virts and without jurisdiction. The Collector could pass
the earlier orders rejecting the applications for rO\ision in October 1958
on the materials before him and without calling for the record. Having
called for the record, be should have waited for its arrival, but bis orders
passed before such arrival were not without jurisdiction. The mere fact
that be called for the record is no ground for saying that be C011ld not
thereafter examine the materials before him and pass an order refusing to
E interfere with the Mamlatdar's order, without notice to the parties. Those
orders passed by the Collector in the exercise of bis revisional powers were
quasi-judicial and final. Even if the order calling for the record is not
of a quasi-judicial nature, the Collector having called for the record
and then determined that there was no ground for interference, his order
would be quasi-judicial. Since the Act does not empower the Collector
to review such an order passed by him, bis earlier orders dismissing the
applications for revision were final and could not be reopened by him
I' sobsequently. [346 B.C; 347 F-H; 348 D-H]
D
Per Sarkar, J. (dissenting) : The conditions laid down ins. 32(!)(b)(i).
(ii) and (iii) are not in the alternative and fulfihnent of any one of them
G
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would not entitle a tenant to claim to be a purchaser. In order to become
a purchaser a tenant has to satisfy all the conditions laid down in els. ( i),
(ii) and (iii). Therefore, when an application for ejectment filed before
3 lst March 1957 on the basis of a notice under s. 31 was pending when
the Amending Act came into force, the tenant had not become a purchaser
on the specified date. This bowe.-er does not lead to the conclusion that
in such a case an application for ejectment on the basis of a dotice under
s. 14, filed after 31st March 1957 remained maintainable after the Amending Act and that an order for ejectment could properlv be made on it. OD
the coming into force of the Amending Act, the landlord's application for
ejectment filed in July 1957 on the strength of a notice under s. 14
became incompetent arid ·bad to be reiected. The order of eiectment pas.•ed by the Mamlatdar would be wholly ille~al, and the order of the Collector of 19th February 1959, setting aside that order was valid and
proper Under s. 76A sending. for the record is a preliminary sten to
Ille judicial act concerning the right of the parties which is to follow
330
SUPllBMB OOtmT JlEPOl.TS
(1965] 2 S.C.ll.
upon the perusal of the record when it. arrives. By send~g for !he
record, the Collector decided that the. ments of tbc case reqwrC!' loo~g
into. Having sent for the record his only ~er was to. wait for its
arrival and decide the merits of the case on 1t. The section 4oes n,ot
contemplate that an order can be made before the Collector had receiyed
the record and looked into it. As the record had not arrived by the time
he rejected the applications in October 1958, he had not made any order
under the section. It follows that the only order made by the Collector
under the section was that of 19th February 1959. [333 C-D, O; 334 C,
E; 336 G-H; 337 D; 339 B-D; 340 B-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 791·
798 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and orders dated
November 4/5, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil
Applications Nos. 428 to 430 and 432 to 436 of 1961.
I. N. Shroff, for ~e appellants (in all the appeals) S. G.
Patwardhan and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondents (in all
the appeals).
SARKAR J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. The Judgment of
RA.JAGOPALA AYYANGAR and BACHAWAT JJ. was delivered by
BACHAWAT J.
Sarkar J. The appellants are tenants against whom orders
for ejectment had been passed at the instance of the landlord.
They contend that in view of a certain amendment of s. 32 of the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, these O(ders
were illegal and had rightly been set aside by the Collector under
s. 76A of that Act. The questions that arise in these appeals
depend on the interpretation of these two sections.
There were eight tenants and each of them has filed an appeal.
We have thus eight appeals before us. As the landlord was the
same person, the respondent in each appeal is the same. The
landlord took steps under ss. 14, 31 and 29 of the Act against
each tenant and these have led to the present proceedings. Section
14 gives a landlord power to terminate a tenancy on the ground
inter a/ia of the tenant's· failure to pay rent by giving the tenant
a notice informing him of his intention to terminate the tenancy.
Section 31 provides that notwithstanding anything eontained in
s. 14, a landlord may after giving notice to the tenant terminate
the tenancy if he bona fide requires the land for cultivating . it
personally. Section 29 of the Act states that a landlord shall
not obtain possession of land from a tenant except under an
order made by the Mamlatdar on the application mentioned in it.
On May 1, 1956, the landlord had given a notice to the
tenants under s. 14. On December 25, 1956, the landlord had
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CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO (Sarkar, /.)
331
A given a fresh notice to the tenants under s. 31. On March 28,
1957 the landlord filed applications against the tenants before
the Mamlatdar for ejectment under s. 29 on the strength of the
notice under s. 31 and thereafter on July 10, 1957, he filed
another set of applications for their ejectment on the strength
of the notice under s. 14. By various orders made between
B December 20 and 25, 1957, the Mamlatdar allowed the landlord's applications for ejectment on the basis of the notice under
s. 14. Thereafter on March 1, 1958, the landlord withdrew his
applications for ejectment pursuant to the notice under s. 31.
The tenants did not file any appeal aguinst 'the Mamlatdar's
c orders of ejectment but moved the Collector under s. 76A of the
Act for setting them aside. Three successive sets of such applications had been made by the tenants. The first set of applications
was made on August 4, 1958. On August 14, 1958, the Collector
acting under s. 7 6A called for the record of the ejectment proceedings .before ths Mamlatdar. 111e record did not arrive till
n December 24, 1958. In the meantinle however, on August 26,
1958 the tenants made the second set of applications under s.
76A. On October 3 and 4, 1958, the Collector appears to have
made orders purporting to reject both sets of the tenants' 'applications under s. 76A. On or about October 6, 1958, the tenants
preferred a joint application under s. 7 6A and this was also
F. rejected by the Coliector on October 17, 1958. On November
7, 1958, the local Congress Committee passed a resolution stating that the tenants were being subjected to harassment and
demanding that justice be done to them. A copy of the resolution
was sent to the Collector. Subsequently on December 24, 1958,
the record of the proceedings called for was received by the
F Collector. The Collector thereafter gave notice to the parties,
heard them and made an order on February 17, 1959 setting
aside the Mamlatdar's orders of ejectment on the ground that in
view of the provisions of s. 32 as amended by Act XXXVIII of
1957 the tenants could not be evicted. The landlord then moved
the Revenue Tribunal in revision to set aside the Collector's
G order of February 17, 1959 but his applications were dismissed.
He, thereafter, applied to the High Court under Art. 227 of the
Comtitution to set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the
Collector. The High Court allowed these applications and hence
the present appeals by the tenants. As there was a ~eparate
H application to the High Court by the landlord against each of the
~ight tenants, we have now eight appeals before us.
The landlord had contended in the High Court that the
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) 2 S.C.R.
Collector having once rejected the tenants' applications by tho A
order of October 3 or of October 4 or lastly of October 17, 1958
had no power under s. 76A to reconsider the matter and pass his
order of February 17, 1959 setting aside the Mamlatdar's order
and that the Tribunal also was wrong in holding that the Collector had the power. On the merits, the landlord had contended in
the High Court thats. 32 as amended by Act XXXVIII of 1957, B
which came into force on September 28, 1957, was not applicable to the ejectment proceedings. The High Court held that the ·
Collector had the power to make the order of February 17, 1959
but it took the view that the amended s. 32 did not govern the
ejectment proceedings on the ground that that section could not C
affect applications which were pending on the date the amending
Act came into force. It was for this reason that the High Court
set aside the orders of the Tribunal and th() Collector. It has
been contended in these appeals, by the respondent landlord, that
the High Court's view of s. 76A was wrong, and by the appellant
tenants that its view as to the applicability of s. 32 was erroneous. 0
These are the two questions that arise in these appeals.
I will first take up the question of the interpretation of s. 7EA.
That section so far as material is in these terms :
S. 16A. Where no appeal has been filed within the
period provided for it, the Collector may, suo moiu or
E
on a reference made in this behalf by the Divisional
Officer or the State Government, at any time,( a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceedings
of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of
satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of F
any order passed· by, and as to the regularity of ·the
proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal. as the
case may be, and
(b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit;
Provided that no such record shall be called for
G
after the expiry of one year from the date of such order
and no order of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shali be
modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has
been given to the interested parties to appear and be
heard.
The contention of the landlord is that power under s. 76A
can be exercised only once and that was done by one of tho
orders of October 1958 earlier mentioned and, therefore, the
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CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO (Sarkar, J.)
333
A Collector's order of February 17, 1959 was wholly incompetent
and a nullity. I do not think it necessary to decide the correctness of the contention that power under the section can be exercised only once and will proceed on the assumption that ii is
right. The question still remains, was an order under s. 76A
made by the Collector prior to February 17, 1959? It seems to
B me that the order contemplated by the section is provided for in
cl. ( ~) and that order , is to be made after the record has been
called for and perused by the Collector. That clause says the
Collector may "pass such order thereon" as he deems fit, meaning
that the order is to be made on the record. The section does not
contemplate that the order can be made before the Collector has
c received the· record and looked into it. As the record had not
arrived by the time that the Collector rejected the applications,
namely, on October 3, or 4 or 17, 1958, it can be said that he
had not made any order under s. 76A on those dates. It would
follow that the only order made by the Collector under the secD tion was the order of February 17, 1959.
It was however said on behalf of the landlord that the Collector had by the earlier orders of October 1958 refused to call for
the record and had thereby fully exercised his powers under the
section and could not make the order of February 17, 1959. The
E High Court held that a refusal to send for the record was an administrative act and it was not an order made under the section
in a judicial capacity and such an order did not exhaust the
Collector's power under the section. I am unable to say that this
view is entirely devoid of force. The section does not create any
right in any party to move the Collector under it. Under it the
F Collector is either to act suo motu or at the instance of the
Divisional Officer or the State Government. The act contemplated by the section is to send for the record and make an order
as to the rights of the parties after perusing it. Therefore, sending for the record would appear to be a preliminary step to the
judicial act concerning the rights of the parties which is to
G follow upon the perusal of the record when it arrives. The
Collector sends for the record to get the materials on which alone
he is under the section to base his judicial act. His only real
power under the section is to do the judicial act. He cannot be
said to have exhausted that power before he has looked into the
record. The proviso to the section would lend support to this
H view, for it says that the judicial power can be exercised at any
point of time if he has sent for the record within the period
mentioned.
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SUPREMF.
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There is however another aspect of the case. Let me assume
that if the Collector had refused to send for the record, he would
have exhausted his power under the section. This would be only
on the basis that he had formed the opinion that it was not a fit
ca~e for going into the merits and, therefore, refused to send for
the record. In the present case however he did not refuse to
send for the record. By his earliest order, which was of August
J4, 1958, he had called for the record. If he could not review
his order refusing to call for the record because his power under
the section was thereby exhausted, he could not review the order
calling for the record either. If any of his orders ·of October 3,
4 aml 17, 1958 was to be an effective order under the section,
the result of that would have been to review, and thereupon to
s..:t aside, the order sending for the record. By sending for the
record he did decide that the merits of the c:a~e required looking
into it. If that was not the effect of the order sending for the
record, that act would be only a meaningless act and I am unable
to think that such an act of the Collector could be within the
contemplation of the section. The order of October 3, or 4, or
17, 1958 must be held to have decided that the merits of the case
did not deserve to be looked into. This would be reviewing the
earlier order and this, ex hypothesi, the Collector had no power
to do. Having sent for the record his only power was to wait for
its arrival and decide the merits of the case on it. The order of
October 3, or 4 or 17, 1958 which had been made before the
arrival of the record was, therefore, wholly incompetent and ineffective. None of them could affect the Collector's power to
pass a proper order after the record had arrived. In mv view,
therefore, the order of February 17, 1959 had been properly
1nade and was a valid order.
[ now take up the question of the interpretation of 's. 32 as
it stood in December 1957 when the ejectment orders were made
by the 'Mamlatdar and its applicability to pending ej.ectment PI?"
ceeclings. Section 32 was amended from time to ume but 1~ JS
necessary to refer only to two of the amendments. That secuon
wa~ first amended by Act XIII of 1956 which was enacted on
March 16, 1956 but came into force on August l, 1956. As
so amended, it for the first time provided that in certain circumstances a tenant would be deemed to have purchased on April I,
1957 from his landlord the land held by him. The section was
again amended by Act XXXVIII of 1957 which came into force
on September 28, 1957 and it is with this amendment that we
are really concerned. Section 12 of this amending Act inserted
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CHUNIBHAI
v. NARAYANRAO (Sarkar, J.)
335
A cl. (iii) in sub-s. (1) of s. 32 ands. 34 of the amending Act gave
effect to the amendment made bys. 12 from August l, 1956
retrospectively. It is of some interest to point out that August l,
1956 is the date on which the amendment of s. 32 by Act XIII
of 1956 was brought into force. lt will be noticed that amending Act XXXVlll of 1957 was in force at the date of the MamB latdar's orders of ejectment. Now s. 32 as it stood after the
amendment by Act XXXVIII of 1957 is in these terms :
"On the first day of April 1957 .... every tenant
shall .... he <le~med to have purchased from his landlord .... th~ land held by him ~·s tenant, if( a) such tenant is a perm:in~nt tenant ther~Pf and culti-
vates land personally;
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( b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates
the l~nd leased !Jersonally; and
( i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under section 31; or
(ii) notice ha' been given under section 31, but the
landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on
or before- the 31st day of March 1957 under
section 29 for obtaining possession <lf the land;
or
(iii) th~ land[oc.l has not terminated this tenancy
on any of the grounds specified in section 14,
or has so terminated the tenancy hut has not
applied to thJ Mamlatdar on or before the 31st
day of March 1957 under 'cction 29 for obtaining possession of the lands :
Provided that if an application made by the landlord under section 29 for obtaining possession of the
land has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the
Collector in appeal or in revision by the Bombay
Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the
tenant shall be deemed to have purcha,;ed the land on
the date on which the final order of rejection is passed.
The date on which the final order of rejection i~ p1ssed
is hereafter referred to as 'the rostponed ch1te'."
The High Court, as I have stated, said that s. 32 though
made retrospective did not affect pending applications for ·ejectment which the applications of the landlord resulting in the
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
orders of ejectment were. The matter was put in this way. "A A
retrospective provision cannot, in my view, have any effect to
pending proceedings where such retrospective provision provides
that an application or proceeding shall be started not later than
a part'cular date when proceedings have already been filed by the
time that the said amending Act comes into force." I am unable
lo say that I have fully understood this observation but learned B
advocate for the landlord assures us that it can only mean that
the amendment made does not affect pending proceedings.
Learned advocate for the landlord, was however, unable to support the view taken by the High Court. I also think that the
doubt c
High Court fell into an error. Now, there is, of course, no
.
thut the legislature can validly make a law so retrospective as to
affect a pending proceeding. The question is, did it do so in the
present case ? I think it clearly did. Section 32 after the amendment provided that a tenant personally cultivating land would
on the date of the amending :Act be entitled to claim to have
become a purchaser of :he land held by him with effect from D
April I, l 957, if no application for his ejectment on the strength
of a notice under s. 14 or under s. 3 I had been filed on or before
March 31, 1957. Any such application made after that date
and pending when the amending Act came into force, therefore,
could not ~!feet the right of the' tenant under the amended section
to claim to be' a purchaser; such application would, therefore, on E
the passing of the amending Act become infructuous for the
tenant having been made the owner of the land was no longer a
tenant who .could be evicted. The amended section, therefore,
necessarily affected 'pending proceedings. The Act could not
be read in the way the High Court did without refusing to give
full effect to the language used. An interpretation doing so · I'
would be unsupportable. Hence I am unable to agree with the
view taken by the High Court.
''
I pass on to consider whether the amended s. 32 made the
Mamlatdar's order of ejectment illegal. In order that a tenant
may claim to have become a purchaser under the section, he G
has to satisfy the conditions mentioned in it. Those conditions
are set out in two sets. The first set of conditions is in els. (a)
and (b). These two conditions are obviously in the alternative
though between them the word "or" does not occur, for it is not
possible for a tenant to fulfil both the conditions; he cannot be
both a permanent tenant and not a permanent tenant at the same H
time. It is not in dispute that the tenants in the present case per·sonally cultivated the lands held by them on the date mentione<!
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CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO (Sarkar, J.)
337
A ,in the section.
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So one of the conditions in the first set can be
said to have been fulfilled.
The arguments in this case have turned on the second set of
conditions which are contained in els. (i), (ii) and (iii). I think
cl. (iii) really contains two conditions, namely, first a failure to
terminate the tenancy by notice under s. 14 and secondly, if ther~
has been such a termination, failure to apply for ejectment on the
basis of such termination on or before March 31, 1957. So this set
really contains four conditions. Now, Mr. Shroff appearing for
the tenants contended that the conditions in these clauses in the
second set are alternative conditions and that it is enough for a
tenant to satisfy any one of them. If this contention is well founded, then it cannot be disputed that the tenants in the present case
had become purchasers because the last condition had been fulfilled as the landlord had not applied to the Mamlatdar for ejectment
before March 31, 1957 on the strength of a notice under s. 14.
I am however unable to agree that the conditions are in the
alternative and fulfilment of any one of them would entitle a
tenant to claim to be a purchaser. The fallacy of Mr. Shroff's
contention can be shown by an illustration. Suppose cl. (iii) is
fulfilled but at the same time it appears that the landlord had before March 31, 1957, both given a notice under s. 31 and made
an application for ejectment under s. 29 on the basis of that notice
which was pending when the amending Act came into force. That
is what happened in the present case. If Mr. Shroff is right, then
the tenant must be held to have become a purchaser on the passing
of the amending Act with effect from April l, 1957 notwithstanding the pending application. Such a reading of the section would
however make the proviso ineffective. The application mentioned
in the proviso must be of one of the kinds mentioned in els. (ii)
and (iii) for under the section in the absence of such an application, the tenant becomes a purchaser. Now the proviso says that
when such an application is pending when the amending Act
comes into force, the tenant would not become a purchaser unless
that application is rejected and then only on the date when it is
rejected. According to Mr. Shroff's contention, the tenant in the
case supposed has become a purchaser on the enactment of the
amending Act. But the proviso obviously contemplates that the
application contemplated in it might succeed for it says "if an
application .... has been rejected". By ..contemplating that the
application may succeed, the proviso is laying down that the
tenant against whom it is made may be evicted. This could not
be done if the tenant had already become the purchaser as he
338
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
would be if Mr. Shroff is right. Neither ~.ould it for the same A
reason be, as the proviso also contemplates, that if the application
fails the tenant wo~ld become the purchaser on the date when the
application is rejected. The plain effect of the section obviously
is that a tenant fulfilling its conditions is to be deemed to have
beconie a purchaser on the passing of the amending Act, with
effect from an earlier date and where an application for his eject- B
ment on the'i:>asis of a notice either under s. 14 or s. 31 had been
made on or before March 31, 1957 and was pending when the ·
amending Act came into force, the teniint was to become a purchaser only if that application was rejected and then on the date
of the rejection. . It follows that where there is such a pending C
application, the tenant does not become a purchaser on the passing
of the amending Act though another condition of the section is
found to have been fulfilled. Hence the conditions set out cannot
be in the alternative.
In the present case the tenants relied principally on the second 0
condition contained in cl.' (iii) for their contention that the
Mamlatdar's order for ejectment was illegal. The applications on
which that order was made had been filed after March 31, 1957.
In fact they had been filed on July 10, 1957 and were pending
when the amending Act came· into force. If these applications
constitute the only step that the landlord had taken for ejectment E
of the tenants then obviously the conditions'in els. (i), (ii) and
(iii) had all been fulfilled and in that case the tenants must be
deemed to have become purchasers of the lands on April 1, 1957
and this wa~ the position which existed on September 28, 1957
when Act XXXVIII of 1957 had come into force. The Mamlatdar's order of ejectment had been made subsequent to the coming F
into force of that Act. These orders, as I have earlier stated, were
made between December 20, and 25, 1957. Before these dates
the tenants, on the assumption that I have made, having become
purchasers had ceased to be tenants and there was no question
therefore of evicting them as such. The Mamlatdar should on
this supposition have dismissed those applications and his orders G
of ejectment were therefore illegal.
But the facts here are different. The landlord had made an
:tnplication for ejectment before March 31, 1957 on the strength
of a notice under s. 31 and that application was pending when the
amending Act came into operation. It was then said that it
followed from this t.'iat the condition in cl. (ii) had not been
satisfied and so the tenants had not become purchasers under the
H
CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO (Sarkar, J.)
339
A section. It was contended that that being so, the Mamlatdar could
treat them as tenants and make an order of ejectment on the landlord's applications pursuant to the notices under s. 14 even though
they were made after March 31, 1957. In my opinion, this contention is ill founded. It is true that in order to become a purchaser a tenant has to satisfy all the conditions laid down in els.
B (i), (ii) and (iii). Therefore when an application for ejectment
filed before March 31, 1957 ou the basis of a notice under s. 31
was pending when the amending Act XXXVIII of 1957 came.into
force, as happened in this case, the tenant had not become a purchaser on the date of the enactment if the amending Act. This
however does not lead to the conclusion that in such a case an
C application for ejectment on the basis of a notice under s. 14
filed after March 31, 1957 remained maintainable after the
amending Act and an order for ejectment could properly be made
on it. In my view, such an application became incompetent on
the passing of that Act. The reason is that if it remained mainD tainable, then the situation would be anomalous. Assume that
the application filed prior to March 31, 1957 was rejected after
the amending Act came into force, as happened in this case, for
the withdrawal of the application in law amounts to its rejection,
then by virtue of the proviso the tenant would become purchaser
on the date of the rejection. If in such a case the application filed
.E after March 31, 1957 had remained competent after the amending
Act had come into force and had succeeded, the position would be
curious. If the the application filed prior to March 31, 1957 had
failed before the application filed after that date came up for
hearing, then the tenant having become the owner under the proviso on the failure of the earlier application, the later application
F could not thereafter be decided in favour of the landlord giving
him a right to eject the tenant for there was then no tenant to eject.
If, on the other hand, the application filed after March 31, 1957
had succeeded before the earlier application came to be heard,
then the earlier application would become infructuous for the
proviso contemplates a pending application for ejectment and,
G therefore, against one who is still a tenant. In either case the
proviso would become ineffective. An interpretation of the section
producing such a result would be most unnatural. The proviso
clearly intends that if an application filed before March 31, 1957
is pending when the amending Act comes into force, the tenant
who could not in such a case have become a purchaser when the
H
amending Act came into force can do so if that application fails,
and then only on the date of the rejection. The tenant's right w
become a purchaser in the case of such a pending application is
340
SUPllBMB COUllT llBPORTS
[1965) 2 S.C.R.
not intended to depend on anything but the result of that applica- A
tion. That right cannot be affected in any way except by the
success of that application; it cannot be affected by an order
made on an application for ejectment filed subsequent to March
31, 1957. No application for ejectment either pursuant to a
notice under s. 14 ors. 31 filed after March 31, 1957 can effect
the tenant's right under s. 32 at all. That application, therefore, B
if not disposed of prior to the coming into force of Act XXXVIII
of 1957 becomes thereafter dead and infructuous. For these
reasons, I think that on the coming into force of Act XXXVIII
of 1957 the landlord's applications for ejectment filed on July 10,
1957 on the strength of notice under s. 14 became incompetent C
and had to be rejected. An order of ejectment made on such an
application after the coming into force of the amending Act
would be wholly illegal. The Mamlatdar in the present case was
in error in passing orders of ejectment on those' applications. They
were rightly set aside by the Collector and the Tribunal.
It might be somewhat unfortunate that the landlord withdrew D
the applications filed before March 31, 1957 pursuant to the
notice under s. 31. It might be that the landlord would have
succeeded on merits in them. As they were withdrawn, they must
in law be deemed to have been rejected. It does not appear why
the lanllord withdrew these applications which he did on March
l, 1958. Neither does it appear that the tenants had in any way E
induced him to do so. The landlord might have made a mistake;
he might have thought that the orders of ejectment by the
Mamlatdar earlier made were legal and sufficiently protected his
rights. For that mistake however he alone is responsible. That
the applications had been withdrawn by the landlord and had not F .
been rejected on merits does not improve the landlord's position
under s. 32.
I, therefore, think that the High Court was wrong in setting
aside the order of the Tribunal. In my view, the order of the
Tribunal upholding the Collector's order setting aside the orders
of ejectment passed by the Mamlatdar was in all respects correct G
and should in my view be maintained. I would, therefore, allow
the appeals and restore the orders of the Tribunal.
Bachawat, J. These appeals raise questions of construction of
ss. 32( 1) and 76-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948). The facts in
all the appeals are similar, In this judgment, we will refer to H
the relevant facts in Civil Appeal No. 791 of 1964. Respondent
No. 1 was the landlord and the appellant was the tenant of the
CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO
(Bachawat, J.)
341
A disputed lands. On May 1, 1956, respondent No. l gave a
notice to the appellant under s. 14 terminating the tenancy. On
December 25, 1956 respondent No. l gave another notice to the
appellant under s. 31 terminating the tenancy. On March 28,
1957 respondent No. l filed an application under s. 29 read with
s. 31 for recovery of possession of the lands. On July 10, 1957,
B respondent No. l filed another application under s. 29 read with
s. 14 for the same relief. By an order dated December 25, 1957
the Mahalkari allowed respondent No 1's application under s. 29
read with s: 14 filed on July 10, 1957, and directed that the
tenancy be terminated and po,session of the lands be delivered to
c respondent No. 1. On March 1, 1958, respondent No. 1 withdrew the application under s. 29 read with s. 31 filed on March
28, 1957. The appellant applied to the Collector of Baroda on
August 9, 1958 and again on August 26, 1958 under s. 76-A
for revision of the Mahalkari's order dated December 25, 1957.
On or about August 14, 1958 the Collector called for the records
D from the Mahalkari, but the records did not reach the office of
the Collector until December 24, 1958. On or about October 3,
1958 the Collector rejected these revision applications. On
October 6, 1958 the appellant again applied to the Collector for
revision of the Mahalkari's order, but this application also was
disposed of by the Collector on October 17, 1958. It is said
E that the letter of the Collector dated October 17, 1958 was only
an intimation of the previous rejection, but we think, though the
point is not important, it amounted to an order of rejection of the
application made on Octoher 6, 1958. On November 7, 1958,
the local Congress Manda! Samiti pas'ed a resolution requesting
F the Collector to reconsider his previous orders. A copy of this
resolution was sent to the Collector on November 10, 1958. On
November 14, 1958, the appellant again applied to the Collector
under s. 76-A for revision of the Mahalkari's order. On February
17, 1959, the Collector acting under s. 76-A reversed the Mahalkari's order, and directed that possession of the disputed lands be
G restored to the appellant. An application for revision preferred
by respondent No. l on March 24, 1959 was dismissed by the
Tribunal on February 23, 1961. An application under Art. 227
of the Const'tution preferred by respondent No. I on June 15,
1961 was allowed by the High Court on November 5, 1963. The
appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave.
H
The contention of the appellant is that in view of s. 32 (1),
as amended retrospectively by Bombay Act XXXVTII of 1957,
he must be deemed to have purchased the land on April I, 1957,
• 342
SUPltJ!MB COURT ltJ!PORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
and consequently the application of respondent No. 1 fifod under A
s. 29 read with s. 14 was not maintainable, and alternatively, the
aforesaid application being filed after April 1, 1957 was not
maintainable and should have been dismissed by the Mahalkari
on that ground, and subsequently on March 1, 1958, the appellant
must be deemed to have purchased the land> in view of the withdrawal and consequential rejection of the previous application 8
filed under s. 2 9 read with s. 14 and in the circumstances, the
Collector rightly set aside the order of the Mahalkari.
Section 32(1), as amended by Bombay Act XXXVIll of
1957, reads thus:
c
"32(1). On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the tillers' day') every tenant shall,
subject to the other provisions of this section and the
provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to
have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held
D
by him as tenant, if( a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally;
(b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates
the land leased personally; and
E
(i) the landlord has not given notice of termination
of his tenancy under section 31 ; or
(ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the
landlord has not applied to the Mainlatdar on
or before the 31st day of March 1957 under
section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; F
or
'(iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on
any of the grounds specified in section 14, or
has so terminated the tenancy but has not
applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 3 lst G
day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the lands :
Provided that if an application made by the "landlord under section 29 for obtaining possession of the
land has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the ColH
lector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the
tenant shall be deemed to have purchased· the land on
CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO (Bachawat, J.)
A
n
343
the date on which the final order of rejection is passed.
The date on which the final order of rejection is passed
is hereinafter referred to as 'the postponed date' :
Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is
entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub-section ( 3)
of section 31 shall be deemed to have purchased the
land on the 1st day of April 1958, if no separation of
his share has been effected before the date mentioned
in that proviso."
It may be recalled that amendments to s. 32 were made
from time to time, and the Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957
C added to sub-s (l)(b) cl. (iii) and the preceeding "or". It is
to be n<Jticed that the conditions mentioned in sub-ss ( 1) (a) and
(I )(b) are mutually exclusive; In spite of the absence of the
word "or" between sub-ss (l)(a) and (l)(b), the two subsecticm lay down alternative conditions. The tenant must be
D deemed to have purchased the land if he satisfies either of the
two conditions. The appellant is not a permanent tenant, and
does not satisfy the condition mentioned in sub-s (l)(a). Though
not a permanent tenant, he cultivated the larids leased personally,
and therefore satisfies the first part of the condition specified in
~ub-s (l){b). The appellant's contention is that sub-ss. (l){b)E (i), (l)(b)(ii) and (l)(b)(iii) lay down alternative conditions,
and as he satisfies the condition mentioned is sub-s (l){b){iii),
he must be deemed to have purchased the land on April l, 1957.
Colour is lent to this argument by the word "or" appearing between sub-s (l){b){ii) and sub-s (l){b)(iii). But, we think
that the word "o.r" between sub-ss (l){b)(ii) and (l)(b)(iii)
F in conjunction with the succeeding negatives is equivalent to and
should be read as "nor". In other words, a tenant (other than a
permanent tenant) cultivating the lands personally would become
the purchaser of the lands on April l, 1957, if on that date
neither an application under s. 29 read with s. 31 nor an application under s. 29 read with s. 14 was pending. If an application
G either under s. 29 read with s. 31 or under s. 29 read with s. 14
was pending on April 1, 1957, the tenant would become the purchaser on "the postponed date'', that is to say, when the application would be finally rejected. But if the application be finally
allowed, the tenant would not become the purchaser. The expression "'1n application" in the proviso means not only an applicaH tion under s. 31 but also an application under s. 29 read with
s. 14. If an application of either type was pending on April 1,
1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on that date.
L3Sup./6S-6
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
Now, on April 1, 1957 the application filed by respondent No .1 A
under s. 29 read with s. 31 was pending. Consequently, the
appellant could not be deemed to have purchased the lands on
April l, 1957.
But the application under s. 29 read with s. 14 was not maintainable, as it was filed after April l, 1957. On this point, we B
adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan('). We
agree with the following observations of Chainani, C. J. in the
aforesaid case :
"It has been contended that as there is no provi<ion
c
in the Act that an application on the grounds mentioned
in s. 14 cannot be made after April l, 1947, such an
application is maintainable, for since the Legislature
has preserved the right to make such an application, it
could not have intended that it should not be availed of
in any case. There is undoubtedly force in this argument, but it seems to us that the intention of the Legislature in enacting s. 32 clearly was to transfer the
ownership of the lands to the tenants on April 1, 1957,
except in cases where applications for possession had
been made by the landlords before April l, 1957.
Where such an application had been made, the right
of purchase given to the tenant is postponed until that
application is rejected. It is clear from this section that
the Legislature did not intend that the right given to
a tenant by this section should be destroyed or affected
by any application made after April 1, 1957. If an
application for possession made under s. 29 read with
s. 14 after April l, 1957 is decided in favour of the
.landlord before the application made by him prior to
April 1, 1957 is disposed of, it will affect the right of
the tenant .fo become the owner of the land on the postponed date. It seems to us that this was not intended by
the Legislature. The fact !hat the Legislature has provided that only an application made prior to April 1,
1957, should affect the right of the tenllnt to become
the purchaser of the land 9n April 1, 1957 clearly indicates that the Legislature contemplated that no such
application should be made after April 1, 1957."
D
E
F
G
H
(I) [1962] 64 B.L.R. 635.
J
CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO (Bachawat, J.)
A
B
C
D
E
F
345
On this construction of s. 32 ( 1) it would appear that the
application under s. 29 read with s. 14 filed on July 10, 1957
was not maintainable since September 22, 1957. when the amending Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force. It is true
th.at on July 10, 1957 the other application under s. 29 read with
s. 31 was pending, and consequently the appellant was still a
tenant and had not become the purchaser. But s. 32 bars all
applications filed after April l, 1957, and it matters not that the
application is made against a person who is still the tenant. But
respondent No. 1 contends that the Bombay Act XXXVIII of
1957 could not retrospectively amends. 32 so as to affect pending
applications. Though this contention found favour with the High
Court, we are unable to accept it. Section 34 of Bombay Act
XXXVIll of 1957 provided that the aforesaid amendment of s.
32 ''shall be deemed to have been made and should have come
into force on the date on which the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 came into force." Now,
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act,
1955 came into force on August l, 1956. The amended s. 32
must, therefore. be deemed to have been made and to have come
into force on August l, 1956. The section saves all applications
pending on April 1, 1957, but by necessary implication, it bars all
applications filed on and after April l, 1957. The bar takes
within its sweep all applications filed on and after April 1, 1957
whether or not such an application was pending on September 22,
1957; no exception is made in favour of applications filed between
April 1 and September 22, 1957 and pending on September 22,
1957. Consequently, the application filed on July 10, 1957,
though pending on September 22, 1957, was not maintainable
and ought to have been dismissed by the Mahalkari.
But by his order dated December 25, 1957, the Mahalkari
allowed the application. This order of the Mahalkari, though
erroneous, was an order of a competent tribunal terminating the
tenancy and directing delivery of possession of the lands to the
G landlord. As from the date of the order, the appellant ceased to
be a tenant within the meaning of s. 32 read withs. 2(18); he
was neither a person lawfully cultivating the lruids, nor a person
who neld the lands on lease and neither a protected tenant nor a
permanent tenant. Subsequently, on March 1, 1958 after the
time provided for filing an appeal from the order had expired,
H respondent No. 1 withdrew the pending application for eviction
filed by him on March 28, 1957. As a result of the withdrawal,
that application stood finally disposed of and rejected. But on
346
SUPREME COURT JlBPORTS
(1965]2 S.C.R.
March l, 1958, the appellant was not a tenant and consequently A
he could not then claim the benefit of s. 32 and become the purchaser of the lands. However, on February 17, 1959, the Collector purported to rever~e and set aside the Mahalkari's order. If
this order of reversal stood, the position would be that the order
fQ!' eviction had never existed, and the appellant had never
ceased to be a tenant, and· had become a purchaser on the R
postponed date, i.e. on March 1, 1958. But the point in issue
is whether the Collector had in the circumstances the power to
revise the Mahalkari's order under s. 76-A. Now, s. 76-A provides a; follows :
·
"Where no appeal has been filed within the period
provided for it, the Collector may, suo motu or on a
reference made in this behalf by the Divisional Officer
or the State Government, <:t any time,-
c
(a) call for the record of any enquiry or the proceedings
of any Mamlatdar or Tribur.al for the purpose of
any order passed b:y, and as to the regularity of the
proceedings of such Mamlatdar "or Tribunal, as the
case may be, and
D
( b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit :
Provided that no such record shall be called for
after the expiry of one year from the date of such order
and no order of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be
modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has
been given to the interested parties to appear and be
heard."
E
i:
The order of the Mahalkari under s. 29 was passed on
December 25, 1957 and was appealable under s. 74. By s. 79,
the appeal could be filed within 60 days from the cfute of the
order. No appeal was filed within the period provided for by it.
The Collector could at any time thereafter exercise his revisional G
powers under s. 76-A either suo motu, i.e., of his own motion or
. on a reference made by the Divisional Officer or the State
Government. In the exercise of his revisional powers, the Collector could call for the record of the proceedings of the Mahalkari
and pass such order as he deemed fit. There were two limitations
on this power of revision. Firstiy, the record could not be called H
for after the expiry of one year from the date of the order.
Secondly, the order could not be modified, annulled, or reversed
CHUNIBHAI V. NARAYANRAO (Bachawat, /.)
347
unless opportunity had been given to the interested parties to
appear and be heard. In the instant case, there was no reference
by any authority. The Collector could still exercise his revisional
powers, but he seldom exercises such powers unless some irregularity or illegality is brought to his notice by the aggrieved party.
Though s. 76-A, unlike s. 76, does not provide for
application
B for revision by the aggrieved party, the appellant properly drew
the attention of the Collector to his grievances and asked him
to exercise his revisional powers under s. 76-A. . Having perused
the applications for revision filed by the appellant, the Collector
decided to exercise his suo motu powers and called for the record
on August 14, 1958 within one year of the order of the MahalC kari. But before the record arrived and without looking into the
record, the Collector passed orders on October 3, October 4 and
October 17, 1958 rejecting the applications for revision. By
these orders, the Collector decided that there was no ground for
interference with the Mahalkari's order. The Collector observed
D that the appellant liad not paid rent for three consecutive years,
and· his tenancy had been duly tenninated by the requisite notice
and the findings of the Mahalkari on these points had not been
challenged by a regular appeal: The Collector thus upheld and
confirmed the Mahalkari's order. He did not specifically deal
with the point as to the non-maintainability of the application for
E eviction in view of the amended s. 32, as the point was not taken
either before him or before the Mahalkari. All these orders were
passed by the Collector in the exercise of his suo motu power of
revision. These orders as also the previous order calling for the
record could be passed by the Collector only in the exercise of
his revisional power under s. 76-A. As he refused to modify,
F · annual or reverse the order of the Mahalkari, he could pass these
orders without issuing notice to the respondent No. 2. These
orders passed by the Collector in the exercise of his revisional
powers were quasi-judicial, and were final. The Act does not
empower the Collector to review an order passed by him under
G s. 76-A. In the absence of any power of review, the Collector
could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and
hold that there were grounds for annulling or reversing the
Mahalkari's order. The subsequent order dated February 17,
1959 reopening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without
jurisdiction. The High Court ought to have quashed the order
H of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on this ground.
A
an
The High Court was of the opinion that the Collector could
exei"cise his revisional power under s. 7 6-A only after looking
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
into the record of the impugned order of the Mahalkari. We A
have come to the opposite conclusion. In exercise of his
revisional powers under s. 76-A, the Collector may or may not
call for the record. Without calling for the record and without
looking into them, the Collector may, on a perusal of the order,
along with the representation to him by the aggrieved party or
the reference by the Divisional Officer or the State Government, 3
as the case may be, with such other documents as may be submitted to him, come to the conclusion that there is no ground
for interference with the impugned order and that, therefore, the
order should be confirmed. The contention of the appellant was that
the word "thereon" in s. 76-A supports the opinion of the High C
Court. We do not think so. We think thats. 76-A(b) means that the
Collector is empowered to pass such orders as he deems fit on
the legality or propriety of any order passed by any Mamlatdar
or tribunal and as to the regularity of the proeeedings before
them. The Collector can, in our opinion, pass such ordets on
the materials before him without calling for the record. But D
having called for the record, the Collector should properly have
waited for its arrival before passing any orders. The orders
passed by him before the arrival of the record were, however, not
without jurisdiction. The mere fact that he called for the records
is no ground for saying that he could not thereafter examine the
materials before him and pass an order that the order of the E
Mahalkari or tribunal did not call for interference. By way of
analogy, we might point out that if in the case of an application
or petition before a Court notice is issued to the respondent to
show cause why it should not be granted, the Court is not debarred from dismissing the application or petition without hearing the respondent on the day when it is called for hearing. The F
calling for the record is no decision which compels the Collector
to look into the record before dismissing the petition, though of
course he cannot allow the petition without considering the record and hearing the party supporting the order sought to be
revised. However erroneous those orders of the Collector dismis- -G
sing the revision might be, they were final and could not be reviewed and reopened by him subsequently.
The High Court also observed that only the act of the final
determination by the ·Collector could be said to be a quasijudicial act and that his order calling or not calling for the record
was not an act of a quasi-judicial nature. But, in the instant case, ff
the collector not ·only called for the record but also determined
that there was no ground for intereference with the Mahalkari's
CHUNIBHAI v. NARAYANRAO (Bachawat, /.)
349
A order. The subsequent order of the Collector dated February
17, 1957 reversing the Mahalkari's order was without jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed by the High Court on thil
ground.
·
B
In the result, the order of the Mahalkari remained the final
and operative order, the appellant ceased to be a tenant and
could not become the purchaser of the lands on March l, 19 58,
when the application filed on March 28, 1957 stood rejected.
The High Court set aside the Col!ector's order on the ground
that the amended s. 32 could not affect the application for evicC lion filed on July 10, 1957 and
pending when the
amending Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force; and
the application was rightly allowed by the Mahalkari. We have
already pointed out that the High Court was in error in quashing
the Collector's order on this ground. But the High Court should
have set aside the Collector's order on the ground that having
D already decided that there was no ground for interference with
the Mahalkari's order, the Collector could not subsequently
revise that order. We, therefore, hold that the Collector's order
was liable to be quashed, though on grounds different from those
on which the High Court proceeded. On this ground, in all these
appeals the order of the High Court setting aside the order of
E the Collector and restoring that of the Mahalkari should be
affirmed.
In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs.
will be one hearing fee.
F
There
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion of the majority, the appeals
are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee.
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