STATE OF MAHARASHTRA versus MAYER HANS GEORGE
Supreme Court of India | Decided 24 August 1964 | [1965] 1 S.C.R. 123 | 1964 INSC 176
Key facts
- Decided
- 24 August 1964
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR*, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 218/1963
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1965] 1 S.C.R. 123
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 176
Text of the judgment
A
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
v.
•
MAYER HANS GEORGE
August 24, 1964
B
(K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYA"NGAR AND
J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1 of 1947), ss. 8(1) 23(1-A) and
24(1)-Mens rea-When a necessary ingredient of offence-Publication of
notlfication-'-Knowledge of notification-When can h~ imputed-"Cargo"
a1td "persona/ Luggage", meaning of.
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The respondent, a German smuggler, left Zurich by plane on 27th November 1962 with 34 kilos of gold concealed on his person to be delivered
in Manila. The plane arrived in Bombay on the 28th but the respondent
did not come out of the plane. The Customs Authorities examined the
manifest of the aircraft to see if any gold was consigned by any passenger.
a11d not finding any entry they entered the plane, searched the respondent.
recovered the gold and charged him with an offence under ss. 8 ( 1) and
23(1-A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (7 of 1947) read with
a notification dated 8th November 1962 of the Reserve Bank of India
which was published in the Gazette of India on 24th November. The respondent was convicted by the Magistrate, but acquitted by the High Court
on appeal. In the appeal by the State to the Supreme Court, the respondent sought to support the judgment of the High Court by contending
that : (i) Mens rea was an essential ingredient of the offence charged and
as it was not disputed by the prosecution that the respondent was not
aware of the notification of the Reserve Bank, he could not be found guilty,
(ii) the notification being merely subordinate or delegated legislation could
be deemed to be in force only when it was brought to the notice of persons
affected by it and (iii) the second proviso in the notification requiring disclosure in the manifest was not applicable to gold carried on the person of
a passenger.
HELD: (per RA.rAGOPALA AYYANGAR and MunHoLKAR JJ.) (i) On the
language of s. 8(1) read with s. 24(1) of the Act, which throws on the
accused the burden of proving that he had the requisite permission to
bring gold into India, there was no scope for the invocation of the rule
that besides the mere act of voluntarily bringing gold into India any further
mental condition or mens rea is postulated as necessary to constitute an
offence referred to ins. 23(1-A). Further, the very object and purpose
of the Act and its effectiveness as an instrument for the prevention of
&muggling would be entirely frustrated if a condition were to be read into
the sections qualifying the plains words of the enactment, that the accused
•hould be proved to have knowledge that he was contravening the law
beioce be could be held to have contravened the provision. (145G; 147G;
154C-D; 1570-E].
Case law reviewed.
The Jndo-Chlna St•am Navigation Co. Ltd. v. lasjit Singh, Addi. Coll•clor of Customs, Calcutta (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1140) .followed.
(ii) The notification was "published" and made known in India by publi·
cation in the Gazette and the ignorance of it by the respondent who is a
foreigner was wholly irrelevant and made no difference to his liability.
[163B-D].
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] I S.C.IL
In the absence of any statutory requirement the rule is that subordinate
or delegated legislation should be published in the usual form, that is, by
publication within the country by such media as are generally adopted to
notify to all persons concerned and .publication in the Official Gazette is
the ordinary method of hringing a notification or rule to the notice of
persons concerned. [164A-BJ.
Um Chi11 A ik v. The Queen [ 1963] A.C. 160, Distingut•hed.
A
John.mn v. Sargant & Sons [1918] I K.B. 101 and lmperator v. Leslie
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Gwilt I.LR. [1945} Rom. 681, referred to.
An enactment on the lines of the U.K. Statutory Instruments Act, 1946
or suitable amendment of General Clauses Act (IO of I897) to clarify
when subordinate legislation could he said to have been passed and when it
comes into effect. suggested. [164E-FJ.
.
(iii) The term "cargo" in the notification is u~cd in contradistinction to
"'per.>e>nal luggage" in the Jaw relating to the carriage of goods. The latter
bas been defined as whatever a passenger takes with him for bis penooal
use or convenience either with reference to his immediate necessities or
for his personal needs at the end of the journey. Gold of the quantity
and in the fonn and manner in which it was carried by the respondent
would ccnainly not be "personal luggage." [ l 65E-GJ.
/'er SueeA RAO J. (dissenting) : (i) The respondent should not be
held guilty of contravening the provisions of s. 8 of the Act read with
the notification issued by the Rc.c;crve Bank, as it was not proved he had
knowingly brought gold into India in contravention of the terms o( the
notification. [ 141 C-DJ.
There is a presumption that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a
statutory offence; but this may he rebutted by the expr= words of a
ltatute creating the offence or by necessary impliciltion. But the mere fact
that the object of a statute is to promole \\'Clfarc activities or to eradicate
grave social evils is in itself aot decisive of the question whether the
element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of the offence.
Men:; rea by neccs.,ary implication can be excluded from a statute only
where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of a
statule would otherwise be defeated and ils exclusion enables those put
under stricl liability by their act or omi\sion 10 assist the promotion of
the law. The nature of mens rea that will be implied in a statute creating
an offence depends upon the object of the Act and the provisions th~
of. [l 39D-G].
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Ca.c;e law reviewed.
Lin Chi11 Aik v. The Queen [196)) A.C. 160. relied upon.
(ii) The re'spondcnt W:.lS not guilty of lhc offence a~ it had not been
established that he had kno•.vlcJgc of the content\ of 1hc notification. [142P].
There is no provision providing for Lhc publication of the notification
made by the Reserve Bank of India impo~iniz conditions on the bringing
of gold into India. The fact th:it it \Vas puhli5hed in the Official Gazette
does not affect the question. In such cases the maxim that ignorance of
law is not an excuse cannot be invoked and the prosecution has to bring
home to the accused that he had knowlcd~e or could have had knowledge
if he was not negligent or had made proper enquiries. [ 142C-EJ.
[.in Chin Aik v. The Queen [1963) A.C. 160, relied upon.
(iii) ·me rcrmis .. ion i;?ivcn in the notification could be taken advantage
of only by a person passing through India to a foreign country if he dee-
G
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STATE V. MAYER HANS (Subba Rao J.)
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Jared the gold in his possession in the manifest for transit as "bottom
cargo" or "transhipment cargo". [131A-B].
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
218 of 1963.
B
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
December 10, 1963, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 653 of 1963.
H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-Genera/, N. S. Bindra and R. H.
Dhebar, for the appellant.
c
Soli Soharabji, A. J. Rana, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.
SunnA RAO J., delivered a dissenting opinion. The judgnient
of RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and MUDHOLKAR JJ. was delivered
by AYYANGAR J.
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Subba Rao J, I
regret my inability to agree. This
appeal raises the question of the scope of the ban imposed by
the Central Government and· the Central Board of Revenue in
cxer~ise of the powers conferred on them under s. 8 of the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, (7 of 1947), hereinafter called the Act,
against persons transporting prohibited articles through India.
ln exercise of the powers conferred under s. 8 of the Act the
Government of India issued on August 25, 1948 a notification
that gold· and gold articles, among others, should not be brought
into India or sent to India except with the general or special
permission of the Reserve Bank of India. On the same date the
F Reserve Bank of India issued a notification giving a general permission for bringing or sending any such gold provided it was
on through transit to a place outside India. On November 24,
1962, the Reserve Bank of India. published a notification dated
November 8, 1962 in supersession of its earlier notification
placing further restrictions on the transit of such gold to a place
G outside the territory of India, one of them being that such gold
should be declared in the "Manifest" for transit in the "same
bottom cargo" or "transhipment cargo". The respondent left
Zurich by a Swiss air plane on November 27, 1962, which
touched Santa Cruz Air Port at 6.05 a.m. on the next day. The
Customs Officers, on the basis of previous information, searched
H for the respondent and found hinl sitting in the plane. On a
search of the person of .the respondent it was found that he had
put on a jacket containing 28 compartments and in 19 of them
L!Sup./64 .. 9
126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.
he was carrying gold slabs weighing approximately 34 kilos. It
was also found that the respondent was a passenger bound for
M<J.niia. The other facts arc not necessary for this appeal. Till.
November 24, 1962 there was a general permission for a person
to bring or send gold into fndia, if it was on through transit to a
place outside the territory of India; but horn the date it could
not be so done except on the condition that it was declared in
the "Manifest" for transit as "same bottom cargo" ·or "transhii>rnent cargo".
When the respondent boarded the Swiss
plane at Zurich on November 27, 1962, he could not have
had kno·v!.~<.lgc of the fact that the said condition had been
imposzd on the general pem1ission given by the earlier notification. The gold was carried on the person of the respondent and
he \\"JS only sittin~ in the: plane after it touched the Santa Crnz
Airport. The respondent was prosecuted for importing gold into
India under s. 8(1) of the Act, read withs. 23( 1-A) thereof, and
under s.167(8)(i) of the Sea Customs Act. The learned Presidency Magistrate found the accused guilty on the two counts
and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year. On
appeal the High Court of Bombay held that the second proviso
to the r~levant notification issued by the O:ntral Government did
nvt .ipply w a person carrying gold with him on his body, that
even if it applied, mens rea being a necessary ingredient of
the offence, the respondent, who brought gold into I Pdia for
transit to Manila, did not know that durin?, the crucial period
such ~ condition had been imposed and. <hcrefore, he did not
commit any offence. Or, those findings. it held that the respondent was not guilty under any of the aforesaid sections. In the
result the conviction by the Presidency M<:gimate was set aside.
This appeal has been preferred by special leave against the said
order of the High Court.
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Learned Solicitor-General. appearing for the State of Maharashtca. contends th3t the Act was enacted to prevent smug2ling
of gold in the interests of the economic stability of the country
and. thercfocc, in construing the relevant provisions of such an
Act there is no scope for applying the presumption of common. G
law that mens rea is a nccessaoy ingredient of the offence. The
obje.:t of the statute and the mandatory terms of the relevant
provisions, the arz.ument proceeds, rebut any such presumption
and indicate that mens rea is not a necessary ingredient of the
offence. He further contends that on a reasonable construction
H
of the second proviso of the notification dated November 8. 1962
issued by the Board of Revenue. it should be held that the general
permission for bringing gold into India is subject to the condition
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STATE v. MAYl!R HANS·(Subba Rao
/.)
127
A laid down in the second proviso and that, as in the present case
the gold was not disclosed in the Manifest, the respondent contravened the terms thereof and was, therefore, liable to be convicted under the aforesaid sections of the Foreign Exchange Act.
No argument was advanced before us under s. 168(8)(i) of the
Sea Customs Act and, therefore, nothing need, be said about that
B section.
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Learned counsel for the respondent sougl:n to sustain the
acquittal of his client practically on the grounds which found
favour with the High Court. I shall consider in detail his argument at the appropriate places of the judgment.
The first question turns upon the relevant provisions of the
Act and the notifications issued thereunder. At the outset it
would be convenient to read the relevant parts of the said provisions and the notifications, for the answer to the question raised
depends upon them.
Section 8.(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, order that subject to
such exemptions, if any, as may be contained in the
notification, no person shall, except with the general
or 'special permission of the Reserve Banis: and on
payment of the fee, if any prescribed, bring or send
into India any go!d ........... .
Explanation.-The bringing or sending into any port or
place in India of any such article as aforesaid intended to be taken out of India without being removed
from the ship or conveyance in which it is being
carried shalt nonetheless be deemed to be bringing.
or, as the case may be, sending into India of that
article for the purpose of this section. ·
In exercise of the power conferred by the said section on the
Central Government, it had issued the following notification
dat!;ld August 25, 1948 (as amended upto July 31, 1958):
"In exercise of the powers conferred by su!Hection ( 1 )
of section 8 of the Foreign Exdhange Regulation
Act, 1947 (VU of 1947) and in supersession or
the Notification of the Government of India ..... .
the Central Government is pleased to direct that,
except with the general or special permission of the
Reserve Bank no person shall bring or send into
India from any place out of India:-
.128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1965) I S.C.R.
(a) any gold coin, gold bullion, gold sheets or gold
ingot, whether refined or not: ......... .
A
The Reserve Bank of India issued a notification dated August 25,
1948 giving a general permission in the following term:
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the Reserve Bank of India is
hereby pleased to give general pennis.~ion to the
bringing or sending of any such gold or silver by
sea or air into any port in India provided that the
gold or silver (a) is on through transit to a place
which is outside both (i) the territory of India and
(ii) the Portuguese Territories which are adjacent
to or surrounded by the territory of lndia and (b)
is not removed from the carrying ship or aircraft,
except for the purpose of transhipment.
1
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On November 8, 1962, in supersession of the said notification
the: Reserve Bank of India issued the following notification which
was published in the Official Gazette on November 24, 1962:
" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the Reserve Bank of India
gives general pennission to the bringing or sending
of any of the following articles, namely,
(a) any gold coin, gold bullion, gold sheets or gold
ingot, whether refined or not,
into any port or place in India when such article is on
through transit to a place which is outside the territory
of India. Provided that such article is not ·removed
from the ship or conveyance in which it is being
carried except for the purpose of transhipment;
Provided further that it is declared in the manifest for
transit as same bot~om cargo or transhipment cargo."
The combined ellect of the terms of the section and the notifications may be stated thus: No gold can be brought in or sent to
India though it is on through transit to a place which is outside
India except with the general or special permission of the
Reserve Bank of India. Till November 24, 1962, under tile
general permission given by the Reserve Bank of India such gold
could be brought in or sent to India if it was not removed from
the ship or aircraft except for the purpose of transhipment. But
from that date another condition was imposed thereon, namely,
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that such gold shall be declared in the manifest for transit as
"same bottom cargo" or "transhipment cargo".
Pausing here, it will be useful to notice the meaning of some
of the technical words used in the second provis<i to the notification. The object of maintaining a transit manifest for cargo, a~
explained by the High Court, is twofold,· namely, "to keep a
record of goods delivered into the custody of the carrier for safe
carriage and to enable the Customs authorities to check and
verify the dutiable goods which arrive · by a partjcular ftight".,
"~" is a shipload or the lading of a &hip. · No statutory or
accepted definition of the word "cargo" has been placed before
us. While the appellant contends that all .the goods carried in a
ship or plane is cargo, the respondent's counsel argues that nothing is cargo unless it is included in the manifest. But what
should be included and what need not be included in the manife&t
is not made clear. It is said that the expressions "same bottom
cargo" and "transit cargo" throw $Ol1le ligltt on the meaning
of the word "cargo". Article 606 of the Chapter on "Shipping
and Navigation" in Halsbury's Laws .of England, 3rd edition,
Vol. 35, at p. 426, brings out the distinction between the two
types of cargo. If the cargo is to be carried to iis destination by
the same conveyance throughout the voyage _or· journey it is
described as "same bottom cargo". On the other hand, if the
cargo is to be transhipped from one conveyance to another
during the course of transit, it is called "transhipment cargo".
This distinction also does not throw any light on the meaning of
t1le word "cargo". If the expression "cargo" takes in all the
goods carried ~n the plane, whether it is carried under the
personal care of the passenger or entrusted to the care of the
olicer in charge of the cargo; both the categories of cargO can
squarely fall under the said two heads. Does the word "manifest"
throw any light? Inspector Darine Bejan Bhappu says in bis
evidence that manifest for transit discloses only such goods as
are unaccompanied baggage but on the same flight and that
"accompanied baggage is never manifested as Cargo Manifest".
In the absence of any material or evidence to the contrary, this
statemel]t must be accepted as a correct representation of the
actual practice obtaining in such matters. But that practice
does not prevent the imposition of a statutory obligation to
include accompanied baggage also as an item in the manifest if
a pa5senger seeks to take advantage of the general permission
given thereunder. I cannot see ~ il\J1erent impossibility implicit in the expression "cargo" compelling me to exclude an accompanied baggage from the said expression.
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.CR
Now let me look at the second proviso of the notification
dated November 8, 1962. Under s. 8 of the Act there is ban
against bringing or sending into India gold. The notification
lifts the ban to some extent. It says that a person can bring
into any port or place in India gold when the same is on through
transit to a place which is outside the territory of India, provided
that it is declared in the manifest for transit as "same bottom
cargo or transhipment- cargo". It is, therefore, not an absolute
permission but one conditioned by the said proviso. If the permission is sought to be availed of, the condition should be complied with. It is a condition precedent for availing of the
permission.
Learned counsel for "the respondent contends that the said
construction of the proviso would preclude a person from carrying small articles of gold on his person if such article could not
be declared in the manifest for transit as "same bottom cargo"
or "trnnshipmcnt cargo". and that could not have been the intention of the Board of Revenue. On that basis, the argument
proceeds, the second proviso should be made to apply only to slMh
cargo to which the said proviso applies and the general permission
to bring gold into India would apply to all other gold not covered
by the second proviso. This argument, if accepted, would
enab:e a passenger to circumvent the proviso by carrying gold
on his body by diverse methods. The present case illustrates
how such a construction can defeat the purpose of the Act itself.
I cannot accept such a construction unless the terms of the notification compel me to do so. I do not s~e any such compulsion.
The altemafrve construction for which the appellant contends no
doubt prevents a passenger from carrying with him small article.~
of gold. The learned Solicitor-General relies upon certain rules
permitting a passenger to bring into India on his person small
articles of gold, but ex facie those rules do not appear to apply
to a person passing through India to a foreign country. No
doubt to have international goodwill the appropriate authority
may be well advised to give permission for such small articles of
gold or any other article for being carried by a person with him
on his way through India to foreign countries. But for one
reason or other, the general permission in express terms says that
gold shall be declared in the manifest and I do not see, nor any
provision of law has been placed before us, why gold carried on
a person cannot be declared in the manifest if that person seeks
to avail himself of the permission. Though I appreciate
the
inconvenience and irritation that will be caused to passengers
hona fide pas>ing through our country to foreign countries for
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STATE v. MAYER HANS (Subba Rao
131
honest purposes, I cannot see my way to interpret the second
proviso in such a way as to defeat its purpose. I, therefore, hold
that on a fair construction of the notification dated November 8,
1962 that the general permission can be taken advantage of only
by a person passing through India to a foreign country if he
declares the gold in his possession in the manifest for transit as·
B "same bottom cargo" or "transhipment cargo''.
The next argument is that mens rea is an essential ingredient
of the offence under s. 8 of the Ai;t, read withs. 23(1-A)(a)
thereof. Under s. 8 no person shall, except with the general or
special permission of the Reserve Bank of India, bring or send
c 'to India any gold. Under the notification dated November 8,
1962, and published on November 24, 1962, a.S interpreted by
me, such gold to earn the permission shall be declared in the
manifest. The section, read with the said notification, prohibits
bringing or sending to India gold intended to be taken out of
India unless it is declared in the manifest. If any person brings
D into or sends to India any gold without declaring it in such
manifest, he will be doing an act in contravention of s. 8 of the
Act read with the notification and, therefore, he will be contravening the provisions of the Act. Under s. 23(1-A)(a) of the
Act he will be liable to punishment of imprisopment "".hich may
extend to two years or with fine or with both. The question is
E whether the intention of the Legislature is to punish persons who
boeak the said Jaw without a guilty mind. The doctrine of mens
rea in ~he context of statutory c;rimes has been the subject matter
of many decisions in England as well as in our country. I shall
briefly consider some of the important standard textbooks and
decisions cited at the Bar to ascertain its exact scope.
F
In Russell on Crime, I Ith edn. Vol. 1, it is stated at p. 64:
" ........ there is a presumption that in any statutory
crime the common law mental element, mens rea,
is an essential ingredient."
On the question how to rebut this presumption, the learned author
G points out that 1he policy of the courts is unpredictable. I shall
notice some of the decisions which appear to substantiate the
author's view. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd .edn. Vol.
10, in para, 508, at p. 273, the following passage appears:
"A statutory crime may or may not contain an express
definition of the necessary state of mind. A statute
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may require a specific intention, malice. knowledge .
.)Vilfulness, or reckles~ness. On the other hand, it
may be silent as to any requirement of 111e111· rea,
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132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1965] I S.C.R.
and in such a case in order to determine whether or A
•not mens rea is an essential element of the offence, ·
it is n=ary to look at the objects and terms of
the statute."
This passage also indicates that the absence of any specific
mention of a state of mind as an ingredient of an offence in a
statute is not decisive of the question whether mens rea is 1111
ingredient of the offence or not: it depends upon the object ud
the terms of the statute. So too, Archbold in his book on
"Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice", 35th edn., says
much to the same effect at p. 24 thus:
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"It has always been a principle of the common law that
mens rea iS an essential element in the commissicm
of any criminal offence against the common law ..
In the case of statutory offences it depends ol} the
effect of the statute . . . . . . There is a presumption
that mens era is an essential ingredient in a statutory
offence, but this presumption is liable to be displ.acc:d
either by the works of the statute creating the offence
or by the subject matter with which it deals."
The leading case on the subject is Sherras v. De Rutzen(').
Section 16(2) of the Licensing Act, 1872, prohibited a licemed
victualler from supplymg liquor to a police constable while on
duty. It was held that that section did not apply where a licellsed victualler bona fide believed that the police officer was off
duty. Wright J., observed :
"There is a presi1mption that mens rea, an evil intention,
or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an
essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by tile
words of the statute creating the offence or by tk
subject-matter with which it deals, and both must
be considered."
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This sums up the stat.emcnt of the law that has been practically
adopted in later decisions. 1be Privy Council in Jacob Bruhn
v. Tire K.ing on the Prosecution of the Opium Farmer(') CODBtrued s. 73 of the Straits Settlements Opium Ordinance, 1906.
Section 73 ot the said Ordinance stated that if any ship was uad ff
for.. importation, lan~g, removal, carriage or conveyance of aay
(I} (119S) I Q.B. 9tl, 921.
(2) L. R. (1909) A. C. 317, 32.4.
STATE v. MAYER HANS (Subba Rao
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133-
A opium or chandu contrary to the provisions of the said Ordinance· or of the rules . made thereunder, the master. and owner
thereof would be liable to a fine. The section also laid down the
rule· of evidence that if a particular quantity of opium was found
in the ship that was evidence that the ship had been l1sed for
· importation of opium, unless it was proved to the satisfaction of
B the court that every reasonable precaution' had been taken to
prevent such user of ~uch ship and that n,one of the officers; their
servants or the crew or any persons employed on board the ship,
were implicated therein. The said provisions are very clear; the
offence is defined, the relevant evidence iii' described and the burdC en of proof is placed upon the accused: In the context of that
seetion the Judicial Committee observed:
"By this Ordinance every person other tha.n tho opium
farmer is prohibited from importing or exporting
chandu. If any other person does so, he prima
facie commits a crime under .the provisions of the
Ordinant:e. If it be provided in the Ordinance, as
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it is, that certain facts, if established, justify or
excuse what is prima facie a crime, then the burden·.
of proving those facts obviously rests on the party·
accused. In truth, this objection is but the objection in another form, that knowledge is a necessary
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element in crime, and it is answered by the same·
reasoning."
It would be seen from the aforesaid observations that in that case·
mens rea was not really excluded but the burden of proof tO'
negative mens rea was placed upon the accused. In Pearks'
Dairies Ltd. v. Tottenham Food Control Committee(')
the·
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Court of Appeal considered the scope of Regulations 3 and 6 ·
of the Margarine (Maximum Prices) Order, 1917. The appellant's assistant, in violation of their instructiobs, but by an inao-·
cent mistake, sold margarine to a customer at the price of 1 sh.
per lb. giving only 14! ozs. by weight instead of 16 ozs. The
G appellants were prosecuted for selling margarine at a price exceed-·
ing the maximum price fixed and one of the eontentions raised Oii"
behalf of the accusell was that mens rea on the part of the appellants was not an essential element ofthe offence. Lord Coleridge J.,
cited with approval the following passage· of Channell J., in Pearks,.
Gunston & Tee, Ltd. v. Ward(') :
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"But there are exceptidns to this rule in the case of quasicrimi~al offences, as they may be termed, that is t<i
(I) (1919) 88 L.J. K.B. 623, 626.
(2) (1902) 71 L.J. X.B. 656.
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[ 1965] I S.C.R.
say, where certain acts are forbidden by law under
a penalty, possibly even under a personal penalty
such as imprisonment, at any rate in default of payment of a fine; and the reason for this is, that the
Legislature has thought it so important to prevent
the particular act from being committed that it
absolutely forbids it to be done; and if it is done the
offender is liable to a penalty whether he had any
mens rea or not, and whether or not he intended
to commit a breach of the law. Where the act is of
this character then the 'master, who, in fact, has
done the forbidden thing through his servant, is responsible and is liable to a penalty. There is no
reason why he should not be, becailse the very object
of the Legislature was to forbid the thing absolutely."
This decision states the same principle in a different form. It
also places emphasis on the terms and the object of the statute in
the context of the question whether mens rea is excluded or not.
The decision in Rex v. Jacobs( 1 ) arose out of an agreement to
sell price-controlled goods at excess price. The defence was that
the accused was ignorant of the proper price. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that in the summing up the direction given by the
Judge to the jury that it was not necessary that the prosecution
should prove that the appellants knew what the permitted price
was but that they need only show in fact a sale at an excessive
price had taken place, was correct in law. This onlv illustrates
that on a construction of the particular statute, having regard
to the object of the statute and its terms, the Court may hold
that mens rea is not a necessary ingredient of the offence. In
Bread v. Waod(') dealing with an emergency legislation relating to fuel rationing, Goddard C.J., observed :
"There are statutes and regulations in which Parliament
has seen fit to create offences and make people
responsible before criminal Courts although there
is an absence of mens rea, but it is certainly not the
Court's duty to be acute to find that mens rea is
not a constituent part of a crime. It is of the
utmost importance for the protection of the liberty
of the subject that a Court should always bear in
mind that, unless a statute, either clearly or by
necessary implication, rules out mens re'I as a
(I) (19441 K. B. 417.
(~) (194jl) 62 T.
L. .R. 462, 463.
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constituent part of a crime, the Court should not
find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal
law unless he has a guilty mind."
This caution administered by an eminent and ·experienced judge
in the matter of construing such statutes cannot easily be ignored. The judicial Committee in Srinivas Mall Bairoliva v.
King-Emperor(') was dealing with a case in which one of the
appellants was charged with an offence under the rules made
by virtue of the Defence of J:ndia Act, 1939, of selling salt .at
prices exceeding those prescribed under the rules, though the
sales were made without the appellant's knowledge by one of
his sert>tmts. Lord du Parcq speaking for the Board, approved
the view expressed by Goddard C. J., in Brend v. Wood(') and
observed:
"Their Lordships agree with the view which was recently
expressed by the Lord Chief Justice. of England,
when he said: "It is in my opinion the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject
that a court should always bear in mind that, unless
the statute, either clearly or by necessary implication,
rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime,
a defendant should not be found guilty of an offence
against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty
mind."
The acceptance of the principle by the Judicial Committee that
mens rea is a constituent part of a crime unless the statute
clearly or by necessary implication excludes the same, and the application of the same to a welfare measure is an indication that the
Court shall not be astute in construing a statute to ignore mens
rea on a slippery ground of a welfare measure unless the statute
compels it to do w. Indeed, in that case the Judicial Committee
refused to accept the argument that where L11ere is an absolute
prohibition, no question of mens rea arises. The Privy Council
again in Lim Chin Aik v. The Qlleen(') reviewed the entire law
on the question iri an illuminating judgment and approached
the question, if J may sey so, from a correct perspective.
By s. 6 of the Immigration Ordinance, 1952, of the State of
Singapore, "Jt shall not be lawful for any person other than a
citizen of Singapore to enter the colony from the Federation or
having entered the colony from the Federation to remain in the
colony if such person has been prqhibited by order made under
(I} (1947) I.LR. 26 Pat. 460. 469 (P.C.).
(2) (19"6) 62 T.L.R. 462.
(3) [1%3] A.C. 160, 174, 175.
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[I 965] l S.C.R.
s. 9 of this Ordinance from entering the colony" and s. 9, in
the case of an order directed to a single individual, contained
no provision for publishing the order or for otherwise bringing
it to the attention of the person named. The Minister made
an order prohibiting the appellant from entering the colony and
forwarded it to the Immigration Officer. There was no evidence that the order bad in fact ccme to the notice or attention
of the appellant. He was prosecuted for contravening s. 6(2)
of the Ordinance. Lord EversheCI, speaking for the Board, reafllrmcd the formulation~ cited from the judgment of Wright J.,
and accepted hy Lord du Parcq in Srinivas Mull Bairoliyil's
case('). On a review of the case law on the subject and the
principles enunciated therein, the Judicial Committee came to
the following ccnclusion:
•But it is not enough in their Lordships' opinion merely
to label the statute as one dealing with a grave social
evil and from that to infer that strict liability was intended. It is pertinent also to inquire whethllr
putting the defendant under strict liability will as.1ist
in the enforcement of the regulations. That means
that there must be something he can do, directly or
indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improYement of his business methods or by exhorting th05C
whom he may be expected to influence or control,
which will promote the observance of the regulatiollli.
Unless this is so, there is no reason in penalising
him, and it cannot be inferred that the legislature
imposed strict liability merely in order to find a
luckless victim."
The same idea was repeated thus:
"Where it can be shown that the imposition of strict
liability would result in the prwecution and conviction of a class of persons whose conduct could
not in any way affect the observance of the law,
their Lordships consider that even where the statute
is dealing with a grave social evil, strict liability is
not likely to be intended."
Dealing with the facts of the case before it, the Privy Council
proceeded to illustrate the principle thus:
~ut Mr. Le Quesne was unable to point to anything
that the appellant could possibly have done
as
so
(I) (1947) l.L.R. 26 Pat. 460, 469 (P.C.).
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to ensure that he complied with the regulations. It
was not, for example, suggested that it would be
practicable for him to make continuous inquiry to
see whether an order had been made against him.
Clearly one of the objects of the Ordinance is the
expulsion of prohibited persons from Singapore, but
there is nothing that a man can do about it, before
the commission of the offence, there is no practical
or sensible way in which he can ascertain whether
he is a prohibited person or not."
On that reasoning the Judicial Committee held that the accused
was not guilty of the offence with which he was charged. This
decision adds a new dimension to the rule of construction of a
statute in the context of mens rea accepted by earlier decisions,
While it accepts the rule that for the purpose of ascertaining
whether a statute excludes mens rea or not, the object of the statute
and its wording must be weighed, it lays down that mens rea cannot be excluded unless the person or persons aimed at by the
prohibition are in a position to observe the law or to promote
the observance of the law. I shall revert to this decision at a
later stage in a different context. This Court in Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. The State('); speaking through Faz! Ali J.,
accepted the observations made by the Lord Chief Justice of
England in Brend v. Wood('). The decision of this Court in
The Inda-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., v. Jasjit Singh.
Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta(') is strongly relied
upon by the appellant in support of the contention that mens rea
is out of place in construing statutes similar to that under inquiry
now. There, this Court was concerned with the interpretation
of s. 52-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The Indo-China
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., which carries on the business of
carriage of goods and passengers by ·sea, owns a fleet of ships,
and has been carrying on its business for over 80 years. One of
the routes plied by its ships in the Calcutta:Japan-Calcutta route.
The vessel "Eastern Saga" arrived at Calcutta on October 29,
1957. On a search it was found that a hole was covered with a
piece of wood and overpainted and when the hole was opened a
large quantity of gold in bars was discovered. After following
the prescribed procedure the Customs authorities made an order
confiscating the vessel in addition to imposing other penalties.
One of the contentions raised was that s. 52-A of the Sea Customs Act the infringement whereof was the occasion for the con(!) [1951] S.C.R. 322.
(2) (1946) 62 T.L.R. 462.
(3) A.!.R. 1964 S.C. 1!40.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 1 S.C.R.
fiscation could not be invoked unless mens rea was established.
Under that section no vessel constructed, adapted, altered or
fitted for the purpose of concealing goods shall enter, or be
within, the limits of any port in India, or the Indian customs
waters. This Court in construing the scheme and object of the
Sea Customs Act came to the conclusion that mens rea was· not
a necessary ingredient of the offence, as, if that was so, the statute
would become a dead-letter. That decision was given on the
basis of the clear object of the statute and on a construction of
the provisions of that statute which implemented the said object.
It does not help us in construing the relevant provisions of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
The Indian decisions also pursued the same line. A division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Isak Solomon
Macmu/ 1(') in the co•1iext of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order,
I 941, made under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946, held that a mascer is not vicariously liab1e, in the
absence of mens rea, for an offence committed by his servant for
selling petrol in the absence. of requisite couoons and at a rate
in excess of the controlled rate. Chagla C.J .. speaking for the
Division Bench ( afcer cons;dering the relevant English and Indian
decisions, observed:
"It is not suggested that even in the class of cases where
the offence is not a minor offence or not quasi-criminal that the Legislature cannot introduce the principle of vicarious liability and make the master
liable for the acts of his servant although the master
had no mens rea and was morally innocent. But
the Courts must be reluctant to come to such a conclusion unless the clear words of the statute compel
them to do so or they are driven to that conclusion
by necessary implication."
So too, a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in The State
of Coorg v. P. K. Assu(2) held that a driver and a cleaner of a
lorry which carried bags of charcoal and also contained bags of
paddy and rice underneath without pennit as required by a
notification issued under the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946, were not guilty of any offence in the absence
of their knowledge that the lorry contained foodgrains. To the
some effect a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
(I) (1948) SO Born. L.R. 191, 194.
(2) I.LR. J19SS) Mysore 516.
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A State v. Sheo Prasad(') held th.at a· master was not liable for his
servant's act in carrying oilseeds in contravention of the order
made under the Es~ntial Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,,
1946, on the ground that he had not the guilty mind. In the
same manner a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in
C. T. Prim v. The State( 2 ) accepted as settled law that unless a
B statute clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as
a constituent part of the crime, no one should be found guilty of
an offence under the criminal law unless he has got a guilty
mind.
The law on the subject relevant to the present enquiry may
briefly be stated as follows. It is a well settled principle of
common law that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal
offence. Doubtless a statute can exclude that element, but it
is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and also
accepted in India to construe a statutory provision creating an
offence in conformity with the common law rather than against
D it unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded mens rea. To put it differently, there is a presumption that
mens rea is an essential ingredient of a statutory offence; but
this may be rebutted by the express words of a statute creating
the offence or by necessary implication. But the mere fact that
the object of a statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradiE cate grave social evils is in itself not decisive of the question
whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of the offence. It is also necessary to enquire whether a
statute by putting a person under strict liability help him to assist
the State in the enforcement of .the law: can he do anything to
F promote the observance of the law? A person who does not know
that gold cannot be brought into India. without a licence or is
not bringing into India any gold at all cannot possibly do anything to promote the observance of the law. Mens rea by
necessary implication can be excluded from a statute only where
it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of a·
G statute would otherwise be defeated and its exclusiOn enables
those put under strict liability by their act or omission to assist
the promotion of the law. The nature of mens rea that will be
implied in a statute creating an offence depends upon the object
of the Act and the provisions thereof.
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What is the object of the Act? The object of the Act and
the notification issued thereunder is to prevent smuggling of
(I) A.I.R. 1956 All. 610.
(2) A.LR. 1961 Cal. 177.
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SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS
[196~ I S.C.R
·gold and to conserve foreign exchange .. Doubtless it is a laudable
object. The Act and the notification were conceived and enacted
in public interest; but that in itself is not, as I have indicated,
decisive of the legislative intention.
A
The terms of the section and those of the relevant notification
issued thereunder do not expressly exclude mens rea. Can we
say that mens rea is excluded by ncces5ary implication? Section
8 docs not contain an absolute prohibition against bringing or
sending into India any gold. It in effect confers a power on the
Reserve Bank of India to regulate the import by giving general
-Or special permission; nor the notification dated August 25, 1948,
issued by the Government embodies any such absolute prohibi- c
·tion. It again, in substance, leaves the regulation of import of
gold to the Reserve Bank of India; in its tum the Reserve Bank
of India by a notification of the same date permitted persons to
transit gold to a place which is outside the territory of India and
the Portuguese terr;tories without any permission. Even the
impugned notification docs not impose an absolute prohibition D
against bringing into India gold which is on through transit to a
place outside India. It permits such import for such through
transit, but only subject to conditions. It is, therefore, manifest
that the law of India as embodied in the Act under s. 8 and in
the notification issued thereunder does not impose an absolute
prohibition against bringing into India gold which is on through E
transit to a place outside India; and indeed it permits such bringing of gold but subject to certain conditions. The Legislature,
therefore, did not think that public interest would irreparably
suffer if such transit was permitted, but it was satisfied that with
some regulation such interest oould be protected. The law F
,does not become nugatory if the element of mens rea is read into
it, for there would still be persons who would be bringing into
India gold with the knowledge that they would be breaking the
law. In such circumstances no question of exclusion of men.<
-rea by necessary implication can arise.
If a person was held to have committed an offence in breach
of the provision of s. 8 of the Act and the notification issued thereunder without any knowledge on his part that ther~ was any such
notification or ·that he was bringing any gold at all, many innocent pcr;,ons would become victims of law. An aeroplane in
which a person with gold on his body is travelling may have a
forced landing in India, or an enemy of a passenger may surreptitiously and maliciously put some gold trinket in his pocket without
his knowledge so as to bring him into trouble: a person may be
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STATE v. MAYER HANS (Subba Rao
141
carrying gold without knowledge or even without the possibility
of knowing that a law prohibiting taking of gold through India
is in existence. All of them, if the interpretation suggested by
the learned Solicitor-General be accepted, will have to be convicted and they might be put in jail for a period extending to 2
years. Such an interpretation is neither supported by the proB vision of the Act · nor is necessary to implement its object.
That apart,. by imposing such a strict liability as to catch.
innocent persons in the net of crime, the Act and the notification·
issued thereunder cannot conceivably enable such a class of
persons tQ assist the implementation of the law:· they will be
helpless victims of law. Having regard to the object of the Act, I
C think no person shall be held to be guilty of contravening the
provisions of s. 8 of the Act, read with the notification dated'
November 8, 1962, issued thereunuer, unless he has knowingly·
brought into India gold without complying with the terms of the
proviso to the notification.
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Even so it is contended that the notification dated November
s; 1962, is law and that the maxim "ignorance of law is no
defence" applies to· the brea¢h of the said law. To state it
differently, the argument is that even the mental condition of
knowledge on the part of a person is imported into the notification; the said knowledge is imputed to him· by the force of taeE said maxim. Assuming that the notification dated November 8,
1962, is a delegated legislation, I find it difficult to invoke that
maxim as the statute empowering the Reserve Bank of India to·
give the permission, or the rules made thereunder do not pres·
cribe the mode of publication of · the notification. Indeed a·
. similar question arose before the Privy Council in Lim Chin
F Aik v. The Queen('), and a similar argument ·was advanced
before it; but the Board rejected it. I have already dealt with
this decision in another context. There the Minister under the
powers conferred on him by s. 9 of the Immigration Ordinance
1952, issued an order prohibiting the appellant therein from
entering Singapore. He was prosecuted for disobeying that
G order. Section 9, in the case of an order directed to a sin!l)e
individual, contaii:ted no provision for publishing the order or for·
otherwise bringing it to the knowledge of the person named. The
Crown invoked the precept that ignorance of the law was no
excuse. In rejecting the contention of the Crown, Lord Evershed speaking for the Board, observed at p. 171 thus:
H
"Their Lordships are unable to accept the contention. In
their Lordships opinion, even if the making of theA
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1965] I S.C.R.
order by the Minister be regarded as an exercise of
the legislative as distinct from the executive or
administrative function (as they do not concede),
the maxim cannot apply to such a case as the present where it appears that there is in the State of
Singapore no provision, corresponding, for example.
to that contained in section 3(2) of the English
Statutory Instruments Act of J 946, for the publication
in any form of an order of the kind made ic the
present case or any other provision designed to enable
a man by appropriate inquiry to find out what 'the
law' is."
Here, ·as there, it is conceded that there is no provision providing
for the p11blication in any form of an order of the kind made
by the Reserve Bank of India imposing conditions on the bringing of gold into India. The fact that the Reserve Bank of India
published the order in the Official Gazette does not affect the
question for it need not have done so under any express provisions
of any statute or rules made thereunder. In such cases the
maJtim cannot be invoked and the prosecution has to bring home
to the accused that he had knowledge or could have had knowedge if he was not negligent or had made proper enquiries befo~
he could be found guilty of infringing the law. Tn this case the
said notification was published on November 24, 1962, and the
accused left Zurich on November 27, 1962, and it was not serionsly contended that the accused had or could have had with
diligence the knowledge of the .contents of the said notification
before he brought gold into India. I, therefore, hold that th•
respondent was not guilty of the offence under s. 23 ( 1-A) of
the Act as it has not been established that he had with knowLedge of the contents of the said notification brought gold into
India on his way to Manila and, therefore, he had not committed
any offence under the said seotion. I agree with the High Coort
in its conclusion though for different reasons.
Though the facts est,?blished in the case stamp the respondent
as an experienced smuggler of gold and though I am satisfied
that the Customs authorities bona fide and with diligence performed their difficult du"ties, r have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the accused has not committed any offence under !.
23(1-A) of the Act.
Io the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
A.yyangar J. This appeal by special leave is directed
a~aiost the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay
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A setting aside the conviction of the respondent under s. 8 (1) of
the .Foreign Exchange Regulation Act ( 7 of 1947), hereinafter
called the "Act'', read with a notification of the Reserve Bank of
lndia .dated November 8, 1962 and directing his acquittal. The
appelll was heard by us at the end of April last and on the
8th May which was the last working day of the Court before it
B adjourned for the summer vacation, the Court pronounced the
..
following order :
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"By majority, the appeal is allowed and the conviction
of the respondent is restored; but the sentence imposed on
him is reduced to the period already undergone. The
respondent shall forthwith be released and the bail bond,
if any, cancelled. Reasons will be given in due course."
We now proceed to state our reasons. The material facts of
tl)e case are not in controversy. The respondent who is a German
national by birth is stated to be a sailor by profession. Jn the
statement that he made to the Customs authorities, when he was
apprehended the respondent stated that some person not named
by him met him in Hamburg and engaged him on certain terms
of remuneration, to Clandestinely transport gold from Geneva to
places in the Far East. His first assignment was'Stated by him to
be to fly to Tokyo wearing a jacket which concealed in its specially
designed pockets 34 bars of gold each weighing a kilo. He claimed
he had accomplished this assignment and that he handed over the
gold he carried to the person who- contacted him at Tokyo. From
there he returned to Geneva where he was paid his agreed remuneration. He made other trips, su6sequently being engaged in like
adventurd in all of which he stated he had succeeded, each time
carrying 34 kilos of gold bars which on every ocoasion was carried
concealed in a jacket which he wore, but we are now concerned
with ihe one which he undertook at the instance of this international gang of gold smugglers carrying, similarly, 34 kilo bars
of gold concealed in a jacket which he wore on his person. This
trip started at Zurich on November 27, 1962 and according to the
respondent his destinalion was Manila :where he was to deliver
the gold to a contact there. The plane arrived in Bombay on the
morning of the 28th. ·The Customs authorities who bad evidently
advance information of gold being attempted to be smuggled by
the respondent travelling by that plane, first examined the manifest
of the aircraft to see if ap.y gol<I had .been consigned by any
passenger. Not finding any entry there, after ascertaining that the
respondent had not come out of the plane as usual to the airport
lounge, entered the plane and found. him there seated. They then
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.
asked him if he had any gold with him. The answer of the A
respondent was "what gold" with a shrug indicating that he did
not have any. The Customs Inspecto~ thereupon felt the respondent's back and shoulders and found that he had some metal
blocks on his person. ·He was then asked to come out of ths
plane and his baggage and person were searched. On removing
the jacket he wore it was found to have 28 specially made compart- B
ments 9 of which were empty and from the remaining 19, 34 bars
oi gold each weighing approximately one kilo were recovered.
The respondent, when questioned, disclaimed ownership of the
gold and stated that he had no interest in these goods and gave
the story of his several trips which we have narrated earlier. It C
was common ground that the gold which the respondent carried
was not entered in the manifest of the aircraft or other documents
carried by it.
The respondent was thereafter prosecuted and charged with
having committed an offence under s. 8 (I) of the Act and also
of certain provision of the Sea Customs Act, in the Court of the D
Presidency Magistrate, Bombay. The Presidency Magistrate,
Bombay took the complaint on file. The facts stated earlier were
not in dispute but the point raised by the respondent before the
Magistrate was one of law based on his having been ignorant of
the law prohibiting the carrying of the gold in the manner that
he did. In other words, the plea was that mens rea was an ingre- E
dient of the offence with which he was charged and as it was not
disputed by the prosecution that he was not actually aware of the
notification of the Reserve Bank of India which rendered the
carriage of gold in the manner that he did an offenc;e. he could
not be held guilty. The learned Magistrate rejected this defence F
and convicted the respondent and sentenced him to imprisonment
for one year. On appeal by the respondent the learned Judges of
the High Court have allowed the appeal and acquitted the respondent upholding the legal defence which he raise<!. It is the
correctness of thi~ conclusion that calls for consideration in this
appeal.
G
Before considering the arguments advanced by either side
before us it would be necessary to set out the legal provisions on
the basis of which this appeal has to be decided. The Foreign
E~change Regulation Act, 1947 was enacted in order to conserve
foreign exchange, the conservation of which is of the utmost
essentiality for the economic survival and advance of every country,
and very much more so in the case of a developing country like
India. S1ction 8 of the Act enacts the restrictions on the import
H,,.
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STATE v. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar J.)
145
A and export, inter alia, of bullion. This section enacts, to read only
that portion which relates to the import with which this appeal is
concerned:
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"8. ( 1) The Central Government may, by notification
in the Official Ga~ette, order that, subject to such exemptions, if any, as may be contained in the notification, no
person shall, except with the.genyral or special permission
of the Reserve Bank and on payment of the fee, if any,
prescribed, bring or send into India any gold or silver or
any currency notes or bank notes or coin whether Indian
or foreign.
Explanation.-The bringing or sending into any port
or place in India, ·of any such article as aforesaid intended
to be taken out of .Indi.a without being removed from the
ship or conveyance in which it is being carried shall nonetheless be deemed to be a bringing, or as the case may be,
sending into India of that article for the purposes of this
section."
.Section 8 has to be read in conjunction with s. 23 :which imposes
penalties ton persons contravening the provisions-of the Act. ·Subsection ( I ) penalises the contravention of the provisions of certain
named sections of the Act which do not include s. 8, and this is
E followed by sub-s. (1-A) which is residuary and is directly relevant in the present context and it reads :
"23. (1-A) Whoever contravenesF
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( a) any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule,
direction or -order made. thereunder, other than those
referred to in sub-section ( 1) of this section and
section 19 shall, upon conviction by a Court, be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
( b) any direction or order made under section 19 shall.
upon conviction by a Court be punishable with fine
which may extend to two thousand rupees."
These have to be read in conjunction with the rule as to onus of
proof laid down in s. 24 ( 1) which enacts :
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"24. ( 1) Where any persOJ) is prosecuted or proceeded
against for contravening any provisions of this Act or of any
rule, direction or order made 'theieunder which prohibits
him from doing an act without permission, the burden of
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965) I S.C.R.
proving that he had the requisite permission shall be on
him."
A
Very soon after the enactment of the Act the Central Govern·
ment took action under s. 8 ( 1) and by a notification published in
the Official Gazette dated August 25, 1948 the Central Government directed that "except with the general or special pennission 8
of the Reserve Bank no person shall bring or send into India from
any place out of India any gold bullion", to refer only to the item
relevant in the present context. The Reserve Bank by a notification
of even date (August 25, 1948) granted a general pennis.~ion in
these terms :
"The Reserve Bank of India is hereby pleased to give C
general peimission to the bringing or sending of any gold
or any such silver by sea or air into any port in India :
Provided that the gold or silver
(a) is on through transit to a place which is outside both
(i) the territory of India,
(ii) the Portuguese territorie~ which are adjacent to
or surrounded by the territory of India, and
( b) is not removed from the carrying ship or aircraft
except for the purpose of transhipment".
On November 8, 1962, however, the Reserve Bank of India in
supersession of the notification just now read, published a notification (and this is the one which was in force at the date relevant
to this case) giving general pennission to the bringing or sending
of gold, gold-coin etc. "into any pon or place in India when such
article is on through transit to a place which is outside the territory
of India :
D
E
F
Provided that such articles if not removed from the ship or
conveyance in which it is being carried except for the purpose of
transhipment :
Provided further that it is declared in the manifest for transit
as same bottom cargo or transhipment cargo". This notification
was published in the Gazette of India on November 24, 1962.
G
It was not disputed by Mr. Sorabjee--leamed Counsel for the
respondent, subject to an argument based on the construction of
the newly added 2nd proviso to which we shall refer later, that if
the second notification of the Reserve Bank restricting the range H
of the exemption applied to the respondent, he was clearly guilty
of an offence under s. 8 ( 1 ) of the Act read with the Explanation
STATE V. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar I.)
147
A
to the sub-section. On the other hand, it was not also dispnted by
the learned Solicitor-General for the appellant-State that if the
exemption notification which applied to the present case was that
contained in the notification of the Reserve Bank dated August 25, ·
1948 the respondent had not committed any offence since (a) he
.was a through passenger from Geneva to Manila as shown by
B the ticket which he had and the manifest. of the aircraft, and
besides, (b) he had not even got down from the plane.
Two principal questions have been raised by Mr. Sorabjee
in 11upport of the proposition that the notification dated November
8, 1962 restricting the scope of the permission or exemption
C granted by the Resei:ve Bank did not apply to the case. The first
was that mens rea was an essential ingredient of an offence ~r
s. 23(1-A) of the Act and that the prosecution had not established
that the respondent knowingly contravened the law in ttllation
to the carriage of the contraband article; (2) The second head Gf
learned Counsel's argument was that the notification dlltcd.
D November 8, 1962, being merely subordinate or delt!gated legblation, could be deemed to be in force not from the date of it~ mile
or publication in the Gazette but only when it was brought to the
notice of persons who would be affected by it and that as the
same was published in the Gazette of India only on November 24,
1962 whereas the respondent left Zurich on the 27th No•ember
E he oould not possibly have had any knowledge there of the new
restrictions imposed by the Jndian authorities and that, in theee
ciJ;'Cumstances, the respondent could not be held guilty of an offence
under s. 8(1) or s. 23(1-A) of the Act. He also raised a
subsidiary point that the notification of the Reserve Bank collld
F not be attracted to the present case because the second proviso
whiclr made provision for a declaration in the manifest "for transit
as bottom cargo or trattshipment cargo" could ~y apply to gold
handed over .to the aircraft for being carried as .cargo and was
inapplicable to cases where the gold was c~ on the persdn
of a passenger.
G
H
We shall deal with these poinls in that order. First as to
whether men& rea is an essential ingredient iJI rospect of au offence
undet s. 23 (I-A) of the Act. The argument under this head was
broadly as follows : It is a principle of the Common Law that mens
rea is an essential element in the commissiGD of auy criminal
offence against the Common Law. This presumption that mnr3 rea
is an essential ingredient of an offence equally applies to an
offence created by statute, though the presumption is liable ti> be
rl isp1ated by the words Of the statute creating the olence, or by the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
148
[1965) l SC.R.
subject-matter dealt with by it (Wright J. in Shen as v. D~
Rutzen). ( 1 ) But unless the statute clearly or by fair implication
rules out mens rea, a man should not be convicted unless he has a
guilty mind. In other words, absolute liability is not to be
pre~umed, but ought to be established. For the purpose of finding
out if the presumption is displaced, reference ha' to be made
to the language of the enactment, the object and subject-matter of
the statute and the nature and character of the act sought to be
punished. In this connection learned Counsel for the respondent
strongly relied on a decision of the Judicial Committee in Srinivas
Mall Bairo/iya v. King-Emperor.(') The Board was, there,
dealing with the correctness of a conviction under the Defence of
India Rules, 1939 relating to the control of prices. The appellant
before the Board was a wholesale dealer who had employed
a servant to whom he had entrusted the duty of allotting salt to
retail dealers and noting on the buyer's licence the quantity which
the latter had bought and received all of which were requin:d to
be done under the rules. For the contravention by the servant
of the Regulations for the sale of salt prescribed by the Defence
of India Rules the appellant was prosecuted and convicted .as
being vicariously liable for the act of his servant in having made
illegal exactions contrary to the Rules. The High Court took the
viow that even if the aoocllant had not been proved to have known
the unlawful acts of his servant. he would still he liable on the
grvund that "where there is an absolute prohibition and no
quei;tion of mens rea arises, the master is criminally liable for
the acts of his servant". On appeal to the Privy Council Lord nu
Pan:q who delivered the judgment of the Board dissented from
this view of the High Court and stated :
A
8
C
I
D
E
F
"They see no ground for saying that offences against
those of the Defence of India Rules here in question are
within !he limited and exceptional class of offences which
car. be held to be committed without a guilty mind.
See the judgment of Wright J. in Sherm< v. De Rutxm.
[ ( 1895) 1 Q. B. 91 R, 921 ]. Offences which are within G
that class arc usually of a cefmnaratively minor character.
and it would be a surprising result of this delegated
legislation if a person who was morally innocent of blame
could be held vicariously liable for a servant's crime and
so punishable 'with imprisonment for a term which may
II
extend to three years' ".
(I t IJIUl t Q L918.
(2) (t947) I.LR. 26 Patna 461l. (P.C.)
'
STATE v. MAYER HAN:S (Ayyangar !.)
A
B
149
The learned Lord then quoted with approval the view expressed
by the Lord Chief Justice in Brend v. Wood(') :
. "It is ................. of the utmost importance
for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a
court should always bear in ;mind that, unless the statute,
either clearly or by necessary irhplication rules out mens
rea as a constituent part of .a crime, a defendant should
not be fqund guilty of an offence' against the criminal
law unless he has got a guilty mind".
Mr. Sorabjee is justified in referring 'us to these rules regarding
presumption and construction and it may be pointed out that this
C Court has, in Ravula Hariprasada Rao-v. The State('), approved
of this passage in the judgment of Lord Du Parcq and the
principle of construction underlying it.-_ We therefore agree that
absolute liability is not to be lightly presumed but has to be
clearly established. Besides, learned Coiinsel for the respondent
D strongly urged that on this point the exposition by Lord Evershed
in Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen("), had clarified the principles
applicable in this branch of the law, and that in the light of the
criteria there laid down we should hold that on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, inens rea or a guilty
mind must be held to be an essential ingredient of the offence and
that
as it was conceded by the prose;ution in .the present case
E
that the respondent was not aware of the notifieation by the
Reserve Bank of India, dated the 8th November, he could not
be held guilty of the offence. We might incidentally· state that
that decision was also relied on in connection with the second of
the submissions made to us as regards the time when delegatrd
legislation
could be deemed to come into operation, but to that
F
aspect we shall advert later.
'
G
H
In order to appreciate the scope and effect of the decision
and of the observations and reasoning to which we shall presently
adve11 it is necessary to explain in some detail the facts involved
in it. Section 6 ( 2) of the Immigration Ordinance, 1952, of the
State of Singapore enacted :
"Ii. (2) It shall not be lawful for any person other
than a citizen of Singapore to enter the Colony from the
Federation. , ...... if such person has been prohibited
by order made under s. 9 of this Ordinance from entering
the colony."
(2) [19511 S.C.R. 322, 328.
(3) [1963] A.C. 160.
150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 1 s,c.R.
By sub-s. ( 3) it was provided that :
A
"Any person who contravenes the provision.~ of
sub-section ( 2) of this section shall be guilty of an
offence against this ordinance".
Section 9 which is referred to in s. 6(2) read, to quote the
material words of sub-section ( 1 ) :
"The minister may by order. ............... (1)
prohibit either for a stated period or 1 permanently the
entry or re-entry into the colony of any person or class
of persons".
Its sub-s. ( 3) provided .
"Every order made under sub-s. ( 1) of this section
Shall unless it be otherwise provided in such order take
elfect and come into operation on the date on whic1! it
was made".
While provision was made by the succeeiling portion of the subsection for the publication in the Gazette of orders which related
to a class of persons, there was no provision in the sub-section
for the publication of an order in relation to named individuals or
otherwise for bringing it to the attention of such persons. The
appellant before the Privy Council had been charged with and
convicted by the couns in Singapore of contravening s. 6(2) of
the Ordinance by remaining in Singapore when by an order made
by the Minister under s. 9 (I ) he had been, by name, prohibited
from entering the island. At the trial there was no evidence from
which it could be inferred that the order had in fact come to the
notice or attention of the accused. On the other hand, the facts
disclosed that he could not have known of the order. On appeal
by the accused, the conviction was set aside by the Privy Council.
The judgment of the Judicial Committee insofar as it was in
favour of the appellant, was based on two lines of reasoning.
The first was that in order to constitute a contravention of s. 6(2)
of the Ordinance mens rea was essential. The second wa., that
even if the order of the Minister under s. 9 were regarded u an
exercise of legislative power, the maxim 'ignorance of law is no
excuse' could not apply because there was not, in Singapore, any
provision for tho publication, in any form, of an order of the !rind
made in the case or any other provision to enable a man, by
appropriate enquiry, to find out what the Jaw was.
·Lord Evershed 'Who delivered the judgment of the Board
referred with approval to tbe formulation of the principle as
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
STATE V. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar J.)
A
151
regards mens rea to be found in the judgment of Wright J. in
Sherras v. De Rutzen, (') already referred to. His Lordship also
accepted as correct the enunciation of the rule in Srinivas Mall
Bairoliya v. King-Emperor(') in the passage we have extracted
earlier. Referring next to the argument that where the statute was
one for the regulation for the public welfare of a particular actiB vity it had frequently been inferred that strict liability was the
object sought to be enforced by the fogislature, it was pointed
out:
"The presumption is that the statute or statutory
instrument can be effectively enforced only if those in
c
charge of the relevant activities are made responsible for
seeing that they are complied with. When such a presumption is to be inferred, it displaces the ordinary presumption of mens rea."
0
E
F
Reference was then made to legislation regulating sale of food·
and drink and he then proceeded to state :
"It is not enough merely to label the statute as one
dealing with a grave social evil and from that to infer
that strict liability was intended. It is pertinent also to
inquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability
will assist in the enforcemeut of the regulations. That
means that there must be something he can do, directly
or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom
he may be expected to influence or control, which wiff
promote the observance of the regulations. Unless this
is so, there is no reason in penalising him, ·and it cannot
be inferred that !he legislature imposed strict liability
merely in order to find a lucldess victim."
As learned Counsel has laid great stress on the above
passages, it is necessary to analyse in some detail the provisions
in the Singapore Ordinance in relation to which this approach
G was made and compare them with the case on hand. Let us first
consider the frame of s. 6(2) of the Singapore Ordinance the
relevant portion of which we have set out earlier. It prohibits
•
the entry of ndll-citiz.ens i:nto the cotoriy .front the Federation,
only in the ·event of that entry being banned by a general or
pa:rticuia'r order made by the Mll'li~ under 9. In Other words,
H in the absence of an ·order made Ul'lder s. 9, there was freedom
of 'ent'ry ·or ra~er absence of any legal prohibition against entry
s.
(I} .[!89S] 1 Q.B. 918,
(2) (1947) l. L. R. 26 Patna 460. (P.C.)
152
SUPREME COURT" REPORTS
[I 965] I s.c.R.
of persons from the Federation. In the light of this situation. A
the construction adopted was that persons who normally could
lawfully enter the colony, had to be proved to have a guilty mind
i.e., actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of ·the
prohibition against their entry before they could be held to ha'1e
violated the terms of s. 6 (2). It is in this context that the
reference to "the luckless victim" has to be understood. The B
position under s.s. 8 and 23 of the Act is. if we say so, just the
reverse. Apart from the public policy and other matters underlying the legislation before us to which we shall advert later.
s. 8 ( I ) of the Act empowers the Central Government to impose
a complete ban on the bringing of any gold into India, the act
of "bringing" being understood in the sense indicated in the C
Explanation. When such a ban is imposed, the import or the
hririging of gold into India could be effccrcd only subject to the
general or special pennission of the Reserve Bank. Added :o this.
and this is of some significance, there is the provision in s. 24( I)
of the Act which throws on the accused in a prosecution the
D
burden of proving that he had the requisite permission, emphasising as it were that in the absence of a factual and existent pern1ission to which he can refer, his act would be a violation of the law.
In pursuance of the provision in s. 8 ( I), Central Government
published a notification on August 25, 1948 in which the terms
of s. 8 (I) regarding the necessity of permission of the Reserve E
Bank to bring gold into India were repeated. On the issue of
this notification the position was that everyone who "brought" gold
into India, in the sense of the Explanation to s. 8 ( 1) , was guilty of
an offence. unless he was able to rely for his act on permission
granted by the Reserve Bank. We therefore start with this : The
bringing of gold into India is unlawful unless permitted by the F
Reserve Bank,-unlike as under the Singapore Ordinance, where
an entry was not unlawful unless it was prohibited hy an order
made by the Minister. In the circumstances, therefore. mens r1t11,
which was held to be an essential ingredient of the offence of a
contravention of a Minister's order under the Ordinance, cannot
obviously be deduced in the context of the reverse position obtain- G
ing under the Act.
There was one further circumstance to which it is necessary
to advert to appreciate the setting in which the question arose
before the Privy Council. The charge against the appellant was
that having entered Singapore on or about May 17, 19S9 lie H
remained there while prohibited by an order of the Minister under
-s. 9 and thereby contravened s. 6(2) of the Immigration
Ordinance. At the trial it was proved that the order of the Minllter
STATE v. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar J.)
A
B
c
D
...
153
was made on May 28, 1959 i.e., over 10 days after the appellant
had entered the colony. It was proved that the Minister's order
which prohibited the appellant, who was named in it, from entering Singapore was received by the Deputy Assistant Controller
of Immigration on the day on which it was made and it was retained
by that official with himself. The question of the materiality of
the knowledge of the accused of the order prohibiting him from
entering the colony came up for consideration in such a context.
The further question as to when the order would, in law, become
effective, relates to the second of the submissions made to us by
the respondent and will be considered later.
Reverting now to the question whether mens rea-in the
sense of actual knowledge that the act done by the accused was
contrary to the law-is requisite in respect of a contravention of
s. 8 (I), starting with an initial prescription in favour of the need
for mens rea, we have to ascertain whether the presumption is
overborne by the language of the enactment, read in the light of
the objects and purposes of the Act, and particularly whether the
enforcement of the law and the attainment of its purpose would
not be rendered futile in the event of such an ingredient being
considered necessary.
We shall therefore first address ourselves to th'e language
of
the
relevant provisions. Section 23(1-A) of the Act which has
E
already been set out merely refers to contravention of the provisions of the Act or the rule etc., so that it might be termed neutral
in the present context, in that it neither refers to the state of the
mind of the contravener by the use of the expression such as
'wilfully, knowingly' etc., nor does it, in terms, create an absolute
F liability. Where the statute does not contain th(} word 'knowingly',
the first thing to do is to examine the statute to see whether
the ordinary presumption that mens rea is required applies ot not.
When one turns to the main provision whose contravention is
the subject of the penalty imposed by s. 23(1-A) viz., s. 8(1)
in the present context, one reaches the conclusion that there is no
G scope for the invocation of the rule of mens rea. It lays an absolate
embargo upon persons who without the special or general permission of the Reserve Bank and after satisfying the conditions, if
any prescribed by the· Bank bfing or send into India any gold etc.,
the absoluteness _being emphasised, as we have already pointed'
out, by the terms of s. 24( 1) of the Act. No doubt, the very
H concept of "bringing" or "sending" would exclude an involuntary
bringing or an involuntary sending. Tims, for Instance, if without the knowledge of the persqn a packet of gold was slipped into ,
IH
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] l S.C.R.
his pocket it is possible to accept the contention that such a
person did not ·~bring" the gold into India within the meaning
9f s. 8 ( 1) . Similar considerations would apply to a case where
the aircraft on a through flight which did not include any landing
in India has to make a force landing in lndia--0wing say to engine
trouble. But if the bringing into India was a conscious act and
was done with the intention of bringing it into India the mere
"bringing" constitutes the offence and there is no other ingredient
that is necessary in order to constitute a contravention of s. 8 (I )
than that conscious physical act of bringing. If then under s.
8 ( I ) the conscious physical act of "bringing" constitutes the
offence, s. 23(1-A) does not import any further condition for
the imposition of liability than what is provided for in s. 8 (I ) .
On the language, therefore, of s. 8 ( I ) read with s. 24( I ) we
arc clearly of the opinion that there is no scope for the invocation of the rule that besides the mere act of voluntarily bringing
gold into India -any further mental condition is postulated as
necessary to constitute an offence of the contravention referred
to ins. 23(1-A).
A
B
C
D
Next we have to have regard to the subject-matter of the
legislation. For, as pointed out by Wills J. in R. v. Tolson(') :
"Although, prima facie and as a general rule, there
must be a mind at fault before there can be a crime, it
is not an inflexible rule, and a statute may relate to such
a subject-matter and may be so framed as to make an
act criminal whether there has been any intention to break
the law or otherwise to do wrong or not".
E
The Act is designed to safeguarding and conserving foreign ~·
exchange which is essential to the economic life of a ·developing
country. The provisions have therefore to be stringent and llO
framed as to prevent unauthorised and unregulated transaction.,
which might upset the scheme underlying the controls; and in
a larger context, the penal provisions are aimed at eliminating
smuggling which is a concomitant of controls over the free move- G
ment of goods or currencies. In this connection we comider it
useful to refer to two decisions-the first 4 decision of the Privy
Council and the other of the Court ol Criminal Appeal. The
decision of the Privy Council is that ~ed as Bruhn v. Tiie
King(') where the plea of mens rea was raised as a defence to a
pl'OSetution l'or importation of opium in contravention of tile H
Straits Settlements Opium Ordinance, 1906. Loni Allimoo
(I) (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168.
(2) [1909) A.C. 317..
STATE v. MAYER. HANS (Ayyangar. J.)
A
.,
B
c
speaking for the Board, referring to the plea as
observed:
155
to mens rea,
"The other point relied upon on be)lalf of the
appellant was that there should be proof, express or implied, of a mens rea in the accused person before he could
be convicted of a criminal offence. But that depends
upon the terms of the statute or Ordinance creating the
offence. In many cases connected with the revenue certain things are prohibited unless done by certain persons,
ot under certain conditions. Unless the person who does
one of these thin~ can establish that he is one of the
privileged class, or that the prescribed conditions have
been fulfilled, he will be adjudged guilty of the offe1:1ce,
though in fact he knew nothing of the prohibition."
The criteria for the construction of statutes of the type we have
before us laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Regina v.
D St. Margarets Trust Ltd.(') is perhaps even nearer to the point.
The offence with which the appellants were there charged was a
violation of the Hire Purchase and Credit Sale Agreements
(Control) Order, 1956 which, having been enacted to effectuate
a credit-squeeze, as being necessary for the maintenance of Britisheconomy, required by the rules made under it that every Hire
E Purchase agreement should state the price of the article and fix
the maximum proportion thereof which a hirer might be paid
by a Financing Company. The appellant-company advanced to
the hirer of a motor-car more than the permissible percentage
but did so as it was misled by the company which sold the motorcar as regards the price it charged to the customer. The plea
F raised in defence was that the Finance Company were unaware
of the true price and that not having guilty knowledge, they
could not be convicted of the offence. Donovan J. who spoke
for the Court said :
G
H
"The language of article 1 of the Order expressly
prohi bi.ts what was done by St. Margarets Trust Ltd., and
if that company is to be held to have committed on offence
some judicial modification of the actual terms of the
article is essential. The appellants contend that the article
should be construed so as not to apply where the prohibited
act was done innocently. In other words, that mens rea
should be regarded as essential to the commission of the
offence. The appellants rely on the presumption that
-~---
(!) (1958) I W.L.R. 522.
156
SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS
[ 1965] I S.C.R.
mens rea is essential for the commission of any statutory
offence unless the language of tt:e statute, expressly or by
necessary implication, negatives such presumption."
The learned Judge then referred to the various decisions in which
the question as to when the Court would hold the liability to be
absolute and proceeded :
A
...
B
'The words of the Order themselves are an express
and unqualified prohibition of the acts done in this care
by St. Margarets Trust Ltd. The object of the Order was
to help to defend the currency against the peril of inflation which, if unchecked, would bring disaster upon the C
country. There is no need to elaborate this. The pre8ent
generation has witnessed the collapse of the currency in
other countries and the consequent chaos, misery and
widespread ruin. It would not be at all surprising if
Parliament, detennined to prevent similar calamities here,
enacted measures which it intended to be absolute prohibi- D
tion of acts which might increase the risk in however small
n degree. Indeed, that would be the natural expectation .
. There would be little point in enacting that no one should
breach the defences against a flood, and at the same time
excusing anyone who did it innocently. For these reasons E
we think that article I of the Order should receive a literal
construction, and that the ruling of Diplock I. wa~ correct.
It is true that Parliament has prescribed imprironment as one of the punishments that may be inflicted for
a breach of the Order, and this circumstance is urged in
support of the appellants' argument that Parliament intended to punish only the guilty. We think it is the better view
that, having regard to the gravity of the issues, Parliament
rntended the prohibition to be absolute, leaving the court
to use it< powers to inflict nominal punishment or none at
all in appropriate cases."
F
G
We consider these observations apposite to the construction
of the provision of the Act now before us.
This question as to when the presumption as to the necessity
for mens rea is overborne has received elaborate consideration at
the hands of this Court when the question of the construction
. of s. 52~A of the Sea Custom< Act came up for consideration in
The lndo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. las/it Singh, Addi.
H
•
STATE v. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar /,)
A
B
c
157
Collector of Customs, Calcutta etc. (') Speaking for the Court
Gajendragadkar C.J. said :
"The .intention of the legislature in providing for the
prohibition prescribed by s. 52-A, is, inter alia, to put an
end to illegal smuggling which has the effect of disturbing
very rudely the national economy of the country. It is
well-known, for example, that ·smuggling of - gold has
become a serious problem in this country and operations
of smuggling are conducted by operators who work on
an· international basis. The· persons who actually carry
out the physical part of smuggling gold by one means or
another are generally no more than agents and presumably, behind them stands a well-knit organisation which,
for motives of profit-making; undertakes this activity."
This passage, in our opinion, is very apt in the present context
and the offence created by ss. 8 and 23(1-A) of the Act.
n
In our opinion, the very object and purpose of the Act and
its effectiveness as an instrument for the prevention of smuggling
. would be entirely frustrated if a condition were to be read into
s. 8 ( 1) or s. 23 (1-A) of the Act qualifying the plain words of the
enactment, that the accused should be proved to have knowledge
that he was contravening the law before he could be held to have
E ·contravened the provision.
Summarising the position, the result would be this. If the
Central Government, by notification in the Official Gautte
.imposed a ban on any person bringing gold into India any person
who brought such gold in contravention of the notification would
F be guilty of an offence under this section. This brings us to the
notification of the Central Government dated August 25, 1948
whose terms we have. set out. By reason of .that notification the
l;lringing of gold into India was made an offence. In this connec~
ti on it is necessary to bear in mind the Explanation to ~. 8 (1)
which we have already set out. By reason of that Explanation it
G would be seen that even if the gold continued to remain in a ship
or aircraft which is within India without its being taken out and
was not removed from the ship or aircraft it shall nevertheless
be deemed. to be a 'bringing' for the purpose of the section. We
are referring to this Explanation because if the act of the respon-·
dent 'l'(as an offence under the section---s. 8 ( 1) he gets no'
H advantage by his having remained on tlle aircraft without disembarking at Bombay, for if the carrying on his person of the gold
(I) A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1140.
LIS" . 64--11
IS8
SUPllMB COURT REPORTS
[ 1965) I S.C.R.
Wis "the bringing" of the gold into India, the fact that ho did
A
not remove himself from the aircraft but stayed on in it would
mak11 no difference and he would nevertheless be guilty of the
-01Ience by reason of the Explanation to s. 8(1). We would only
add that learned Counsel for the respondent did not dispute this.
Thti position, therefore, was that immediately the Central Government published the notification on August 25, 1948 the bringing B
of gold into India in the sense covered by the Explanation would
have brought it within s. 8 (I) of the Act So much is common
growid. But by reason of a notification by the Reserve Bank, of
even date, gold in through-transit from places outside India lo
places similarly situated which was not removed from the aircraft C
except for the purpoo-e of transhipment was exempted from the
·Clp(Tlltion of the notification of the Central Government issued
under s. 8 ( I ) . If this notification had continued in force and had
governed the right of persons to transport gold ihrough India the
respondent could not be guilty of a contravention of s. 8 (I). The
respondent would then have had the permission which saved hi~ 0
act of "bringing" from being an offence. However, as stated earlier,
on November 8, 1962 the Reserve Bank of India modified the
earlier notification and added an additional condition for exemp·
Lion vii;., that the gold must be declared in the manifest of the
aircraft as same bottom cargo or transhipment cargo. Therefore
when the respondent was in Bombay with the gold, he had not i,:
the requisite permission of the Reserve Bank and so he contravened the rroliibition under s. 8 (I).
The next submission of Mr. Sorabjee was that even assuming
that mens rea. which in the present context was equated with
knowledge of the existence and contents of the notification of the
Reserve B~nk, dated November 8, I 962, v:as not necessary to 11
be established to prove a contravention of s. 8 (I)( a) of the
Act, the notification of the Reserve Bank, dated November 8.
1962. could not be deemed to have been in force and operation
on November 28. 1962, when the respondent was alleged to have
committed the offence of "bringing" gold into India. Accepting
the general rule that ignorance of law is no excuse for its contra- G
vention · and the maxim that everyone is presumed to know the
law, learned Counsel submitted an elaborate argument as reeards
the precise point of time when a piece of delegated legislation
like the exemption notification by the Reserve Bank would in
law take effect. There is no provision in the General Clauses Act
a~ reµrd' the time when. subordinate le!!islation enacted under H
powers conferred by Acts of the Central Le!?islature shall come
into effect. There is no provision either in the particular Act wit"
,.
,_.
STATE V. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar I.)
159
A which we are concem~d determining the point of time at which
orders made, or pernllssi,ot) granted by virtue of powers conferred by the parent statute would come into operation. Jn the
absence of a statutory provision such as is found in s. 5 ( 1) of the
General Clauses Act, learned Counsel submitted that such orders
or notifications could have effect only from the date on which the
B person against whom it is sought to be enforced had knowledge
of their making. In suppQrt of this position he relied strongly
on the decision of the Privy Council already referred to-Lim
Chin Aik v. The Queen(').
We have dealt with that decision in regard to the point about
mens rea, and have also pointed out that one of the grounds on
which the appeal was allowed was that there had been no publication of the order of the Minister, banning the entry of the appellant, so as to render the appellant's act a contravention of s. 6(2)
of the Singapore Ordinance. We have adverted to the circumstance that the order of the Minister there in question was
D communicated only to the officer in the Immigration department
from whose custody it was produced at the trial. In that situation
. Lord Evershed observed :
"It was said on the respondent's part that the order
made by the Minister under the powers conferred by.
section 9 of the Ordinance was an instance of the exercise
E
of delegated legislation and. therefore that the order, once
made, became part of the law of Singapore .of which
ignorance could provide an· excuse upon a charge of contravention of the section. Their Lordships are unable to
accept this contention. In their Lordships' opinion, even
if the making of the order by the Minister be regarded as
F
an exercise of the legislative as distinct from the executive
or administrative function (as they do not concede), the
. maxim cannot apply to such a case as the present where
it appears that there is in the State of Singapore no provision, corresponding, for example, to that contained in
section 3 ( 2) of the English Statutory Instruments Act of
a
1946 for the publication in any form of an order of the
kind made in the present case or any other provision
designed to enable a man by appropriate inquiry to find out
what 'the law' is. In this connection it is to be observed
that a distinction is drawn in the Ordinance itself between
an order directed to a partic~Jar individual on the one
H
hand and an order directed to a class of persons on the
c
(I) [1963[ A. C. 160.
160
SUPREME COURT itEPORTS
[l 965) I S.C.R.
other; for sub-section (3)(b) of section 9 provides in the
latter case both for publication in the Gazette and presentation to the Legislative Assembly."
A
Based on this passage, it was urged that the notification of the
Reserve Bank, dated November 8, 1962 could not be deemed
to be in force, at least not on November 28, 1962 when the respon- B
dent landed in Bombay and that consequently he could not bf:
held guilty of the contravention of s. 8 ( 1). This argument cannot,
in our opinion, be accepted. In the first place, the order of the
Minister dealt with by the Privy Council was riever "published"
since admittedly it was transmitted only to the Immigration official
who kc•Jt it with himself. But in the case on hand, the notification c
by 1hc 'Rc~crve Bank varying the scope of the e:r.emption, was
ad;ni:i~Jly "published" in the Official Gazette-the usual mode
of publication in India, and it was so published long before the
resp.cndc;;, 12nded in Bombay. The question, therefore, is not
wh~tltcr it was publbhed or not, for in truth it was published, but
whether it is necessary that the publication should be proved to D
have been brought to the knowledge of the accused. Jn the
scc,,nd place. it was the contravention of the order of the Minister
that w"' made criminal by s. 6(2) of the Immigration Ordinance.
Th::i is not the position here, because the contravention contemplated bys. 23( l·A) of the Act is, in the present context, of an
or<kr of the Central Government issued under s. 8(1) of the Act E
and publish~d in the Official Gazette on November 25, 1948 and
this o,-dcr was in force during all this period. No doubt, for the
period up to the 8th November, the bringing of gold by through
passengers would not be a contravention because of the perP1i~sion
of tho Rc-crve Bank exempting such bringing from the operation
qf ti1~ Central Government's notification. It was really the with- F
draw"I nf this exemption by the Reserve Bank that rendered the
act of the respondent criminal. It might well be that there ;, a
distinction between the withdrawal of an exemption which saves
an ac! nthcrwisc criminal from being one and the passing of an
order "hc»e contravention constitutes the crime. Lastly, the
order m;:cic by the Minister in the Singapore case, was one with G
respect to a single individual, not a general order, whereas what
we have before us is a general rule applicable to every per<;on
who pa"cs through India. Jn the first case. it would be reasonable tn c~pect that the proper method of acquainting a person
with an order which he is directed to obey is to serve it on '1im.
or so publish it that he would certainly know of it; but there would H
be no question of individual service of a general notification on
everv member of the public, and all that the subordinate law-
STATE v. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar J,)
161
A making body can or need do, would be to publish it in such a ·
manner that persons can, if they are interested, acquaint themselves with its contents. In this connection reference may be
made to rule' 141 of the Defence of India Rules 1962.which runs :
"141. Publication, afjixation and defacement of
notices.-( l) Save as otherwise expressly provided in these
B
Rules, every authority, o(licer or person who makes any
order in writing in pursuance'of any of these Rules shall,
in the case of an order of a general nature or affecting
a class of persons publish notice of such order in such
manner as may, in the opinion of such authority, officer
or person· be best adapted for informing persons whom
c
the order concerns in the case of an order affecting an
individual cori>oration or firm serve or cause the order to
be served in the manner for the service of a summons in
rule 2 of Order XXIX or rule 3 of Order XXX, as the
case may be, in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) and in the case of an order
D
affecting an individual person (not being a corporation or
firm) serve or cause the order to be served on that person--(i) personally, by delivering or tendering to him the
order, or
{ii) by post, or
E
(iii) where the person c:<.1nnot be found, by leavinc~• an
authentic copy of the order with some. adult male
member of his family or by affixing such copy to
some conspicuous part of the premises in which he is
known to have last resided or carried on husiness or
personally· worked for gain and thereupon the persons,
F
corporation, firm or person concerned shall be deemed
to have been duly inforn1ed of the order."
and.this which is substantially the same as rule 119 of the Defence
of India Rules, 1939, brings out clea1ly the distinction between
orders which are intended to apply to named individual~ and
G orders of a general nature.
Reliance was also placed by Mr. Sorabjee on the judgment
of Bailhache J. in Johnson v. Sargant & Som(') where speakin~
of an order of the Food Controller dated May I 6 said to have
been contravened on the same day. the learned Judge said :
H
"I hzve no reason to suppose that an'J one ;n the
trade knew about it on May 16 .......... While T agree
-------··------· - - - (I) [l9lEJ I K. R ICL
162
SUPREME CQURT REPOR'J;S
(1965] 1 S.C.R.
that the rule ·is that a• statute ~ effect on the earliest A
moment of the day on which it is passed .or on which it
is -declared to llome into operation, there is about statutes
a publicity even before they come into operation which is
·absent in th~ cas~, of many orders such as that with which
w.e are now dealing; indeed, if certain Orders are to be
ejfective at all, it is essential that they should not be known · B
until1bey are actually published.. In the ~bsence of authori.ty upon the point I am unable to hold that this order
came into operation before it was ~own, and, a~ I have
·said, it was.not.known.until the morning of May 17."
Referring to this case Prof., C. K. Allen says : ,..._._, -''On the face of it, it would seem reasonable that
legislati<;m of any kind should not b.e binding until it has
somehow been 'made known' to the public; but that is not
the rule of law, and if. it were', the automatic. cogency of
a statute which has received the royal assent would be
seriously and most inconveniently impaired. In a solitary
case, however, before the passing of the Act of 1946 [The
S!atutc:iry Instruments Act] johnson v. Sargant, Bailhache,
J .. held that an Order did not take effect until it 'became
known'. The reasoning was that statutes at least received
t~e- publicity of Parliamentary debate, and that therefore
they were, or should be, 'known', but that this ·was not
true of delegated legislation, which did ·not necessarily
receive any publicity in Parliament or in any other way.
c.
D
E
This was a bold example of judge-made law. There was
llD precedent for it, and indeed a decision, Jones.v. Robson
[(1901) 1 Q. B. 673] which, though not on all fours,
· militated strongly' agaii:ist the judge's conclusion, was not
.~ited; not d.id the judge attempt to define how and when
delegate<! legislation 'became known'_ Both· arguments
and judgment are very brief. The decision ha8 always
been regarded as very doubtful, but -it never came under
/
review by a higher c<m'1."
We see, great force in the le.arnrd author's commc.nt on the reasoning in Sargant's case('). Taking the present case, the question
would immediately arise is it to· be made known in India or
throughout the wot_ld, for the a •gument ,on behalf of the respondent was ii)at. when the respondrnt left Geneva 'on November 27
•Law and Orders (2nd. ed. p. 132).
(I) [l9l8] I. K.B. IOI.
F
G
H
STATE v. MA'\'ER HANS (Ayyan$ar I.)
16~
A h~ w~ not aware of the change in the content of the exemption
grante4 by the Reserve Bank. In a sense the knowledge of the
wwice or content of a Jaw by an individual would not always
bQ telc:ivant, save on the question of the sentence to be imposed
for it~ violation. It is obvious that for an Indian Jaw to opetate
anti bQ effective in the territory where it operates viz,, the territory
B . of India it is not necessary that it should either be published or
be nu1de known outside the country. Even .if, thetefore, the view
enunciated by Bai!hache, J. is taken to bci correct. it would be
apparent that the test to find out effective publication would be
publication in India, not outside India so as to bring it to the
notice of everyone who intends to pass through India. It was
C "published" and ma4e known in India by publication in the
Gazette on the 24th November and the ignorance of it by the
respondent who is a foreigner is, in our opinion, wholly irrelevant.
It is, no doubt, admittlld :m behalf of the prosecution in the present
case that the respondent did not have actual notice of the notificaD tion of the Reserve Bank, dated November 8, 1962 but, for the
reasons stated, it ma::e.,, in our opinion, no difference to his.
liability to be proceed~.d against for the contravention of s. 8 ( 1)
of the Act.
Learned Counsel ;or the respondent also referred us to the
decision of the Bon bay High Court in lmperator v. Leslie
E Gwilt(') where the qaestion of the proper construction and
etfect of rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules, 1937 came up
for consideration. The learned Judges held that there had not
been a. proper publication or notification of an order, a~ required
by rule 119 and that ir. cor•.1equence the accused could not be
pr~cuted for a violation of that order. Other dedsions of a
F like nature dealing with the failure to comply with the reauircments of rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules or the Essential
Supplies Act, or the Essentivl Commodities Act, were aJS'"
brought to our notice but "":; consider that they do not as5ist us
in the present appeal. Where there is a statutory· requirement as
to the mode or form of pubhcation and they are such that, in the
G circumstances, the Court ho:ds to be mandatory, a failure to
comply with those requiremen'.s might result i.n there being no·
effective order the contravention of which could be the subject of
prosecution but where there is ;io statutory requirement we conceive the rule to be that it is necessary that it should be publi~hed
in the usual form i.e., by publication within the country in 'uch
H media as generally adopt~.d to notify to all the persons concerned
the making of rules. In most of the Indian statutes, inc!nding the
(I) l.L.R. [1945] Born. 681.
·"- •.~--;--,.:.,.--.- •.'"'."
,_
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) I S.C.R.
Act now under consideration, there is provision for the rul~ made A
being published in the Official Gazette. It therefore stands to
reason that publication in the Official Gazette viz.; the Gazette
ot India is the ordinary method of bringing· a rule or subordinate
legislation to the notice of the persons concerned. As we have
stated earlier, the notification by the Reserve Bank was published
in the Gazette of India on November 24, 1962, and hence even B
adopting the view of Bailhache, J. the notification must be deemrd
to have been published and brought to the notice of the concerned
individuals on November 25, 1962. The· argument; therefore,
that the notification, dated November '8, 1962 · was not
effective, because it was not properly· published in the sense of C
having been brought to .the actual notice of the respondent must
be rejected.
Before parting from this topic we would. desire to make an
observation. There is undoubtedly a certain amount ·of uncertainty
in. the law except in cases w.here specific provision in that behalf
is made in individuai statutes as to (a) ·when subordinate legislalion could be said io have been passed, and (b) when it comes
into effect. The position in Englan\l has been clarifi~ by the
Statutory Instruments Act of 1946, though there is · a slight
ambiguity in the language employed in i!, which has given rise
to disputed questions of construction as regards certain expressions
used in the Act. We consider that it would be conducive to clarity
as well as to the avoidance of unnecessary technical objections
giving occasion for litigation if an enactment on the lines of t.lie
U.K. Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, were made in India either
by an amendment of the General Clauses Act or by independent
legislation keeping in mind the difficulties of construction to which
the U.K. enactment has given rise. As we have pointed out, so
far as the present case is concerned; even' on the narrowest view
of the law the ·notification of. the Reserve Bank must be deemed
to have been published in the sense of having been brought to the
notice of the relevant public at least bv November 25, 1962 and
hence the plea by the respondent th~t he was ignorant of the
law cannot afford him any. defence in his prosecution.
D
E
F.
G
The last of the points urged by learned Counsel for the
: respondent was as renrds the construction of the new second
proviso which had been ·introduced bv the notification of · the
Reserve Bank. dated November 8, 1962. The argument was that
the ?;Old that the resnondent earned wa~ hk rer!'~nal lugg~~e and H
nOt "cargo"-either "bottom cario" or "tr:tnshinment ·carJro"and that therefore could not. and need not have been entered in
~~
STATE v. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar J.)
-
165
the manifest of the aircraft and hence the second proviso could
not be attracted to the case. The entire submission on this part
of the case was rested on the meaning of the word 'cargo', the
point sought to be made being that what a passenger carried with
himself or on his person could not be 'cargo', and that cargo was
that which was handed over to the carrier for carriage. Reliance
B was, in this connection placed on the definition of the term 'cargo'
in dictionaries where it is said to mean "the merchandise or wares
·contained or conveyed in a ship." We find 'ourselves unable to
accept this argument. To say that the second proviso refers only to
what is handed over to the ship or 'aircraft for carriage would
make the provision practically futile and unmeaning. If all the
c goods
or articles retained by a passenger in hi.S own custody or
carried by him on his person were outside the second proviso, and
the provision were attracted only to cases where the article was
handed over to the custody of the canier, it would have no value
at all as a condition of exemption. The goods entrusted to a
c~~rier would be entered in the manifest and if they were not, it
D
must be owing to the fault of the carrier, and it could hardly be
that the passenger was being penalised for the default of the
carrier. If the carriage of the goods on the person or in the
custody of the passenger were exempt, there would be no scope
at all for the operation of the 2nd proviso. We therefore consider
E that the proper construction of the term 'cargo' when it occurs
· in the notification of the Reserve Bank is that ii is used· as contradistinguished from personal luggage in the Jaw relating to the
carriage of goods. The latter has been defined as whatever a
pas.5enger takes with him for his personal use or convenience.
either with reference to his immediate necessities or for hi~
F personal needs at the end of his journey. Obviously, the gold of
the quantity and in the form in which it was carried by the respondent would certainly not be "personal luggage" in the sense in
which "luggage" is understood, as explained earlier. It was really
a case of merchandise not for the use of the passenger ·either durin!!
the journey or thereafter and therefore could not be called
G Personal luggage or baggage. It was, therefore. "cargo" which
had to be manifested and its value must have been inserted in the
air c,onsignment note. In this connection. reference may usefully
be made to certain of the International Air Traffic Association's
Gener3l Conditions of Carriage not• as direct1v l!overnin!! the
contract between the respondent and the aircraft b11t as elucidatin~
H the p.eneral nractice of transoort bv air in the Jil!ht of which th~
second proviso has to be understood. Part A entitled 'Carriage of
Prssengers and BaggRge' hy its Art. R. oara 1 (c) excludes goods
A
166
SUPJlEME COURT RHORTS
[J 965] I S.C.R.
which are merchandise from the obligation of carriers to transport
as luggage or as baggage, while Art. 3 of Part B dealing with
carriage of goods provides that gold is accepted for carriage only
if securely packed and its value inserted in the consignment note
under the heading "Quantity and nature of goods".
A
Some point was made of the fact that if the second proviso B
were applied to the case of gold or articles made of gold curled
on the person, a tic-pin or a fountain-pen which had a gold nib
carried by a through passenger might attract the prohibition of
s. 8 (I) read with the exemption by the Reserve Bank as it now
stands and that the Indian law would be unnecessarily harsh and
unreasonable. We do not consider this correct, for a clear and C
sharp distinction exists between what is personal baggage and
what i> not and it is tho latter that is 'cargo' and has to be entered
in the manifest. If a person chooses to carry on his person what
is not personal baggage or luggage understood in the legal..sense
but what should properly be dee la red and. entered in the manifest D
of the aircraft there can be no complaint of the unreasonableness
of the Indian law on the topic.
The result, therefore, is that we consider that the learned
Judges of the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent. The
appeal has. therefore, to be allowed and the conviction of the
respondent restored.
E
Now, coming to the question of sentence to be passed on the
appellant, it is undoubtedly the settled rule of this Court that it
would not interfere with the sentence passed by the courts below
unless there is any illegality in it or the same involves any question
of principle. The facts o[ the case before us have, however, F
presented some unusual features which had led us to technically
interfere with the sentence of one year's imprisonment passed by
the Chief Presidency Magistrate. The respondent was sentenced
by the Presidency Magistrate on April 24, 1963 and thereupon
he started serving the sentence till the judgment of the High Court
which was rendered on December I 0, 1963. The respondent G
was rele1sed the next day i.e., December 11, 1963. This court
granted speoial leave on December 20, 1963 and thereafter on
applicMion made by the appellant-State, this Court directed the
arrest of the respondent. The respondent was accordingly arw.;ted
and though the Magistrate directed his release on bail pendin!! the H
dis!lOSal of the appeal in this Court, the resnondent was unable
to furnish the bail required and hence suffered imprisonment.
thou.~h it would be noticed that such imorisonment was not in
STATE v. MAYER HANS (Ayyangar J.)
16i
A pursuance of the conviction and sentence passed on him by the
Magistrate. Such imprisonment continued till May 8, 1964 when
the decision of this Court was pronounced, so that virtually the
respondent had suffered the imprisonment that had been in11icted
on him by the order of the Pri:sidency Magistrate. In these circumstances, we directed that though the appeal was allowed, the
B sentence would be reduced to the period already undergone which
was only a technical interference with the sentence passed by the
Presidency Magistrate, though in substance it Wal! oot.
Appeal allowed.
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