THE AMALGAMATED ELECTRICITY CO. LTD. versus N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 March 1964 | [1964] 7 S.C.R. 503 | 1964 INSC 97
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 March 1964
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 590/1963
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 7 S.C.R. 503
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 97
Text of the judgment
..
is.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
THE AMALGAMATED ELECTRICITY CO. LTD.
1964
v.
March JO
N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER
(A. K. SARKAR, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAJAGOPALA AYYAN·
GAR, JJ.J
Eiectricity Supply Act, 1948 (54 of 1948), ss. 57, 57A, 70 Sch.
VI Indian Electricity Aot, 1910 (9 of 1910). s. 3 Schedule
-Electricity Rates-Enhancement-Powers of !icenseeLimits of such power-Legality of rates-J11.nsdiction of civil
court-Burden of proofThe appellant company was supplying electricity under ~
licence issued in 1932 by the Government of Bombay under the
Indian Electricity Act, 1910. The licence fixed the limits r·f the
prices which the appellant rould charge but these limits were altered by an order made by the Government on December 30, 1942,
acting under para XI of the Schedule to that Act, Due to the
conditions brought about by the seeond world war, the licensee
was permitted to add a surcharge not exceeding 33-1/3 % to the
existing charges. On September 30, 1946, tho Bombay Electricity
(Surcharge) Act, 1946, was passed which continued the surcharges
for a period of·three years. Though the Surcharge Act of 1946 expired on September 30, 1949, the appellant continued charging
the consumers at rates which included the surcharge and thi'
was sought to be justified by resort to the provisions' of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which came into force on September 10,
1948. On September 25, 1958, the appellant gave notice to its customers that with effect from November 1, 1958, it would charge
them at certain rates which the customers considered to be illegal and unauthorised on the ground that they were in excess of
those prescribed in the order of December 30, 1942. In the suits instituted on behalf of the consumers challenging the legality of
the rates levied by the appellant in excess of the maximum prescribed by the Government of Bombay in its order dated December 30, 1942, the defence of the appellant was that the charges
were well within the limits prescribed by the Electricity Supply
Act, 1948, which according to its contention. effected such a radical change in the method of determining the reasonable rate as
to completely supersede the rates and the maxima fixed under
the Electricity Act of 1910. The question was also raised as to
whether having regard to the provisions contained in ss. 57 and
57A of the Act of 1948 a civil court would have jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the legality of the rates levied by the
appellant.
·
Held-(i) The maxima prescribed by the State Government
which bound the licensee under the Indian Electricity Act. 1910.
no longer limited the amount which he could charge after the
Electricity Supply Act, 1948, came into force and that the licensee
had a statutory right to adjust his rates as provided by Part I of
Sch. VI of the latter Act.
(ii) Where a party challenged the legality oi the rates on the
contained
ground that they contravened the provisions
in Sch. VI of the Act of 1948 there was no duty on the
licensee to prove that the rates were within the limits indicated
in Sch. VI and it was for the party alleging his right to relief to
prove his case.
504
196A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964],
Per Sarkar, J.-The respondents were not entitled to canvass
TM. Amalgamakd in a civil court any question ao to the rates of a licensee being in
Elutrici<yOo. Lid. excess of the limit prescribed in para I of Sch. VI to the Act of
v.
1948. A civil court could not declare that the rates charged by a
N.S. Bha<lu:na licensee were illegal as they made its clear profit exceed the reaandAiwther
sonable return. If there ~as such excess. the relief could be ob-
tained. only if'the Government set up a rating committee, a refund became due thereupon under the last proviso to para I of
Sch. VI or if relief was available under para Il(l) of that Schedule.
Per Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.-(i) There
could be unilateral adjustment of the rates by a licensee but such
an adjustment must not leave him with more than the reasonable return. Where the amount of reasonable return is exceeded,
para II of Sch. VI comes into play and the excess over the reasonable return is to be distributed in the manner !&id down in that
paragraph.
(ii) In view of the machinery that is provided for complaints
in the event of the licensee deriving more than a reasonable
return as contemplated by Sch. VI, the failure consciously to adjust the rates by working out the details so as to reach at the
same rate as·was charged previously did not constltute a failure
to adjust the rates as required by para I.
(iii) There being no express bar to the jurisdiction of the
civil court, its jurisdiction could not be held to be excluded in
respec't of such matters which were not assigned by s. 57A of
the Act of 1948 to the rating committee, or in regard to which
the rating committee could not afford the consumer relief
aga,inst an infraction of a statutory provision by which he was
aggrieved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 590591 of 1963-Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
February 6, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Second Appeals
Nos. 471and472 of 1960.
H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, M. M. Gharekhan and
I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 590/1963).
H. N. Sanyal. Solicitor-General, M.C. Setalvad, M.M.
Gharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 591 /
63).
Naraindas C Malkani, J.B. Dadachan/i, 0. C. Mathur and
Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (in both the appeals).
March 30, 1964. The judgment of DAS GUPTA and AYYANGAR JJ. was delivered by AYYANGAR J. SARKAR J. delivered a separate opinion.
Sarkar, J.
SARKAR, J.-The appellant is a company carrying on
business as supplier of electricity in a certain area in the State
of Bombay. The respondents Bhathena and ,Tendulkar were
consumers of electrical energy supplied by the appellant. The
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
present appeals arise out of disputes between these consumers
1964
and the appellant concerning the legality of the charges made The Amalga111ated
by the appellant for electricity supplied by it.
Electricity Co. Lid.
v.
The supply of electrical energy is controlled by two N.S. Bhathena
and AnnlMr
statutes and the questions involved in the present cases will
turn on them. These statutes are the Electricity Act, 1910 and
Sarkar, J.
the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948. I will first consider the Act
of 1910. Section 3 of this Act gives power to the Government
to grant a licence to• a party to supply electrical energy in any
specified area and to prescribe in the licence the limits of
price to be charged by it for the supply. This section further
provides that the provisions in the Schedule to the Act would,
unless otherwise directed, be deemed to be incorporated in
the licence. Paragraph XI of that Schedule states that a
licensee would not be entitled to exceed the limits of price
fixed in his licence. This paragraph, however, gives power to
the Government to alter these limits on the recommendation
of an Advisory Board appointed under s. 35 of the Act. It
is not necessary to refer to the other provisions of this Act.
The appellant had been supplying electricity under a
licence issued in 1932 by the .Government of Bombay under
the Act of 1910. The licence fixed the limits of the prices
which the appellant could charge but these limits were altered
by an order made by the Government on December 30, 1942
under paragraph XI of the Schedule and stood thereafter as
follows:
A. For lights and fans annas -/5/- (= 31 nP.) per
unit and,
B. For motive power, (i) upto 4 B.H.P. anna -/1 /.
(=0.06 nP.) per unit in addition to standing
charge of Rs. 2/- per month per B.H.P connected.
(ii) over 4 B.H.P. ·i:/9 pies (=0.05 nP.) per unit
in addition to the standing charge at the same rak
of Rs. 2/- per B.H.P. per month.
Due to the conditions brought about by the Second
World War, certain orders were made from time to time permitting the licensees to add a surcharge n0t exceeding 33!
per cent to the existing charges. Lastly, on September 30, 1946
an Act was passed by the Bombay legislature called the
Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1946, hereinafter refer·
red to as the Surcharge Act, which continued the surcharge
specified therein for a period of three years. This Act expired
on September 30, 1949. It is said that even thereafter the appellant continued charging the. consumers at ra.tes which included the surcharge under the Surcharge Act, and, therefore.
at rates in excess of those fixed by the Order of December 30,
1942 and that was illegal. The appellant on its part claims
506
1964
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
that its charges after the expiry of the Surcharge Act were air
TA< ..A._malganuzted justified under the Act of 1948 the relevant provisions of
Electricity Go. Ltd. which came into force on September 10, 1948. This Act will
v.
N.S. Bhathena be referred to later.
and Another
Sarkar, J,
The respondent Bathena commenced taking electricity
from the appellant sometime in 1954. Soon thereafter he
started disputes about the legality of the charges realised
from him by the appellant in respect of energy supplied for
purposes of motive power of over 4 B.H.P. and in 1955 filed
a suit against the appellant for refund of amounts alleged to
have been illegally collected from him in excess of the limits
fixed by the order of December 30, 1942, namely, an excess
standing charge of 0.69 nP. per B.H.P. per month over that
fixed by the Order of December 30, 1942 and a similar excess
unit charge of 0.01 nP. per unit. That suit is still pending and
with the disputes involved in it I am not concerned in this
judgment.
On September 25, 1958, the appellant gave notice to its
customers that with effect from November 1. 1958 it would
charge for motive power 0.09 nP. per unit plus a standing
charge of Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P. per month. The unit charge
mentioned in the notice was in excess of that prescribed
in the order of December 30, 1942 by 0.04 nP. per unit. There
is no dispute that this notice revised the unit charge existing
at its date but it seems that it did not enhance the then existing standing charge. The notice gave rise to further disputes
as a result of which two suits were filed against the appellant
on March 31. 1959 in the court of the Civil Judge, Belgaum.
The first of these suits was filed by the respondent Bathena
acting for himself and all other consumers of electricity supplied by the appellant for purposes of motive power over 4
B.H.P. for the following reliefs:
"(a) That a declaration be granted by this Hon'able
Court thai the standing charges of 2.69 nP. per
B.H.P. per month and the excess sum of 0.04 nP.
per unit of energy consumed, for motive power
whether oonnected or otherwise, are illegal and
unauthorised, inoperative and ultra vires of the
Defendant company and the Plaintiff is not bound
to pay the same and that the Defendant-Company
have no 'authority to control or interfere in the
supply of electric energy or its use, and that the
restrictions imposed in Notice dated 25-9-58 are
illegal, bad in law, and,
(b) an injunction restraining the Defendant-Company,
its servants, its agents or its representatives from
levying and recovering the excess and illegal
charges, (such as standing charges and per unit
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
of consumed energy at 0.04 nP.) from the plain1964
tiff, by means of any coercive measures and from The Amalgamai.
interfering or controlling with the electric supply".ElectrieityOo.Ltd.
The other suit was filed by the respondent Tandulkar also N .s. •·
Bhathena
in a representative capacity in respect of the charge of 0.37
andAnother
nP. per unit for electricity
.
. f supplied for lights and fans, and it
Sarkar,J.
sought the followmg re11e s:
"(a) That a declaration be granted by this Hon 'able
Court that the excess sum of 0.06 nP. per unit of
energy consumed for lights and fans, are illegal
and unauthorised, inoperative and ultra vires of the
Defendant-Company and the plaintiff is not bound
to pay the same.
(b) An injunction restraining the Defendant-Company
its servants, its agents or its representa.tives from
Iexying and recovering the excess and illegal
charges, i.e. 0.06 nP. per unit of consumed energy
from the plaintiff by means of any coercive measures and from interfering or controlling with the
electric supply".
Various persons were on their own applications later added as
plaintiffs in these suits.
The suits were decreed by the trial Court but that decision
was reversed on appeal by a District Judge. On second appeal,
however, the High Court oj Mysore set aside the decision of
the learned District Judge and restored that of the trial Court.
The present appeals are against the judgment of the ·High
Court.
I will first take up the suit relating to the charges for
motive power. To clear the ground it may be stated that this
suit is not concerned with any charge made prior to the date
that it was filed. As earlier stated, it asks for a declaration and
an injunction. An injunction cannot of course be in respect
of a past period and the declaration sought must also, therefore. be confined to the future. In anv case, since the declaration is sought in respect of the charges as revised by the said
notice as from November I, 1958 it is clear that no question
as to the legality of any charge made before November I, 1958
was sought to be raised. It would have been noticed that the
suit was concerned with disputes about two charges, namely,
the unit charge of 0.09 nP. per unit fixed by the notice of
September 25, 1958 and the standing charge of Rs. 2.69 per
B.H.P. per month.
I will first consider the dispute about the unit charge.
Could the appellant enhance the charge? It is not disputed
that a licensee can on his own enhance his charges upto the
maximum limit fixed in the licence or otherwise fixed by the
Government. The dispute is as to the right to enhance them
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
508
[1964]
beyond that limit and in this judgment I will be _discussing
Tiie Amalgamated such enhancement cnly. It is not in controversy that under the
Eltdri<ily Co. Ltd. Electricity Act of 1910 it could not do so but as already
T.
stated, the appellant bases its claim to enhance the charge on
N.S. BhatheM
the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 as amended by Act 101 of
an:l.A.nofher
1956 with effect from•December 30, 1956. It will be noticed
8ar'/v.Jr, J.
that this amendment was in force when the revised rate came
into force under the notice of September 25, 1958. The relevant provisions of this Act so amended are these :
S. 57. "The prO'Visions of the Sixth Schedule and the
Seventh Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated fo the licence of every licensee, not being a
local authority(a) in the case of a licence granted before the com·
mencement of this Act, from the date of the
commencement of the licensee's next succeeding-year of account; and.
(b) in the case of a licence granted after the commencement of this Act, from the date of the
commencement of suply,
and as from the said date, the licensee shall comply 'IVith
the provisions of the said Schedules accordingly, and any pr()visions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and the
licence granted to him thereunder and of any other Jaw, agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall, in relation
to the licensee, be void and of no effect in so far as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of section 57A and the said
Schedules".
S. 57A. "(1) Where the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the Seventh Schedule are under section
57 deemed to be incorporated in the licence of any
licensee, the following provisions shall have effect
in relation to the said licensee, namely:(a) the Board or where no Board is constituted under
this Act, the State Government(i) may, if satisfied that the licensee bas failed to
comply with any of the provisions of the
Sixth Schedule; and,
(ii) shall, when so requested by the licensee in
writing,
constitute a rating committee to examine the licensee's charge.~
for the supply of electricity and to make recommendations in
that behalf to the State Government:
1964
*
*
*
*
•
(c) a rating committee shall ............ report to the
State Government .................. making recommendations regarding the charges for electricity
which the licensee may make ............ .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7 S.C.R.
509
1Yt14
(d) within one month after the receipt of the report
under clause (c), the State Government . . . . . . .. ... Tht A~
inay ............... make an order in accordance Electricity Go. Ltd.
therewith fixing the licensee's charges for the sup- N 8 ;hathena
ply of electricity ......... and the licensee shall
~,;,iAnother
forthwith give effect to such order".
Sarkar,J.
Sixth Schedule
I. "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and the provisions in the licence of a licensee, the licensee shall
so adjust his rates for the sale of electricity whether
by enhancing or reducing them that his clear prcfit
in any year of account shall not, as far as possible,
exceed the amount of reasonable return;
•
•
•
•
•
how the first paragraph of the Sixth Schedule to the Act
of 1948 clearly gives a licensee the power to adjust and therefore also to enhance his rates on his own. It, however, fixes
a limit for the enhancement and that. is, so as not, as far as
possible, to make his "clear profit", for the year exceed the
amount of "reasonabie return". The methods of determining
"clear profit" and "reasonable return" are stated respectively
in els. (2) and (9) cf paragraph XVII of the Schedule but it
will not be necessary for me to go into their details. Now under
paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule the rates can be enhanced "Notwitllstanding anything contained in the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and the provisions in
the licence of a licensee". Nothing to the contrary, therefore,
contained in the Act of 1910 or the licence can make the enhancement of the rates by the licensee in terms; of this paragraph illegal. It would follow that the ·pqwer under paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule would justify ~ enhancement of
.the rate beyond that fixed by the licence or any order of the
Government. This seems to me to be perfectly plain. It will
be remembered that paragraph XI of the Schedule to the Act
of 1910 prohibited a. licensee from charging a rate in
excess of the maximum fixed by the licence:· That provision,
howeyer, was repealed by Act IOI of 1956. This was obviously
done because it was realised that paragraph I of the Sixth
Schedule to the Act of 1948 made the prohibition in paragraph
XI of the Schedule to the Act of 1910 quite ineffective. Then
we have s. 70(1) of the Act of 1948 which provides that
"No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910),
or of any rules ma.de thereunder or of any instrument having
effect by virtue of such law or rule shall, so far as it is inconsistrnt with any of the provisions of this Act. have any effect".
This provision also supports the view that the power t(}
.510
1964
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
enhance the rates given by the Act of 1948 is not in any way
The A-;;;;;lgamateil affected by anything in the Act of 1910 or the licence granted
Blectrieity. Go. Ltd under it.
v.
:N.8. Bhathena
andAnotlter
Sarkar,J.
Learned counsel for the respondents, however, first contended that the power to enhance cannot be exercised by the
iic'cnsee on its own. If, it wants an increase in its rates it has
first to ask the Government under s. 57 A of the Act of l 948 to
constitute a rating committee. This contention appears to
me to be entirely unfounded. No doubt a licensee can ask the
Government to constitute a rating committee under that section and if the Government does so and fixes rates on the
·b~sis of the recommendations of that committee, the licensee
would be bound by such fixation of rates. But I find nothing
in s. 57A or anywhere else in the Act of 1948 to lead to the
view that the licensee cannot increase his rates except after a
rating committee has recommended such increase and the Government has permitted it. Such a view would largely
render paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule nugatory. Nor do l
think that there is any conflict betweens. 57A and paragraph
J as was contended by the respondents. Quite clearly s. 57 A
giYes a licensee the power to call for the constitution of rating
committee. If he does so. be does not take the risk of
Ii ~ing an enhanced rate on his own with the possible consequences of having to refund part of the amounts collected
under provisions to which reference will be made later. That
seems to be the only reason why the licensee has been
given the right to ask for the constitution of a rating commit~
If he does not mind taking the risk of these consequences,
J find nothing in the Act of 1948 requiring him to ask for the
constitution of a rating committee before he can proceed to
enhance the rates on bis own.
Learned counsel for the respondents then relied on subs. (2) of s. 70 of the Act of 1948 which states that "Save as
otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall
be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910". He contended that thjs showed that an
attempt· has to be made to harmonise the two Acts and, therefore, the power to enhance the rates given by the Act of 1948
must be confined to an enhancement upto the maxima
limits specified in the Iicel}ie granted or any order made
by the Government. I am wholly unable to agree that subs. (2) of s. 70 of the Act of 1948 requires the two Acts
to be harmonised. In fact sub-s..m of s. 70 of the Act of
1948 provides that when there is inconsistency between the
two Acts, the earlier Act is not to have effect. There can be
no question of harmonising unless there is inconsistency and
sub-s. (\) says what is to happen in case of inconsistency;
it is that one is to give way to the other and not that
'1 S.C.R.
SUPREMJ<~ COURT REPORTS
511
an allemprshould be made to harmonise the two. Furthermore
1964
sub-s. \2.) of. s. 70 cl the Act of 1948 says that "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf
wise provided in this Act" the later Act is not to be read as Electricity Co. Ltd;
in derogation of the earlier Act. When, therefore, it is other- N 8 B/;;;th
wise pro~ided in the Act of 1948, this Act might be read as ·.;.,lAno:£:
in derogation of the Act of 1910. Now s. 57 of the Act of
1948 and paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to it clearly pro- 8 • i•r,J
vide that the provisions therein contained are to override the
provisions of the earlier Act. It would thus be against the
express terms of the Act of 1948 to .attempt to harmonise the
power to enhance the rates given to the licensee by it with any
of the provisions of the licence or the Act of 1910.
Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents relied on
Babula! Chaganlal Gujerathi v. Chopda Electric Supply Co.
Ltd.('\ to support his contention that under paragraph I of
the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 a licensee had the power
to enhance the rates only upto the maxima limits specified
in the licence er Government's order but not beyond those
limits. It was no doubt so decided in that case but then it
turned on paragraph I ofthe Sixth Schedule as it stood before
the amendment in 1956. Before the amendment, that paragraph did not contain the words "Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910! and
the provisions in the licence of a licensee". It sems to me
plain that these words have made a material change in the
provision and as it now stands, it cannot be said that the enhancement permitted must be restricted to the limit fixed in
the licence or an order by the Government. The decision cited,
therefore, is of no assistance in interpreting paragraph I of the
Sixth Schedule as it stands after the amendment in 1956.
Whether Chhaganlal's case(') was correctly decided in view
of the terms of paragraph I as it stood before the amendment
is not a question which arises for determination in this case
and on that question I express no opinion. I think that it must
be held on the terms of paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule
to the Act of 1948 as it stood at the time of the notice
that a liomsee had power to enhance the rates and such power
was not 1imited to an enhancement up to the limits fixed by
the licence or otherwise by any order of the Government.
On the question whether under paragraph I of the Sixth
Scheclul.e to the Act of 1948 a licensee could enhance his
rates beyond the limits fixed by the Government or in the
licence the High Court took the same view as I have done
and held that the respondents could not claim any relief
solely on the ground that the rates charged had exceeded
those limits. The High Court, however. observed that the
appellant had failed to establish that it had revised its rates
-----------~------------
'') I.L.R. [1955] Born. 42.
1964
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
The A.malgam.ated as provided by the Act of 1948 before its amendmen! in
Electricity Co. Ltd. 1956 and, therefore, held tha.t the appellant must be taKen
v.
N.S. Blvtthena
and Another
Sarkar, J.
to have illegaliy continued the surcharge which it was levying under the Surcharge Act, 1946 even after its expiry
on October. 1, 1949. It is somewhat difficult to understand
these observations. As I have earlier said, no question as
to the legality of any charge made before the suit or at
any rate, before November 1, 1958, arises in this case.
Therefore, even if the appellant had not revised its charges
prior to the amendment. no grievance on that account can
be made on the plaint on which the present suit is based.
Furthermore I do not see why the burden of proving that
those charges were the charges duly revised under the Act
of 1948 prior to its amendment should be upon the appellant. No issue on this question also appears to have been
framed by the trial Court a.t all. Even the plaint does not say
that what the appellant had done was to continue an illegal
charge. I repeat that whether the charges made before Novem·
ber 1, 1958 were illegal or not, is not a question that arises
for decision in these cases. Admittedly the notice of September 25, 1958, revised the unit charge and, therefore, in fact
there was no continuation of an earlier illegal charge, assuming the earlier charge to have been illegal.
The High Court, however, also held that the appellant
was under a statutory duty under the Act of 1948 to adjust
its rates so that its ciear profit did not exceed the amount of
reasonable return and it had not established that it had done
so after the Act was amended, nor had it proved that the enhancement mentioned in the notice of September 25. 1958
would not result in its clear profits exceeding the amount of
reasonable return. Lastly, the High Court observed that "even
otherwi.se the enhancement is the continuation of the illegal
charges and that by itself is invalid". It was on these grounds
that the High Court decided the cases in favour of the respondents. I am unable to agree with the High Court on any of
these points.
I will take the last point first. With respect to the learned
Judges of the High Court, I do not understand what exactly is
meant by the enhancement being the continuation of the
illegal charge. That there was a revision of the rates by
the notice of September 25, 1958 is the respondent's own
case in the plaint. I will assume that the revision raised the
rates to the figures that were chargeable under the expired
Surcharge Act of 1946. But the identity of the figures cannot
by itself make the enhancement illegal if it was legal under
the Act of 1948 as amended. Indeed as there was admittedly
a revision there was really no continuation of a previous charge.
This point must, therefore, be rejected.
'
~./
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS,
513
The other points on which, as stated above. the High
1964
Co.urt based itself, appear me to. be eqaally untenable. These T1" Amalgamated
pomts are really one and that 1s whether the appellant hasElectricityOo.Ltd.
established that the revised rate fixed by the notice of
"•
September 25, 1958 would not make its clear profit exceed N.~~d 11~~~,:
the amount of reasonable return. As already stated, it is
admitted in the plaint that there was a revision of the unit
Sarkar, J.
charge by the notice. So it is not in dispute that after the
amendment of paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule the appellant had revised its unit charge. I am unable to agree that the
onus of establishing that the revision did not make the appel· 1ant's clear profit exceed the amount of a reasonable return
should be on the appellant. I think that onus should be on
the respondents because it is they who allege that "the rates
mentioned by the defondant are exceeding the reasonable
return". The more serious objection to this point, however,
is that it does not seem to me that it is competent for a Civil
Court to go into the question whether the enhanced rates are
illegal because they take the clear profit beyond the amount
of the reasonable return, and to give any relief on that basis.
The reasons for this view will now be stated.
Paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948
no doubt prohibits the licensee from enhancing his rates beyond
a figure which would make his clear profit exceed the amount
of reasonable return. The Act, however, at the same time provided the consequences of a breach of the prohibition. Thus
the fourth and the last proviso in paragraph I of the Sixth
Schedule to the Act of 1948 states, "Provided further that if
the rates of supply fixed in pursuance of the recommendations
of a rating committee constituted under section 57A are
lowef' than those notified by the licensee under and in
accordance with the preceeding proviso, the licensee shall
refund to the consumers the excess amount recovered by him
from them". One consequence of the breach of the prohibition, therefore, is the liability to refund the difference between
the enhanced rate which has to be notified under the third
proviso and that fixed by the rating committee. But a rating
committee may not have been constituted for it is constituted
only where the licensee wants it, or the Government is entitled to constitute it under s. 57(1) of the Act of 1948. Where
a rating committing is not constituted, there is no liability to
refund· but the provisions of paragraph II of the Schedule
would then apply and this equally whether there is an enhancement of the charge under paragraph I and where there
is none. That paragraph is in these terms:
Paragraph 11 . . (!) H the clear profit of a licensee in any
year of account'is in excess of the amount of
L/P(D)ISCI-17
514
1964
The .Amalgamated
Eleetrieity Co. Ltd.
v.
N.S. Bhathena
and A notlier
Sarkar, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
reasonable return, one-third of such excess, not
exceeding five per cent of the amount of reasonable return, shall be at the disposal of the undertaking. Of the balance of the excess. One-half
shall be appropriated to a reserve which shall be
called the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve
and the remaining half shall either be distributed
in the form of a proportional rebate on the amounts
collected from the sale of electricity and meter
rentals or carried forward in the accounts of the
licensee for distribution ,to the consumers in future,
in such manner as the State Government may
direct.
This provision shows that where there was a revised rate
and that rate exceeded the limit prescribed in paragraph I, a
consumer might get a refund of a part of the excess but that
too only at the discretion of the government. l1e had clearly
no right to any refund even in such a case. Quite obviously if
the consumer could obtain refund of the whole excess as determined by a civil court, these provisions would be completely
meaningless. Equally obviously if a civil court could decide
that the charne m3de had exceeded the limit and was. therefore. illegal, it could also direct a refund of the amount illegally realised. Therefore, it seems to me clear that the question
of a brea,ch of the terms of the first part of paragraph I of the
Sixth Schedule was not intended to be canvassed in a civil court;
a civil court has no power to decide that question ncr can it
give any relief in respect thereof. Indeed if this were not so, the
consequences would be most anomalous. If the Civil Court
could decide the question whether the enhanced rate resulted in the clear profit exceeding the amount of the reasonable return, then it is ,onceivable that different courts might
come to different conclusion on different materials placed
before them and the result of that would be to destroy the uniformity of rate chargeable by a licensee. Such a situation could
not have been intended. Again the Act of 1948 did not give
to the consumer the right to have a rating committee constituted. This was obviously because it would be impossible to
work a public utility concern like an electric supply business if every consumer could get a rating committee to go into
the question of rates. There may then be a continuous succession of rating committees and there would be no fixity of the
rates chargeable. The convenience of all had to be kept in
mind. Power was hence given only to the Government to take
steps when, a licensee committeed a breach of its obligations. Therefore, in my opinion, the High Court was in
errot in holding that the appellant should have shown that the
enhancement did not result in its clear profit exceeding the
amount of reasonable return and in deciding in favour of the
7 S.C.R.
SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS
515
1964
respondents on that basis. I hold that the respondents were
not entitled to canvass in a Civil Court any question as The Amalgamal<4
to the rates of a licensee being in excess of 1'\e Limit pre>- Electricity Co. Lid.
cribed in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of N.S. vBnmhena'
1948. A Civil Court could not declare that the rates charged
and Another
by a licensee were illegal as they made its clear profit exceed
the reasonable return. lf there was such excess. the relief could
Sarkar, J.
be obtained only if the Government set up a. rating committee,
a refund became due thereupon under the last proviso to paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948' or if relief
was available under paragraph II (!) of that Schedule.
Then it was said that the revision by the notice of September 25, 1958 was bad in any case because under the third
proviso to paragraph I in the Sixth Schedule there could be
no revision of rates under that paragraph unless a notice in
writing of the intention to enhance was given by the licensee
to the Government or to the State Electricity Board and
no such notice was in fact given. That proviso no doubt requires a notice to be given but the contention is none the less
clearly without foundation for. as I shall immediately show
such a notice was in fact given. Now Ex. 62 is a copy of a
letter received by the appellant from the Secretary of the State
Electricity Board and it refers to a letter "No. AMAL/BEL/
C-2, dated 7-8-1958" written by the appellant to the Board and
the letter last mentioned, which is Ex. 60, is the notice
by the appellant to the Board expressing its intention to
revise the rates. It is quite clear, therefore, that notice had been
given to the Board of the proposed enhancement. This point
it may be stated does not seem to have been taken in the High
Court.
It was also said that the notice was bad as it did not
state that the standing charge was being increased from Rs. 2 /'to Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P. per month. This again is an unfounded
contention for the standing charge had not been increased by
the notice at all. Indeed the plaint itself in paragraph 5 states
that prior to November !, 1958 the appellant had been levying standing charges at the rate of Rs. 2.69. So there was no
enhancement of this charge by the notice and, hence no question of giving any notice of any enhancement of the standing
charge arises.
Lastly, it was said that in the notice to the consumers
it was stated that the power supply would be restricted between certain hours but the notice to the Government did not
mention this restriction in the suppl)': The notice to the consumers no doubt stated that the revised unit charge would be
in respect of restricted hours of supply but that does not
make the contention of any substance. There was nothing in
the notice to show that the supply would be restricted. Further
L'P(D)ISCI-17(a)
•.
..
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1964
it is neither alleged in the plaint nor does it appear from any,.,.. Amalgamated thing on the record. that there wa~ in fact ~ny res!riction in
EleelricityOo. Ltd. the supply. That being so, the failure to give notice to !he
N
11ia11it.
Government of the restriction in the supply is wholly 1m8
·a;..,Anotkuna material. I have not, further been shown any provision under
Sarkar, J.
which notice to the Government of a restriction in the supply
of electricity is necessary. It is certainly not required by anything in paragraph I in the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948.
I am, therefore. of the opinion that there is no reason to
hold that the appellant was not entitled to levy the charge
mentioned in its notice of September 25, 1948.
I come now to the standing charge of Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P.
per month. As in the case of fue other charge and for the
same reasons, I am not concerned with any qnestio!l as to its
legality in respect of any period prior to the suit. It has to be
remembered that there is no complaint that this rate had been
increased by the notice. Lastly, as already sta.ted, a Civil Court
cannot go into the question whether a charge is illegal inasmuch as it has been revised to an amount exceeding the limit
mentioned in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of
1948 . The only ground on which this charge is questioned is
put in paragraph 23 of the plaint in these words: "any standing charges along with the usual Unit Charges is against equity
and law, it being double charge for the industry to pay for
the enrichment of the defendants"; the legality of the standing charge is not challenged on any other ground. Now where
a charge is permitted by a statute no question of its being inequitable can be raised in a Court of law, neither can the
question whether the charge is in excess of the limit justified
by the statute be canvassed in such a Court. Therefore. the
respondents cannot in these cases challenge the legality of
the standing charge.
What l have said so far disposes of the appeal in the suit
concerning' the rates charged for the supply of motive power.
That appeal must, therefore, be allowed.
The appeal in the suit with regard to the charges for light
and fans can be disposed of substantially on the grounds earlier
discussed. The High Court also placed its decision in respect
of this matter on the same ground on· which it had disposed
of the other matter. The only point made in this case is that
the appellant had been wrongfully charging a rate in excess
of the limit fixed by the order of December 30, 1942 by 0.06
nP. per unit. On this basis a declaration that the excess charge
was illegal was sought and also an injunction restraining the
appellant from levying it. It will be observed that in this case
there was no notice given by the appellant of any increase in
the charge. No question of the charge being illegal by reason
of any enhancement, therefore, arises. The only complaint is
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
that the charge is illegal as it is in excess of the limit fixed by
1964
the Government. As I have said, under paragraphs I and II of The Amalgamated
the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 a licensee can charge Eleetridty Go. Ltd.
v.
any amount so that his clear profit does not exceed his reason- N.S. Bhathena
able return and if he exceeds the limit he only exposes himand A!iother
self to the consequences mentioned in them and a consumer
cannot go to a court of law for relief on the ground that the
licensee had exceeded this limit. Therefore, the respondent cannot ask for any relief in a civil court on the basis that the
appellant had exceeded the limit. As in the other case, in
this case also I am not concerned with the legality of any charge
made prior to the date of the suit; the only question is the
legality of the charge made since March 31. 1959. That question has to be decided under the Act of 1948 as amended in
1956. lt follows that in this case also the respondents can get
no assistance from the decision in Babula/ Chhaganlal(') even
if that case was rightly decided. I, therefore, think that this
appeal also succeeds.
In the result I would allow both the appeals with costs
throughout.
AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals which come before us
by virtue of special leave granted by this Court are against a
common judgment of the High Court of Mysore in two Second
Appeals preferred to it by the respective respondents in the
two appeals. They raise for consideration a question of the
legality of certain rates charged by the Appellant-company
for the supply of electricity to the respondents for power and
for light and fans respectively.
•
The Appellant-company is a licensee who is eligaged in the
business of supplying electricity in the town of Belgaum and
other places. A licence for the supply of electricity in the town
of Belgaum was granted in 1932 to two persons B. S. Ankle
and A.S. Ankle. These two assigned their licence to a concern
by name the Belgaum Electricity Co. Ltd. and by a further assignment by these assignees. the licence came to be owned by
the Appellant who are now effecting the distribution and sup·
ply of electricity in Belgaum. The original licence was granted
by the Government of Bombay under s. 3 of the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 (Act IX of 1910) which we shall hereafter
refer to as the "Electricity Act, 1910" tu whose provisions some
reference would be necessary to be made later. Broadly speaking, under the provisions of this ~nactment the maximum and
minimum rates which a licensee might charge its consumers
were fixed by Government and licensees were affonjed freedom
to fix the rates to be actually charged within these limits. Under
the powers so vested in them in that behalf the Government of
(') I.L.R. [1955] Born. 42.
Ayyan(Jar, J.
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
Bombay within whose jurisdiction Belgaum then was, passed
The Amalgamated an order on December 30, 1942 fixing the maximum rates which
' Electricity Co. Ltd. could be charged by licensees for supply to consumers and these
N. s. Bhalliena rates which applied to the Appellant were to be effective from
a•d Another
February 1, 1943. The maximum rates for the supply of energy
under the licence were, under this order, to be (I) where the
Ayyangar, J.
energy was supplied for lights and fans 5 annas per unit; (21
where energy was supplied for power purposes i.e., for purpose
other than lights and fans the maximum rate was to be (a) upto
and including 4 B.H.P. one anna per unit in addition to a standing charge of Rs. 2/- per month per B.H.P. connected, and (b)
for over 4 B.H.P. rate was 0. 75 annas unit in addition to a
standing charge of Rs. 2/- per month per B.H.P. connected.
Thereafter charges at the maximum permitted rate were levied
and collected by the Appellant. While so, on March, l I, 1943 a
notification was issued by the Government.of Bombay in exercise of powers conferred by rule 81 (2)(b) of the Defence of India
Rules by which relaxation was made as regards the maximum
rates for the supply of electrical energy chargeable by a licensee
under the Electricity Act. Such licensees were permitted to
charge amounts not exceeding 33t per cent over the permitted
maximum rates. Later this surcharge under the Defence of
India Rules fixed by the notificatiOn of 1943, was withdrawn
and simultaneously what is known as "War Costs Surcharge"
was permitted to be levied, but it did not make any practical
difference as the permitted increases over the maximum was
identical. The War Costs Surcharge was continued up to the
year 1946 when the Government of Bombay em\cted a statute
entitled the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act of l 946 which
came into force on September 30, 1946. It was a temporary enactment which uncler sub-s.(4) of s. l was to be in force for a
period of three years only so that it lapsed en October 1, 1949.
The Provincial Government was under s. 3 of that Act empowered to fix rates of surcharge and under s. 5 of that Act the
existing surcharge viz., the War Cost Surcharge were to be
deemed surcharges fixed under s. 3. As a result of this piece of
legislation the position that emerged was that though the original licence issued under the Electricity Act, 1910 which empowered the Government to fix the maximum of the rates that
could be charged by licensees for the supply of energy was
determined by the order dated Decem!Jer 30, 1942, still practically almost from the commencement of the operation of that
order a 33f per cent. surcharge was permitted to be levied by
the licensees over the permitted maximum charge and this state
of things continued until October 1, 1949.
Notwithstanding the lapse of the Act of 1946 the Appellant has continued to demand and collect practically the same
charges for the supply of energy as it had done during the
4
7 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
period when it was in force, with a slight variation by way of
1964
incr~ase in regard to the supply of power to which we s~all im- The Amalgamat.a
mediately advert. In the case of supply for power, while the Electricity Co. Liil.
standing charges are being levied at the maximum permitted N.8. v.Bhathena
by the notification of December 30, 1942, with the addition of and Another
, __
the surcharge, the unit charge has been increased even beyond
this figure by resort to the provisions of the Electricity Supply
Act, 1948 (Central Act 54 of 1948) which it will !Je convenien,
to refer. to as the Supply Act. The legality of the continuance
of the surcharge in regard to the standing charge from and
after !st October, 1949 and of the increase in the unit rate
even beyond it are challenged in the suit which has given rise
to Civil Appeal 590 of 1963. In the case of the charge for the
supply of energy for lights and fans there has been no change
since the 30th September 1949, but the maximum as increased by 33} per cent still continues and it is the legality of this
continuance of the surcharge that is impugned in Civil Appeal
No. 591 of 1963. The levy or the rates impugned is in every
case justified by the Appellant by reference to the terms of
the Supply Act to the relevant provisions of which we shall
have to make detailed reference la.ter.
Pausing here, we might advert to the fact that the Supply
Act was en!lcted to provide "for the rationalisation of the purchase and supp)y of electricity and generally for taking measures conducive to the electrical development". The Act ca in~
into force from September JO, 1948. The principal questior.
that arises for decision in these appeals relates to the effect of
the Supply Act, 1948 and the provisions that it contains on the
rates to be charged by licensees which had been fixed under
the Electricity Act, 1910-a matter which we shall examine
in its proper place. We might even at this stage refer to s. 70
of the Supply Act which enacts.:"(!) No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, or
of any rules made there.under or of any instrument
having effect by virtue of such law or rule shall, so
far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Act, have any effect;
Provided that nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to prevent the State Government from
granting, after consultatioit with the Board, a
licence not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Indian Electricity Act, 1910, to any person in respect of such area and on such terms and conditions
as the State Government may think fit.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in
derogation of, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910."
Ayyangar, J.
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
We are drawing attention to this provision to indicate the
The Amalgamated inter-relation between the .two Acts-the Electricity Act, 1910
Elutricity Co. Lt.a. and the Supply Act, 1948.
.
1961
v.
N. S. Bhathena
We shall now briefly narrate the course of the proceedings
which have led to the present appeals. Two suits were filed by
consumers of electrical energy in Belgaum receiving their supAyyanr1fJr, J.
plies from the Appellant in the court of Civil Judge, Belgaum,
both being representative suits under 0.I.r.8 of the Civil Proce-. dure Code. The first suit no. 133 of 1959 was in relation to the
supply of energy for power. In the plaint it was pointed out that
before-November 1, 1958 the Appellant was charging the plaintiffs Rs. 2I11 /- per B.H. Power per month as standing charges
plus one anna per unit of energy consumed. It was stated that
the Appellant had by a notice to the consumers dated September 25, 1958 whose terms were set out, proposed to raise from
and after November !, 1958 the unit charge from one anna per
unit to 1! anna or 9 naye paise per unit. It recited that the
plaintiffs had protested and addressed letters to the Government of Mysore, (Belgaum having been made part of this State
by the State Reorganisation Act) but without any result. Reference was made to the circumstance that the Appellant justified
the increase with reference to the provisions of the Supply Act,
particularly after the same was amended by Central Act 101
·Of 1956. The material averment on the basis of which relief was
claimed in the plaint was that the revision effected by the notice
of September 25, 1958 was illegal because it exceeded the
maximum prescribed by the Government of Bombay in its order
dated December 30, 1942 which, it was stated. still bound the
Appellant. The plaintiffs, therefore, sought a declaration that
any increase beyond the rates fixed by the notification of the
year 1942 was illegal and sought a declaration (a) that the
standing charge was illegal to the extent of the excess of
0.69 nP. per B.H.P. over the 2 rupees and the increase by 4
naye paise per unit of energy consumed was also illegal and
prayed for an injunctio11 restraining the Appellant from levying or collecting these illegal and excess charges.
and
Another
The other suit in relation to supply of energy for lights and
fans was no. 135 of 1959. That plaint pointed out that under
the order of Government of Bombay dated December 30, 1942
the Appellant could charge only 5 annas per unit or decimal
coinage 31 nP. and taking advantage of the!. surcharges that
were permitted during the war period and subsequently under
the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1946 it had been
charging 6 annas per unit, and after the decimal coinage cam11
into force 37 nP. The main point that was urged in the plaint
was that on the lapse of the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge)
Act, 1956 on September 30, 1959 ·the right of the Appellan to charge anyhting above 31 11P. ceased but that notwith·
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
1964
·.
standing this want of legal sanction it had continued to levy
the same rates even afterwards. On this basis a prayer was The Amalgamaled
Go. Lt4.
made seeking a declaration about the invalidity of any charge Eleotri<ity
v.
beyond 31 nP. per unit and an injunction restraining the N.S. Bhalhena
and An.other
Appellant from charging this illegal excess.
The defence of the Appellant was based on the provisions Ayyangar, J.
contained in the Supply Act of 1948, the contention being that
the charges they continued to levy or which they intended to
levy by virtue of the notice of September 25, 1958, were well
within the limits prescribed by the Supply Act of 1948 and consequently the plaintiffs in neither suit were entitled to any
relief.
The learned trial Judge held on an examination of the provisions of the two Acts-the Electricity Act and the Supply
Act-and their schedules that even after the coming into force
of the Supply Act the maximum limit of charge fixed by Government under the ·Electricity Act of 1910 continued to govern
the maximum rate that could be charged and as admittedly the
rates charged or threatened to be charged by the Appellant
were in excess of those rates, it granted to the plaintiffs in each
suit the declaration and injunction they sought.
The Appellant thereupon filed appeals to the learned Dis·
trict Judge and contended that the Supply Act of 1948 effected
such a radical change in. the method of determining the reasonable rate as to completely supersede the rates and the maxima
fixed under the Electricity Act of 1910. This contention was
accepted by the Appellate Court and the appeals were allowed
and the suits directed to be dismi,;;sed. The plaintiffs thereafter
filed second appeals to the High Court. The learned Single
Judge of the Mysore High Court who heard the appeals accepted in part the submission made by the Appellant that the
maxima prescribed by the Government under the powers vested
in them by the Electricity Act of 19 IO ceased to be in force on
the enactment of the Supply Act. He nevertheless held that the
procedure prescribed for the fixing of rates to be charged by
the licensees by the Supply Act of 1948 had not been tollowed
by the Appellant with the result that it could not sustain the
contention that the charges levied or to be levied were legal.
On this reasoning the learned Jndge allowed the appeals and
restored the decrees of the trial Court in the two suits. It is
from these judgments of the High Court that the present appeals have been brought by special leave of this Court.
Before setting out the arguments addressed to us on behalf
of the Appellant and to appreciate them it is necessary to read
the statutory provisions which bear upon the controversy in the
appeal. The Appellant was, as stated earlier, the transferee of
a licence granted under the Electricity Act, 1910. Section 3 of
522
1961
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
this Act enables the State Government, on application made to
TM Amalgamated it, to grant to any person a licence to supply energy in any speci-
Eledricity Co. Ltd.
N.S. ~hathe=
andA..other
.Ayyangar, J,
lied area. Under sub-s. (2) of that section "the provisions which
shall have effect on licences granted under the Act" are se~ out
and of these those relevant for our purpose are those contamed
in cl. (d) and cl. (f) which read: "(d) a license under this Part:(i) may prescribe such terms as to
the limits withir1
which, and the conditions under which, the sup.ply of energy is to be compulsory or permissive,
and as to be limits of price to he charged in respect of the supply of energy, and generally as to
such matters as the State Government 1r>ay think
fit. ...................... ' ... ' .. ' .. '' .. '.'' '.,,
"(f) the provisions contained in the Schedule shall j>e
deemed to be incorporated with, and to form 'part
of, every license granred under this Part, save in so
far as they are expressly added to, varied or excepted. by the license, and shall, subject to any such additions, variations or exceptions which the State
Government is hereby empowered to make, apply
to the undertaking authorised by the license:"
(the clause contains a proviso which is omitted as immaterial).
Section 23 requires the licensee not to show undue preference· to
any person and enacts that "save as aforesaid, make such charges for the supply of energy as tnay be agreed upon, not exceeding the limits imposed by his /iceme".
In the schedule that is referred to in s.3(2)(f) which is headed "Provisions to be deemed to be incorporated with, and to
form part of, every license granted under Part II, so far as not
added to, varied or excepted by the license", Paragraph XI
which is the one material for our purpose reads:
"Save as provided by clause IX, sub-clause (3) (a saving
not now relevant) the prices charged by the licensee
for energy supplied by him shall not exceed the
maxima fixed by his license, or, in the case of a
method of charge approved by the State Government, such maxima as the State Government shall
fix on approving the method."
It was in exercise of the powers conferred by the State
Government under s.3(2) of this Act that the notification dated
December 30, 1942 to which reference has already been made
was issued and under it the charges for supply were fixed.
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
1964
While narrating the facts we have already set out the maximum
rate which was fixed as that which could be levied by licensees The Amalgamated
under the Act both for the supply of energy for power as well Ekctricity Co. LU.
as for lights and fans. This notification came into force on and x.s. ~
was effective from February 1, l943. We have already seen how
a1UIA>wt11u
by virtue first of the notification under the Defence of India Ayyang'ar, J.
Rules and later under the War costs Surcharge and still later
under the Bombay Act of 1946, the maximum was raised by
33! per cent. of that specified in the notification of December
30, 1942 and how these rates continued to be validly charged
by the Appellant till September 30, 1949 when the Bombay Act
of 1946 lapsed.
The question that now falls to be considered is as regards
the legality of the continuance of this rate beyond the maximum
prescribed by the notification of December 30, 1942 subsequent
to September 30, 1949. For this purpose, it is necessary to refer
to the Supply of 1948 and it is on the proper construction of it&
provisions and their effect on the limitations prescribed by the
previous law on the rates to be charged that the decision o[
these appeals turns. Reference has already been made to s. 70
of the Supply Act, 1948 and this provision would show that
where there is any inconsistency between the two Acts, the.Supply Act, 1948 would prevail and it is only to the extent that the
two enactments do not cover the same field that the provisions
of the Electricity Act, 1910 would continue in operation. Coming now to the provision relating to the fixation of the rates
to be charged by a licensee for the supply of energy the relevant provisions of the supply Act dealing with it are those contained in ss.57 and 57A and read with Sch. VI to the Act.
Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the
provisions of the Supply Act of 1948 were amended by Central Act 101 of 1956 and among them was s. 57. Section 57, as
originally enacted, contained substantially the same provisions
as are after amendment contained in s. 57 and 57A, and as
thus there has been no material change effected by the Amendment for the purposes of the present 'appeal, we shall set out
ss. 57 and 57A which were in force when the present proceedings were commenced: "57. The provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the
Seventh Schedule ;hall be !leemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee, not being a local
authority(a) in the case of a licence granted before the commencement of this Act, from the date or the
commencement of the licensee's next succeeding
year of acconnt; and
524
196#
The Ama/gama!w
Electricity Co. Ltd,
v.
N. S. Bhathena
and Ancither
.Ayyangar, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
(b) in the case of a licence granted after the commencement of this Act, from ·the date of the commencement of supply,
and as from the said date, the licensee shall comply
with the provisions of the said Schedules accordingly, and any provisions of the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910, and the licence granted to him thereunder and of any other law, agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall. in relation to
the licensee, be void and of no effect in so far as
they are inconsistent with the provisions of section
57A and the said Schedules."
"57 A (!) Where the provisions of the Sixth Schedule
and the Seventh Schedule are under section 57
deemed to be incorporated in the licence of any
licensee, the following provisions shall have effect
in relation to the said licensee, r.amely: -(a) the Board or where no Board is constituted under
this Act, the State Govermnenr(i) may, if satisfied that the licensee has failed to
comply with any of the provisions of the Sixth
"·
Schedule;
and
''
(ii) shall, when so request~d by the licensee in writing,
constitute a rating committee to examine the licensee's
charges for the supply of electricity and to make
recommendations in that behalf to the State Government.
Provided that where it is proposed to constitute a rating
committee under this section on account of the
failure of the licensee to comply vvith any provisions
of the Sixth Schedule, such committee shall not be
constituted unless the licensee has been given a
notice in writing of thirty clear days (which period
if the circumstances so warrant may be extended
from time to time) to show ' buse against the
action proposed to be taken,.
Provided further that no such rating c11mmittee shall be
constituted if the alleged failure of the licensee to
comply with any provisions of the Sixth Schedule
raises any dispute or difference as to the interpretation of the said provisions or any matter arising
therefrom and such difference or dispute has been
referred by the licensee to the arbitration of the
Authority under paragraph XVI of that Schedule
7 S.C.R.
525
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
1964
before the notice referred to in the precedmg pro_
viso was given or is so referred within the period of The A.malgamat<d
the said notice:
Eleclnc>tyCo. LUI.
v.
Provided further that no rating committee shall be consututed in respect of a licensee within three years
from the date on which such a committee has reported in respect of that licensee, unless the State
Government declares that in its opinion circumstances have arisen rendering the orders passed on
the recommendations of the previous rating committee unfair to the licensee or any of his consumers;
(b) ......................................... .
(c) ............................... ·-·. ··-····
(d) within one month after the receipt of the report
under clause (e), the State Government shall cause
the report to be publi>hed in the Official Gazette,
:ind may at the same time make an order in accordance therewith fixing the licensee's charges for
the supply of electricity with effect from such date,
not earlier than two months or. later than three
months, after the date of publication of the report
as· may be specified in the order and the licensee
shall forthwith give effect to such order;
w ......................................... "
<The other sub-sections (2) to (8) are not material and
so are omitted).
Schedule VI referred to in ss.57 and 57 A has undergone
modification as a result of the :imendment effected by Act IOI
of 1956 and some argument has turned on these changes. We
shall set out para I and also para II of this Schedule as they
stood when originally enacted and as they now read. As enacted the first two paragraphs ran:
"I. The licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of
·electricity by periodical revision that his clear profit
in any year shall not as far as possible exceed the
amount of reasonable return:
Provided that the licensee shall not be cons;dered to have failed so to adjust his rates if the clear
profit in any year of account has not exceeded the
amount of the reasonable return by more than
thirty per centum of the amount of the reasonable
return.
II. (I) If the clear profit of a licensee in any year of account is in excess of the amount of reasonable return, one-third of such excess, not exceeding 7t per
l!l. S. Bhathena
and Another
Ayyangar, J.
526
1964
TM< Amalgam~ted
Electricity Go. Ltd.
v.
N.S. Bhaihena
and Another
Ayyangar,J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
cent. of the amount of reasonable return, shall be
at the disposal of the undertaking. Of the balance
of the excess, one-half shall be appropriated to a
reserve which shall be called the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve and the remaining half shall
either be distributed in the form of a. proportional
rebate on the amorn1ts collected from the sale of
electricity and meter rentals or carried forward in
the accounts of the licensee for distribution to the
consumers in future, in such manner as the State
Government may direct.
(2) The Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve shall be
available for disposal by the licensee only to the
extent by which the clear profit is less than the reasonable return iii any year of account.
(3) On the purchase of the undertaking under the terms
of its license any balance remaining in the Tariffs
and Dividends Control Reserve shall be handed
over to the purchaser and maintained as such
Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve."
These paragraphs were amended in 1956 to read:"I. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910, except sub-section (2) of section 32A, and the provisions in the licence of a
licensee, the licensee shall so adjust his rates for the
sale of electricity whether by enhancing or reducing them that his clear profit in any year of account
shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount ot
reasonabe return:
Provided that such rates shall not be enhanced more
than once in any year of account:
Provided further that the licensee shall not be deemed
to have failed so to adjust his rates if the clear
profit in any year of a.ccount has not exceeded
the amount of reasonable return by fifteen per
centum of the amount of reasonable return:
Provided further that the licensee shall not enhance the
rates for the supply of electricity until after the
expiry of a notice in writing of not less than sixty
clear days of his intention to so enhance the rates,
given by him to the State Government and to the
Board:
Provided further that if the rates of supply fixed in pursuance of the recommendations of a rating committee constituted under section 57A are lower
"'
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
527
than those notified by the licensee under and in ac1964
cordance with the preceding proviso, the licensee p··11e .nm.alga,,_
. - - --··•
shall refund to the consumers the excess amount re- Electricity co. Lid.
covered by him from them.
v.
N.S. Bhat"""'
II. ( 1) If the clear profit of a licensee in any year of acand .A.1IOl1oer
count is in excess of the amount of reasonable
re.
Ayyangar, J.
turn, one-third of such excess, not exceedmg five
per cent. of the amount of reasonable return, shall
be at the disposal of the undertaking. Of the
balance of the excess, one-half shall be appropriat·
ed to a reserve which shall be called the Tariffs and
Dividends Control Re,erve <.nd the remaining half
shall either be distributed in the form of a proportional rebate on the amounts collected from the sale
of electricity and meter rentals or carried forward
in the accounts bf the licensee for distribution to
the consumers in future, in such manner as the
State Government may direct.
(2) The Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve sj:lall be
available for disposal by the licensee only to the
extent by which the clear profit is less than the reasonable return in any year of account. ' ·
(3) On the purchase of the undertaking under the terms
of its licence any baiance remaming in the Tariffs
and Dividends Control Reserve shall be handed
over to the purchaser and maintained as such
Tariffs and DividenJs Control Reserve."
Paragraph 17 of this Schedule contains the definitions and
among the terms there defined is 'clear profit'-an expression
used in paragraphs I & II. As nothing material turns on the
manner in which the 'clear profit' is to be computed which is
described in para 17 we do not think it necessary to refer to
the details contained there.
The questions raised before us are principally three: (1)
'[he effect of the Supply Act, 1948 on the maxima of rates
fixed by Government under s. J(2) of the Electricity Act, 1910
which could be charged by a licensee. The submission of the
appellant which was accepted by the High Court but which
was contested by the respondents before us was that any changes that might be effected by a licensee acting under the provisions under s.57 of the Supply Act read with paragraph 1 of
Sch. VI in revising his rates so as to derive the reasonable return permitted by these provisions, had still to be within the
maxima prescribed by Government under the Electricity Act
of 1910; (2) The next point was that assuming that the Appellant was right on poi.Vt no. 1, whether the charges demanded by
.the appellant-company from the respondents were legal and
528
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
[1964}
1964
justified by the Supply Act: It is on this point that the learned
The Amalgamated Single Judge in the High Court has upheld the contention urged
Ekctr;<ityCo.Ltd. by the respondent; (3) Closely related· to the 2nd point, the
limits of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to afford relief to conN.s. v.
Bhatkena
an3Another
sumers who complained of excessive charges beincr demanded
Ayyanqar, J.
by licensees.
"'
So far as the !st point is concerned viz., whether the
maxima prescribed by Government under the Electricity Act.
1910 still continues to bind the licensee after the coming into
force of the Supply Act, we feel no hesitation in agreein" with
the submission of the Appellant which found favour with the
High Court. Section 57 of the Supply Act, 1948-both as originally enacted and as amended in 1956 expressly provide that
the provisions of the Vlth Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated in the license of every licensee and "that the p:ovisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the license granted thereunder and any other law, :igreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall be void and of no effect in so far
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the section and
the said Schedule". Read in the light of s.70 of the Supply Act
it would follow that if any restriction incorporated in the
licence granted under the Electricity Act, 1910 is inconsistent
with the rate which a licensee might charge under para I of Sch.
VI of the Supply Act, 1948, the former would, to that extent, be
superseded and the latter would prevail.
Para I of Sch. VI both as it originally stood and as amended, as seen already, empowered the licensee "to adjust his rates,
so that his clear profit in any year shall not, as far as possible,
exceed the amount of reasonable return". We shall reserve for
later consideration the meaning of the expression "so adjust bis
rates". But one thing is clear and that is that the adjustment is
unilateral and that the licensee has a statutory right to adjust
his rates provided he conforms to the requirements of that paragraph viz., the rate charged does not yield a profit exceeding
the amount of reasonable return. The conclusion is therefore
irresistible that the maxima prescribed by the State Government which bound the licensee under the Electricity Act of
1910 no longer limited the amount which a licensee could
charge after the Supply Act, 1948 came into force, since the
"clear profit" and "reasonable return" which determined the
rate to be charged was to be computed on the basis of very -·
different criteria and factors than what obtained under the
Electricity Act. In support of the submission that notwithstanding the Supply Act the maxima fixed by the State Government
was still binding on the licensee and that any adjustment within
1st paragraph of Sch. VI should ~~ within the limits of t_his
maxima we were referred to a dec1s10n of the Bornbay High
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
Court reported as Babu/al v. Chopda Electricity Supply Co.(')
1964
It is sufficient to extract the headnote to understand the point The Amalgamated
of the decision:
Electridty Co. Ltd•
...
"Section 57(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, or
cl. l of the Sixth Schedule to the Act, does not confer a right upon a licensee unilaterally to alter the
terms and conditions on which supply may be
made by a licensee of electrical energy to consumers in the area of supply irrespective of the restrictions contained in the license and the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910.
Not only does s. 57(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948, impose an obligation upon the licensee to
conform to the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and
the table appended to the Seventh Schedule to
the Act, but the first clause of the Sixth Schedule
imposes a further obligation to make periodical revisions and to adjust the profits so that hi~ profits
in any year do not as far as possible exceed a reasonable return on his investment. There is nothing
in s.57 or in the first clause of the SiXth Schedule
which either expressly or by implication amends
the provision;; of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910,
contained in s.3(2)(d) or in s. '.i.1(2) of that Act or
the rates and methods of charging the same as fixed
by the licence. The provision contained in s.3(2)(d)
of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, which requires
the State Government to prescribe the terms and
conditions under which the supply of energy is to
be made is not affected by the Electricity (Supply)
Act, 1948. The right to amend the license is conferred by the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, upon the
State Government and that right is not affected by
the Eectricity (Supply) Act, 1948."
With great respect to the learned Judge we are unable to
agree with this decision, for, in our opinion, the provisions of
the Supply Act, 1948 to which we have adverted are too strong
to permit the construction, that the maxima prescribed under
the Electricity Act of 1910 survives as a fetter on the rights of
the licensee under paragraph I of the VIth Schedule. ff there
was any room for any argument of this kind on the terms of
para I of Sch. VI as originally enacted, the matter is placed
beyond possibility of dispute by the amendment effected by
Act 101 of 1956 to the Vlth Schedule where the opening paragraph commences with the words 'notwithstanding anything
(') 06 Born, L. R. fi94
N.S. Bltatli('na
and A11oflur
530
1964
SUPREME COURT REPORTd
[1964]
contained in the Indian Electricity Act and the provisions in
TlleA!llalgamatea the li~e1_1ce of a licensee'. We, therefore, conside{ that the first
Sleclricity ao. Lid. subm1ss10n of learned Counsel for the Appellant that the limit
v.
imposed by the maxima prescribed by the State Government
1:;!i~:a
-"!JYO'fllJO'• •1·
ceased to be .in force after the Supply Act of 1948 came into
force is well-founded. •
·
The next question for consideration is whether the action
of the appellant-company in continuing to charge the rates that
it was permitted to charge by virtµe of the War Cost (Surcharge)
Rules and the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act.
i 946 i.e., by making an addition of 331 per cent. to the
maxima which he was permitted by the notification dated
December 30, 1942 is lawful. This would have a vital ,bearing on the point involved in Civil Appeal 591.of 1963 which
relates to the unit charge for light and fans for domestic consumption as well as on the legality of the standing charges
for the supply of power which is raised in Civil Appeal 590
of 1963. It would be recalled that in these cases the Appellant has merely continued the charges that it was making
before September 30, 1949 even after that date, there being
no variation in the rates charged. On October 1, 1949 the
position was this. The Bombay Act of .1946 having lapsed
by effiux of time, the previous charge which was 331
per cent. in excess of the maxima permitted could not be continued unless recourse was had to the provisions of paragraph
I of Sch. VI of the Supply Act of 1948. It was not suggested that
on or before that day there was any conscious act on the part
of the Appellant to determine (a) the "clear profit" on the basis
formulated in Sch. VI and (b) an adjustment of its rates so as
not to exceed the amount of the reasonable return permitted by
paragraph I of that Schedule. In this connection there was
some debate in the courts below as to the date the Appellant's
license came to be governed by the provisions of s. 57(1) and
the VIth Schedule. Section 57(a) fixes the period from which
licenses previously in existence would be governed by Sch. VI
as "the commencement of the licensee's next succeeding year
of account". The controversy was as to the period which would
be the date of the commencement of the Appellant's "next succeeding year of account''. Two possible interpretations were
suggested of this provision: (1) As the year of account of the
Appellant was the financial year it was contended on behalf of
the respondents that the AC! became applicable to it from April
1, 1949 onwards, the contention on the side of the Appellant
being that it became applicable only on April I. 1950; but for
the purposes of the cases before us it makes little difference, because assuming that s. 57 and the Supply Act I 948 became applicable to the Appellant from April I, 1950 onwards, still the
~ame question would arise as to whether at the commencement
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
1964
of that year the requirements of paragraph 1 of the Vlth Schedule had been complied with.
Th< Amalgamated
00
The material words of paragraph 1 of the Vlth ScheduleElectri~~Yv. • Lid.
are "The licensee shall so adjust his rates". The normal inter- N.S.BhoJhe""
pretation of these words would imply that there should be a an<IAnolher
conscious act on the part of the licensee, for the Act and the · Awanu:u, J.
Schedule for the first time specified the criteria for determining the maximum profit that shall be made by a company and
gave elaborate calculations as to how the 'clear profit' and the
reasonable return' were to be computed and determined. It is,
however, possible to read the paragraph as meaning that it
·was only in those cases where either an increase or a decrease
of the charge was necessary in order to ensure (a) that a
licensee obtained a reasonable return or that the profit that he
made exceeded or fell below the amount of reasonable return
that the rates had to be modified. In other words, where no
change is needed, it might be presumed that no adjustment was
needed. In view of the machinery that is provided for complaints in the event of the licensee deriving more than a reasonable return as contemplated by the Vlth Schedule we consider that the failure consciously to adjust the rates by working out the details so as to reach at the same rate as was charged previously does not constitute a failure "to adjust the
rates" as required by paragraph 1.
This leads us to the further questions (1) as to whether assuming that the rates had been adjusted by the licensee as required by paragraph 1 and the licensee is charging the rates
so adjusted whether the rates now charged (a) for liglifs and
fans, and (b) as standing charges for the supply of motive
power, could be successfully impugned as not conforming to
the requirements of the Vlth Schedule, .(2) and closely related
to this, and that is the third question we have specified earlier,
whether having regard to the prqvisions contained in ss. 57
and 57 A of the Supply Act, a Civil Court would have jurisdic·
tion to entertain a suit for the reliefs claimed in the present
pJai!1tS.
Taking up, first, the question of lights and fans (and the
standing charges for the supply of power would be governed
by similar considerations) the position would be that the Appellant must be deemed to have adjusted his rates under paragraph I of the Vlth Schedule when after the lapse of the
Bombay Act of 1946 it continued to levy the same charges.
When in 1949 or 1950 it is deemed to have made this adjustment paragraph I which empowered it to make this adjustment contained a proviso which we shall recall:
"Provided that the licensee shall not be' considered to
have failed so to adjust his rates if the clear profit
532
1964
The Amalgamat<d
Eleriri<ity Oo. Ltd.
v.
N. 8. BT!athtna
aod AnolMr
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
in any year of account has not exceeded by more
than 30 per cent of the amount of the reasonable
return".
The proviso, no doubt. uses a double negative "not be
considered to" have failed" but expressed in positive terms it
Ayyangar, J.
would mean that where the licensee adjusted his rates so that
his clear profit exceeds by more than 30 per cent the reasonable return to which it was entitled, it could not be $aid to
have adjusted his rates. In other words, such an adjustment
would not be an adjustment at all as is contemplated by paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 of the VIth Schedule proceeds on the
basis that there is an adjustment within paragraph I; in other
words, that the rate charged would yield to the licensee a clear
profit which would not exceed the reasonable return by more
than 30 per cent. It is only on that basis that the percentages
specified in paragraph 2 could be properly appreciated, for it
proceeds to take the excess over the reasonable return, divide
it by 3 and of that lrd allot a proportion not exceeding 7!
per cent. over to the licensee himself. Of the balance half is
to be appropriated to the Tariffs and Dividend Control Reserve and the other half is directed to be given to the consumers by granting them proportional rebates. From the per·centage named in para II read in conjunction with the absolute prohibition against a rate which would yield more than
30 per cent. over the reasonable return it appears to us that
the lawfully adjusted rate contemplated by paragraph 1 is one
where the amount of clear profit does not exceed the "reasonable return" by more than the maximum specified i.e.,· 30 per
cent. The other paragraphs of the Vlth Schedule deal with the
creation and disposal of certain funds and reserves to which
it is not necessary to refer.
We thus reach the position that there could be a unilateral adjustment of the rates by a licensee but that such an adjustment must not leave him with more than the reasonable
return plus another 30 per cent, this being an absolute limitation on the power to "adjust". Whern the amount of "reasonable return" is exceeded paragraph 2 comes into play and the
excess over the reasonable return is distributed in the manner
laid down in that paragraph.
We have next to consider that effect of the amendment
to para 1 of the Vlth Schedule brought about by Central Act
101 of 1956 by which the maximul)l rate permitted to a
licensee became reduced from one which yielded him not more
than 30 per cent. beyond the "reasonable return" to one
which yielded him not more than 15· per cent. The result of
this would obviously be that there should have been a further
7 S.C.R.
8UPRE1\1E COURT REPORTS
533
1964
adjustment by licensees so as to conform to the revised pattern. Here again, the question would arise whether there The Amalgamaltd
should be a conscious readjustment. Applying the rule of con- ElecJricity Co. Ltd.
struction we have explained earlier in relation to "adjustment" N 8 ';ihatheM
in 1949 or 1950 it would be seen that if the rate previously ·• .;a A1IOl.\er
charged yielded a profit over the "reasonable return., of ! 5
per cent. or less there need be no readjustment and if the rate Ayvangar, J.
charged yields more than this permitted profit there should be
a readjustment. The result. would, therefore, be that unless it
is established that. the rate charged by the Appellant for lights
and fans and for the standing monthly charge for supply of
power resulted in a profit to it of more than 15 per cent. over
the "reasonable return", the Appellant would be held to have
properly adjusted these rates in conformity with the requirements of the relevant provisions of the Supply Act as ;!mended by Act 101 of 1956.
We shall, when dealing with the question relating to the
jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain suits relating to infractions by licensees of their obligations under Para 1 of the
Vlth Schedule which is the last of the matters debated before
us, also examine the question as to the party on whom the
burden of proof would lie to establish that the adjustment
which is made or which could be deemed to be made by a
licensee by the continuance of a pre-existing rate contravenes
the statutory provisions.
Coming next to the unit charge for supply for power,
the impugned rate was that which had been stepped up from
that which had been continued from before September 1949,
by action taken in compliance with the 3rd proviso to paragraph 1 of Sch. VI as amended by Act 101 of 1956. The
licensee notified to the consumers on September 25, 1958 His
intention to enhance the unit rate for the supply of power.
Previous thereto in terms of that proviso a notice in writing
had been issued to the State Government intimating its intention to enhance the rate, and thereafter the consumers
were notified of -this increase in rates. It would be seen that
the 3rd proviso to para 1 requires a notice to the State
Government of the intention of the licensee to enhance the
rates. On August 7, 1958 the Appellant intimated the Government of Mysore setting out the clear profit it h:id made in
1957-58 and the estimated working position in 1958-59 and
its intention to increase the unit rate for supply of power
from 6 nP. to 9 nP. unit. Thereafter. on September 25, 1958,
it notified the consumers that on and after November 1, 1958
it would be charging the enhanced unit rate together with
the previously existing standing charges of Rs. 2.69 per
B.H.P. per month. The only point that was suggested as invalidating the notice to the Government was that the Government were not informed· that the licensee was effecting an
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964J
19 64
enhancement of the rates as regards the standing charges and
Th• Am.lgamated that the notice was, therefore, bad. We do not consider that
Ekttricitu oo. J.,W. there is any substance in this objection. Rs. 2.69 was the
v.
char~ which had been made prior to the notice as standing
N:;.,i,J/:i~":,."" charges and if, as we have held, that was the rate which must
be deemed to have been adjusted and which the appellant
Ayya,.g.r, J. was entitled to charge when Sch. VI as it originally stood,
the continuance of the same charge after the amendment of
the Schedule would not make it an enhancement.
There is however one circumstance to which it is necessary tb advert. As already stated, the rate charged prior to
the Supply Act, 1948 and which was continued thereafter
would be a lawful rate only if the profit that it left to the
licensee was less than 30% over the reasonable return. This
was the position when the Supply Act, 1948 came into force.
By reason of the amendment effect by Act IOI of 1956 the
percentage of permissible profit was reduced to 15 % and so
the adjusted rate would be valid if it was within this permissible limit. Unless the-,_adjusted rate prior to the amendment of 1956 was in excess of 15 per cent permitted by the
!st proviso to paragraph I the continuance of such rate
could not be objected to as an enhancement or as· a violation of paragraph I of the Vlth Schedule. The .question as
to the burden of proof as regards this requirement and
whether the same has been discharged in these cases we
shall reserve' for later consideration. Subject to this so far
as regards the unit charge, the requirement of the third proviso to paragraph I was complied with. There was thus no
illegality or invalidity attaching to the notice to the Government issued under proviso 3 to paragraph I and the contention raised in that behalf by the respondents must be
rejected.
The question next to be examined is as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suits from which
these appeals arise for the 'reliefs prayed for therein. Section
57 of the Supply Act, 1948 which incorporates the Vlth
Schedule in the licence of every licensee lays an obligation
on the licensee to comply with the provisions of the said
~chedule. Then comes S. 57-A under which where the Board
or the State Government, where there is no Board, "if sati~
fied that the licensee has failed to comply with any. of the
provisions of the Vlth Schedule and shall when so requested
hy the licensee in writing, consti'tutc a Rating Committee". It
is unnecessary to refer to the provisions relating to the procedure to be followed by the Rating Committee but it is sufficient to recall that the Rating Committee is empowered to
fix the rates to be charged by licensees and the duty is cast
· on the Rating Committee to recommend a rate which would
ensure to the licensee a clear profit sufficient to afford it a
reasonable return as defined in the VIth Schedule during the
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
1964
next three years of account. The provisions in s. 57-A have
to be read in conjunction with the last proviso to paragraph '!''"1~gamated
1 of the Vlth Schedule under which where the rates are fixed Electricuy Co. Ltd.
in pursuance of the recommendations of the Rating Com- x.s. Bhathena
mittee and they are lower than those adjusted by the licensee
and Another
under the Schedule, the licensee is directed to refund to the
consumers the excess amount recovered by him from them.
Ayyangar, J.
The argument of the learned Solicitor-General was that
as the Supply Act had bys. 57 A made special provision and
created a special machinery for the determination of a proper rate to be charged by a licensee on its consumers, a suit
in a civil court by the consumer for obtaining the same relief
was impliedly barred. )'he procedure prescribed by s. 57 A
was (I) where a consumer complained that a rate charged
was excessively high he should first approach the Board or
where there was no Board, the State Government, (2) the
Board or the State Government should, on considering the
complaint, be prima facie satisfied about the reasonableness
of the complaint and it was in their discretion to appoint a
Rating Committee, (3) if the Board or the State Government
decided that it was not necessary to appoint a Rating Committee there was an end of the matter. If, however, a committee was appointed the Rating Committee would take evidence and, applying the provisions of the Act and the Schedules, would arrive at a rate which would yield the licensee
an amount not less than the reasonable return that is provided for him under the Act. It was submitted that this procedure was wholly incompatible with the continued existence
l:lf the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine aily question
as to whether a licensee had failed to comply with the requirements of Sch. VI and in particular as tl:l the reasonableness of the rate to be charged. Besides, attention was also
drawn to the last proviso to paragrap'l. l of the Vlth Schedule under which provision is made for refund to consumers
in cases where an excess amount is coli~cted from them
beyond what was fixed as a reasonable rate by the Rating
Committee.
t
It is undoubted that these provisions have laid down a
specific procedure for violations by the licensee of the requirements of Sch. VI. There being no express bar to the
jurisdiction of the Rating Committee; or expressed in other
scope and extent of the bar that could be implied from the
existence of these provisions. One thing, however, is clear;
che bar cannot extend beyond the scope and . limits of the
juri~diction of the Rating Committee; or expressed in other
words, the jurisdiction of the civil court could not be held to
be excluded in respect of those matters which are not assign;.
ed by s. 57A to the Rating Committee, or in regard to which
the Rating Committee cannot afford the ccinsumer relief against
an infraction of a statutory provision by which he is aggrieved
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964}
Before turning to the facts of the present case with a
view to examine whether the relief sought by the respondents
;iz., a declaration and injunction could be granted by a civil
'"
court. we shall deal with the major argument of the learned
'J·.s.
Bhai11uu1 S 1· .
• f ractton
. by a l'1censee of 1us
.
<mdAnotlur
o 1c1tor-General that f or no m
obligations under the schedule could a suit be filed in a civil
A!f'l""~'"•J.
court. This was based on the words of s. 57A-(l)(a)(i) which
empowers the Board or the State Government to ::ppoint a
Rating Committee if satisfied "that the licensee bas failed to
comply with any of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule"
The learned Solicitor-General further contended that the
provisions contained in s. 57 A were wholly incompatible
with the existence of a right in a consumer to move a civil
court for obtaining a refund even of an illegal collectibn
which the licensee is prohibited from charging. It was in this
connection that he invited our attention to the provision for
refund contained in the last proviso to paragraph 1 of Sch.
VI and relying on this he submitted that the scheme of s. 57A
could obviously not have contemplated a procedure by which
one consumer went to a civil court and obtained redress, the
civil court holding that the rate charged so far as the particular plaintiff was concerned was illegal and therefore entitling him to a refund of a particular-sum, while another consumer approached the Government who appointed a Rating
connection that he invited attention to the provision for
it did provide, for a different amount of refund. This is doubtless a serious argument which requires careful examination.
In this. context and in support of this submission stress was
laid down on the words "the licensee has failed to comply
with any of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule" occurring
in s. 57 A·(l)(a)(i) and it was urged that for any and. every
default of the licensee resort must be had to the Board or the
Government and cc uld not be had to the civil courts. But
from these provisi011\ it does not, in our opinion, follow that
the jurisdiction of a civil cot.'\'! is barred in respect of the
infraction of every obligation cast on a licensee by Sch. VI.
Broadly speaking, the utmost that could be urged would be
that the bar to the jurisdiction of a civil court would be coextensive with and be restricted to the powers of the Rating
Committee and the reliefs which the committee could grant
under s. 57A. A few examples of breaches of Sch. VI which
a licensee may commit and in regard to which a reference to
the Rating Committee is not contemplated would make our
meaning clear. The first proviso to paragraph I specifies that
"such rates shall not be enhanced more than once in any
year of account". Let us suppose that the licensee contravenes this prohibition and enhances the rate more than once.
There is no provision in s. 57 A for the Rating Committee to
control the licensee in the event of his transgressing a positive
1964
The AMa/gamated
f.'lecJrieily co. Ltd.
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
1964
prohibition of this sort and. indeed, it would be most anomalous to say that the statute having made a provision that the T,.. Amalgamated
rates shall not be enhanced more than once in a year, the Eledri<ity Co. U~.
v.
consumer is left without a remedy if the Government does
Blwt"""•
not choose to appoint a Rating Committee which, as we said N.S.
and Another
earlier, has no power to afford ·redress to the affected consuA:JYangar, J.
mer. In such a case it appears to us that by no principle of
construction can the jurisdiction of a civil court to grant a
declaration and an injunction be denied. It would also follow
that if that rate is collected, the court could order a refund
of the illegal collection. Take next the case where a licensee
in contravention of the 3rd proviso enhances the rates for the
supply of electricity without giving the requisite notice of his
intention to tbe Government and to the Board. Here again,
the Rating Committee does not come into the picture for preventing the continued charging of the rates in contravention
of the 3rd proviso and here we consider it impossible to
contend that the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant a
declaration and an injunction are affected by the provisions
of s. 57A. We therefore arrive at this position that notwithstanding the generality of the words in s. 57AO)(a)(i) referring to the failure on the part of the licensee in complying
with the requirements of the Sixth Schedule" there are some
"failures" in regard to which the jurisdiction of the civil court.
it is clear, not barred.
The next question would be whether the same principle
is not applicable to a case where the 2nd proviso is contravened i.e., where the licensee so adjusts his rates as to yield
him a profit beyond 15 % over the reasonable return. The
proviso casts an absolute obligation on the licensee not to
exceed this limit. There is thus a statutory prohibition against
the licensee of fixing a rate which would yield such excessive profit, and if he does so he would not be acting in terms
of the Vlth Schedule at all or by virtue of a power conferred
by that Schedule and therefore he would be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the court which would .be competent to issue
an injunction restraining him from charging that rate. No
doubt, the proviso also adds that if he does so he would be
failing to comply with the requirement of the main part of
paragraph I. It would therefore follow that in a case where
in adjusting his rate the licensee fixes it so high as to contravene this proviso, it would be open to the aggrieved consumer to approach the Board or the State Government to
appoint a Rating Committee. But from this circumstance we
are not prepared to hold; (a) that the action of the licensee
in charging a prohibited rate is any the less an illegality not
.::ountenanced by the statute and (b) that where such an illegality is made out the jurisdiction of a civil court to afford
relief is ousted. It is possible to hold, and we do not desire
538
1964
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964}
to express a final opinion on a point which is not directly
TM, Amalgamated involved in these appeals, that the jurisdiction of the court
El<ctricity Go. Ltd. may be confined to granting a declaration as to the invalidi·
v.
ty of the adjustment and injunction against the violation of
N.! ~"::,~· the statutory prohibition, and not to grant a refund. It is
Ayyangar, J.
only necessary to add that the relief sought in these 2 suits
was merely a declaration regarding the invalidity of the rates
charged and an injunction restraining the Appellant from
continuing to charge them.
We are, therefore, satisfied that the mere existence of
s. 57A does not by itself, and without reference to the particular violation complained of by the licensee, bar the jurisdiction of a civil court and the argument in the extreme fomi
presented to us by the learned Solicitor-General must be re·
jected.
The next and the last question that arises is whether the
respondents have established that the appellant has violated
any of the provisions of the Supply Act and in particular those
contained in Sch. VI, paragraph I of the Supply Act. We
have already dealt with the objection that there was no
"adjustment" of rates in 1949 or 1950. Again, we have already held that in regard to the unit rate for power in regard
to which alone there was an enhancement there was a valid
notice issued to Government as required by the 3rd proviso
to paragraph I. In the circumstances of this case the only
ground upon which the respondents would have been entitled
to the relief of declaration and injunction that they claimed
was that they had· established that the rate charged by the
Appellant offended the second proviso, in that it yielded a
profit in excess of 15 per cent of the reasonable return. The
learned Judge in the High Court has held that the onus of
proving that the rate which the Appellant charged was within
this limit was on it and that as no evidence had been led by
it on this point he granted the plaintiffs the declaration and
injunction they sought. We consider that the learned Judge
was in error in this respect. There is no presumption that the
rate charged by a licensee contravenes the statutory prohibi·
tion. It is for the party who alleges his right to relief to estab·
lish the facts upon which such relief could be obtained. It
was, therefore, for the plaintiffs to prove by facts placed
before the court that the rate charged offended the statutory
provision. This they admittedly failed to do and. we, there·
fore, hold that they were not entitled to the declaration and
injunction which the learned Judge of the High Court
granted.
·
We accordingly allow the appeals and direct the dismissal of the suits. The appellant would be entitled to its costs
here and in the High Court-one hearing fee.
Appeals allowed
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