R.L.ARORA versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 February 1964 | [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784 | 1964 INSC 34
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 February 1964
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 137/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 34
Text of the judgment
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
& M. Karim
Bibi
••Sakinri
Hidayatullah
J.
suggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever aserted any hostile
title against him or thitt a dispute with regard to ownership
and possession had ever arisen. Adverse possession must
be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea
is required at the least to show when possession becomes
adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the
party affected can be found. There is no evidence here
when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere
suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff
had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise
such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse
possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a
plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered, because
each case must be determined upon the allegations in the
plaint in tl1at case. It is sufficient to point out that in
Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad and another [A.I.R. 1940
P.C. 202], the Judicial Committee did not accept an
alternative case based on possession after purchase without
a proper plea.
Reading the plaint as a whole, we agree with the High
Court that a case based on possession after the purchase
was not stated in the plaint and the decision of the
High
Court in the circumstances of this case was therefore proper.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1961
R. L. ARORA
February 14.
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS
GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act-Acquisition for company engaged in industry for
public purpose-Provision if hit by Ari. 31(2) and Art. 19(1)
of the Constitution-lnterprttation-Disthiction made be.tween
Government companies, Public companies and Prtvatt companie1
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REfORTS
If hit by Art. 14-Conitltution of India, ATll. 14, 19(1), 31(2)Land Acqui1itloit (Amtndmtnl) Act, 1962 (Act 31 of 1962), 1t. 1,
40 and 41.
IHI
It. I.. A,.,,.
'·
The petitioner i.o the owner of certain land in Kanpur, U.P. On 81•1• 0 1 Ull•
a previous occasion land acquisition proceedings were taken regardin1
,,,__,,
this land for acquiring it for an industrialist. The petitioner ques.~oned
the validity of these proceedings and this Comt by its judgment reported
as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. J49, quashed
the notification made under s. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thereafter certain amendments were made to ss. 40 and 41 of that Act by
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1961. The petitioner thereupon filed before this Co\Jrt a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the amended ss. 40, 41 and s. 7 ol Ille
amending Act The petitioner contended that the said sections violated
Art. 31(2) and Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as cl. (aa)
ol the amended s. 40 provided that ail acquisitions made for a company
for construction of some building arc permissible even though the
building may not be for a public purpose. The validity ol s. 7 of tile
amending Act was challenged on the ground' that it contravened Art.
31(2) inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before !uly 20,
1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so ill
fact. Section 7 was also challenged on the ground that it contravenes
Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable discrimination in
the matter of acquisition for a company before July
1962 and
after that date insofar as the former acquisitions are validated on thl
basis of their being deemed to be for a public purpose while the latter
acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public
purpose.
2n.
Held (ptr P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAR, CJ., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. Du
GuPTA and J. C. SHAH JI.): (i) If the language of a provision of
law is capable of only one construction and if according to that
construction the provision contravenes a constitutional provision it
must be struck down. A literal interpretation is not always the only
interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to loot at
the setting in which the words arc used and the circumstances in wlti~
the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit
behind the words actually used which would control the literal mcsnina
of the words used.
The Mysore State El~ctricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cottor1
and Silk Mills, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127; followed.
(ii) It is well settled that if certain provisions ol law construed
in one way will be consistent with the Constitution and if another
interpretation would render them unconstitutional the court would bear
in favour of the former construction.
Kedar Nath Singh v. Stalt of 811"", [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.JL 78,
followed.
134-159 S.C.-50
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
B 1- Arora
...
State nf Utta1
l'rad61h
(iii) Applying the above principles of constn1ction it cannot be
•aid that •· 40(aa) contravenes Art. 31(2), for the public purpose
required therein is present v.·here land is acquired for the construction
of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the
indllstry or work in which a company is engaged or is about to be
engaged. Nor can it be said that the provision is hit by Art. 19(1)(f)
for it would be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property.
The amendments to s. 41 are only consequential to the insertion of
cl. (aa) in s. 40(1) and would therefore be equally valid.
(iv) The first of the two fictions introduced by s. 7 of the Amend,
ment Act merely lays- down that where a notification under s. 6 of
the Act cannot be justified under cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1) it
will be judged in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. (aa)
and if it satisfies those provisions the acquisition will be deemed for
the purpose of that clause as if that clause existed at the relevant time,
though in actual fact it did not. The first fiction does not provide that.
even though the purpose of the acquisition does not fall within cl. (aa)
it· will still be deemed to· be a public purpose. Therefore s. 7 dOCB
not violate Art. 31(2).
(v) '.fhe acquisition made before July 20, 1962 as well as the
acquisitions. nlade thereafter have to satisfy the conditions of cl. (aa)
ot, s. 40 and s. 7 of the Amendment Act validates only acquisitions
before July 20, 1962 which actually satisfy the provisions in cl. (aa).
Therefore it cannoi be said that s. 7 v.iolates Art. 14.
(vi) 'Section T specifically validates acqui•ition made before July 20,
1962 .. nc'twithstanding any judgment. decree or orders of any court''
and therefore the petitioner's contention that the acquisition of the
petitioner's land declared to be invalid by reason of the judgment of
this Court reported as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., [1962] Supp. 2
S.C.R. 149 is bad is rejected.
(vii) The various pi"ovisions in the agreement between the GovemR
ment and the · industrialist for whom the ]and in question bas been
acquire'd: conclusively e~tablish that the acquisition is for a public purpose
within the meanin~ of cl. (aa) of •· 40.
Province of Bombay v. KusaldaJ
1.
Advanl, [1950] S.C.R 621,
distinguished.
(viii) A distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between
public companies and Government companies on the one hand and
private individuals and .private companies on the other is justified
considering the object behind cl .. (aa) of s. 40 of the Act and therefore
it does not violate Art. 14.
Per Ayyangar J. (dissent1'ng) '(i) The wording of cl. (aa) of
1. 40 is not capable of two interpretatiom and there is no ;imbiguity
In the wording. It is a well established principle of construction that
It is only when there b an ambiguity and the words are capable ot
6 S.C.K.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
more than one construction that any extrinsic nid in the shape of tbe
purpose of the legislature or the object of the legislation come in
for consideration. Where -the language of an Act is clear and expl~cit
the court must give effect to it wbateVer may be the consequences.
for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the
legislature. The intention of the legislature is -not a · matter to be
speculated upon. lnterpret?.tion or construction cannot mean thaL a
Court first reaches a conclusion as to what in its opinion the legislature
intended, even though this involves attributing a meaning divorced
from lhe words used and then adjust the meaning to the conclusio3 fl
baa reached.
Warburton v. Loveland, 2 D. & Cl. (H.L.) 480. Salomon v. A.
Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 and Cox v. IIakes, 15 App. caa. '06,
followed.
(iv) The only way cl. (aa) could be read is to relate t~e "·ordl
..public purpose" to the nature of the industry carried on , by\ tha
company· and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic 'aid1
or with reference to the context, not to speak of rules of grammer,
can the reference t~ public purpose he related to the building or _wort
for which the acquisition is permitted to be n1ade.
( v) Where the provisions, as in the present case, gives a carte
blanche to Government to acquire land for any purpose it Is not possible
to sustain the validity of such law and strike down merely the parti~
cular acquisition where land is acquired for a purpose which is .C a
public purpose, for here the vice is in the law itself and not mlftly
in its application.
Clause (aa) of s. 40 is ~iolative of Art. 21(2) of the Constitution.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 137 of 1962.
Petition under Art. 32 of th: Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Fum.J~ental Rights.
C. B. Agarwala and Naunit Lal, for the petitioner.
M. C. Setalvad and C. P. Lal, for respondent No. 1.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. !Jindra and
R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 2.
M. C. Setalvad, M. S. Devendra Swamv and l. P. Guyal,
for resrondent No. 3.
I. M. Nanavati, 0. C. Mathur, l. B. Dadachanji and
Ravinder Narain. for Intervener No. 1.
-...
JI. L ,t,.,,.
State of Uttar
Prad61~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-••
1,,,
Rajani Pa~/ and /. N. Shroff, for Intervener No. 2.
a.LA.rON
llMI of Utt°'
February 14, 1964. The Judgment of P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shah JJ. was
delivered by Wanchoo J. Rajagopala Ayyangar J. delivered
a dissenting Opinion.
Wanchoo 1.
WANCHOO . 1.-This petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution is a sequel to the judgment of this Court in
R. L. Arora v. State of U.P.('). The petitioner is the owner
of certain lands in village Nauraiya Khera, in the district
of Kanpur. He got information in May 1956 that steps
were being taken to acquire nine acres of his land for an
industrialist in Kanpur. He therefore wrote to the Collector
of Kanpur .in that connection. On June 25, 1956, however,
a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, No. I of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating
that the land in dispute was required for a company for the
construction of textile machinery parts factory by Lakshmi
Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur. This order was
followed on July 5, 1956, by a notification under s. 6 of
the Act, which was in similar terms. This notification also
provided for the Collector to take possession of any waste
or arable land forming part of the land in the Schedule to
the notification immediately under the powers conferred by
s. 17(1) of the Act. On July 31, 1956, the Collector took
possession of the land and handed it over to the company
along with some constructions standing on it. In the meantime, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court
on July 31, 1956, praying that the notification under s. 6
of July 1956 be quashed and also applied for interim stay.
As however possession had already been taken on July 31,
1956, the application for interim stay became infructuous.
One of the main grounds in support of the writ petition of
July 31, 1956 was that ss. 38 to 42 of the Act had not
been complied with. Thereafter steps were taken by the
State Government to comply with the provisions of ss. 38
to 42 of the Act and an agreement was entered into between
the Government and the company in August 1956 and wa,
-
l'roddh
(I) [1962) ~upp. 2 S.C.IL 1-49.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
published in the Government gazette on August 11, 1956.
This was done without making any enquiry either under R. L. dtDN
s. 5-A or s. 40 of the Act. Therefore on Septen•ber 14,
:Stott 01 Uti.
1956 an inquiry was ordered by the Government under
l'rad•m
s. 40. The inquiry was accordingly made and the inquiry
Wane/loo I.
officer submitted a report on October 3, 1956. This was
followed by a fresh agreement between the Government and
the company on December 6, 1956. On December 7, 1956,
a fresh notification was issued under s. 6 of the Act after
the formalities provided under ss. 38 to 42 had been
complied with. Thereafter a fresh notice was issued under
s. 9 of the Act and it appears that possession was formally
taken again after January 2, 1957.
A fresh writ petition was filed by the petitioner before
the High Court on January 29, 1957 in view of the fresh
action taken by the State Government and the main ground
taken in this petition was that the notification was invalid
as it was not in compliance with s. 40(1 ){b) of the Act
read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in
the agreement under s. 41. The petitioner failed in the
High Court. Thereafter he came by special leave to this
Court. This Court decided on a construction of s. 40 ( 1 )(b)
read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in
the agreement under s. 41 that these provisions had to be
read together and required that the work should be directly
useful to the public and that the agreement should contain
a term as to how the public will have the right to use the
work directly. The provision as to access to land or works
for those having business with the company or the fact that
the product would be useful to public was not considered
sufficient to bring the acquisition for a company within the
meaning of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. The appeal
therefore was allowed on December 1, 1961 and the last
notification under s. 6 was quashed: see R. L. Arortl11
case(').
On July 20, 1962, the Lal'.d Acquisition (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1962 (No. 3 of 1962) was promulgated by the
President of India. By that Ordinance, ss. 40 and 41 ~
the Act were amended and certain acquisitiom of lml
"·
(I) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.Jl. 149.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
R. L. Arora
T.
State of Uttar
Prade1h
'Wanchoo I.
[1964]
made before the date of the Ordinance were validated
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or ord'r of any court.
The Ordinance was replaced by the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, No. 31 of 1962, (hereinafter referred
to as the Amendme.nt Act), which was made retrospective
from July 20, 1962, the date on which the Ordinance was
promulgated. This Act made certain amendments in ss. 40
and 41 of the Act and validated certain acquisitions. The
pn:sent petition challenges the validity of the amendments
to ss. 40 and 41 ::tn•1 also the validity of s. 7 of the Amendment Act by which certain acquisitions made before July 20,
1962 were validated. It is therefore necessary to read the
amendments made in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as well as
ll. 7 of the Amendment Act. In s. 40 ( 1) of the Act a new
clause was inserted in these terms:"(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construe··
tion oi some building or work for a company
which is engaged or is takinr, steps for engr.ging
itseli in any industry or work which is for a
public purpose;"
Section 41 was lmended to read as below:"41. If the appropdatc Government is satisfied after
considering the report, if any, of the Collector,
under section SA, sub-section (2), or on the
report of the officer making an inquiry under
section 40 that the proposed acquisition is for
any of the purposes referred to in clause (a)
or clause ( aa) or claU3e (b) of sub-section ( 1)
of section 40, it shall require tlie company to
enter into an. agreement with the appropriate
Government providing to the satisfaction of the
appropriate Government for the following
matters, namely:(1) •
(2) •
(3) •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
*
•
•
•
•
•
•
(4)
*
*
*
( 4A) Where the acquisition is for the construetion of any builcfing or work for a com-
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
791
1961
pany which is engaged or is taking steps
for engaging itself in any industry or work R. L Arora
which is for a public purpose, the time State of U ttar
Prade1h
within which, and the conditions on which,
the building or work shall be constructed Wane/zoo /,
or executed; and
...
•
•
(5) •
.,,
•
Section 7 of the Amendment Act, which validated certain
acquisitions reads as fo!lows:"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of
any court, every acquisition of land for a
company made or purporting to have been
made under Part VlI of the principal Act
before 20th day of July 1962, shall, insofar as such acquisition is not ior any of the
purposes mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b)
of sub-section ( 1) of section 40 of the principal
Act, be deemed to have been made for the
purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said
sub-secti.on. and accordingly e\'ery such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or
action in connection with such acquisition shall
be, and shall be deemed always to have been,
as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and
41 of the principal Act, as amended by this
Act, were in force at all \naterial times when
such acquisition was made or proceeding was
held or order was made or agreement was
entered into or action was taken.
Explanation
•
•
•
•
...
Besides these amer.dments which require consideration in
the present petition, ss. 44A and 44B were also inserted in
the Act providing for restriction on transfer, etc. (s. 44A)
and making certain provisions forbidding acqui~i'ion of land
for a private company other than a government company
(s. 44B). It is however not necessary to set out the terms
of these new sections.
792
SUPREME COURT REPORTS'
[1g64)
IHI
The present petition challenges the validity of the
amendments to ss. 40 and 41 of the Act and also of s. 7
of the Amendment Act, and the challenge is made in this
~ of Ulk:t
way. It is submitted that the amendments made to ss. 40
hade1h
and 41 of the Act are ultra vires, as they contravene Art.
Wanchoo /.
31(2) and Art. !9(l){f) of the Constitution. The argument is that on a construction of the amendment to s. 40
by which cl. (aa) has been introduced therein, it is provided
that aJI acquisitions made for a company for construction
of some building or work are permissible even though the
building or work for the construction of which the acquisition is made may not be for a public punpose, as the new
cl. ( aa) ll\erely requires that the company which is applying
for acquisition is engaged or is taking steps for engaging
itself in any industry or work, which is for a public purpose.
It is urged that all that this clause requires is that tha
company for which the acquisition is being made should be
engaged in any industry or work which is for a public
purpose and in that case it can acquire land under this
clause even though the particular building or work for thct
construction of which land is acquired may not be for a
public purpose. Therefore the new clause ( aa) which
permits such acquisition contravenes Art. 31( 2) which lays
down that no property shaJI be compulsorily acquired save
for a public purpose, and also Art. 19 ( 1) ( f), as such
acquisition would amount to an unreasonable restriction on
the fundamental right to hold property.
·
Jl. L. A.101•
...
The validity cif s. 7 of the Amendment Act is attacked
on the ground that it contravenes Art. 31 ( 2) and Art. 14
of the Constitution inasmuch as it makes acquisition for
a company before July 20, 1962 as being for a public
purpose even though it may not be so in fact and thus raises
'J:I irrebuttable presumption of public purpose by fiction of
. ltlw and so contr~venes Art. 31 (2) which requires that
there muiiJ: be an actual public purpose before land can be
compulsorily acquired. And it also contravenes Art. 14
inasmuch as it makes a discrimination in the matter of
acquisitions for a company before July 20, 1962 and after
July 20, 1962 insofar as the former acquisitions .are validated on the basis of their being deemed to be for a public
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
1961
purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and
have to satisfy the test of public purpose.
R. L. Aroto
Y,
Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in State of Ullal
Pradt1h
the Amendment Act, it is urged that the rights of the
petitioner cannot be affected by the validating provision in
Wanchoo J.
the Amendment Act as s. 7 of the Amendment Act does
not re-open decided cases and does not revive notifications
or acquisitions struck down by courts. Lastly, it is urged
that the acquisition in the present case cannot be said to
be for a public purpose inasmuch as (firstly) the agreement
between the company and the Government does not regulate
or control the products of the company in the interest of
the public, and (secondly) the petitioner's land which was
intended to be used for one public purpose is being taken
away for another such purpose. We shall deal with these
contentions seriatim.
The first question that falls for consideration is the
construction of cl. ( aa) of sub-s. (1) of s. 40 of the Act.
The amendments to s. 41 are consequential and will stand
or fall with cl. (aa) inserted ins. 40(1). It is contended
on behalf of the petitioner that on a literal construction
of this clause (which, it is urged, is the only possible
construction) it requires that the company which is acquiring the land should be engaged or should be taking steps
for engaging itself in any industry or work, which is for a
public purpose. If a company satisfieS that requirement it
can acquire land for the construction of some building or
work, even though that building or work may not itself
subserve such public purpose. Therefore, the argument runs
that cl. ( aa) permits compulsory acquisition of land for
a purpose other than a public purpose and is hit by Art.
31 (2) of the Constitution, whereunder land can be compulsorily acquired only for a public purpose. It may be
conceded that on a literal construction the adjectival clause,
namely, "which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging
itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose",
qualifies the word "company" and not the words "building
or work" for the construction of which the iand is needed.
So prima facie it can be argued with some force that all
that cl. ( aa) requires is that the company for which land
794
1961
R. L. Arora
...
State of Uttor
Praderh
Wonchoo /.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1go4J
is being acquired should be engaged or about to be engaged
in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and
it is not required that the building or work, for the construction of which l&lld is acquired should be for such public
purpose.
In approaching the question of construction of this
clause, it cannot be forgotten that the amendment was made
in consequence of the decision of this Court in R. l,.
Arora's case(') and the intention of Parliament was to fill
the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the
Act in the matter of acquisitions for a company; nor can
it be forgotten that Parliament when it enacted the Amend·
ment Act was aware of Art. 31 ( 2) of the Constitution
which provides that land can only be acquired compulsorily
for a pt!blic purpose and not otherwise. It could not therefore be the intention of Parliament to make a provision
which would be in contravention of Art. 31 (2), though it
may be admitted that if the language used is capable of
only one construction and fails to carry out the intention
of Parliament when making the amendment, the .amendment
may have to be struck down if it contravenes a constitutional
prov1s10n. Further, a literal interpretation is not always
the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the
court has to lpok at the setting in which the words are used
and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed
to decide whether there is something implicit behind the
words actually used which would control the literal meaning
of the words used in a provision of the statute. It is permissible to control the wide language used in a statute if
that is. possible by the setting in which the words are used
and the· intention of the ·law-making body which may be
apparent from the circumstances in which the particular
provision came to be made. Therefore, a literal and
mechanical inteqiretation is not the only interpretation
which courts are bound to give to the words of a statute;
?nd it may be possible to control the wide language in which
a provision is made by ta!>ing mto account what is implicit
in it in view. of the setting in which the provision appears
and the circumstances in which it might have been enacted.
(I) [!962] Supp. 2 S.C.R 149.
6 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
We may in this connection refer to a decision of this Court
in The Mysore State Eln;tricity Board v. The Bangalore R. L. Arora
Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd.('), where the wide State of Uttat
words used ins. 76(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act of
Pradesh
1948 fell for interpretation, and this Court held that even Wanchoo ].
though the words used were of wide amplitude, it was
implicit in the sub-section that the question arising thereunder w:is one which arose under the Electricity (Supply)
t\ct. Therefore, we have to see whether the provision in
cl. ( aa) bears another construction also in the setting in
which it a;:ipears and in the circumstances in which it was
put on the statute book and also in viow of the lang!lage
used in the clause. The circumstances in which the amendment came to be made have already been mentioned by us
and the intention of Parliament clellrty was to fill up the
lacuna in the Act which became evident on the decision of
this Court in R. L. Arora's case( 2 ). Parliament must also
be well aware of the provision of Art. 31( 2) which lays
down that compulsory acquisition of property can only be
made for a public purpose. Clause ( aa) was insert~d
between cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1). Section 40(1)
as it stood before the amendment prohibited consent being
given to acquisition of land by a company unless the acquisition was for one of the two reasons mentioned in els. (a)
and (b). Those two clauses clearly showed that acquisition
for a company was for a public purpose and sach acquisition
could not be made for any purpose other than public
purpose. Between the existing cl. (a) and cl. (b) . of
s. 40(1 ), we find cl. (aa) bc!ng inserted. We also find thr.t
cl. ( aa) specifically uses the words "public purpose" and
indicates that the company for which land is required
should be engaged or about to be engaged in some industry
or work of a public purpose. It was only for such a company that land was to be acquired compulsodly and the
acquisition w.1s for the construction of some building or
work for such a company, i.e. a company engaged or about
fo be engaged in some industry or work wl1ich is for. a
public purpose. .Jn this setting it seems to us r°'uoon~ble
to hold that the intention of Parliament could only have
...
(1) [1963} Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127.
(2) (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149.
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64]
been that land should be acquired for such building or work
for a company as would subserve the public purpose of the
"· L. A.1010
company; it could not have been intended, considering the
Stat• of Uf/01 setting in which cl. ( aa) was introduced, that land could
l'tath1ll
be acquired for a building or work which would not subWanchoo /.
serve the public purpose of the company. In the circumstances it seems to us clear that the literal construction of the
clause based on rules of grammar is not the only construction of it and it is in our opinion legitimate to hold that
the public purpose of the industry of the company, which
is imperative under the clause, also attaches to the building
or work for the construction of which land is to be acquired.
Further, acquisition is for the construction of some building
or work for a company and the nature of that company
is that it is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself
in any industry or work which is for a rpublic purpose. When
therefore the building or work is for such a company it
seems to us that it is reasonable to hold that the nature
of the building or work to be constructed takes colour from
the nature of the company for which it is to be constructed.
We are therefore of opinion that the literal and mechanical
construction for which the petitioner contends is neither
the only nor the true construction of cl. ( aa) and that when
cl. (aa) provides for acquisition of land needed for construction of some building or work it implicitly intends that the
building or work which is to be constructed must be such
as to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work
in which the company is engaged or is about to be engaged.
In short, the words "building or work"· used in cl. ( aa)
take their colour from the adjectival clause which governs
the company for which the building or work is being
constructed and acquisition undet this clause can only be
made where the comrpany is engaged or is taking steps to
engage itself in any industry or work which is for a public
purpose, and the building or work which the company is
intending to construct is of the same nature, namely, that
it is a building or work which is meant to subserve the
public purpose of the industry or work for which it is being
constructed. It is only in these cases where the company
is engaged in an industry or work of that kind and where
the buildin& or work is also constructed for a purpose of
1961
...
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
IHI
that kind, which is a public purpose, that acquisition can
be made under cl. ( aa) . As we read the clause we are
R. L. AroN
of opinion that lthe public purpose of the company for State of Utw
which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from
Pradtlll
the purpose of the building or work and it is not open for
Wancltoo /.
such a company to acquire land under cl. (aa) for a building or work which will not subserve the public purpose of
the company. We are therefore of opinion that in the setting
in which cl. ( aa) appears and in the circumstances in which
it came to be enacted, a literal and mechanical construction
for which the petitioner contends is nonhe only construction
of this clause and that there is another construction which
in our opinion is a better construction, and which is that
the public pul'ljlose of the company is also implicit in the
purpose of the building or work which is to be constructed
for the company and it is only for such work or building
which subserves the public purpose of the company that
acquisition under cl. ( aa) can be made. Thus there are
two possible constructions of this clause, one a mere
mechanical and literal construction based on rules of
grammar and the other which emerges from the setting in
which the clause appears and the circumstances in which
it came to be enacted and also from the words used therein,
namely, acquisition being for a company which has a public
purpose behind it, and therefore the building or work which
is to be constructed and for which land is required must
also have the same public purpose behind it, that animates
the company making the construction. We are therefore
clearly of opinion that two constructions are possible of
this clause of which the second construction which is other
than literal is .the better one. It is well settled that if
certain provisions of law construed in one way will be
consistent with the Constitution, and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would
lean in favour of the former construction: [see Kcdar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar(') ]. We are therefore of opinion
that cl. (aa) does not permit acquisition of land for
construction of some building or work for a company
engaged or to be engaged in an industry or work, which
...
<I) (1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 769
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
1961
is for a public purpose unless the building or work for
which the land is acquired also subservcs the public purpose
of the industry or work in which the company is engaged.
\late of Uttar
Pradesh
This is in our ophion the better construction of cl. ( aa)
taking
into account the setting in which it appears and the
Wanchoo J.
circumstances in which it came to be enacted and the words
used. therein. lf that is the t:-ue construction of cl. (aa) it
cannot be said to contravene A~t. 31 (2), for the public
purpose required therein is present where land is required
for ·the construction of a building or work which must
subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in
which a company i~ engaged or is about to be engaged.
Nor can it be said that tile provision is hit by Art. 19 (1 ) ( f),
for it would in our opi;lion be a reasonable restriction on
the right to hold property. We hold therefore that the clause
so interpreted is not unconstitutional. We have already said
that the amendments in s. 41 are only consequential to the
insertion of cl. ( aa) in s. 40 (1) and would therefore be
equally valid and constitutional.
R.. L. A.rqra
v.
We now come to the consti tu tionality of s. 7 of the
Amendment Act, which is attacked on the ground that it
contravenes Art. 31 ( 2) and Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Let us therefore see what exaotly s. 7 validates and under
what conditions. It first provides that the acquisition to be
validated must have been made before July 20, 1962.
Secondly it provides where suoh acquisition is not for any
of the purposes mentioned in cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1)
of the Act, it shall be deemed to be for the purpose mentioned in cl. ( aa) introduced by the Amendment Act. Thirdly
it provides that every such acquisition shall be, and shall
be deemed always to have been as valid as if the provisions
of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the Amendment
Act, were in force at all material times when such acquisition was made or rproceeding was held or order was made
or agreement was entered into or action was taken. Lastlv,
it provides that such acquisition shall be valid notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court. Therefore
before s. 7 can validate an acquisition made before July 20,
1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition is complete
and the land acquired has vested in Government. , This
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
799
means that the larid acquired has vested in Government
196'
either under s. 16 or s. 17 (1) of the Act. Thus s. 7 of the
R. L. Arora
Amendment Act vnlidates such acquisitions in which proof Uttar
perty has vested absolutely in Government either under s. 16 StatePrade1/a
or s. 17 ( 1). Secondly s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides
Wanchoo ].
that where acquisition has been made for a company before
July 20, 1962 or purported to have been made under cl. (a)
or cl. (b) of s. 40 (1) and those clauses do not apply in
view of the interpretation put thereon in R. L. Arora·s
case ('), it shall be deemed that the acquisition was for the
purpose mentioned in cl. ( aa) as inserted in s. 40 (1) of
the Act by the Amendment Act. Thirdly s. 7 of the Amendm~nt Act provides that every such acquisition and any
proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with
such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to
have b~en, as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of
the Act as amended by the Amendment Act were in force
at all material times when any action was taken for such
acquisition. Finally, this validity is given to such acquisitions and to all acHons taken in connection therewith
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court.
This is what s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides. The
attack on it on th~ basis of Art. 31 ( 2) is that it makes an
irret 1ttable presumption that the acquisition was for a
putlic purpose, though it may not be actually so and therefore contravenes Art. 31 ( 2) inasmuch as the result of this
irrcbuttable presumption is that acquisitian which may not
have been for a public purpose, is validated. We do not
think that there is any force in this contention in view of
the interpretation we have given to cl. ( aa) introduced in
s. 40 ( 1). The fim fiction i.n s. 7 is that it shall be presumed
that acquisitions before July 20, 1962, if they do not fall
within cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1 ), shall be deemed to
fall within cl. ( aa). That means that building or work for
which acquisition was made was required for a public
purpose of the kind indicated in cl. (aa). It does not
however follow from this that if the purpose was not of the
kind indicated in cl. ( aa) it will still be presumed !hat the
acquisitian was for the purpose mentioned in cl. ( aa). All
"·
(I) [19,2J Supp. 2 S.C:R. 149.
800
... L. Arora
Y•
. :State of Uttar
had<1h
·W~lwo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64J
that the first deeming provision lays down is that where the
public purpose does not come within cl. (a) or cl. (b) it
should be deemed to come within cl. (aa), provided it is
of a kind which can come within this clause. The intention
behind this deeming provision clearly is to make the punpose
of an acquisition made before July 20, 1962 which does
not fall within cl. fa) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) to be judged
in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. ( aa). On
a reasonable interpretation, this deeming provision therefore
only provides that where the purpose does not fall within
els. (a) and (b), it shall be deemed to fall under cl. (aa)
and to be judged in accordance therewith. If in fact the
purpose of any acquisition made before July 20, 1962, is
such as does not fall within cl. (aa), the deeming provision
would be of no avail. Thus the first of the two fictions
introduced by s. 7 of the Amendment Act merely lays down
that where a notification under s. 6 of the Act cannot be
justified under cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40 ( I), it will be
judged in accordance with the iprovisions contained in
cl. ( aa) and if it satisfies those provisions, the acquisition
will be deemed for the purpose of that clause, as if that
clause existed at the relevant time, though in actual fact it
did not. The first fiction therefore in our opinion goes no
further than this and does not provide that even though the
purpose of acquisition does not fall within cl. (aa), it will
still be deemed to be a public purpose. Ln this view of the
matter, we are of opinion that the attack on s. 7 on the
basis of Art. 31 (2) must fail.
Next it is urged that s. 7 of the Amendment Act is hit
by Art. 14 inasmuch as it discriminates between acquisition
for a company before July 20, 1962 and after that date.
Wc do not think that there is any force in this contention
either. Jn the view we have taken of the meaning of cl. (aa)
and the meaning of the first fiction introduced in s. 7 of
the Amendment Act, all that the second fiction in s. 7 of
the Amendment Act says is .that when the first fiction is
satisfied the second fiction will come into force and every
such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or
action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall
be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisiODB
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
8oI
of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the Amendment
Act, were in force at all material times. In effect therefore
s. 7 provides that even though acquisitions made before
July 20, 1962 do not satisfy the conditions of cl. (a) and
cl. (b) of s. 40(1), they will be valid if they satisfy the
conditions of cl. ( aa) as introduced by the Amendment
Act, as if that clause was in existence when the acquisition
was made before July 20, 1962. Jn this view we are of
opinion that there is no discrimination in the matter of
acquisition for a company before July 20, 1962 and after
that date because in either case the conditions of cl. ( aa)
have to be actually satisfied whether the acquisition was
before July 20, 1962 or thereafter, as the validation by s. 7
of the Amendment Act is only of such acquisition before
July 20, 1962 which actually satisfy the provisions in cl. (aa).
We may in this connection refer to .the words "as valid
as if' appearing in s. 7 of the Amendment Act, because
they are in our opinion the key words for the purpose of
intenpreting the extent of the validity conferred on acquisitions before July 20, 1962. What the second fiction provides
is that an acquisition made before that date shall be as valid
as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended
by the Amendment Act were in force at all material times.
The force of the words "as valid as if" clearly is that the
validity of acquisitions made before July 20, l 962, has to
be judged on the basis that cl. ( aa) was in force at the
material time and in accordance therewith. The validity
therefore is not absolute; it is conditioned by the fact that
it will be as valid as if cl. ( aa) was in force; so that if it
could not be valid even if cl. ( aa) was in force and could
not be justified under the terms of that clause, the validity
conferred by s. 7 of the Amendment Act will not attach to
it. This in our opinion is the force of the words "as valid
as if" and the validity it has conferred is not absolute as
contended on behalf of the petitioner and will not apply
to those acquisitions which would not be valid if they could
not be justified on the basis of cl. ( aa) assuming it to be
in force at the material time. In this view the attack under
Art. 14 as well as Art. 31 ( 2) fails, for in neither case can
acquisition be valid whether made before July 20, 1962 or
thereafter unless the conditions of cl. ( aa) are satisfied.
134-159 S.C.-51
1961
R. L. A.rOnl
v.
St11e of Ull•
Prodah
Wonchoo /.
802
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Next it is urged that even if s. 7 is intra vires, it does
not reopen decided cases and does not revive notifications
R. L. .A.roro
v.
and acquisitions actually struck down by courts. We see
Stai. of Uttar
no
force in this contention. Section 7 opens with the words
Prad11h
"notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any
Wanchoo /.
court" and the validity conferred by it on acquisitions made
before July 20, 1962 is thus notwithstanding any judgment,
decree or order of any court. These are the usual wo1 Js
to be found in validating legislation where the intention is
to validate some action which would otherwise be invalid
and which may have been declared invalid by any court.
The rpurpose of such words in a validating leg1slat1on is to
declare valid what has been held invalid by courts and once
the legislature declares such action valid all steps ~aken in
connection therewith are validated to the extent· of validation. The result of the validation is that notifications or
other steps taken which may otherwise have been invalid
become valid. Further an acquisition also even though it
may have been struck down by a court would be validated
if it has been made in the sense that property in the land
to be acquired has vested in Government either under s. ) 6
or s. 17 (1) of the Act. It is not in dispute in this case that
the property has vested in Goverrunent under s. 17 ( 1) ot
the Act. It is also not ID dispute that the purpose of the
company was a rpublic purpose, namely, manufacture of
textile machinery parts and that the acquisition was aiso for
the construction of works for that purpose. In the circumstances we fail to see how it can be said that the rights of
the petitioner have not been affected at all by the validating
provision in s. 7 of the Act. The contention under his head
also fails.
1964
Then it is urged that the acquisition in the pre>ent case
cannot be said to be for a public purpose inasmuch as the
agreement between the company and the Government does
not regulate or control the rproducts of the company in the
interest of the public. We have not been able to understand
exactly what is meant by this. As we have already said,
it is not in dispute that the purpose of the company is a
public purpose, namely, production of textile machmery
parts, and the land is acquired for the cor truction of works
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1964
for that pm1pose. The agreement shows that the land is
required for the construction of a work, namely, a factory R. L. A.ION
for the manufacture of textile machinery and parts and State of
"· Uthat such work is likely to prove useful to the public. One
P1ade1h
term of the agreement is that the company, its successors
Wane/Joo/.
and assignees will use the said land for the aforesaid purpose
and for no other purpose without the previous sanction in
writing of the State Government. Another term provides
that if the said land or any ipart or parts thereof shall no
longer be required by the company, then the company will
forthwith relinquish and restore the same, alter removing all
buildings and structures, to the Governor at a price equal
to the amount paid by it under the Act. It is clear therefore
that the land cannot be used for any other purpose and it
will have to be restored to the Government if it is not used
for the purpose for which it was acquired. Jn this connection reference may be made to s. 44-A introduced by the
Amendment Act which lays down that "no company for
which any land is acquired under this Part shall be entitled
to transfer the said land or any part thereof by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise except with the previous
sanction of the appropriate Government". This provision
also provides a safeguard that the land will only be used for
the public purpose for which it is acquired and not otherwise. The aforesaid terms in the agreement in our opinion
satisfy the condition that the land will be used for the public
purpose for which it was being acquired and for no other.
Therefore the acquisition is for a public purpose as provided
in cl. ( aa). We do not think it is the purpose of the Act
that the agreement should provide for regulation or control
of the products of a company, which probably means that
Government should control the quantum of production and
distribution or the price of the produced articles. This in
our opinion is foreigr to the purpose of the Act All that
the Act requires is that before land is transferred to the
company by the Government, the agreement should provide
that land would be used for the purpose for which it was
acquired and for no other. The Act has nothing to do with
the control or regulation of the products of the company
and gives no power to Government in that behalf. Nor do
we think it was necessary in order that the public purpose
-
·'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
mentioned in cl. (aa) is carried out to have any further
term in the agreement besides those which have been proin the agreement in this case. The contention that
stale o",· uttar vided
...
. the present case was not f or a public
Pratk1h
the acqu1S1t1on
m
W=M<> /.
purpose as the agreement does.not provide for the control
and regulation of the product of the company must therefore
1964
R. L. Arora
fail.
Lastly it is urged that the petitioner who was a businessman was intending to use the land for erecting a factory.
He could not do so because certain rules did not permit
him to build a factory adjacent to the military installations
which had been put up by the Defence Department on
adjoining land. It is urged that it could not be the purpose
of the Act that land which was intended to be used for one
public purpose should be acquired for another public
purpose. We see no force in this contention either. All
that the Act requires is that the land should be required
for a public purpose. The intention of the previous owner
whatever it may be does not in our opinion enter into the
question at all, so far as the validity of the acquisition Is
concerned provided the acquisition is for a public purpose.
Whether the land should be acquired or not is a matter
which may be urged under s. 5-A of the Act, which gives
the owner of the land the right to object to the acquisition,
and it is for Government to· decide whether the objection
should be allowed or rejected. Once the Government
decides that the objection should be rejected and that the
acquisition is needed for a public purpose the validity of
the notification under s. 6 and the subsequent action thereafter cannot be challenged on the ground that the previous
owner himself intended to use the land for some public
purpose. In this connection our attention is invited to the
observations of this Court in Province of Bombay "·
Kusaldas S. Advani( 1 ), where it was observed that "under
certain circumstances even securing a house for an individual may be in the interests of the community, but it cannot
be to the general interest of the community to requisition
the property of one refugee for the benefit of another
refugee". These observations in our opinion have no
(!) (1950] S.C.R. 621. 687.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
1964
relevance to the matter under consideration. We are concerned here with acquisition for a public purpose, which R. L. Aron
v.
is undisputed. This is not a case of a house of one person
State of Uttlll'
being requisitioned for another; this is a case of constructing
Prade1h
some work which will be useful to the public and will subWonchoo /.
serve the public purpose of the production of textile
machinery and its parts for the use of the general public.
In these circumstances we are of opinion that there being
a definite public purpose behind the acquisition in the
present case, the acquisition would be justified under the
Act irrespective of the intention of .the previous owner of
the land to use it for some other public purpose. The contention under this head must also fail.
It now remains only to consider the argument on behalf
of the intervener that cl. ( aa) violates Art. 14 inasmuch as
it permits acquisition of land for a company but not for
an individual or a private company, though the individual
or the private company may also be engaged in or taking
steps to engage himself or itself in an industry or work
which is for a public purpose. Reference was also made to
s. 44-B, introduced by the Amendment Act, which lays
down that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
no land shall be acquired under this Part, except for the
purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
section 40, for a private company which is not a Government company". It is said that there is discrimination
between a public company and a Government company for
which land can be acquired under cl. ( aa) o~ the one hand
and a private company or an individual on the other. It is
true that acquisition for the purpose of cl. ( aa) can only be
made for a Government company or a public company and
cannot be made for a private company or an individual;
but there is in our opinion a clear classification between
a public company and a Government company on the one
hand and a private company and an individual on the other,
which has a reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved
under the law. The intention of the legislature clearly is
that private individuals and private companies which really
consist of a few private individuals banded together should
not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they
8o6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
may be intending to engage in some industry or work which
may be for a public ipurpose inasmuch as the enrichment
R. L. Arora
"· Utlllr consequent on such work goes to private individuals or to
Stai. of
a group of them who have formed themselves into a private
Pradesh
company.
Public companies on the other hand are broad
Wanchoo /.
based and Government companies are really in a sense no
different from Government, though for convenience of
administration a Government company may be formed,
which thus becomes a separate legal entity. Thus in one
case the acquisition results i.n private enrichment while in
the other it is the public which gains in every way. Therefore a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between
ipublic companies and Government companies on the one
hand and private individuals and private companies on the
other is in our opinion justified, considering the object
behind cl. ( aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention
under this head must the,eforc also fail.
The petition therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. In
the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
A71angar I.
AYYANGAR J. I have had the advantage of perusing the
judgment prepared by Wanchoo, J. but regret my inability
to agree with it. In my opinion this writ petition has to be
allowed.
The facts of the case and the relevant statutory provisions
whose construction is involved in the petition, have been set
out in full in the judgment just now pronounced and it is
therefore unnecessary for me to recapitulate them. The
principal ipoints on which learned counsel for the petitioner
rested his case were mainly two: (1) that s. 40(1)(aa) introduced by s. 3 of the Land Acquisition Amending Act (Act
XXXI of 1962) which I shall hereafter refer to as the Act,
was unconstitutional, in that it authorised the compulsory
acquisition of land for purposes which might not at all be
public purposes and was therefore violative of Art. 31 (2l of
the Constitution, and (2) that s. 7 of the Act by which
acquisitions of land made prior to July 20, 1962 for the purposes mentioned in s. 40(l)(aa) were purported to be validated 'did not on its proper construction cover the present
Cllie and further, even if it did that the said provision was
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
invalid as ultra vires for the very same reason for which
cl. (aa) was.
R. L. Arora
Y,
I shall first take up the submission made to · us by StGtt of
UPradult
M.r. Agarwal about the amendment effected to s. 40(1) by
the introduction of the new clause (aa). That clause reads
"that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some
building or work for a company which is engaged or is taking
steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for
a public purpose", so that after the amendment land may be
compulsorily acquired by the State for a company for being
utilised for the purpose above set out. It was not disputed
by Mr. Setalvad who, appearing for the first and 3rd respondents, addressed to us the main arguments on behalf of the
respondent, nor by the learned Attorney-General appearing
for the Union of India that if on a proper construction of
cl. (aa) power was reserved to compulsorily acquire land for
a purpose other than a public purpose, the same would infringe Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution and would, therefore.
be void. The scope of the inquiry in the petition is therefore
narrowed down and it would be sufficient to consider merely
the construction of this clause and ascertain whether the
purpose for which authority is conferred by it for making
an acquisition, is a public purpose.
The clause starts with the words that the acquisition is
needed fo~ the construction of a building or work. It goes
without saying that if the power to acquire here conferre<!
is related to the construction of a building or work which is
essential for starting an industry or for carrying on an industry which is necessary to be carried on in the public interest,
the acquisition would be for a public purpose and undoubtedly the provision would be valid. The question is whether
the words of the clause are capable of this construction. The
words of the clause may be thus split up: (!) the land is
needed for the construction of "a building" or "work", and
(2) that "building" or "work" is for a company which is
engaged (omitting the immaterial words) in an industry or
work which is for a public purpose. Therefore, if a company which is engaged in- an industry which industry is
invested with a public purpose i.e., if the industry itself serves
a public purpose, that the land is needed for the construction
of a building or work for such a company is made sufficient
808
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1961
to enable the acquisition to be made. In other words, the
criterion of the justification for the acquisition is, that it is
R. L. Arora
for
a company of a designated nature, not that the land
"· Uttar acquired
$1111• of
is needed for a building or work which is essenlial
Praduh
for the carrying on of an industry which serves a public
A11M1t•r I.
purpose. The company might be engaged in an industry
which might be informed by a public purpose or whose
products might be essential for the needs of the community,
but under the clause as enacted it is not necessary that the
land acquired is needed for being used for the purpose of
that industry but may be needed for any purpose of the
company, the only qualification being that the company
answers the description set down in the clause. Thus, to
take the present case, the third respondent-company intends
to start a factory for the manufacture of textile machinery,
in the present state of the country's industrial development.
There oould be no dispute that the industry in which the third
resl'ondent is engaged or would be engaged, would serve a
national need and therefore a public purpose. But, as was
put during the course of the argument, the land acquired
might be needed not for the putting up of the factory
premises or essential buildings connected with it for its
operational needs, if one might use that expression, but say
for a swimming pool or a tennis court in the compound of
the Directors' residence for whom the company might consider it proper to provide accommodation. To take a more
extreme case, the company's factory may be in city A, and
if the company wants to provide a guest house, a holiday
home or accommodation for its Directors at city B, the
clause will enable the acquisition to be made for the purpose.
It cannot be contended that the use of the land for such a
purpose was invested with a public purpose so as to permit
compulsory acquisition of land having regard to the terms
of Art. 31 (2).
-
The question, therefore, arises whether an acquisition for
a purpose of this type is or is not permitted on cl. (aa) as
it now stands. I am clearly of the opinion that an acquisition for such a purpose would be covered, for the only two
tests that are prescribed in it as conditions to be satisfied
before an acquisition could .be made under this clause are ( 1)
that the land is needed for the construction of a building or
6 S.CR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
809
work for a company i.e., the acquisition of the land and the
construction are intra vires of the memorandum of association of the company, and (2) that that company for which
the acquisition is being made is one engaged or is to be
engaged in an industry which is for a public purpose.
The first, and I would say the primary submission of
Mr. Setalvad was that the words "for a public purpose" at
the end of the clause ought to be read as governing and
qualifying the words "building or work for a company"
which occur earlier, so that under the clause not merely has
the company to be one of the type described i.e. engaging
in an industry which· serves a public purpose but su<rh a
company needs the land for the construction of a building
or work which is essential for that industry to be commenced
or carried on. I feel unable to accept this as a possible
construction of the words used. For that construction to be
adopted even the transposition of the words "for a public
purpose" to an earlier point after the words "for a company"
would not be sufficient assuming the rules of grammer permitted such a course; for, then it would leave out the description or categorisation of the company for which the land
is needed.• and in such a situation the entire object of the
amendment would be frustrated, as it would not be a condition that the industry in which the company is engaged
is one which is required in public interest. Even if the
clause were rewritten so as to introduce the words "for a
public purpose" earlier and also retain them where it occurs
now, the construction for which Mr. Setalvad contends cannot result, for then it would not make much sense, for the
words "for a public purpose" if transposed earlier would not
convey the meaning which Mr. Setalvad says they convey,
because the construction which learned counsel suggests is
that the clause means that the land is needed for the construction of the factory and other essential buildings for a
company engaged in an industry which serves the national
interest. By no transposition of the words actually used in
the clause can such a transformation be achieved.
The position as regards the construction of cl. (aa) is not
improved when one turns to the consequential amendment
effected in s. 4 I of the Land Acquisition Act where a new
cl. 4(a) has been introduced by s. 4 of the Act. If in this
1961
R. L. A"""
v.
State of UllM
Prade1h
-
Ayyangar I.
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
provision at least, which deals with the agreements which the
Government is directed to enter into, it is clear that the
R. L. Arora
...
acquisition could be made only for a public purpose and not
State of Uttar for what one might term "the private purposes" of a comPradesh
. an m
. dustry wh.1ch 1s
. essentia
. 1 for the publ.1c,
_
pany engaged m
A.yyangar J.
then one could read cl. (aa) together with this provision and
use the terms of s. 41 for construing the scope and purpose
of s. 40(l)(aa). Clause 4(a) reads:
1961
"Where the acquisition is for the construction of any
building or work for a company which is engag·
ed or is taking steps for engaging itself in any
industry or work which is for a public purpose
the time within which, and the conditions on
.which, the building or work shall be constructed
or executed;
"
If anything, therefore, cl. 4(a) emphasizes that what Parliament considered essential was the nature of the company for
whose benefit the acquisition was being made and not the
nature of the use to which the property acquired may be
put and that it would not matter if a company of the type
described used the land acquired for the pleasure of it~
Directors or for its private purposes unrelated to the purpose
of the industry in which it was engaged. Lastly, some
attempt was made to show that the rules framed under the
Land Acquisition Act themselves threw light on the purpose
for which the acquisition was to be made but it was,
however, conceded that the rules afforded no assistance
either way on the matter.
It was then submitted that there is a presumption in
favour of constitutionality and that the clause ought to be
so read, if that were possible so as to sustain its validity. I
quite agree that if the language were flexible in the sense
that it could be read so as to make it refer only to cases of
acquisition for a public purpose, this could and ought 'o be
done. But this assumes that the clause is reasonably capable
of two interpretations: one which would render it unconstitutional and the other which even though it be a little
strained, would make it constitutional. then the Court would
lean in favour of the latter construction.
'
6 S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
8n
The question therefore is whether the clause is capable
of more than one interpretation. I would be stating only
a truism if I said that there is no scope for interpretation
here. With profound respect for my learned brethren, I
consider that the words are capable only of one meaning.
Rules of construction are merely aids to resolving ambiguity.
if any exists. The first and primary rule, if those rules have
to be invoked, is to take the words themselves and then
arrive at their true meaning, for if they disclose an intelligible
meaning, then the process of interpretation stops unless the
words are reasonably capable of being understood in more
than one way and rules of interpretation are then invoked to
r~,1lve that ambiguity. It was not suggested that the words
do not, as they stand, make sense. They do, only the sense
which they convey makes the clause unconstitutional. No
doubt, the meaning of a word may vary with the setting or
context, but that is not the position here. One asks in vain
"which is the word which is said to bear a different meaning
from the natural normal, dictionary sense, because of the
context or setting"?
It was, however, urged that it could not have been the
intention of Parliament to have intended the clause to mean
what appears to be meaning which I have said the words
bore. But this argument ignores the basic principle ,mderlying all rules of statutory construction that the intention
of the legislature has to be gathered only from the meaning
of the. words used, for they are the only means by which
the intention of the law-maker could be ('.nthcred. It is only
where there is an ambiguity and the words are capable of
more than one construction that any extrinsic aid in the
shape of the purpose of the legislature, or the object of the
legislation come in for consideration. "Where the language
of an Act is clear and explicit," said Tindal, C.J. in
Warburton v. Loveland('), "we must give effect to it, what~ver be <he -consequences, for in that case the words of the
statute speak the intention of the lcgisbture". Authority is
not needed for the proposition that the intention of the legislatffre is not a matter to be speculated upon. Interpretation
or construction cannot mean that a Court first reaches ~ conclm,ion as to what in its opinion the legislature intended,
(I) 2 D. & Cl. (H.L.) 480 at p. 489.
1964
R. L. Arora
...
State ct U ttar
Praduh
A.11angar /.
812
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
even though this involves attributing a meaning divorced
from the words used, and then adjust the meaning to the
R. L. Arora
conclusion it has reached. As was observed by Lord Watson
v.
Stat• of Uttar in an oft quoted passage in Salomon v. A. Salomon &
Pradesh
Co.(');
1964
Ayyangar I.
"Intention of the legislature is a common but very
slippery phrase, which, popularly understood.
may signify anything from intention embodied
in positive enactment to speculative opinion as
to what the legislature probably would have
meant, although there has been an omission to
enact it. . In a court of law or equity, what the
legislature intended to be done or not to be done
can only be legitimately ascertained from what
it has chosen to enact, either in express words
or by reasonable and necessary implication. '
It was the same principle that was explained by Lord
Herschell in Cox v. Hakes( 2 ) when he said:
" .......... It must be admitted that if the language of
the legislature interpreted according to the
recognised canons of construction involves this
result, your Lordships must frankly yield to it,
even if you should be satisfied that it was not ie
the contemplation of the legislature."
The only way in which I am able to read the clause is to
relate the words "public purpose" to the nature of the industry carried on by the company and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic aids or with reference to the
context, not to speak of rules of grammar, can the reference
to public purpose be related to the building or work for
which the acquisition is permitted, to be made.
The learned Attomey-Oeneral submitted that the provision could and ought to be read down and confined in its
operation to acquisition for public purposes as properly
understood; in other words, to sever the constitutional from
the unconstitutional portions and uphold the former. I do
not find it possible to adopt this approach in a clause worded
like the one before us. On the construction of the clause
which I hold is the only possible one to adopt, it means the
(I) [1897] A.C. 22 at p. 38.
(2) 1' A.C. 506 at p. S28.
,
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
1961
State is empowered to compulsorily acquire land for com·
panies which satisfy the description of being engaged in an R. L. Arora
industry which is essential for the life of the community
••
Stlllt of Utt<ll'
whether or not the purpose for which the company proposes
Prade1h
to use the land acquired is a public purpose. Where the
Ayyang"1' 1.
purpose for which the acquisition could be made is indicated
by the enactment and that purpose is one which is primarily
constitutionally permissible, but the words employed for
indicating the purposes might possibly include some oul5ide
the power of the legislature, an argument about reading
down would require consideration. But in the clause now
impugned, there is no purpose indicated at all, except thar
it is needed for a company which falis within a particular
category. For such a situation I consider that there is no
scope at all for invoking the principle of reading down.
Again, where the provision gives a carte blanche to Government to acquire land for any purpose it is not possible to
sustain the validity of such a law and strike down merely
the particular acquisition where land is acquired for a pur·
pose which is not a public purpose, for here the vice is in
the law itself and not merely in the application.
I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that cl. (aa) introduced by the Amending Act XXXI of 1962 is unconstitutional as violative of Art. 31(2).
In this view it is unnecessary for me to consider the
proper construction of s. 7 of the Amending Act. Under
the terms of s. 7 of the Act, all acquisitions of land made
prior to June 20, 1962, even accepting the construction which
Mr. Setalvad pressed upon us, are deemed to have been made
for a purpose falling within cl. (aa). Tf, as I have held.
cl. (aa) is unconstitutional and void, it was not contended
that s. '/ would be of any assistance to the respondents to
sustain the acquisition of the petitioner's land. I would,
therefore, allow the petition and grant the reliefs prayed for
therein.
ORDER
In a.::cordance with the opinion of the majority this
petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to
costs.
Petition dismisud.
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