K. J. NATHAN versus S. V. MARUTY REDDY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 11 February 1964 | [1964] 6 S.C.R. 727 | 1964 INSC 32
Key facts
- Decided
- 11 February 1964
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 407/1962
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 6 S.C.R. 727
- Neutral citation
- 1964 INSC 32
Text of the judgment
Ci S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
K. J. NATHAN
v.
S. V. MARUTY REDDY AND OTHERS
(K. SUBBA RAO AND J. R. MUDHOLKAB JJ.)
Mortgage-Mortgage by depolit of title deeh-No document ezec11t•d
on tM day of deposit-<:an intention be infe"ed flom 4 Md
subsequently '1tecuted and registered-Transfer t1f Pra~rty .4ct (Act
No. IV of 1882), 1. 58(/).
The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit to enforce a mortgage by deposit
of title deeds. The case of the plaintil! was that on 10th May, 1947,
the 1st defendant deposited with the plaintiff al Madras other title deedl
and papers relating to his half share in items specified in Schedule 'B'
attached to the plaint with intent to create a security over the same in
respect of advances made by the plaintilf. Before the 10th May, 1947,
the 1st defendant borrowed from the plaintiff from time to time
Rs. J 6,SOO/- on 7 promissory notes. The case of the plaintiff further
was that the 1st defendant executed a memorandum of agreement, dated
Sth July, 1947, in which the equitable mortgage thus created and the
amount borrowed by him till ·then were acknowledged and he had
undertaken to repay the said sum of Rs. 16,SOO/- with interest This
memorandum of agreement had been duly registered. This suit was
for recovery of the principal amount of Rs. 16,SOO/- and interest thereollThe !st defendant did not file any written statement denying the said
allegations. The 3rd defendant (a subsequent mortgagee), the only
contesting defendant, filed a written statement wherein he put the plainlilf
to strict proof of the fact tllat the sums claimed in the plaint were due
to him from the !st defendant and of the fact that the !st defendant
effected a mortgage in his favour by deposit of title deeds. The Trial
Court held that the 1st defendant had no intention to create a mortgage
by deposit of title deeds on May JO, 1947. On appeal the High Court
also affirmed the finding of the trial Court The question for consideration was whether on 10th May, 1947, there was a loan and whether
the 1st defendant delivered to the appellant the documents of title of
B Schedule properties with the intent to create a security thereon.
Held: (i) Under the Transfer of the Property Act, a mortgage by
deposit of title deeds is one of the forms of mortgap whereunder there
is a transfer of interest in specific immovable property for the purpose
of securing payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of
loan. Therefore, such a mortgage of property takes effect against a
mortgage deed subsequently executed and registered in respect of the
same property under Section S8(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
The three requisites of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt,
(ii) deposit of title deeds, and (iii) an intention than the deeds shall
be security for the debt. Whether there is an intention that the deedl
shall be security for tho debt is a question of fact in each case. 11111
-
1961
F1bntt1r7 II.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
[1g64]
said fact will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence.
TheR>
-·is no presumption of law that the mere deposit of title deeds constitutes
K. J. Nathan
T.
S. Y. Maruty
lWdy
a mortgage, for no such presumption has been laid down either in the
Evidence Act or in the Transfer of Property Act. But a court may
presume under section 114 of the Evidence Act that under certain
circumstances a loan and a deposit of title deeds constitute a mortgage.
But that is really an inference as to the existence of one fact from
the existence of some other fact or facts. Nor the fact that at the
time the title deeds were deposited there was an intention to execute a
mortgage deed in itself negatives, or is inconsistent with, the intention
to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds to be in force till the
mortgage deed was executed, On the facts of this case the intention
to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be inferred from the
document dated 5th July, 1947 which was subsequently registered and
in which the deposit of title deeds on May 10. 1947 was duly
acknowledged.
Norris v. Wilkinson, (1806) 33 E.R. 73, Keys v. Williams, (1838)
51 Revised Reports, 339, Whitbread, Ex Parte, (1912) 34 E.R. 496,
In re. Beetham, Ex Parle Broderick, (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 380, Dayal Jairaj
v. Jivraj Ratai1si, (1875) l.L.R. 1 Born. 237, Jaitha Bhima v. Haji Abdul
Vyad Cosman, (1886) I.L.R. 10 Bom. 634, Behram Bashid Irani v.
Sorabji Rustomji Ela1·ia, (1914) I.L.R. 38 Born. 372 and Y.E.R.M.A.R.
Chettyar Fmn v. Ma Joo Teen, (1933) I.L.R. 11 Rang. 239, discussed.
(ii) Physical delivery of documents by the debtor to the creditor
is not the only mode of deposit. There may be a constructive deposit.
A court will have to ascertain in each case whether in substance there
is a delivery of the title deeds by the debtor to the creditor. If the
creditor was already in possession of the title deeds, it would be hyper·
technical to insist upon the formality Of the creditor delivering the ti.tie
deeds to the debtor, and the debtor re-delivering them to the creditor.
What would be necessary in these circumstances is whether the parties
agreed to treat the documents in the possession of the creditor or his
agent as delivery to him for the purpose of the transaction. In the
present case the plaintiff-the mortgagee-had the physical possession of
the title deeds at Madras on f\..fay 10, 1947. On the facts of this case,
though the form of physical delivery of title·decds bad not been gone
through, on May 10, 1947, there was constructive delivery of the title
deeds coupled with the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of
title deeds. Such delivery satisfied the condition laid down by s. SS(f)
of the Transfer of Property Act.
(iii) There is nothing unusual in this conduct of the parties either.
If there was a mortgage by deposit of title deeds at an earlier stage,
even though there was at that time an agreement to execute a format
document later on, there would be nothing out of the wav in the parties,
for their own reasons, giving up the idea of executing a formal document
and being satisfied with the memorandum acknowlcag1111 the earlier form
.,, ICCW'ity.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 407
of 1962.
1961
K. J. Natlulll
...
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 31, >. V. Marut,
1957 of the Madras High Court in A!)?eal No. 969/1952.
ReddJ
R. Mamamurthi Aiyar, T. S. Rangarajan and R. Gopala.krishnan, for the appellant.
V. S. Venkataraman, M. R. Krishna Pillai and M. S. K.
Iyengar, for the respondent No. 3.
February 11, 1964.
delivered by-
The Judgment of- the Coutt was
Su BB A RAO, J .-This appeal on a certificate iSsued by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras is preferred against
the judgment and decree of the said High Court modifying
those of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, in a suit filed by
the appellant to enforce a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.
The facts are as follows. . The first defendant borrowed
from the plaintiff from ·time to time on seven promissory
notes. The plaintiff, alleging that the first defendant had
created a mortgage by deposit of title deeds in his favour
in respect of his half share in the properties specified in
B-Schedule. instituted O.S. No. 45 of 1951 in the Court of
the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, for enforcing the said mortgage against the said properties. The suit was for recovery
of a sum of Rs. 20.435-15-0. made up of principal amount
of Rs. 16,500/- and interest thereon. To that suit six persons were made defendants: defendant I was the mortgagor;
defendant 2 was the subsequent purchaser of several of the
items of the suit properties subject to plaintiff's mortgage;
defendant 3 was the subsequent morgagee; defendant 4 was
the subsequent purchaser of one of the plaint-schedule properties; and defendant 5 and 6 were sister and brother of the
lst defendant. The plaintiff also alleged that in a partition
effected between the 1st defendant and his brother properties
described in the C Schedule annexed to the plaint were
allotted to the !st defendant. He, therefore, asked in the
alternative that the C Schedule properties should be sold
for the realization of •the amount due to him from the 1st
defendant.
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
1l. /. Nathan
"·
$. Y. Mona,
R6"'1
IUN Rao I.
[1964]
As the only contesting party before us is the 3rd defendant (3rd respondent herein), it is not necessary to notice
the defences raised by defendants other than the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant alleged that the 1st defendant had
executed a security bond in his favour for a sum of Rs.
15,000/- on October 10, 1947 and that, being a bona fide
purchaser for value, he had priority over the plaintiff's security, even if it were true. He put the plaintiff to strict
proof of the fact that the sum claimed in the plaint under
several promissory notes was owing to him and also of the
fact that the 1st defendant effected a mortgage of the suit
properties by deposit of title deeds in favour of the plaintiff.
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the suit Joans
were true, that the mortgage by deposit of title deeds was
also true, but the plaintiff had a valid mortgage only of
items I and 4 of the C Schedule in respect of a sum of
Rs. 9,157-5-0 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum thereon.
On that finding, he gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff
against defendants 1 to 3 for the said amount with a charge
over items 1 and 4 of the C Schedule properties, and he also
gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a ;;um of
Rs. 7,565-2-0 with further interest at 6 per cent. per annum
from July 5, 1947, against the 1st defendant personally.
The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the decree of the
Subordinate Judge, insofar as it went against him, and the
3rd defendant filed cross-objection in respect of that part of
the decree which went against him. A Division Bench of the
Madras High Court, which heard the appeal and the crossobjeotions, held that the 1st defendant did not effect a
mortgage by deposit of title deeds on May 10, 1947, in
favour of the plaintiff for the entire suit claim, but that he
effected such a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff on Jan•
uary 25, 1947, for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- in respect of two
of the plaint-schedule items described in Ex. A-8. On that
finding, the High Court modified the judgment and decree of
the Subordinate Judge by restricting the mortgage decree
given to the plaintiff to the amounts covered by the first three
promissory notes and interest thereon and to one half of the
properties described in Ex. A-8 and by giving a money
decree against the !st defendant for the entire balance of tbe
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
decree amount. The plaintiff has preferred the present
appeal against the decree of the High Court.
1961
K. J. Naa-.
v.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends, (1) that the
finding of both the lower courts that no mortgage by deposit
of title deeds was effected for the entire plaint claim was
vitiated by the fact that they had ignored Ex. A-19, a
registered agreement entered into between the plaintiff and
the 1st defendant on July 5, 1947, wherein the said fact
was clearly and unambiguously recorded; and (2) that,
even if such a mortgage was not effected on May 10, 1947,
Ex. A-19 proprio vigore effected such a mortgage to come
into effect at any rate from the date of the execution of the
agreement.
Learned counsel for the contesting 3rd respondent argues
that the definite case of the plaintiff was that such a mortgage was effected only on M\iy 10, 1947, and that both the
Courts below on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence concurrently found that no such transaction
was effected on that date and that, therefore, this Court
should not interfere with such a finding of fact. He further
contends that in Ex. A-19 the parties only recorded that a
mortgage by deposit of title deeds was effected 011 May 10,
1947 and that, if that fact was not true, Ex. A-19 could not
be of any help to the plaintiff. If there was no mortgage on
May 10, 1947, the argument proceeds, Ex. A-19 by its own
force could not create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds
on July 5, 1947, as in terms it only referred to a mortgage
alleged to have been effected on May 10, 1947. That apart,
it is argued that as a mortgage by deposit of title deeds
could only be effected at Madras and that, as one of the
important ingredients of such a mortgage is that the delivery
of the said title deeds to the creditor should have been given
at Madras, no such mortgage could have been effected in
law in the present case, as the delivery of the title deeds
was given by the bank to the representative of the plaintiff
at Kumbakonam.
Before we advert to the arguments advanced in the case
it would be convenient at this stage to notice the relevant
aspects of the law portaining to mortgage by deposit of title
deeds.
$. Y.
Marul1-
Redd7
Subba R• I.
732
1961
,g. J. NatloJJn
'$. Y.
v.
Maruty
Reddy
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64]
Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act defines a
mortgage by deposit of title deeds thus: ·
"Where a person in any of the following towns,
namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras and
Bombay .......................delivers to a creditor
or his agent documents of title to immovable
property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title deeds."
Under this definition the essential requisites of a mortgage
by deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt, (ii) deposit of title
deeds, and (iii) an intention that the deeds shall be security
for the debt. Though such a mortgage is often described
as an equitable mortgage, there is an essential distinction
betwee.n an equitable mortgage as understood in English law
and th~ mortgage by deposit of title deeds recognised under
the Transfer of Property Act in India. In England an equitable mortgage can be created either, (I) by actual deposit
of title-deeds, in which case parol evidence is admissihie to
show the meaning of the deposit and the extent of the security created, or (2) if there be no deposit of tit!e·deeds, then
by a memorandum in writing, pu11porting ·to create a security'
for money advanced: see White and Tudor's Leading Cases
in Equity, 9th edition, Vol. 2, at p. 77. In either case it does
not operate as an a~tual conveyance though it is enforceable
in equity; whereas under the Transfer of Property Act a
mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the modes of
creating a legal mortgage whereunder there will be transfer
of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. This
distinction will have to be borne in mind in appreciating the
scope of the English decisions cited at the Bar. This distinction is also the basis for the view that for the purpose of
priority it stood on the same footing as a mortgage by deed.
Indeed a proviso has been added to s. 48 of the Registration
Act by Amending Act 21 of 1929. It says:
"Provided that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds
as defined in section 58 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882,_ shall take effect against
any mortgage-deed subsequently executed and
registered which relates to the same property.~
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
1964
Therefore, under the Jaw of India a mortgage by deposit of
title-deeds, thoygh it is limited to specific cities, is on a par K. J. Nathan
....
with any other legal mortgage. The text-books and the cases
S. Y. MOJ'ldT
cited at the Bar give some valuable guides for ascertaining
Reddy
the intention of parties and also the nature of delivery of the
Subba Raa I.
documents of title requisite for constituting such a mortgage
Fisher in his book on The Law of Mortgage. 2nd edition,
p. 32, suggests how the intention to create such a 5ecurity
could be established. He says:
"The intent to create such a security may be established by written documents, alone or coupled
with parol evidence; by parol evidence only that
the deposit was made by way of security; or by
the mere inference of an agreement drawn from
the very fact of the deposit."
In Norris v. Wilkinson(') the Master of the Rolls in the
context of that case where documents were delivered to the
Attorney of the creditor for the purpose of enabling the
attorney to draw a mortgage which it was alleged that the
debtor had agreed to give. made the following observations:
"It is clear, that these deeds, if voluntarily delivered
at all, were not delivered by v·ov of deposit, in
the sense in which that word h~3 been used in
the cases : i.e., as a present and immediate
security; but were delivered only for the purpose
of enabling the attorney •to draw the mortgage,
which it is alleged, Wilkinson the father had
agreed to give."
The learned Master of the Rolls distinguished the cases
cited before him thus:
"Now in all the cases, that have been referred to, the
deeds were delivered by way of deposit. Such
deposit was indeed held to imply an obligation
to execute a legal conveyance, whenever it
should be required. But the primary intention
was to execute an immediate pledge; with an
implied engagement to do all, that might be
necessary to render •the pledge effectual for its
purpose."
·
.
·-~-·
(I) ( 1806) 33 E.R. 73, 76.
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1964
These passages indicate that an intention to create a mortgage
deed
in the future is not inconsistent with the intention to
IC. /. Nat/tan
v.
create in presenting a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.
s. Y. Maruty Both may co-exist. In Keys v. Williams(') it was held that
R1ddy
an agreement to grant a mortgage for money already
Subbe Rao I.
advanced and a deposit of deeds for the purpose of preparing a mortgage, was, in itself, an equitable mortgage by
deposit. Though the facts of the case do not appear in
the report, this decision indicates that the fact that deposit
of title-deeds was given for .the punpose of· preparing a
mortgage does not in itself without more, exclude the
inference to create an equitable mortgage if the requisite
conditions for creating thereof are satisfied. The decision
in Whitbread, Ex Parte(') throws some light on the legal
requirements of delivery of title-deeds. There, the petitioner
claimed a lien, as an equitable mortgagee, by deposit in
1808 of the lease of a public-house as a collateral security
for £ 1,000, lent to the lessee on his promissory note, and
a subsequent advance of £ 100 made in January 1810.
One of the points mooted was whether the subsequent
advance of £ 100 was also charged on the property covered
by the document. The learned Chancellor in that context
made the following observations :
"If the original bargain did not look to future
advances, no subsequent advance can be a
charge, unless the subsequent transaction is
equivalent to the original transaction. If it is
equivalent to a re-delivery of the deed, receiving
it back as a security for both sums, that will
do; as it cannot depend upon •that mere form :
but I shall require them to swear expressly,
that when the sum of £ 100 was advanced, it
was upon the security of the deposit."
The said observations emphasize the substance of the transaction rather than the form. _It implies that a debtor, who
has already affected a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds in
respect of an earlier advance, need not go through the forma(1) (1838) SI Revised Reports, 339.
(2) (1812) 34 E.R. 496.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
735
IHf
lity of receiving back the said documents from the creditor
and formally re-delivering them to the creditor as K. /, Nat,,,,.
Y,
security for further advances taken by him. It would
s.
Y. Mlll'lll'/
comply with the requirements of law if there was clear evilWJ7
dence that the documents already deposited with the creditor
Subbo Rao I.
would also be charged by way of deposit of title-deeds
in respect of the further advances. The doctrine accepted
by this decision may, for convenience of reference,
be described as the doctrine of constructive delivery.
Learned counsel for the respondent attempted to confine the scope of this decision to a case of further
advances on the basis of documents already deposited
with the creditor in respect of earlier advances. It is ,true
that the principle was enunciated in the context of the said
facts, but it is of wider application. In our view, the same
principle will have to be invoked wherever documents of
title have already been in the possession of creditor at the
time when the debtor seeks to create a mortgage by jeposit
of title-deeds. In In re Beetham, Ex Parte Broderick(') the
facts were-A, being indebted to a banking company in respect of an overdrawn account, wrote to the directors promising to give them, when required, security over his reversionary interest in one-fifth share of a farm, to come into posses1ion on the death of the life tenant; but no formal security
was ever executed in accordance with this promise. After
the deatb of the life tenant the deeds of the farm came into
the possession of A's brother, the manager of the bank, for
the purpose of paying the succession duty. As regards A's
share therein the brother claimed to hold them for the banking company with the consent of A as security for the overdrawn account. There was no memorandum of the deposit
in the bank books, nor was the usual printed form of jeposit
of title-deeds by way of security made use of with reference
to the transaction. A subsequently became bankrupt. The
Queen's Bench held that the banking company had no valid
equitable mortgage on the bankrupt's share in the farm and
that it could not hold the rents as against his trustee in bankruptcy. On appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed the said
decision of the Queen's Bench. It is contended that this
decision negatives the doctrine of constructive deposit. for
(I) (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 380.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1964
I!. J. Nathan
Y.
S. Y. Mandy
&ddy
S11bba Rao 1.
[rg64J
it is said that though the manager of the bank with the consent of A, held the title-deeds as security for the bank, the
Court did not accept that fact for holding there was an equitable mortgage. In our view, this decision does not lay down
any such proposition. The main reason for the aforesaid
conclusion of the Court of Appeal is found in the judgment
of Lord Esher, M. R. at pp. 768-769 of '.he said Report.
After considering the facts of the case, the Master of the
Rolls proceeded to state:
"If this be so, there was nothing but the oral promise
of the bankrupt to give the bank security, and
that is not enough to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds. In order to take the case out of the
statute it must be shown that there has been
performance or part performance of the 0ral
promise.
But nothing more was done with the deeds; they
were left in precisely the same position. Nothing was done, except that the one brother said
something, and the other said something in
reply. Was this such a part performance of the
original oral promise as will take the case out of.
the statute?"
His Lordship concluded:
"I take that proposition to amount to this that where
there is a mere oral promise to do something,
and nothing takes place afterwards but the
speaking of more words by the parties-when
nothing more is done in fact-there is no part
performance which can exclude the application
of the Statute of Frauds."
The entire judgment was based upon the doctrine of part
performance and the Court of Appeal held that the facts
established did not constitute part performance of the oral
agreement. The doctrine of constructive deposit was neither raised nor touched upon in that case.
Now let us consider some of the Indian decisions cited
at the Bar. In Dayal Jairai v. Ji1•ra; Ratansi( 1 ), the plaintiff
(I) (1857) I.LR. l Born. 237.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
nad advanced to the 1st defendant Rs.· 38,0C3.'-. and had
agreed to advance Rs. 27,000/- more, the whole of Rs.
65.000/- to be secured by a mortgage of the !st defendant'~
immovable property. The I st defendant had deposited
with the plaintiff the title-deeds of his immovable p:operty,
for the purpose of enabling him to get a mortgage deed prepared, and had agreed to execute such mortgage deed on payment to him by the plaintiff the balance of the amount of
Rs. '65,00C/-. The title-deeds were afterwards returned by
the plaintiff to the !st defendant for the purpose of enabling
him to clear up certain doubts as to his title to some of the
premises comprised in the deeds, but the said deeds were
neither subsequently returned by the 1st defendant, nor were
others deposited in lieu• thereof. The balance of the Rs.
65,000/- was not paid by the plaintiff to the 1st defenda'lt.
The Court held that there was an equitable mortgage of the
said property to secure the sum of Rs. 38,000:'-. The fact
tnat the title-deeds were deposited for the purpose of executing a mortgage deed, which did not fructify, did not in a!"y
way preclude the Court from holding on the facts of the
case that a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was created
in respect of the amount that had already been paid to the
debtor. The court relied upon the principle enunciated by
earlier English decisions based upon the fact whether
amounts were lent before or after the deposit of titl~·decds.
In /aitha Bhima v. Haji Abdul Vyad Cosman(') the facts
were these: The plaintiff consented to lend Rs. 10,0001- to
the defendant. The latter deposited with him on April 2,
1883, the title-deeds of a certain property. On receiving
them the plaintiff told the defendant that he would take them
to his ~.ttorney, have a deed drawn and then advance the
money. The defendant applied to the plaintilI for the
money before the deed was prepared, but the plaintiff
refused, saying he would not advance the money until
he was satisfied by his attorney, and the deed had
been prepared. At the time the deeds were handed over
to the plaintiff, there was no existing debt due by the drfendant to the plaintiff. On April 6, 1885, the mortgage-deed
was executed, and on the .same day the money was advanced
by the plaintiff to the defendant. The mortgage-deed was
not registered. The plaintiff filed a suit for a declaratio;i
(I) (1886) l.L.R. 10 Brun. 634.
llt-118 11.C......7.
1961
Ir.. I. NatW
Y,
S. V. Mfl11111
Rldd1
S11bbe Rao /,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
that he was entitled to an equitable mortgage upon the said
property and for the sale thereof. The court held ihat on
the facts no equitable mortgage was created. From the
aloresa,id narration of facts it would be obvious that the
plaintifi lent the money immediately before the execution of
tbe document indicating thereby that it was paid under that
document. Farran, J ., who delivered the judgment, relied
upon the following passage from Seton on Decrees, p. 1131:
"H deeds be delivered to enaple a legal mortgage for
securing an existing debt to be prepared, there
js an equitable mortgage until the legal mortga~e is completed; secus is to secure a fre~h
ioan yet to be made."
1bl'Jl th,c learned I udge cited the following passage from
tbc iudgment in Keys v. Williams( 1 ):
l'Certairily, if, before ,the money· was advanced. the
deeds had been deposited with a view to pre pa re
future mortgage, such a transaction could not
be considered as an equitable mortgage by
deposit; but it is otherwise where there is a present advance, and the deeds are deposited under
a promise to forbear suing, although they may
be deposited only for the purpose of preparing
a mortgage deed. In such case the deeds
are given in as part of the security, ttnd become
pledged from the very nature of the transa.:t:on."
These two· passages also indicate that the fact that title·
deeds were deposited for the purpose of preparing a futun
mortgage is in itself not decisive of the question whether such
a mortgage was effected or not. A Division Bench of the
~ombay High Court in Behram Bashid Trani v. Sorabji
Rustomji Elavia(') held that in that case there wa~ no
evide.nce whatever of intention to connect the deposit of
titl~-d;.cts with the debt. The plaintiff therein deposited
with the defendant in Bombay title-deeds of his property
tituate at Nasik and borrowed a sum from the defendant.
·Jfe also executed a document but that was held to be
f#admissible for w,ant of registration. There was no other
a
(I) (1838) SI R.V. Rep. 339.
'.2) (191•) I.LR. 38 Born. 372, 37•.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURf REPOHTS
739
evidence to si10w under what circumstances the documents
lHt
were deposited. Beaman, J ., made the following observa- 1:. 1. NM,,_
v.
tions:
.s. ... Ill~
lf.1d/Jy
"The doctrine thus created, amounted at that time
to very much what the Jaw now is, as I have .Srdlk llM I.
just expressed it, although the learned Chancellor, I think, Jent strongly to the supposed leg~!
presumption arising from the fact of indebtedness\ and the contemporaneous or subsequent
deposit of title-deeds. Then for the better p~ri .
of a century, the Courts in England virtually
aJopted this presumption as a presumption of
law and the need of proving intention almost disappeared. Latterly, however, the legal doctrine
i'l England veered in the opposite direction and
the Courts began to insist more and more ~trong
Iy upon the proof of intention as a question of
fact, and that has been embodied in our own
statute Jaw and that is the law we have to
administer."
This decision only neg?tives the presumption of law, but does
not exclude the presumption of fact of a mortgage arising
under certain circum';tances from the very deposit of. titledeeds. An elabor3te discussion of the subject is found in
V.£.R.M.A.R. Chcflyar Firm v. Ma Joo Teen('). The
main question decided i'l that case was, what did the terms
"documents of title" and "title-deeds" denote? The Coul1
held that they denoted such a document or documertts as
show a prima facie or apparent title in the depositor to tho
property or to some interest therein. But what is relevant
for the present purpose is that the learned Chief Justice, who
spoke for the Co•irt, after considering the leading judgments
on the subject, observed:
"If the form of the documents of tit!~ that h,ave !J~FD
delivered to the creditor is such that froqi Ui•
deposit of such documents alone ~e Court
would he entitled to conclude that the documc:iiis
were deposited with the intentio~ . creating 'a
security for the r~payment of the del:it, prima
of
----------
(1) (1933) 1.L.ll.. 11 Rang. 239, 253.
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1964}
IHI
facie a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds would
Y.
~nce would not be irrebuttable,
£ ·J. N•l'/wm
& r. ,.,.,,,,,
Rtd"1
hbbo,IfMI.
be proved; although, of course, such an inferan:i would not
··be drawn if the weight of the evidence as a
whole told against it."
The learned Chief Justice accepted the principle that if
title-deeds, as defined by him, were deposited and the money
was lent, prima facie an inference of a mortgage could be ·
drawn, though such an inference could be displaced by other
evidence. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further.
The foregoing discussion may be summarized thus:
Under the Transfer of Property Act a mortgage by deposit
of title-deeds is one of the forms of mortgages whereunder
there, is a transfer of interest in spocific immovable property
tot, the purpos~ of securing payment of money advanced or
to be advanced by way of· 1oan. Therefor", such a mortga~e of property takes effect against a mcmgage deed subsequently executed and registered in respect of the same property. The three requisites for such a mortgage are, (i) debt,
(ii) deposit of title-deeds; and (iii) an intention that the deeds
1hall be security for the debt. Whether there is an intention
that the deeds shall be security for the debt is a quest ion
of fact in each case. The said fact will have to be decided
just like any other fact on presumptions and on oral, docu·
mentary or circumstantial evidence. There is no presumption of law that the mere deposit of title-deeds constitutes a
mortgage, for no such presumption has been laid down either
in the Evidence Act or in the Transfer of property Act. But
a court may presume under s. 114 of the Evidence Act that
under certain circumstances a loan and a deposit of. titledeeds constitute a mortgage. But that is really an inference
as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some
other fact or facts. Nor the fact that at the time the title·
deeds were deposited there was an intention to execute a
mortgage deed in itself negatives. or is inconsistent with. the .
iriterition to create a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds to
be in force till the mortgage deed was executed. The decl·
'aion of Enj!li~h courts making a di~tinction between the debt
preeeding the depqi:it and that following it can at best l.e
only a gurtfe: ~,11t ·the said distinction itself cannot be coo-
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT Rf.PORTS
741
sidered to Ile a rule of law for application under all circumstances. Physical delivery of documents by the debtor to
the creditor is not the only mode of deposit. There may· be
a constructive deposit. A court will have to ascertain in
each case whether in substance there is a delivery of titledeeds by the debtor to the creditor. If the creditor YLaS
a !ready in possession of the title-deeds, it would be hypertechnical to insist upon the formality of the creditor delivering the title-deeds to the debtor and the debtor re-delivering
them to the creditor. What would be necessary in those
circumstances is whether the parties agreed to treat the documents in the possession of the creditor or his. agent as delivery
to him for the purpose of the transaction.
With this background we shall now proceed to consider
the questions that arise for consideration on the facts of tht
present case.
The first question is whether there was a mortgage by
deposit of title-deeds of the 8-Schedule properties on May
JO, 1947. To put it in other words, whether on that date
there was a loan and whether the first defendant delivered to
the appellant the documents of title of 8-Schedule properties
with the intent to create a security thereon.
Learned Subordinate ·Judge and. on appeal, the Higlll
Court. held on .the evidence that there was no such deposit
of title-deeds with the requisite intention on May 10, 1947.
Learned counsel for the respondent pressed on us to follow
the usual practice of this Court of not interfering with concurrent findings of fact. But the question whether on facts
found a transaction is a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds ii
a mixed question of fact and law.. That apart, both the courll
· in coming to the conclusion which they did missed the importance of the impact of the terms of Ex. A-19 on the question
raised. We, therefore, propose to consider the evidence on
the said question afresh, along with Ex. A-19.
In para S of the plaint, after giving the particulars of
the promissory notes executed by the first defendant in
favour of the plaintiff, it is stated:
"On 10th May 1947, the first defendant deposited
with the plaintiff at Madras other title deeds aiid
""'...
J[. /. N.i,_
s. "·IWl1.
JI.,.,,,
SuhllMt.
742
Ilfil
I(. J. Natlw.11
••
S. Y Marut-,
Reddy
Subbll Raa J,
SHPREME COURT REPORTS
12a;:icrs relating to his half-share in items speci·
lied in 'B' schedule hereunder with intent to
create a security over the same in respect of
advances made and to be made by the plaintiff.
The first defendant has further executed a memorandum of agreement, dated 5th July 194 7, in
which the equitable martgage thus created and
the amount borrowed by him till then were
acknowledged and he has undertaken to repay
the said sum of Rs. 16,500 with interest at 6
per cent. per annum and to obtain a return of
the title deeds and documents deposited by him
with the plaintiff.
This memorandum of
agreement has been duly registered and the same
iS herewith produced. The plaintiff prays that
its contents may be read as part and parcel of
this plaint."
There is, thereto1e, a clear avennent in the plaint that an
equitable mortgage was created on May 10, 1947. and that
was acknowledged by the agreement dated July 5, 1947. The
1st defendant did not file any written-statement denying the
said allegations. The 3rd defendant, the only contesting
defendant, filed a written-statement wherein he put the plaintiff to strict proof of the fact that the sums claimed in the
plaint were due to him from the !st defendant and of the
fact that the first defendant effected a mortgage in his favour
by deposit of title-deeds. Before we consider the oral ed·
<Jenee, we shall orieny notice the documentary evidence in
the case.
Exhiliit A·l dated January 25, 1947, Ex. A-9 dated
February 13, 194'1, Ex. A-12 dated March 2. 1947, Ex. A-14
dated Apn17,1947, Ex. A-15 dated April 13, 1947, Ex. A·
17 dated May 10, 1947, and Ex. A-18 dated July 4, 194 7 are
the promissory notes executed by the !st defendant in favour
of the plaintiff. The total of the amounts covered by the
said promissory notes is Rs. 16.500/-. It is not disputed that
the promissory notes were gaiume and that the said amounts
were lent by the plalnti1r to the !st defendant on the dates
the promissory notes bear. On 1anuary 26, 1947. i.e., a day
a'f'a:r the ftrst protniSIO'ly nore wu executed, a list of titledeedl of the pn)(Jeltle! bi:iollging to the !st defendant in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOI<TS
Tanjore was given to the plaintiff as collateral security and.
196'
by way of equitable mortgage for the loan 0£ Rs. 1,500
borrowed under Ex. A-1. On April 7, 1947, the 1st defen- X. /. Hallum
dant executed an unregistered agreement in favour of the
s. Y. Mrruf1
plaintiff whereunder, as the plaintiff agreed to lend to the
Rnliy
1st defendant a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to discharge his earlier
Subba RH I..
indebtedness and also his indebtedness to the Kumbakonam
Bank and to enable him to do business, the 1st dP.fendant
agreed to execute a first mortgage of the Tanjore propertie:t
as well as of the properties mortgaged to the Kumbakonam
Bank. He also undertook to bring all the title-deeds from
the Kumbakonam Bank and hand them over to the plaintill
for preparing the mortgage deed. This agreemeut shows
that the I st defendant was willing to execute a mortgage deed
of his properties to the plaintiff and with that object under·
took to bring the title-deeds and hand tl1em over to the
plaintiff for preparing the mortgage deed. Pursuant to this
agreement, the plaintiff on the same d'a}' advanced to the
1st defendant a sum of Rs. 3,000/- under a promissory note
of the same date. On April 13, 1947, the plaintiff lent an·
other sum of Rs. 3,000 /- under a promissory note tv the 1st
defendant. The 1st defendant did not bring the title-deeds,
but by a letter dated April 27, 1947, (Ex. B-2), he authorised
the Managing Director of the Kumbakonam Bank to hand
over the title-deeds and the mortgage deed duly discharged
to the plaintiff or his representative on his paying the amount
due by him to the Bank. On May 5, 1947, .the pta!ntilr
wrote a letter, Ex. B-1, to the Kumbakonam J3ank informing it that one S. Narayana Ayyar of Madras would diseharge.
the mortgage amount due to the Bank from tb·e 1st defendant and authorizing the Bank to deliver to th'e said
Narayana Ayyar the cancelled mortgage deed ahd the rela.
tive title-deeds. The said Narayana Ayyar took tlie lefter.
Ex. B-1, to the Bank, paid the amount due to it from tho
1st defendant and took the title-deeds on behalf of the 1st
defendant and sent them on to the plaintiff at Madras ·
by registered post. On May 10, 1947, the 1st defendant
executed another promissory note, Ex. A-17, for a sum of
Rs. 7, I 00 /- in favour of the plaintiff in regard to the amount.
paid by Narayana Ayyar to the Bank. On July 4, 19lJt, tiio
1st defendant ·executed another promissory ndte, EJI. A-18,
in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 400. Tlie total
••
744
n'lff•.·
/l. J. Nathan
"'·
I. J'. Maruty
. /Wld7
...... Rao I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of the amounts advanced up to that date by tbe plaintiff to
the !st defendant was Rs. lo.500/-. Ex. A-19 dated July S,
l 947, is a registered memorandum of agreement executed
between the p1aintiff and the !st defendant. Though it was
executed on July S, 1947, it was presented for registration
on October 31, 1947 and was eventually registered on June
22, 1948. It is not disputCd that the said agreement was
executed on July 5, 1947. Under s. 47 of. the Registration
Act the said document would have legal effect from the date
of execution i.e., July 5, 1947. Under that document the !st
defendant, after acknowledging that between January 25,
1947, and July 4, 1947, he had received from the plaintilf
a sum of Rs. 16,SOO I· under various promissory notes executed in favour of the plaintiff, proceeded to state:
"The borrower hereby acknowledges having deposited with the lender at Madras on 25th January
1947 the title deeds relating to the borrower's
undivided half share in items 17 to 2C mentioned in the B schedule hereunder, and also having
deposited with the lender on IOth May 1947 the
title-deeds and other papers rehting to th•
borrower's undivided· half share in items I to
16 mentioned in B schedule hereunder with
interest to create a security over the deposit of
title deeds."
This acknowledgment is couched in clear and unambiguous
terms. The !st defendant acknowledges in express terms that
a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was effected on May 10,
1947. If there was no oral evidence adduced i,, this r•~e.
the said ·documentary evidence prima facie would establish
that the Isl defendant borrowed a sum of Rs ..16.5001- from
time to time from the p:aintiff and effeoted a ·mortgage by
deposit of title-deeds on May IO. 1947, as security for the
repayment of the said amount Exhibit A-19 contains a clear
admission by the 1st defendant that he effected a mortgage
by deposit of title-deeds in favour of the plaintiff. As tha
mortgage deed in· favour of the 3rd defendant was executed
subsequent to Ex. A-19, he is bound by that admission, un·
Jess there is sufficient evidence on the record to explain away
the said admission. The Ist defendant, who .could e'1Cpla1n
the circWD$tanccs under ·which Ex. A-19 was executed was
-0 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RFPORTS
745
1961'
not examined as a witness in this case. But it is said that
the evidence of P.Ws 1, 2 and 3 displaces the evidentiary K. /. Nat,,,,.
value of the recitals of the said document. P.W. I· is the S. Y. Y.M"""1
{llaintiff. He says in his examination-in-chief:
Redd1
"On 10th May 1947 defendant I and Narayana Subb• RAo /,
Ayyar met my lawyer at Madras and I was sent
for. Exhibit A-17 is the pro-note executed for
Rs. 7,100/- for the payment made to the bank.
Defendant 1 then personally hanc\ed over the
documents to me by way of deposit of titledeeds as security, for the advance made and to
be made. Defendant I did not execute any
mortgage. In July 1947, defendant I asked for
Rs. 400 /- to buy stamps for the mortgage. I
paid Rs. 400 /- under Exhibit A-18. On 5th
July 1947 the memorandum, Exhibit A-19, wa1
executed in my lawyer's house.
My lawyer
attested the document as well as Narayana
Ayyar. They saw defendant l sign the document."
If this evidence is accepted, the plaintiff's case will be esta't>llshed to the hilt. But in the cross-examination he deposed:
"On 5th July 1947, the agreement about executing a
simple mortgage was changed into one of equit·
able mortgage. Defendant I suggested it und
I was advised to accept and I accepted."
Reliance is placed upon this statement to show that the Idea
cf effecting an equitable mortgage dawned on the parties
only on July 5, 1947, and. therefore. the case that suet•. a
mortgage was effected on May 10. 1947, must be untrue.
We do not see any inconsistency between the statement made
by the plaintiff in the examination-in-chief and that made in
the cross-examination. What he stated in the cross-exami·
nation is that though it was agreed earlier that a formal
ptortgage deed should be executed, on July 5, 1947, the
parties, for one reason or other. were content to have a
deed of equitable mortgage. It is too much to expect this
vritness to bear in mind the subtle distinction between the
e~ecution of an equitable mortgage on July 5. 1947. and the
acknowledgment of an eauitable mortim"e that had alrendy
been effected. In this statement he emphasized more on !M
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
document than on the contents of the document. So underK. J. Nathan swod, this evidence does not run counter to the express recitJ!s fot•nd in Ex. A-19. There is also nothing unusual that
v.
s. V. A1aruty en the advice of the advocate the formalities of actual deliRedJy
\ery were comp!ied with in the presence of the advocate.
S;,bba Rao I. But one need not scrutinize the version of this witness metiClllously in that regard, if in law a constructive delivery
would be as good as a physical delivery. We, therefore, donot see in the ev:dence of P. W. I anything to discountenance
tile admission made by the !st defendant in Ex. A· 19.
1961
P.W. 2, the advocate, also says in his evidence that he
gave the title-deeds to the !st defendant and asked him tohand t'lem over to P.W. l and· to state that these and dqcuments already deposited would be security for the loans advanced till that date. There would be r:o:h;:,:; unusual if an
advocate, who knew the technicalities of a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, adv:sed his client to conform to the formalities. Even if the partie; accepted constructive delivery.
the evidence given by th:s witness is more an embellishment
than a conscious effort to depart from the truth. A> to what
happened on July 4, 1947, this witness says that on that date
the !st defendant and Narayana Ayyar came to him and
1uggested that the memorandum may be registered instead of
e~ecuting a simple
mortgage asthat would be cheaper.
There is nothing unsual in this conduct of the parties either.
If there was a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds at an earlier
stage, even though there was at that time an agreemerit to
execute a formal document later on, there would be nothing
out of the way in the parties for their own reasons giving up
the idea of executing a formal document and being satisfied
with a memorandum acknowledging the earlier form of
security. In the cross-examination this witness stated that
till July 4, 1947, the idea was only to make a simple mortgage
over the half-share covered by all the title-deeds given to
P.W. 1.· This statement only means that till that date the
parties had no idea of executing a document acknowledging
the earlier mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, for they want·
~d a formal document. This answer is in no way inconsistent
with the staterr:ent of the advocate at the earlier sta11:e that
thl'Fe was a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds on May 10,
1947. So too, Naray~a Ayyar, as P.W. 3, supports the evi-
•
6 S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT RF~PORTS
747
19M
dence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. He too in his cross-examination
savs that it was only on July 4, 1947, the idea of executing an K. J. Nathan
equitable mortgage was suggested by the !st defendant ar.d S. V. v.~faruf1·
that on May 10, 194 7, he did not suggest to the !st defendant
Reddy
to execute 2ny document. Here ~igain, his stateli'Cnt in the
cross-examination would not be in:onsistent with that made
by him in the examination-in-chief. if the former statcme!'t
was understood to rc'.ate to Ex. A-19. This witness o'dy
meant to say that the idea of executing Ex. A-19 c;awned on
!ht parties only on July 4, 1947.
Th~ zvidencc C1f iltc;e
three witnesses is consistent with the admission m~de hy the
first defendant in Ex. A-19. The ~videntiary value of the
recitals in Ex. A-19 is in no way displaced by the evidence
of the said witnesses: indeed, it supp:irts the recitals therein
in toto. In the circumstances, we hold that on Mav 10, 194 7,
the !st defendant deposited the title-deeds with the plaintiff
physically as se:urity for the amounts advanced by the plaintiff •o the I st defendant up to that date. Even if the evidence
of the witnesses as reg~.rds the handing over of the dc~uments
physically by the !st defen;lant to the plaintiff was an embellhhment of what took place on that date and that the:·e was
only constructive del'very, we think that such delivery satis:
tied the condition laid down by s. 58f) of the Transfer of
{'ropcrty Act.
Even so, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that the delivery of the title-deeds was to the appellant's representative, Narayam Ayyar, at Kumbakonam and.
therefore, the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, even if true,
must be deemed to have been effected at Kumbakonam and
that u!lder the law such a mortgage could not be effected at
Ku1'!bakonam as it was not one of the places mentioned in
s. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. But Narayana
Ayyar, as P.W. 3, stated in his evidence that he had authority
to take the title-deeds on behalf of the I st defendant and that,
aftet having taken delivery of them on his behalf, he sent
them .to the plaintiff at Madras by registered post. But
whether Narayana Ayyar received the title-deeds from the
Bank a~ agent of the 1st defendant or as that of the plaintiff,
it would not affect the question to be decided in the present
case. We shall assume that Narayana Ayyar was ~e agent
of the p:aintilf. But mere delivery of title-deeds without the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg6
1961
intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds would
not constitute such a mongage. On May 5,)947, when the
Y.
title-deeds were received by the plaintif{ through his agent,
1/. Y. Marui,
Narayana Ayyar, at Kumbakonam, they were received only
R•ddy
for the purpose of prepar :ng the mortgage deed. The p:ain·
Sllbba Rao I. tiff had the physical possession of the title-deeds at Madras
on May 10, 1947. On that date the possession of the title·
deeds by the plaintiff was as agent of the !st defendant. He
wa~ not holding the said documents, iu his own right on the
basis of his title or interest therein. The agent's possession
was the possession of the 1st defendant, the principal. On
May 10, 1947, the creditor and the debtor, i.e., the. plaintiff
and the !st defendant, met in the house of P.W. 2 and the 1st
defendant agreed to deposit the said title-deeds already in
the physical possession of the plaintiff as his agent in order to
hold them thereafter as security for the moneys advanced.
From May 10, 1947, the plaintiff ceased to hold the title·
deeds as agent of the I st defendant but held them only
as a mortgagee. If the plaintiff physically handed over the
title-deeds to ,the !st defendant and the 1st defendant immediately handed over the same to the plaintiff with intentio1
to mortgage them, it is conceded that a valid mortgage was
created. To insist upon such a formality is to ignore the
·substance for the form. When the:principal tells the agent
"from today you hold my title-deeds as security", in substance
·there is a physical delivery. For convenience of reference
such a delivery can be described as constructive delivery of
title-deeds. The law recognizes such a constructive delivery.
·we, therefore, hold that, even on the assumption that the
form of physical delivery had not been gone through·though we hold that it was so effected on May 10, 1947there was constructive delivery of the title-deeds coupled
with the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title·
-deeds.
'IC. J. Nathan
The last argument of learned counsel for the appellant
is that even if there was no mortgage by deposit of title·
deeds on May 10, 1947, under Ex. A-19 such a morteaee v111
created at any rate from July 5, 1947. It is true-that rhe
·document in express terms says that the documents of title
were deposited on May IO, 1947, with intention to rreate a
"1Ilortgage by deposit of title-deeds. Assuming it was not so
-
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
749
done on that date, can such an intention be inferred from
the document as on July 5, 1947 ? Admittedly on July 5,
1947, the title-deeds were in the possession of the plaintiff.
If on that date the 1st defendant had expressed his intention
that from that date he would consider the title-deeds as secu. r!ly for the loans already advanced to him. all the necessary
cor.dit:o:is of a mortgage by d.~posit of title-deeds would be
present, name:y, (i) debt, (ii) constructive delivery, and (iii)
intention. The fact that he had such an intention from an
e~rlier date could not make any difference in kw, ~.s the intention expressed was a continu:ng one. 0!1 J::ly 5, 1947,
according to the 1st defendant, the mortgage by depo5it of
tit'c-deeds was in existence and, therefore, on that date the
said three necessary ingred;ents of a mortgage by dep0sit of
title-deeds were present. We, therefore, hold that even if
there was no mortgage by dep:isit of title-deeds on }.·fay 10,
1947, it was effected '01) July 5, 1947.
If the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was effected on
May 10, 1947, or on. July 5, i947, the legal p0sit1on 'wo11ld
be the same, as the mortgage deed in favour of the 3rd defendant was executed only on October 10, 1947. Tho~1gh Ex.
A-19 was registered on June 22, 1948, under s. 47 of the
Registration Act the agreement would take effect from July
1947.
It is not disputed that in the partition that was effected
between the 1st defendant and his brother the properties
specified in 'C' schedule were allotted to the share of the I st
defendant. If so, the plaintiff would be entitled to have a
mortgage decree in respect of the said propert:es. In the
result there will be a preliminary decree in favour of the
plaintiff for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 20,434-15-0
with interest at 6 per cent. per annum thereon till the said
amount is paid. The period of redemption will be three
months from today and in default the 'C' schedule properties
will be sold for the realization of the same. Liberty is
reserved to the plaintiff to aoply for persona! decree against
the 1st defendant .in case there is any deficiency after the
ltypotheca has been sold. The decree of the Subordinate
Judge and of the High Court are set aside and there will be
11 decree in the said terms. The 1st and 3rd defendants wilt
pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout.
Apptal allowed..
s.
1964
K. /. Natluilt
••
S. Y. MandJ
Reddy
Subba RQ,, A
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