VIDYACHARAN SHUKLA versus KHUBCHAND BAGHEL AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 December 1963 | [1964] 6 S.C.R. 129 | 1963 INSC 266
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 December 1963
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 815/1963
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 6 S.C.R. 129
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 266
Text of the judgment
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
umbrella fllld soap which never paid tax under the Act of
1961
1918 could be dealt with by the partners as they liked Sail Nagi•• p,,,.
without affecting 'the question of relief under s. 25 in respect shottam &: Co.
.of the head business.
Commi.s:~,,.,. ot
lncome·ta>:.
•
In my judgment, these appeals must be allowed ano the Madr.,
question answered in favour of the assessee firm but only in Hidayatul/IJh
respect of the business in piece-goods, yarn and banking
which alone had paid tax under the Income-tax Act of 1918.
I would therefore allow the appeals with costs here and in
the High Court
ORDER BY COURT .
In accordance with the opinion of the majority the
appeals are dismissed with costs.
VIDYACHARAN SHUKLA
11.
KHUBCHAND BAGHEL AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)
Election-Appeal ta High Court under s. 116·A-Whether in
computing period of limitation for filing an appeal to High Court, time
provided by s. 12 of Limitation Act for getting a copy of the order CIJll
be excluded-Whether s. 29(2)(a) applied to cases of appeal preferre4
under s. 116-A-Relationship between the two limbs of •· 29(2) of Limi·
tation Act-Limitation Act. 1908 (9 of 1908), ss. 12, 29(2), Fir/II
Schedule, Art, 156-Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951),
•· 116-A.
The appellant was elected to the House of the People from a con·
•tituency in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The respondents were tho
other contesting candidates' Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition
challenging the election of the appellant. That election petition was
dismissed by the Election Tribunal. Against the order of the Tribunal.
the first respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court under s. 116-A
134-159 S.C.-9.
1963
Decunber, 20
·
1.;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Vltlyac/raran
Sltukla
v.
Xhubchand
Baghel
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Admittedly, the appeal
was filed more than 30 days after the order of the Election Tribunal.
If the time requisite for obtaining a copy o(. the order of the Tribunal
was excluded. the appeal was filed within 30 days. However, if that
was not tlone, the appeal was out of time. The contention of theappellant before the High Court was that the respondent No. I was not
entitled in law to exclude the time taken by him i'l obtaining the copy
of the order of the Tribunal. That contention was rejected by the High
Court. The High Court also found that the appellant was guilty of two
corrupt practices and hence his election was set aside. The appellant
came to this Court by special leave.
-
The only question raised before this Court was whether for thepurpose of computing the period of 30 days prescribed under s. 116-A(3)
of tho Act, the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act could be invoked
or not. Dismissing the appeal.
Held: (per B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal and
N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JI.) (i) The exclusion of time provided for
by s. 12 is permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing
the appeal in the High Court.
Per B. p. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
JI.) (ii) Though the right of appeal is conferred by s. 116-A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, and it is by virtue thereof that
the appeal was filed by respondent in the High Court, it is still an appeal
"under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, tO the High Court". To
attract Art. 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. it is not
necessary for an appeal to be an "appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure" that tho right to prefer the appeal should be conferred by the
Code of Civil Procedure. It is sufficient if the proccaure for the filing.
of the appeal and the power of the Court for dealing With the ippeal,
when filed, are &overned by the Code.
Per Raghubar Dayal and Mudholkar JJ.-There is no warrant fer
holding that an appeal which is not given by the Code of Civil Procedure is still an appeal under the Code merely because its procedural
provisions govern its course. Where a right of appeal is given by some·
other law, the appeal must be regarded as one untler that law and not
under the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no reason for constr.llng
the words "under the Code of Civil Procedure" as meaning ••governed
in the matter of procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure".
Held: liii) (per B. P. Sinha, C.J., N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and
Raghubar Dayal JJ.) The entire sub-s. (2) of s. 29 of the LimitatioP
Act has to be read as an integrated provision ana the conjunction ."and..
connects the iwo parts and makes it necessary for attracting cl. (a) that
the conditions laid down by the opening words of sub-s. (2) should be
satisfied.
~
6 S.C.R.
-·
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
Per Subba Rao and Mudholkar JJ.-The second limb of sub-s. \2)
of s. 29 is __ wide enough to include a suit, appeal or an application under
a special or local law which is of a type for which no period of limitation is prescribed in the First SchetluJe.
Yidyacharan
Shukla
"·
Per Subba Rao J.-The use of the word "any" clearly shows that
the second part of sub-s. (2) of s. 29 does not depend on the first part
or vice versa. The second part of sub-s. (2) is an independent provision
providing for that category of proceedings to which the first part- does
not apply.
Held: (i) that s. 116-A does not provide an exhaustive and exclusive
code of limitation for the purpose of appeals against orders of Tribunals
and also does not exclude the general provisions of the Limitation Act.
Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act speaks of express e.:clusion and
there is no express exclusion in s. 116-A(3) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951. Moreover, the proviso to s. 116-A(3) from which
an implied exclusion is sought to be drawn does not lead to any such
necessary implication. The proviso only restores the power denied to
the Court under s. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act. If this proviso haJ
not been there, s. 29(2)(b) would have excluded the operation of s. S
of the Limitation Act with the result that even if a sufficient cause for
the delay existe'd. the High Court would have been helpless to excuse
the delay.
(ii) S. 12(2) of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal to the High
Court against the order of the Tribunal.
1963
An order made under s. 98
of the Representation of the People Act, 19Sl, if it contains also tho
./ reasons for it, is a composite document satisfying the definition of a judgment as well as that of an order and thereby attracting the relevant
provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act. Section 12(2) does not say
that the order mentioned therein shall be only such order as is defined
in the Civil Proce'dure Code. If a statute provides for the making of
an order and confers a right of appeal to an aggrieved party against that
order within a prescribed time, the time requisite for obtaining a copy
of the order can be excluded. The Act of 1951 empowers the Tribunal
to make an order and gives a right of appeal against that order to the
High Court and therefore s. 12(2) is directly
attracted without any
recourse to the definition of an order in the Code of Civil Proce'durc.
Per Mudholkar J.--The first limb of s. 29(2) is concerned only with
the proceedings under special or local law for which a perjod of limitation is prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. If for
such a proceeding the period to be found in the First Schedule is different from that prescribed under" a spCcial or local law. certain consequences will follow unaer the provision. No inconvenience is to be
caused by giving a literal and natural interpretation to the expression
used by the legislature in the first portion of sub-s. (2) of s. 29 because
cases of other kind can easily come under the second portion thereof.
Case Law referred to.
Khubchand
Barh41
132
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khu behand
BagheI
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 815 of
1963.
Appeal by special.leave from judgment and order dated
April 23, 1963, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in 1st
Ap;ieal No. 23 of 1963.
G. S. Pathak, B. A. Musodkar, S. N. Andley and
Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.
M. S. Gupta, for res;iondent No. 1.
Ayyangar J.
December 20, 1963.
The following Judgments were delivered:
AYYANGAR J.-On behalf of the Chlef Justice and
hlmself) We have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of our brother Subba Rao J. and we agree with rum
that the appeal should be dismissed.
The justification for this separate judgment, however,
is because of our inability to agree with him in his construction of the relative scope of the two limbs of s. 29(2) of the
Indian Limitation Act.
The facts of the case have been set out in detail in the
judgment of Subba Rao J. and it is therefore unnecessary
to repeat them. There were three principal points that were
urged before us on either side which require to be considered
and all of them turn on the proper construction of s. 29(2)
of the Inaian Limitation Act which we shall for convenience
set out here:
"29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for
any suit, appeal or application a period of liinitation different from the period prescribed
therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of
section 3 shall apply, as if such period were
prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for
the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed fot any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9
to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far
as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local Jaw;
and
6 S.C.R.
-·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
\b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not
apply."
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
The learned Judges of the High Court have proceeded
on the basis that s. 29(2)(a) applies to the case of appeals Khubchand
BagheI
preferred under s. 116 A of the Representation of the People
Ayyangar 1Act, 1951 and on that footing have held that the appeal
presented to them by the respondent was within tinie if
computed after making the deductions permitted by s. 12 of
the Limitation Act. It is the correctness of this vi~w that
is challenged before us.
Proceeding now to deal with the question whether the
terms of s. 29(2) are apt to take in appeals under the Representation of the People Act, the first matter to be considered necessarily is whether that Act is a "special or
local law" within the opening words of the sub-section. As
to this, however, Mr. Pathak raised no dispute and he conceded thats. 116A was such a "special or local law." Thal
this "special or local Jaw" prescribes "for an appeal a period
of limitation" is also evident. The first r,>aint of controversy, however, has arisen as to whether "the period of limitation prescribed by the special or local Law is different
from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule."
The contention urged strenuously before us by Mr. Pathak,
the learned counsel for the appellant, was tbwt there would
be "a different period" only where for the identical Ropeal
(to refer only to that proceeding with which we arc i:<1mediately concerned) for which a period of limitation bas been
prescribed by the special or local Law, a period is prescribed
by first column of the first schedule. and there is a difference
between the two periods. It was his further contention that
where the Indian Limitation Act maae no provision for
such an appeal, s. 29(2) and the provision contained in its
(a) and (b) were inapplicable. There have been several
decidons on this point but it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Canara Bank Ltd., Bombay v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd., Bombay (') where
Chagla C.J. rer,ielled this construction and held that even
where there was no provision in the first schedule for an
(I) I. L. R. 1952 Born. 1083.
134
1963
Yl"111Clwvm
$ulk1"
v.
Khubchand
Bogh1l
A.yyangnr
/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
appeal in a situation identical with that for which the special law provides, the test of "a prescription of a period of
limitation different from the period prescribed by the First
Schedule is satisfied. This Court in State of U.P. v. Smt.
Kaushaliya etc. ( 1 ) upheld this construction and awroved
the judgment of Chagla C.J. in the Canara Bank case. ·
Apart from the decision of this Court, we consider the
reasoning of Chagla c.r. to be unexceptionable and we agree
with Subba Rao J. in holding that the requirement of a
prescription by the special law "of a period different" from
that prescribed by the First Schedule' is satisfied in the present case.
·-
0
I
The next point was one that arose on the submission of
counsel for the respondent and it was this. Assume that
the construction of the words "different from" urged by the
appellant were accepted, and this requirement would be
satisfied only if the First Schedule made provision for an
identical appeal as that under the special law, still it was
submitted by the respondent that even this was satisfied in
this case. For this purpose he relied on Art. 156 of the
first schedule which runs:
"Description of
Period of
Time from which
period begins to
appeal
]imitation
run
-------- --------------156.-Under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, to a High
Court, except in the cases
Ninety days
The date of the
decree or order
appealed from.''
provided for by article I 5I
and article 153.
The argument was that though.the right of appeal in the case
before us was conferred by s. I 16A c;>f the Representation of
the People Act and it was by virtue thereof that the appeal
was filed by the respondent to the High Court, it was still
an appeal "under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a
High Court." For this submission learned Counsel relid
principally on two decisions-one of the Calcutta and the
(1) A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 416.
-
6 S.C.R.
t
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
other of the Madras High Court, and they undoubtedly
support him. In Aga Mohd. Hamdan! v. Cohen and Ors.(')
-as well as in Ramasami Pillai v. Deputy Collector of,
Madura( 2 ) which followed it-the Court held that to a~tract
this article it was not necessary in order to be an "appeal
under the Code of Civil Procedure" within the meaning of
those words in Art. 156, that the right to prefer the appeal
should be conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure but that
it was sufficient if the procedure for the filing of the ap:;ieal
and the powers of the court for dealing with the ai;>peal were
governed by that Code. For adopting this construction the
Court relied on the reference in Art. 156 to Art. 151. Artide 151 dealt with appeals to the High Court from judgment
rendered on the original side of that Court. The right to
prefer these appeals was conferred by the Letters P~. tent
constituting the respective High Courts and not by the Code
of Civil Procedure, though the Code of Civil Procedure
governed the procedure, jurisdiction and powers of the
Court in dealing with the appeals so filed. There would
have been need therefore to except cases covered by Art. 151
only if the words "under the Code of Civil Procedure" were
understood as meaning appeals for the disposal of which
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure was made
applicable. We might mention that besides the Calcutta
and the Madras High Courts a Full Bench of the Allahabad
High Court also has in Daropadi v. Hira Lal(') adopted a
similar construction of the Article, the learned Judges pointing out that several Indian enactments, among them the
Indian Succession Act, the Probate and Administration
Act, the Land Acquisition Act and the Provincial Insolvency
Act, proceeded on the basis of a legislative praotice of conferring rights of appeal under the respective statutes without
prescribing any period of limitation within which the appeal
should be preferred, but directing the application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to such appeals, the intention obviously being that Art. 156 would furnish the period
of limitation for such appeais. We consider that these deci-
(1) I. L. R. 13 Cal, 221.
(3) I. L. R. 34 Allahabad 496.
(2) I. L, R. 43 Mad. SJ.
196J
Vldyaclumm
Slulkt.
v.
Khubchilnd
B1111Ml
Ayyangar /,
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
YidJ,.°:Ci,.ran
.v.
Klwbchand
Boghel
A1Yangar J.
[196
sions correctly interpret Art. 156 and, in any event, we arec
not prepared to disturb the decisions which have stood for
so long and on the basis of the correctness of which Indian
legislation has proceeded.
Mr. Pathak drew our attention to some decisions in which
a different construction was adopted of tl)e word "under" a
particular enactment occurring in other Articles of the Limitation Act and in particular some dealing with appeals in certain criminal matters. In them the word 'under' was understood as meaning "by virtue of". He was, however, unable·
to bring to our notice any decision in which the construction
adopted of Art. 156 which we have set out has been departed
from. In the cases dealing with the words "under the Criminal Procedure Code" which he placed before us, the situation would obviously be different, since the indication afforded
by the mention of Art. 151 in Art. 156 does not figure in the
Therefore that would be a circumstance
1 Articles dealt with.
pointing to a different result.
If the construction adopted of Art. 156 in the Calcutta
and Madras decisions to which we have referred were UQheld,
there could be no controversy that an appeal under s. 116A
of the Representation of the People Act would be "under the
Cede of Civil Procedure'', for s. l l 6A(2) enacts, to read the
m"terial portion:
"116A. (2) The High Court shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority, and follow the same procedure, with respect to an appeal under this
Chapter as if the appeal were an appeal from an
original decree passed by a civil court situated
within the local limits of its civil appellate jurisdiction: ........................... "
In this view even on the narrowest construction of the words
"different from those prescribed therefor in first schedule"
occurring the opening part of s. 29(2). the exclusion of time
provided for by Art. 12 of the Limitation Act would be permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing the
appeal to the High· Court in the case before us.
'
•
6 S.C.R.
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
The last point which remains for consideration is one
which would be material only in the event of the two points
we have already dealt with being decided differently. This
rebtes to the relationship or inter-connection between the
first and the second limbs of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
The reason why we are dealing with it i~ because of our inability to agree with the construction which our learned brothers Subba Rao & Mudholkar JJ. have placed on this
feature of the sub-section. Sub-section (2), it would be seen,
consists of two parts. The first sets out the conditions to
which the special law should conform in order to attract section 3 and that part ends with the words "as if such period
were prescribed therefor in that schedule". This is followed
by the conjunction 'and' that word by the second part reading "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special
or local law( a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections
9 to 18, and section 22 sha!J apply only in so
far as, and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law;
and
(b)
'
the remaining provisions of this Act shall not
apply."
The question that has been debated before us is. whether the
condition postulated by the first limb, namely the special or
local law prescribing a period of limitation for a suit appeal
etc. different from the period prescribed therefor by the first
schedule has to be satisfied in order to render the provisions
of cl. (a) applicable. If the conjunction 'and' was used for
the purpose of indicating that the two parts were cumulative,
that is, if the two parts operated in respect of the same set of
circumstances, then unless the opening words of sub-s. (2)
were satisfied, there would be no basis for the application of
cl. (al to the period prescribed-for a suit, appeal or application
applicable by the special or local law. If on the other hand,
the two parts of the sub-section could be read independently
as if they made provision for two separate situations, the
result would be that the words starting from "for the purpose
J963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
"·
Khubchand
Baghtl
Ayyangar I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
1911,_
of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law" fol$Wla
lowed
by clauses (a) & (b) would be an independent <;Jrovi, Y.
sion unrelated to the first part and therefore could operate
JChubcMnd
B011kl
unhampered by the~ condition set out in the first part. In
other words, if the latter construction were adopted for every
suit, appeal or application for which a period of limitation
was prescribed by a special or local law, the provisions in ss.
4, 9 to 18 & 22 would apply unless excluded. Mr. Pathak
urged that the conjunc~ion 'and' could in the context be construed only as rendering the second limb a part and parcel of
the first, so that unless the conditions laid down by the opening words of the sub-section were satisfied, the provisions of
the Limitation Act set out in cl. (a) would not be attracted
to "determine the period of limitation" prescribed by the speciaI or local law. The question of the import and function
of the conjunction 'and' was the subject of elaborate consi1
deration by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a
decision in Sehat Ali Khan v. Abdul Qavi Khan( 1 ). The
majority of the learned Judges held that the two parts of the
sub-section were independent and that "for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application by any special or local law". cl. (a)
would apply unless excluded. Raghubar Dayal J. then a
judge of that Court, however, dissented from this view and
held that the entire sub-s. (2) had to be read as an integrated
provision and that the conjunction 'and' connected the two
parts and made it necessary for attracting cl. (a) that the conditions laid down by the opening words of sub-s. (2) should
be satisfied. Mr. Pat~ak recommended for our acceptance
the dissenting judgment of Dayal J. We consider that the
view expressed by Raghubar Dayal J. as to the inter-relation
· of the two parts of the sub-section reflects correctly our own
construction of the i;_>rovision. Raghubar Dayal J. has approached this question of construtcion from several angles
including the grammar of the passage. Without going into
any of them, we would rest our decision on a shorter ground.
In order that the second part might be held to be independent
of the first, the first part should itself be complete and be
Vl4Yulraun
"'"°""" /.
(1) t. L. It. (1956)2 Allahabad 252.
'
I
6 S.C.R.
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
1161
capable of operating independently. Unless this test were
satisfied, the conjunction 'and' would have to be read as im- Vidyacharan
Shukla
porting into what follows it, the conditions or consideration
v.
Khubchand
set out earlier as otherwise even the first part would be inBaJhel
co1119Icte. Let us now see whether the first part could
function without the second. The first part reads "where A.yyangar /,
any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the first schedule the provision of s. 3 shall
apply as if that period was prescribed therefor in that
schedule."
The question is what this, standing by itself,
would signify. If the conditions prescribed by the opening ·
words were satisfied, s. 3 of the Limitation Act would be
attracted Section 3 reads:
"Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to
25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of
limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has
not been set up as a defence .................. "
ln other words, if the special or local law prescribed a period
of limitation different from that prescribed by the first schedule by the application of the first part of sub-s. (2), the court
is enabled to dismiss suits, appeals and applications filed beyond time. If this is the only effect it would be seen that the
provision is inane and redundant, because even without it, by
the very prescription of a period of limitation the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit, appeal etc. would be
dependent on the same being filed in time.
It is possible, however, to construe the reference to s. 3
in s. 29(2) to mean that the power to dismiss the suit, appeal
etc. if filed beyond the time prescribed, is subject to the modes
of computation etc. of the time prescribed by applying the
provisions of ss. 4 to 25 which are referred to in the opening
words of s. 3. On this construction where a case satisfies
the opening words of s. 29(2) the entire group of ss. 3 to 25
would be attracted to determine the period of limitation pres. cribed by the special or local law. Now let us test this with
refere11ce to the second limb of s. 29(2) treating the latter as
140
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khu behand
Baghel
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
a separate and independent provision. That part starts with
the words "for determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or
local law" (italics ours). The words italicised being perfectly
general, would manifestly be comprehensive to include every
special or local law, and among these must necessarily be included such special or local laws which satisfy the conditions
~pecified by the first limb of s. 29(2).
We then have this
strange result that by the operation of the first part ss. 3 to 25
of the Limitation Act are made applicable to that class of
special and local laws which satisfy the conditions specified by
the first limb, whereas by the operation of the second limb
the provisions of section 3, 5. 6 to 8 & 19 to 21 & 23 to 25
would not apply to the same class of cases. A construction
which would lead to this anomalous result cannot be accepted
and we, therefore, hold that subject to the construction we
have put upon sub-s. (2) of s. 29 both the parts are to be read
as one whole and that the words following the conjunction
'and' "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation" etc. attract the conditions laid down by the opening
words of the sub-section.
As we have pointed out earlier this does not affect the
result. We agree that the appeal fails and we direct that it
be dismissed with costs.
Subba Rao].
SUBBA RAO J.-This appeal by S?ecial leave raises the
question of true construction of the provisions of s. 29(2) of
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), in the context of
its application to s. 116-A of the 'Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), hereinafter called the Act.
The facts relevant to the question raised lie in a small compass and they are not disputed. The appellant was elected
to the House of the People from the Mahasamund parliamentary constituency in the State of Madhya Pradesh in the
third general election)s. The respondents were the other
contesting candidates. Respondent 1 filed an election petition before the Election Commissioner of India under ss. 80
and 81 of the Act for setting aside the election of the appel- ·
lant and it was duly referred to the Election Tribunal. The
r
6 S.C.k.
--
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Election Tribunal, by its order dated January 5, 1963, dismissed the election petition. On February 11, 1963, the
first respondent preferred an appeal against the said order of
the Election Tribunal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
at Jabalpur. Under sub-s. (3) of s. 116-A of the Act every
appeal under Ch. IVA of the Act shall be preferred within
a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Tribunal under s. 98 or s. 99 thereof.- Admittedly, the appeal
was filed more than 30 days from the said order. If the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the order of the Tribunal
was excluded, the appeal was filed within 30 days; but if in
law it could not be excluded, the appeal would certainly be
out of time. The appellant contended before the High Court
that respondent l was not entitled in law to exclude the time
so taken by him in obtaining a copy of the order of the Tribunal, but that plea was rejected by the High Court. On
merits, the High Court held that the appellant had committed
two acts of corrupt practice as defined by s. 123(4) of the
Act and on that finding it declared the election of the appellant void. It is not necessary to go into the details of the
judgment of the High Court given on the merits of the case,
as nothing turns upon them in ~his appeal, for the learned
counsel confined his argument only to the question of limitation. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the said order of the High Court setting aside his
·election.
The only question, therefore, is whether for the purpose
-0f computing the period of 30 days prescribed under s. 116A (3) of the Act the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act
<:an be invoked.
Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant, in an elaborate argument placed before us the different aspects of the
question raised, and I shall deal with his argument in the appropriate context in the course of my judgment. It would be
convenient at the outset to read the relevant provisions of the
Act and those of the Limitation Act.
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khu behand
Baghel
Subba Rao J,
142
1961
Vidyacllllran
Shukla
v.
Khubcllllnd
Baghel
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Decision of the Tribunal :
Section. 98. At the conclusion of the trial of an election
petition the Tribunal shall make an order:-
Subba Raa J.
(a) dismissing the election petition; or
(b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned
candidates to be void; or
Secticn l l 6·A. (!) An appeal shall lie from every order
made by a Tribunal under section 98 or section 99 to the
High Court of the State in which the Tribunal is situated.
(2) The High Court shall, subject to the provisions of this
Act, have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority, and
follow the same procedure, with respect to an appeal under
this Chapter as if the appeal were an appeal from an original
decree passed by a civil court situated within the local limits.
of its civil appellate jurisd'ction.
'
(3) Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred
within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of
the Tribunal under section 98 or section 99:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal
after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal within such period.
0
The Indian Limitation Act, 1908
Section 29.-(2) Where any special or .local Jaw prescribes for any suit, appeal or ap;ilication a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First
Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such
period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the
'
Ii S.C.R.
_)
,.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed
for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local
law(a) the provisions contained in section 4, section 9
to 18, and section 22 shalJ apply only in so far
as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law;
and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not
apply.
Section 12.-(2) In computing the period of limitation
presc1 ibed f0r an appeal, an application for leave to appeal
and an application for a review of judgment, the day on
which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and
time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence
or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be
excluded.
( 3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be
reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
judgment on which it is founded sha!J also be excluded.
Section 116-A of the Act confers a right of appeal against
an order of the Tribunal under s. 98 or s. 99 thereof; sub-s.
( 3) thereof prescribes a period of limitation of 30 days
for preferring such an ai;ipeal. Section 29 of 1the Limitation
Act attracts, by fiction, the provisions of s. 3 thereof to an
appeal described in s. 29 of the said Act; with the result,
the pro\'isit'llS of sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 12 of the Limitation Act are attracted thereto; and if those sub-sections
were attracted in computing the period of limitation prescribed
for an appeal the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
decree or order or judgment on which it is founded shall be
excluded. Learned counsel for the ap;>ellant, therefore, contends that s. 29 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an
appeal under s. 116-A of the Act. The first argument of
learned counsel is that for invoking s,ub-s. (2) of s. 29 of the
Limitation Act the necessary condition is that the First Sche·
dule thereto shall prescribe a period of limitiition for an appeal and that a special law shall prescribe for the same type
of appeal a different period of limitation and that, as in the
1'63
1'illyacharG11
Slt•kl•
...
Kbbchand
BagheI
Subba Rao I.
144
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khu behand
Baghel
Subba Rao 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
present case the First Schedule has not prescribed any period
of limitation to an appeal under s. 116-A of the Act against
an order of the Tribunal, sub-s. (2) of s. 29 of the Act is
not attracted. This argument is met by learned counsel for
the respondents in two ways, namely, (i) that the First Schedule to the Limitation Act has prescribed a period of limitation for such an appea~ and (ii) that sub-s. (2) will apply
even to a case where the First Schedule to the Limitation Act
has not [Jrescribed any period of limitation for an appeal, but
a special law prescribed a period of limitation for such an
appeal. I shall proceed to consider the two limbs of the
argument separately.
Has the First Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribed
a period of limitation for an appeal against an order of an
Election Tribunal under s. 98 or s. 99 of the Act? Article
156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act says that t•
an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High
Court, except in the cases provided for by article 151 and
article 153, the period of limitation is 90 days from the date
of the decree or order appealed from; and article 151 referred to in article 156 provides for an appeal against a decree
or order of any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort
William, Madras, and Bombay, or of the High Court of Punjab in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. What does the
expression "under the Code of Civil Procedure" in art. 156
of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act connote? Does it
mean that a right of appeal shall be conferred under the Code
of Civil Procedure, or does it mean that the procedure prescribed by the said Code shall apply to such an appeal? A
comparison of the terms of art. 156 and art. 151 indicates
that the emphasis is more upon the procedure applicable to
an appeal than on the right of a[Jpeal conferred under an
Act. The heading of the first column in the.First Schedule to
the Limitation Act is "Description of appeal". The r;:ihraseology used in art. 156 describes the nature of the appeal
in respect of which a particular period of limitation is prescribed. It does not refer to a r:ght conferred under the Code
of Civil Procedure, but only describes the aippeal with reference to the procedure applicable thereto. · Though the word
"under" may support the contrary view, the reference to
'
I
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
-
art. 151 therein detracts from it. Article 151 is an exce;ition
to alt. 156, indicating thereby that, but for the exception
art. 156 will apply to an appeal covered by art. 151: that is
to say, an appeal under art. 151 is deemed to be an appeal
under the Code of Civil Procedure. Though a right of appeaf
is conferred under the Letters Patent, it is deemed to be -an
appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, because the Code
of Civil Procedure governs the said appeal. As Rajamannar,
C.J., observed in Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty(' ),
"It is well established that the Limitation Act and
the Code are to be read together, because both
are statutes relating to procedure and they are
in pari materia and,· therefore, to be taken and
construed together as one system as explanatory
of each other."
So construed it may reasonablyibe held that art. 156 provides
for an appeal governed by the procedure prescribed by the
Code of Civil Procedure. This view was accepted by the
Calcutta High Court as early as 1886 in Aga Mahomed
Hamadani v. Cohen('). There, under s. 49 of the Burma
Courts Act (XVII of 1875), where the amount or value of
a suit or proceeding in the Recorder's Court exceeded
Rs. 3,000, and was less than Rs. 10,000, an ap;ieal lay to
the High Court. Under s. 97 of the said Act, "save as otherwise provided by this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure shall
be, and shall, on and from the 15th day of April 1872, be
deemed to have been in force throughout British Burma".
Section 540 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, which was
in force at that time, read:
-~
"Unless when otherwise expressly provided by this
Code or by any other law for the time being in
force, an appeal shall lie from the decrees or
from any part of the decrees- of the Courts exercising original jurisdiction to the Courts authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of those
Courts."
·
(1) .A. I. R. 1952 Mad. 186.
134-159 S.C.-10.
(2) (1886) I. L. R. 13 Cal. 221.
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Bagh•I
Subba Rao 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Bagh•I
Subba Rao I.
The effect of this provision of the Code on the Burma Courts
Act was that where an appeal was not expressly excluded by
any special Act, an appeal lay to whatever court which under
the enactment in force was the appropriate court. But this.
section was overborne by the Burma Courts Act to the extent
it conferred a right of appeal from the Recorder's Court to the
High Court subject to certain conditions, for s. 49 of the
Burma Courts Act had taken away the right of appeal of value
under a prescribed amount and conferred such a right, when
the subject-matter of the appeal was between two prescribed
amounts, from the decree of the Recorder's Court to the High
Court. It is, therefore, not correct to say, as contended by
the learned counsel, that a right of appeal was conferred
under s. 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. After
the passing of the Burma Courts Act, a right of appeal was
conferred under s. 49 of that Act and not under s. 540 of the
Code. It was contended before the Calcutta High Court, as
it is now contended before us, that art. 156 of Schedule II of
the Limitation Act did not apply to an appeal under the
Burma Courts Act, on the ground that the said appeal was '
not an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The
learned Judges observed thus, at p. 224:
.
"Now, what is meant by an ap;ieal under the Civil
Procedure Code? A particular appeal was given
by the Burma Courts Act and the Burma Courts
Act is still the only Act which prescribes to what
Court this appeal shall lie. If it had not been
given by the Burma Courts Act then s. 540 of
the Civil Procedure Code would have been sufficient to give it, provided that some Court was
by some enactment provided as the proper Court
to hear the appeal. The procedure in appeals
in every respect is governed by the Code of
Civil Procedure. The Limitation Act, Schedule
II. Art. 156, when it speaks of the Civil Procedure Code is, on the face of it, speaking of a
Code which relates to procedure, and does not
ordinarily deal with substantive rights: and the
•
6 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
147
Vidyacharan
Shukla
It is manifest from this passage that the learned Judges -Oid
Subba Rao J.
not repel the contention on the ground that the right of
appeal was conferred by s. 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but expressly for the reason that the natural meaning of
the relevant expressioµ in art. 156 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act was that the appeal mentioned therein was one
governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. This decision
was followed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court
in Ramaswami Pilai v. The Deputy Collector of Madura(').
The learned Judges, Abdur Rahim and Oldfield, .TJ., held
that art. 156 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) applied
to appeals filed under s. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act ( 1 of
lfl94). The right of ap;ieal was conferred under the Land
Acquisition Act, but the procedure prescribed by the Code
of Civil Procedure governed that appeal. The same argument now raised before us was raised, but was repelled. After
citing the relevant part of the passage from the judgment of
the Calcutta High Court extracted above, the learned Judges
stated at p. 55 thus:
•
1963
natural meaning of an appeal under the Civil
Procedure Code a;ipears to us to be an appeal
governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so
far as procedure is concerned."
"It seems to us that this is the correct interpretation
of article 156.
There seems to be no good
reason fo; saying that an appeal under the Civil
Procedure Code means only an appeal the right
to prefer which is conferred by the Code itself.
On the other hand it would not be straining the
language of the article too much to hold that an
appeal, the procedure with respect to which, from
its inception to its disposal, is governed by the
Civil Procedure Code, may rightly be spoken
of as an appeal under the Code."
Then the learned Judges referred to art. 151 of the Limitation Act and concluded thus:
(I) (1919) I .L. R. 43 Mad. 51.
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
Subba Rao I.
"That also tends to show that what is meant by the
legislature is appeals, the hearing and disposal
of which is governed by the rules of ;irocedure
laid down in the Civil Procedure Code."
Though about 77 years have passed by since the decision
of the Calcutta High Court and though the Limitation Act
was amended a number of times, the Legislature did not think
fit to express its dissent from this view by amendment or
otherwise. No direct decision has been brought to our notice
which has differed from, or even questioned the correctness
of, this decision. In this context we may also refer to the
decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dropadi v. Hira
Lal(') where it is pointed ouMhat several Indian enactments,
for instance, the Succession Act, the Probate and Administration Act, the Land Acquisition Act and the Provincial
Insolvency Act, confer rights of appeal and direct the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to
such appeals, but prescribed no ?eriod within which such
appeals might be filed, the idea being that art. 156 of the
Limitation Act would furnish the period of limitation for the
filing of such appeals. Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the
appellant, brought to our notice a number ,~ decisions which
considered the forum to which an appeal shall lie against
an order under s. 4 7 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and the ?raced ure to be followed therein.
In Nasaruddin Khan v. Emperor('), where an appeal
under s. 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the
Court of the Munsif was heard in part by the District Judge,
and .on the next date of hearing the appellant's pleader was
not present in Court. it was held that the District Judge was
entitled to consider that the apeal had been abandoned and
to dismiss it under the provisions of Order XLI of the Code
of Civil Procedure. In Mt. Abida Khatoon v. Chore
Khan ( 3 ), the Allahabad High Court held, under similar circumstances, that an appellate court could set aside an order
dismissing an appeal for default. The Nagpur High Court in
(r) (1912) I. L. R. 34 All. 496.
(3) A. I. R. 1956 All. 155.
(2) \1926) I. L. R. 53 Cal. 827.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
Bholanath Balbhadra Sahai v. Achheram Puran Kurmi('),
held that in such an appeal the appellate Court could exercise its power under 0. XLI, r. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure./ In Chandra Kumar Sen v. Mathuria Debya( 2 ), the
Calcutta High Court applied to such an appeal the period
of limitation prescribed under art. 154 of the Limitation
Act.
'
It is said that the combined effect of these decisions is
that the procedure ap;ilicable in an appeal against an order
made by a civil court under s. 4 7 6 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is that prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure
whereas the period of limitation is that prescribed for an
appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the learned counsel himself conceded that there is a conflict of decisions on the question whether to an appeal against the order
of a civil court under s. 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the civil procedure applies or the criminal 1;irocedure
applies and, therefore, the only decision which may have some
bearing on the question now raised is that in Chandra Kumar
Sen v. Mathuria Debya( 2 ). There, an ap;ilication was filed
before the Subordinate· Judge for filing of a complaint against
the petitioner under s. 47 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That was rejected. The complainant preferred an
ap;ieal to the District Judge more than 30 days prescribed
under art. 154 of the Limitation Act. The learned District
Judge held that no question of limitation arose, for the District Judge suo motu could lodge a complaint in the criminal
court when an offence in connection with the administration
of civil justice came to his notice. On that reasoning he instituted a complaint. The High Court held tha~ the appeal
was filed before he District Judge under s. 476-B of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and that under art. 154 of the Limitation Act it should have been filed within 30 days from the
date of the order of the Subordinate court. It will be noticed
that no argument was raised in that case that the appeal was
governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the
appropriate article of the Limitation Act was not art. 154,
(1) A. I. R. 1937 Nag. 91.
(2) (1925) I. L. R. 52 Cal. 1009.
,
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Bagh•I
Subba Ra<> J.
150
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghe!
Subba ~ao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
but art. 156 thereof, for the simple reason that whichever
article applied the ap;:ieal was clearly barred by limitation. It
is not, therefore, permissible to read into the decision the
entire argument now advanced before us. The present question was neither raised nor argued in that case. It may,
therefore, be safely held that for over 75 years the decision
of the Calcutta High Court on the construction of art. 156
of the Limitation Act stood the ground. Though it must be
conceded that the point is not free from difficulty, we are
not prepared to depart from the construction put upon the
article as early as 1886 and which was not dissented from all
these years. I, therefore, hold that the expression "appeal
under the Code of Civil Procedure" in art. 156 of the Limitation Act means an appeal governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Even so, it is contended that under s. 116-A(2) of the
Act ,the High Court, though it has the same powers, jurisdiction and authority of an appellate court governed by the
Code of Civil Procedure, is not empo';\'ered to follow the
procedure prescribed under the Code in respect of receiving
the appeals. This argument is contrary to the express terms
of sub-s. (2) of s. 116-A of the Act. Under that sub-section,
"The High Court shall, subject to the provisions of this Act,
have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority and follow
the same procedure, with respect to an appeal under this
Chapter as if the appeal were an appeal from an original
decree passed by a civil court situated within the local limits
of its civil appellate jurisdiction'". Under the second 9art of
sub-s. (2) of s. 116-A of the Act, a fiction is created, namely,
that though a right of appeal is conferred by s. 116-A (I) of
the Act, the appeal thereunder for the purpose of sub-s. ( 2)
will be deemed to be an appeal from an original decree passed
by a civil court situated within the local limits of its civil
ap;:iellate jurisdiction. The first part of the sub-section describes the purposes for which the fiction is invoked, namely,
the exercise of the powers, jurisdiction and authority and the
following of the procedure with respect to such an appeal.
The powers, jurisdiction and authority take in the powers,
jurisdiction and authority exercisable by an appellate tribunal
in regard to various matters ?rescribed in the Code of Civil
,
•
-
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
Procedure. What does the word "procedure" mean? The
procedure must necessarily be the procedure governing such
an appeal. It means, imer alia, the manner of receiving an
appeal in the court, the preparation of records of the ·appeal,
the posting of the aQpeal and the manner of its disposal. We
find it impossible to exclude from the word "procedure" the
filing and receiving of an appeal in the court. If that part
was excluded, how could the appeal be received in the High
Court? The answer given is that the Government might
make rules under s. 169(1) of the Act. Whens. 168(2)
<:onfers a statutory power on the High Court to follow the
procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, we
<:annot invoke the general power of the Central Government
to make rules under s. 169 (1 ) of the Act. If so, the procedure prescribed by 0. XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure,
along with the other relevant provisions of the said Code,
equally applies to an appeal filed under s. 116-A (2) of the
Act. The result is that under s. 116-A(2) of the Act, the
appeal, by fiction, is equated with an appeal filed under the
Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of not only the exercise
vf the powers, jurisdiction and authority but also in the matter
-0f procedure to be followed from the date of receipt of the
appeal to its final disposal. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold
that the special law, namely, the Act, prescribes a period of
limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by
the First Schedule to the Limitation Act within the meaning
of art. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. If so, s. 12 of the Limitation Act is attracted, and the 1st respondent was entitled
to exclude the time taken by him for obtaining the copy of
the order.
Even assuming that art. 156 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act did not prescribe a period of limitation for the kind
vf appeal under consideration, the question arises whether
sub-s. (2) of s. 29 of the Limitation Act would not be ap;>licable if no period was prescribed by the First Schedule for
an appeal created by a special law but the special law prescribed a period of limitation for the same. The history of
this provision throws some light on this question. The first
Limitation Act was passed in the year 1859 (Act XN of
1859). Section 3 of that act provided:
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
S11bba Rao I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Yidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khu behand
Baghel
Subba Rao/.
"When, by any law now or hereafter to be in force;
a shorter period of limitation ·than that prescribed
by this Act is specially prescribed for the institution of a particular suit, such shorter period of
limitation shall be ai;>plied notwithstanding this
Act."
The provisions of the Act of 1859 were repealed by the Limitation Act IX of 1871. Section 6 of that Act, which is relevant to the present inquiry, read:
"When, by any law not mentioned in the schedule
hereto annexed, and now or hereafter to be in
force in any part of British India, a period of
limitation differing from that prescribed by this
Act is especially prescribed for any suits, appeals
or applications, nothing herein contained shall
affect such law."
The Limitation Act of 1871 was replaced by Act XV of 1877.
Section 6 of this Act read:
"When, by any special or local law now or hereafter
in force in British India, a period of limitation
is especially prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application, nothing herein contained shall
affect or alter the period so prescribed."
The same provision was retained in the Limitation Act IX
of 1908, but it was amended in the year 1922 in the present
form. Before the amendment of 1922, there was a difference of view on the following questions, namely, ( 1) whether
the general provisions of the Limitation Act, where the word
"prescribed" alone without reference to any Act, was used or
even where that word was not used, would be applicable to
special or local laws, and (2) whether the general provisions
of the Limitation Act did not apply at all to the periods of
limitation prescribed by special or local laws.
Decisions
holding that the general provisions of the Limitation Act did
not apply to periods of !imitations prescribed by other laws
relied upon the expression "affect or alter" used in the section as it then. stood. Section 29 of the Limitation Act was
amended to remove the conflict with a view to make the
..
6 S.C R.
•
.
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
153
1963
general provisions applicable to the Qeriod of limitation prescribed by special or local laws. A comparison of the phraVidyacharan:
Shukla
seology of the earlier sections shows that while s. 3 of the
v.
Limitation Act of 1859 used the words "shorter period",
Khubchand
Baghel
s. 6 of the Act of 1871 used the expression "differing", and
s. 6 of the Acts of 1877 and 1908 removed both the expres- Subba Rao J.
sions. The result was that s. 6 of the Act of 1871 saved
all the special or local laws which prescribed a special i;ieriod
of limitation from the operation of the provisions of the
Limitation Act. As the section then stood, it applied to all
special or local laws prescribing a :;ieriod of limitation whether
the Limitation Act prescribed any period of limitation or not
for suits or a:;ipeals similar to those governed by special or
local laws, or where the period of limitation so prescribed by
special or local laws was shorter or longer than that prescribed in the Limitation Act. Can it be said that by the Amending Act of 1922, a conscious departure was made by the Legislature to impose a condition for the application of sub-s. ( 2)
of s. 29, namely, that a period of limitation should have been
expressly prescribed by the First Schedule to the Limitation
Act in respect of a suit or ar,ipeal governed by the special or
local law? There was no occasion for such a departure. To
put it in other words,. apart from resolving the conflict, did
the Legislature intend to exclude a particular category of
proceedings governed by special or local laws from the operation of the benefit conferred by sub-s. (2) of s. 29? No
justification was suggested for such a departur~ and we find
none.
The problem may be approached from a different i;ierspective. The scheme of the Limitation Act may be briefly
stated thus: The preamble to the Act shows that it was
passed to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the
law of limitation in respect of the proceedings mentioned in
the Act. It applies to the whole of lnj.ia. Part II comprising
ss. 3 to 11 deals with limitation of smtS, appeals and applications; Part III comprising ss. 12 to 25 provides for computation of periods of limitation; and Part V deals with savings
and repeals. We are not concerned with Schedules II and
III, for they have been repealed. The First Schedule consists
of three divisions: the first division provides for the period
154
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Bagne/
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
of limitation for suits; the second division, for appeals; and
the third division, for applications. Article 120 found in the
first division prescribes for a suit for which no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the Schedule; art. 181 in the
third division prescribes for application for which no period
of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the Schedule or by
s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But no such residuary
article is found in the second division dealing with appeals.
The Limitation Act was conceived to be an exhaustive code
prescribing for every conceivable proceeding, whether suit,
appeal or application, subject to the saving in Part V thereof. It follows that there is no period of limitation for an
appeal not provided for in the 'second division unless the
special or local law prescribes for it. If so, it may reasonably
be said that, as the First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no limitation for an appeal not covered by arts. 150
to 157 thereof, under the Limitation Act such a suit or
ar,ipeal can be filed irrespective of any time limit.
•
.
With this background let us revert to the construction
of s. 29 ( 2) of the Limitation Act. When the First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a
particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit
to it, can it not be said that under the First Schedule of the
Limitation Act an appeal can be filed at any time, but the
special law by limiting it provides for a different ?eriod?
While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any
time, the latter limits it to the prescribed period. It is, therefore, different from that prescribed in the former. This
problem was considered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, consisting of Chagla C.J., and Gajendragadkar J., in Canara Bank Limited, Bombay v .. The Warden
Insurance Company, Ltd., Bombay('). Therein, Chagla
C.J., speaking for th~ Court, observed at p. 1086 thus:
"The ljleriod ~-0f limitation may be different under
two different circumstances. It may be different if it modifies or alters a period of limitation fixed by the first Schedule to the Limitation Act. It may also be different in the
(1) I. L. R. [1952] Born. 1083.
,..
6 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
155
1963
sense that it departs fro.!Il the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the LimiVidyacharan
Shukla
tation Act. If the first Schedule to the Limitav.
tion Act omits laying down any period of limiKhubchand
Baghel
tation for a particular appeal and the special
Jaw provides a period of limitation, then to that Subba 11.ao 1extent the special law is different from the
Limitation Act. We are conscious of the fact
that the language used by the Legislature is
perhaps not very happy, but we must put upon
it a construction which will reconcile the
various difficulties caused by the other sections of the Limitation Act and which will
give effect to the object which obviously the
Legislature had in mind, because if we were
to give to s. 29 ( 2) the meaning which Mr.
Adarkar contends for, then the result would be
that even s. 3 of the Limitation Act would not
apply to this special law. The result would
be that although an appeal may be barred by
limitation, it would not be liable to be dismissed
under s. 3".
A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Sehat Ali
Khan v. Abdul Qavi Khan(') also dealt with this question. The learned Judges expres.sed conflicting views.
Mootham G.J., assumed that the first limb of the sub-section
<lid not apply to a case where the schedule omitted to provide
for a period of limitation. On that assumption he proceeded to consider the second limb of the sub-section. Dayal
J .. took the view that for the application of the first part of
s. 29(2) the period of limitation should have been prescribed by the First Schedule. Agarwala J., agreed with the vi~w
of the Bombay High Court. Bhargava J., agreed with the
view expressed by Mootham C.J., and U;:iadhya J., did
not agree with the view of the Bombay High Court. A
Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Beharilal. Chaurasiya v. Regional Transport A uthority( 2 )
(1) I. L.R. (1956) 2 All. 252.
(2) A. I. R. 1961 M. P. 75, 77-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
Subba Rao J.
agreed with the view c;xpressed by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court. Dixit C.P., speaking for 1the Court,.
stated thus;
"A special law may provide a period of limitation
and schedule l may omit to do so. None the
less the special law would be different from
the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act is not very happily worded. It
must be construed so as to avoid absurdity. The
expression 'a period of limitation( different
from the ~eriod prescribed therefor by the first
schedule' occurring in s. 29 ( 2) cannot be construed as meaning that schedule l must also
positively prescribe the period of limitation.
Such a construction v1ould not be in accordance with the intention of the Legislature and
would lead to an abs~rdity."
The learned Chief Justice proceeded to consider the ano·
malous position that would arise if a literal construction
was given to the provisions of the first part of the section.
This Court, in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh('), had to
consider this question incidentally in the context of the
application of s. 29 ( 2) of the Limitation Act to an application for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal
under sub-s. ( 3) of s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court held that s. 5 of the Limitation Act would
not ap;ily to an application for special leave to appeal under
sub-s. ( 3) of s. ·417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Limitation Act does not provide any period of limitation for an application for special leave to appeal from an
order of acquittal under the said section. If that be so, on
the argument of learned counsel for the appellant, s. 29 of
the Limitation Act could not be invoked. But this Court
held that s. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act applied, but that
section excluded the application of s. 5 to the said application. Sinha C.J., speaking for the Court, observed:
"Hence it may be said that there is no fimitation
prescribed by the Limitation Act for an
~~~~~~~~~
(1) A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 26o
•
<i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
appeal against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor. Thus, there is
a difference between the Limitation Act and
the rule laid down in s. 417 (4) of the Cod··
in respect of limitation affecting such an application. Section 29(2) is supplemental in its
character in so far as it provides for the application of s. 3 to such cases as would not come
within its purview but for this provision."
This observation clearly supports the position that s. 29(2)
would apply even to a case where a difference between the
special law and the Limitation Act arose by the omission
to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under
the Limitation Act.
I, therefore, hold that in the instant case the Act provides a period of limitation different from that prescribed
therefor by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and,
therefore, it is governed by s. 29 ( 2) of the said Act.
Even if my view on the construction of the first limb of
s. 29 of the Limitation Act were wrong, it would not help
the appellant, for his case squarely falls within the scope of
the second limb of the section. For convenience I restate the
relevant part of the section :
" ......... and for the purpose of determining
any
period of limita\ion 1;irescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law."
Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the conjunction "and" in Sl!pport of his contention that the use of that
conjunction makes the following sentence a limitation on
the first part of the section. He further argues that if it is not
a limitation but an independent clause, it will lead to the
anomaly of ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act applicable to
proceedings falling under the first part and only some of
the provisions thereof, namely, ss. 4, 9 to 18 and 22 applying to the second part of tbe section. Apart from the
grammatical construction, which I will consider presently,
I do not see any anomaly in ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act
a pplying to the first part of the section and only some of
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
Subba Rao 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
them applying to the second part thereof. Those proceedings to which the first part applies, by fiction the period'
prescribed in the special or local law is treated as prescribed·
v.
Khubchand · in the First Schedule i1tself. There cannot possibly be any
Baghe/
reason why s. 3 of the Limitation Act in toto shall not apply
Subba Rao 1.
to them. But the same cannot be said in the case of the
proceedings of a different type not provided for in the First
Schedule. So, the Legislature specified the sections applicable to them and excluded the general sections which
relate to legal disabilities, acknowledgements, part-payments
and others specified therein. The Legislature may have
thought that such articles are not generally appropriate to
proceedings under s;iecial or local laws for reliefs not provided for in the First Schedule.
Yidyacharan
Shukla
Now, coming to the construction of the section, the relevant rule of construction is well settled. "A construction
which will leave without effect any part of the language of
a statute will normally be rejected": or tsi put it in a positive
form, the Court shall ordinarily give meaning to every word
used in the section. Does the conjunction "and" make the
following clause a limitation on the preceding one? No rule
of grammatical construction has been brought to our notice
which requires an interpretation that if sentences complete
by themselves are· connected by a conjunction, the second
sentence must be held to limit the scope of the first sentence.
The conjunction "and" is used in different contexts. It
may combine two sentences dealing with the same subject
without one depending upon the other. But, if the interpretation suggested by the learned counsel be accepted, we
would not be giving any meaning at all to the word "any''
used thrice in the second part of the section, namely. "any
period". "any suit" and "any special or local law". If the
second part is a limitation on the first part. the sentence
should read. "for the purpose of determining the period of
!imitation prescribed for such suit, appeal or application by
such special or local law." Instead of that, the use of the
word "any" clearly demonstraces that the second part does
not depend upon the first part or vice versa. There is no
reason why we should attribute such a grammatical deficiency to the legislature when every word in the second part of
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
the section can be given full and satisfactory meaning. I
would, therefore, hold that the second part is an independent
provision providing for the aforesaid category of proceedings to which the first part does not apply. This is the
view expressed by the majority of the judges of the Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sehat Ali Khan v.
Abdul Qavi Khan('). I agree with the same.
It was then said that s. 116-A of the Act provided an
exhaustive and exclusive code of limitation for the purpose
of appeals against orders of tribunals and reliance is placed
on the proviso to sub-s. (3) of that section, which reads:
"Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred
within a period of thirty days from the date of
the order of the Tribunal under section 98 or
section 99.
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal
after the expiry of the said period of thirty
days if it is satisfied that the appellant had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within such period."
~
The contention is that sub-s. (3) of s. 116-A of the Act not
only provides a period of limitation for such an appeal.
but also the circumstances under which the delay can be
excused, indicating thereby that the general provisions of
the Limitation Act are excluded. There are two answers
to this argument. Firstly, s. 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act
speaks of express exclusion but there is no express exclusion
in sub-s. (3) of s. 116-A of the Act; secondly, the proviso
from which an implied exclusion is sought to be drawn does
not lead to any such necessary implication. The proviso bas
become necessary, because, if the proviso was not enacted,
s. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act would have excluded the
operation of s. 5 of the Limitation Act, with the result that
even if a sufficient cause for the delay existed, the High
Court wou!d have been helpless to excuse the delay. I,
therefore, hold that the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 116-A of
the Act bnly restores the power denied to the court under
s. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Att.
1) !. L. R. [1956] 2 All. 252.
1963.'
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
BagheI
Subba Rao J.
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Lastly, it is contended that s. 12(2) of the Limitation
Act, on its express terms, would not apply to an appeal to
Vidyacharan
Shukla
· the High Court against an order of the Election Tribunal
v.
under s. 98 of the Act. Elaborating the argument it is
Khubchand
Baghe/
said that in order to exclude the time for obtaining a copy
of the order appealed against, the original shall be a decree
'tiu~ba Rao J.
or order within the meaning of s. 12(2) or judgment within
the meaning of s. 12(3) of the Limitation Act and the order
under s. 98 of the Act is neither a decree nor an order or a
judgment within the meaning of the said sub-sections of s.
12 of the Limitation Act. Reference is made to the definitions of decree, judgment and order in sub-sections (2), (9l
and (14) of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, respectively,
and it is contended that the order under s. 98 of the Act does
not fall under any of the said three expressions as defined
therein. Under sub-s. (9) of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "judgment" is defined to mean the statement given
by the judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Sub-section (14) of s. 2 of the said Code defines "order" to mean
the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which
is not a decree. It follows from the said definitions that
judgment is a statement of the reasons given by the judge
and. order is the formal expression of his decision. Section
104 of the said Code says, "An appeal shall lie from the
following orders, and save as otherwise expressely provided
in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being
in force, from no other orders." Order XX of the Code
deals with the manner of pronouncing a judgment and decree.
Under 0. XX, r. 20, of the Code, "Certified copies of the
judgment and decree shall be furnished to the parties on
application to the Court, and at their expense." Under s.
141 of the Code, ''The procedure provided in this Code in
regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made
applicable, in all proceedings in any coun 01 civil jurisdiction". The effect of these provisions is that a decree is a
formal expression' of adjudication conclusively determining
the rights of parties with regard to all or any of the controversies in a suit. whereas order is a formal expression of any
decision of a civil court which is not a decree. Judgment is
a statement given by the judge of his grounds in respect of
a decree or order. Ordinarily judgment and order are en-
-
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I6r
grossed in two separate documer.ts. But the fact that both
are engrossed in the same document does not deprive the
statement of reasons arid the formal expression of a decision
of their character as judgment or order, as the case may be.
With this background let me look at the provisions of
s. 116-A of the Act. Under sub-s. (1) thereof, an appeal
shall lie from every order made by a Tribunal under s. 98
or s. 99 to the High Court of the State in which the Tribunal is situated. Under s. 98 of the Act,
"At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition
the Tribunal shall make an order(a) dismissing the election petition; or
(bl declaring the election of all or aoy
returned candidates to be void; or
o[
the
(c) declaring
the election of all or any of the
returned candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been
duly elected."
Part VI of the Act provides for disputes regarding elections;
Ch. III thereof prescribes the procedure for the trial of election petitions. and s. 90 therein says:
"(I) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any
rules made thereunder, every election petition
shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may
be, in accordance with the procedure applicable
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the
trial of suits."
There is no provision in the Act defining how the decision
should be given. It could not have been the intention of
the Legislature that the Tribunal need not give the statement
of reasons for its decision. As under s. 90 of the Act the
Election Tribunal is directed to try election petitions as
nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, it
is the duty of the Election Tribunal to give a statement of
.. reasons for its decision. It is open to it to issue two docu. ments-0ne embodying, the reasons for the decision and the
134-159 S.C.-11.
1963
Vidyachara11
Shukla
v.
Khuhchand
Bagh•I
Subha RM J.
162
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
other, the formal expression of its decision: the former will
be its judgment and the latter, its order. It may issue both
in the same document in which case the judgment as well
as the order is embodied in the same document. If so it
is manifest that an order made under s. 98 of the Act, if it
contains also the reasons for it, is a composite document
satisfying the definition of a judgment as well as that of an
order and thereby attracting the relevant provisions of s. 12
of the Limitation Act. That apart, a different approach
to the question raised leads to the same conclusion. Section
12(2) of the Limitation Act does not say that the order mentioned therein shall be only such order as defined in the Civil
Procedure Code. If a statute provides for the making of
an order and confers a right of appeal to an aggrieved party
against that order within a prescribed time, sub-s. (2) of s. 12
of the Limitation Act says that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of such order shall be excluded. The Act empowers the Tribunal to make an order and gives a right of
appeal against that order to the High Court. Section 12(2)
of the Limitation Act is, therefore, directly attracted without
any recourse to the definition of an order in the Code of
Civil Procedure. In either view, s. 12 of the Limitation Act
applies and, therefore, the time taken for obtaining a copy
of the said order shall be excluded in computing the period
of limitation.
YU1Jac/i4ran
Slulkla
.,,
n.llchaild
BaiN;l
Subbtl Rao 1.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
llJlllulbar Dayal J.
RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-1 agree that the appeal be dismissed, but for different reasons.
I am of opinion that the first part of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only when a special or local law prescribes
a period of limitation for an appeal and when for that particular appeal a period of limitation is prescribed in the First
Schedule to the Limitation Act, as omission to prescribe a
period of limitation cannot be equated with the prescribing
of any positive period of limitation within which the appeal
should be filed, and that the second part of s. 29(2) of the
Act is independent of the first part and can apply to
cases to which the first part does not apply. I am also of
. opinion that art. 156 of the First Schedule applies to appeals
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
which are instituted in view of the right of appeal conferred
1963
by any special or local law and not in pursuance of the
Vidyacharan
provisions of s. 96 C.P.C. I do not elaborate mv views as
Shukla
I agree with what my learned brother Mudholkar J .• has
Khub~hand
said in construing the first part of s. 29(2) of the Limitation
Baghel
Act and art. 156 of the First Schedule and agr~e with my Raghubar Dayal J.
learned brother Ayyangar J., with respect to his construction of the second part of s. 29(2).
The proviso to s. l 16(a) of the Representation of the
People Act gives discretion to the High Court to entertain
an appeal presented after the expiry of 30 days from the
date of the order of the Tribunal in case it is satisfied that
there is sufficient cause for the late presentation of the
memorandum of appeal. The respondent has applied in
this Court for the condonation of the delay in filing the
appeal in the High Court. In the circumstances of the
case, I consider it a fit case for condoning the delay. There
was a difference of opinion in the High Courts regarding the
applicability of s. 12 of the Limitation Act to such appeals.
The delay was of a few days. The Election Tribunal passed
the order on January 5, 1963 and the appeal was filed on
February 11, 1963.
A party can reasonably desire to obtain a copy of the
judgment for deciding, after studying it, whether it is worth·
while appealing against it. and if so. on what grounds. I
am satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the respondent's not presenting the appeal within the period of limitation. I therefore condone the delay and confirm the order
of the High Court.
MuoHOLKAR J.-While I agree with my brother Subba
Rao J. that the a;ipeal should be dismissed, I regret my
inability to agree with all the reasons which he has given.
I need not reca;iitulate the facts which have been set out
fully in the judgment prepared by my learned brother but
I would only state the point which we have to consider in
this appeal. The point is whether for the purpose of computing the period of 30 days prescribed by s. 116A ( 3) of
Mudholkar
1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
Mudholkar
J.
[1964}
the Representation of the Peo;ile Act, 1951 under which an
appeal can be preferred from the decision of the Election
Tribunal, the provisions of s. 12, sub-s. (2) of the Limitation Act, whereunder the time requisite for obtaining a copy
of the decree and the day on which the judgment complained
of was pronounced can be excluded can be pressed in aid. It
was contended before us that the appeal should be deemed
to be one under the Code of Civil Procedure, in which case
it would fall under art. 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, and that though a shorter period of limitation
is prescribed for it by the Representation of the People Act
the provisions of s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act would be
attracted by reason of the provisions of cl. (a) of s. 29(2)
Reliance was i;ilaced in this connection on the first limb of s.
29(2). Alternatively it was argued that the first !i·nb of s.
29, sub-s. (2) of the Limitation Act would also appiy to an
appeal under the Representation of the People Act even
though it does not fall under art. 156 of the Limitation Act
since a different period of limitation was prescribcJ for it
from that prescribed for an appeal in the First Schedule of
the Limitation Act and that, therefore, cl. (a) thereof would
attract s. I 2(2) of the Limitation Act. Finally it w"s argued
that even if the appeal cannot be regarded as one falling
within the first limb of s. 29(2) sub-s. (2) of s. 12 wo~ld still
apply because the second limb of sub-s. (2) of s. 29 is wide
enough in its ambit to include a suit, appeal or application
for which no period of limitation is prescribed in the first
schedule but a period of limitation has been prescribed by
a special or local law. My learned brother has held in his
judgment that an appeal provided for by s. I 16A of the
Representation of the People Act would be an appeal under
the Coje of Civil Procedure and thus fall under the first
column of art. 156 of the First Schedule of the Limitation
Act. Hi has also held !hat the words "where any special
or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or applical" .. , J period of limitation different from the period prescribeJ t~aeic>c 1'v the first schedule" occurring in the first
limb of sub-s· (2) 0f s. 2() would include a suit or an appeal
even though it is not of a type fr W";ch a period of limitation is prescribed in the First Schedule be~aust· it is enough
if the special Jaw prescribes for such an appeal a period
~-
6 S.C.R.
•
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
which is different from any period prescribed in the First
Schedule. I regret I am unable to agree with either of these
Vidyacharan
Shukla
views. Finally, however, my learned brother has construed
v.
the second limb of sub-s. 2 of s. 29 "and for the purpose of
Khubchand
Baghe/
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application by any special or local law" as being Mudho/kar /,
wide enough to include a suit, appeal or an application under
a special or local law which is of a type for which no period
of limitation is prescribed in the First Schedule. With this
last conclusion I agree. In my judgment what he has said
on the last point is enough for the purpose of disposing of
the appeal in the way proposed by him. As, however, I do
not agree with what he has said on the first two points I
must briefly indicate my reasons for coming to different cc"clusions.
In support of the conclusion that art. 156 applies, my
learned brother has relied upon the decision in Aga Mahomed Hamadani v. Cohen (1) which was followed by the
Madras High Court in Ramasami Pillai v. the Deputy Collector of Madura('). The first of these two cases was one
from what was then British Burma. Under s. 49 of the
Burma Courts Act, 1875 (XVII of 1875) an appeal lay to
the High Court from the decision in a suit or proceeding
before the Recorder's Court in which the amount or value
was not less than Rs. 3,000 and was not more than
Rs. I 0,000. Section 97 of that Act said: "save as otherwise provided by this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure sha 11
be, and shall, on and from the 15th day of April, 1872. be
deemed to have been in force throughout British Burma."
Section 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 which was
in force at that time read thus:
"Unless when otherwise expressly provided by this
Code or by any other law for the time being
in force, an appeal shall lie from the uecrees
or from any part of the decrees of the Courts
exercising original jurisdiction to the Courts
authorised to hear appeals from the decisions
of those courts."
(1) (1SS6) I. L. R. 13 Cal. 221
(2) (1919) I. L. R. 43 Mad. 51
166
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
Mudho/kar
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The question which the High Court had to consider in that
case was whether the appeal could be said to be in iime as
it fell to be governed by art. 156 of the First Schedule to·
the Limitation Act. For deciding this matter the High
Court proceeded to consider what was meant by an appeal
under the Code of Civil Procedure. While dealing with
the matter the High Court observed:
"A particular appeal was given by the Burma Courts
Act and the Burma Courts Act is still the onlr
Act which prescribes to what Court this appeal
shall lie. If it had not been given by the
Burma Courts Act then s. 540 of the Civil Pro·
eedure Code would have been sufficient to give
it. provided that some Court was by somir
enaotment provided as the proper Court to
hear the appeal. The rprocedure in appeals in
every respect is governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Limitation Act, Sch. I, Art.
156 when it speaks of the Civil Procedure Code
is, on the face of it, speaking of a Code which
relates to procedure, and does not ordinarily
deal with substantive rights: and the naturar
meaning of an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code appears to us to be an appeal
governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far
as procedure; is concerned."
Referring to this, my learned brother has observed:
"It is manifest from this passage that the learned
judges did not repel the contention on the
ground that the right of appeal was conferred
by s. 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but
expressely for the reason that the natural meaning of the relevant exi;iression in art. 156 of
Sch. I of the Limitation Act was that the a7peal
mentioned thereiin was one governed by the
Code of Civil Procedure."
That is true. It is, however, not material for my purpose
to consider whether or not the High Court was right in holding that the appeal before it was under the Burma Courts
•
6 S.C.R.
.J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963 .
Act. I would assume that the High Court was right but
it is necessary to point out that the provisions of s. 29 of the
Yi~
slaal/4
Limitation Act as then in force did not come for considera.
tion in that case. The question would then be whether its
KhUbclttutd
Baghtl
view that an appeal, though not provided by the Code of
Civil Procedure, would yet be deemed to be an appeal under Mudhol.kar I.
the Code for the purpose of art. 156 of the Limitation Act,
was right. With respect I do not think that there was any
warrant for holding that an appeal which was not given by
the Code would still be one under the Code merely because
the procedural provisions thereof would govern its cour~e.
Where the right of appeal is given by some other law, the
appeal must be regarded as one under that law and not
under the Code. I see no ,valid reason for construing the
words 'under the Code of Civil Procedure· as meaning
'governed in the matter of procedure by the Code of Civil
Procedure'. For, that is, in effect, what the High Court has
done in this case. By reading the article in the way it has
done the High Court has virtually construed the only provision in the Limitation Act dealing with normal civil appeals
to the High Court as a residuary article which would take in
all appeals by whatever law they may be provided, merely
because the procedure relating to appeals contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to them. This
would in my judgment go against the plain in'.cndment of
the Legislature. Indeed, while a right to in"itute a suit
or make an application is a wider kind of right, there can
be no right of appeal unless some statute confers it. That is
why the Legislature has expressly enacted residuary provisions, Arts. 120 and 180, for suits and applications respectively in 1the Limitation Act. The First Schedule is divided
into three divisions. Article 156 is one of the eight articles
contained in the second division which deals with 2ppeals.
The first division of that schedule deals with suits.
There, provision is made for a variety of suits including some
under special laws, but it was realised that it could not be
exhaustive. Therefore, art. 120 was provided therein,
which deals with "Suits for-which no period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in this schedule." The third division of
the First :Schedule deals with applications of different kinds.
Article 181 makes provision for applications for which no
•.
168
i963
Vidyachalvm
Shukla
·v.
Khubchand
BagheI
Mudholkar
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the Schedule.
In the second division, however, which deals with appeals,
there is no provision analogous to art. I 20 and art. 18 L
Four of the eight articles deal with appeals under the Code
of Criminal Procedure and four with ap;ieals other than
those under the Code of Criminal Procedure. As already
stated, only one of these articles deals with normal civil
appeals to the High Court, namely, art. 156. It is not
couched in language similar to that used in art 120 and art
181. Would we then be justified in reading the first column
of art. 156 to mean the same thing as is said in the first
column of arts. 120 or 181? The Legislature knew that
appeals have been provided by various special laws; but it
made no provision for such ap;ieals in this Schedule apparently for the reason that a law which confers a right of
appeal is expected to provide for the period of limitation
for such an appeaL That seems to be the explanation for
the absence of a residuary provision for appeals.
The first difficulty, therefore, in interpreting art. 156
in the way contended for by the respondents is that where
a different period of limitation for appeal is expressly provided by a special law art. 156 will not in terms be attracted.
To bring such an appeal under it would clearly go against
the express intention of the Legislature which was to confine that article to appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure. The next difficulty is that the entry deals with appeals
"under" the Code of Civil Procedure and not appeals aris·
ing out of proceedings to which the Code of Civil Procedure
applies. Nor again, does it include an appeal which is only
deemed to be under the Code of Civil Procedure. Be it
noted that so far as proceedings under the Representation
of the People Act are concerned, the whole of the Code
of Civil Procedure does not apply but only so much of it as
is expressly made applicable by the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. It was said that if the provisions of 0. XLI, of the Code of Civil Procedure were not
·applicable to an appeal under the Representation of the
People Act there would be no provision whereunder the
party could at all file an appeal. It seems to me, however,
that there can be no difficulty at all in this matter as every
'
.1\.,
6 cc·...,
<
~.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
High Court has made rules partly under the Constitution
and partly in exercise of its inherent power to make suitable
provisions in regard to this and allied matters. The Calcutta High Court, however, does not appear to have given
the full consideration in Cohen's case(') to the ambit of art.
156 and that is another reason why I find myself unable to
accept the correctness of the view it has taken in that case.
-
•
It was then said that the view should be accepted on
the ground of stare decisis. In this connection it was pointed out that so far no court has dissented from that view and
indeed the view was fully accepted in Ramasami Pi//ai's
case(') by the Madras High Court. In so far as the prin'
ciple of stare decisis is concerned it is nothing more than,
.as observed by Dowrick in Justice According to the English
Common Lawyers (1961 ed. p. 195), a precipitate of the
notion of legal justice. In other words it is the principle
that judicial decisions have a binding character. But in
India the position is not quite the same. Here the decision
of a High Court is not even always binding upon it in the
sense that it can be reconsidered by a Full Bench. No doubt
its decision may bind all courts subordinate to it as also all
Judges sitting singly or in division benches of the High
Court. It is also true that a decision of a Division Bench
of a High Court is binding on every other Division Bench
of that High Court but there again there have been cases
where one Full Bench has reconsidered the decision of an
earlier Full Bench. !n any case the decision of a High Court
has no more than persuasive character in so far as this
Court is concerned. fn that view the decision of the Calcutta High Court. even though it may not have been dissented from since the time it was rendered, cannot, in the proper sense of the term be regarded as stare decisis. What
could be stare decisis in this Court would be its own previous
decisions. But even here instances are not wanting where,
unlike perhaps the House of Lords, we have considered
ourselves free to go back on previous decisions. (See The
Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar
& ors. ( 3 ) Finally, even where a decision has not been
(1) (1886) !. L. R. 13 Cal. 221
(3) [195~] 2 S. C.R. 603
(2) (1919) I. L. R. 43 Mad. 51
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
1'.
Khubchand
Baghel
Mudholkar
I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Vidyacharan
Shukla
v.
Khubchand
Baghel
Mudholkar
J.
dissented from for a Jong time, but has on the other hand'
been followed, it is not entitled to be treated as immutable,
particularly where it deals only with a question appertaining to the adjective law, such as the law of limitation. There
may be a great deal to be said in favour of not disturbing
even erroneous decisions affecting substantive rights to property which have stood undisturbed for a Jong time on the
ground that such a course may unsettle existing titles to
property. But this or similar considerations which would
justify leaving such decisions undisturbed would· not stand
in the way of overruling an erroneous decision on a matter
appertaining to the adjective law however ancient the decision may be (1). Therefore, I do not feel myself persuaded to hold that the present appeal can be regarded as
of a type falling within the first column of art. 156 of the
First Schedule to the Limitation Act.
In order to deal with the second ground given by my
· learned brother it is necessary to reproduce the provisions·
of s. 29, sub-s. (2) of the Limitation Act. They run thus:
"Where any special or local law prescribes for any
suit, ap;ieal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed therefor
by the First Schedule, the provisions of section
3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed
therefor in that Schedule, ·and for the purpose
of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, ~peal or application by
any special or local , law-·
(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only ·
in so far as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded by such special
or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall
not apply."
(1) Sec Allen, I.aw in the making (sth cdn.) p. 209 f.n. 3
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
1963
While expressing the view that the legislature has not expressed itself hap;iily while enacting this provision he has
Vidyacharan
Shukla
agreed with the view taken in Canara Bank Ltd. v. The
v.
Warden Insurance Co., Ltd., Bombay('), which was followKhubchand
Baghel
ed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Beharilal
Chaurasiya v. Regional Transport Authority(').
In tha. Mudho/kar J,
case the Bombay High Court has held that art. 156 is
attracted on the ground that the period provided by the
special law is different from that contained in the First Schedule. With great respect to the learned Judges, I find it
difficult to strain the language used in the first limb of s. 29
( 2) in this manner. The legislature has in clear terms
spoken of cases in which a special or local law has prescribed
for a suit, appeal or an application a period of limitation
"different" from that prescribed by the First Schedule. Now,
the governing words are "suit, <i;ipeal or application''.
Therefore, what has to be seen is whether a suit, appeal or
application under a particular local or special law is of a
kind similar to one for which a period of limitation is prescribed in the First Schedule. The first limb of sub~s. ( 2) of
s. 29 is concerned only with proceedings of this kind, that
is, proceedings under special or local law for which a period
of limitation is provided in the First Schedule. If for such
a proceeding the period to be found in the First Schedule is
· different from that prescribed under a special or local law
certain consequences will follow under the provision. I do
not think that any inconvenience would be caused by giving
literal and natural interpretation to the expression used by
the legislature in the first portion of sub-s. (2) of s. 29 because cases of other kind can easily come under the second
portion thereof.
Since I agree with my learned brother about what he
has said regarding the second limh of sub-s. (2) of s. 29
the aQpeal must be dismissed witli co~ts as proposed by him.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) I. L. R. 1952 Born, 1083.
(2) A.LR. 1961 M. P. 75.
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