JABAR SINGH versus GENDA LAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 December 1963 | [1964] 6 S.C.R. 54 | 1963 INSC 262
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 December 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1042/1963
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 6 S.C.R. 54
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 262
Text of the judgment
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
JABAR SINGH
Dec1mber, 19
v.
[ HJ(>4)
GENDA LAL
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), ss. 97, !OO(l)(d)
and IOl(a) and Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 r. 57(1)-scope of.
The appellant was tleclared elected having defeated the respondent
by 2 votes. Thereafter. the respondent filed an elect:Wn petition. The
respondent challenged the validity of the appellant's election on the
ground of improper reception of votes in favour of the appellant and
improper rejection of votes in regard to himself. His prayer was that
the appel1ant's election should be declared void and a declaration
should be made that the respondent was (iuly elected.
The appellant urged before the Tribunal that there had been im~
proper rejection of his votes and improper acceptance of the votes of
the respondent. and his case was that if recounting and re-scrutiny was
made, it would be found that he had secured a majority of votes. The
respondent objected to this course; his case was that since the appellant
had not recriminate'd nor furnished security under s. 97 of the Act, it
was not open to him to make this plea. The Tribunal rejected the
objection of the respondent and accepted the plea of the appellant.
The Tribunal re-examined the ballot papers of the respondent as well
as the appellant and came to the conclusion that 22 ballot papers cast
in favour of the respondent had been wrongly accepted. The result
was that the respondent had not secured a majority of votes.
The
Tribunal declared that the election of the appellant was void an(l
refused to grant a declaration to the respondent that he had been duly
elected. Both the appellant and the respondent preferre<i appeals before
the High Court against the decision of the Tribunal. The High Court
dismissed both the appeals and the decision of Tribunal was confirmea.
Hence the appeal.
y
t
Held: (i) The scope of the enquiry in a case falling under s. 100
( I ) l d) (iii) is to determine whether any votes have been improperly
cast in favour of the returned candidate or any votes have been improperly refused or rejected in regard to any other candidate.
These
are the only two matters which would be relevant in ~eciding whether
the election of the returned candidate has been materially affected or·
not. At this enquiry the onus is on the petitioner to prove his allegation.
Therefore, in the case of a petition where the only claim made is that
the election of the returned candidate is void, the scope of the -J
enquiry is clearly limited by the requirement of s. 100 (! )(d) itself. In
fact, s. 97(1) bas no application to the case falling under s. IOO(l)(<l)
(iii); the scope of the enquiry is limited for the simple reason that what
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
the clause requires to be considered is whether the election of the returned candi'date has been materially affected and nothing else.
(ii) There are cases in which the election petition makes a double
claim; it claims that the election of a returned candidate is void and also
•
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asks for a declaration that the petitioner himself or some other person
has bct!n duly elected. It is in regard to such a composite case that
s. I 00 as well as s. 100( I) would apply. and it is in respect of the
additional claim for a declaration that some other candidate has been
duly elected that s. 97 comes into play. Section 97(1) thus allows the
returned candidate to recriminate and raise pleas in support of his·
case. The result of s. 97 ( 1) therefore, is that in dealing with a compositP. P.lection petition the Tribunal enquires into not only the cruse
made out by the petitioner, but also the counter-claim made by the
returned candidate. In this conhection the returned candi(late is required to comply with the provisions of s. 97 (I) an'd s. 97 (2) of the
Act. If the returned candidate does not recriminate as required by
~. 97, then he cannot make any attack against the
alternative claim
made by the petitioner. In other words the returned candidate will not
be allo\ve\.l to lead any evidence because he is precluded from raising
any pleas against the validity of the claim of the alternative candidate.
(iii) The pleas of the returned candidate under s. 97 of the Act,
have to be tried after a declaration has been made under s. 100 of the
Act. The first part of the enquiry in regard to the validity of
the election of the returned ·candidate must be tried within the narrow
limits prescribed bys. IOO(l)(d) (iii) and the latter part of the enquiry
which is governed by s. 10 I (a) will have to be tried on a broader basis
"Permitting the returned candidate to lead evidence in support of the pleas
which he may have taken by way of recrimination under s. 97(1). But
even in cases to which s. 97 applies, the enquiry necessary while dealing
with the aispute under s. lOl(a) will not be wider if the returne'd candidate
has failed to recriminate, and in a case of this type the duty of the
Elec iron Tribunal will not be to count and scrutinise all the votes cast
at the election. As a result of T· S7, the Election Tribunal will have to
assume that every ballot paper which had not been rejected under r. 56
-constituted one vali'd vote and it is on that basis the finding will have
to be made under s. !Ol(a) .. Therefore, it is clear that in holding an
~nquiry either under s. IOO(l)(d) (iii) or under s. IOI where s. 97 has
not been complied with it is not competent to the Tribunal to order a
general recount of the votes preceded by a scrutiny about their
validity.
Jnayatu/lah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219 and
Lakshmi Shankar Yadav v. Kunwar Sripa/ Singh, 22 E.L.R. 47 overruled.
Bhim Sen v. Gopali and Ors. 22 E-L.R. 288, relied on.
Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra, [1955] I S.C.R. 509, Hari
Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmed lshaque, [1955] I S.C.R. 1104 and
1963
Jabar Singh
v.
Genda l,ol
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
lobar Slnzh
'"
Gerula Lal
[rg64J
Keslwv La:cman Borkar v. Dr. Devrao Laxn1an Anande, [1960] 1 S.C.R.
902, liiscussed.
l't'r Ayyangar L-(i) Section 100 of the Act casts on the election
petitioner the onus of establishing to the satisfaction of the l'ribunal
that "the result ot the election was materially affected by the improper
reception or rejection of particul<1r votes", but from this it does not
follow that the returned candidate is powerless to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that notwithstanding the improper reception or
rejection of the particular votes alleged by the petitioner hi~ elt:ction
ha:-i not been materially affected. If the key words of the provision on
the fulfihnent of which alone the Tribunal is invested with jurisdiction
to set aside an election are taken to be the words "the result of the
election has bee11 materially affected''; it is not beyond the power of the
returned candi'date to '!Stablish this fact which he might do in any
manner he likes. The returned candidate might <lo this by establishing
that though a few votes were wrongly counted as in hb favour, still a
l::i.rge number of his own votes were counted in favour of the petitioner
or that votes which ought to have been counted as cast for him. have
been improperly counted as cast in favour of defeated candidates other
than tht.! petitioner. Without such a scrutiny it would manifestly not
1
be possible to determinl: wht:ther the election of the returned can'didate
has been materially affected or not. There is nothing in cl. (iii) which
precludes the returned candidates from establishing this. As this
clause does not speak of the person in whose favour or as against whom
the improper reception or rejection has taken place, its content and
significa.nce have to be ascertained from the purpose of which the provision is intended i•iz., to determine from a counting of the voting
papers after a scrutiny whether the election of the returned candidate
has been materially affected. The expres-.ion "any vote" in this clause
has to be rea.'d as meaning "any vote cast in the election with which
this petition is concerned" and not "any vote cast in the favour of the
returned candidate".
(ii) Section lOl(a) provides that theI-c cannot be a declaration in
favour of the claimant to a seat merely because the election of the
returned candidate has been declared void but he must in addition
have secured the majority of the lawful votes cast. It is obvious that
for this purpose the Tribunal ought to scrutinise not merely the ballot
papers of the claimant and the returne'd candidate but also of the O(hor
candidates. When the Tribunal has reached the conclusion after
scrutiny of votes that the claimant has, in fact, received the majority
of valid vote~, the Tribunal embarks on the further enquiry as to
whether there are any reasons why he should not be declared elected.
·And it is at this stage that the provisions of s. 97 in regatd to recrimination came into play. If no recrimination is filed then on the terms
of s. lOl(a) the claimant would be immediately declared elected tiut
if there is r1.cr1mination the provision of s. lOl(b) is attracted.
This
constructior 'vould harmonise the prov1s1on of ss. 97. lOO(ll(d) and
101 and would lead to a rational result.
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6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(iii) Ru!~ 57(1) means that so far as the returning offi.Cer jS~COD.-:-~-- 196]
cerned and for the purpose of enabling hini to ·declare the result the
Ja~ar Singh
ballot papers y,:hich are not rejected are io be deemed as valfd. It is. '
v.
manifest that if that validity held good even at the ·stage of the election
Genda Uil
petition and for the conduct of the enquiry before the Tribunal that
could really be no scrutiny of the ballot papers ands. lOO(l)(d) _(iii)
would become me3.ningless;· The validity of the Ballot Paper can be
challenged in Election Petition by making proper pleadings and the
Tribunal can -declare 3.ny~ ballot paper as irnproperlY received. Rule 57
does no; bea-i upon the construction of s. IOO(l)(d) (iii) or of s. _lOI(a).
CIVIL APPELLATE-: JURISDICTION: Civil
1042 of 1963. ·
'
Appeal No.
Appeal by special lea"'.e from the judgment and order
dated May 3, 1963, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
First Appeal No. 46 of 1962.
S. K. Kapur, B. L. Khanna and B~ N. Kirplll, for the
appellant.
Homi Daji, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, M. K. Ramamurthi and D. P. Singh, for the respondent.
December 20, 1963. The Judgment of P.- B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo and K. C. Das Gupta,
JJ. was delivered by Gajendragadkar J. N. Rajagopala
Ayyangar J. delivered a separate opinion.
ol
0
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-_-·The question
law which this Gajendragadkar J.
appeal has raised for our decision is in relation to the nature
and scope of the enquiry contemplated by sections 97, I 00
and 101 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (No. 43
of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act). The appellant Jabar
Singh and the respondent Genda Lal, besides five others,
had contested the election to the Madhya Pradesh Assembly oil behalf of the Morena Constituency No. 5. This election took place on the 21st February, 1962. In due course,
the scrutiny of recorded votes took place and counting
followed on the 27th February, 1962. As a result of the
counting, the appellant was shown to have secured 5,671
votes, whereas the respondent 5, 703 votes. It is not necessary to refer to the votes secured by the other candidates. After the result of the counting was thus ascertained, the
appellant applied for recounting of the votes and thereupon,
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64]
recounting followed as a result of which the appellant was
declared elected having defeated the respondent by 2 votes.
•·
The recounting showed that the appellant secured 5,656
Genda Lal
votes and the respondent 5,654. Thereafter, the respondent
Gajendragadkar J. filed an election petition from which the present appeal
arises. By his petition the respondent challenged the validity of the appellant's election on the ground of improper
reception of votes in favour of the appellant and improper
rejection of votes in regard to himself. The respondent urged
before the Tribunal either for the restoration. of the results
in accordance with the calculations initially made before recounting, or a re-scrutiny of the votes by the Tribunal and
declaration of the result according to the calculations which
the Tribunal may make. His prayer was that the appellant's
election should be declared to be void and a declaration
should be made that the respondent was duly elected.
1963
,
Jabar Singh
The Election· Tribunal found that IO ballot papers in
favour of the· respondent had been improperly rejected and
4 had been improperly accepted iii favour of the appellant.
That led to a difference of 12 votes and the position of the
votes was found to be the respondent 5,664 and the appellant 5,652 votes.
At this stage, the appellant urged before the Tribunal
that there had been improper rejection of his votes and improper acceptance of the votes of the respondent, and his
case was that if recounting and re-scrutiny was made, it
would be found that he had secured a majority of votes.
The respondent objected to this course; his case was that
since the appellant had not recriminated under s. 97 of the
Act. it was not open to him to make the plea that a recounting and re-scrutiny should be made on the ground that
improper votes had been accepted in favour of the respondent and valid votes had been improperly rejected when they
were cast in favour of the appellant. The respondent's contention was that in order to justify the claim made by the
appellant it was necessary fhat he should have complied
with the provisions of the proviso to s. 97(1) of the Act and
should have furnished security as required by it. The
failure of the appellant in that behalf precluded him from
raising such a contention.
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+i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
1961
The Tribunal rejected the respondent's contention and
held that in order to consider the relief which the respondent
Jabar S11111t
had cliamed in his election petition, it was necessary for it
.,J·4 Lal
0
to deciue whether the respondent had in fact received a
· -majority of votes under s. 101 of the Act, and so. he re-exa- Gaie11 dragadkar /.
mined the ballot papers of the respondent as well as. the
appellant and came to the conclusion that 22 ballot papers
cast in favour of the respondent had been wrongly accepted.
The result was that the respondent had, in fact, not secured
a majority of votes. As a consequence of these fir.dings,
the Tribunal declared that the election of the appellant was
void and refused to grant a declaration to the respondent
that he had been duly elected.
•
This decision led to two cross-appeals before the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, No. 46 of 1952 and No. 1 of 1963
respectively. The appellant challenged the conclusion of
the Tribunal that his election was void, whereas the respondent disputed the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal
that no declaration could be granted in his favour that he
had been duly elected. In these appeals. the main question
which was agitated before the High Court was about the
nature and scope of the enquiry permissible under sections
100 and 101 of the Act. In dealing with this question, the
High Court based itself upon its own earlier decision in
lnayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan and Ors.(')., as
well as the decision of this Court in Bhim Sen v. Gopali and
Ors. ( 2 ) and held that the grievance made by both the parties
in their respective appeals was not well-founded and that the
decision of the Tribunal was right. In the result, both the
appeals were dismissed and the decision of the Tribunal was
confirmed. Against this decision, the appellant has come to
this Court by special leave. Later on, the respondent filed an
application for leave to appeal to this Court, but the said
application was filed beyond time. When the said application came on for hearing before this Court, the delay made
by the respondent in preferring his application for special
leave was not condoned, and so, the decision of the High
Court against the respondent has become final and is ~o
(I)
15 E.L.R. 219.
(2) 22 E.L.R. 288.
60
SUPREME ~OURT REPORTS
[1g64J
1963
longer open to challenge in this Court. When the application for leave filed by the appellant was argued and admitted
labar Singh
v.
by this Court, it was urged by Mr. Kapoor on his behalf that
Genda Lal
the observations made by this Court in the case of Rhim
Ga1endragadka1 I. Sen(') on which the High Court substantially relied required
reconsideration. That is why the appeal has been placed before a Bench of five Judges for final hearing.
ln dealing with the question raised by Mr. Kapoor before
us, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act in regard to th~ presentation of election petitions and the prayers
that the petitioners can make therein. Section 81 provides
that an election petition calling in question any election on
one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (!) of s.
100 and s. 101 may be presented to the Election Commission
by any candidate or any elector within the time specified by
the said section. It is thus clear that when a person presenb
an election petition, it is open to him to challenge the election of the returned candidate under s. 100 (1) and claim a
deciaration that the returned candidate's election is void. He
can also claim a further declaration that he himself or any
other candidate has been duly elected. In other words, if
the election petition contents itself with claiming a simple
declaration that the election of the returned cand:date should
be declared to be void, the petition falls under s. 100 and the
Election Tribunal can either grant the said declaration in
which case the petition is allowed, or refuse to grant it in
which case the petition is dismissed. It is also possible that
the e'ection petition may claim two reliefs, one under s. I 00
'. l). and the other under s. 10 I. In this category of cases,
the Tribunal first decides the questia'n as to whether the election of the returned candidate is valid or not, and if it is
found that the said election is void, it makes a declaration to
that effect and then deals with the further question whether
the petitioner himself or some other person can be said to
have been duly elected. The scope of the enquiry which
the Tribunal has to ho.Id in such cases would obviously
depend upon the nature of the reliefs claimed by the petition.
There is another fact which it is necessary to bear in mind
in dealing with the controversv before us in the present ap(I) 22 E.L.R. 288.
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6 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
1963
peal. When elections are held, the declarations of the results
are governed by the statutory mies framed under the Act.
/a/Jar Singh
v.
The counting of votes is dealt with in the relevant rules under
Gerula Lal
Part V. Rule 55 deals with the scrutiny and opening of ballot boxes. Rule 56(1) requires that the ballot papers taken Ga;endra!adkar J.
out of each ballot box shall be arranged in convenient bundle'
and scrutinised. R. 56(2) provides when the returning officer
has to reject a ballot paper; the grounds for rejection are specified in clauses (a) to (h). Rules 56(3), (4) and (5) prescribe
the procedure for rejecting ballot papers. When the ballot
papers have been taken out of the ballot boxes and have been
scrutinised, counting follows and that is dealt with by r. 57
and the following Rules. R. 63 provides for recounting of
votes; R. 63 (1) lays down that after the counting has been
completed, the returning officer shall record in the result sheet
in Form. 20 the total number of votes polled by each candidate and announce the same. R. 63(2) permits ai1 application to be made for a recounting and if that application is allowed, a recounting follows. If a recounting is made, then
the result is declared once again on the sheet in Form 20. In
pursuance of the result of counting thus announced, the result of the election is declared under r. 64 and a certificate
of election is granted to the returned candidate. It is significant that r. 57 (I) provides that every ballot paper which
is not rejected under r. 56 shall be counted as one valid
vote, which means that after the ballot papers have been
scrutinised and invalid papers are rejected under r. 56(2).
all voting papers which have been taken into the countini:
by the returning officer shall be deemed to be valid under
r. 57 (1). Similarly, when the scrutiny of the nomination
papers is made by the returning officer under s. 36 of
the Act and as a result, certain nomination papers are
accepted, s. 36(8) provides that the said acceptance
shall be presumed to be valid. In other words, when
an election petition is filed before an Election Tribunal
challenging the validity of the election of the returned cand idate, prima facie the acceptance of nomination papers is
presumed to be valid and the voting papers which have been
counted are also presumed to be valid. The election petition may challenge the validity of the votes counted. or the
validity of the acceptance or rejection of a nomination
62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
paper; that is a matter of proof. But the enquiry would
commence in every case with prima facie presumption in
v.
favour
of the validity of the acceptance or rejection of
Genda Lal
nomination paper and of the validity of the voting papers
Gaje11dragqdkar J. which have been counted. It is necessary to bear in mind
this aspect of the matter in dealing with the question about
the scope and nature of the enquiry under sections 100 and
10 l of the A.ct.
Jabar S111gh
Let us now read the three relevant sections with which
we are concerned in the present appeal. Section 97
provides:
"(1) When in an election petition a declaration that
any candidate other than the returned candidate
has been duly elected is claimed, the returned
candidate or any other party may give evidence
to prove that the election of such candidat~
would have been void if he had been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented
calling in question his election.
Provided that the returned candidate or such other
party as aforesaid shall not be entitled to give
such evidence unless he has, within fourteen days
from the date of commencement of the trial,
given notice to the Tribunal of his intention to
do so and has also given the security and the
further security referred to in sections 117 and
118 respectively.
(2) Every notice referred to in sub-section (!) chall bt
accompanied by the statement and particulars
required by section 83 in the case of an election
petition and shall be signed and verified in like
manner".
Section I 00, sub-section (I) reads as under: -(!) Subject to the provisions of sub-sectiou (2) if the Tri·
bunal is of opinion(a) that on the date of his election a returned candi
date. was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be
chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or
this Act; or
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6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by
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1963
a returned candidate or his election ~.gent or
labar Singh
v.
by any other person with the consent of a reGendu Lal
turned candidate or his election agent; or
Gajendragadkar /.
. . h b
.
l
.
(c) that any nommation
as een improper y re1ect·
ed; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it con- .
cerns a returned candidate. has been materially
affected(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination,
or
(ii} by any corrupt practice committed in the
interests of the returned candidate by an agent
other than his election agent, or
(iii! by the improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote or the reception of any vote
which is void; or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules
or orders made under this Act,
the Tribunal shall declare the election of the
feturned candidate to be void".
Section W1 provides that :
"If any person who has lodged a petition has, in addition to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claimed a declaration that he
himself or any other candidate has been duly
elected and the Tribunal is of opinion(a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes; or
(b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned
candidate by corrupt practices the petitioner
or such other candidate would have obtained
a majority of the valid votes,
the Tribunal shall after declaring the election of
the returned candidate to be void declare the
petitioner or such other candidate, as the case
may be, to have been duly elected".
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
-
1963
Mr. Kapoor contends that in dealing with the cases falling
under s. lOO(l)(d)(iii), section 97 can have no application
Jubar Singh
v.
and so, the enquiry contemplated in regard to cases falling
Genda Lal
under that class is not restricted by the prohibition prescribed
Ga/endragadkar_ J. by s. 97 ( 1). He suggests that when the Tribunal decides
whether or not the election of the returned candidate has
been materially affected by the improper reception, refusal or
rejection of any vote, or the reception of any vote which is
void, it has to examine the validity of all votes which have
been counted in declaring the returned candidate to be elected, and so, no limitation can be imposed upon the right of
the appellant to require the Tribunal to consider his contention that some votes which were rejected though cast
in his favour had been improperly rejected and some
votes which were accepted in favour of the respondent had
been improperly accepted. Basing himself on this position,
Mr. Kapoor further contends that when s. 101 requires that
the Tribunal has to come to the conclusion that in fact the
petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the
valid votes, that can be done only when a recount is made
after eliminating invalid votes, and so, no limitations can
be placed upon the scope of the enquiry contemplated by
s. lOl(a). Since s. lOO(l)(d)(iii) is outside the purview
of s. 97, it would make no difference to the scope of the
enquiry even if the appellant has not recriminated as required bys. 97(1).
On the other hand, Mr. Garg who has addressed to us a
very able argument on behalf of the respondent, urged that
the approach adopted by the appellant in dealing with the
problem posed for our decision in the present appeal is inappropriate. He contends that in construing sections 97.
100 and IOI, we must bear in mind one important fact that
the returned candidate whose election is challenged can face
the challenge under s. I 00 only by making pleas which can
be described as pleas affording him a shield of defence,
whereas if the election petition besides challenging the validity of the returned candidate claims that some other ~ '.'rson has been duly elected, the returned candidate is given an
opportunity to recriminate and by way of recrimination he
<:an adopt pleas which can be described as weapons of attack
against the validity of the election of the other :oerson.
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6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
His argument is that though s. JOO(l)(d)(iii) is outside s. 97,
1961
it does not mean that in dealing with a claim made by an iobor Si11gh
election petition challenging the validity of his election, a
v.
returned candidate can both defend the validity of his clcc·
G•~Lal
tion and assail the validity of the votes cast in favour of the Ga/endrazadkar I.
petitioner or some other person. It is in the light of these
two rival contentions !hat we must now proceed to decide
what the true legal position in lhe matter is.
..
•
lt would be convenient if we take a simple case of an
election petition where the petitioner makes only one claim
and that is that the election of the returned candidate is
void. This claim can be made under s. 100. Section 100(1)
(a), lbl and (c) refer to three distinct grounds on which the
election of the returned candidate can be challenged. We
are not concerned with any of these grounds. In dealing with
the challenge to the validity of the election of the returned
can•fah•tc under s. JOO(l)(d), it would be noticed that what
the election petition has to prove is not only the existence
of one or the other of the grounds specified in clauses (i) to
(iv) of s. JOO(l)(d), but it has also to establish that as a result
of the existence of the said ground, the result of the election
in so far as it concerns a returned cand:date has been materially affected. It is thus obvious that what the Tribunal has
to find is whether or not the election in so far as it concerns
the returned candidate has been materially affected, and that
means that the only point which the Tribunal has to decide
is: has the election of the returned candidate been materially
affected? And no other enquiry is legitimate or permissible
in such a case. This requirement of s. lOO(l)(d) necessarily
impons iimitaticns on the scope of the enquiry. Confining
ourselves to clause (iii) of s. IOO(l)(d), what the Tribunal has
to consider is whether there has been an improper reception
of votes in favour of the returned candidate. It may also
enquire whether there h:1s been a refusal or rejection of any
vote in regard to any other candidate or whether there has
been a reception of any vote which is void and this can only
be the reception of a void vote in favour of the returned
candidate. In other words, the scope of the enquiry in a
case falling under s. JOO(l)(d)(iii) is to determine whether
any ~otcs have been improperly cast in favour of the returned
candidate. or any votes have been improperly refused or reta4-159 S.C.-5.
66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
jected in regard to any other candidate. These are the only
two matters which would be relevant in deciding whether the'
Jabar Singh
election of the returned candidate has been materially affectG1rul#i Lal
ed or not. At this enquiry, the onus is on the petitioner to
Ga/endraradkar J. show that by reason of the infirmities specified in s. 1OO(l)(d)
(iii), the result of the return~d candidate's election has been
materially affected, and that, incidentally, helps IQ determine
the scope of the enquiry. Therefore, it seems to us that ii~.
the case of a petition where the only claim made is that the
election of the returned candidate is void, the scope of the
enquiry is clearly limited by the requirement of s. lOO(l)(d1
itself. The enquiry is limited not because the returned candidate has not recriminated under s. 97(1); in fact, s, 970 J has
no application to the case falling under s. lOO(l)(d)(iiiJ; the,
scope of the enquiry is limited for the simple reason that what
the clause requires to be considered is whether the election
of the returned candidate has been materially affected and
nothing else. If the result of the enquiry is in favour of the
petitioner who challenges the election of the returned candidate, the Tribunal has to make a declaration to that effect,
and that declaration brings to an end the proceedings in the
election petition.
There are, however, cases in which the election petition
makes a double claim; it claims that the election of the returned candidate is void, and also asks fot a declaration that
the petitioner himself or some other person has been duly
elected. It is in regard to such a composite case that s, 100
as well ass. IOI would apply, and it is in respect of the additional claim fot a declaration that some other candidate has
been duly elected that s. 97 comes into play. Section 97( I)
thus allows the returned candidate to recriminate and raise
pleas in support of his case that the other person in whose
favour a declaration is claimed by the petition cannot be said
to be validly elected, and these .would be pleas of attack and
it would be open to the returned candidate to take these
pleas, because/When he recriminates, he really becomes a
counter-petitioner challenging the validity of the election of
the alternative candidate. The result of s. 97(1) therefore, is
that in dealing with a composite election petition, the
Tribunal enquires into not only the case made out by the
petitioner, but also the counter-claim made by the returned
...
..
•
•
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
1963
candidate. That being the nature of me proceedings contemplated by s. 97(1), it is not surprising that the returned
lobar Sin11.
y,
candidate is required to make his recrimination and serve
Genda Lal
notice in that behalf in the manner and within the time
specified by s. 97 ( 1) proviso and s. 97 (2). If the returned Gaiendragadur J.
candidate does not recriminate as required by s. 97,--then
he cannot make any attack against the alternative claim
made by the petition. In such a case, an enquiry would be
held under s. 100 so far as the validity of the returned
candidaie's election is concerned, and if as a result of the
said enquiry a declaration is made that the election of the
returned candidate is void, then the Tribunal will proceed to
deal with alternative claim, but in doing so, the returned
candidate will not be allowed to lead any evidence because
he is precluded from raising any pleas against the validity
of the claim of the alternative candidate.
•
..
...
It is true that s. lOl(a) requires the Tribunal to firtd that
the petitioner or such other candidate for the declaration of
whose election a prayer is made in the election petition hl)s in
fact received a majority of the valid votes. -It is urged by
Mr. Kapoor that the Tribunal cannot make a finding that
the alternative candidate has in fact received a majority of
the valid votes unless all the votes cast at the election are
scrutinised and counted. In our opinion, this contention is
not well-founded. We have already noticed that as a result
of rule 57, the Election Tribunal will have to assume that
every ballot paper which had not been rejected under r. 56
constituted one valid vote and it is on that basis that the finding will have to be made under s. IOl(a). Section 97(1) undoubtedly gives an opportunity to the returned candidate to
dispute the validity of any of the votes cast in favour of the
alternative candidate or to plead for the validity of any vote
cast in his favour which has been rejected; but if by his
failure to make recrimination within time as required by s.
97 the returned candidate is precluded from raising any such
plea at the hearing of the election petition, there would be
nothing wrong if the Tribunal proceeds to deal with the dispute under s. 10!(a) on the basis that the other votes counted
by the returning officer were valid votes and that votes in
favour of the returned candidate, if any, which were rejected.
68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64]
1963
w.ere invalid. What we have said about the presumed valiJabar Singh
dity of the votes in dealing with a petition under s. 10 !(a) is
equally true in dealing with the matter under s. l()()(l)(d)(iii• .
Ge111Ja Lal
We are, therefore, satisfied that even in cases to which s 97
Ga1endragadkar J. applies, the enquiry necessary while dealing with the dispute
under s. lOl(a) will not be wider if the returned candidate
has failed to recriminate.
••
If the returned candidate has recriminated and has raised
pleas in regard to the votes cast in favour of the alternative
candidate or his votes wrongly rejected, then those plea' may
have to be tried after· a declaration has been made under s.
100 and the matter proceeds to be tried under s. lOl(a). ln
other words, the first part of the enquiry in regard to the
validity of the election of the returned candidate must be
tried within the narrow limits prescribed by s. l()l)(J)(d)(iiil
and the latter part of the enquiry which is governed by s.
101 (a) will have to be tried on a broader basis permitting the
returnea candidate to lead evidence in support of the pleas
which he may have taken by way of recrimination under s.
97 ( 1). If Mr. Kapoor's construction of s. l 00 ( 1) ( d) (iii) is
accepted, it would either make s. 97 otiose and ineffective
or make the operation of s. I 01 read with s. 97 inconsistent
with the operation of s. IOO(l)(d)(iii). We are therefore
satisfied that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the Tribunal was in error in holding that "it was
an authority charged with the duty of investigating the validity of votes for and against the petitioning and returned
candidate or for a matter of that any other contesting
candidate."
It, however, appears that following its own earlier decision in lnayatul/ah Khan's(') case the High Court
was disposed to take the view that the enquiry under s.
JOl(a) was wider and that in making its finding under the
said provision, it was open to the Tribunal to scrutinise the
votes and determine whether in fact, the petitioner or some
other person had received a majority of the valid votes. As
we have already indicated, this would be the position only if
the returned candidate had recriminated; in the absence of
recrimination, it would not be open to the Election Tribunal
(1) 15 E.L.R. 219.
•
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6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6g
1963
to allow the returned candidate to challenge the validity of
votes cast in favour of the petitioner or any other candidate
Jabar Srng!1
v.
in whose favour a declaration is claimed by the election petiGendc. lc.l
tion or to contend that any of his votes were improperly
rejected. We ought to add that the view taken by the Gaj<11dragad~ar I.
Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Inayatul/ah
Khan(1) in regard to the scope of the enquiry under s. 101
(a) does not correctly represent the true legal position in that
behalf. Similarly, the view taken by the Allahabad High
Court in Lakshmi Shankar Yadm· v. l(;.inwar Sripa/ Singh
and Ors. ( 2 ). cannot be said to interpret correctly the scope of
the enquiry either under s. 100 or s. 101. The conclmion
which we han! reached in the present appeal is substantially
in accord with the observations made by this Ct•urt in the
case of Bhim Sen(") though it appears that the points
in question were not elaborately argued before the Court in
that case.
There i;, another point to which reference must be made.
Mr. Garg contended that even if the view taken by the Tribunal about the scope of the enquiry under s. 100(1) (d)(iii)
and s. 101 was righit, the relief granted by it was not justified
by the pleadings of the appellant in the present proce~dings.
In support of this argument, he referred us to paragraph 4
of the Specfal Pleas filed by the appellant, and relied on
the fact that at the initial stage of the hearing, the Tribunal
had framed 18 issues including issue No. 16 which consisted
of three parts. viz.,(a) Whether any votes cast in favour of respondent
No. 1 were wrongly rejected specially pertaining to polling station mentioned in para 4 of the
written statement under heading special pleas?
(b) Whether many votes were wrongly accepted in
favour of the petitioner appertaining to the polling stations mentioned in para 4 of the special
pleas in written .statement?
(c) What is the effect of the above in the case?
(1) 15 B.L.R. 219.
' ll.L.R. 288,
(2) 22 E.L.R. 47.
70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
196J
Later on, when the respondent contended that in the absence
of any recrimination by the appellant these issues did not arise
Jaw Sillfh
v.
on
the pleadings, they were struck out, and yet in its judgGCll4 Lal
ment, the Tribunal has virtually tried these issues and given
.. Ga}lndrllgodka. J. relief on grounds which were not included even in his written statement. Since this appeal was admitted mainly on the
ground that the appellant wanted this Court to reconsider the
observations made by it in the case of Bhim Sen (1),
we do not propose to rest our decision on this subsidiary point
raised by Mt. Garg.
It now remains to refer to two decisions which were cited
before us during the course of the arguments. In Vashist
Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and Ors.('), this Court has
held that s. 1OO(l)(c), as it then stood, places a burden on the
objector to substantiate the objection that the result of the
election ·has been materially affected by the improper acceptance 'or rejection of the nomination paper. In. that connection,' this Court observed that where the margin of votes is
, greater than the votes secured by the candidate whose nomination paper had been improperly accepted, the result is not
only materially not affected but not affected at all: but where
it is not possiJle to anticipate the result, the petitioner must
discharge the burden of proving that fact and on his failure
to do so, the election must be allowed to stand.
In Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmed lshaque and
others( 3 ), adverting to the expression "the result of the election" in s. 100(1)(c), this Court stated that unless there. is
something in the context compelling a different interpretation,
the said expression must be construed in the same sense as
in section 66, and there it clearly means the result on the
basis of the valid votes. Basing himself on this observation,
Mr. Kapoor has urged that while the Tribunal decides the
question as to whether the election of the returned candidate
has been materially affected or not, the validity of the votes
falls to be considered, and that inevitably enlarges the scope
of the enquiry. We do not think that the observation on
which Mr. Kapoor relies was intended to lay down any such
proposition. All that the reference to s. 66 denotes is that
.
-- --(I) 22 E.L.R. 288.
(3) rr?5S] I S.C.R. rro4 at p n31.
(2) [r9SS) I S.C.R. 509.
-·
6 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
71
1963
.after considering the pleas raised, the Tribunal has to decide
whether the election of the returned candidate has been
labor Singh
materially affected or not, and that only means that if any
Gtnda Lal
votes are shown to have been improperly accepted, or any
votes are shown to have been improperly refused or rejected, Gajtndragadkar I.
the Tribunal has to make calculations on the basis of its
decisions on those points and nothing more. It is necessary
to recall that the votes which have not be<\n rejected by the
·returning officer under r· 56 have to be treated as valid, unless the contrary is specifically pleaded and proved. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Kapoor is justified in contend·
.ing that the observations ip Bari Vishnu Kamath's case
support his plea that the enquiry under s. 100(1 )(d)(iii) is
wide enough to take in <he scrutiny of the validity of all voting papers.
.,,
In Keshav La~man Borkar v. Dr. Devrao Laxman
Anande(') this Court has pointed out that the expression
"valid votes" has nowhere been defined in the Act, but in
the light of the provision of s. 36 CS) of the Act read with rule
58, two things are clear, first that the candidates are validly
nominated candidates whose nomination papers are accepted
by the returning officer after scrutiny, and second that the
provision of s. 58 provides that the ballot papers which are
not rejected under r. 57 are deemed to be "valid ballot
papers" and are to be counted as such.
It appears that the position under the English Law· in
regard to the recounting of votes in proceedings under election petitions is substantially similar. As Halsbury points
out: "where a petitioner claims the seat for an unsuccessful
c:andidate, alleging that he had a majority of lawful votes,
dther party must, six days before that appointed for the trial,
deliver to the master, and also at the address, if any, given
by the other side, a list of the votes intended to be objected
to and of the heads of the objection to each of thosll
votes(')". It further appears !hat no evidence may be !!iven
against the validity of any vote or under any head not specified in the list, unless by leave of the Court upon such terws
(I) [1960] I S.C.R. 902.
(2) Ha/sbury's Laws of England, p. 306 paras. 553 & 554·
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
as to amendment of the list, postponement of the enquiry, and
Jabar ~"''"
payment of costs as may be ordered. Where no list of the
Loi
votes, to which it is intended to take objection, has been de0
e~
livered within the time specified, the Court has no power to
Ga/endragadkar l. extend the time or to allow evidence of the votes objec!ed
to or of the objections thereto to be given at the trial. Therefore, it seems clear that in holding an enquiry either under
s. IOO(l)(d)(iii) or under s. 10 I, where s. 97 has not been
complied with, it is not competent to the Tribunal to order
a general recount of the votes preceded by a scrutiny about
their validity.
196J
J·
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. We would
like to add that though we have accepted the construction of
s. IOO(J)(d)(iii) ands. IOI for which Mr. Garg contended, no
relief can be granted to the respondent, because his application for speciPl leave to appeal against the decision of the
High Cot•rt has been dismissed since he was unable to make
out a sufticient cause for condoning the delay made by him in
preferring the said application. In the circumstances of this
case. we direct that the parties should bear their own costs.
We ought to mention that when this appeal was arguerl
before us on the 4th December, 1963, we were told that the
fresh election which had been ordered to be held in accordance with the decision of the High Court was fixed for the
6th December, 1963; and so, after the case was argued, we
arinounced our decision and intimated to the learned Advocates that our reasons will follow. The present judgment
gives the reasons for our decision.
.Ayyangar J,
AYYANGAR J.-While I agree that the appeal deserves
to be dismissed for reasons which I shall indicate later, I
regret my inability to agree with the construction which
my learned brethren have placed on s. 100(1) (d) (iii) of
the Representation of the People Act which for shortness
I shall call the Act. on which in ultimate analysis the
question of law arising in the appeal turns.
The facts of the case which have given rise to the
proceeding as well as the points involved in the appeal
have all been set <mt· in detail in the judgment of
Gajendragadkar J. and I consider it unnecessary to repeat
..
ti S.C.R.
•
I
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
them. I shall accordingly state only those facts which are
relevant for the purpose of: ( l) the construction of
s. lOO(l)(d) of the Act, and (2) the conclusion I have
reached that the appeal should be dismissed.
The appeal arises out of a contested election to the
Morena Constituency of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative
Assembly. The polling for the election took place on
February 21, 1962 and there were as many as seven
candidates who participated in that poll. The appeal is,
however, concerned only with two of them--Genda Lal
and Jabar Singh-the latter being the returned candidate
and is the appellant before us. The voting procedure
adopted was that set out in rule 39, Conduct of Election
Rules, 1961, which I shall hereafter refer to as the Rules,
under which the voter makes a mark on the ballot paper
on or near the symbol of the contesting candidate to
indicate his choice. On the first count of the ballot papers
the Returning Officer computed the valid votes obtained
by Genda Lal as 5,703 as against 5,671 which had been
counted in favour of Jabar Singh. Jabar Singh, however.
immediately applied for a recount under rule 63 of the
Rules on the ground that the original scrutiny and
i:ounting were defective and this, though opposed, was
acceded to by the Returning Officer who carried out a
recount. I might mention in passing that the Election
Tribunal has found discrepancies even in the total of the
number of ballot papers in some of the polling stations,
the figures of the total number of valid votes in 6 polling
stations being different from those found in the result sheet
prepared under rule 57(2) in Form 20. The scrutiny and
recount disclosed that Genda Lal was found to have polled
5,654 votes as against 5,656 votes counted as having been
obtained by Jabar Singh. As a result of this recount
J abar Singh was declared elected, he having obtained
2 votes more than his rival---Genda Lal.
Genda Lal thereupon filed the election petition which
has given rise to this appeal in which he sought to have
the election of J abar Singh declared void and also made
a claim to the seat. The election was sought to be set aside
on various grounds but we are concerned in this appeal
1961
Jabar Smglt
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar /.
74
1963
.Jabar Si11gh
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
solely with one of the them viz., the correctness of the scrutiny
and counting of votes at the recount vis-a-vis the petitioner
and the returned candidate. Shortly stated, the allegation
in this respect in the election petition was that 49 valid
votes cast in favour of the petitioner (who is the
respondent before us) were improperly rejected and that
32 votes were improperly accepted in favour of the
returned candidate who is the appellant before us. Needless
to add these allegations were denied by the returned
candidate. Besides the denial, he also pleaded in his written
stat~ment that many votes cast in favour of himself had
been wrongly rejected in regard to which details were given
and that similarly several votes were wrongly accepted in
favour of the election-petitioner and in regard to which also
details were given and it ended with the prayer that if a
proper scrutiny and recount were made of the valid votes
received by each, it would be found that he-the returned
candidate-had, in fact, obtained a larger number of votes
than the election-petitioner and for this reason he submitted
that the election petition ought to be dismissed. Though
Genda Lal had by his election petition, besides seeking the
relief of having the appellant's election declared . void,
claimed the seat for himself under s. 84 of the Act, none of
the respondents to the petition including the appellant had
filed any recrimination in conformity with the provisions of
s. 97 of the Act against the grant of such further relief and
it is the effect of this failure on the rights of the parties that
forms the principal point for consideration in the appeal.
The Election Tribunal who inquired into the petition
framed the necessary issues arising out of these pleadings.
Issue 6(a) dealt with the allegation •in the petition that 49
valid votes cast in favour of Genda Lal had been improperly
rejected. After examining the evidence adduced and
considering the validity of those votes in regard to which
a dispute was raised, the Election Tribunal recorded the
finding that not 49 but only 10 votes of Genda Lal had been
improperly rejected. In regard to the question of the
improper acceptance of 32 votes cast in favour of Jabar
Singh which was covered by issue 6(b), the Tribunal found,
again after going through the evidence in respect of the
particular votes in dispute, that not 32 but only 4 had been
•
...
I
•
fi S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
75
improperly accepted. The result of these findings on issues
6(a) and 6(b) was that the total number of valid votes
polled by Genda Lal became 5,664 as against 5,652 polled
by Jabar Singh. The Tribunal consequently held that the
election of J abar Singh who had obtained a minority of
votes compared to Genda Lal must be declared void under
s. IOO(l)(d)(iii).
•
..
t
So far we are on non-controversial ground except this
that on this state of the voting Genda Lal claimed that he
was entitled to the further relief that he be declared elected
having obtained the majority of lawful votes satisfying the
requirement of s. 101 (a). The Election Tribunal refused
him that relief for reasons which it is unnecessary to set out
or discuss and that decision having been affirmed by the
High Court in appeal and the special leave prayed for to
appeal from that decision of the High Court having been
dismissed by us, the possibility of the disallowance of this
additional relief does not require to be further noticed.
The question about the scope of s. 100 ( 1)( d) (iii)
and its relative place in the scheme of ss. 97, 100 and 10 I
of the Act arises out of the plea made by Jabar Singh that
without reference to the irregularities in the counting of
the 49 and the 32 votes alleged by Genda Lal and which
he had denied, and which were the subject-matter of issues
6(a) and 6(b) to which I have already adverted, there
were other irregularities in 'the scrutiny and counting
which, if examined, would establish that after every error
was eliminated, he himself had obtained a ·majority of
lawful votes. The question of law that was debated before
us was whether on the scheme of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, Jabar Singh was entitled to make such
a plea and claim to adduce proof in support thereof in
order to sustain his election without filing a recrimination
under s. 97 of the Act. My learned brethren have held
that l!e could not and it is on that point that I do not find
it possible to agree with them.
;
The correct answer to this question would depend. it
is common ground, on a proper construction of
s. lOO(l)(d)(iii) read in conjunction withs. lOl(a), and
1963
Jabar Smgh
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Jabar Singli
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar J.
this I shall first consider. I shall next deal with the place
and function of s. 97 in tliis context and its bearing on the
interpretation of the provisions on which the decision of
this appeal turns.
Though there have b' en a few decisions bearing upon
the question of law I have indicated, and they have all
been referred to by Gajcndragadkar J. it is common
ground that there is no binding decision of this Court
touching the matter, though some observations in Bhim Sen
v. Gopali and Ors:(1) would appear to favour the
construction which m f learned brethren hav~ adoptd.
As, however, the appeal was placed before this Bench for
the consideration of this question and we have proceed~d
on the basis that the matter is res integra I do not propose
.to refer to any of these decisions but shall proceed merely
to interpret the provisions without advertencc to the
authorities to which our attention was invited during the
course of the arguments.
I
Section 100(1) (d) reads:
"100. Grounds for declaring elcc1io11 to be \'oid-( I)
Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if
the Tribunal is of opinion-
•
........................................
( d) that the result of the election, in so far · as it
concerns a returned candida!e, has been
materially affected(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination,
or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the
interests of the returned candidate by an agent
other than his election agent. or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote or the reception of any vote which
is void, or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules
or orders made under this Act, the Tribunal
(1) 22 E.L.R. 288.
'
6 S.C.R.
•
I
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void."
The short question arising for consideration in this
appeal may be stated thus: In the context of the provisions
contained in s. 1()()(1 )(d) which permits an election of a
returned candidate to be set aside only on proof of the
"result" viz .. ·the election of the returned candidate having
been "materfally affected" by the improprieties or illegalities
referred to in the four clauses numbered (i) to (iv) what
is the import of the words "by the improper reception,
refusal or,' rejection of any vote or the reception of any vole
which is void". For our present purposes I might omit the
reference to the latter part of this provision relating to "the
reception of a vote which is void" and concentrate on the
earlier part.,
It is manifest that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to
declare an election void arises only when it is of opinion
that "the result of the election has been materially affected"
by the defects or improprieties set out in els. ( i) to (iv),
so that if notwithstanding that impropriety or illegality of
the ty!ICs set out in the four clauses, the result of the election
is not )materially affected, the returned candidate is entitled
to retain his seat. With this preliminary observation I shall
proceed to consider the import of the relevant words
"materially affected by the improper reception, refusal or
rejection of any vote" first in a case where there is no
complication arising from the petition claiming the seat in
addition to the relief of having the election of the returned
candidate declared void. The argument strenuously pressed
before us by Mr. Garg-learned counsel for the respondent
was, that the Tribunal in considering whether the result of
an election had been materially affected, was confined to the
consideration of any impropriety alleged as regards the
reception of the votes of the returned candidate as well as
improprieties alleged by the petitioner in the refusal or
rejection of votes stated to have been cast in favour of the
petitioner and the denials of these charges or allegations by
the returned candidate. His further submission was that the
returned candidate could not sustain his seat by showing
a similar improper reception of votes in favour of the
196J
Jabar Singn
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COL' RT REPORTS
1963
Jab(lr Singh
v.
Genda Loi
tlyyangt>T J.
peiitioner or an improper refusal or rejection of his O\I n
votes. In other words, the argument was that the Tribunal
dealing with a petition under s. 100(l)(d) had jurisdiction
to proceed only on the allegations made in the petition and
that even where a case had been established for a scrutiny,
and a recount is ordered, it would be so confined and that
its jurisdiction would not extend to cases of complaints by
the returned candidate. It is this argument that I feel unable
to accept.
When an election petition is filed complaining of the
improper reception or rejection of votes and praying for a
scrutiny of the ballot papers for the purpose of determining
whether the votes have been properly counted by the
Returning Officer, the Tribunal would doubtless have to
be satisfied that a case is made out for scrutiny and a recount, for it is settled law that the petitioner is not as a
matter of right entitled to have such a scrutiny and recount
merely because he prays for such a relief, but has to allege,
make out and prove the specific grounds to establish that
the scrutiny or counting was improper and that the return
was in consequence erroneous. If one reaches that stage
and the Tribunal is satisfied that a case for scrutiny and recount is made out it would mean that the Returning Officer
had not discharged his duties properly in the matter of the
scrutiny of the ballot papers and their counting. If in such
circumstances the respondent (the returned candidate) also
makes allegations of the same type regarding the scrutiny
and the counting I consider it would be unjust to deprive
him of the opportunity of proving his allegations and thus
maintain his seat, unless of course, the statutory provision
clearly precludes him from doing so. In saying this I am
not suggesting that the respondent need make no averment
in his pleadings making definite allegations regarding the
particular votes regarding which he desires scrutiny and
which he says have been wrongly counted either for or
against him. Let us take a case where the allegation of
the petitioner is that there has been a miscount i.e., a
wrong counting of the votes of the returned candidate and
nothing more. Let us suppose that A has been declared
elected as having secured, say 200 votes as against B who
has secured 190. If B in his election petition says that
•
I
6 S.C.R.
•
,_
!'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79
A's votes have lxen wrongly counted as 200, whereas, in
fact, if they were :ecounted they would only be 180 and the
Tribunal on a recount finds. the allegation in the petition
made out and th:;t the returned candidate had obtained only
180 votes the a~ceptance of Mr. Garg's argument would
mean that the ekction of A would have to be set aside notwithstanding thut there has been a similar mistake in the
counting of B's votes and if these were properly counted
they might not amount to more than 170. · Mr. Garg submitted that tho ugh if B claimed the seat there would have
to be a recouii ( of the votes of both the candidates and this
also, only in t ne event of a recrimination being filed under
s. 97' still if no seat was claimed the election of the returned
candidate would be set aside and that the latter had no
means whereby he could maintain his election notwithstanding that as a fact he had obtained a majority of lawful
votes.
It is urged that this result flowed from the opening
words of s. 100 (1 )( d) which speaks of "the result of the
election" being materially affected "so far as it concerns a
returned candidate". I do not find it possible to agree with
the construction or reasoning on which the submission is
based. There is, no doubt, that an election petition is
primarily concerned with the validity of the election of the
returned candidate. It cannot also be disputed that the
election of the returned candidate cannot be declared void,
unless, confining oneself to the impropriety or illegality
involved in the reception or refusal of votes, the returned
candidate is proved to have obtained a minority of votes,
for otherwise whatever be the impropriety or its degree or
extensiveness, the result of the election would not be
materially affected. It is common ground and beyond controversy that the election petitioner is not restricted as
regards the manner or details of the improper reception or
refusal of votes which he could allege and prove which
would achieve that result. If so much is conceded and is
common ground, I do not see any force in the contention
that the returned candidate is confined merely to disproving
what is alleged to dislodge him from his seat and is forbidden from proving that votes which under the law had to
1963
Jabar Singh
v.
Genda Lal
4.yyangar ]'.
8o
1963
Jabar Singh
v.
(/enda Lal
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
be counted in his favour, have been wrongly omitted to be
so counted. The words in cl. (iii) do not impose any such
restriction, for they speak of the "improper reception or
refusal of any vote'', and as the inquiry under s. I OO(l)(d)
is for ascertaining whether the res\llt of the election has been
materially affected which in the context of cl. (iii) obviously
means "the returned candidate has been proved not to have
obtained, in fact, a majority of valid votes", there appears
to me no scope for the argument pressed before us by
Mr. Garg.
On an analysis of the situation the position would
appear to be this. Let us for instance assume that the
voting procedure adopted in an election was that prescribed
in rule 59 i.e., by placing the ballot papers in the ballot
boxes set apart for the different contesting candidates. The
returning officer counts the valid votes cast in the several
boxes and declares A elected as having secured 200 votes as
against B whose votes are counted as 198. If B files a
petition and alleges that the counting was irregular, that
the totals of the ballot papers in the result sheet are not
properly computed, and that as a matter of fact A's papers.
if counted, would be 196, Mr. Garg's submission is that
though the discrepancy disclosed in the totals is considerable, A cannot prove that there has been a miscounting of
B's votes also, and that though if properly counted his
total is only 190, still A's election should be set aside. It
is said that the position would be different and the anomaly
would be overcome in cases where the election petitioner.
besides claiming a declaration that the election of the returned cadidate is void, also seeks a further declaration that
he should be declared duly elected and the returned candidate files a recrimination against such a prayer and
challenges the right to have the further declaration. This,
however, obviously furnishes no answer for more than
one reason. It is the submission of Mr. Garg, and that is
the whole basis upon which the construction which he desires us to adopt of s. 100 ( I )( d )(iii) turns, that the question raised by the recrimination arises only after the election
of the returned candidate is declared void. Therefore we
would have the anomalous situation wherein the election
of the returned candiate is declared void by reason of his
•
,,
6 S.C.R.
•
'-
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81
not obtaining the majority of valid votes so far as the decision under s. 100(l)(d) is concerned and then after the matter
set out in the claim to the seat and the recrimination is inquired into and decided the election tribunal holds that the
returned candidate had a majority of lawful votes but that
this affected only the right of the defeated candidate to
claim the seat. In my judgment the provisions of s. I 00 read
with s. 101 do not contemplate this position of a
candidate's election being set aside because he did not get
a majority of lawful votes but in the same proceedings and
as part of the same inquiry he being held to have obtained
a majority of lawful votes. A construction of s. 100(1 )(d)
which would lead to this result must, in my opinion, be
rejected as unsound.
The apart, there is the further circumstance arising from
the fact that according to Mr. Garg the enquiry in respect
of a recrimination and its defence is identical with what he
says is the scope of a petition and its defence. This, of
course, is logical, but it suffers from the same anomaly
which I have pointed out as resulting from the acceptance
of the primary argument regarding the construction of
s. lOO(l)(d)(iii). Applying what I have shown already
regarding a case where there was no claim to a seat in an
election petition in which the election of a returned candidate has to be declared void, notwithstanding that he had,
in fact, obtained a majority of valid votes, because he is
precluded from proving this fact, similarly in cases where
a seat is claimed, the petitioner so claiming would have to
be declared elected, notwithstanding that as a fact he has
not obtained the majority of lawful votes, but that the returned candidate has obtained such a majority, because
the latter is precluded from proving it. If one took a case
where there were more candidates than two, the anomaly
I have indicated would be seen clearly. If B files a petition against A the returned candidate claiming the seat and
impleads as he must C & D who are the other contestants,
no proof could be led by A to show that some of his own
votes have been counted for C or D, though B would be
entitled to prove that some of C's or D's votes have been
wrongly counted as cast in favour of A. In such a case
134-159 S.C.-6.
1963
Jabar Sing/I
v.
Genda Lal
A.yyangar J.
82
1963
lobar Singh
...
Gerula Lal
.A.11angar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64J
it is obvious that B gains no advantage by recriminating,
because recrimination under s. 97 could only be against
A and not against the other contesting candidates impleaded
as respondents. The result, therefore, would be that though,
in fact, A has obtained the majority of lawful votes, B,
the petitioner, will be declared elected-recrimination or
no recrimination. I cannot accept the position that either
s. lOO(l)(d)(iii) or s. lOl(a) contemplate this result
which is at once so unjust and anomalous and appears te>
me to contradict the basic principles underlying election
law viz., ( 1) that apart from disqualification, corrupt
practices etc., the election of a candidate .who obtains the
majority of valid votes shall not be set aside. and ( 2) no
candidates shall be declared duly elected who has not
obtained the majority of valid votes.
I would add that the entire argument proceeds on a misconception of the procedure involved in a scrutiny. I
will take the case where the voting takes place, as in the
case of the election before us, in accordance with the provisions of rule 39. Then conformably to Rule 57{3) all
the ballot papers which have been held to be valid in each
polling station are bundled up and sealed by the Returning
Officer, and similarly all the rejected ones of each station
are made into another bundle. At the scrutiny by the
Tribunal these two sets of bundles are examined to find out
whether the votes cast in favour of each of the contesting
candidates have been properly counted or not. How this
can be done compartmentally, as those cast for A or B or
C separately as is suggested by Mr. Garg, I am unable to
follow. If the votes cast in favour of each candidate were
made into separate bundles, then at least. there might be
scope for an argument that the bundle of A or B shall not
be opened up, but when all the voting papers have to be
scrutinised in order to find out (a) whether the returned
candidate has really been proved to have received a minority of valid votes and (b) whether the candidate claiming
the seat has obtained a majority of valid votes, this cannot
obviously be done without an examination of the ballot
papers to which objection is taken and which are contained
in the two types of bundles into which these are made up
under rule 57(3).
•
•
6 S.C.R.
'.
;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
1963
Support was sought by Mr. Garg for the construction
that he sought to press upon us by reference to the provi- Jabar Singh
v.
sions in the other sub-clauses of s. 100( 1 )( d). His point
. Genda Lal
was that if the returned candidate could not put forward
the objections contained in those clauses the returned Ayyangar J.
candidate could not likewise allege improprieties in the reception of the votes of any other candidate including the
petitioner.
I am wholly unimpressed by this argument
which does not take into account both the nature of the
objections in these other clauses as well as their bearing on
the question whether the election of the returned candidate
has been materially affected, which is the prime questior
for consideration in the provision and which furnishes tht
key to the interpretation of the sub-clause now under consideration. Let me take each of the cases provided by the
other sub-clauses. Sub-cl. (i) deals with the improper acceptance of a nomination. It is obvious that allegations
and proof by ihe returned candidate regarding the improper
acceptance of a nomination cannot serve to sustain his
election. A fortiori so, clause (ii) which reads
"(ii)
by any corrupt practice committed in the
interests of the returned candidate by an agent
other than his election agent, or"
could have no meaning in the present context nor cl. (iv)
unless the non-compliance has a bearing on the reception
of votes in which case it would be wholly covered by cl.
(iii). In the case of els. (i), (ii) and (iv\ it is obvious,
having regard to the very nature of the provisions, that the
returned candidate can do no more than prove (a) that
there was no such impropriety or illegality as is alleged, and
(b) that even if there was, the same bad not affected the
result of his election; in other words, that the impropriety
or illegality, if any, was inconsequential so far as bis election
was concerned. But this would not be the position in regard to the improper reception or rejection of votes. There
we have two factors: (1 ) the impropriety of the reception
or rejection, and (2) whether as a result of such improper
reception or rejection the result was materially affected.
In the case contemplated by cl. (iii) the question whether
the result was materially affected or not could not, when
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
labar Singh
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar /.
the facts are ascertained, be a matter of doubt or dispute
but would be one merely of arithmetical calculation and
comparison. No doubt, s. 100 of the Act casts on the
election petitioner the onus of establishing to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that "the result of the election
was
materiitlly affected" by the impropriety etc., and taking the
case of cl. (iii) in hand, of improper reception or rejection
of particular votes, but from this it does not follow that the
returned candidate is powerless to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that notwithstanding the improper reception or rejection of the particular votes alleged by the petitioner his election has not been materially affected. The argument of Mr. Garg, if accepted, would mean that the returned
candidate can merely comhat the case alleged against him
and is disabled from establishing positively that the result
of the election has not been materially affected. If the key
words of the provision on the fulfilment of which alone the
Tribunal is invested with jurisdiction to set aside an election
are taken to be the words "The result of the election has
been materially affected." I do not consider that it is possible
to contend that it is beyond the power of the returned candidate to establish this fact which he might do in any manner
he lilfes. He might do this by establishing that though a
few votes were wrongly counted as in his favour, still a larger
number of his own votes were counted in favour of the
petitioner or that votes which ought to have been counted
as cast for him, have been improperly counted as cast in
favour of defeated candidates other than the petitioner.
Without such a scrutiny it would manifestly not be possible
to determine whether the election of the returned candidate has been materially affected or not. Nor do I see
anything in the language of cl. (iii) which precludes
the returned candidate from establishing this. This clause
employs the words "improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote", to confine oneself to its first part. No doubt,
when a petitioner complains of a rejection, he obviously
means an improper rejection of votes in his own favour and
when he speaks of an improper reception he means also
obviously an improper reception of votes in favour of the
returned candidate. But from this it does not follow that
there might not be an improper reception of votes in favour
.'
.
...
6 S.C.R.
..
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85
of the election petitioner or of another candidate or of an
improper rejection of votes of the returned candidate. As
the clause does not speak of the person in whose favour or
as against whom the improper reception or rejection has
taken place, its content and significance have to be ascertained from the purpose for which the provision is intended
viz., to determine from a counting of the voting papers
after a scrutiny whether the election of the returned candidate has been materially affected. For instance, let me
lake a case within s. IOO(l)(d)(i) where there has been
an improper acceptance of any nomination. The question
arises as to whether the election of the returned candidate
has been materially affected by that improper acceptance.
Obviously, a nomination which is alleged to have been improperly accepted and which is the subject of the charge
under s. lOO(l)(d)(i) is not the acceptance of the nomination either of the election petitioner where he has been
one of the candidates or of the returned candidate but only
of one of the other defeated candidates. If after inquiry
the nomination is found to have been improperly accepted
and the Tribunal proceeds to iqquire as to its effect on
the election, I take it, ii would necessarily have to consider
the votes received by that candidate. If this is not to be
done it would either mean that in every case of an improper
acceptance of a nomination the election is to be declared
void or that in no case can such a declaration be made.
Now, if the votes cast in favour of that candidate whose
nomination was improperly accepted have to be counted,
necessarily there has to be a scrutiny and the Tribunal would
have to inquire and ascertain the number of valid votes
cast for that candidate in order to determine whether the
improper reception of votes in favour of that candidate has
materially affected the result of the election i.e., has resulted
in the election of the returned candidate. In that context
the scrutiny of the improper reception of the votes in favour
of such candidate would obviously have to take place and
that could be done only by virtue of the provision in s· 100
(1 )( d) (iii). This would at least show that the expression of "any vote" in the clause has to be read as meaning
'any vote cast in the election with which the petition is
concerned' and not 'any vote cast in favour of the returned
1963 .
Jabar Sin1h
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar J.
86
1963
labar Singh
v.
1Genda Lal
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
candidate', to take the illustration merely of the improper
'
reception of a vote.
The construction which I have placed on s. 100(1 )(d)
(iii) would harmonise the provision contained in the opening words of s. lOO(l)(d) ands. lOl(a). I cannot reasonably conceive of the law providing (unless of course the
language employed leaves me no alternative) for the setting
aside of an election of the returned candidate because the
Tribunal finds that he did not receive the highest number of
valid votes cast at the election; but that after this stage is
over and the Tribunal proceeds to consider whether the claim
to the seat is made out or not its reaching the finding that
such a petitioner is not entitled to that relief because on
further scrutiny, the returned candidate had, in fact, secured the highest number of votes. Mr. Garg, no doubt, contemplated this anomaly with equanimity suggesting that it
was due not to any anomaly at all but a situation arising
merely from the application of different tests or being the
result of inquiries directed to different ends at different
stages of the petition. It is this that I am unable to reconcile myself to. The language used in s: 101 (a) is, no
doubt, "in fact received the majority of the valid votes".
I do not, however, consider that the use of the words 'in
fact' involves scrutiny of a type different from that which the
Tribunal conducts for ascertaining whether by reason of
the improper reception or rejection of votes the election of
a returned candidate has been materially affected so as to
justify its being set aside. The inquiries are identical. If
every vote which has been improperly received is eliminated
and every vote which has been improperly refused or
rejected is added you get the totality of the valid votes cast
in favour of a candidate. That is precisely the inquiry
wnich is prescribed to be conducted under s. IOO(J)(d) read
with cl. (iii). The words 'in fact' used in s. JOl(a) to my mind
do not add any new element as regards either the scrutiny
or the counting. If so, on the construction which I have
endeavoured to explain, when once it is ascertained that
the returned candidate has obtained a majority of valid
votes there is no question of his election having to be set
aside. But it might be shown that he had not obtained the
6 S.C.R.
>
,..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
majority of valid votes. In other words, by the scrutiny
that has taken place in order to test the validity of his election the Tribunal might have arrived at a conclusion that
he had not received the majority of valid votes. Immediately that stage is reached and that conclusion is arrived at
the Tribunal proceeds to declare the election void. If there
is no claim to a seat there is nothing more to be done, with
the result that it stops with declaring the election void in
which evcut there would be a re-election. If, however, the
seat is daimed by a defeated candidate or on his behalf
there has to be a further inquiry which the Tribunal is
called upon to conduct. For the purpose of declaring the
election void the Tribunal would have arrived at the figures
of the valid votes cast in favour of the several candidates.
It might be that the petitioner who made the claim to the
;Seat or the person on whose behalf that is made might not
have obtained the highest number of valid votes in which
case, of course, a .claim to the seat would be rejected. It
is this situation which is indicated by s. 101 (a). It provides
that there cami.ot be a ~eclaration in favour of the claimant
to a seat merely because the election of the returned candidate
has been declared void but he must in addition have secured
the majority of the lawful votes cast. A question might
arise_ as to how this total is to be ascertained. It is obvious
that for this purpose the Tribunal ought to scrutinise not
merely the ballot papers of the claimant and the returned
candidate but also of the other candidates. Thus, for
instance, taking the case only of the petitioner who is a
claimant, among the votes counted in his favour might be
some which were really votes cilst in favour of a defeated
candidate and similarly votes properly cast for him might
have been improperly counted as the votes of· the other
defeated candidates. Undoubtedly the irregularities would
have to be pleaded, but I am now concerned with whether
even if pleaded, the Tribunal would on a proper interpretation of ss. 100 and 101 have fiurisdiction to entertain the
pleas and embark on such a scrutiny. Proceeding then on
the footing that the necessary averments have been made in
the pleadings filed there would have to be a scrutiny of the
ballot papers before it can be ascertained whether or not the
person who or on whose behalf the seat is claimed has obtain-
1963
labor Singll
v.
Genda Lal
{lyyangar /.
88
1963
lobar Singh
v.
Genda Lal
.A.yyangar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ed a majority of valid votes in order to sustain the claim to
the seat. After this stage is passed and the Tribunal has reached the conclusion that the claimant has, in fact, received
the majority of valid votes that the Tribunal embarks on
the further inquiry as to whether there are any reasons why
he should not be declared elected. And it is at this stage
that the provisions of s. 97 in regard to recrimination come
into play. If no recrimination is filed then on the terms
of s. IO !(a) the claimant would be immediately declared
elected but if there is a recrimination then s. 10 l(b) is
attracted and the Tribunal would have to inquire whether
if the claimant were a returned candidate there are circumstances in which his election could be declared void. This
would indicate that the recrimination is concerned with a
stage which emerges after the scrutiny is completed and
assumes that the scrutiny has resulted in the claimant being
found to have obtained the majority of valid votes. This
construction would harmonise the provisions of ss. 97, 100 ( 1)
(d) and 101 and would lead to a rational result.
This brings me to a submission based upon rule 57 ( 1) to
which reference was made by Mr. Garg. He referred us to
the words of that rule reading:
"Every ballot paper which is not rejected under
Rule 56 shall be counted as one valid vote"
as throwing some light on the construction of s. 100(l)(d)
(iii) and as favouring the intrepretation which he invited us
to put upon the provision. I consider that the rule has no
bearing at all upon the pojnt now in controversy. Rule 57
occurs in Part V of the Rules beginning with rule 50 which
is headed 'Counting of votes in Parliamentary and Assembly
Constituencies.' Rule 55 prescribes the scrutiny at the time
of the opening of the ballot boxes and rule 5 6 with the scrutiny and rejection of ballot-papers. This last rule lays down
which shall be deemed to be a valid vote on a ballot paper and
which is not and directs the Returning Officer to follow these
directions and make the counting. And it is in that context
that we have rule 57 and the provision in sub-r. (1). It obviously means only that so far as the Returning Officer is
concerned and for the purpose of enabling him to declare the
result the ballot papers which are not rejected are to be
6 S.C.R.
'
,
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
deemed as valid. It is manifest that if that validity held good
even at the stage of the election petition and for the conduct
of the inquiry before the Tribunal, that could really be no
scrutiny of the ballot papers and s. 100(1) ( d)(iii) would
become meaningless. The meaning of rule 57 ( 1) is only this
that ballot papers not rejected shall be deemed to be valid so
far as the Returning Officer is concerned and even as regards
himself it is subject to the provision in rule 63 under which
a recount may be demanded and granted. His decision has, of
course, prima facie validity at the stage of the inquiry by the
Election Tribunal because the impropriety of his acceptance
or refusal has to be pleaded and proved by the party objecting
to this scrutiny and it is only if the Tribunal finds the impropriety established, that the vote would be differently treated
or counted. It appears to me to be clear therefore that rule
57 does not bear upon the construction of s. lOO(l)(d)(iii) or
of s. lOl(a) for which purpose reliance was placed upon it.
The next question that arises is the result of the construction which I have endeavoured to explain of the relevant
provisions of the Act and now I shall set out a few further
findings of the Election Tribunal which bear upon the point
next to be considered. The Election Tribunal found after
a scrutiny of the voting papers to which objection had been
made by the petitioner-Genda Lal-and on a recount that
it resulted in Genda Lal having ob_tained 5,664 votes as
against 5,652 obtained by the returned candidate-Jabar
Singh which meant that the election of Jabar Singh should
be declared void. The Tribunal then proceeded to investigate the allegations made by Jabar Singh as regards the improrer reception of votes in favour of Genda Lal and the
improper rejection of votes in his bwn favour and after considering the ballot papers of the several polling stations, it
arrived at the result that Genda Lal had been improperly
credited with 10 votes and that Jabar Singh had been improperly denied the benefit of 12 votes cast in his favour. If
this position could be sustained the result would be that
Genda Lal had obtained 5,654 votes as against 5,664 votes
polled by Jabar Singh which would mean that the election of
Jabar Singh could not be declared void, for "the result of
the election had not been materially affected." It was this
1961
Jabar Sin11t
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
that was strenuously urged before us by Mr. Kapoor-learned
counsel for the appellant Jabar Singh. Both the Tribujabar Singh
v.
nal as well as the High Court on appeal therefrom have held
Genda Lal
that because Jabar Singh had not recriminated this deduction
Ayyangar J.
of 10 votes in favour of Genda Lal and the addition of 12
votes in favour of Jabar Singh could not be made and consequently denied to the appellant the benefit of this finding. In
view of what I have stated earlier as to the proper construction of ss. (lOO)(I)(d)(iii) and 101 (a) the absence of recrimination could not lead to this resurt and if this finding could be
sustained I would have. allowed the appeal. But this finding of the Tribunal has proceeded partly without any pleading to support it. When an objection is taken to the improper reception or refusal of a vote the facts upon which such
impropriety has occurred have to be set out and the other
party has to be given an opportunity to meet the case.
Though there might be no express requirement of the Act or
any rule made thereunder, I consider that it is implicit in the
pleadings required to be filed under ss. 81 to 83 of the Act
read with the frame of s. 100 that a party who alleges an impropriety or error in the scrutiny by the Returning Officer,
and needless to add this would apply to every allegation of
impropriety or illegality by whosoever committed, must
specify with particularity the grounds of attack on the action
of the Returning' Officer in regard to the scrutiny of the ballot
paper or ithe counting. In the present case it is admitted that
though in his written statement, the appellant Jabar Singh
challenged the propriety of the reception of certain votes in
favour of Genda Lal and the improper rejection of some of
his own votes, he did not specify all of these in regard to
which impropriety has been found by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has, as I have already stated, found that 10 ballot
papers whose numbers have been specified ought not to have
been counted in favour of Genda Lal. But of these, it is now
admitted, that in regard to 6 of them no plea had been made
in the written statement, with the result that only 4 votes
could be taken into account as having been wrongly counted,
bearing in mind the pleading in the case. Similarly, as rngards
the rejection of Jabar Singh's votes the Tirbunal, as stated
eariler, has found that 12 votes ought to have been counted
in his favour. Of these, however, the written statement con-
...
'
fJ S.C.R.
'
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
tained allegations only as regards 6 and not as regards the
rest. This would mean that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to find that more than 6 votes had been improperly rejected
in his case. If the votes regarding which no plea of impropriety had been raised by Jabar Singh were eliminated, it
would follow that as a result of the final scrutiny Genda Lal
had obtained properly 5,660 valid votes as against 5,658 polled by Jabar Singh. The result of the election, therefote,
was materially affected by the improper reception or refusal
of votes and therefore I consider that the election of J abar
Singh was properly set aside and that is why I concur in
the order that the appeal should be dismissed.
1961
Jabar Singh
v.
Genda Lal
Ayyangar J.
Appeal dismissed.
SAIT NAGJEE PURUSHOTHAM AND CO.
1963
v.
December, 20
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS
(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Income Tax Act (II of 1922). s. 25(3) and (4)-Firm carrying on
business in 1918-Disintegration into two firms-If discontinuance of
•
business.
By s. 25(4) of the Income-tax Act, 'Where the person who was at
the commencement of the Indian
Income-tax
(Amendment) Act,
1939 .... carrying on any business, profession or vocatioa in which tax
was at any time charged under the provisions of the Indian Incometax Act, 1918, is succeeded in such capacity by another person, the change
not being merely a change in the constitution of a partnership, no tax
shall be payable by the first mentioned person in respect of the income,
profits and gains of the period between the end of the previous year
and the date of such succession."
A firm bearing the same name as the appellant firm, had been
carrying on business from before 1918 and had paid tax on that
business under the Income-tax Act, 1918. The firm did three kinds
of businesses, namely, (a) in piece-goods, yarn as general merchants,
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org