RAMNARAYAN MOR AND ANOTHER versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 December 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 1064 | 1963 INSC 257
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 December 1963
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 164/1963
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 1064
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 257
Text of the judgment
1064
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
1963
RAMNARAYAN MOR AND ANOTHER
December 16
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(B.P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
J.C. SHAH .AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 173(4) and
207A(6)-"Evidence", meaning of--lf includes documents under
s. 173(4).
'
On the receipt of a police report, the Magistrate First Class
Akola took cognizance of offences under ss. 406, 408, 409, 120B
and 477A Indian Penal Code against the appellants. The Investigating Officer furnished the accused persons with copies of documents which are required by s. 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be furnished. At the commencement of the enquiry
under Ch. XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Public
Prosecutor informed the Court that the evidence in the case being
"mainly documentary" the prosecution did not desire to examine
any witnesses at the stage of the committal proceeding. After
the arguments on behalf of the State and the accused were heard,
an application was submitted by. the Prosecutor that the accused
be examined by 'the Magistrate under s. 207-A(6) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
The application was granted by the Magistrate after rejecting
the objections raised by some of the accused and the accused were
ordered to remain present in court for examination under s. 207-A
sub-ss. (6) and (7). Against that order the appellants· moved the
High Court in rnvision but without success.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that in an enquiry
for commitment to the Court of Session the accused person can
be asked to explain circumstances appearing against him only
from the oral evidence recorded under s. 207-A(4), and not from
circumstances appearing from the documents furnished under
s. 173(4) of the Code.
Held (per B.P. Sinha, C.J. K. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah,
JJ.) (I) that the legislature has used the expression "evidence"
at three places in cl. (6) of s. 207A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the first clause of sub-s. (6) the evidence is, as the
statute expressly enacts "the evidence referred to in sub-s. (4)"
and the expression "that such evidence and documents disclose
no grounds for committing" indicates, having regard to the context
that the evidence referred to in sub-s. (4) alone is comprehended
thereby. But in the context of the explanation of the accused
for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances
appearing again:st him, the legislature has ·used the expression "in
the evidence against him", which is not expressly qualified by reference
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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to sub-s. (4) nor does any implication arise from the context
1963
which would suggest that it has a limited content.
(ii) The legislature did not intend by using the expression Ramnarayan
"examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain
Mor and
any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him" that the
another
opportunity to be given to the accused for explaining circumstances
v.
appearing from the oral evidence. Such a construction of the
State of
clause, by putting a restricted interpretation upon the meaning
of the word 'evidence' would in many cases involve great prejudice Maharashtra
to the accused. The circumstances appearing against the accused
would in a large majority of cases be from the statements recorded
under s. 161(3) under s. 164 and other documentary evidence referred to ins. 173(4) and if the accused is not to be given an opportunity to explain those circumstances, to a large extent the judicial
character of the proceeding would be impaired. The accused
may have a complete answer to the documents on which the prosecution seeks to rely. But if by the words used in cl. (6) the Magistrate
is prohibited from examining him in respect of those documents
the provision might frequently operate oppressively against the
accused. The scheme of s. 251A of the Code which was brought
on the statute book simultaneously with s. 207-A by Act 26 of
1955, also furnishes an indication that in the examination of the
accused for enabling him to explain circumstances appearing in
the evidence against him, documents referred to in s. 173(4) cannot
be excluded.
(iii) Section 207A(6) contemplates examination only for the
purpose of explaining any circumstances appearing against the
accused. Declining to avail himself of such an opportunity and
reserving his right to make a defence at the trial do not amount
to refusal to answer a question and no presumption can arise
under illustration (h) to s. 114 of the Evidence Act against such
refusal.
The scheme of cl. (6) of s. 207 A is not the same as the scheme
of s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the reason that
under the latter section the court can ask the accused any general
question to explain any circumstances appearing against
him.
(iv) Normally in a criminal trial, the court can proceed on
documents which are duly proved, or by the rules of evidence
made admissible without formal proof. but under the amended
Code the Legislature has in s. 207-A prescribed a special procedure
in proceedings for commitment of the accused. The record consists of the oral evidence recorded under sub-s. (4) of s. 173. and
it would be difficult to regard only those documents which arc
duly proved or which are admissible without proof as "evidence"
within the meaning of cl. (6) and not the rest. Section 3 of the
Evidence Act also supports that proposition. The expression
"evidence" as defined ins. 3 of the Evidence Act means and includes
all statements which the court. permits or requires to be made
1066
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
before it by witnesses and all documents produced for the
inspection of the Court. There is no restriction in this definition
Ramnarayan to documents whic:h are duly proved by evidence.
Morand
(Per Ayyangar and Hidayatullah JJ. (dissenting): The word
'evidence' in sub-s. (6) of s. 207 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
another
is confined to the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The
v.
word 'evidence' occurs three times in this sub-section. In the
State of
opening words of the sub-section where it occurs first referring,
Maharashtra as they do, specifically to the evidence recorded under sub-s. (4)
the word is obviously used only in the sense of oral evidence recorded under sub-s. (4) together with the cross-examination and
re-examination permitted by sub-s. (5). This is followed by the
words 'the Magistrate has considered all the documents referred
to in s. 173'. Documents therefore are treated here as a distinct
category of material distinct from "evidence" and the sub-section
proceeds on the e~:istence of a dichotomy between these two species
of material which the Magistrate has to take into account before
ordering committal. If this dichotomy and this distinction between
"evidence" and documents underlie the texture of the entire subsection, it could not be disputed that the word 'evidence' on the
second occasion when it occurs in sub-s.(6) has to be read as meaning only the evidence of witnesses exam:ined under sub-s. (4).
The last place where the word 'evidence' occurs in the sub-section
is the passage reading 'such Magistrate shall if he is of
opinion that such evidence and documents disclose no grounds for
comm:itting the accused persons for trial'. It is clear that here
the word 'documents' denotes the documents referred 10 earlier
namely those in s. 173 and these are again distinguished
from 'evidence'. Here also there cannot be any doubt that the
word 'evidence' is a reference to the evidence recorded under
sub-s. (4).
Sub-sections (4), (6) and (7) draw a clear and sharp distinction
between 'evidence' and 'the documents' referred to in s. 173 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
No importance should be attached to the absence of the word
'such' and the use instead of the word 'the' in the relevant clause. ·
The defin:ite article 'the' obviously in the context refers to the
'evidence' already referred to in the opening words of the subsection, namely that recorded under sub-s. (4).
Ramdas Kikabhai v. State of Bombay, A.l.R. 1960 Born.
124, not relied on.
Re Macmanaways, [1951) A.C. 161, referred to.
(ii) The Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to examine
an accused under s. 342(1) of the Code (a) either when no oral
evidence for prosecution has been recorded or (b) in respect of
matters about which there is no evidence adduced in the sense
in which the expression is used in the Indian Evidence Act for
enabling the court to hold any fact in issue or a relevant fact to
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be proved. The same principle applies as to the circumstances
1963
in which an accused can be examined by the Magistrate under
s. 207-A(6). Where there is no evidence recorded under sub-s. Ramnarayan
(4) of s. 207-A, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to examine an
Morand
accused under s. 207-A(6). In the present case the Magistrate
another
has no jurisdiction to direct the accused to appear before him for
v.
examination.
State of
Bachchan Lal v. State, A.LR. 1957 All. 184 and Bahawala
Maharashtra
v. Crown, l.L.R. 6 Lah. 183, relied on.
(iii) The accused should be examined under s. 207A(6) with
reference to what appears against him in evidence legally admissible before the court, while he is not to be required to commit
himself by his answers in respect of matters which would be proved
against him only at the trial and as regards which he would be
examined later under s. 342(1) of the Code. Interpreted otherwise the section would give a good chance for fishing expedition
and of modulating the prosecution case to destroy the accused's
explanation at the appropriate stage. The accused cannot be
asked under sub-s. (6) with reference to documents mentioned
in s. 173(4) of the Code unless those are legally proved. If without
evidence, properly so called, a magistrate examines an accused, he
would be converting himself into an investigating agency and there
is therefore every possibility of the accused being prejudiced and
that might be the very reason why the sub-section has been framed
in a manner to avoid the result. The position is, of course different
under s. 251A(2) where the examination is by virtue of the statute
and so it stands in a class apart.
(iv) The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to ask question under
sub-s. (6) with the reference to documents mentioned in s. 173(4)
of the Code as they are not evidence under sub-s. (4) of s. 207-A
of the Code. The expression 'evidence' as defined in s. 3 of the
Evidence Act gives merely the dictionary meaning of the word
and it has no application for interpreting the word 'evidence' in
sub-s. (6). The expression 'evidence' is used throughout the criminal
procedure as meaning judicial evidence i.e. oral evidence tested
by cross-examination if any and documents which have been
proved and which are relevant and admissible. The expression
'documents produced for inspection of the court' under s. 3 of the
Evidence Act means merely "for inspection of the Court" and the
court cannot base its findings on the contents of such documents.
(v) The court will be entitled under illustration (h) to s. 114
of the Evidence Act to draw adverse inference for refusal to answer
question put under s. 207 A(6) to the accused.
(vi) The rule of interpretation which is applicable was stated
by Lord Radcliffe: "the meaning which these words ought to be
understood to bear is not to be ascertained by any process akin
to speculation. The primary duty of a court of law is to find
the natural meaning of the words in the context in which they
1068
1963
Ramnarayan
Mor and
another
v.
State of
Maharashtra
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964 J
occur, the context including any other phrases in the Act which
may throw light on the sense in which the makers of the Act used
the words in dispute."
Re Macmanaway In re, [1951] A.C. 161, relied on.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 164 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 30, 1963 of the Bombay High
Court in (Nagpur Bench) in Criminal Application
No. 197 of 1963.
A.S. Bobde,
O.C. Mathur, J.B. Dadachanji
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants.
M.C. Setalvad, H.R. Khanna and R.H. Dhebar,
for the respondent.
December 16, 1963. The Judgment of B.P.
Sinha, C.J., K. Subba Rao, and J.C. Shah JJ. was
delivered by Shah J.
The. dissenting Opinion of
M. Hidayatullah and N.. Rajagopala Ayyangar
JJ. was delivered by Ayyangar J.
Shah J.
SHAH J.-A police report was lodged in the
Court of the l'vfagistrate First Class, Akola, against
the appellants and fifty-five others on charges for
offences punishable under ss. 406, 408, 409, 120-B
and 477-A Indian Penal Code. The Investigating
Officer furnished the accused persons with copies
of documents which are required by s. 173(4) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to be furnished. At
the commencement of the enquiry, the Public Prosecutor informed the Court that the evidence in the case
being "mainly documentary" the prosecution did
not desire to examine any witnesses at the stage of the
committal proceeding. After the arguments on behalf
of the State and the accused were heard, an application was submitted by the prosecutor that the accused
be examined by the Magistrate under s. 207-A (6)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The application was granted by the Magistrate after rejecting the
objections raised by some of the accused and the accused
were ordered to remain present in Court for their
examination under s. 207-A sub-ss. (6) & (7). Against
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1069
that order the appellants moved the High Court of
1963
Bombay in revision, but without success. With
special leave, the appellants have appealed to this Ramnarayan
Court.
Mor and
another
The appellants say that in an enquiry for commitv.
ment to the Court of Session the accused person can be
State of
asked to explain circumstances appearing against him Maharashtra
only from the oral evidence recorded under s. 207-A(4)
and not from circumstances appearing from the docuShah J.
ments furnished under s. 173{4) of the Code.
--
A brief review of the provisions relating to proceedings for commitment of the accused to the Court
of Session may be useful in considering the plea of the
appellants. The Court of Session has except in
cases expressly provided in the Code no power to
take cognisance of a case directly on a complaint
or a report of a police officer or on its own motion.
The case must be committed by a Magistrate competent in that behalf. Commitment under the Code
predicates some enquiry into the case for the prosecution by a Magistrate who must be satisfied that there
is a prima facie case against the accused. The enquiry
is calculated to serve a dual purpose to give to the
person accused of the serious offence with which he
is charged information about the case together with
the nature of the evidence with which it is sought to
be established, and at the same time to eliminate
cases in which there is no reasonable ground for conviction. For this purpose, under the Code of Criminal
Procedure as originally enacted in all cases exclusively
triable by the Court of Session, or where in the opinion
of the Magistrate the case ought to be tried by such
Court, witnesses intended to be examined before the
Court of Session were examined before the Magistrate,
documents on which the prosecution sought to rely
were duly proved and tendered in evidence and if
the Magistrate was satisfied that there was sufficient
ground for committing the accused for trial, a charge
was framed on which the accused was committed
for trial. But this. procedure was often found cumbrous and led to great delay in the trial of criminal
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
cases, without affording any real compensating advantage to the accused at the trial. The Legislature
Ramnarayan with a view to secure expeditious disposal of cases
Mor and
tried by the Court of Session, incorporated by Act
another
26 of 1955 s. 207-A, which prescribed for enquiry
v.
in proceedings commenced on the report of a police
State of
officer, a simpler procedure while maintaining the
Maharashtra original procedure for commitment of cases commenced
otherwise. Simultaneously with the incorporation of
Shah J.
s. 207-A provi~.ion was incorporated in s. 173(4)
imposing a statutory obligation upon the police
officer to furnish or cause to be furnished before the
commencement of an enquiry or trial, copies of the
police report, first information report, and of all
other documents or relevant extracts thereof on which
the prosecution proposed to rely, including statements
and confessions :recorded under s. 164, and statements
recorded under s. 161 (3) of the Code. The new
scheme for enquiry in proceedings for commitment
commenced on police report is briefly this: on receiving a report of a police officer, the Magistrate fixes
an early date for holding the enquiry , and if before
the date fixed the prosecutor applies for process to
compel attendance of witnesses or production of
documents or things he may do so. After satisfying
himself at the commencement of the enquiry that the
accused has been furnished with the documents referred to in s. 173(4 ), the Magistrate records evidence
of persons produced by the prosecution as witnesses
to the actual commission of the offence, and if the
Magistrate is of opinion that it is necessary in the
·interests of justice to take the evidence of other witnesses
he may take such evidence, the accused having liberty
to cross-examine: all such witnesses examined by the
prosecutor or lby the Court. All the documents
on which the prosecutor seeks to rely in support
of the case for the prosecution, statements of all
witnesses recorded ·in the course of investigation
by the Investigating Officer, report of the police officer,
the first information, and confession and statements,
if any, recorded under s. 164 Criminal Procedure
Code are made available to the accused. Witnesses to
1963
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1963
the actual commission of the offence if produced by
the prosecutor and witnesses called at the instance of
the Magistrate are also examined in his presence. Ramnarayan
The object of these provisions is manifestly to give Mor and
another
full information to the accused about the entire pattern
v.
of the prosecution case. The documents of which
State
of
copies are supplied to the accused and the oral evidence
Maharashtra
of witnesses examined before the Magistrate from
the record of the Magistrate. These documents toShahJ.
gether with the examination of the accused, the list
of witnesses furnished by the accused, which form
the record of the enquiry, together with the charge
has to be sent to the Court of Session. If the order
of commitment is erroneous on a point of law, it
may be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under s. 215 of the Code on a consideration of this record. The order of discharge may in
appropriate cases be revised in exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction by the Court of Session or the High Court
on the same record.
Sub-sections (6) & (7) of s. 207-A on which the
argument in this case principally turns provide:
(6) "When the evidence referred to in subsection (4) has been taken and the Magistrate
has considered all the documents referred
to in section 173 and has, if necessary,
examined the accused for the purpose of
enabling him to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against
him
and given the prosecution and the accused
an opportunity of being heard, such Magistrate
shall, if he is of opinion that such evidence
and documents disclose no grounds for committing the accused person for trial, record
his reasons and discharge him, unless it
appears to the Magistrate that such person
should be tried before himself or some
other Magistrate, in which case he shall
proceed accordingly."
(7) "When, upon such evidence being taken, such
documents being considered, such examination
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
(if any) being made and the prosecution
and the accused being given an opportuRamnarayan
nity of being heard, the Magistrate is of
Mor and
opinion that the accused should be committed
another
for trial, he shall frame a charge under his
v.
hand, declaring with what offence the accused
State of
is charge<l."
Maharashtra
The scheme of the two sub-ss. (6) & (1) is plain: the
Magistrate holding an enquiry may discharge an
ShahJ.
accused person if he is of opinion that the evidence
referred to in sub-s. (4) and the documents referred
to in s. 173 do not disclose any ground for committing
the accused person for trial, and if he is of opinion,
on a consideration of the oral evidence and the documents referred to in s. 173 that the accused should be
committed for trial, he has to frame a charge and
commit the accused for trial.
In exercising his functions under sub-s. (6) or
sub-s. (7) a Nlagistrate indisputably performs a judicial
function. He is bound to take the evidence of such
persons, if any, as may be produced by the prosecution
as witnesses to the actual commission of the offenee
alleged, and ieven if the prosecutor does not produce
any witnesses the Magistrate may, if he is of opinion
that it is necessary in the interests of justice to take
evidence -0f any one or more witnesses for the prosecution, take that evidence. By the terms of the statute,
an overriding duty is cast upon the Magistrate whether
the prosecutor has or has not produced witnesses
to the actual commission of the offence to examine
witnesses whose examination is, in his view, necessary
in the interests of justice and this power to examine
witnesses is not restricted to the examination of witnesses to the actual commission of the offence alleged.
After recording the evidence of such witnesses and
considering the documents which are referred to
ins. 173(4), the Magistrate may examine the accused,
if he considers it necessary to do so, for the purpose
of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him. The Magistrate
then gives to the prosecution and the accused an
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1073
1963
" opportunity of being heard. He thereafter forms his
opinion whether the evidence and the documents
disclose any ground for committing the accused Ramnarayan
Mor and
for trial.
another
The object underlying the procedure prescribed
v.
by sub-ss. (4), (6) & (7) is to determine, after the
State of
accused has been apprised of the nature and the details Maharashtra
of the prosecution case together with the evidence
, oral and documentary on which the case against ·Shah J.
' the accused is sought to be proved, whether there
is a prima facie case against the accused which should
g,o before the Court of Session for trial. In the performance of his functions the Legislature has made
it obligatory upon the Magistrate to record evidence
tendered, or appearing to him necessary, to consider
the documents produced and to give the prosecutor
"·
and the accused opportunity of being heard. The
Magistrate is also authorised to examine the accused,
if necessary, for the purpose of enabling him to explain
-..,
any circumstances in the evidence against him. The
. ~ power is in terms discretionary-that is made clear
by the use of the expression "if necessary"-but the
discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles having regard to the purpose of the enquiry which
is to judicially ascertain whether there is a prima facie
case made out against the accused for commitment.
In the context of this scheme it would be difficult
to believe that the Legislature by enacting su b-s.
(6) of s. 207-A sought to restrict the examination
of the accused only to matters which are disclosed
on the oral evidence. It is true that the Legislature
has used the expression "evidence" at three places
in cl. (6), but having regard to the context in which
the expression occurs at different places, the argument
of counsel for the appellants that it uniformly means
oral evidence recorded either of witness produced by
the prosecutor or witnesses examined on his own
initiative by the Magistrate, and does not include
documentary evidence, cannot be accepted. In the
first clause of sub s. (6) the evidence is, as the statute
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SUPREME .COURT REPORTS
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expressly enacts "the evidence referred to in sub-s.
(4)", and the expression· "that. such evidence and
Ramnarayan documents disclose no grounds for committing"
Mor and
indicates, having regard to the context, that the evidence
another
referred to in sub-s. (4) alone is comprehended thereby.
But the expression "the evidence" in the clause "exState of
amined the accused for the purpose of enabling him
Maharashtra to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him" is, in our judgment, not restricted to ;
Shah J.
the oral e'vidence recorded under sub-s. (4). Among
the documents which the Magistrate has to consider
are the documents which the prosecution proposes
to rely upon at the trial including the statements
and confessions, if any, recorded under s. 164 and
s. 161 (3)1. The documents form part of the record
of the Magistrate, and it would be open to the prosecutor and the accused to rely thereon in support of
their respective contentions when they exercise their
right of being heard. Those documents have to
be considered together with the oral ·evidence by the
Magistrate in forming his opinion whether the accused
should be committed to the Court of Session or be t
discharged. It would indeed be surprising if the
Legislature intended by using the expression "examined
the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain
any cin;umstances appearing in the evidence against
him" that the opportunity to be given to the accused
for explaining circumstances appearing against him
_....
must be restricted to circumstances appearing from
··~.
the oral evidence, whereas in making an order of ~
commitment or discharge the Magistrate may take
into consideration the documents referred to in
s. 173 (4) as well as the oral evidence recorded in sub-s.
(4) of s. 207-Aand afford an opportunity to the prosecutor and the accused of being heard on the entire
record. Such a construction of the clause, by putting
a restricted interpretation upon the meaning of the
word "evidence" would in many cases involve great
prejudice to the accused. The circumstances appearing
against the accused would in a large majority of cases
be from the statements recorded under s. 161 (3),
'.under s. 164 and other documentary evidence, but
1963
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1075
1963
if the accused is not to be given an opportunity to
explain those circumstances, to a large extent the
judicial character of the proceeding would be impaired, Ramnarayan
Mor and
for in determining whether the record discloses a
another
prima facie case against the accused justifying an
v.
order of commitment to the Court of Session for
State of
trial, examination of the accused for the purpose of
enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing Maharashtra
against him only from the oral evidence and not
Shah J.
"· from the documents referred to in s. 173(4) would
fail to give to the Magistrate a complete picture of
the case. The accused may have a complete answer
to the documents on which the prosecution seeks
to rely. But if by the words used in cl. (6) the Magistrate is prohibited from examining him in respect
of those documents the provision might frequently
operate oppressively against the accused.
There has been a deliberate change of phraseology in using the expression "the evidence" in cl.
(6). In the openipg clause the evidence referred to
, is evidence taken under sub-s. (4) and as we have
already observed in the last clause the expression
"such evidence" presumably is the evidence referred
to in that sub-section. But in the context of the
examination of the accused for the purpose
,,
of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing against him, the Legislature has used the expression
-r
"in the evidence against him'', which is not expressly
qualified by reference to sub-s. (4) nor does any im1-f plication arise from the context which would suggest
that it has a limited content.
It was urged in the alternative by counsel for
the appellants that even if the expression "evidence"
may include documents, such documents would only
be those which are duly proved at the enquiry for
commitment, because what may be used in a trial,
civil or criminal, to support the judgment of a Court is
evidence duly proved according to law. But by
the Evidence Act which applies to the trial of all
criminal cases, the expression "evidence" is defined in
s. 3 as meaning and including all statements which
I
1076
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the Court permits or requires to be made before it
by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under
Raninarayan enquiry and all documents produced for the inspecMor and
tion of the Court. There is no restriction in this
another
definition to documents which are duly proved by
v.
evidence. Normally in a criminal trial, the Court
State of
can proceed. on documents which are du~y proved,
Maharashtra or by the rules of evidence made admissible without
formal proof, but under the amended Code the Legisla- · A
Shah J.
ture has in s. 207-A prescribed a special procedure I
in proceedings for commitment of the accused. The
recnrd consists of the oral evidence recorded under
sub-s. (4) of s. 173, and it would be difficult to regard
only those documents which are duly proved, or
1 which are admissible without proof as "evidence"
within the meaning of cl. (6) and not the rest. There
is no substance in the contention that the Legislature
could not have intended that the accused should
be examined in respect of documents which are not
duly proved before the Court, because to do so might
in some cases operate, as "a trap for the accused".
The object of the examination it may be remembered l
is to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain
any circumstances appearing against him. He may
avail himself of the opportunity. but he is not obliged
to do so, and if he does not avail himself of the opportunity he is by the statute exposed to no prejudicial
cons1oquences. .But it was urged that if the accused
declined to explain circumstances in answer to the
Court's question, an adverse inference may be raised; -\~
and reliance in that behalf was placed upon illustration (h) to s. 114 of the Evidence Act which provides
that the Court may raise a presumption "that, if
a man refuses to answer a question which he is not
compelled to answer by law, the answer, if given,
would be unfavourable to him". We are unable
to hold that because the accused in an enquiry for
committal declines to avail himself of the opportunity
to explain circumstances appearing against him from
the oral or documentary evidence, a presumption
may be raised against him. Declining to avail himself of such an· opportunity and reserving his right
1963
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t
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I
SS.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1077
1963
to make a defence at the trial do not amount to refusal
to answer a question. The opportunity contemplated by s. 207-A (6) for the examination of the accused Ramnarayan
Morand
is for his benefit and solely for the purpose of enabling
another
him if he desires to do so to explain circumstances
v.
against him from the oral evidence and also the docuState
of
ments referred to in s. 173(4). The scheme of cl. (6)
Maharashtra
of s. 207-A is not the same as the scheme in s. 342
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the latter
Shah J.
section the Court is authorised to put questions to
the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain
any circumstances appearing against him and the
Court is required for that purpose to question him
generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called upon
to enter upon his defence. But s. 207-A (6) does
not contemplate iUCh general questioning: it contemplates examination only for the purpose of explaining
any circumstances appearing against the accused.
Therefore by merely failing to avail himself of the
opportunity to explain circumstances to which his
' attention is drawn the accused does not refuse to
answer a question which would justify a presumption
against him that the answer if given would be against
him.
,
-
The scheme of s. 251-A which was brought on
the statute book simultaneously with s. 207-A by
Act 26 of 1955, also furnishes an indication that in
the examination of the accused for enabling him
to explain circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him, documents referred to in s. l 73l4) cannot
be excluded. Section 251-A prescribes a special
procedure for warrant cases, instituted upon police
reports. In a case started otherwise than on a police
report, the old procedure of examining witnesses
and framing a charge on which the accused is to be
tried continues to apply. But where the proceedings
commence on a police report, the Magistrate has
under s. 251-A (2) to consider the documents referred
to in s. 173(4) and then to examine the accused, if
necessary, and to give the accused and the prosecutor
1078
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
opportunity of being heard. Under s. 251-A no
provision is made for examination of witnesses .before
Ramnarayan making an order under sub-s. (2J discharging the
Morand
accused or under sub-s. (3) framing a charge. Under
another
sub-s. (2) of s. 251-A the Magistrate may upon consiv.
deration of the doucments referred to in s. 173(4)
State of
and making such examination, if any, of the accused
Maharashtra as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving
the prosecutor and the accused an opportunity of
ShahJ.
being heard, discharge the accused if he considers
the charge to be groundless, or frame a charge against
him under sub-s. (3) if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. In
a warrant case therefore there will be no evidence of
witnesses and the examination of the accused if
found necessary by the Magistrate must of necessity
be restricted to the circumstances appearing from
the documents under s. · 173 (4). The Legislature
has therefore in enquiries in warrant cases contemplated examination of the accused solely upon circumstanct~s
appearing from the documentary evidence referred to ins. 173 (4) and it cannot be assumed
that the examination of the accused in respect of
circumstances appearing from those documents which
are not proved but of which copies have been furnished
to the accused, is so inconsistent with principles of
criminal jurisprudence that it must be discountenanced.
If opportunity may be given to an accused person
before framing a charge under s. 251-A (2), to explain
circumstances appearing from the documents referred
to ins. 173(4), it is difficult to see any ground on;which
the Magistrate holding an enquiry for commitment
may be disentitled to do so under s. 207-A (6). It
would bt~ somewhat anomalous, if it were true, that
in the enquiry before framing a charge against the
accused in respect of a chargeJor an offence which
is triable by the Court of Session as well as!by a
Magistrate, two different rules relating to the
examination of the accused would prevail, according
as the accused is to be tried by the Court of Session,
or by the Magistrate.
I
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-
4
_J 5 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1079
/'\,
1963
We are therefore of the view that the Magistrate
has the power, if he thinks it necessary, to examine
the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain Ramnarayan
Morand
any circumstances appearing in the evidence-such
another
evidence being oral evidence, if any, as may have
v.
been recorded and the documents referred to in
State~]
s. 173(4).
We are not concerned to decide whether the
Magistrate in the present case was justified in calling
upon the accused to remain present for their examination after the arguments of the prosecution and
the accused were concluded. Normally, such an
examination would take place before arguments of
the prosecutor and the accused are heard. But
there is nothing in the Code to prevent the examination, if in the course of hearing the arguments, the
Magistrate entertains the opinion that such examination may be necessary in the interests of justice for
the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any
circumstances appearing against him.
Maharashtra
Shah!.
In that view of the case this appeal fails and is
dismissed.
v
AYYANGAR, J.-We regret our inability to agree AyyangarJ.
with the judgment just pronounced.
Section 207-A(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code
reads:
"When the evidence referred to in sub-section
(4) has been taken and the Magistrate has. considered all the documents referred to in section
173 and has, if necessary, examined the accused
for the purpose of enabling him to explain any
circumstances appearing in the evidence against
him and given the prosecution and the accused
an opportunity of being heard, such Magistrate
shall, if he is of opinion that such evidence and
documents disclose no grounds for . commit. ting the accused person for trial, record the reasons
and discharge him, unless it appears to the
Magistrate that such person should be tried
1080
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
L
[1964]
before himself or some other Magistrate, in
which case he shall proceed accordingly."
R.- nJn;..d·uyan
The import of the expression 'to explain any circumJl1or and
stances appearing in the evidence against him' is
another
the only question that is raised for consideration in
v.
this appeal which comes before us by virtue of special
S:ateof
leave granted by this Court under Art. 136 of the
Muhara;htra
Constitution.
Ayyangar J.
Before dealing with that question and as preliminary thereto it will be convenient to narrate the
facts which have given rise to this appeal.
1963
·-
The appellants before us are two out of 57 accused
who are being prosecuted for offences under ss. 120-B,
406, 408, 409 and 477-A, read with s. 34 of the Indian
Penal Code. The amount said to have been misappropriat1~d is stated to be over Rs. 53 lakhs and the
conspJracy in pursuance of which these various offences
were committed are stated by the prosecution to have
extended over a period of twelve years from 1948
to 1960. The charge-sheet was presented on the
24th of December, 1962, in the court of Shri Halbe,
who was appointed as a Special Magistrate for the
trial of the case. It is common ground that he was
dealing with the case as one which was liable to be
committed to Sessions for trial, if the charges made
against the: accused were held to be prima facie proved
and as the proceedings were initiated on a police
report, the Magistrate is making the inquiry under
the provisiions of s. 207-A of the Criminal Procedure
Code, or for shortness, the Code. On March 28,
1963, the Public Prosecutor filed before the Special
Magistrate a memorandum, the material portion
of which read:
"The evidence in this case is mainly documentary. As such the prosecution does not want to
produce any witnesses as evidence before the
committal before this Court.
The Court may be pleased to take into considera.tion all the evidence contained in the
documents the copies of which have been supplied
I
(
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5 S.C.R.
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'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1081
1963
to the accused and also submitted before this
Court as required bys. 173(4) of the Code.
Ramnarayan
The Court may then be pleased to give the
Mor and
prosecution an opportunity of being heard to
another
explain the whole ~ase."
v.
State of
Subsequent to this date the documents under s. 173
of the Code were filed. Immediately thereafter, the Maharashtra
parties addressed arguments to the court based on
the documents before the Court. The prosecution Ayyangar J.
commenced its arguments from July 8, 1963, and
after this was completed the accused made their
submissions and these arguments concluded on the
26th of July, 1963. On the same day a large number
of the accused submitted a memorandum to the court
in which they urged that as the prosecution had led
no oral evidence under s. 207-A(4) of the Code,
but had merely relied on the documents filed in proof
of a primafacie case against the accused, the Magistrate
should not "examine the accused" and this they urged
on two grounds: (!) that on a proper construction of
s.207-A(6) of the Code it was not open to the court to examine them and (2) that such examination, even assuming that the court had jurisdiction to do so, would, in the
circumstances of the case, work serious prejudice
to them particularly as any statement made by the
accused during their examination might be used as
evidence against them. The Special Public Prosecutor in his turn filed a memorandum on July 27, 1963,
opposing the prayer of the accused and sul:imitting
that the court might be pleased to examine the accused
by asking each of them "a few general questions
so as to enable them to explain the circumstances
appearing againt them" and relying for this purpose
on the construction of s. 207-A(6) adopted by the
Bombay High Court in Ramdas Kikabhai v. The
State of BombayO). A truly Gilbertian situation
thus arose, the accused pleading that they did not
want any opportunity to explain anything at that
stage and that it would not be in their interests to
have them examined or questioned then, but that
(1) A.LR. 1960 .Born., 124
\
1082
1963
Ramnarayan
Mor and
another
v.
State of
Maharashtra
AyyangarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
on the other hand such examination would seriously
prejudice them, while on the other, the State through
the Public Prosecutor urging that it was in the interests
of the accused that they should be immediately examined by the ]Magistrate so as to give them the opportunity
to explain a step which they were resisting.
The learned Magistrate acceded to the prayer
of the counsel for the prosecution and directed the
accused to appear before him on August 9, 1963.
The present appellants thereupon filed a revision before
the learned Sessions Judge and obtained orders staying the order of the Magistrate. That revision was,
however, dismissed on August 19, 1963, the learned
Sessions Judge holding that though there were decisions
of other High Courts in which a different construction of s. 207-A(6), which the accused submitted
was the proper one, had been upheld, he was bound
by the decision of the Bombay High Court relied
on by the State, and he, therefore, held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to examine the accused at that
stage and that he would not interfere with that order.
A further revision by the accused to the High Court
was dismiissed in limine and thereafter the accused
applied for and obtained special leave from this
Court to prefer this appeal and that is how the matter
is before us.
The question raised is whether the Magistrate
is empowered to examine the accused when no evidence
has been recorded under s. 207-A(4) to be presently
read, and this primarily turns on a proper construction
of sub~s. (6) of s. 207-A of the Code which we have
extracted earlier. For this purpose it is necessary
to set out some of the other sub-sections of s. 207-A,
because it is in the context of those provisions that
the words of this particular sub-section could be
understood :
"s. 207-A(l). WilJen, in any proceeding instituted on a police report, the Magistrate receives
the report forwarded under s. 173, he shall for
the purpose of holding an inquiry under this
section fix a date which shall be a date not later
I
/
..,
-
-
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-
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•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1083
1963
than fourteen days from the date of the report,
unless the Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded,
Ramnarayan
fixes any later date.
Morand
(2) If at any time before such date, the ofhcer
another
conducting the prosecution applies to the MagisY.
trate to issue a process to compel the attendance of
State of
any witness or the production of any document Maharashtra
or thing the Magistrate shall issue such process
unless for reasons to be recorded, he deems it A.yyangar J.
unnecessary to do so.
(3) When, upon such evidence being taken,
such documents being considered, such examination (if any) being made and the prosecution
and the accused being given an opportunity
of being heard, the Magistrate is of opinion that
the accused should be committed for trial, he
shall frame a charge under his hand, declaring
with what offence the accused is charged."
Section 207-A was newly introduced into the Code
by s. 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment
Act, (Actr 26 of 1955). By this enactment with
a view to cut short the delay that was occurring in
committal proceedings different procedures were
prescribed for inquiry before a Magistrate of cases
(a) where the case is triable exclusively by the Court
of Sessions or the High Court and (b) where in his
opinion the case is to be tried by such court depending
whether the proceedings commenced .by the institution
of a police report or on a private complaint If
it was on a police report, the procedure was prescribed bys. 207-A, whereas if it was instituted otherewise
than by a police report, section 208 and the sections
following were attracted. It might be pointed out
that in proceedings instituted otherwise than by a
police report which were governed by the provisions
of the Code as they existed before, an accused could
be committed for trial under s. 210, and evidence in
the sense of judicial evidence had to be called before
the Magistrate. After such evidence was taken i.e.,
oral evidence on oath together with such evidence
as was afforded by documents which had been proved
~·
•
I
1084
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
in accordance with the provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act, s. 209(1) provided for the examiRamnarayan nation of the accused "for the purpose of enabling
Mor and
him to explain any circumstances appearing in the
another
evidence" against him. That, however, was not the
v.
scheme of s. 207-A. Under the terms of sub-s. (4)
State of
the Magistrate "after satisfying himself under the
Maharashtra provisions of the sub-section that the documents
referred to in s. 173 had been furnished to the accused"
AyyangarJ. proceeds to take the evidence of such persons if any
as may be produced by the prosecution as witnesses
to the actual offences alleged and of other witnesses
whom the Magistrate considers it necessary to
examine. Turning now to s. 173 the documents
that are referred to therein are first a report by the
Officer-in-charge of the Police Station setting forth
the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear to be
acquainted with the circumstances of the case and
stating whether the accused has been taken in custody
or have been released and if so in what manner.
Besides the report, the other documents that are
r~ferred to are those mentioned in sub-s. (4): (1)
the First information Report or relevant extracts
thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely
including the statements and confessions, if any,
recorded under s. 164 and (2) the statements recorded
under sub-s. l3) of s. 161 of all the persons whom
the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
There are some reservations to these provisions under
which certain documents might be withheld but we
shall not refer to them as the same are not relevant
to the context.
1963
tJ
I
I
We shall now take up for consideration the terms
of s. 207-Al6) and the controversy now centres round
the words 'to examine the accused ............... .
to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him'. It is common ground and is not disputed by Mr. Setalvad, the learned counsel for the
respondent-State, that the jurisdiction of the court to
examine the accused conferred by this sub-section
I
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'
SS.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1085
1963
is solely for the purpose of enabling him to explain
the circumstances appearing in the evidence against
him. Consequently it will follow that if there is Ramnarayan
Mor and
no evidence there cannot be circumstances appearing
another
in that evidence against him which he can or need be
v.
called on to explain with the result that the court
State
of
would not have jurisdiction to examine the accused
at that stage. The point, therefore, resolves itself Maharashtra
into the meaning of the word 'evidence' in the expression 'circumstances appearing in the evidence'. AyyangarJ.
,
,.
During the course of the arguments, the word
'evidence' has been stated to convey three distinct
ideas: (!) Evidence of witnesses recorded under
s. 207-A(4J of the Code, (2) Besides the above, such
portion of the documentary evidence referred to in
s. 173(4) of the Code which the Magistrate is directed
to consider before ordering commitment, which being
public documents need no proof under the Indian
Evidence Act, and which would be judicial evidence
before a court under the latter enactment, (3) The
entirety of the documents under s. 173(4) on which
material under s. 207-A, the Magistrate could base
his committal order, under sub-ss. (6) & (7), whether
these- documents be admissible in evidence or not
and whether or not they have been proved as required
by the Evidence Act. The submission of the counsel
for t.!ie appellants is that the word 'evidence' is confined to the oral evidence of persons who have been
produced by the prosecution under sub-s. (4) as witnesses or of witnesses whom the Magistrate examines
under the powers conferred in that behalf by the concluding words of that sub-section. We consider
that there is considerable force in this submission.
The word 'evidence' occurs three times in this subsection. In the opening words of the sub-section
where it occurs first referring, as they do, specifically to the evidence recorded under sub-s. (4)the word is obviously used only in the sense of oral
evidence recorded under sub-s. (4) together with the
cross-examination and re-examination permitted by
sub·s. (5). This is followed by the words 'the
1086
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Magistrate has considered all the documents referred
to in s. 173'. Documents therefore are treated here
Ramnarayan as a distinct category of material distinct from "eviMorand
dence" and the sub-section proceeds on the existence
another
of a dichotomy between these two species of material
v.
· which the Magistrate has to take into account before
State of
ordering committal. If this dichotomy and this disMaharashtra tinction between "evidence" and documents underlie
the texture of the entire sub-section, it could not be
Ayyangar J.
disputed that the word 'evidence' on the second occasion when it occurs in sub-s. (6) and which calls for
construction in the appeal has to be read as meaning
only the evidence of witnesses examined under subs.( 4). We shall revert to this however after referring
to the rest of this sub-section to ascertain what light
this throws on the continued maintenance of this
dichotomy. The last phce where the w.:>rd 'evidence'
occurs in the sub-section is the passage reading 'such
Magistrate shall, if he is of opinion that such evidence
and documents disclose no grounds for committing the accused person fo~ trial'. It is clear here
the word 'documents' denotes the documents referred
to earlier, namely those in s. 173 and these are again
distinguished from 'evidenee'. Here also there cannot
be any doubt that the word 'evidence' is a · reference to the evidence recorded under sub-s. · (4)-·
and which has already been referred to in the
opening words of the sub-section and this also
we might say was not disputed by Mr. Setalvad.
Pausing here and taking up sub-s. (7) the distinction between "evidence" in the sense of oral evidence
recorded under sub-s. (4) and the documents under
s. 173 is again seen to be maintained with rigour for the phraseology adopted in that sub-section
is "upon such evidence being taken, and such documents
being considered".
With the phraseology employed in sub-section(4), two out of three places in
sub-ss. (6) & (7) it would require very strong and
compelling reasons to hold that when words "the
evidence" were used in the passage now in question
they were employed in a different sense divorced
from the dichotomy between 'evidence' and 'documents'
1963
I
)
(
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•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1087
1963
which runs throughout these provisions.
In
fact, even the judgment of the Bombay High Court
on which the Magistrate and the learned Sessions Ramnarayan
Mor and
Judge relied, proceeds on the acceptance of this
another
construction of sub-s. (6). The learned Chief Justice
v.
after referring to the several sub-sections of s. 207-A
State
of
observed:
Maharashtra
"The learned Assistant Government Pleader has
urged that the word 'evidence' which follows with Ayyangar J.
the words 'any circumstances' appearing in
sub-s. (6) is used in a wider sense so
as also to include the documents referred to
in s. 173. This argument cannot be accepted,
in view of the latter part of the sub-section,
which requires the Magistrate to form an opinion
on 'such evidence and documents'. Here again
the documents are referred to separately from
evidence. It is, therefore, clear that 'evidence'
does not include the documents, which are mentioned separately in both sub-secs. (6) and (7).
Consequently, 'evidence' in these provisions means
evidence, if any, recorded under sub-s. (4). The
section, therefore, contemplates an examination
of the accused for the purpose of enabling him
to explain any circumstances appearing in the
evidence against him, that is in the evidence,
if any, recorded under sub-section (4)."
But the learned Chief Justice then proceeded to point
out that there was an apparent lacuna in the subsection which, however, he held was remedied by
the later part of the sub-section directing the Magistrate 'to give the accused an opportunity of being
heard,' and that under this provision the Magistrate
was vested with power to examine the accused for
the purpose of explaining why he should not be committed for trial before the Sessions.
With great respect to the learned Judges we are
unable to accept as correct the reasoning on which
this conclusion is based. In the first place, it is not
possible to accept the view that there is a lacuna
m the sub-section arising out of the construction of
1088
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
J
the word 'evidence' which the learned Judges accepted.
The scheme of s. 207-A(6) & (7) is that there are two
Ramnarayan sets of materials on the basis of which the Magistrate
Mor and
is directed to make up his mind whether a prima facie
another
case has been made out against an accused person
v.
justifying his being committed to take his trial, oral
State of
evidence recorded under sub-s. (4) and the documents
Maharashtra referred to in s. 173 and filed before him. If on
a proper construction of sub-s. (6), it is held that
Ayyangar J.
in the event of one type of material being placed /
before the Court viz., oral evidence, the accused shall
be questioned in order to explain the circumstances
. appearing against him on that material-the provision
discloses no lacuna. On such a construction it would
mean that the accused is not to be questioned if no
such evidence has been recorded in the case and is
present before the Magistrate. Nor are the learned
Judges right in saying that the words 'given the accused
an opportunity to be heard' involve an examination of the accused. These are words of common ,
occurrence in the Code and elsewhere and mean
an opportunity to submit reasons for the acceptance /
of the Court. They do not refer to questions and
answers which must be recorded verbatim and made
part of the record, and which could be used as evidence under s. 287 of the Code. In the context they
are capable of meaning only hearing the arguments
or submissions by the accused on the case or in regard to the documents where there has been no evidence of the type mentioned in sub-s. (4). In this
connection it has to be pointed out that when the
accused is examined, the statement recorded by the
Magistrate may be used as evidence against the accused under s. 287 of the Criminal Procedure Code
and this sub-section merely speaks of an opportunity
to be heard. It is needless to point out that along
with the accused the prosecution is also to be given
"an opportunity to be heard" and in their case it
is obvious that the relevant word cannot mean an
examination by questions put and answers recorded.
This is made more clear and this conclusion is reinforced by the terms of sub-s. (7) which we have
1963
-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1089
extracted. If nothing more could be urged in support
1963
of the construction adopted by the courts below
than the reasoning to be found in the judgment of Ramnarayan
Mor and
the Bombay High Court, it is manifest that the order
another
now under appeal cannot be sustained .
v.
Mr. Setalvad, however, did not rely on the judgState of
ment of the Bombay High Court, nor did he seek Maharashtra
to support the reasoning on which it is based and,
in fact, he conceded that the main reason given by Ayyangar J.
the learned Judges based upon the words 'the accused
being given an opportunity to be heard' could not
be sustained. We invited him to point out any
other place where such words had the meaning attribwted by the High Court of Bombay but he could
not.
The points, however, urged by him were three.
First the employment of the expression 'the evidence'
as contrasted with 'the evidence referred to in subs. (4)' or such evidence which were the expression
used in the other two places where the word 'evidence'
was used in sub-s. (6). Based on this the argument
was that the words 'the evidence' were used in a
comprehensive sense not confined to the oral evidence
recorded under sub-s. (4) and extended to the entirety
of the material on which the Magistrate was to determine the prima facie case against the accused.
We feel unable to accept this argument. We have
already analysed the terms of the sub-section. In
the light of the phraseology employed in other subsections, particularly sub-ss. (4) & (7), we have found
that the sub-sections draw a clear and sharp distinction between "evidence" and "the documents" refeirred to in s. 173. Such a distinction is made in
every part of sub-s. (6), as well as in sub-s. (7). In the
circumstances we attach no importance to the absence
of the word 'such' and the use instead of the word
'the' in the relevant clause. The definite article 'the'
obviously in the context refers to the 'evidence' already referred to in the opening words of the sub-section,
namely that recorded under sub-s. (4). It is the same
evidence which is again referred to in the third plaCC'
1/SCI/64-69
1090
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
where that word is used in the concluding part of
that sub-section. The rule of interpretation which
Ramnarayan is applicable was stated by Lord Radcliffe-"the
Mor and
meaning which these words ought to be understood
another
to bear is not to be ascertained by any process akin
v.
to speculation. The primary duty of a Court of
State of
law is to find the natural meaning of the words in
Maharashtra the context in which they occur, the context including
any other phrases in the Act which may throw light
Ayyangar J. on the sense in which the makers of the Act used
the words in dispute."(!)
Mr. Setalvad's next submission was based on
a comparison of sub-s. (6) of s. 207-A with sub-s.
(2) of s. 251-A. In this connection stress was laid.
on the fact that both ss. 207-A and 251-A were introduced by the same enactment-Act XXVI of
1955, and both dealt with the procedure to be adopted
in cases instituted on a police report. Sub-s. (2)
of s. 251-A empowers the Magistrate to examine
the accused, if necessary, in respect of matters appearing in the documents under s. 173(4). Section 251-A J«i
(2) reads:
"If, upon comideration of all the documents
referred to in s. 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate
thinks necessar) and after giving the prosecution and the a :cused an opportunity of being
heard, the Magi.itrate considers the charge against
the accused to oe groundless, he shall discharge 1""'.
him."
This is preceded by sub-s. {I) which is an analogue
of sub-s. (3) of s. 207-A and enacts:
"When in any case instituted on a police report,
the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, such
Magistrate shall satisfy himself that the documents referred to in section 173 have been furnished to the accused, and if he finds that the
accused has not been furnished with such
1963
t
(1)
Macmanaway In re [1951] A.C. 161 at p. 169.
-
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1091
1963
documents or any of them, he shall cause them
to be so furnished."
Ramnarayan
The argument based upon sub-s. (2) was two fold:
Morand
(1) There is no anomaly or injustice in empoweranother
ing the Magistrate to examine an accused person
v.
in respect of the matters appearing in the documents
State of
under s. 173; for Parliament has in terms made pro- Maharashtra
' vision for such an examination.
(2) Tn view of the terms of s. 251-A(2) which Ayyangar J.
was enacted at the same time as s. 207-A, the word
'evidence' in sub-s. (6) is capable of being understood
as meaning 'on the examination of the accused with
reference to the material on which the Magistrate
proceeds to act', for in both the cases the object
of the examination is in the interests of the accused
"' and in order to afford the accused an opportunity
not to be committed or to have a charge framed
against him as the case may be. We do not think
that such a comparison is a sound rule of construe~ tion. Besides we feel unable to agree that a comparison of the provisions of s. 251-A(2) affords the
respondent any assistance. On the other hand, the
contrast in the language employed in the two provisions appears to us to favour the construction
" that the expression 'evidence' in the relevant portion
of s. 207-A(6) is a reference to the evidence recorded
under sub-s. (4) which has been tested by cross, examination, if any. It is to be noticed that when
""' the framers of Act 26 of 1955 referred to the
documents under s. 173, they are both in s. 207-A,
as well as in s. 251-A referred to as 'documents' .and
not as evidence. Added to this is the circumstance
that whens. 251-A(2) empowers the court to examine
the accused it not merely does not use but scrupulously avoids the use of the expression 'evidence'.
It does not make such examination compulsorymark the words 'if any' -and does not even refer to
the documents at all. In this connection it may be
. pointed out that when the Bill 20-B of 1954 which
later became Act 26 of 1955 emerged from the
•
Select Committee, the relevant words in s. 207-A(6)
-
-
1092
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1964]
I
were identical with those which are now found in
s. 251-A(2) i.e., without the use of the word 'evidence'
Ramnarayan and without even an indication of the purpose for
Morand
which the court was empowered to examine the accused.
another
It was during passing of the Bill in Parliament that
v.
sub-s. (6) was amended so as to read as it does at
· Stateof
present. This, in our opinion, is a circumstance
Maharashtra which shows that the word 'evidence' was not used
by error or inadvertently but that a deliberate change )
Ayyangar J. was intended from the provision contained ins. 251-A
(2). That is an additional reason why we consider
that the terms of s. 251-A(2) far from assisting the _,
respondent in reality militate against the acceptance
of the submission.
We might, in this connection make a reference
to another provision in the Code where the language
now calling for construction has also been employed. "'
Section 342(1) opens with the words 'For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him'. It
is obvious that the Magistrate would have no jurisdic- ;"
tion under · this provision to examine an accused
(a) either when no oral evidence for the prosecution
has been recorded or (b) in respect of matters about
which there is no evidence adduced in the sense in
which that expression is used in the Indian Evidence ~
Act for enabling the court to hold any fact in issue,
or a relevant fact to be proved. Speaking of this
section, Raghu bar Dayal J. as he then was, observed 1.,_.
in Bachchan Lal v. The StateC 1l.
·
"The object of the examination of the accused
under s. 342, Criminal Procedure Code, is to
afford him an opportunity to explain away the
circumstances which go against him and is not
to elicit matter on the record about which there
is no evidence. The Court is not an investigating agency whose duty is to find out facts
which could be put before the Court at the trial";
and in another decision reported in Bahawala v. The ~
CrownC2) the Court held that an illegality was committed . . .
-
-
(!) A.I.R 1957 Allahabad 184.
(2) I.L.R. 6 Lah. 183.
.
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
when the accused was examined before the evidence
1963
for the prosecution was recorded. The reasoning
was that at that stage there was no evidence against Ramnarayan
Morand
him and consequently there were no circumstances
another
in that evidence which he could be called upon to
v.
explain. We consider that the principle laid down
State of
by these decisions correctly explains the law as to
the circumstances in which an accused could be exa- Maharashtra
mined by the Magistrate under a provision worded
Ayyangar J.
like s. 207-A(6).
-
The last submission of Mr. Setalvad was based
on the definition of the expression 'evidence' in s. 3
of the Indian Evidence Act where evidence is defined
thus: 'evidence' means and includes ............. .
(I) oral evidence and (2) all documents produced
for the inspection of the court; such documents
"" are called documentary evidence." Based on this
definition, and taken in conjunction with the fact
that under s. 207-A the documents referred to in
s. 207-A(3) are treated as material upon which the
' court might arrive at the conclusion that a prima facie
case has been made against the accused, it was submitted that there was no impropriety in referring
to these documents as 'evidence'. We are not impressed by this argument. Perhaps it might not
"'
be a great objection that the expressions are defined
in s. 3 only for the purpose of Indian Evidence Act
and this, we would add, is merely the dictionary
meaning of the word. The more serious objection
'!!' is th1: use of this definition for the purpose of importing
probative value to the documentary evidence which
might be inadmissible or irrelevant or prohibited
by law and in any event not proved so as to permit
a court to look into them for basing any judicial
decision apart from any statutory provision to the
contrary. If the expression 'evidence' is used throughout the Criminal Procedure Code as meaning judicial
evidence i.e., oral evidence tested by cross-examination,
if any and documentary evidence which has been
proved and which has been held to be relevant and
admissible, it would, to say the least, be a strange use
1094
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
of that word in the provision now under consideration
that it means documents produced for "the inspecRamnarayan tion of the Court". If it is used merely "for the
Mor and
inspection of the court", it is obvious that the court
another
could not on its terms base any finding on the conv.
tents of such a document, and in· fact that would
·State of
have been the position but for the special provision
Maharashtra contained ins. 207-A ands. 251-A. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this submission also.
1963
Ayyangar J.
This argument was presented in a slightly modi- !'
tied form by suggesting that even if the Magistrate
could not examine the accused with reference to those
parts of the documents which could be held not t0
be 'proved', still if among the documents referred
to in s. 173 there were some which required no proof
as being either public documents or in regard to which
proof was dispensed with by any special law, the
Magistrate could examine the accused with reference
to those matters which appeared against him in such
documents. The precise object of this submission
was to make it out that besides oral evidence under
sub-s. t 4), there could be other species of evidence Y
which would be evidence "strictly so called, and that
it could not have been the intention of the legislature
to exclude such "evidence" from the content of that
word in sub-s. (6). This argument must fail in the
face of the scheme of the section. The whole scheme
of s. 207-A proceeds on drawing a clear and sharp
line of distinction between the two terms 'evidence'
and 'documents' the latter meaning the documents
referred to in s. 173 and that dichotomy is maintained
throughout, admittedly twice, in sub-s. (6) and
in sub-s. (7). When therefore 'documents' are referred
to in sub-ss. (6) & 0), it is a reference to them en masse
i.e., the entirety of the documents referred to in s. 173
and by no possible construction of s. 207(6) can a
distinction be drawn between the documents which
prove themselves and those which require to be proved
by oral evidence.
Lastly, it was submitted that the provision was {. .
in the interests of the accused and that consequently . .
5 S.C.R.
-
SllPREME COURT REPORTS
1095
1963
the words must receive a liberal and not a literal
construction so as to subserve the underlying purpose
viz., that the accused should be in a position to explain Ramnarayan
Mor and
the circumstances appearing against him, whether
another
the circumstances appear in the oral evidence or in the
v.
documents, since the Magistrate was empowered to
State
of
take into consideration both these as affording material
Maharashtra
for committing the accused. If the text of the statute
is clear there might be no escape from the duty of the
court
give effect to it. But the word 'evidence' Ayyangar J.
' in the tocontext
and even otherwise is incapable of the
construction for which the respondent contends. If
so, this argument has no basis to support it. If,
however, there were an . ambiguity, and the word
was reasonably capable both of a narrower and a
wider construction, the court would, no doubt, be
justified in adopting that construction which would
further the purpose of the provision and promote
the cause of justice. In order to attract the application of this rule of construction, the court would
have to be satisfied that the words if so construed
should always operate in favour of the accused.
What we have said earlier about the effect of an
examination of the accused without there being 'evidence' against him with reference to s. 342ll) of the Code
would be apposite in this connection. It is in this
context that we have the situation in the present case
where the accused do not desire to be examined and
are resisting the questions being put to them on the
ground that such questions would lead them to give
~ answers before they are fully aware of the details
of the prosecution case and the manner in which it
is proposed to use the documents under s. 173 or
the precise construction which they place on the
contents of the documents on which they propose to
rely .
The prosecution insists that it is in the interests
of the accused that they should be examined, and the
accused are asserting that their 'examination' at this
stage is calculated to trap them into making statement which might be used to destroy their defence
1096
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
1963
at the trial. Undoubtedly we are concerned in this
appeal not with the facts of this prosecution, for that
Ramnarayan would be a matter for the Magistrate to consider as
Mor and
to whether or not he would 'examine' the accused
another
and on what points he would 'examine' them, keepv.
ing in mind the purpose of the examination specified
State of
in the sub-section, but with the larger question as
Maharashtra to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to 'examine'
the accused with reference to what is disclosed against
Ayyangar J.
them by the documents under s. 173 of the Code.
The documents mentioned in s. 173(4) might include
some which can never be evidence against the accused
at the trial, and yet if the respondent is right, the
accused might be called on to explain the circumstances against them in such documents, and here
it must be noted, the explanation or statement of
the accused even in answer to such questions would
be evidence against him under s. 287 of the Code.
It would, in the circumstances, be manifest that the
construction of the sub-section which the State urges
for our acceptance is, to say the least, capable of
prejudicing the accused, and consequently, even in y
the event of there being an ambiguity in the meaning
of the word 'evidence', is not one which the Court
could accept. Nor are we satisfied that without
such a power in the Magistrate to examine the accused,
the accused would lose the chance of avoiding a
committal by offering a reasonable explanation for
the circumstances appearing in the documents. After
all, the Magi~trate is directed to look into the documents in the light of the submissions made by the
accused as regards their contents and it would not
be unreasonable to hold that the intention of the
legislature was that the accused should be examined
with reference to what appears against him in evidence
legally admissible before the court, while he is not
to be required to commit himself by his answers
in respect of matters which would be proved against
him only at the trial and as regards which he would
be examined later under s. 342(1) of the Code, and
be examined about documents which may never
be moved later. Interpreted otherwise the section
-
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1097
1963
would give a good chance for a fishing expedition and
of modulating the prosecution case to destroy th~
Ramnarayan
accused's explanation at the appropriate stage.
Morand
It was however suggested that if an accused
another
found it inconvenient "to answer any of the questions
v.
put to him, there being no legal obligation on the
State of
accused to do so, he might as well decline to answer Maharashtra
them since he could not be held liable for refusing
so to do. But this argument, however, ignores the Ayyangar J.
fact that an inference adverse to the accused might
be drawn from bis refusal to answer. Among the
illustrations given in s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act
is one which reads:
"The Court may presume(h) "that, if a man refused to answer questions
which he is not compelled to answer by law,
the answer, if given, would be unfavourable
to him·"
,
The court would, therefore, be justified in drawing
this inference from his refusal to answer. Whether
or not a Court would do so, it is certain that if the
accused refuses to answer when examined by the Magistrate at the committal stage, any explanation which
he might offer at later stage could properly be characterised as an after-thought. In the circumstances
it would not be correct to assume that the exercise
of the power at this stage by the Magistrate to question
the accused might not result in serious prejudice
to the accused. No doubt by the use of the expression
'if any' in the sub-clause the Magistrate is given a
discretion to examine or not to examine the accused
and the legislature may well have presumed that
the discretion would be properly exercised, or could
be the subject of complaint at a later stage if this
were not done properly. Undoubtedly where the
evidence is recorded under sub-s. (4) these considerations apply and establish the propriety and justice
of the proceeding. But the question for co~sidera
tion is that when the power is sought to be invoked
where the Magistrate by virtue of the specific provisions of the statute is enabled to find a prirna facie case
~.
1098
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
by reference to unproved, untested and possibly inadmissible documents on which the prosecution proposes
Ramnarayan to rely, whether to such a case those considerations
Mor and
necessarily apply. If without evidence, properly so
another
called, a Magistrate examines ·an accused, he would
v.
be converting himself into an investigating agency
State of
and there is therefore every possibility of the accused
Maharashtra being prejudiced and that might be the very reason
why the sub-section has been framed in a manner to
Ayyangar J. avoid this result. The position is, of course, different
under s. 251-A(2) where the examination is by virtue
of the statute and so it stands in a class apart, and we
are not concerned to consider whether an examination
under that provision might prejudice the accused.
We, therefore, hold that where there is no evidence recorded under sub-s. (4) of s. 207-A, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to examine an accused
under s. 207-A(6) and consequently the Magistrate in
the present case had no jurisdiction to direct the
accused to appear before him for examination.
We would accordingly allow the appeal and set
aside the order of the Magistrate directing the accused
to appear before him for being examined.
ORDER
Jn view of the Judgment of the majority, the
appeal fails and is dismissed.
1963
/
'
!'
I
~
1963
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
v.
December 16
S. RATTAN SINGH
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N.
WANCHOO, J:C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)
The Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act (Act IV of 2002 BK),
ss. 4 and II-Scope of-Civil Court-Jurisdiction to decide if a
person is defaulter.
Provincial Insolvency Act (5of1920), s. 4-Whether Insolvency
Court can go behind decree.
.
c..111·.
...
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