KHYERBARI TEA CO. LTD. &ANR. versus THE STATE OF ASSAM
Supreme Court of India | Decided 13 December 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 975 | 1963 INSC 255
Key facts
- Decided
- 13 December 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 134/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 975
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 255
Text of the judgment
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
KHYERBARI TEA CO. LTD. &ANR.
1963
v.
December 13
THE STATE OF ASSAM
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
A.K. SARKAR,
K.N.
WANCHOO, K.C. DAs GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPA1'A
AYYANGAR, JJ.)
•
Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 301, 304(b) and Seventh
Schedule, List JI, Entry 56-Assam Taxation (on Goods carried
by Road or on Inland Water-ways) Act (Assam Act X of 1961)Constitutional validity.
This petition challenges the constitutional validity of the
Assam Taxation (on Goods carried by Road or on Inland Waterways) Act, 1961. The previous Act of 1954 having been declared
constitutionally invalid by this Court in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd.
v. State of Assam [1961] I S.C.R. 809, the Assam Legislature with
the previous sanction of the President of India under Art. 304(b)
of the Constitution, passed the impugned Act with retrospective
effect from the date on which the Act of 1954 had been promulgated
and its provisions were except for certain additional provisions
substantially the same. The Assam High Court which was moved
under Art. 226 of the Constitution held that the Act was constitutionally invalid. The State of Assam applied for and obtained
certificates to appeal to this Court. The present petitioners moved
this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Since petitioner
No. I was a company and as such its petition was incompetent,
petitioner No. 2, the Manager of the company, was heard and
some of the respondents in the appeals to be preferred by the
State of Assam were allowed to intervene in the present proceedings.
The case of petitioner No. 2 was that the company exported
tea grown and manufactured in its own garden from Goalpara in
Jalpaiguri District to Calcutta. The booking station and the
destination were both in West Bengal, the total distance between
them being 689 miles of which only It to 2 miles of inland waterways Jay in the State of Assam. The tea was carried by railway
from Goalpara to Dhubrighat and thereafter by ferries on inland
waterways and transhipped to steamers at the said Ghat. It
was contended that ss. 3 and 34, which were the material provisions
of the Act, were invalid and that the Assam Legislature was incompetent to enact the said provisions which constituted unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade guaranteed by Art. 301
and infringed Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Held. (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and
Ayyangar JJ .), As the impugned Act was not found to be compensatory by the High Court nor was it claimed to be so by the
State the only question that fell to be decided in this petition
was whether the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act were
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
reasonable and in the public interest within the meaning of Art.
304(b) of the Constitution.
Khyerbari Tea
Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, [1961] I S.C.R. 809,
Co. Ltd. &Anr. and Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan,
v.
[1963] I S.C.R. 491, explained.
The State of
The entries in the three lists In the Seventh Schedule must
Assam
be given the widest possible interpretation. Power conferred on
the Legislature to levy tax must be widely construed so as to include
the power to select the taxable articles, to fix the rates, to prescribe
the machinery for recovery, to prevent evasion and to prescribe
the procedure for determining the amount payable by any individual.
It could not be assumed that Entry 56 of List II, in giving the
Legislature the power to enact the impugned Act, required that
the tax must be levied only against the owner of the goods that
were carried or against persons who carried them_. If the tax
was really levied on goods carried, the Legislature was free to
prescribe the machinery for its recovery.
R.C. Jail v. Unfrm of India. [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436, Sardar
Ba/dev Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi & Ajmer.
[1961] l S.C.R. 482 and Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa.
[1962] I S.C.R. 549, referred to.
Section 3(1) of the impugned Act which imposed the tax and
s. 3(2) which made the producer liable to pay it could not therefore
be impugned on the ground of legislative incompetence.
M' Cullock v. Maryland, (1819)4 L. Ed. 579, considered.
But the machinery set up for recovery of the tax should have
a rational connection with the tax. The absence of such a nexus
between them would make the tax liable to attack as being unjustified under Entry 56.
Article 304(b), properly construed, does not require that
laws passed under it must always be prospective. It was not
correct to say that once the State Legislature passed e.n Act without
recourse to that Article and it was struck down, it could not re-enact
that Act under the Article and give it retrospective effect. That
Article contemplates restrictions and not prohibitions and the rule
that prohibitory legislation cannot have retrospective operation
can have no application.
Punjab· Province v. Dau/at Singh., L.R. 73 I.A. 59, held
inapplicable.
M.P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1958j
S.C.R. 1422, applied.
M/s. West Ramanand Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State
of Madras. [1963] 2 S.C.R. 747, referred to.
Nor could it be said that a restrictive statute passed under
Art. 304(b) with retrospective operation must necessarily defeat
the scheme of Part XIII of the Constitution..
1963
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
The mere fact that a validating taxing statute has retrospective
1963
operation does not necessarily change the character of the tax
sought to be recovered by such retrospective operation. The Khyerbari Tea
proviso to s. 3(2) of the impugned Act was not retrospective in Co Ltd & A r
character and did not change the character of the tax.
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Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [1964] 1 S.C.R. 897 The State of
referred to.
Assam
A law enacted under Art. 304(b) with the previous sanction
of the President, does not necessarily take away the jurisdiction of
the Court to consider whether the restrictions imposed by it arc
reasonable and in the public interest. The observation in Atiabari
Tea Co.'s case in this regard should not be taken as conclusive
on the point.
Although there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute, if it is proved that it invades fundamental rights
under Art. 19(1), the onus shifts on to the State and it must justify
its validity under Art. 19(6). Onus under Art. 304(b) is still more
in favour of the citizen as it clearly purports to restrict the freedom
of trade.
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. (1955] 1 S.C.R. 707, applied.
Hamdard Dawakhana. (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi v. Union of
India. [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671, referred to.
The impugned Act by making the producer liable for the tax
under s. 3(2) proviso or by assessing the tax on a fiat rate on weight
instead of by the ton and mileage method, could not be said to
have imposed unreasonable restrictions. The law of taxation is
a balance of complex considerations and if the Legislature thought
that a fiat rate was just and fair to the tea trade as a whole no
exception could be taken to it.
It was not correct to say that s. 34 of the impunged Act was
discriminatory or infringed Art. 19(1) (g). It was not discriminatory in that it selected only tea and jute for taxation. The
Legislature had full freedom to determine which articles it should
tax, in what manner and at what rate.
Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. [1963] 1 S.C.R·
220 and East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1963]
1 S.C.R. 404, referred to.
The power of this Court to strike down a taxing statute for
contravention of Arts. 14, 19 or 301 must be exercised with circumspection. It is only in cases of such statutes as are clearly
confiscatory in character that the power of this Court can be invoked or exercised.
K.T.Moopi/ Nair v. State of Kera/a, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 77, referred
to.
The impugned Act was not colourable legislation in any sense.
The power of legislation carried with it the power to make the law
I SCI/64-62
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SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
retrospective and the passing of a validating Act is essentially
subsidiary to that power conferred by the relevant legislative List.
Khyerbari Tea
Not was the Act extra-territorial in its application. Whether
Co.Ltd. & Anr. the goods are carried for a long or a short distance had no bearing
v.
on legislative competence under Entry 56 List II under which the
The' State.of impugned Act was enacted. Since the goods were carried, although
over a very small part of inland waterways in Assam, the doctrine
-Assam
of nexus, applicable to such cases, was satisfied.
. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1958] S.C.R.
13~5, referred to.
The word 'carried' in Entry 56, List II is of wider denotation
than 'import' and the Act could not be impugned on the ground
that the goods carried and taxed did not join the mass of goods
in the State of Assam itself.
Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co.
Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, Wardha, [1958] S.C.R. 1!02, held
inapplicable.
The power to levy the tax conferred by Entry 56, List II,
was not controlled by the Tea Act, 1953, passed by the Parliament
under List I. Nor was it correct to say that the River Boards
Act, 1956, imposed a bar on the Assam Legislature to pass the
impugned Act.
Per Sarkar, J.-Entries in the Legislative Lists have to be
read in their widest amplitude. So road there could be no
doubt that the Assam Legislature was competent under Entry
56 of List II to provide for the realisation of the tax in the manner
most suitable to it. The words of the Entry were wide enough
to enable the Legislature to realise the tax either from the producer,
even though he did not carry it, or from the person who actually
carried it.
Under the proviso to s. 3(2) of the Act, a notification could
not be issued with retrospective effect. That proviso made the
producer liable for realisation of the tax from the purchaser from
the date appointed by the notification. If the notification appoint.ed a past date, it would be incompetent.
. It was not correct to say that a statute contemplated by Art.
304(b) cannot be retrospective. A legislature competent to pass
a law can pass it with retrospective effect. If the flow of the trade
could be restricted prospectively, it could be restricted retrospectively as well. The restrictions imposed by Art. 304(b) stand
·on the same footing as those under Art. 19(6).
There is no prohibition in Art. 304 and, therefore, it could
not be said that it did not contemplate retrospective operation.
It provides for reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade
and therefore permits and does not prohibit.
Punjab Province v. Dau/at Singh L.R. 73 I.A. 59, held
inapplicable.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
Entry 56 of List II does not require that the tax imposed mnst
1963
be measured according to the distance they are carried. A fiat
rate is not wanting in reasonableness. It would not be wrong Khyerbari Tea
to say that since a tax is collected in public interest and for public Co Ltd & Anr
good the burden imposed by it on trade would prima facie be ·
·
·
reasonable in the public interest.
v.
The State of
The legislature has the power to pick, and choose the articles
Assam
on which to impose the tax and such choosing cannot by itself
amount to discrimination. The Act applies to all who are concerned
with the carriage of tea and jute.
Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of Bihar, [1963] l S.C.R.
220, referred to.
Section 34 of the impugned Act did not violate Art. 14 of
the Constitution, nor could it be said that it was a colourable
legislation.
A validating Act, passed under the same legislative power
under which the invalid Act was passed, would not amount to
colourable legislation.
Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, [1954] S.C.R. 1,
referred to.
Since the Assam Legislature had the power· to impose the
tax on carriage of goods, however short the distance over which
they were carried, the impugned Act could not be said to be bad
for extra-territoriality.
Quaere as to on whom the onus of proving the reasonableness of a restriction imposed by a statute on which its constitutionality depends lies.
ORIGINAb JURISDICTION : Writ Petiton No.
134 of 1962.•
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of .
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S.K. Niyogi and S.C. Mazumdar, for the petitioners.
B.C. Barua, Advocate-General, Assam, M.C.
Setalvad, R.B. Datar and Naunit Lal, for the respondents.
G.S. Pathak, A.N. Sinha and B.N. Ghosh, for
the interveners.
December 13, 1963. The Judgment of P.B.
Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta
and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ. was delivered by
Gajendragadkar '}. A.K. Sarkar J. delivered a separate
Opinion.
980
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
,.,,...
[1964] ~
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The present writ petition
by which the two petitioners Khyerbari Tea Co.
Khyerbari Tea Ltd., ~.nd M:·. Sudhir Chandra Guha, Manager of
Co. Ltd. &.Anr. the said Company, seek to challenge the validity of the
v.,
Assam Taxation (On Goods Carried by Road or
The State of on Inland Waterways) Act, 1961 (No. 10 of 1961)
Assam
(hereinafter called 'the Act'), is a sequel to the decision
.of this Court in the case of Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd.
Ga;endragadkarv. The State of Assam( 1 ).
To this petition have
J.
been impleaded three respondents, the State of Assam,
the Commissioner of Taxes, the taxing authority
appointed under s. 6 of the Act, and the Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri Division. We will refer to
the State of Assam as the respondent hereafter. The
respondent had passed a similar Act No. 13 of
1954 which had received the assent of the Governor
on the 9th April, 1954. The validity of the said Act
was challenged by the petitioners and certain other
producers of tea by filing writ petitions before the
Assam High Court. The Assam High Court dismissed
the writ petitions and held that the impugned Act
of 1954 was valid. The said judgment was pronounced by the High Court on the 6th of June, 1955.
The petitioners whose writ petitions had been dismissed, then preferred appeals to this Court by special
leave, and they also moved this Court by writ petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution. These
matters were heard by this Court in the case of
Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd.C 1 l and by its judgment delivered
on the 26th September, 1960, the said impugned
Act was struck down as being unconstitutional.
Thereafter, the Act with which we are concerned
in the present proceedings was passed by the Assam
Assembly. It received the assent of the President
on the 6th April, 1961. The relevant terms of
the Act are, on the whole, substantially similar
to the terms of the earlier Act which was struck down.
The Act has made certain additional provisions to
which we will refer later. The petitioners contend
that the operative provisions of the Act are invalid,
and so, they pray for issue of an appropriate writ
1963
(I) [19611 I s.c.R. 809.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
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or order directing the respondent not to enforce
i963
the operative provisions against them. Petitioner
No. l is a company and as such, it has no right to Khyerbari Tea
move this Court under Art. 32. This position is Co.Ltd. &Anr.
conceded by Mr. Mazumdar for the petitioners.
v. .
Petitioner No. 2 who is the Manager of Petitioner The State of
No. l is, however, a citizen of India and as such,
Assam
he is entitled to challenge the validity of the Act
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inasmuch as the respondent threatens to take action Gajendragadkar
in pursuance of the material provisions of the Act
J.
against the company of which he is the Manager.
Mr. Setalvad does not dispute the right of peti_ti9ner
No. 2 to move this Court by a petition under
Art. 32.
After the Act was passed and it came into force,
the question about the scope and effect of the pro~
visions contained in Part XIII of the Constitution
which had been dealt with by this Court in the case
of Atiabari Tea Co.<1 l came to be considered by a
larger Bench in the case of the Automobile Transport
(Rajasthan) Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan<•i, and the
decision of this larger Bench was pronounced on the
9th April, 1962. Since the Act has been passed by
the Assam Legislature with the previous sanction
of the President directly as a result of the decision
of this Court in the case of Atiabari Tea Co., the
present proceedings can be appropriately· described
··
as an after-math of the said decision.
It appears that 487 persons moved the Assam
High Court by writ petitions under Art. 226 of the
Constitution impeaching the validity of the Act.
These writ petitions were considered by a Division
Bench of the said High Court and they were allowed
on the 1st August, 1963. The two learned. Judges
who constituted the Division Bench have delivered
concurring judgments and held that the Act is inva1id.
On some of the points urged by the petitioners before
them, the two learned Judges have differed; but,:
in the result, they agreed in taking the view that the
operative provisions of the Act were unconstitu(1) [1961] I S.C.R. 809.
(2) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491.
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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tional. The respondent State of Assam then moved
the High Court for certificates to enable it to come
Khyerbari Tea to this Court in appeal against the decision of the
Co. Ltd. & Anr. High Court in the said 487 writ petitions. The High
. v.
Court has granted certificates,· but the said appeals
The State of will take long to become ready; and so, 12 of the
Assam
petitioners who are respondents in some of the said
-appeals were allowed to intervene in the present
GaJendragadka,.proceedings. In fact, by arrangement between Mr.
J.
Mazumdar who appeared for the petitioners before
us and· Mr. Pathak who represents the interveners,
the principal argument has been urged before us
by Mr. Pathak and we expressly told Mr. Pathak
that since our decision on the present writ petition
would govern the decision of the appeals which the
respondent is going to bring to this Court against the
decision of the Assam High Court, we would permit
him to raise all points in support of the view taken
by the Assam High Court and would not confine
him to the points which have been taken by the petitioners in their petition before us. In fact, the Assam
Judgments in question have been filed by the Interveners, and Mr. Pathak has invited our attention
to the main findings recorded in those judgments.
Normally, counsel for interveners is not allowed a
right of reply, but having regard to the fact that
Mr. Mazumdar requested us to allow Mr. Pathak to
lead him in the present proceedings, we have allowed
both Mr. Pathak and Mr. Mazumdar to open the ·
case, and have beard both of them in reply.
1963
Petitioner No. 2's case is that petitioner No. l•
the company, carries on the business of manufacturers~
wholesale dealers and exporters of tea at JalpaigurI
in the State of West Bengal. The business of the
said garden is managed by petitioner No. 2 and is
subject to the control and direction of the company.
Naturally, · the remuneration and prospects of petitioner No. 2 depend upon the good and economical
management and the prosperity of the business of
the Company. The petition avers that at all material
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983
times the company exported the tea grown and manu1963
factured by it in its tea garden by Railway from
Garopara Railway Station in the district of Jalpaiguri Khyerbari Tea
to the Calcutta port. It is common ground that Calcutta Co. Ltd. & Anr.
Port is the principal tea market in the country for sale
v.
for consumption at home as well as for export overseas. The State of
According to the petition, the tea was delivered packed
Assam
in chests to the North Eastern Railway Administra- . - tion at Garopara Rly. Station and the rate charged Ga1endragadkar
by the said Administration was paid to it for carrying
J;
the goods to Calcutta. It is clear that both the booking
station and the station of destination are in the State
of West Bengal. When the tea thus travels from
Garopara to Calcutta, it has to traverse a short distance of about 67 miles through Assam to Dhubri
Ghat, on the bank of the River Brahmaputra. It
appears that by an arrangement between the Railway and the I.G.N, and R.S.N. Co. Ltd. these goods
are taken over by ferries on inland waterways and
are transhipped to steamers at the said Ghat. The
steamers then carry the goods through the Brahmaputra in Assam up to Mankachar; the distance
between Dhubri-Ghat and Mankachar is about l t
to 2 miles. In their journey, the steamers cover
a distance of about 572 miles in Pakistan territory,
and then they reach the Calcutta Port. The total
distance covered by the journey of the goods is about
689 miles. Petitioner No. 2 contends that the material
provisions of the Act are invalid, because the Assam
Legislature was not competent to enact the said
provisions. It is also urged that the said provisions
are unconstitutional because they constitute an un·
reasonable restriction on the freedom of trade guaran•
teed by Art. 301, as well as petitioner No. 2's funda-.
mental right guaranteed by Art. 19(J)(g) of the Con·
stitution. The validity of the Act is also challenged
on some other grounds which would be dealt with.
later.
These pleas are denied by the respondent and
it is urged on its behalf that the Act is constitutional,
that it has been passed under Art. 304(b) after obtain-
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
ing the previous sanction of the President; that its
material provisions are in 110 sense unreasonable
Khyerbari Tea and that the restrictions imposed by them on the
Co. Ltd. & Anr. freedom of trade are reasonable restrictions and are
v.
required in the public interest. It is also alleged
The State of that the said restrictions are reasonable and in the
Assam
interests of the general public and as such, they are
saved by clause (6) of Art. 19.
Gajendragadkar ·
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eiore ea1mg wit t ese content10ns, It Is
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necessary to indicate at the outset the effect of the
two judgments to which we have already referred.
In the case of the Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd.<1 ), three views
were expressed. Sinha C.J., held that the freedom
conferred by Art. 301 did not mean freedom from
taxation simpliciter but only from the erection: of
trade barriers, tariff walls and imposts which had
a deleterious effect on the free flow of trade, commerce
and intercourse. According to his view, the earlier
Assam Act did not contravene Art. 301 and was
valid. This view put a somewhat narrow construction on the scope and effect of the provisions contained in Art. 301.
Shah J., on the other hand, placed a very wide
construction on the said provision and held that the
freedom of trade guaranteed by the said Article
included not only freedom from discriminative tariffs
and trade barriers but also from all taxation on commercial intercourse. As such, he held that the said
Act was unconstitutional.
c The majority view was that the freedom of trade
guaranteed by Art. 301 was wider than that contained
ins. 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which
meant that taxes which directly and immediately
impeded the .freedom of trade would come within
the mischief of Art. 301. According to this view,
A'rt. 301 ·provides that the flow of trade shall run
smooth and unhampered by any restriction either
at the boundaries of the States or at any other points
inside the States themselves; and if any Act imposes
· a,ny direct restrictions on .the movement of goods,
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985
it attracts the provisions of Art. 301. On the majority
1963
view, if the impugned tax imposes a restriction on
the movement of trade, the Act could be sustained Khyerbari Tea
if it complied with the provisions of Art. 304(b). Co. Ltd. & Anr.
In regard to the Act with which the Court was, then
v.
concerned, the majority judgment observed that it The State of
may be that one of the objects in passing the Act
Assam
was to enable the State Government to raise money . - to keep its roads and w&terways in repairs; but that GnJendragadkar
object may and can be effectively achieved by adopJ.
ting another course of legislation; if the said object
is intended to be achieved by levying a tax on the
carriage of goods, it can be so done only by satisfying
the requirements of Art. 304(b).
In the Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd.
case( 1 ), the majority view expressed by Das J. on
behalf of himself and Kapur & Sarkar JJ was that
if a tax is compensatory in character, it cannot be
said to fall within the mischief of Art. 301. According to this view, a clarificatory rider was added to
the majority view expressed in the case of the Atiabari
Tea Co. Ltd.< 2 > by providing that regulatory measures
or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the
use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Art. 301,
and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the provisions of Art. 304(b).
Subba Rao J., who delivered a separate judgment concurring with the conclusion reached by
Das J., preferred to emphasise that taxing statutes
which would escape the mischief of Art. 301 could
be appropriately described as regulatory. He, therefore, held that the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (No. 11 of 1951) with which the Bench was
dealing, was regulatory in character and as such,
not· unconstitutional. In other words, whereas Das,
Kapur and Sarkar JJ., upheld the validity of the Act
on the ground that it was either compensatory or
regulatory, Subba Rao J., preferred to base his
decision mainly on the ground that it was regulatory.
0) [1963] I S.C.R. 491.
(2) [1961] I S.C.R. 809.
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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The minority view which has been expressed
by Hidayatullah J., on behalf of himself and Ayyangar
Khyerbari Tea and Madholkar JJ., assumed that though regulatory
Co. Ltd. & Anr. taxing statutes may be said to fall outside Art.30, comv.
pensatory taxing statutes cannot make the same claim.
The State of According to this view, if a taxing statute was sought
Assam
to be justified on the ground that the tax imposed by
. it was compensatory in character, that could be done
Ga;endragadkar only by adopting the procedure prescribed by Art.
J.
304(b). It may be noticed that the scope of the regulatory statutes as discussed by Hidayatullah J., is much
narrower than the scope of the regulatory statutes as
considered by Subba Rao J.
In the result, the majority view expressed in the
case of the Atiabari Tea Co.ell, was substantia!1y
accepted by the majority of the learned Judges constituting the larger Bench which heard the Automobile
Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd.c•l case, but a corollary
was added to the said view as we have just indicated.
The majority view in the Atiabari case<ll proceeded on the basis that the Australian decisions which
dealt with the scope and effect of s. 92 of the Australian Constitution would be of no assistance in construing the effect of the provisions in part XIII of our
Constitution, because the legislative, historical and
political background, the structure and the effect of
the relevant provisions contained in Part XIII were
in material particulars different from those of s. 92
of the Australian Constitution; s. 92 is absolute in
terms and on its literal construction,· admits of no
exceptions. The Australian decisions, therefore, had
to introduce distinctions, such as compensatory or
regulatory tax laws in order to take laws answering
the said description out of the purview of s. 92.
In our Constitution, however, tho ugh Art. 301 is worded
substantially in the same way as s. 92, Art. 302 and
304 provide for reasonable restrictions being imposed
on the freedom of trade subject to the requirements
of the said two Articles, and so, the problem facing
judicial decisions in Australia and in this country
1963
(1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 809.
(2) [1963] l s.c.R. 491.
•
..
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
987
1963
in ragard to the freedom of trade and the restrictions
which it may be permissible to impose on it, is not
exactly the same. The minority view expressed by Khyerbari Tea
Hidayatullah J., has pointedly referred to this aspect Co. Ltd. & Anr.
of the matter. That, in brief, is the position of the
v.
two decisions of this Court in Atiabari Tea Co. The State of
Ltd.cu and Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd.< 2 l
Assam
cases respectively. ·
Gajendragadkar
••
•
-
It would immediately be noticed that though the
majority view in the Automobile Transport (Rajasthan)
casec 2 > substantially agreed with the majority decision
in the case of Atiabari Tea Co.<l>, there would be a
clear difference between the said two views in relation
to the scope and effect of the provisions of Art. 304
(b). According to the majority view in the case of
Atiabari Tea Co., if an Act is passed under Art. 304(b)
and its validity is impeached, then the State may seek,
to justify the Act on the ground that the restrictions
imposed by it are reasonable and in the public interest,
and in doing so, it may, for instance, rely on the fact
that the taxes levied by the impugned Act are compensatory in character. On the other hand, according to
the majority decision in the Automobile Transport
(Rajasthan)< 2> case, compensatory taxation would
be outside Art. 301 and cannot therefore, fall under
Art. 304(b). If in the present case it had been urged
before us that the tax levied by the Act is compensatory
in character, it would have been necessary to consider
the question once again by constituting a larger
Bench. It will be recalled that the Act with which
we are concerned has been passed by the Assam
Legislature directly as a result of the decision of this
Court in Atiabari Tea Co.'s caseCl>; that decision was
that if the tax imposed by the Act was compensatory
in character then the Act could be sustained only if
it was passed after complying with the provisions of
Art. 304(b). The Assam Legislature has accordingly
adopted the said procedure and passed the Act.
If the Act had been compensatory in character, it
would have become necessary for us to consider the
(1) [1961] 1 S.C.R 809.
(2) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491.
J.
988
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
whole position once again, because it would obviously
be unfair and unjust that the earlier Act should have
Khyerbari Tea been struck down though it was compensatory in
Co. Ltd. & Anr. character and in testing the validity of the present
v.
Act, it should be open to the petitioners to contend
The State of that its compensatory character is irrelevant to the
Assam
enquiry under Art. 304(b). In the present case,
the Assam High Court which dealt with the 487 writ
Gajendragadkar petitions has found that the Act is not compensatory,
J.
and Mr. Setalvad has not urged before us that the
Act is in fact compensatory. That is why we are
proceeding to deal with the merits of the dispute
between the parties in the present case on that basis.
The main question, therefore, would be that the tax
imposed by the Act not being compensatory in character, are there any reasons to justify the respondent's
contention that the restrictions imposed by it are
reasonable and in the public interest? ·
1963
Let us then consider the broad features of the
Act and its material provisions before dealing with
the several points urged before us. The Act consists
of 34 sections. As we have already noticed, the
Bill was introduced after obtaining the previous
sanction of the President, and the Act has been passed
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 304(b).
The preamble to the Act provides that the Act has
been passed to provide for the levy of a tax on certain
goods carried by road or on inland water-ways in
the State of Assam and to validate certain taxes imposed on goods carried by road or on inland waterways and for certain other connected matters. Section
1(3) provides that the Act shall be deemed to have
had effect as from the 24th April, 1954, and shall
remain in force till the 31st March, 1962. In other
words, the Act takes effect from the date when the
earlier Act was to have taken effect, and its life continues for one year after it received the assent of the
President and became effective. Section 2, inter
alia, defines a producer as meaning "a producer
of tea and includes the person in charge of the garden
where tea is produced." The Act is concerned with
-
r
.
.
•
~
•···· >
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
tea and jute, but in the present proceedings, we are
1963
dealing with the petitioners whose interest lies in tea.
Section 3 of the Act deals with the liability to tax, Khyerbari Tea
and since its validity is seriously impugned by the Co. Ltd. & Anr ·
petitioners, it is necessary to read it:
v.
"(l) Sub'~ect to the prov1S1ons
··
of
of th'1s Act, TheAState
.
d
ssam
there shall be lev1e a tax on (a) manufactured
__ _
tea and (b) jute in bales carried by motor vehicle, Gajendragadkar
cart, trolley, boat, animal and human agency
J.
or any other means except railways and airways
in such manner and in respect of such period
and at such rate as specified in the Schedule.
(2) Such tax levied on manufactured tea
shall be realised from the producer and· that
levied on jute shall be realised from the
dealer;
Provided that where tea is sold at the factory
premises, the producer shall be liable for realisation of tax from the purchaser with effect from
such date as the Government may, by notification, appoint, for the carriage of such tea as
provided in this section and the producer shall
be liable for the payment of such tax notwithstanding the fact that the tea is not carried by
the producer;
Provided further that no tax shall be levied
under this Act on any jute or tea in respect of
which such tax has already been paid."
Section 4 provides that the tax shall be charged on
the total net weight carried during a return period.
Section 5 deals with the problem of determining the
weight. Section 6 prescribes the taxing authorities.
Section 7 requires the return to be submitted by the
producer and makes appropriate provisions in that
behalf. Section 8 deals with licensing; s. 9 covers
the problem of assessment and it provides that the
Commissioner may, by an order in writing, assess
the producer and determine the tax payable by him
on the basis of his return. Section l 0 deals with
cancellation of assessment; s. 11 makes a provision
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
for assessment in cases of evasion and escape and
authorises the Commissioner within two years of the
Khyerbari Tea expiry of the period in question to serve on the proCo. Ltd. & Anr. ducer a notice requiring him to furnish a return,
v.
and empowers him to proceed to assess or re-assess
The State of the producer as provided by it. Section 12 deals
Assam
with rectification. Section 13 provides for penalty
-for non-submission of returns and evasion of taxes.
Gajendragadkar Under s. 14 it is provided that assessment is no bar
J.
to prosecutions and penalties. Section 15 makes
the tax payable by the representative of a deceased
producer. Sections 16 and 17 deal with appeals
and revision, while s. 18 prescribes for the computation of the period of limitation for the said two remedies. The notice of demand is provided for by
s. 19, and the period when the tax is to be paid is
laid down by s. 20. Section 22 prescribes the mode
of recovery; s. 23 provides for refunds; and s. 24 for
employers' prosecution for failure to furnish returns.
Section 25 provides that no court shall take cognizance
of any offence under the Act or under the rules made
under it, except with the previous sanction of the
Commissioner. Section 26 permits composition of
offences. ·section 27 imposes an obligation on the
producer to maintain and preserve account books;
s. 28 confers power on appropriate authorities to
require the production of accounts. Section 29 bars
civil suits. Section 30 empowers the appropriate
authority to take evidence; s. 31 deals with the delegation of powers; s. 32 confers power on the Government to make rules; s. 33 repeals the earlier Act of
1954 and s. 34 makes provisions by way of validation.
Since this last section has also been challenged, it
is necessary to read it:
1963
"34. (1) Any rule made, any liability incurred,
any tax levied or realised, any returns furnished,
any proceedings commenced, any notification
published, any action taken or anything whatsoever done under the provisions of the Act
repealed, shall be deemed to have been made,
incurred, levied, realised, furnished, commenced,
5 S.C.R.
....
•
-
a)'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
991
published, taken or done under the corresponding
1963
provisions of this Act.
h'
. d.
Khyerbari Tea
. h t di
(2) N otw1t
s an ng anyt mg contame m any c Ltd & A
judgment, decree or order of any court, all taxes o. ·
nr.
imposed or realised or purporting to have been Th ;· 1 0if
imposed or realised under the Act repealed
e ae
Assam
shall for all purposes be deemed to be, and to
have been, validly imposed or realised and Gajendragadkar
accordinglyJ.
(a) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any court against
the Government or any person or authority
whatsoever for the refund of any taxes
so paid; and
(b) no court shall enforce any decree or order
directing the refund of any taxes so paid."
The Schedule to the Act gives the rates for respective
periods and these rates correspond to the rates prescribed by the earlier Act for the period covered by
it and prescribes new rates for the period thereafter. Rules have been made under s. 32(1) and
Forms prescribed for the making of returns. That,
in brief, is the scheme of the Act.
It has been urged before us by Mr. Pathak that
s. 3 which is the charging section, is outside the legislative competence of the Assam Legislature. The
Act purports to have been passed by virtue of the
legislative power conferred on the State Legislature
under Entry 56 in List II of the Seventh Schedule.
This Entry reads thus: "Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways." It
will be recalled that Entry 30 in List I deals with carriage
of passengers and goods by railway, sea or air, or
by national waterways in mechanically propelled
vessels, and so, Entry 56 in List II does not cover
cases falling under Entry 30 in List I. It is only in
regard to goods and passengers carried by road or
inland waterways that the State Legislature can pass
a law imposing taxes. Mr. Pathak's contention is
thatis. 3 read with the proviso to sub-section (2)
992
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
clearly contemplates that the primary and the sole
liability to pay the tax on tea has been placed on the
Khyerbari Tea producer even in cases where the tea in question
Co. Ltd. & Anr. may have been sold at the tea garden before it is carried.
v.
In other words, the contention is that in cases where
The State of tea is carried by the purchaser, it is only the purchaser
Assam
of the tea which is carried who can be taxed, and
. -since the producer is taxed even in such cases, the
Ga;endragadkar taxation itself is beyond the legislative competence
J.
of the State Legislature. This argument proceeds
on the assumption that the proviso lends colour
to the construction of s. 3(2). Section 3(1) is enacted
in terms of Entry 56 and it purports to indicate what
the taxable event is. Section 3(2) makes the producer ·
liable to pay the tax and the proviso to s. 3(2) enables
the producer to recover the tax from the purchaser
with effect from such date as the Government may,
by notification, appoint; this date was notified as
1st May, 1961. It is clear that the proviso is prospective,
but Mr. Pathak suggests that the proviso can be
explained only on the basis that s. 3(2) includes cases
where tea has been sold by the producer before it
is carried, and in that sense the producer has been
made liable to pay the tax even in regard to tea which
has been sold by him.before it is carried.
1963
--
'
On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad argues that
s. 3(2) is confined to cases where the producer him~
self carries tea and his suggestion is that the proviso
which has been added by the present Act and which
was not included in the earlier Act seeks to make the
purchaser liable to pay the tax in case tea which is
carried has been purchased by him before it leaves
the garden. He wants us to read the proviso as
creating an obligation on the purchaser to pay the
tax and as making the producer liable to recover the
tax from the purchaser as the Agent of the State.
In support of his argument that s. 3(2) cannot be
read to include cases where tea has been sold before
it is carried, Mr. Setalvad has referred us to the fact
that when the corresponding provision in the earlier
Act was construed by the Assam High Court, it was
J
.
\A
......
.I" f"'
-
5S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
993
held that where tea is sold before it is carried, the pro1963
ducer is not liable and no tax can be recovered from
him, vide H.P. Barua v. State of Assam(!).
He Khyerbari Tea
also emphasises the fact that the proviso is pros- Co. Ltd. & Anr.
pective in operation, and so, it indicates that it cannot
v.
lend colour to the construction of section 3(2).
The State of
.
Assam
It 1s, however, not easy to accept Mr. Setalvad's
_
construction. The words used in the proviso show Gajendragadkar
that the producer has been made liable for realisaJ
tion of the tax from the purchaser, but there are no
·
words imposing a liability on the purchaser to pay
the tax and no penalty is prescribed in case he fails
to pay the tax to the producer. The relevant forms
prescribed for making returns, also continue to be
the same as under the old Act and do not contemplate
cases where the purchaser may have to make returns.
In the present proceedings, we are not concerned
with the case of any purchaser, and so, it is unnecessary
for us to pronounce a definite opinion on the construction of s. 3. We would, therefore, proceed to deal
with Mr. Pathak's argument on the basis that s. 3(2)
makes the producer liable even in cases where tea
has been sold by him to a purchaser before it is carried
away from the garden.
This argument of legislative incompetence seems
to assume that Entry 56 requires that the tax must be
levied by the State legislature on goods which are
carried only against the owner of the goods that are
carried, or against the persons who carry ·them.
We do not see any justification for introducing such
limitations in the said Entry. It is hardly necessary
to emphasise that Entries in the three Lists in the
Seventh Schedule which .confer legislative competence
on the respective Legislatures to deal with the topics
covered by them must receive the widest possible
interpretation; and so, it would be unreasonable
to read in the Entry any limitation of the kind which
Mr. Pathak's argument seems to postulate. Besides,
it is well-settled that when a power is conferred on
the Legislature to levy a tax, that power itself must
(1) A.LR. 1955 Assam 249.·
1 SCI/64··-63
994
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
be widely construed; it must include the power to
impose a tax and select the ariticles or commodities
Khyerbari Tea for the exercise of such power; it must likewise include
Co. Ltd. & Anr. the power to fix the rate and prescribe the machinery
v.
for the recovery of the tax. This power also gives
The State of jurisdiction to the Legislature to make such provisions
Assam
as, in its opinion, would be necessary to prevent
-.
the evasion of the tax. In imposing taxes, the legisGafendragadkar lature can also appoint authorities for collecting taxes
J. ·
and may prescribe the procedure for determining
the amount of taxes payable . by any individual;
all these provisions are subsidiary to the main power
to levy a tax and, therefore, once it is shown that the
tax in question has been levied on goods carried,
it would be open to the legislature to prescribe the
machinery · for recovering the said tax. As was
observed by Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch
v. Maryland( 1> "the power of taxing the people and their
property is essential to the very existence of Government, and may be legitimately exercised on the
objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent
to which the Government may choose to carry it".
This statement of the law must, however, be read
subject to the condition that even tax statutes have
to satisfy the test of reasonableness prescribed by clause
(6) of Art. 19, and the fundamental right of equality
before law guaranteed by Art. 14 as well as the test
prescribed by Art. 301.
Reverting then .to s. 3(1), we ought to add that
the said section in terms expressly makes the carriage
of goods the taxable event, and s. 3(2) makes the
producer liable to pay the tax only on goods carried.
If the goods produced in the tea garden are not carried,
there is no occasion to pay the tax. That being so,
the fact that the Legislature has adopted the machinery
of making the producer responsible for the payment
of the tax and liable for it in that sense cannot
introduce any element of legislative incompetence
which would vitiate the statute.
It may be conceded that when the legislature
constructs a machinery for the recovery of the taxes
1963
(1) [1819] 4 L. ed. 579, 607.
I
-
-
-
-
-
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
995
which it is within its competence to impose, the said
1963
machinery should have some rational or intelligent
connection with the tax. In the absence of a rational Khyerbari Tea
nexus between the producer and the tax on goods Co. Ltd. & Anr.
carried, it may be open to a citizen to contend that
v.
the tax is not one justified by Entry 56. But can we The State of
say that between the producer of tea and the tax
Assam
which is levied on the tea carried from his garden, . there is no rational nexus? Considerations of admi- Ga1endragadkar
nistrative convenience as well as considerations of
J.
facility in recovering the tax cannot be treated as
irrelevant in this context. The tea which is taxed
has been produced by the producer and even when
he sells it to a purchaser, it is obvious that it would
be carried away and not left with the producer, and
so, the legislature may have thought that it would be
appropriate to make the producer liable to pay the
tax.
It may also be relevant to bear in mind that the
cases of sale of tea before it is carried cannot be too
many. As we have already seen, the earlier Act
did not include the proviso and that seems to suggest
that usually, it is the producers who produce the tea
in their gardens and carry it to Calcutta either for
sale, or for home consumption, or for export. In
fact, the petitioners before us are producers who have
carried· their own product from their tea gardens to
Calcutta, and we were told that amongst the 487
persons who movedl,,the Assam High Court by their
writ petitions, not one was a purchaser; everyone
was a producer who carried his own goods. Apart
from these facts, however, it is impossible to sustain
the argument that it is not competent to the legislature
to devise a proper and appropriate machinery to
recover a tax which it is competent to the legislature
to levy.
This question has been frequently considered
by this Court and the power of the Legislature to create
appropriate machinery to recover a tax, or to prevent
the evasion of the payment of the tax has been consi-
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
~
stently recongised. In R. C. Jail v. Union ofIndiac 1> while
dealing with the question · about the power of the
Khyerbari·Tea legislature to decide at what stage and from whom
·Co. Ltd. & Anr. excise duty should be recovered, this Court held that
Y. ·
subject always to the legislative competence of the
The State of taxing authority, the tax can be levied at a convenient
Assam
stage so long as the character of the impost is not
--~
lost. The method of collection does not effect the
Gajendragadkar essence of the duty but only relates to the machinery
J.
of collection for administrative convenience. While
enunciating this principle, this Court, however, took
the preeaution of adding that "whether in a particular
case the tax ceases to be in essence an excise duty
and the rational connection between the duty and the
person on whom it is imposed ceased to exist, is to be
decided on. a fair construction of the provisions of a
particular Act".
'1963
Jn Sardar Baldev Singh v. Commissioner of
lncome"tax, Delhi & Ajmerc•>, this Court was called
upon to consider the validity of s. 23A of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922. At the relevant time, the
said section gave power to the appropriate authority
to make an order that the undistributed portion of
the assessable income of the company shall be deemed
to have been distributed as dividends and provided
that thereupon the proportionate ~hare thereof of
each shareholder shall be included in his income for
assessment. The argument which was urged before
this Court was that the Companj"'and its shareholders
are different persons and, therefore, s. 23A was invalid inasmuch as under entry 54 of List I a law· could
be passed imposing a tax on a person on his own income.
This argument was, however, rejected because this
Court took the view th~t the Entries in the Lists
should be read in a very wide manner so as to include
all subsidiary and ancillary matters. That is why
Entry 54 was held to. authorise not only the imposition of a tax, but also an enactment which prevents
the .tax being evaded .
. (!) [1962] Supp._3 S.C.R. 436.
(2) [1961] .l S.C.R. 482.
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME1\'COURT REPORTS
997
1963
Similarly, in the Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. The
State of Orissa<ll, this Court has observed that the
power to legislate with respect to a tax comprehends Khycrbari Tea
the power to impose the tax, to prescribe machinery Co. Ltd. & Anr.
for collecting the tax, to designate the officers by whom
v.
the liability may be enforced and to prescribe the The State of
authority, obligations and indemnity of those officers.
Assam
Therefore, we do not think Mr. Pathak is right 'in . - - .
contending that merely because in a few cases where Ga1endragadkar
'• tea may be sold at the garden before it is carried,
J.
the producer is made liable to pay the tax, s. 3 itself
is outside the legislative competence of the Assam
• Legislature .
,
-
'
Then, Mr. Pathak argues that the Act which
has been passed under Art. 304(b) cannot act retrospectively. The argument is that when an Act is passed
under Art. 304(b) after introducing the Bill with the
previous sanction of the President, it must always
and in every case operate prospectively. The scheme
of Part XIII according to Mr. Pathak, clearly shows
that if the State Legislature wants to avail itself of
the provisions of Art. 304(b), it cannot purport to.
pass an Act in the first instance without taking recourse to Art. 304(b) and if the said Act is struck
down, then take recourse to the said Article and
make the law retrospective. If the State Legislature
makes a law without taking recourse to Art. 304(b)
and the law is struck down, the matter must end there
and the provisions of the said law cannot be revived
by a subsequent law passed under Art. 304(b) by
making its operation retrospective. If such a process
is allowed, it would materially affect the significance
and the validity of the provisions contained in Art.
301 ; that is one aspect of the matter.
The other aspect of the argument is that a law
passed under Art. 304(b) really imposes restrictions
and so, the principle that a law creating prohibitions
can operate only prospectively, must govern the
present case. In support of this argument, Mr.
Pathak has relied on the decision of the Privy Council
(I) [1962) I s.c.R. 549.
'
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
1963
in the case of Punjab Province v. Dau/at Singh< 1 >.
In that case, the Privy Council had occasion to deal
Khyerbari Tea withs. 5 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act (Indian
Co. Ltd. & Anr. Ac~ XIII of 1900) considered in the light of the prov.
visibns of s. 298 of the Government of India Act,
The State of 1935. Section 298(2) provides that nothing in this
Assam
section shall affect the operation of any law which
. (a) prohibits, either absolutely or subject to excepGa1endragadkar tions, the sale or mortgage of agricultural land there/.
in described. The Privy Council held that s. 5 of ·•
the. impugned Act which created such a prohibition
could not operate retrospectively because the word
"prohibits" can only mean the forbidding of a transac•
tio~, and such a direction is appropriate only in respect of transactions to take place subsequently to
the'date of the direction, and cannot include an attempt
to reopen or set aside transactions already completed,
or to vacate titles already acquired. It would thus
be seen that this decision turned essentially upon
the use of the word "prohibits" in s. 298(2) , and so,
it would be unreasonable to extend the said decision
to the cases falling under Art. 304(b) particularly
· when the restriction imposed is not of such a character
as to amount to prohibition.
· A similar argument was in fact rejected by this
Court in the case of M .P. V. Sundararamier & Co.
v. The State of Andhra Pradesh< 2 >. What was urged
before this Court in that case was that the principle
laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Punjab
Province< 1 > should be extended to a Jaw to which
Art. 286(2) of the Constitution applied. In rejecting! this contention this Court observed that the
Privy Council's decision proceeded solely on the
connotation of the word "prohibits" in s. 298(2)
of the Government of India Act, 1935, and can be
of no assistance in the construction of Art. 286(2)
wherein the word does not occur. What this Court
has observed about Art. 286(2) as it formerly stood
in the Constitution applies with greater force to Art.
304(b}. It is true that there are some provisions
(1)173 I.A. 59.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 1422.
I
5 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
in the Constitution which prohibit retrospective
1963
legislation as, for instance, Art. 20(1) & (2) vide M/s
West Ramnand Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Khyerbari Tea
State of Madras< 1 >.. But Art. 304(b) cannot be Co. Ltd. & Anr.
construed to mean that a Jaw passed under it must
v.
in every case be prospective. If a Statute is passed The State of
under Art. 304(b) retrospectively, its reasonableAssam
ness may, of course, fall to be considered on the merits . - in a given case but that is not to say that in no case Ga1endragadkar
can a statute be passed under the sain Articles to
J.
operate retrospectively.
Then as to the argument about the scheme of
Part XIII, we do not see how a statute passed under
Art. 304(b) would always and necessarily defeat the
said scheme if its provisions are made retrospective.
It is not disputed by Mr. Pathak that a taxing statute
can be passed retrospectively, and it is conceded that
if such a statute is passed, it would not be possible
for any person to challenge its validity on the ground
that it affects the citizens' fundamental right under
Art. 19(1)(g). If such a challenge is made, it would
be easily met by the plea that a taxing statute, though
retrospective in its operation, can be reasonable
and in the public interest within the meaning of clause
(6) of Art. 19. Therefore, if a taxing statute can,
in a given case, operate retrospectively and its validity
cannot be successfully challenged under Art. 19,
we do not see how a similar challenge could be sustained agains.t a taxing statute which has been passed
under Art. 304(b). The freedom of trade guaranteed
by Art. 301 is no doubt of very great importance
to the political and economic unity of the country;
but the freedom guaranteed to the individual is no
less important; just as in the case of a challenge to
the validity of a statute under Art. 19 the court has
to consider whether the restrictions imposed by the
statute are reasonable and in the interests of the
general public, so in dealing with a challenge to the
validity of a statute passed under Art. 304( b)
the court has to consider whether the restrictions
(1) (1963J 2 s.c.R. 747 p. 761.
1000
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
impdsed by it are reasonable and are required in the
public interest. The impact of the restrictions on
Khyerbari Tea the individual's right has to be judged in one case,
Co. Ltd. & Anr. whereas the impact of the restrictions on the freedom
v.
of trade has to be judged in the other; but basically,
The State of it is jthe invasion of a guaranteed right whose validity
Assam
is being examined in either case; and so, if the law
-can be retrospective in one case, there is no reason
Gajendragadkar why it cannot be retrospective in the other. We
J.
are, ,therefore, satisfied that there is no substance in
the plea raised by Mr. Pathak that the Act is invalid
solely because it operates retrospectively.
It is then faintly suggested that the retrospective
operation of s. 3, in substance, changes the character
of the tax. The argument is that the proviso to s. 3(2)
enables the producer to recover the tax from the purchaser in case the goods are sold to a purchaser before
they' are carried, whereas such a provision did not
exist in the past and in that sense, the retrospective
operation changes the character of the tax. We
have already noticed that the proviso in question is
not 'retrospective in operation, and so, this argument
has to be tested by reference to the remaining portion
of s. 3(2). Thus tested, it is difficult to accept it
as sound. In this connection, we may refer to the
recent decision of this Court in Rai Ramkrishna
v. State of Bihar<U where a similar plea was
rejected and it was pointed out that this Court has
consistently held that the mere fact that a validating
statute operates retrospectively does not justify the
contention that the character of the tax sought to
be recovered by such retrospective operation is necessarily changed.
The next question to consider in dealing with
the validity of the Act which has been passed under
Art. 304(b) is the extent of the dispute that is justifiable in law. Art. 304(b) provides that notwithstanCiing anything in Art. 30 l or Art. 303 the Legislature: of a State may by law impose such reasonable
restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or
1963
I
(1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 897.
•
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,
......
S S.C.R.
.,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1001
intercourse with or within that State as may be re1963
quired in the public interest, provided that no Bill
or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall Khyerbari Tea
be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State Co. Ltd. & Anr.
without the previous sanction of the President. It
v.
would thus be clear that an Act passed under Art. The State of
304(b) can be held to be valid if it is shown that the
Assam
restrictions imposed by it are reasonable and in the . - public interest. It is true that before a Bill is introduced Ga1endragadkar
in that behalf, the previous sanction of the President
J.
has been obtained; but that does not take away the
jurisdiction of the Court to consider the question
as to whether the Act passed with the previous sanction
of the President satisfies the requirements of Art.
304(bJ. Since Art. 304(b) permits restrictions to
be imposed on the freedom of trade, the Constitution has made it clear that the said restrictions can
be sustained only if they are reasonable and are required in the public interest. This position is not
disputed by Mr. Setalvad before us. lt is true that
in the case of Atiabari Tea Co.(ll, whilst contrasting
the provisions of Art. 302 with those of Art. 304(b)
the majority judgment has observed that prima facie
the requirement of public interest may be said to
have been satisfied by the previous sanction of the
President and it is only the reasonableness of the
restrictions which may fall to be considered in proceedings before the Court. However, this point did
not directly arise for the decision of the Court, and
so, those observations should not be read as definitely
expressing the opinion that the requirement of public
interest does not become the subject-matter of adjudication in proceedings before the Court when
the validity of an Act passed under Art. 304(b) is
questioned.
That takes us to the question about the onus of
proof in these proceedings. It may be that in most
cases, the questionaboutthe onus of proof would turn
out to be merely of academic importance, because
when one considers the reasonableness of a given
(I) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 809
1002
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
restriction, one inevitably enquires also whether the
said restriction is not unreasonable; but since the
Khyerbari Tea point about the onus has been argued before us,
Co. Ltd. & Anr. it is necessary that we should deaJ with
it. Mr.
v.
Setalvad contends that in dealing with the question
The State of about the constitutionality of any statute, we must
Assam
drawl an initial presumption in favour of the constitu. -tionality of the statute, and he suggests that this initial
Ga1endragadkar presumption will cover even the requirement that
1·
the restriction must be reasonable and in the public
interest as required by Art. 304(b). The same argument has been urged by him in regard to the presumption in so far as the petitioners' fundamental right
under Art. 19 (l)(g) is concerned. He urges that in
deterinining the content of the individual's fundamental right under Art. 19(1 )(g), we must take into
account Art. 19(l)(g) as well as the limitations placed
on it by clause (6) of Art. 19. The fundamental
right to carry on the trade is not an absolute right;
it can be regulated and controlled by law which imposes restrictions on the said right, provided the
said restrictions are reasonable and in the interests
of the general public, and so, the contention is that
whertl we speak about the initial presumption of constitutionality, it means that the court should assume
that the restrictions imposed by the statute are reasonable and in the interests of the general public, unless
the contrary is shown.
On the other hand, Mr. Pathak strenuously argues
that the initial presumption would be rebutted as
soon '.as it is shown that the fundamental right under
Art. 'l 9(1 )(g) is invaded by a statute, or the freedom
of trade guaranteed by Art. 301 is assaulted by the
impugned statute. Once a citizen shows that the
impugned statute invades either his individual fundamental right, or the right of freedom of trade, the
presumption has worked itself out and the onus
shifts to the State to show that the invasion amounts
to a !restriction which is reasonable, or it is in the
interests of the general public.
Tt may be conceded that, prima facie, there is
some :force in the argument raised before us by Mr.
1963
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1003
Setalvad. · If the freedom guaranteed to an individual
1963
citizen is not absolute and its content must be determined by reading Art. 19(1)(g) and clause (6) of Art. Khyerbari Tea
19 together, it can perhaps be said that the initial Co. Ltd. & Anr.
presumption cannot be rebutted merely by showing
v.
that the freedom under Art. 19(l)(g) has, prima Jacie, The State of
been invaded. But we do not think it necessary
Assam
to pursue this matter any further, because we are . - satisfied that the question rais.ed by Mr. Setalvad Ga;endragadkar
is concluded against him by a decision of this Court.
J.
•
•
In Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.PPl where ../
this Court was dealing with the invasion of the citizens' fundamental right under Art. 19(l)(g), it has
been observed that when the enactment on the face
of it is found to violate a fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(l)lgJ, it must be held to be invalid,
unless those who support the legislation can bring
it within the purview of the exception laid down in
clause (6) of Art. 19. If the respondents do not place
any materials before the Court to establish that the
legislation comes within the permissible limits of
clause (6J, it is surely not for the appellants to prove
negatively that the legislation was not reasonable
and was not conducive to the welfare of the community.
It is true that on several occasions, this Court has
generally observed that a presumption of constitutionality arises where a statute is impeached as being unconstitutional, but as has been held in the case of Saghir
Ahmadn> in regard to the fundamental right under
Art. 19(1 )(g) as soon as the invasion of the right is
proved, it is for the State to prove its case that the
impugned legislation falls within clause (6) of Art.
19. · The position may be different when we are
dealing with Art. 14, because under that Article the
initial presumption of constitutionality may have
a larger sway inasmuch as it may place the burden
on the petitioner to show that the impugned law
denied equality before the law, or equal protection
of the laws. We may in this connection refer to the
observations made by this Court in the case of Hamdard
(I) [1955) I. S.C.R. 707, 726.
1004
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
[1964]
I
Dawal~hana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi v. Union of
Indid 1
Another principle which has to be borne
Khyerbari Tea in mind in examining the constitutionality of a statute,
Co. Ltd. & Anr. it was observed, is that it must be assumed that the
v.
legislature understands and appreciates the needs
The State of of the' people and the laws it enacts are directed to
Assam
problems which are made manifest by experience
and that the elected representatives assembled in
Gajendragadkar a Iegi~lature enact laws which they consider to be
reasonable for the purpose for which they are enacted.
Presumption is, therefore, in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment. It is significant that
all the decisions to which reference is made in support
of this statement of the law are decisions under Art.
14 of the Constitution. Mr. Setalvad has fairly
conceded that in view of the decision of this Court
in the: case of Saghir Ahmad( 2 >, it would not be open
to him to contend that even after the invasion of the
fundamental right of a citizen is proved under Art.
19(I)(g), the onus would not shift to the State. In
our opinion, the said decision is a clear authority
for the proposition that once the invasion of the fundamental right under Art. 19(1) is proved, the State
rirnst justify its case under cl. (6) which is in the nature
of an exception to the main provisions contained
in Art. 19(1). The position with regard to the onus
woulp be the same in dealing with the law passed
unde~ Art. 304(b ). In fact, in the case of such a
law, 1the position is somewhat stronger in favour
of the citizen, because the very fact that a law is
passed under Art. 304(b) means clearly that it purports to restrict the freedom of trade. That being
so, we think that as soon as it is shown that the Act
invad'es the right of freedom of trade, it is necessary
to enquire whether the State has proved that the
restri~tions imposed by it by way of taxation are
reasonable and in the public interest within the meaning of Art. 304(b). This enquiry would be of a similar
character in regard to cl. (6) of Art. 19.
That naturally takes us to the question as to
whether the respondent has shown that the restric1963
•
1
1
(1)
[1960] 2 S.C.R. 671, 679.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 707, 726.
5 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1005
tions imposed by the Act by levying a tax on the
1963
movement of tea can be said to be reasonable and in
the public interest. The decision of this question will Khyerbari Tea
inevitably involve the balancing of the importance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
of freedon of trade as against the requirements of
v.
public interest. Art. 304(b) necessarily postulates The State of
that considerations of public . interest may require
Assam
and justify the imposition of restrictions on the freedom
of trade, provided they are reasonable. In deter- Gajendragadkar
mining the reasonableness of the restrictions we will
J.
have to bear in mind again the importance of
freedom of trade and the requirements of public interest. It is a question of weighing one relevant consideration against another and harmonisii:ig both the
competing interests so as to serve the public interest
in the end. This process of assessment may not
always be easy, but, nevertheless, we must try
to weigh the pros and cons urged before us by both
the parties and decide whether the tax levied by the
Act satisfies the requirement prescribed by Art. 304l b).
In support of his case, Mr. Pathak has emphasised
the fact that the producer has been made liable for
goods even when they are sold before they are carried.
In other words, the argument which he urged in support
of his case that the Act was beyond the legislative
competence of the State Legislature, has been again
pressed by him into service in support of the plea
that the restriction is unreasonable. We are not
impressed by this plea.
It is then urged that the serious infirmity in the
Act is that it levies a flat rate in respect of goods
carried. Normally, the method which should have
been adopted by the Act is what is sometimes described as the ton-mileage method, i.e., levy the tax
according to the weight of the goods carried and the
distance over which they are carried. Since the Act
imposes a flat rate merely on the weight, the burden
imposed by it is unreasonable.
On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad strongly urges
that the tax constitutes a reasonable restriction in
the public interest, because it purports to raise revenue
1006
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
for public purposes. As we have already seen,
tax laws have to stand the scrutiny of Art. 19. That be-·
Khyerbari Tea ing so, as soon as the validity of a tax law is challenged.
Co. Ltd. & Anr. under Art. 19, the State would be entitled to rely
v.
on the fact that the revenue raised by the tax law
The State of serves public purpose and that is its basic justiAssam
fl.cation for being treated as a reasonable restriction on
-the individual's fundamental right under Art. I 9(1 )(g).
Gajendragadkar It would, therefore, follow that the consideration
J.
on which Mr. Setalvad relies is not irrelevant, though
its significance and importance cannot be over-rated.
In this context, it may, however, be legitimate to bear
in mind that the revenue is required by the State to
raise money in order to carry on the function of
government and to sustain the manifold welfare
activities undertaken by it. Similarly, the fact that
the President has given previous sanction to the:
introduction of the Bill may conceivably be
relevant, because the Constitution seems to contem-·
plate that the sanction of the President would
indicate that the Central Government had applied
its mind to the problem and had come to the conclusion that the proposed tax is reasonable and in the public interest. But we must hasten to add that the signi..
ficance of his consideration cannot also be exaggerated.
Mr. Setalvad urges that evidence in the case:
shows that the State has levied the tax on the goods
carried because it wants to utilise the income for the:
purpose of keeping the roads in order and to meet
the huge expenses incurrred in maintaining the
waterways in the State. In the affidavit filed on
behalf of the respondent, details have been given
about the expenditure incurred by the State on roads
and waterways from year to year, and the revenue
received by it form the carriage tax during the same
period. The affidavit points out that tea and the
jute are the main products of the State of Assam
and in order to have a regular and easy flow of trade,
the State has to maintain the roads. The trade in
these commodities through waterways is cheaper and,
therefore, the State has also to incur large sums on
maintaining the waterways The statement filed in
1963
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1007
the affidavit clearly shows that every year the ex1963
penditure incurred is very much more than the
revenue received from carriage tax. It may perhaps Khyerbari Tea
be that since the ton-mileage method has not been Co. Ltd. & Anr·
adopted in imposing the tax, the State may not be
v.
able to claim that the tax is compensatory in character. The State of
Usually, compensatory character may be claimed for
Assam
a tax of this kind, provided the extent of the service
-rendered by the State by raising the tax is shown and Gajendragadkar
it is also proved that the recovery of the tax has some
J.
relation to the rendering of the said service. That
is why Mr. Setalvad has not argued that the tax in
question is compensatory in character. He, however,
suggests that under Art. 304(b) it would be open to
hitn to sustain the restriction imposed by the tax on
the ground that the tax is levied not merely to raise
general revenue for the State which itself is a public
purpose, but that the tax is raised and utilised for
keeping the waterways and the roads in good condition
in the State. In our opinion, there is considerable
force in these contentions.
Then we turn to the main point urged by Mr.
Pathak that the flat rate introduces an element of
unreasonableness in the levy of the tax. It is necessary
to bear in mind that having regard to the interests
of the trade as a whole, a flat rate may in some cases
be reasonable. If different rates are levied by reference
to the distance over which the tea is carried before
it reaches the Calcutta Port, it would obviously mean
that some producers of tea would have to pay more
taxes than others and that would. introduce an element of unfair competition between the producers
of tea considered as a class. We are referring to
this aspect of the matter to emphasise the fact that
the legislature has to consider several relevant factors
before deciding how a particular tax should be levied.
The law of taxation is in the ultimate analysis the
result of the balancing of several complex considerations, and so, it would be unreasonable to insist upon
·the application of a general rule that if a tax is levied
at a flat rate, it must be treated as unreasonable.
1008
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
In the present case, the legislature may have c:onsidered
the requirements of the trade carried on by the proKhyerbari Tea ducers of tea and may have thought that a flat rate
Co. Ltd. & Anr. would be just and fair to the trade as a whole. These
v.
are questions which must normally be left to the
The State of legislature to decide. Therefore, we do not think
Assam
that the main ground on which the reasonableness
. -of the tax levied by s. 3 was impeached by Mr. Pathak,
Ga1endragadkar can be sustained.
J.
Mr. Pathak further contended that s. 34 of the
Act is unconstitutional inasmuch as it is discriminatory and imposes an unreasonable restriction on the
citizens' fundamental right to trade under Art. 19(l)(g).
We have already cited s. 34. The argument that the
restriction imposed by s. 34 is unreasonable, proceeds
on the assumption that sub-section (2) prohibits a
producer from ventilating his grievance against irregular, excessive, or illegal levy of the tax before any
forum, and such a prohibition, it is urged, is patently
unreasonable. We are satisfied that the assumption
on which the argument is founded is completely
misplaced. What s. 34(2)(a) prohibits is merely
a suit or the other proceeding in any court. It does
not prohibit the remedy of an appeal or revision specifically provided by sections 16 & 17 of the Act.
1963
Then it is urged that s. 34(1) makes an invidious
distinction between producers who had been ordered
to pay the tax under the earlier Act and who took no
steps to challenge the said levy either by an appeal
or revision, and those who had adopted the remedy
of an appeal or revision under the said Act. In the
case of the latter category of producers the appeals
and revisions would be continued and dealt with as
though the said proceedings had been adopted under
the relevant provisions of the Act, whereas assessments which had been closed under the earlier Act
cannot be reopened by the producers by filing an
appeal or revision after the Act was passed. We do
not think there is any substance in this argument.
Persons who had taken proceedings by way of appeal
or revision under the earlier Act are, on this argu-
. ,,
j
-
-
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._ 5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1009
1963
) ment, treated as of the same class as persons who
had taken no such proceedings, and that, in our
opinion, is not justified because the two categories Khyerbari Tea
are not same or similar in character. Besides, an Co.Ltd. &Anr.
argument of this kind is purely hypothetical and not
v.
based on any material facts. It is very difficult to The State of
assume that producers who were taxed under the
Assam
earlier Act paid the tax without preferring an appeal
or revision though they had a grievance against the Gajendragadkar
':. validity or regularity of the assessment order. ThereJ.
' fore, we do not think the challenge to the validity
of s. 34 can be sustained.
A similar challenge has been made against the
validity of s. 24 which prescribes punishment for the
three categories of offences specified by it under
clauses (I), (2) & (3). The argument is that since
the earlier Act was struck down as unconstitutional,
• if any producer had knowingly submitted false returns
or had knowingly produced incorrect account, or
had contravened the relevant provision of s. 8(1),
it could not be said that he was guilty of any offence,
• · and so, he could not have been prosecuted under the
corresponding provision of the earlier Act which
also was s. 24, that being so, s. 24, of the present
Act which purports to operate retrospectively would
,,. be invalid. There may be some force in this contention; but we do not see how the petitioners can
be permitted to challenge the validity of s. 24 when
it is not alleged by them that any action is proposed
~ to be taken against them under the said section.
In dealing with petitions under Art. 32, this Court
would naturally confine the petitioners to the provisions of the impugned Act by which their fundamental rights are either affected or threatened, That
is why we are not satisfied that it is necessary to decide
· the question about the validity of s. 24 in the present
proceedings.
That takes us to the question whether the tax
. levied by the Act can be said to be discriminatory
.· ,\ and as such, unconstitutional because it has selected
_, only tea and jute as objects of taxation. The argument
I
1/SCI/64-64
1010
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
appears to be that the legislature should have taxed ( · other commodities along with tea and jute and in
Khyerbari Tea so far as only tea and jute have been selected for
Co.Ltd. &Anr. the purpose of taxation, Art. 14 has been contravened.
v.
This argument is entirely fallacious. It is not disThe State of puted that tea and jute are the main products of the
Assam
State of Assam and it is not surprising that the Assam
.. - Legislature, therefore, levied tax on the said two
Gajendragadkar articles. Besides, the legislature which is competent
J. ·
to levy a tax must inevitably be given full freedom (
to determine which articles should be taxed, in what
manner and at what rate, vide Raja Jagannath Baksh
Singh v. The State of U.P.<1>.
It would be idle to
.
contend that a State must tax everything in order to
tax something. In tax matters, "the State is allowed ·. _ ··.
to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods ·
and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably.
The Supreme Court of the United States of America .,
has been practical and has permitted a very wide latitude
This approach
in classification for taxation"< 2 >.
has been approved by this Court in the case of East
India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh.<3>.
1963
tJ'
It is, of coursl';, true that the validity of tax laws
can be questioned in the light of the provisions of
Arts. 14, 19; andArt. 301 if the said tax directly and
immediately imposes a restriction on the fre:edom
of trade; but the power conferred on this Court to
strike down a taxing statute if it contravenes the
provisions of Arts. 14, 19 or 301 has to be exercised
with circumspection, bearing in mind that the power
of the State to levy taxes for the purpose of governance and for carrying out its welfare activities is a
necessary attribute of sovereignty and in that sense
it is a power of paramount character. In what cases
a taxing statute can be struck down as being unconstitutional is illustrated by the decision of this Court
in K.T. Moopil Nair v. The State of Kera!a< 4 >.
In that case, a careful examination of the scheme
of the relevant provisions of the Travancore-Cochin
~
~
L<.
(I) ·[1963] I S.C.R 22.0. (2) Willis on 'Constitutional Law' p. 587.
(3) [1963) I S.C.R. 404, 409.
(4) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77. "4 '
~I
5 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1011
Land Tax Act (No. 15 of 1955) satisfied this Court
1963
that the said Act imposed unreasonable restrictions
on the fundamental rights of the citizens, conferred Khyerbari Tea
unbridled power on the appropriate authorities, in- Co.Ltd. & Anr.
troduced unconstitutional discrimination and in conv.
sequence, amounted to a colourable exercise of legisla- The State of
tive power. It is in regard to such a taxing statute
Assam
which can properly he regarded as purely confiscatory that the power of the Court can be legitimately Gajendragadkar
invoked and exercised. In our opinion, it would
J.
· be idle to suggest that a tax imposed by the Act in
the present case should he struck down because it
has taxed only tea and jute.
The next contention to which reference must
be made is that the Act is a colourable exercise of
legislative power and should also be regarded as
confiscatory for the reason that it has been passed
substantially for the purpose of validating the recoveries made under the earlier Act and enforcing
the assessment orders passed under the Act. We
have already seen that the Act is retrospective in
character and came into force from the date on which
the earlier Act was applied. We have also noticed
that the prospective operation of the Act was limited
to one year from the date on which it was published.
In fact, a subsequent Act had been passed by the
Assam Legislature (Act No. 16 of 1962) and this
Act has adopted a somewhat different procedure and
prescribed a different machinery for the recovery of
the tax imposed by it. Section 3 of this Act makes
the owner liable to pay the tax and s. 2(7) defines
the owner as meaning the owner of a taxable vehicle
and includes in that category the four types of persons
specified by clauses (a) to (d) of s. 2(7). The argument, therefore, is that the Act was deliberately
passed by the legislature merely for the purpose of
recovering dues to which it had originally made a
claim under the earlier Act which was unconstitutional and that, it is suggested, makes the Act open
to the charge that it represents a colourable exercise
of legislative power. We are satisfied that there is
1012
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
no substance in this argument. It is not disputed
that the power to make a law necessarily includes
Khyerbari Tea the power to make the provisions of the law retroCo.Ltd. & Am'. spective. It is also not disputed that it is within the
v,
competence of a legislature to pass validating Acts,
The State of because the power to pass such validating Acts is
Assam
essentially subsidiary to. the main power of legisla.tion on the topics included in the relevant List. ThiereGa1endragadkar fore, if the legislature felt that the infirmity in the
J.
earlier Act could be cured and it proceeded to comply
with the requirements of Art. 304(b), it cannot be
said that a law passed under Art. 304(b) is void,
because the legislature has thereby attempted to recover
taxes which could not be recovered under the earlier
Act owing to the constitutional infirmity in the said
Act. , The exercise of legislative power which 'has
resulted in the passing of the present Act cannot,
in our opinion, be said to be colourable in any sense.
Is the Act extra-territorial in its application?
That is the next question which calls for an answer,
In support of the plea of extra-territoriality, it is
urged 'that the petitioners are all residents of Bengal,
that they carry on their tea business in Calcutta,
and it is only on the very narrow ground that in its
passage from tea garden to Calcutta the tea in question
has to cross a distance of a mile and a half in Assam
that the tax purports to make the producers from Bengal
liable under s. 3(2). This argument also is entirely
misconceived. Entry 56 in List II empowers the
Assam Legislature to levy a tax on goods carried.
Whether the goods are carried. for a long distance
or a short distance cannot effect the question of the
legislative competence of the legislature. It is the
carriage goods through Assam that is the taxing event
and since the physical carriage of goods through a
part of Assam is not denied, it is difficult to see how
a challenge to the validity of the Act on the ground
that it is extra-territorial in character could be sustained.
The doctrine of nexus has been applied in considering
the validity of tax statutes in this country in the Tata
Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihm·O). Das
1963
.
(1) [1958] s.c.R: 1355.
·
(
.
\
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·~
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5 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1013
C.J., who spoke for the Court has examined the genesis
1963
of the doctrine of nexus, has considered the relevant
judicial decisions bearing on the point and has expressed Khyabari Tea
the conclusion of the Court that the said doctrine Co Ltd, & Anr.
can be invoked to sustain the validity of tax statutes.
v.
The nexus in question must be rational, but it would The State of
be impossible to accede to the argument that the
Assam
sufficiency of nexus can be a matter for adjudication
before the Court. In the present case, undoubtedly, Gajrndragadkar
tea has been carried over a part of the inland waterways
J.
in Assam and that satisfies the test of nexus. The
argument of extra-territoriality must, therefore, fail.
Mr. Mazumdar has urged before us three subsidiary points in addition to the points argued by
Mr. Pathak. He contends that the tax levied
by the Act is invalid because a tax can be levied on
goods carried only if the said goods join the mass of
goods in the taxing State. In the present case, the
goods had not entered the mass of goods in the State
of Assam at any stage; they just travelled for a very
short distance on their way from the tea garden to
the Calcutta Port and that cannot attract a tax under
Entry 56 of List II. In support of this argument,
Mr. Mazumdar has invited our attention to the decision of this Court in The Central India Spinning
and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., the Empress
Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, fVardha< 1 >.
In that case, this Court was considering the
scope and effect of s. 66(1)(c) of the C.P. and Berar
Municipalities Act, 1922, and the decision turned
upon the true interpretation of the words "imported
into''. In that connection, the legislative history
of the octroi duty was examined and it was held that
the concept of import requires that the goods
which are brought into must mix up with the mass
of the property in the local area where the goods
are alleged to have been imported. If the gqods
are just carried and not mixed with the mass of the
property in the area through which they are can;ied,
they cannot be said to have been imported into that
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1102.
1014
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
area. We do not see how this decision which turned
essentially upon the true significance of the concept
Khyerbari Tea of import can have any relevance where the tax with
Co.Ltd. & Anr. which we are concerned is a tax on goods carried.
v.
The word "carried" is of much wider denotation, and
The State of it would be unreasonable to limit its scope b)! introAssam
ducing considerations which are relevant in dealing
. .with the question of import. Therefore, we do not
Ga;endragadkar think that the attempt to challenge the validity of
J.
the Act on the ground that the carried goods which
are taxed do not join the mass of goods in the State
of Assam, can succeed,
1963
Mr. Mazumdar has also urged that so far as the
petitioners' goods are concerned, they are substantially carried by the railway and should, therefore,
be held to be outside the purview of s. 3 of the Act.
We have already seen that the operation of the Act
is confined to the goods carried by road or by an inland waterways and the goods carried entirely by
the railway are outside its scope. The question which
Mr. Mazumdar has raised before us is that having
regard to the long distance which the tea chests have
travelled between the tea gardens and the Calcutta
Port, it should be held that a short distance of 1!
to 2 miles which they travelled by inland waterways
does not alter the character of their journey; it is,
on the whole, a journey made by the railway, and so,
the goods must be deemed to have been carried by
railway throughout. This argument also is misconceived. As we have just indicated, the length of the
distance over which the goods are carried has no
relevance to the point. It is the physical fact of carriage
of goods through a part of Assam that attracts the
levy of the tax imposed by s. 3. Besides, the definition
of railway to which Mr. Mazumdar invited our attention contained in s. 3 of the Indian Railways Act
(No. 9 of 1890) itself shows that the carriage of the
goods over the inland waterways cannot be brought
within the scope of the definition. Section 3(4)
:iefines the railway as meaning a railway, or any portion of a railway, for the public carriage of passengers,
(
-
't
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I
I
_ ) 5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
1963
animals or goods, and includes, inter alia, all
ferries, ships, boats and rafts which are used on inland
waters for the purposes of the traffic of a railway Khyerbari Tea
and belong to or are hired or worked by the authority Co.Ltd. &Anr.
administering the railway. It is common ground
v.
that the ferries by which tea chests of the petitioners The State of
are carried over the inland waterways in Assam do
Assam
not belong to the railway, nor are they hired or worked
by the authority of the railway to which the goods Gajendragadkar
) were consigned for carriage. In fact, s. 74E of the
J.
Railway Act which, after amendment, has become
s.76D in 1961, clearly brings out the fact that when
any goods arc: tendered to a railway admini~tration
for carriage by railway and have been booked thwugh
over a railway or any other transport system not
belonging to the railway administration, the person
who tenders the goods shall be deemed to have contracted with the railway and the said other transpl>rt
system separately. Therefore, the argument based
on the fact that the goods have been entrusted to
the railway for through carriage, and so, the carriage
. of the goods should be held to be outside the purview
of s. 3 of the Act, cannot be sustained.
'
-j
'
That leaves only one more point urged by Mr.
Mazumdar to be considered. Mr. Mazumdar contends that the tax is invalid for the' reason that tea
which is one of the objects taxed has been covered
by the O!ntral Tea Act (Act No. 29 of 1953) and
he argues that since the Central Act has been passed
by reference to the relevant Entry in List I in the Seventh
Schedule, it is not open to the State Legislature to
pass a taxing statute in respect of tea. It is true that
the Tea Act has made several provisi6ns in regard
to tea and has constituted a Board to deal with the
problems enumerated in the other provisions of the
said Act; but one has merely to glance through
the relevant provisions of the Tea Act to realise that
the scope and purpose of the said Act is entirely
different from the scope and purpose of the taxing
Act with which we are concerned. The pith and
substance of the taxing statute is the levy of a tax
(
1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964] ( .'._
1963
on tea which is carried in the State of Assam and the
right to levy such a tax cannot be said to have been
Khyerbari Tea taken away merely by the fact that a Tea Act had been
Co. Ltd. & Anr. passed by the ·Central Legislature which is referable
11 •
to the relevant Entry in List I of the 7th Schedule.
(I
The State of The power to levy a tax which has been conferred
Assam
on the State Legislature by Entry 56 cannot, therefore,
be said to be controlled by the Tea Act in question.
.Ga;endragadkarlt would be noticed that List I does not contain any (
1·
Entry by which the Central Legislature can pass an
Act levying a tax on goods carried which can be said
to control Entry 56 in List II. That being so, we,
must hold that there is no substance in the argu- t
ment that the State Legislature has no power to levy \ _
a tax on tea which is carried over a part of the area
of the State of Assam.
A similar argument was urged by Mr. Mazumdar
on the strength of the provisions contained in the
River Boards Act, 1956 (No. 49 of 1956). Mr.
Mazumdar suggested that the Brahmaputra River
over a part of whose stream the tea chests are carried ','
is governed by the provisions of the River Boards
Act and that imposes a ban on the power of the Assam
Legislature to pass an Act in respect of goods carried
over the Brahmaputra River. What we have said
i,
about the objection raised by Mr. Mazumdar on the
strength of the' Tea Act applies with equal force to
the present argument.
The result is, the petition fails and is dismissed
with costs.
,
·-
Sarkar J.
SARKAR J.-1 agree that the petition fails but I
wish to say a few words of my own.
The petition challenges the validity of the Assam
Taxation (on Goods Carried by Road or on Inland
Water-ways) Act, 1961. (Act 10 of 1961), passed
by the Legislature of the 'State of Assam. There
are two petitioners, one of whom is a limited company
and cannot, therefore, admittedly maintain the petition which is under Art. 32. It is conceded that the
petition is maintainable by the other petitioner, an .
Ii
/
>
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1017
officer of the Company, as he is interested in the
1963
rights of the Company. No question of the
-competency of the petition was, therefore, raised on Khyerbari Tea
behalf of the respondents who are the State of Assam Co.Ltd. &Anr.
and two of its officers concerned with the collection
v.
of the tax under the Act.
The State of
Assam
The petitioner Company is the owner of a tea
estate in Jalpaiguri in the State of West Bengal. One Sarkar J.
of the grounds on which the validity of the Act is
challenged is that the Act imposes an unreasonable
restriction on the trade of the Company. The respondents contend that the Act is valid in view of the
provisions of Art. 304(b) and also cl. (6) of Art. 19
of the Constitution. They say that the restriction
impo8ed by the Act is reasonable. Article 301 of
the Constitution provides that subject to the other
provisions of Part XIII, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free,
and the relevant part of Art. 304 is in these terms:
"Notwithstanding anything in article 301 .........
the Legislature of a State may by law(a) ........................................ ..
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the
freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse
with or within that Stat~ as may be required
in the public interest:
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the
purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or
moved in the Legislature of a State without
the previous sanction of the President."
It is not in dispute that the sanction of the President
contemplated in the proviso to Art. 304(b) had been
obtained in connection with the impugned Act. That
Act had, however, a predecessor which bore the same
title and was Assam Act 13 of 1954 but for which
no sanction of the President under Art. 304(b) had
been obtained. In Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The State
of Assam( 1 ), this Court by a majonty held that as
Act 13 of 1954 imposed a tax on the carriage of
(1) [1961] l S.C.R. 809.
1018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
goods it constituted a direct restriction on the free
movement of trade and as no sanction of the President
Khyerbari Tea had been obtained in respect of it, it was void. No
Co. Ltd. & Anr · question arose there as to the reasonableness of the
v.
restriction imposed by the Act. The other members
The State of of the Court who constituted the minority expressed
Assam
dissenting opinions but no useful purpose will be
served by referring to them. As a result of the opinion
Sarkar J.
of the majority Act 13 of 1954 became void.
Article 301 and the succeeding articles in Part
XIII, including Art. 304, were again considered by
another and a larger bench of this Court in The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. The State of
RajasthanPl Das J., with whose judgment Kapur J.,
and myself were associated, accepted the interpretation of Art. 301 by the majority in the Atiabari
Tea Co. case( 2 ) as correct, but stated that regulatory
measures such as rules laying down speed limit or
lights to be carried by, vehicles and other rules of the
road as also measures imposing compensatory taxes
such as, taxes collected for maintaining the roads
or bridges, were not restrictions within Art. 301
as such measures really facilitated trade rather than
It was, therefore, said by Das J.,
restrict it.
that such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Art. 304(b) of the Constitution. As I apprehend the judgment of Subba
Rao J., in that case, he seems to have taken the same
view though he used the description 'regulatory
measure' to include measures laying down the rule
of the road as also measures intended to raise funds
for construction and maintenance of roads. This
was the opinion of the majority of the Court in that
case. It is unnecessary to refer to the other opinion
expressed in it.
Neither of these cases, however, has any bearing
on the case in hand for it is not contended by the
respondents that the impugned Act was a compensatory measure. It was of course not a regulatory
measure as laying down a rule of the road. Indeed
1963
(1) [1963] l S.C.R. 491.
(2) f1961] 1 S.C.R. 809·
(
'
-
1
••
-
-4
•
)
_.,
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1019
it was not contended that the impugned Act did not
J 963
impose restrictions on the movement of trade. In . view of the sanction of the President which had been Khyerbari Tea
obtained in the present case, the only question con- Co.Ltd. & Anr.
cerning the freedom guaranteed by Art. 301 was
v.
whether the restriction imposed by the Act was reason- The State of
ably required in the public interest. It· was said
Assam
that the impugned Act (Act 10 of 1961) is practically
in the same terms as the predecessor Act of 1954 Sarkar J.
but that by itself would not bring the impugned Act
within the mischief of the decision in the Atiabari
Tea CoP l case for that case held the earlier Act
invahd only on the ground that the sanction of the
President had not been obtained. No question was
canvassed there as to the reasonableness of any restriction imposed by the Act. The sanction of the President, as already stated, was obtained for the impugned
Act. I should however state here that apart from the
point about the reasonableness of the restrictions
imposed on trade by the Act, there were other attacks
on it. These will be mentioned later.
The impugned Act came into force on April
15, 1961, and imposed a tax on manufactured tea
and jute carried by any means other than railway
and airways. This case is not, however, concerned
with any carriage of jute. The Act was given a
retrospective operation as it was to be deemed to
have effect from April 24, 1954, being the date on
which the predecessor Act, (Act 13 of 1954), came
into force. Further, the Act was to remain in force
till March 31, 1962, that is, for about a year only;
see s. 1(3\ It has since been replaced by another
Act, namely, Act 16 of 1962. It may be that as
this last mentioned Act was in contemplation, the
impugned Act was given a short term of life. This
Act further stated that the tax collected under Act
13 of 1954 would be deemed to have been collected
under the corresponding provisions contained in it.
There is one other matter to which I would like
to refer before I proceed to consider the points argued
(I) [1961] l S.C.R. 809.
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
at the bar. I have said that the tea estate of the petitioner Company was in West Bengal and not in
Khyerbari Tea Assam.
Its practice was to book its tea from a
Co. Ltd. & Anr. railway station in West Bengal for carriage to Calcutta
v.
for sale there. Now what the railway did was to
The State of carry the tea to another of its stations called Dhubri
Assam
Ghat on the river Brahmputra situate in Assam.
The railway had arranged for the trans-shipment
Sarkar J.
of the tea there from its wagons to steamers belonging
to a carrier company atDhubri Ghat and these steamers
carried the tea by inland waterways to Calcutta. The
steamers in the course of their journey passed through
one and a half mile or two miles of Assam waterways,
about 572 miles of Pakistan waterways and 165
miles of West Bengal waterways, before reaching
Calcutta. The tax was levied in respect of the carriage
of the tea for about two miles on Assam waterways.
1963
At the hearing in this Court learned counsel
appearing in support of the petition really attacked
only two sections of the impugned Act, namely,
ss. 3 and 34. Section 3, which is the charging section,
is in these terms:
S. 3. (I) Subject to the provisions of this Act,
there shall be levied a tax on (a) manufactured
tea and (b) Jute in bales carried by motor vehicle,
cart, trolley, boat, animal and human agency
or any other means except railways and airways
in such manner and in respect of such period
and at such rate as specified in the Schedule.
(2) Such tax levied on manufactured tea shall
be realised from the producer and that levied
on jute shall be realised from the dealer:
Provided that where tea is sold at the factory
premises, the producer shall be liable for realisation of tax from the purchaser with effect from
such date as the Government, by notification,
appoint, for the carriage of such tea as provided
in this section and the producer shall be liable
for the payment of such tax notwithstanding
·-
'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
1963
the fact that the tea is not carried by the producer:
Khyerbari Tea
x
x
x
x
X Co.Ltd. & Anr.
v.
The first contention was that the section was
The
State
of
beyond the legislative competence of the State LegislaAssam
ture. It is not in dispute that the Act had been passed
under the powers contained in Item 56 of List II
in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which Sarkar J.
authorised a State Legislature to pass laws imposing
"taxes on goods and passengers carried on roads
or on inland waterways". It was said that under
this entry a tax could be levied only on the person
who carried the goods but the proviso to s. 3(2) showed
that even where a producer was not himself carrying the tea, he was liable for the tax and, therefore,
the Act levied the tax not really on goods carried
by road or waterways and was for that reason, ultra
vires the State Legislature and void. It may be
that there is nothing in s. 3 imposing directly a tax on
the purchaser of the tea even when he is the person
carrying it. It seems to me however that under Item
56 of List II it was competent for the legislature to
provide for the tax being realised from the producer
m the way it has been done in the Act. It is wellknown that the entries in the legislative lists have to
be read with all possible width and amplitude. An
entry authorising the levy of a tax of a particular
kind would justify that levy in the manner best suited
for collecting it. The purchasers of tea would be
mostly parties in Calcutta. The State of Assam
may find it difficult to realise the tax from them.
It may, therefore, legitimately provide that the tax
may be realised from the producer even where he
does not carry the tea for otherwise the tax may be
evaded. Then again, under s. 3 tax is leviable only
when tea has been carried by road or inland waterways. It is clear, however, that it was the action
of the producer, namely, the sale by him, which
alone caused the carriage of the tea; without the
sale there would have been no occasion for the
purchaser to carry the tea. If he did not actually
1022.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
carry the tea himself, he certainly brought about
its carriage. Therefore, he might under Item 56
Khyerbari Tea of List II be made liable for the carriage of the tea
Co. Ltd. & Anr. just as much as tht.: person actually carr;:ing it. I
v.
am unable to see why the words of Item 56 of List
The State of II would not cover both.
1963
Assam
Sarkar J.
I do not think it necessary to decide the question
raised at the bar whether the producer mentioned in
sub-s. (2) of s. 3 refers only to a producer who
himself carries the tea produced by him. Even if
the word 'producer' in that sub-section includes
one who does not himself carry the tea, a tax can
be legitimately levied on him when the tea is carried
as a result of its sale by him and for facility of collection of the tax.
It was next said that the proviso in s. 3 may,
if effect is given to it from a past date, impose a tax
on a producer which he could not collect from the
purchaser. It was pointed out that if he was made
liable by the notification mentioned in the proviso
in respect of sales which had already taken place,
he would have to pay the tax personally as the sales
having taken place, he could no more collect the tax
from the purchaser. It was contended that this
would make the restriction put by the Act unreasonable and also make the provision incompetent as
outside Item 56 of List II for the reasons earlier mentioned. It was also said that this would create a
discrimination between producers hit by such retrospective notification and those whose sales came after
the date when the notification was published. All
these reasons, it was contended, would make the
proviso illegal and void. I think the whole contention is imaginary and unfounded. It is based on
the notification being given a retrospective effect
but I am clear in my mind that under the proviso
a notification cannot be issued with retrospective
effect. Under the proviso the producer is made
liable for realisation of the tax from the purchaser
from a date appointed by the notification. The notification, therefore, necessarily contemplates a situation
-)
..
-
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
1963
in which the producer can collect the tax from
a purchaser. He cannot of course do so in respect
of past sales. Therefore, the notification if it appoint- Khyerbari Tea
ed a past date would be incompetent.
Co. Ltd. & Anr.
The next contention is that the Act must be The State
v. of
held to be void as it had been given retrospective
Assam
operation. This contention was founded on the
argument that a statute contemplated by Art. 304(b) Sarkar;.
cannot be retrospective. I am unable to see why
not. Without more, when a legislature has the
power to pass a law it can pass a law having a retrospective operation. This, I do not think, was disputed.
What was said was that the terms of Art. 304 indicated that it was not intended that a retrospective law
would be passed under it. It was argued that the
law contemplated there was one which put restrictions on the freedom of the flow of trade and, therefore, if the trade had once 'flown' it could not be
restricted and so a retrospective effect could not be
given to a law passed under the Article. I am unable
to appreciate this argument. If the flow of trade
in future can be restricted, then I do not see why a
trade which has flown in the past cannot be restrited retrospective!~'. It is not disputed .that a restriction which can be imposed under cl. (6) of Art.
19 can be imposed retrospectively. There is no reason
why the same position should not obtain in regard
to the restrictions contemplated by Art. 304(b).
It was then said that the effect of Art. 304 was
to prohibit the doing of a thing and a prohibition
by its very nature could only be in respect of the future
and, therefore, a retrospective restriction would be
outside the Article. This argument was sought to
be supported by reference to Punjab Province
v. Dau/at SinghC 1 ) where the Judicial Committee
said that where a legislature had power to make a
law prohibiting something, it would not in exercise
of that power prohibit that thing from a past date
because the word 'prohibit' in the nature of it, referred
only to a prospective prohibition. But I do not
(1) L.R. 73 I.A. 59.
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
(-
find any prohibition in Art. 304. The effect of
Arts. 301 and 304 is that the freedom of trade is not
Khyerbari Tea to be restricted by law passed by a State except by
Co. Ltd. & Anr. a law imposing a reasonable restriction on it in the
v.
interest of the public and passed with the sanction
The State of of the President. It then comes to this that the
Assam
freedom can be restricted by a Jaw which has to satisfy
the two conditions. Article 304, therefore, permits
Sarkar J.
and does not prohibit. There is no scope for applying here the Punjab Province caseOJ.
1963
The next point to which I wish to refer is that
the restriction imposed by the tax levied under the
Act is not reasonable. A question was rais1~d as
to on whom the onus to prove the reasonableness
of the restriction lies. It was said that it has been
held by this Court in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of
U.PJ 2 l that the onus lies on the State. It must
be conceded that it does seem to have been so held
there. On the other hand, however, there is a very
large number of cases where it is said that there is
a presumption as to the constitutionality of a statute
and that, therefore, the onus of showing that it is
unconstitutional is on the party so alleging: see the
cases collected in Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal
Kuan v. Union of IndiaC 3 l. No doubt these cases
dealt with the question of constitutionality arising
from discrimination, that is, under Art. 14 of the Constitution, but I am unable to see that that makes a
difference on the question of onus. These cases say
that the presumption of constitutionality arises
because "it must be assumed that the legislature understands and appreciates the need of the people and the
laws it enacts are directed to problems which are made
manifest by experience and that the elected representatives assembled in a legislature enact laws which
they consider to be reasonable for the pupose for
which they are enacted. Presumption is, therefore,
in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment":
Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf)C3)
case at p. 679.
(I) L.R. 73 I.A. 59.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 707, 727.
(3) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671, 679.
(
•
(
·,,
I..,
I
•
-l
•
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1025
If the Legislature is to be presumed to know that an
1963
Act which makes a distinction is justified because
-the people with whom it is concerned are distinguished Khyerbari Tea
from the others by an intelligible differentia having Co.Ltd. & Anr.
a rational relation to the objects of the Act, that
v.
being the test to save a statute from being held to be The State of
discriminatory, then I do not see why it cannot be
Assam
presumed that knowing the people and their needs,
the legislature has passed a law which imposes reason- Sarkar J.
,
able restrictions on their activities. It was said that
the restriction is permitted by cl. (6) of Art. 19 which
• contains an exception and that an exception has to
be proved by the party who wants to take advantage
of it. That does not seem to me to be a proper way
of reading a constitution and this rule of construction
must, in my view, give way to the rule of presumµtion
of constitutionality. It may also legitimately be
said that there is no exception; the real fundamental
right is what is left after the restriction has been imposed
and, therefore, the citizen alleging violation of his
fundamental right must also show that the restriction
r , is unreasonable. It is not necessary to pursue
the matter further or to pronounce finally on it now
because for one thing, the observation in Saghir
Ahmad's (I) case is there and for another, nothing
turns on onus in this case. I have only mentioned
it as it is a matter which, to my mind, requires consideration when the question properly arises.
.
•
•
The first ground on which it was said that the
Act imposed an unreasonable .restriction was that
the rates imposed by it were flat rates. The rates
were prescribed in the Schedule mentioned in s. 3
and different rates were fixed for different periods
of time but in respect of each period there was one
rate, for example, between June 1, 1954, and June 30,
1955, the rate was one pice per pound. The point
made was that the tax being a tax on carriage it becomes
an unreasonable restriction if the tax did not vary
with the distance over which the thing was carried .
Put that way, it would really seem not a question of
(J) [1955] 1 s.c.R. 101, 121.
I SCl/64-65
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
't -
reasonableness but a question oflegislative competence.
I am wholly unable to see that Item 56 in List II
Khyerbari Tea requires that the tax imposed must be measured
Co.Lid. & Anr. according to the distance over which the goods are
v.
carried. Tested by the scale of reasonableness also,
The State of a flat rate does not seem to me to be wanting in that
·Assam
quality. One may well ask why is a flat rate not
reasonable? I find no answer. Why is a rate dependSarkar J.
ing on the distance carried more reasonable? Again ./'
I find no answer. If the rate varied with distance,' \
then it is conceivable that in many cases the burden
would be much heavier. How could that have
<
been more reasonable? The only effect of a flat
rate may be that people who carry for a short distance
pay as much as those who carry a longer distance.
I do not see that this can make the levy unreasonable.
Now let me look at the question from another
point of view. To start with it would not be wrong
to say that since a tax is collected in public interest
and for public good the burden imposed by it on .....' ~
trade would prima facie be reasonable in the public
interest. There is no reason to think that the burden
imposed by this Act is onerous, that it is such as would
crush the trade by putting a weight on it .which it
could not carry. Furthermore it has been established
on the affidavit that the Government spends on roads
and facilities on waterways much more than what
is collected in the shape of tax on the goods carried.
That also is a consideration which goes to establish •
the reasonableness of the levy. The petitioner has
not been able to put before us anything which would
destroy the effect of these considerations. The fact
that the Act imposes the tax with retrospective effect
cannot by itself also make the restriction unreasonable. For the reasons earlier mentioned, it may
still be reasonable.
1963
I now proceed to consider the charge of discrimination. It was said that the Act offended Art. 14
because it taxed only tea and jute and no other article.
But I am unable to see that this is discrimination.
·
•
5 S.C.R.
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1027
The Act applies to all who are concerned with the
1963.
carriage of tea and jute. No doubt it does not apply
to the carriage of other goods but as has been said, Khyerbari: Tea
"it is for the legislature to decide on what objects Co.. Ltd•. &.cAnr;
to levy": see Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The State
v;
of Uttar Pradesh(!). The legislature must pick and The State of
choose and such picking and choosing cannot by
Assam.
itself amount to discrimination. Besides, it is common
knowledge that tea is a very prosperous industry SarkarcJ.
in Assam and is certainly more fit to bear the burden
of taxation than most other industries there.. The
flat rate of tax imposed also. creates no discrimination for it applies the same rate to all. It has not
been shown that in fact a discrimination. has
arisen.
Then it was said that s. 34 of the Act amounted
to a violation of Art. 14. That section is in these
terms:-S. 34. (1) Any rules made, any liability incurred, any tax levied or realised, any returns
furnished, any proceedings commenced, any notification published any action taken or anything
whatsoever done under the provisions of the Act
repealed, shall be deemed to have been macie,
incurred, levied, realised, furnished, commenced,
published, taken or done under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
(2) Notwithstanding anything. contained in any
judgment, decree or order of any court, all taxes
imposed or realised or purporting to have been
imposed or realised under the Act repealed
shall for all purposes be deemed to be, and to
have been, validly imposed or realised and accordingly(a) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any court against
the Government or any person or authority whatsoever for the refund of any taxes
so paid; and
(I) [1963] l s.c.R. 220, 234,
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
(b) no court shall enforce any decree or order
directing the refund of any taxes so paid.
· prevente d peop1e
cKhyerbari
L d &ATea. It was fir st sa1'd that the su b-sect10n
0
1
nr. from whom tax had been collected under Act 13
·
·
v.
of 1954, from taking proceedings in court, while
The State of those subiected to the tax only under the impugned
Assam
.Act wereJ
not so prevente d. I f by 'Proceedings
Sarkar J.
in court' are meant proceedings outside those for
which the Acts provide, then such proceedings cannot
be taken by persons from whom tax is collected under
the present Act either: see s. 29. Therefore the Act
makes no discrimination as alleged. If proceedings
by way of appeal and otherwise for which provision
is made in the Acts themselves are to be considered,
then also there is no discrimination. Under the
earlier Act there were provisions for appeal etc.
and if one had filed an appeal under that Act, that
appeal had to be deemed to have been filed under
the impugned Act. Likewise, in respect of every
other kind of proceeding contemplated in the earlier
Act. If one has not chosen to take these proceedings under that Act, he cannot complain. That would
not be a case of discrimination by the Act but would
be giving up by a party of his rights under it. Therefore the position of a tax payer is the same under
both the Acts.
We were also referred to s. 24 of the Act. That
section provides for prosecution for failure to do
certain things required by the Act to be done. It
was contended that as the section had been given
retrospective operation, it had the effect of making
something which was not an offence when done,
an offence by an ex post facto law. It is not necessary
to go into that question for it is purely academic.
It has not been suggested that the petitioner has been
affected by it.
Another point argued was that the Act was only
a colourable exercise of legislative power under Item
56 of List II. The contention was that the Act had
nothing to do with tax on carriage of goods but
was really passed to retain what had been collected
f,-
1963
<
.
,.
c,
S S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1029
under an Act which this Court had declared invalid.
1963
That of course is not on the face of it wholly correct,
-.
for the Act operated prospectively also. But apart Khyerbari Tea
from that this contention which was based on s. 34(1) Co.Ltd. & Anr.
of the Act is wholly unacceptable to me. Such a
v.
contention would make it impossible to pass an The State of
Act validating a taxing statute. Such Acts have
Assam
very often been passed. A validating Act is passed
under the legislative power under which the invalid Sarkar 1 ·
law had been purported to be passed and it had
been held that where legislative power exists, it could
not be said that the exercise of that power was colourable: Gajapatti Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa(I).
See also M.P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The
State of Andhra Pradesh.(2)
The last thing to which I wish to refer is the
contention that the Act was bad as it had extraterritorial operation. It was said that to· the petitioner it applied only because the tea was carried
over inland waterways in Assam for about a mile
and a half only. Apparently, the argument is that
this distance is too trivial. But it seems to me beyond
question that if the goods were carried for any distance over the territory of Assam, however short
that distance might be, the Assam Legislature would
have full jurisdiction to impose a tax on such carriage.
This point is, therefore, also without any merit.
Mr. Mazumdar raised certain other points and
these have been dealt with by my brother Gajendragadkar. I do not wish to add anything to what he
has said concerning them.
I would, therefore, dismiss the petition.
Petition dismissed.
(I) [1954] S.C.R. 1.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 1422.
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