MOTI RAM DEKA ETC. versus GENERAL MANAGER, N.E.F. RAILWAYS, MALIGAON, PANDU, ETC.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 December 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 683 | 1963 INSC 244
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 December 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO*, K.N. WANCHOO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 711/1962
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 683
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 244
Text of the judgment
5 S.C.R.
683
MOTI RAM DEKA ETC.
l'.
GENERAL MANAGER, N.E.F. RAILWAYS,
MALIGAON, PANDU, ETC.
(With connected appeals)
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N.
WANCHOO, M. HJDAYATULLAH K.C. DAS GUPTA,
J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Civil Service-Termination of services of a permanent servantValidity of Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Railway Establishment
Code vis-a-vis Art. 311(2)-If Rules violate Art. 14-Scope of exercise of Pleasure of President-Basis of superannuation-Rule compulsory retirement when can be applied-Constitution of India,
1950, Arts. 14, 310, 311(2}--Indian Railway Establishment Code,
Vol. I, Rules 148(3), 149(3).
Moti Ram Deka was a peon employed by the North East Frontier Railway and Sudhir Kumar Das was a confirmed clerk. The
General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, terminated their
services under R. 148(3) oflndian Railway Establishment Code,
Vol. I. They challenged the termination of their services but their
writ petitions were rejected by the Assam High Court and they
came to this court by special leave.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Priya Gupta was an Assistant Electrical Foreman in the
North Eastern Railway.
His services were terminated under
R. 148. His writ petition and Letters Patent Appeal challenging
termination of his services having been rejected by Allahabad
High Court, he came to this Court by special leave .
Tirath Ram Lakhanpal was a Guard employed by the Northern
Railway. His services were terminated under R. 148. His writ
petition and Letters Patent Appeal were dismissed by Punjab
High Court and he came to this court by special leave.
S.B. Tewari, Parimal Gupta and Prem Chand Thakur were
employed in the North Eastern Frontier Railway. Their services
were terminated under R. 149. Their writ petitions challenging
termination of their services were accepted by the Assam High
Court and Union of India came to this Court after getting a certificate of fitness from the Assam High Court.
The only question involved was the constitutional validity
or otherwise of Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Indian Railway
Establishment Code on the ground that they violated Arts. 14
and 311(2) of Constitution of India.
Held: By majority by Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, Ayyangar, Subba Rao and Das Gupta JJ.(Shah J. dissenting)
1963
December 5
684
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
that Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of Indian Railway Establishment
Code were invalid.
Moti Ram Deka
Per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah and Ayyangar,
etc.
JJ.
v.
Rules 148(3) and 149(3) are invalid inasmuch as they ate
General
inconsistent with the provisions of Arts. 311(2). The termination
Manager, N.E.F. of the services of a permanent servant which is authorised by those
Railways,
rules, is no more and no less than his removal from service and
Ma/igaon,
hence Art. 311(2) must come into play in respect of such cases.
Pandu, etc. The rule which does not require compliance with the procedure
prescribed under Art. 311(2) must be struck down as invalid.
A person who substantively holds a permanent post has a
right to continue in service, subject to the rules of superannuation
and compulsory retirement. If for any other reason that right
is invaded and he is asked to leave his service, the termination of
his service must inevitably mean the defeat of·his right to continue
in service and as such it is in the nature of a penalty and amounts
to removal. In other words, termination of the services of a
permanent servant otherwise than on ground of superannuation
or compulsory retirement, must per se amount to his removal
and if by R. 148(3) or R. 149(3), such a termination is brought
about, the rule clearly contravenes Art. 311(2) and must be held
to be invalid.'
r
Rules 148(3) and 149(3) contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is difficult to understand on what ground employment
by the Railways alone can be said to constitute a class by itself for
the purposes of framing the impugned rules. If considerations of
administrative efficiency or exigencies of service justify the making
of such a rule, such rules should have been framed in other departments also.
The pleasure of the President has lost some of its majesty and
power as it is controlled by the provisions of Art. 311.
Rules of superannuation are based on considerations of life
expectation, mental capacity of civil servants having regard to
climatic conditions under which they work and the nature of the
work they do. They are not fixed on any ad hoc basis and do not
involve the exercise of any discretion. They apply uniformly
to all public servants falling under the category in respect of which
they are framed. There can be no analogy between the rule of
superannuation and rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Code.
If any rule permits the appropriate authority to retire compulsorily a civil servant without imposing a limitation in that behalf
that such civil servant should have put in a minimum period of
service, that rule would be invalid and the so-called retirement
ordered under the said rule would amount to removal of the civil
servant within the meaning of Art. 311(2).
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SUPREME COURTREPORTS
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Where a rule is alleged to violate the constitutional guarantee
1963
afforded by Art. 311 (2), the argument of contract between the parties
and its binding character is wholly inappropriate.
Moti Ram Deka
Per Subba Rao, J.-Rules 148(3) and 149(3) which confer a
etc.
power on the appointing authority to remove a permanent servant
v.
on notice, infringe the constitutional protection guaranteed to
General
a Government servant under Arts. 14 and 311 ofthe Constitution.
A permanent post and rules such as 148(3) and 149(3) cannot Manager, N.E.F.
stand together and the latter must inevitably yield to the former.
Railways,
Ma/igaon,
It is neither the phraseology nor the nomenclature given to
the act of termination of service that is material but the legal Pandu, etc.
effect of the action taken that is decisive in considering the question
whether a Government servant is dismissed or not. Whetherthe services of a permanent Government servant are terminated by giving him
15 day's notice or whether his services are dispensed with before
the age of superannuation by way of compulsory retirement under
or outside a rule of compulsory retirement, the termination deprives
him of his title to the permanent post. If in the former case it
amounts to dismissal, in the latter case, it must be equally so. In
both cases, Art. 311 (2) is attracted.
Compulsory retirement before age of superannuation is not
an incident of tenure. It does not work automatically. It
is not conceived in the interest of the employee. It is a mode
of terminating his employment at the discretion of the appointing
authority. As a matter of fact, whatever the language used in that
connection, it is a punishment imposed on him. It not only destroys
his title but also inevitably carries with it a stigma and hence such
a termination is dismissal or removal within the meatting of Art.
311.
A title to an office must be distinguished from the mode of
its termination. If a person has title to an office, he will continue
to have it till he is dismissed or removed from there. Terms of
statutory ruJe9 may provide for conferment of a title to an office
and also for the mode of protecting it. If under such rules, a person
acquires title to an office, whatever mode of termination is prescribed and whatever phraseology is used to describe it, the termination
is neither more nor less than a dismissal or removal from service
and that inevitably attracts the provisions of Art. 311 of the
Constitution. The argument that the mode of termination prescribed derogates from the title that otherwise would have been conferred
on the employee mixes up two clear concepts of conferment of title
and the mode of its deprivation. Article 311 is a constitutional
protection given to Government servants, who have title to office,
against their arbitrary and summary dismissal. Government
cannot by rule evade the provisions of Art. 311. Parties also
cannot contract themselves out of the constitutional provision.
Per Das Gupta, J. Rule 148(3) does not contravene Art.
311(2). A railway servant to whom R. 148(3) applied has two
686
[1964]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
limitations put on his right to continue in service, viz., termination
on attaining a certain age and termination of service on a notice
Moti Ram Deka under R. 148(3). Where service is terminated by order of retireetc
men! under R. 2046, the termination is of a service where the
·
servant has no right to continue and it is not removal or dismissal.
v.
Likewise when service is terminated by notice under R. 148(3)
General
that termination is not removal or dismissal.
Manager, N.E.F.
The words 'removal' and 'dismissal' in Art. 311 mean and
Railways,
include only those terminations of service where a servant has
acquired a right to continue in the post on the basis of terms and
Maligaon,
Pandu, etc. conditions of service and such other terminations where though
there is no such right, the order has resulted in loss of accrued benefits. Terminations of service which do not satisfy either of these two
tests do not come within any of these words.
Both Arts. 309 and 310 are subject to Art. 311. If any rule
is made under Art. 309 as regards conditions of service of a Government servant in the matter of his dismissal or removal or reduction
in rank, it has to comply with the requirements of Art. 311. Before
an order dismissing or removing or reducing a Government servant
in rank is made by President or Governor in exercise of his pleasure,
President or. Governor has to comply with the requirements of
311(2). Under Art. 310, all servants of the State hold office during
the pleasure of the President or Governor as the case may be.
That means that the officer has no right to be heard before his
services are terminated. Article 311 provides an exception in
the case of removal or dismissal.
However, R. 148(3) contravenes Art. 14 as it does not give
any guidance for exercise of discretion by the authority concerned
and hence is invalid.
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Per Shah, J. Rules 148(3) and 149(3) do not infringe Art.
311(2) or Art. 14 of the Constitution. There is neither logic nor
law in support of the contention that r. 148(3) contravenes Art.
311(2). The termination of employment under r. 148(3)doesnot
involve the public servant concerned in loss of any rightwhichhe
has already acquired. It does not amount to loss of a post to
which he is entitled· under the terms of his employment because
the right to a post is necessarily circumscribed by the conditions
of employment which include r. 148(3). It also does not cast
any stigma upon him.
'
Mere determination of employment of a public servant, whether
he is a temporary employee, a probationer, a contractual appointee
or appointed substantively to hold a permanent post, will not
attract the provisions of Art. 311(2) unless the determination
is imposed as a matter of punishment. A railway servant who
has accepted employment on the conditions contained in the rules,
cannot after having obtained employment, claim that the conditions
which were· offered to him and which he accepted, are not binding
upon him. The sole exception to that rule is in cases where .the
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1963
condition prescribed by contract or statutory regulations is void
as inconsistent with the constitutional safeguard.
This exception
is founded not on any right in the public servant to elect, but on the Mo ti Ram Deka
invalidity of the covenant or regulation. There is no distinction
etc
between cases of termination of employment resulting from attaining
·
the age of superannuation or from orders of compulsory retirement,
v·
terminating temporary employment or employment on probation
General
and orders terminating employment after notice under R. 148(3). Manager, N.E.F.
Railways,
An appointment to a public post is always subject to the
Maligaon,
pleasure of the President, the exercise of such pleasure being
restricted in the manner provided by the Constitution. A person Pandu, etc.
appointed substantively to a post does not acquire a right to
hold the post till he dies. He acquires merely a right to
hold the post subject to the rules. If employment is validly termi..nated, the right to hold the post is determined even apart from the
exercise of the pleasure of the President or the Governor. A
public servant cannot claim to remain in office so long as he is
of good behaviour. Such a concept of the tenure of a public
servant's post is inconsistent with Arts. 309 and 310 of the Constitution.
Rules 148(3) and 149(3) do not infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution. Art. 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The
special conditions in which the railways have to operate and the
interests of the nation which they serve, justify the classification.
If for the purpose of ensuring the interests and safety of the public
and the State, the President has reserved to the Railway Administration power to terminate employment under the Railways, it cannot
be assumed that such vesting of authority singles out the railway
servants for a special or discriminatory treatment'so as to expose
the rule which authorises termination of employment to the liability to be struck off as infringing Art. 14.
It is true that R. 148(3) does not expressly provide for guidance
to the authority exercising the power conferred by it, but on that
account, the rule cannot be said to confer an arbitrary power and
be unreasonable or be in its operation unequal. The power is
exercisable by the appointing authority who normally is if not
the General Manager, a Senior Officer of the Railways. In considering the validity of an order of determination of employment
under r. 148, an assumption that the power may be exercised malafide and on that ground discrimination may be practised, is wholly
out of place. Because of the absence of specific directions in
R. 148, governing the exercise of authority conferred thereby,
the power to terminate employment cannot be regarded as an
arbitrary power exercisable at the sweet will of the authority,
when having regard to the nature of the employment and the
service to be rendered, importance of the efficient functioning of
the rail transport in the interest of national economy and the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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status of the authority invested with the exercise of power, it may
reasonably be assumed that the exercise of ·the power would
Moti Ram Deka appropriately be exercised for the protection of public interest or
tc
on grounds of administrative convenience. Power to exercise
e ·
discretion is not necessarily to be assumed to be a power to disv. .
criminate unlawfully and possibility of abuse of power will not
General
invalidate the conferment of power.
Manager, N.E.F.
Case law referred to.
Railways,
Maligaon,
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Pandu, etc. Nos. 711-713 of 1962.
1963.
.. .'
Appeals by special leave from the judgments
and order dated May 27, 25, 1960, of the Assam
High Court in Civil Rule Nos. 3 and 25of1960 res-.
pectively and December 15, 1959 of the Allahabad
High Court in Special Appeal No. 502 of 1958.
CIVIL APPEAL No. 614 OF 1962.
Appeal by special· leave from the order dated
April 6, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Letters
Patent Appeal No. 81/1961.
CIVIL APPEALS Nos. 837 TO. 839 ~F 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
January 18, 1963 of the Assam High Court in Civil
Rule 386 to 388 of 1961.
B.C. Ghose and P.K. Chatterjee, for the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 711 to 713/1962).
J.M. Lall and V.D. Mahajan, for the appellant
(in C.A. Nos. 714 of 1962). ·
S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N aunit
Lal and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in C.A.
Nos. 711-714i1962).
C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy
Jyar and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellants (in C.A.
Nos. 837-839;1963).
B.C. Ghosh andP.K. Chatterjee, for the respondents
(in C.A. Nos. 837-839/1963).
·
R.K. Garg, M.K. Ramamurthi, S.C. Agarwal
and D.P. Singh, for the intervener (in C.A. No. 711/
1962.J
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689
R.K. Garg and P.K. Chatterjee, for the intervener
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1963
(in C.A. Nos. 837-839/1963).
Moti Ram Deka
December 5, 1963. The Judgment of P.B. Gajendraetc.
gadkar, K. ·N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and N.
v.
Rajagopala Iyyangar, JJ. was delivered by Gajendra- M Gener# E F
gadkar J. K. Subba Rao, and K.C. Das Gupta JJ. 0 ';.!7(' Y~ • ·
delivered separate Opinions. J.C. Shah J. delivered a Mal;~OI;
dissenting Opinion.
·
Pandu, etc'.
GAJENDRAGADKAR J. These two groups of appeals have been placed before us for hearing together, Gajendragadkar
1·
because they raise a common question of law in re-·
gard to the Constitutional validity of Rules 148(3) and
149(3) contained in the Indian Railway Establishment
Code, Vol. I. (hereafter called the Code), The first
group consists of four appeals. C.A. Nos. 711 &
712 of 1962 arise from two petitions filed by the
appellants Moti Ram Deka and Sudhir Kumar Das
respectively in the Assam High Court. Deka was
a peon employed by the North East Frontier Railway,
whereas Das was a confirmed clerk. They alleged
that purporting to exercise its power under Rule
148 of the Code, the respondent, the General Manager
North East Frontier Railway, terminated their services and according to them, the said termination
was illegal inasmuch as the Rule under which the
impugned orders of termination had been passed,
was invalid. This plea has been rejected by the
Assam High Court and the writ petitions filed by the
two appellants have been dismissed. It is against
these orders of dismissal that they have come to
this Court by special leave.
Civil Appeal No. 713 of 1962 arises out of a
petition filed by the appellant Priya Gupta who was
an Assistant Electrical Foreman employed by the
North Eastern Raijway, Gorakhpur. His services
having been terminated by the respondent General
Manager of the said Railway, he moved the Allahabad
High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and
challenged the validity of the order terminating his
services on the ground that Rule 148 of the Code
was· invalid .. The appelll\nt's plea has been .rejected·
1/SCI/64-44
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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by the said High Court both by the learned single Judge
who heard his petition in the first instance and by the
Mot• Ram Deka Division Bench which heard his Letters Patent Appeal.
etc.
That is how the appellant has . come to this Court
v.
by special leave.
· 1963
.
General
Manager, N.E.F.
a
Civil Appeal No. 71411962 arises out of writ
petition filed by Tirath Ram Lakhanpal who was a
Maligaon,
Class A Guard employed by the Northern Railway,
Pandu, etc. New· Delhi. His services were terminated by the
·
Respondent General Manager of the said Railway
Gajendragadkar_under Rule 148 of the Code and his writ petition to
J.
quash the said order has been dismissed by the Punjab
High Court. The learned single Judge who heard
this writ petition rejected the pleas raised by the appellant, and the Division Bench . which the appellant
moved by way of Letters Patent Appeal summarily
dismissed his Appeal. It is this dismissal of his Letters
Patent Appeal which. has brought the appellant .to
this Court by Special Leave. That is how this group
of four appeals raises a common question about the
validity of . Rule 148.
Rail•ays,
f' .
The next group .consists of three appeals which
challenge the decision of the Assam High Court
holding that the orders of dismissal passed by appellant No. -2, the General Manager, North .East {
Frontier Railway, against the three respective respon~
dents S.B. Tewari, Parimal Gupta and Prem Chand
Thakur, under Rule 149 of the Code, were invalid.
These three .respondents had moved the Assam High
Court for quashing the impugned orders terminating
their services, and the writ petitions having been
heard by a special Bench of the said High Court
consisting of three learned Judges, the majority opinion
was that the impugned orders were orders of dismissal and as such, were outside the purview of Rule
149. According to this view, though Rule 149 may
not be invalid, the impugned orders were bad because
as orders of dismissal they were not justified by Rule
149. The. minority view was that Rule 149 itself
is invalid, and so, the impugned orders were automatically invalid, In the result, the three writ petitions
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
filed by the three respondents respectively were allowed.
1963
That is why the Union of India and the General
.Manager, N.E.F. Railway, appellants l & 2 respective- Mot• Ram Deka
ly, have come to this Court with a certificate granted
etc.
by the Assam High Court, and they challenge the
v.
correctness of both the majority and the minority
Generar
views. Thus, in these three appeals, the question Manag~r,N.E.F.
about the validity of Rule 149 falls to be considered. Ra•l~ays,
1
Ma 1gaon,
Pandu, etc.
>
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The first group of four appeals was first heard
_
by a Constitution Bench of five Judges for some Gajendragadkar
time. At the hearing before the said Bench, the
1
learned Addi. Solicitor-General conceded that the ques·
tion about the validity of Rule 148 had not been
directly considered by this Court on any occasion,
and so, it could not be said that it was covered by
any previous decision. After the hearing of the arguments before the said Bench had made some progress,
the learned Addi. Solicitor-General suggested that he
was strongly relying on certain observations made in
the previous decisions of this Court and his argument
was going to be that the said observations are consistent with his contention that Rule 148 is valid and in
fact, they would logically lead to that inference.
That is why the Bench took the view that it would be
appropriate if a larger Bench is constituted to hear the
said group of appeals, and so, the matter was referred
to the learned Chief Justice for his directions. Thereafter, the learned Chief Justice ordered that the said
group should be heard by a larger Bench of seven
Judges of this Court. At that time, direction was
also issuejl that the second group of three appeals
which raised the question about the validity of Rule
149 should be placed for hearing along with the first
group. In fact, the learned counsel appearing for both
the parties in the said group themselves thought that
it would be appropriate if the two groups of appeals
are heard together. That is how the two groups
of appeals have come for disposal before a larger
Bench; and so, the main question which we have to consider is whether Rule 148(3), and Rule 149(3) which
has superseded it are valid. The contention of the
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
.railway employees concerned is that these Rules
contravene the Constitutional safeguard guaranteed
iMoti Ram Deka to civil servants by Art. 311 (2). It is common ground
etc.
that if it is held that the Constitutional guarantee
v. .
prescribed by Art. 311(2) is violated by the Rules,
. 'General
they would be invalid; on the other hand, the Union
Manag~r, N E.F. of India and the Railway Administration contend
.<Rai/~ays, Jhat the said Rules do not contravene Art: 311(2),
.•Mabgaon,
but are wholly consistent with it.
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Pandu, etc.
At this stage, it would be convenient to refer
Git]endragadkar to the two Rules. Rule 148 deals with the termination
J.
of service and periods of notice. Rule 148(1) deals
with temporary railway servants; R. 148(2) deals
with apprentices, and R. 148(3) ·deals with other
(non-pensionable) railway servants. It is with R. 148(3)
that. we are concerned in the present appeals. It
reads thus:·
"(3) Other (non-pensionable) railway servants:The service of other (non-pensionable) railway
servants shall be liable to termination on notice
on either side for the periods shown below.
Such notice is not however required in cases of
:. dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure
'.after compliance with the provisions of Clause
, ·(2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement
on attaining the ··age of superannuation, and
-termination of service· due to · mental or phy:>ical
incapacity."
·
. ':'Note:-The appointing authorities are empower.. : , · ,ed. 'to. reduce or waive, at their discretion, the
' , ; stipula'.ted period of notice to be given by an
1
--·· ~·emplbyee, but the reason justifying their action
·.; '~ sh'ould be recorded.
i,. · ;u
1.:o:This power cannot be re-delegated."
Th~il'.'follow'' tlie. respective periods for which notice
lias"to'
be~giyen. It is unnecessary to refer to these.
-''oitd
pe1:18 .,~·· . ,. ! . , .:
1: •.Wefriiay incidentally cite Rule 148(4) as well which
relidsHhus :;c.=:: :n·· ,.
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"In lieu of the notice prescribed in this rule,
1963
it shall be permissible on the part of the Railway u 011.R-~ k
Administration to terminate the service of a
am e .a
railway servant by paying him the pay for the
etc;
period of notice."
v.
General
It is thus clear that R. 148(3) empowers the appropriate Manager, N.E.F.
authority to terminate the services of other non-· Railways
pensionable railway servants after giving them notice Ma/igao~
for the specified period, or paying them their salary Pandu et;,
for the said period in lieu of notice under R 148(4).
·_'
The non-pensionable services were brought to Gajendragadkar
an end in November, 1957 and an option was given to
J.
the non-pensionable servants either to opt for pensionable service or to continue on their previous terms and
conditions of service. Thereafter, Rule 149 was framed
in place of R. 148. Rule 149(1) & (2) like Rule
148(1) & (2) deal with the temporary railway servants
and apprentices respectively. Rule 149(3) deals with
other railway servants; it reads thus:"Other railway servants :-The services of other
railway servants shall be liable to termination
on notice on either side for the periods shown
below. Such notice is not however, . required
in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the
provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 of the
Constitution, retirement on attaining the age
of superannuation, and termination of service
due to mental or physical incapacity"
Th~ Rule. then specifies. the different periods
f~r which notice has to be given in regard to the
different categories of servants. It is unnecessary
to refer to these periods.
Then follow sub-rule (4). The same may be
·
conveniently set out at this place:
'.'(4) In lieu of .th~ notice prescribed in this rule,
1t sh~ll. be p7rm1ss1ble on the part of the Railway
Adm1mstrat1on to terminate the service of a
railway servant by paying him the pay for the
period of notice.
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Note:-The appointing, authorites are empowered to reduce or waive, at their discretion,
Moti Ram Deka
the stipulated period of notice to be given by an
etc.
employee, but the reason justifying their action
v.
should be recorded.
General
This power cannot be re-delegated."
Manager, N.E.F;
Just as under Rule 148(3) the services ofthe railway
Railways,
employees to which it applied could be terminated after
Ma/igliOn,
Pandu, etc. giving them notice for the period specified, so under R.
I 49(3) termination of services of the employees conGajendragadkar cerned can be brought about by serving them with a
J:
notice for the requisite period, or paying them their
salary for the said period in lieu of notice under R.
149(4). Rule 149(3) applies to all servants other
than temporary servants and apprentices. The distinction between pensionable and non-pensionable
servants no longer prevails. The question which
we have to consider in the present appeals is whether
the termination of services of a permanent railway
servant under Rule 148(3) or Rule 149(3) amounts
to his .removal under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.
If it does, the impugned Rules are invalid; if it does
not, the said Rules are vaild.
That takes us to the question as to the true scope
and effect of the provisions contained in Art. 3U (2),
and the decision of this question naturally involves
the construction of Art. 311 (2) read in the light of
Articles 309 and 3JO. In considering this poinl!, if
may be useful to refer very briefly to the genesis of
these provisions and their legislative background. In
this connection, it would be enough for our purpose
if we begin with the Government of India Act, 1833. ·
Section· 74 of the said Act made the tenure · of all
Services under the East India Company subject to
His Majesty's pleasure. These· servants were also
made subject to the pleasure of the Court of Directors
with a proviso which excepted from the said rule
those who had been appointed directly by His Majesty.
In due course, when the Crown took over the government of this country by the Government of India
Act, 1858, section 3 conferred on the Secretary of
...
1963
1
•-
1
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
State all powers which has till then vested in the
1963
Court of Directors, while the powers in relation to the
servants of the Company which had till then ve$ted Moti Ram Deka
in the Director were, by s. 37, delegated to the Secreetc.
tary of State.
v.
General
.
.
.
.
d
.
'
h
h
Th1s pos1tJon contmue untJ1 we reac
t e Manager NE F
Government of India Act, 1915. This Act repealed Rail~ay;, · •
all the earlier Parliamentary legislation and was in the Maligaon,
nature of a consolidating Act. There was, however, Pandu, etc.
a saving clause contained in section 130 of the said
Act which preserved the earlier tenures of servants Gajendragadkar
and continued the rules and regulations applicable
J.
to them. Section 96B of this Act which was enacted
in 1919 brought about a change in the constitutional
position of the civil servants.
Section 96B{l ),
in substance, provided that "subject to the provisions
of this Act and the rules made thereunder, every
person in the civil service of the Crown in India holds
office during His Majesty's pleasure", and it added
that no person in that service may be dismissed by
any authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed. It also empowered the Secretary of State
in Council to re-instate any person in that service
who had been dismissed, except so far as the Secretary
of State in Council may, by rules, provide to the contra- .
ry. Section 96B(2) conferred power on the Secretary
of State in Council to make rules for regulating the
classification of the Civil Services in India, the method
of recruitment, the conditions of service, pay and
allowances and discipline and conduct while subsection l4) declared that all service rules then in force
had been duly made and confirmed the same.
In 1935, the Government of India Act 1935 was
passed and s. 96Bll) was reproduced in sub-.sections
(1) and (2) of section 240, and a new sub-section
was. added as .ss. (3). By t?i~ new sub-section, protection was given to the crvll servant by providing
that he shall not be dismissed or reduced in rank until
he had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard
to him. The definition contained in s. 277 of the said
696
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
act shows that the expression "dismissal" included
removal from service.
Moti Ram Deka
· That continued to be the position until the Coneti:.
stitution was adopted in 1950. The Constitution
G v.
has dealt with this topic in Articles 309, 310 and
1
M
ener~ E F 311. Art. 310 deals with the tenure of office of persons
anager, .. · ·serving the Union or a State, and provides that such
Raib1·ays, ·
·
1
f
Ma/igaon,
office is held durmg the p easure o the President
if the post is under the Union, or during the pleasure
Pandu, etc.
~~
of the Governor if the post is under a State. The
Gajendragadkar doctrine of pleasure is thus embodied by Art. 31 Otl ).
J
Art. 310(2) deals with cases of persons appointed
·
under contract, and it provides that if the President
or the Governor deems it necessary in order to secure
the services of a person having special qualifica.tions,
he may appoint him under a special contract and the
said contract may provide for the payment to him of
compensation if pefore the expiration of an a.greed
period, that post is abolished or he is, for reasons
not connected with any misconduct on his part,
required to vacate that post. It is significant that
Art:: 310(1) begins with a clause "except as expressly
provided by this Constitution". In other words,
if there are any other provisions in the Constitution which impinge upon it, the provisions of
Art: 310(1) must be read subject to them. The exceptions thus contemplated may be illustrated by
reference to Articles 124, 148, 218 and 324. Another
exception is also provided by Art. 311. In other words,
Art. 311 has to be read as a proviso to Art. 310, and
so, there can be no doubt that the pleasure contemplated by Art. 310( l) must be exercised subject to the
limitations prescribed by Art. 311.
. Art. 309 provides that subject to the provisions
of the constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislative
may regulate the recruitment, and .conditions of service
of persons appointed, to public services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the Union or of any
State. This clearly means that the appropriate Legislature may . pass· Acts in respect of the terms and
i.:<)nditions of service of persons appointed to .public
<
c
'
\
5S.C.R.
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
services and posts, but that must be subject to the
1963
provisions of the constitutio11 which inevitably brings
-in Art. 310(1). The proviso to Art. 309 makes Moti Ram Deka
it clear that it would be competent for the President or
etc.
such person as he may direct in the case of services
v.
and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union,
General
and for the Governor of a State or such person as Manager, N.E.f.
he may direct in the case of services and posts in Railways,
connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules Maligaon,
regulating the recruitment, and prescribing the con- Pandu, etc.
ditions of service of persons respectively appointed . - to services and posts under the Union or the State. Ga1endragadkar
The pleasure of the President or the Governor menJ.
tioned in Art. 310(1) can thus be exercised by such
person as the President or the Governor may respectively direct in that behalf, and the pleasure thus
exercised has to be exercised in accordance with the
rules made in that behalf. These rules, and indeed,
the exercise of the powers conferred on the delegate
must be subject to Art. 310, and so Art. 309 cannot
impair or affect the pleasure of the President or the
Governor therein specified. There is thus no doubt
that Art. 309 has to be read subject to Articles 310
and 311, and Art. 310 has to be read subject to Art.
311. It is significant that the provisions contained
in Art. 311 are not subject to any other provision of
the Constitution. Within the field covered by them,
they are absolute and paramount. What then is
the effect of the provisions contained in Art. 311(2)?
Art. 311(2) reads thus:"No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until
he has been given a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the action proposed
to be taken in regard to him."
·
We are not concerned with the cases covered by the
proviso to this article in the present appeals. It
may be taken to be settled by the decisions of this
Court that since Art. 311 makes no distinction between
permanent and temporary posts, its protection must
be held to extend to all government servants holding
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964J
permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any
. of them: The protection afforded by Art. 311(2)
Muti'Ram·Dekajs limited to the imposition of three major penalties .
. etc.
contemplated by the service Rules, viz., dismissal,
v.
removal or reduction in rank. It is true that the
General
consequences of dismissal are more serious than
Manager, N.E.F. those of removal and in that sense, there is a technical
Railways,
distinction between the two; but in the context, dis~
Ma/igaon,
missal, .. removal and reduction in rank which are
Pandu, etc. specified by Art. 311 (2) represent actions taken
. -by way of penalty. In regard to temporary servants,
Ga1endragadkar or servants on probation, every case of termination
1·
of service ·may not amount to removal. In cases
falling under these categories, the terms of contract·
or service rules may provide for the termination of
the services on notice of a specified period, or on
payment of salary for the said period, and if in exercise
of the power thus conferred on the employer, the
services of a temporary or probationary servant
are terminated, it may not necessarily amount to
removal. In every such case, courts examine the
substance of the matter, and if it is shown that the
termination .. of services is no more than discharge
simpliciter effected by virtue of the contract or the
relevant rules, Art. 311 (2) may not be applicable
to such a case. If, however, the termination of a
temporary servant's services in substance represents
a penalty imposed on him or punitive action taken
against him, then such termination would amount
to removal and Art. 311(2) would be attracted.
Similar would be the position in regard to the reduction in rank of an officiating servant. This aspect
of the matter has been considered ·by this Court
in several recent decisions, vide Jagdish Mitter v.
Union of IndiaOl State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore
Prasad(2) State of Orissa & Anr. v. Ram Narayan
Das<3J S. Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab(4J
and Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab & Ors. (5)
1963
.
(I) A. I. R. 1964 S.. C. 449.
(2) [1961] 2 S. C.R. 590:
(3) [1961] I S. C.R. 606.
(4) [1963] I S. C.R. 416.
.,.
(5) [1963] 3 S. C. R. 716.
;.
•
5 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
This branch of the law must, therefore, be taken to
1963
be well-settled.
.
.
Moti Ram Delea
In regard to servants hol~mg substant1yely
ere.
a permanent post who may conveniently be· descnbed
v
G ·
hereafter as permanent servants, it is similarly well1
. d un.der Mana enera
sett1ea' that 1'f th7y are compulson'lY retire
er N.E.F.
the relevant service rules, such compulsory retlfe- n!iw~ys
ment does not amount to removal under Art. 311 M /' '
{2}. Similarly, there can be no·doub~ that t~~ retire- Pa~~~~~;;,
ment of a permanent servant on his attammg the
age of superannuation does not amount to his re- Gajendragadkar
moval within the meaning of Art. 311(2).
J.
The question which arises for our decision in the
present appeals is: if the service of a permanent
civil servant is terminated otherwise than by operation
of the rule of superannuation, or the rule of compulsory retirement does such termination amount to
removal under Art. 311(2) or not ? It is on this
aspect of the question that the controversy between
the parties arises before us.
Before dealing with this problem, it is necessary
to refer to the relevant Railway Rules themselves.
Speaking historically, it appears that even while the
affairs of the country were in charge of the East India
Company, there used to be some regulations which
were substantially in the nature of administrative
instructions in regard to the conditions of service
of the Company's employees. These regulations were
continued by s. 130(c) of the Government of India
Act, 1915 which provided, inter alia that the repeal
shall not affect the tenure of office, conditions of
service, terms of remuneration or right to pension
of any officer appointed before the commencement
of this Act. Section 96B(2) which was inserted in
the said Act in 1919, however, provided that the
said regulations could be modified or superseded
by rules framed by the Secretary of State. In due
course, the Secretary of State framed certain rules.
The first batch of rules was framed in December
1920. They applied to all officers in the All India'
Provincial as well as Subordinate Services. and governed
700
SUPREME COURT-REPORTS
[ 1964]
even officers holding special posts. The Local Government had a limited power in respect of officers in the
Moti Ram DekaAll-India Services under their employment and this
etc.
power was confined to imposing on them punishments
v.
of censure, reduction, withholding of promotion and
General
suspension (vide Rule 10); in the case of Provincial
Manager, N.E.F. Services, however, the powers of the Local GovernRailways,
ment were plenary. They could not only impose
Maligaon,
the penalties to which we have just referred, but
Pandu, etc. also remove or dismiss them (vide Rule 13). It
-appears that Rule 14 prescribed the procedure which
Gajendragadkar had to be followed in imposing the penalty of disJ.
missal, removal or reduction; and so, it may be said
that for the first time these three major punishments
were collated together and a special procedure
prescribed in that behalf. No definition of removal
was, however, prescribed. Incidentally, we may refer
to Rule XX which is included in the group of rules
relating to appeals. Under this rule, an appeal
would not lie against; (I) the discharge of a person
appointed on probation before the end of his probation, an.d (2) the dismissal and removal of a person
appointed by an authority in India to hold a temporary
appointment It would be permissible to point
out that this provision would show that the termination ofthe services ofa person permanently employed
would not have fallen within the ambit of this rule.
1963
The Rules thus framed. in 1920 were amended
from time to time and were re-issued in June, 1924.
It. appears that subsequent to 1924, fresh rules were
made under the Governors Provinces Civil Services
(Control and Appeal) Rules and Governors Provinces
Civil Services (Delegation) Rules of 1926 which were
published in March, 1926. ·.Then followed the Rules
framed by the Secretary of State in 1930. These
Rules were in force .. when the Government of India
Act, 1935 was enacted, and they continue in force
even now by reason of Article. 313. We ought to
add that' these Rules superseded all the earlier rules
and constitute an exhaustive code as regards disciplinary m;itters .... '..'•Rule 3(b) of these,rules excluded the
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
Railway Servants from the application of the
1963
said rules, and that furnishes the historical back-ground why separate Fundamental Rules for Railways, Moti Ram Deka
corresponding to the Fundamental Rules in other
etc.
public services, came to be framed.
v.
General
Before we proceed to the relevant Railway Rules, Manager, N.E.F.
we may incidentally mention Rule 49 of the Rules Railways,
framed by the Secretary of State in 1930. This Rule Ma/igaon,
provides that penalties may, for good and sufficient Pandu, etc.
reason and as hereinafter provided, be imposed . - 'Lipon members of the services comprised in any of Ga1endragadkar
the clauses (I) to (5) specified in Rule 14. These
J.
penalties number seven in all. Amongst them are
mentioned reduction to a lower post, dismissal and removal. Then follows an explanation which is useful
for our purpose. Before quoting that explanation,
it may be pointed· out that the said explanation which
was originally introduced under Rule 49, was
subsequently amended once in 1948, then in 1950 and
lastly in 1955 when explanation No. 2 was added.
Thus amended, the two explanations read as follows:"Explanation I-The termination of employment(a) of a person appointed on probation during
or at the end of the period of probation, in accordance with the terms of the appointment and the
rules governing the probationary service; or
(b) of a temporary Government servant appointed
otherwise than under contract, in accordance
with rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949; or
(c) of a person engaged under a contract,
does not amount to removal or dismissal within the
meaning of this rule or of rule 55.
Explanation II :-Stopping a Government Servant
. at an efficiency bar .in the time scale of his. pay
on the ground of his unfitness to cross the bar
does not amount to withholding of increments or
promotions 'within the meaning of this rule."
702
. SUpREME COURT REP0RTS
[1964]
Looking at clauses (a), (b) and. (c) of Explanation I,
it would be apparent that these clauses deal with
Moti Ram Deka persons appointed on probation, . ·or appointed as
· etc.
temporary seryants, or engaged on a contract, and
v.
the effect of the said explanation is that the termination
cGeneral
of the services of such persons does not amount to
Manager, N.E.F. removal or dismissal. within the meaning of Rule 49 or
Railways,
Rule 55. In other words, R. 49 read along with exMaligaon,
planation I, would,prima facie; inferentially support the
Pandu, etc. contention .that in regard to a permanent civil servant,
-the termination of his sci-vices otherwise than under
Gajendragadkar the rule of superannuation or compulsory,retirement . --..,!
1·
would amount to removal.
.....,
.1963
--
Let us· then consider the relevant Railway Fundamental Rules which have a bearing on the point with
which we are concerned. Paragraph 2003 . of the
Code, ·Vol. II which corresponds to Fundame:ntal
Rule 9 contains definitions. Fundamental·Rule 9(14)
tlefines a lien as meaning the title of a Railway servant
to hold substantively, either immediately or on the
termination· of a period or periods of absenci:, a
permanent post, including a tenure. post, to which
he" has been appointed substantively. An officiating
servant is defined by F.R. 9(19) as one who performs
the duties of a post on which another person holds
a lien, or when a competent authority appoint!: him
to officiate in a vacant post on which -no other railway
servant holds a lien.
There Is a proviso to this
definition which is not relevant ,'for our purpose.
That takes us to the definition o(· a permanent post
which tinder F.R. 9(22) means a pos,t carrying a definite rate of pay sanctioned without limit of time.
A temporary post, on the other hand, means under
F.R. 9 (29) a postcarrying a.definite rate of pay sanctioned for a hmited . time, and a tenure post means
under F. R. 9 (30) a permanent post which an individual railway servant may not hold for more than
a limiteo period. It is thus clear that as a result of the
relevant definitions, a permanent post carries a definite
rate of pay,,without a limit of time and a servant
who substantively holds a< permanent post has
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
a title to hold the post to which he is subs1963
tantively appointed, and that, in terms, means
-that a permanent servant has a right to hold the Moti Ram Deka
post until, of course he reaches the age of superanetc.
nuation, or until he is compulsorily retired under
v.
·the relevant rule.
General
Manager, N.E.F.
,
•
It is in the light of this position that we must Railways
now proceed to examine the question as to whether Maligao;
the termination of the permanent servant's services Pandu, et~.
either under Rule 148(3) or R. 149(3) amounts to
his removal or not. . On this point, two extreme Gajendragadkar
contentions have been raised before us by the parties.
J.
The learned Addi. · Solicitor-General contends that
in ·dealing with the present controversy, we must
bear in mind the doctrine of pleasure which has
been enshrined in Art. 310(1). He argues that every
civil servant holds his office during the pleasure of
the President or the Governor. It is true that in the
present cases, we are dealing with rules framed under
the proviso to Art. 309 and in that sense, the question
of pleasure on which so much stress is laid by the learned
Addi. Solicitor-General may not directly arise; but
it must be conceded that the point raised for our
decision may have some impact on the doctrine of
pleasure, and so it needs to be examined. The
argument is that all civil service is strictly speaking
precarious in character. There is no guarantee
of any security of tenure, because the pleasure of the
President or the Governor can be exercised at any
time against the civil servant. It is true that this
pleasure would not be exercised capriciously, unjustly,
or unfairly, but the existence of the doctrine of pleasure
inevitably imposes a stamp of precarious character on the tenure enjoyed by the civil servant, and so,
it is urged whether Rule 148 or R. 149 is made or
not, it would be open to the President or the Governor
to terminaJe the services of any civil .servant to whose
case Art. 310(1) applies.
The learned Addi. Solicitor-General has also
impressed upon us the necessity to construe Art.
310(1) and Art. 311 in such a manner that the pleasure
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
contemplated by Art. 310ll) does not become illusory
or is not completely obliterated.
He, theri~fore,
.Moti Ram Deka.suggests that Art. 311(2) which is in the nature of a
etc.
proviso or an exception to Art. 310(1) must be strictly
v.
construed and in all cases falling outside the scope of
General
the said provision, the pleasure of the President'or the
Manager, N.E.F. Govem<;>r must be allowed to rule supreme.
1963
--
Railwavs,
.
· On the oth~r hand, 1t has ~een urged .by the learned
.Malig;on,
Pandu etc
counsel appearmg for the railway servants concerned
before us that the pleasure of the President is controlled
Gajendragad/wr by Art. 311 and if the argument. of the learned Addi.
J.
· Solicitor-General is accepted and full scope given to
the· exercise .of the said pleasure, Art. 311 itself would
become otiose. It is urged that the employment in
civil service can be terminated only after complying
with Art. 311 and any rule which violates the guarantee
provided by the said Article would be invalid. Jn
fact, the argument on the other side is that the ·word
"removal" should receive a much wider denotation
than has been accepted by this Court in its decisions
bearing cm the point, and that all terminations of
services in respect of all categories of public servants
should be held to constitute removal within Art. 311(2).
We are inclined to hold that the two extreme contentions raised by both the parties must . be rejected.
There is no doubt that the pleasure of the President
on which the learned Addi. Solicitor Qeneral so strongly relies has lost some of its majesty and power,
because it is clearly controlled by the provisions of
Art. 311, and so, the field that is covered by Art.
311 on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant words used in that article, would be excluded
from the operation of the absolute doctrine of pleasure:
The pleasure of the President would still be tlu:re,
but it· has .to be exercised in accordance with the
requirements of Art. 311.
· Besides, as this Court has held in · the State of
Biharv. Abdul MajidO>, the rule of English Law pithily
expressed in. the Iatin phrase "duranto bene placito"
("during pleasure") has not been fully adopted either
'
·
(i) [1954) S.C.R. 786, 799.
.
< '
II
•
5 S.C.R.
....
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
by section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935
1963
or by Art. 310(1). To the extent to which that rule
has been modified by the relevant provisions of Moti Ram Deka
s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, or Art.
etc.
311 the Government servants are entitled to relief like
v.
any other person under the ordinary law and that
General
relief must be regulated by the Code of Civil Proce- Manager, N.E.F.
dure. It is mainly on the basis of this principle Railways,
that this Court refused to apply the doctrine against Maligaon,
abdul Majid that a civil servant cannot maintain suit Pandu, etc.
against a State or against the Crown for the recovery
of arrears of salary due to him. Thus, the extreme Gajendragadkar
contention based on the doctrine of pleasure enshrined
J.
in Art. 310(1) cannot be sustained. Similarly, we
do not think it would be possible to accept the argument that the word "removal" in Art. 311(2) should
receive the widest interpretation. Apart from the
fact that the said provision is in the nature of a proviso
to Art. 310(1) and must, therefore, be strictly construed,
the point raised by the contention is concluded by
the decisions of this Court and we propose to deal
with the present appeals on the basis that the word
"removal" like the two other words "dismissal"
and "reduction in rank" used in Art. 311 (2) refer to
cases of major penalties which were specified by the
relevant service rules. Therefore, the true position
is that Articles 310 and 311 must no doubt be read
together, but once the true scope and effect of Art. 311
is determined, the scope and effect of Art. 310(1)
must be limited in the sense that in regard to cases
falling under Art. 311(2) the pleasure mentioned in
Art. 310(1) must be exercised in accordance with the
requirements of Art. 311.
It is then urged by the learned Addi. Solicitor
General that Art. 310 does not permit of the concept
of tenure during good behaviour. According to him,
in spite of the rule of superannuation, the services
of a civil servant can be terminated by the President
exercising his pleasure at any time. The rule of
superannuation on this contention merely gives an
indication to the civil servant as to the length of time
!/SCI/64-45
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1964]
he may expect to serve, but it gives him no ri1~1t to
continue during the whole of the said period. In fact,
Moti Ram Deka the learned Addl. Solicitor-General did not disguis'e the
etc,
fact that according to his argument, whether or not
v
a rule of superannuation is framed and whether or not
General
Rule 148 or R. 149 is issued, the President's pleasure
Manager N.E.F.can be exercised independently of these Rules and
Railways,
the action taken by the President in exercise of his
Maligaon,
pleasure cannot be questioned under Art. 311(2).
Pandu, etc.
· Alternatively, he contends that if Art. 311(2)
. d-- dk is read in a very general and wide sense, even th1.: rule
Ga;enragaar
· t h e age of superannuat10n
· may b e quest1one
· d as
j
· as to
·
being invalid, because it does put an end to the service of
a civil servant. We are not impressed by this argument,
We will no doubt have to decide what cases of termination of services of permanent civil servants amount
to removal; but once that question is determined,
wherever it is shown that a permanent civil servant
is removed from his service, Art. 311(2) will apply and
Art. 310(1) cannot be invoked independently with the
object of justifying the contravention of the provisions
of Art. 311(2).
In regard to the age of superannuation, it may be
.../ said prima facie that rules of superannuation which
are prescribed in respect of public services in all
modern States are based on considerations of life
expectation, mental capacity of the civil servants
having regard to the climatic conditions under which
they work, and tile nature of the work they do. They
are not fixed on any ad hoc basis and do not involve
the exercise of any discretion. They apply uniformly
to all public servants falling under the category in
respect of which they are framed. Therefore, no
analogy can be suggested between the rule of superannu.ation and Rule 148(3) or Rule 149(3). Besides,
nobody has questioned the validity of the. rule of superannuation, and so, it would be fruitless and idle to
consider whether such a rule can be challenged at all.
· Reverting then to the nature of the right which
a permanent servant has under the relevant Railway
Rules, whitt is the true position? A person who
1963
!"
~
'·'
~
'.f
5S.C.R.
-,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
substantively holds a permanent post has a right
1963
to continue in service, subject, of course, to the rule
of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory Moti Ram Deka
retirement. If for any other reason that right is inetc.
vaded and he is asked to leave his service, the terminav.
tion of his service must inevitably mean the defeat
General
of his right to continue in service and as such, it is Manager, N.E.F.
in the nature of a penalty and amounts to removal. Railways,
In other words, termination of the services of a perma- Maligaon,
nent servant otherwise than on the ground of super- Pandu; etc.
annuation or compulsory retirement, must per se
-.amount to his removal, and so, if by R.148(3) or R.149(3) Gajendragadkar
such a termination is brought about, the Rule clearly
J,
contravenes Art. 311(2) and must be held to be invalid.
It is common ground that neither of the two Rules
contemplates an enquiry and in none of the cases
before us has the procedure prescribed by Art. 311(2)
been followed. We appreciate the argument urged by the
learned Addi. Solicitor-General about the pleasure of
the President and its significance; but since the pleasure
has to be exercised subject to the provisions of Art.
311, there would be no escape from the conclusion
that in respect of cases falling under Art. 311 (2 ),
the procedure prescribed by the said Article must
be complied with and the exercise of pleasure regulated
accordingly.
In this connection, it is necessary to emphasise
that the rule-making authority contemplated by Art.
309 cannot be validly exercised so as to curtail or
affect the rights guaranteed to public servants under
Art. 311(1). Art. 311(1) is intended to afford a sense
of security to public servants who are substantively
appointed to a permanent post and one of the principal
benefits which they are entitled to expect is the benefit
of pension after rendering public service for the period
prescribed by the Rules. It would, we think, not
be legitimate to contend that the right to earn a pension
to which a servant substantively appointed to a permanent post is entitled can be curtailed by Rules framed
under Art. 309 so as to make the said right either
ineffective or illusory. Once the scope of Art. 311 (1 ~
and (2) is duly determined, it must be held that no Rule
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1964]
framed under Art. 309 can trespass on the rights
guaranteed by Art. 311. This position is of basic
Mati Ram Dekc importance and must be borne in mind in dealing
etc.
with the controversy in the present appeals. ·
G v.ial
. At this stage, we ought to add that in a modern
u
NE F democratic State the efficiency and incorruptibility of
-~'~ay; ·public administration is of such importance that it
;,'/ . ' is essential to afford to civil servants adequate prop a;ga;~
tection against capricious action from their superior
an. u,
· authority. If a permanent civil servant is guilty of
Gajendragadkar misconduct, he should no doubt be proceeded against
J.
promptly under the relevant disciplinary rules, subject, of course, to the safeguard prescribed by Art.
311(2); but in regard to honest, straightforward and
efficient permanent civil servants, it is of utmost
importance even from the point of view of the State
that they should enjoy a sense of security which alone
can make them independent and truly efficient, In
our opinion, the sword of Damocles hanging over
the heads of permanent railway servants in the form
of R. 148(3) or R. 149(3) would inevitably create a
sense of insecurity in the minds of such servants and
would invest appropriate authorities with very wide
powers which may conceivably be abused.
1963
;ne
a";
·
In this connection, no distinction can be made
between pensionable and non-pensionable service.
Even if a person is holding a post which does not
carry any pension, he has a right to continue in service
until he reaches the age of superannuation and the
said right is a very valuable right. That is why the
invasion of this right must inevitably mean that the
termination of his service is, in substance, and in
law, removal from service. It appears that after Rule
· 149 was brought into force in 1957, another provision
has been made by Rule 321 which seems to contemplate
the award of some kind of pension to the employees
whose services are terminated under Rule 149(3).
But it is significant that the application of R. 149(3)
does not require, as normal rules of compulsory
retirement do, that the power conferred by the said
Rule can be exercised in respect of servants who have
•
5 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
put in a prescribed minimum period of service. There1963
fore, the fact that some kind of proportionate pension is awardable to railway servants whose services Moti Ram Deka
are terminated under R. 149(3) would not assimilate
etc.
the cases dealt with under the said Rule to cases of
v.
compulsory retirement. As we will presently point out,
General
cases of compulsory retirement which have been con- Manager, N.E.F.
sidered by this Court were all cases where the rule as Railways,
to compulsory retirement came into operation before Maligaon,
the age of supperannuation was reached and after Pandu, etc.
a prescribed minimum period of service had been . put in by the servant.
Ga1endragadkar
--t•
It is true that the termination of service authorised
by R. 148(3) or R.149(3) contemplates the right to terminate on either side. For all practical purposes, the right
conferred on the servant to terminate his services
after giving due notice to the employer does not
mean much in the present position of unemployment
in this country; but apart from it, the fact that a servant has been given a corresponding right cannot
detract from the position that the right which is
conferred on the railway authorities by the impugned
Rules is inconsistent with Art. 311(2), and so, it has
to be struck down in spite of the fact that a similar
right is given to the servant concerned.
It has, however, been urged that the railway
servants who entered service with the full knowledge
of these Rules cannot be allowed to complain that
the Rules contravene Art. 311 and are, therefore,
invalid. It appears that under Rule 144 (which was
originally Rule 143), it was obligatory on railwayservants to execute a contract in terms of the relevant Railway Rules. That is how the argument
based on the contract and its binding character arises.
If a person while entering service executes a contract
containing the relevant Rule in that behalf with open
eyes, how can he be heard to challenge the validity
of the said Rule, or the said contract 7 In our opinion,
this approach may be relevant in dealing with purely
commercial cases governed by rules of contract;
but it is wholly inappropriate in dealing with a case
J.
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
where the contract or the Rule is ,alleged to violate
a constitutional guarantee afforded by Art. 311(2);
Moti Ram Deka and even as to commercial transactions, it is welletc.
known that if the contract is void, as for instance,
v.
under s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act, the plea that
General
it was executed by the party would be of no avail.
Manager, N.E.F. In any case, we do not think that the argument
Railways,
of contract and its binding character can have vabdity
Ma/igaon,
in dealing with the question about the constitutionPandu, etc. ality of the impugned Rules.
1963
--
Let us then test this argument by reference to
provisions of Art. 311 (1 ). Art. 311 (I) provides
that no person to whom the said article applies shall
be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Can it be
suggested that the Railway Administration can enter
into a contract with its employees by which authority
to dismiss or remove the employees can be delegated to
persons other than those contemplated by Art. 311(1)?
The answer to this question is obviously in the negative,
and the same answer must be given to the conten"
tion that as a result of the contract which embodies the
impugned Rules, the termination of the railway
servant's· services would not attract the provisions
of Art. 311 (2), though, in law, .it amounts to removal.
If the said termination does not amount to removal,
then, of course, Art. 311(2) would be inapplicable and
the challenge to the validity of the impugned Rules
would fail; but if the termination in question amounts
to a removal, the challenge to the validity of the
impugned Rules must succeed notwithstanding the
fact that the Rule has been included in a contract
signed by the railway servant.
,
There is one more point which still remains to
be considered and that is the point of construction.
The learned Addl. Solicitor-General argued · that in
construing the impugned Rule 148(3) as well as R.
149(3), we ought to take into account the fact that
the Rule as amended has been so framed as to avoid
conflict with, or non-compliance of, the provisions
of Art. 311 (2), and so, he suggests that we should
Gajendragadkar
J.
the
-
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
adopt that interpretation of the Rule which would
1963
be consistent with Art. 311(2). The argument is
-that the termination of services permissible under Moti Ram Deka
the impugned Rules really proceeds on administrative
etc.
grounds or considerations of exigencies of service.
.v.
If, for instance, the post held by a permanent servant
General
is abolished, or the whole of the cadre to which the Manager, N.E.F.
post belonged is brought to an end and the railway Railways,
servant's services are terminated in consequence, Maligaon,
that cannot amount to his removal because the ter- Pandu, etc.
mination of his services is not based on any consi- . - deration personal to the servant. In support of this Ga1endragadkar
1
argument, the Addl. ·Solicitor-General wants us to
test the provision contained in the latter portion of
the impugned Rules. We are not impressed by this
argument. What the latter portion of the impugned
Rules provides is that in case a railway servant is
dealt with under that portion, no notice need be
served on him. The first part of the Rules can reasonably and legitimately take in all cases and may be
used even in respect of cases falling under the latter
category, provided, of course, notice for the specified period or salary in lieu '()f such notice is given
to the railway servant. There is no doubt that on a fair
construction, the impugned Rules authorise the Railway Administration to terminate the services of all the
permanent servants to whom the Rules apply merely
on giving notice for the specified period, or on payment of salary in lieu thereof, and that clearly amounts
to the removal of the servant in question. Therefore,,
we are satisfied that the impugned Rules are invalid
in as much as they are inconsistent with the provisions
contained in Art. 311(2). The termination of the
permanent servants' tenure which is authorised· by
the said Rules is no more and no less than their removal from service, and so, Art. 311(2) must come into
play in respect of such cases.. That being so, the
Rule which does not require compliance with the pro"
cedure prescribed by Art. 311(2) must be struck
down as invalid.
It is now necessary to examine some of the cases
on which the learned Addl. Solicitor-General has
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
relied. In fact, as we have already indicated, his
main argument was that some of the observations
Moti Ram Deka made in some of the decisions to which we will preetc.
sently refer support his contention and logically lead
v.
to the conclusion that the impugned 'Rules are valid.
General
That naturally makes it necessary for us to examine
Manager, N.E.F. the said cases very carefully. In Satish Chandra
Railways, Anand v. The Unfon of IndiaO), this Court was dealing
Maligaon,
with the case of a person who had been employed
Pandu, etc. by the Government of India on a five-year contract
. --,in the Resettlement and Employment Directorate of
Ga;endragadkar the Ministry of Labour. When his contract was
J.
due to expire, a new offer was made to him to continue.
· him in service in his post temporarily for the period of
the Resettlement and Employment Organisation on
the condition that he would be governed by the Central
Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. The
relevant rule in that behalf authorised the termination of the contract on either side by one month's
notice. Subsequently, his services were terminated
after· giving him one month's notice. He challenged
the validity of the said order, but did not succeed
for the reason that neither Art. 14 nor Art. 16 on
which he relied really applied.
This Court held
that it is competent to the State to enter into contracts
of temporary employment subject to the term that
the contract would be terminated on one month's
notice on either side. Such a contract was not inconsistent with Art. 311(2). This case, therefore, is
of no assistance in the present appeals.
1963
-
In Gopal Krishna Potnay v. Union of India &
Anr. (2) a permanent railway employee who was discharged from service after one month's notice brought
a suit challenging the validity of the order
terminating his services. The point about the validity
of the Rule was not agitated before the Court. Questions which were raised for the decision of the Court
were, inter clia, whether the agreement in question
had been executed by the servant and whether the
(I) [19531 S.C.R. 655.
(2) A.LR. 1954 S.C. 632.
•
.
'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
termination of his services amounted to a discharge
1963
or not. In that connection, reference was made to
Rules 1504 and 1505 and it was held that the conduct Moti Ram Deka
of the parties showed that the termination of the
etc.
servant's services was not more than a discharge
v.
in terms of the agreement. This case again is of
General
no assistance.
Manager, N.E.F.
That takes us to the decision in the case of Shyam
Lal v. The State of U.P. and the Union of Indialll Shyam
Railways,
Maligaon,
Pandu, etc.
Lal's services were terminated under Art. 465-A
of the Civil Service Regulations and Note I appended Gajendragadkar
J.
thereto. Shyam Lal alleged that his compulsory
retirement offended the provisions of Art. 311 (2) on
the ground that compulsory retirement was in substance
removal from service. This Court considered the
scheme of the relevant Rule and held that compulsory
retirement did not amount to removal within the meaning of Art. 311(2). In dealing with this question, this
Court observed that removal was almost synonymous with dismissal and that in the case of removal
as in the case of dismissal, some ground personal
to the servant which was blameworthy was involved.
There was a stigma attached to the servant who
was removed and it involved a loss of benefit already
• earned by him. It is in the light of these tests that
this Court held that compulsory retirement did not
amount to removal. It is true that in dealing with the
argument about the loss of benefit, this Court observed
• that a distinction must be made between the loss of
benefit already earned and the loss of prospect of
earning something more, and it proce::ded to add
that in the first case, it is a present and certain loss
and is certainly a punishment, but the loss of future
prospect is too uncertain, for the officer may die or
be otherwise incapacitated from serving a day longer
and cannot, therefore, be regarded in the eye of the
law as a punishment. It appears that in dealing with
the point, the attention of the Court was drawn to
•
Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control
,. and Appeal) Rules, and presumably the explanation
-
(!)
[1955) 1 S.C.R. 26.
714
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~
[1964]
to the said Rule to which we have already referred,
was taken into account in rejecting the argument
Moti Ram Deka that a loss of future service cannot be said to be a
etc.
relevant factor in determining the question as to whether
v.
compulsory retirement is removal or not. The judgGeneral
ment does not show that the invasion of the right
Manager, N.E.F. which a permanent servant has, to remain in service
Railways,
until he reaches the age of superannuation, was
Maligaon,
pressed before the Court, and naturally the same has
Pandu, etc. not been examined. Confining itself to the special
features of compulsory retirement which was effected
Gajendragadkar under Art. 465-A and Note I appended thereto, the
J.
Court came to the conclusion that compulsory retirement was not removal. We may add that subsequent decisions show that the same view has been
taken in respect of compulsory retirement throughout
and so, that branch of the law must be held to be
concluded by the series of decisions to which we
shall presently refer. We would, however, like to
make it clear that the observation made in the judgment that every termination of service does not amount
to dismissal or removal should, in the context, be
confined to the case of compulsory retirement and
should not be read as a decision of the question with
which we are directly concerned in the present appeals.
That problem did not arise before the Court iri that
case, was not argued before it, and cannot, therefore,
be deemed to have been decided by this decision.
~·
1963
Then we have a batch of four decisions reported
in 1958 which are relevant for our purpose. In
Hartwell Prescott Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Government & Ors.<1\ a civil servant held a post in a temporary
capacity in the Subordinate Agriculture Service, Uttar
Pradesh, and was shown in the gradation list as on
probation. He was later appointed with the approval
of the Public Service Commission of the United
Provinces to officiate in Class II of the said Service.
After about 10 years, he was reverted to his original
temporary appointment and his services were thereafter terminated under Rule 25(4) of the Subordinate
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 509.
-
•
1:,
5 S.C.R.
...
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
Agriculture Service Rules. Dealing with the said
1963
civil servant's objection that the termination of his
-services contravened Art. 311 (2), this Court held that Moti Ram Deka
reversion from a temporary post held by a person
etc.
does not per se amount to reduction in rank.
v.
To decide whether the reversion is a reduction in
General
rank, the post held must be of a substantive rank; Manager, N.E.F.
and further it must be established that the order of Railways,
reversion was by way of penalty. As we have already Maligaon,
discussed, the cases of temporary servants, probationers Pandu, etc.
and servants holding posts in officiating capacities stand
on a different footing and the principles applicable Gajendragadkar
to them are now firmly established and need not
J.
detain us .
The next decision in the same volume is the
State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi OJ.
This was a case of compulsory retirement under Rule
165-A of the Bombay Civil Services Rules as amended
by the Saurashtra Government. In so far as this
case dealt with the compulsory retirement of a civil
servant, it is unnecessary to consider the Rule in
question or the facts relating to the compulsory retirement of the civil servant. It is of interest to note
that in dealing with the question as to whether compulsory retirement amounted to removal or not,
the tests which were applied were in regard to the
loss of benefit already accrued and stigma attached
to the civil servant. It is, however, significant that
in considering the objection based on the contravention of Art. 311(2), Venkatarama Aiyar J. took the
precaution of adding that "questions of the said
character could arise only when the rules fix both
an .age of superannuation and an age for compulsory
retirement and the services of a civil servant are
terminated between these two points of time. But
wh~re there is. no rul: fixing the age of compulsory
retirement, or if there rs one and the servant is retired
before the age prescribed therein, then that can be
regarded only as dismissal or removal within Art. 311
(2)." It would be noticed that the rule providing
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 571.
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
for compulsory retirement was upheld on the ground
that such compulsory retirement does not amount to
Moti Ram Dekaremoval under Art. 311(2) because it was another
etc.
mode of retirement and it could be enforced only
v.
between the period of age of superannuation prescribed
General
and after the minimum period of service indicated in
Manager, N.E.F. the rule had been put in. If, however, no such miniRailways,
mum period is prescribed by the rule of compulsory
Maligaon,
retirement, that according to the judgment, would
Pandu, etc. violate Art. 311(2) and though the termination of
-a servant's services may be described as compulsory
Gajendragadkar retirement, it would amount to dismissal or removal
J.
within the meaning of Art. 311(2). With respect,
we think that this statement correctly represents
the true position in law.
1963
The third case in the said volume is the case of
Parshotam la! Dhingra v. Union of India.< 1 J In this case,
Das C.J. who spoke for the Bench considered comprehensively the scope and effect of ther elevant constitutional provisions, service rules and their. impact
on the question as to whether reversion of Dhingra
offended the provisions of Art. 311(2). Dhingra was
appointed as a Signaller in 1924 and promoted to the
post of Chief Controller in 1950. Both these posts
were in Class III Service. In 1951, he was appointed to
officiate in Class II Service as Asstt. Superintendent,
Railway Telegraphs. On certain adverse remarks
having been made against him, he was reverted as
a subordinate till he made good the short-comings.
Then, Dhingra made a representation. This was
followed by a notice issued by the General Manager
reverting him to Class III appointment. It was this
ordei: of reversion which was challenged by Dhingra
by a writ petition. It would thus be seen that the
point with which the Court was directly concerned
was whether the reversion of an officiating officer to
his permanent post constituted reduction in rank or
removal under Art. 311(2). The decision of this
question was somewhat complicated by the fact
that certain defects were noticed in the work of Dhingra
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
<
r
'(
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
and the argument was that his reversion was in the
1963
nature of a penalty, and so, it should be treated as
-reduction under Art. 311(2). This Court rejected Moti Ram Deka
Dhingra's contention and held that the reversion of
etc.
an officiating officer to his substantive post did not
v.
attract the provisions of Art. 311 (2). Though the
General
decision of the question which directly arose before Manager, N.E.F.
this Court thus lay within a very narrow compass, Railways,
it appears that the matter was elaborately argued Maligaon,
before the Court and the learned Chief Justice has Pandu, etc.
exhaustively considered all the points raised by the
parties. For our present purpose, it is unnecessary Gajendragadkar
to summarise the reasons given by the learned Chief
J.
Justice for holding that the reversion of Dhingra
did not amount to reduction in rank. The only
point which has to be considered by us is whether
the observations made in the course of this judgment
in regard to permanent servants assist the ·learned
Addi. Solicitor-General and if they do, what is their
effect? Broadly stated, this decision widened the
scope of Art. 311 by including within its purview not
only permanent servants, but temporary servants and
servants holding officiating posts also. The decision
further held that dismissal, removal and reduction
represent the three major penalties contemplated
by the relevant service rules and it is only where the
impugned orders partake of the character of one or
the other of the said penalties that Art. 311 (2) can
be invoked. In the course of his judgment the learned
Chief Justice has referred to Rule 49 and the explanation attached thereto. The explanation to the
Rule clearly shows that it refers to persons appointed on probation, or persons holding temporary
appointments and contractual posts. It is in the light
of this explanation that the learned Chief Justice
proceeded to examine the contention raised by Dhingra
that his reversion amounted to reduction in rank,
and so, it became necessary to examine whether any
loss of benefit already accrued had been incurred,
or any stigma had been attached to the servant before he
was reverted. It is in that connection that the Court
also held that though a kind of enquiry may have
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
been held and the short-comings in the work of Dhingra
may have weighed in the mind of the authority who
Motz Ram Deka reverted him, the said motive could not alter the characetc.
ter of reversion which was not reduction within the
v.
meaning of Art. 311(2). All those points have been
General
considered and decided and so far as the temporary
Manager, N.E.F. servants probationers, or contractual servants are
Railways,
concerned, they are no longer in doubt.
1963
.
Maligaon,
In regard to permanent servants, the learned
Chief Justice has made some observations which it
a1end7gadkar is n~w necessary to consider very carefully. "The
·
appomtment of a government servant to a permanent
post," observed the learned C.J., "may be substantive
or on probation or on an officiating basis. A substantive appointment to a permanent post in public
service confers normally on the servant so appointed a substantive right to the post and he becomes
entitled to hold a lien on the post. "(p. 841) On the
same subject, the learned C.J has later added that
"in the absence of any special contract, the substantive
appointment to a permanent post gives the servant
so appointed a right to hold the post until, under the
rules, he attains the age of superannuation or is compulsorily retired after having put in the prescribed
number of years' service, or the post is abolished
and his service cannot be terminated except by
way of punishment for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification found against
him on proper enquiry after due notice to him."
(p. 843). Reading these two observations together, there
can be no doubt that with the exception of appointments held under special contract, the Court took
the view that wherever a civil servant was appointed
to a permanent post substantively, he had a right
to hold that post until he reached the age of superannuation or was compulsorily retired, or the post
was abolished. In all other cases, if the services
of the said servant were terminated, they would have
to be in conformity with the provisions of Art. 311 (2),
because termination in such cases amounts to removal.
The two statements of the law to which we have just
Pandu, etc.
G . -·
I
6""
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
I
referred do not leave any room for doubt on this
point.
1963
Moii Ram Deka
etc.
learn-
Later during the course of the judgment,
ed C.J. proceeded to examine Rule 49 and the exv.
planations added to it, and then reverting to the
General
question of permanent servants once again, he obser-Manag~r, NE.F.
ved that "it has already been said that where a person Rarlways,
is appointed substantively to a permanent post in Mahgaon,
Government service, he normally acquires a right Pandu, etc.
to hold the post until under the rules, he attains
the age of superannuation or is compulsorily retired Gajendragadkar
and in the absence of a contract, express or implied,
J.
or a service rule, he cannot be turned out of his post
unless the post itself is abolished or unless he is guilty
of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications and appropriate proceedin~s are taken
under the service rules read with Art. 311(2). Termination of service of such a servant so appointed must
per se be a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture
of the servant's rights and brings about a premature
end of his employment." (pp. 857-58). With respect,
we ought to point out that though the learned C.J.
at this place purports to reproduce what had already
been stated in the judgment, he has made two significant additions because in the present statement,
he refers to a contract or service rules which may
permit the authority to terminate the services of a
permanent servant without taking the case under
Art. 311(2), though such termination may not
amount to ordinary or compulsory retirement. The
absence of contract, express or implied, or a service
rule, which has been introduced in the present statement
are not to be found in the earlier statements to which
we have already referred, and addition of these two
clauses apparently is due to the fact that the learned
C.J. considered Rule 49 and the explanations attached
thereto and brought them into the discussion of a
permanent servant, and that, we venture to think,
is not strictly correct. As we have already seen,
Explanation No. 1 to R. 49 is confined to the three
categories of officers specified by it in its clauses (a),
720
1963
-
Moti Ram Deka
etc.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
(b) and (c), and it has no relevance or application to the
cases of permanent servants.
Similarly, the same statement is repeated with
v.
the observation "as already stated, if the servant
General
has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless
Manager, N.E.F. the contract of employment or the rules provide to
Raz;.ways,
the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherMa ~gaon,
wise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency
Pan u, etc. or other good and sufficient cause. A termination
. - d dk of the service of such a servant on such grounds
Ga1en raga ar
· hment and, there1ore,
,.
· 1
J
must be a pums
a d"1sm1ssa
·
or removal within Art. 311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances." (p. 862).
With respect, we wish to make the same comment
about this statement which we have already made
about the statement just cited. In this connection,
it may be relevant to add that in the paragraph where
this statement occurs, the learned C.J. was summing
up the position and the cases there considered are
cases of Satish Chandra Anand, Cl) and Shyam Lal (2J,
These two cases were concerned with the termination
of a temporary servant's services and the compulsory retirement of a permanent servant respectively,
and strictly speaking, they do not justify the broader
proposition enunciated at the end of the paragraph.
At the conclusion of his judgment, the learned
C.J. has observed that "in every case, the Court
has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely,
(1) whether the servant had a right to the post or
the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil
consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to."
(p. 863) It would be noticed that the two tests are
not cumulative, but are alternative, so that if the
first test is satisfied, termination of a permanent
servant's services would amount to removal because
his right to the post has been prematurely invaded.
The learned C.J. himself makes it clear by adding
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 655.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 26,
r
5 S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
that if the case satisfies either of the two tests, then
1963
it must be held that the servant had been punished
and the termination of his services must be held Moti Ram Deka
to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional
etc.
rights of the servant. It would thus be noticed that
v.
the first test would be applicable to the cases
General
of permanent servants, whereas the second test would Manager, N.E.F.
be relevant in the cases of temporary servants, pro- Rat/ways,
bationers and the like. Therefore, we do not think, Maligaon,
the learned Add!. Solicitor-General is justified in Pandu, etc.
contending that all the observations made in the
course of this judgment in regard to permanent servants Gajendragadkar
considered together support his contention. Besides,
J.
if we may say so, with respect, these observations
are in the nature of obiter dicta and the learned Add!.
Solicitor-General cannot rely solely upon them for
the purpose of showing that R. 148(3) or R. 149(3)
should be held to be valid as a result of the said observations.
•
The last decision on this point rendered by this
Court in 1958 (vide P. Balakotaiah v. The Union of
India & 0 thers(1 l dealt with the case of Balakotaiah
who was a permanent railway servant and whose
services had been terminated for reasons of national
security under s. 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949. It
appears that in this case, Balakotaiah who challenged
the order terminating his services before the High Court
of Nagpur, failed because the High Court held
that the said order was justified under Rule 148(3)
of the Railway Rules. In his appeal before this
Court, it was urged on his behalf that the High Court
was in error in sustaining the impugned order under
the said Rule when the Union of India had not attempted to rely on the said Rule, and the impugned order
did not purport to have been passed under it. The
argument was that the impugned order had been
passed under R. 3 of the Security Rules and the High
Court should have considered the matter by reference
to the said Rule and not to R. 148(3). This plea was
(!) [1958] S.C.R. 1052.
1/SCl/64-46
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
upheld by this Court, and so, Balakotaiah's challenge
.
to the validity of the impugned order was examined
Motz Ram Dekaby reference to security rule 3. The scheme of the
etc.
relevant Security Rules was then considered by this
v.
Court and it was held that the said Rules did not
General
contravene either Art. 14 or Art. 19(1)(c) of the
Manager, N.E.F. Constitution as contended by the appellant. Having
Railways,
held that the impugned rule was not unconstitutional,
Maligaon,
this Court proceeded to examine the further contention
Pandu, etc. that the procedure prescribed by the said rules for
he~ring of the charges does not satisfy the re.Ga1endragadkar qmrement of Art. 311 and as such, the said Rules
J.
are invalid.
1963
Rules, 3, 4 and 5 of the Security Rules which
dealt with this point do contemplate some kind of
an enquiry at which an opportunity is given to the
railway servant concerned to show cause against
the action proposed to be taken against him. Rule
7 also provides that a person who is compulsorily
retired or whose service is terminated under Rule
3, shall be entitled to such compensation, pension,
gratuity and/or Provident Fund benefits as would
have been admissible to him under the Rules applicable to his service if he had been discharged from
service due to the abolition of his post wihout any
alternative suitable employment being provided. The
contention was that the nature of the enquiry contemplated by the relevant Rules did not satisfy the requirements of Art. 311(2\ and so, the Rules should
be struck down as being invalid and the order terminating the services of Balakotaiah should, therefore,
be held to be invalid. This argument was rejected
by this Court, and relying upon the earlier decisions
in the cases of Satish Chandra Anand(ll, Shyam Lai<•>
Saubhagchand M. Doshi(3), and Parshotam Lal
Dhingra< 4 >, it was held that the order terminating
the services of the railway employee which can be
(I) (1953] S.C.R. 655.
(2) [1955].1S.C.R.26.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 571.
(4) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
.(
r
-
~
}
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
passed under R. 3 is not an order of dismissal or remo1963
val, and so, Art. 311(2) is inapplicable. On that view,
the validity of R. 3 was sustained. In recording its Moti Ram Deka
conclusion on this point, this Court observed that
etc.
the order terminating the services under R. 3 stands
v.
on the same footing as an order of discharge under
General
Rule 148 and it is neither one of dismissal nor of Manager, N.E.F.
removal within the meaning of Art 311. Naturally, Railways,
the learned Addi. Solicitor-General relies on this Maligaon,
statement of the Jaw.
Pandu, etc.
~
4
'
. In appreciating the effect of this observation, Gajendragadkar
J.
it is necessary to bear in mind that in the earlier portion
of the Judgment, this Court has specifically referred
to the argument that the Security Rules had an
independent operation of their own quite apart from
Rule 148, and has observed that the Court did not
desire to express any final opinion on that quesion
"as Mr. Ganapathy Iyer is willing that the validity of
the orders in question might be determined on the
footing that they were passed under R. 3 of the Security Rules, without reference to R. 148. That renders
it necessary to decide whether the Security Rules are
unconstitutional as contended by the appellant."
It would thus be noticed that having upheld the
contention of the appellant Balakotaiah that the
High Court was in error in referring to and relying
upon R. 148(3) for the purpose of sustaining the
impugned order terminating his services, this Court
had naturally no occasion to consider the validity,
the effect or the applicability of the said Rule to the
case before it, and so, the attention of the Court
centered round the question as to whether the relevant security rule was valid and whether it justified
the order passed against the appellant. In dealing
with this aspect of the matter, this Court no doubt
came to the conclusion that the termination of Balakotaiah's services under R. 3 did not amount to his
removal or dismissal; but since no argument was urged
beforethe Court in respect of R. 148(3), the reference to
the said Rule made by the judgment is purely in the
nature of an obiter, and so, we are not prepared to
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
read that statement as a decision that R. 148(3) is
valid. To read the said statement in that manner
Moti Ram Deka would be to ignore the fact that this Court had reetc.
versed the conclusion of the High Court that the
v.
impugned order was valid under R. 148(3) speciGeneral
fically on the ground that that case had not been made
Manager, N.E.F. out by the Union of India and should not have been
Railways,
adopted by the High Court. It is thus clear that
Maligaon,
as the case was argued before this Court and consiPandu, etc. dered, R. 148(3) was outside the controversy between
. -• the parties. That is why it would be unreasonable
Ga;endragadkar to rely on the reference to R. 148 in the statement
1·
made in the judgment on which the learned Addi.
Solicitor-General relies.
1963
t
There is another aspect of this question to which
we may incidentally refer before we part with this
case. We have already quoted the observation of fl
Venkatarama Aiyar J. in the case of Subhagchand
M. Doshi 0) to the effect that if compulsory
retirement is permitted by any service rule without
fixing the minimum period of service after which the
Rule can be invoked, termination of the services
of a permanent civil servant by the application of
such a Rule would be dismissal or removal under
Art. 311(2), and we have indicated that we regard
that statement as correctly representing the true legal •
position in the matter. It appears that when this
Court decided the case of Balakotaiah, this aspect
of the matter was not argued before the Court and lthe observation to which we have just referred was
not brought to its notice.
One more case which still remains to be considered in this context is the decision in Dalip Singh v. The
State of Punjab<•>. In this case, Dalip Singh was
compulsorily retired from service by the Rajpramukh
of Pepsu exercising his power under Rule 278 of the
Patiala State Regulations, 1931. In the suit from
which the appeal before this Court arose he alleged
that the order of retirement passed against him amoun(!)
[1958] S.C.R. 571.
(2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 88.
~
5 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
ted to his dismissal, and so, he claimed to recover
1963
Rs. 26,699-13-0 on that basis. The validity of
R. 278 was not put in issue in the proceedings at Moti Ram Deka
any stage. The only point raised was that the said
etc.
Rule was not applicable to his case, and it was urged
v.
that in the circumstances, the order was an order
General
of dismissal. This Court held that R. 278 applied Manager, N.E.F.
to the case, and so, the preliminary objection against
Railways,
the applicability of the Rule was rejected. Dealing Maligaon,
with the main contention raised before this Court Pandu, etc.
that the compulsory retirement of Dalip Singh was
removal from service within the meaning of Art. Gajendragadkar
311(2), this Court applied the tests laid down in the
J.
case of Shyam La/ll) and Saubhagchand DoshiC2)
and held that the said retirement did not amount
to removal. Dalip Singh had not lost the benefit
which he earned, and though considerations of alleged
misconduct or inefficiency may have weighed with the
Government in compulsorily retiring him, that did
not affect the character of the order; in fact, full pension
had been paid to the officer, and so, it was held that
the order of retirement is clearly not by way of punishment.
At the end of this judgment, this Court added that
" the observations made in the case of Doshi( 2 l which
· we have already cited, should not be read as laying
down the law that retirement under R. 278 would
be invalid for the reason that a minimum period of
~ service had not been prescribed before the said Rule
could be enforced against the civil servant. It would
be recalled that in the case of Doshi (2J, Venkatarama Aiyar J. had observed that if the two periods
are not prescribed one for superannuation and the
other for enforcing the rule of compulsory retirement, compulsory retirement of the officer would
amount to dismissal or removal under Art. 311(2).
In Dalip Singh's case (2J, it was stated that the said observation should not be taken to have laid down any
rufo of ·universal application in that behalf. The
(1) [1955] l S.C.R. 26
(2) [1958] I S.C.R. 571.
(3) [1961] I S.C.R. 88
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
learned Addi. Solicitor-General has naturally relied
on these observations.
Mori Ram Deka
It is, however, necessary to point out that the said
e~c.
observations were made on the assumption that
Gen~ral
the Patiala Rules did not lay down any minimum
Manager NE F period of service which had to be put in by civil servant
Rail~ay~, · ·before he could be compulsorily retired under Rule
Maligaon,
278. We have already seen that the validity of
Pandu, etc. R. 278 was not challenged before the Court in Dalip
Singh' s case; besides, we have now been referred
Gajendragadkar to the relevant Patiala Rules, and it appears that the
f
J.
combined operation of Rules 53, 54, 125, 236, 239,
240, 243 and 278 would tend to show that .no officer ·
could have been compulsorily retired under R. 278
unless he had put in at least 12 years' service. We
are referring to this aspect of the matter for the purpose of showing that the assumption made by this
Court in making the observations to which we have
just referred may not be well-founded in fact. Apart
from that, we think that if any Rule permits the appropriate authority to retire compulsorily a civil
servant without imposing a limitation in that behalf that
such civil servant should have put in a minimum
period of service, that Rule would be invalid and the
so-called retirement ordered under the said Rule
would amount to removal of the civil servant within .._
the meaning of Art. 311t2).
1963
At this stage, we ought to make it clear that ,.,
in the present appeals, we are not called upon to
consider whether a rule of compulsory retirement
would be valid, if, having fixed a proper age of superannuation, it permits a permanent servant to be
retired at a very early stage of his career. We have
referred to the decisions dealing with cases of compulsory retirement only for the purpose of ascertaining
the effect of the obiter observations made in some of
those decisions in relation to the question with which
we are directly concerned. The question raised by
the orders of compulsory retirement so far as it is
covered by the said decisions must be deemed to .be
concluded. Our conclusion, therefore, is that rules ,
S S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
148(3) and 149(3) which permit the termination of
1963
a permanent railway servant's services in the manner
provided by them, are invalid because the termination Moti Ram Deka
of services which the said Rules authorise is removal
etc.
of the said railway permanent servant and it contrav.
venes the constitutional safeguard provided by Art. · General
311(2).
Manager, N.E.F.
Railways,
Ma/igaon,
Pandu, etc.
After this Court pronounced its decision in the
case of Shyam Lalc:Li the question about the
validity of Rule 148(3) has been considered by several
High Courts and it must be conceded that with the Gajendragadkar
J.
exception of two decisions of the Calcutta High
Court in Union of India v. Someswar Banerjee< 21 , and
Fakir Chandra Chiki v. S. Chakravarti & Ors <31 , which
have held that R. 1709 and R. 148(3) of the Railway
Rules are respectively invalid, the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the contention raised _by
the learned Addi. Solicitor-General. These decisions
have held that R. 148(3) is constitutionally valid
(vide Biswanath Singh v. District Traffic Supdt., N.E.
Railway, Sonepur<• 1 , The Union of India v. Askaran <5 >
Hardwari Lal v. General Manager, North Eastern
Railway, Gorakhpur<•> and Anr., Kishan Prasad v. The
Union of India< 7 > and D.S. Srinath v. General Manager,
Southern Railway, Madras<•>. In fairness, we ought
to add that all these decisions proceeded on the basis
that the observations made by this Court either in
!he case of Shyam La/< 1 >, or in the case of Dhingra C9>
m respect of permanent servants amounted fo a
decision oi:i that point and were, therefore, binding
on the H1g~ Courts. . Some decisions purport to
~dopt t~e sa1~ observations and extend them logically
m dealmg with the question about the validity of
Rul.e. 148(3 ). With respect, we must hold that these
dec~s~ons. do not correctly represent the true legal
pos1t10n m regard to the character of R. 148(3).
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26.
(i) A.LR. 1954 Cal. 399.
(3) A.LR. 1954 Cal. 566.
(4) A.LR. 1956 Patna 221.
(5) A.LR. 1957 Rajasthan 836.
(6) A.LR. 1959 All. 439.
(7) A.LR. 1960 Cal. 264.
(8) A.LR. 1962 Mad 379.
(9) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
There is still one more point which must be considered and that is the challenge to the validity of
Mvti Ram Deka Rules 148(3) and 149(3) on the ground that they
etc.
contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution. The pleadings
v.
on this part of the case filed by both the parties are
General
not very satisfactory; but as to the broad features
Manager, N.E.F. of the Rules on which the challenge rests, there is
Railways,
no serious dispute. We have already seen the Rules;
Ma/igaon,
it is urged that they purport to give no guidance
Pandu, etc. to the authority which would operate the said Rules.
No principle is laid down which should guide the
. Ga;endragadkar decision of the authority in exercising its power under
J.
the said Rules. Discretion is left in the authority
completely unguided in the matter and the Rules
are so worded that the power conferred by them can
be capriciously exercised without· offending the Rules.
It is also not disputed by the learned Addi. SolicitorGeneral that no other branch of public services either
under the States or under the Union contains any
rule which corresponds to the impugned Rules.
Therefore, basing themselves on these two features
of the impugned Rules it is argued by the Railway
employees before us that the Rules offend Art. 14..
1963
--
In support of the first argument, it is suggested
that though the impugned Rule may not in terms
enact a discriminatory rule and in that sense may
not patently infringe Art. 14, it may, nevertheless,
contravene the said Art. if it is so framed as to enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be
m~ted out to persons or things similarly situated;
and in support of this point, reliance is placed on
the decision of this Court in Jyoti Pershad v. The
Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi' 1 ). Such
a result, it is said, would inevitably follow where
the rule vests a discretion in an authority as an executive officer and does not lay down any policy and
fails to disclose any tangible, intelligible, or rational
purpose which the power conferred by it is intended
to serve.
(!) [1962] l S.C.R, 125 at P. 137.
i'
·'...
;r
~
5 S.C.R;
'
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
On the other hand, the Addi. Solicitor-General
1963
has contended that the very purpose of the Rule
-gives guidance to the appropriate authority exercising Moti Ram Deka
its power under it; in exercising the said power the
etc.
appropriate authority will have to take into account
v.
all the relevant circumstances in regard to the nature
General
and quality of the work of the railway servant in Manager, N.E.F
question and will have to decide whether there are Railll'ays,
circumstances which require that_ the services of the Ma/igaon,
said servant should be terminated. In dealing with Pandu, et_c.
such a question, it is plain that the appropriate autho- _ - rity would naturally have regard for considerations Ga1endragadkar
of public interest and the interest of the Railway
J.
Administration. Therefore, it is suggested that the
Rule cannot be struck down on the ground that it
confers absolute, unguided and uncanalised power
on the appropriate authority. Since we have come
to the conclusion that the second attack made against
the validity of the Rule under Art. 14 ought to be sustained we do not propose to express any opinion on
this part of the controversy between the parties.
The other aspect of the matter arises from the
fact that no other branch of public service contains
such a rule for its civil servants. The true scope and
effect of Art. 14 has been considered by this Court
on several occasions. It may, however, be sufficient
to refer to the decision of this Court in Shri Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolker &
OrsYl After examining the Article and the relevant
decisions of this Court bearing on it, Das C.J. who
spoke for the Court stated the position in the form
of propositions, (a) to (f). Propositions (a) and
(f) are relevant for our purpose. "The decisions of
this Court establish," said Das C.J., "(a) that a law
may be constitutional even though it relates to a
single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated
as a class by himself; and (f) that while good faith and
knowledge of the existing conditions on the part
(I) [1959] S.C.R. 279 at P. 297.
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing
-on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances
Moti Ram Deka brought to the notice of the court on which the classietc.
fication may reasonably be regarded as based, the
v.
presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried
General
to the extent of always holding that there must be
Manager, N.E.F.some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting
Railways,
certain individuals or corporations to hostile or
Maligaon,
discriminating legislation." Applying these two prinPandu, etc. ciples, it is difficult to understand on what ground
employment by the Railways alone can be said to
. -Ga1endragadkar constitute a class by itself for the purpose of framing
J.
the impugned Rules. If considerations of administrative efficiency or exigencies of service justify the
making of such a rule, why should such a Rule not
have been framed in the Posts & Telegraph Department to take only one instance. The learned Additional
Solicitor-General frankly conceded that the affidavits filed by the Railway Administration or the Union
of India afforded no material on which the framing
of the Rule only in respect of one sector of public
service can be justified. We appreciate the argument that the nature of services rendered by employees in different sectors of public service may differ
and the terms and conditions governing employment in all public sectors may not necessarily be
the same or uniform; but in regard to the question
of terminating the services of a civil servant after
serving him with a notice for a specified period, we
are unable to see how the Railways can be regarded
as constituting a separate and distinct class by reference to which the impugned Rule can be justified
in the light of Art. 14. If there is any rational connection between the making of such a Rule and the
object intended to be achieved by it, that connection
would clearly be in existence in several other sectors
of public service. What has happened is that a provision like R. 148(3) or R. 149(3) was first made by
the Railway Companies when employment with the
Railways was a purely commercial matter governed
by the ordinary rules of contract. After the Railways
were taken over by the State, that position has essen1963
,
'
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f
-
5 S.C.R.
~-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
I
tially altered, and so, the validity of the Rule is now
1963
exposed to the challenge under Art. 14. Therefore,
we are satisfied that the challenge to, the validity of Moti Ram Deka
the impugned Rules on the ground that they contraetc.
vene Art. 14 must also succeed.
,v.
,
General
There is one , more point which we ought to Manager, N.E.F.
mention before we part with these appeals. In Railways,
dealing with the valiCtity of R. 149, Nayudu J. of the Maligaon,
Assam High Court who, has delivered the minority , Pandu, etc.
judgment in the case of Shyam Behari Tewari & Ors.
v. union of India & Anr.u>, has observed that the Rule Gajendragadkar
would be invalid for the additional reason that it
J.
purports to give power to the Railway Administration
to terminate the services of any person in permanent
employment in railway service on ,notice at the sweetwill and pleasure of the Railway Administration.
Such a power, said the learned Judge, can only be
exercised by the President in the instant cases where
the service h under the Union and not by any other,
whereas the Rule in question purports to give. that
power to the Railway Administration; , ·In support of
this conclusion, the learned Judge has relied on the
observations made in the majority judgment delivered
by this Court in The State of Uttar PradeJh and .Ors.
v. Babu Ram Upadhya< 2 >. We ought to point out that
the learned Judge has misconstrued the effect of the
observations on which he relies. What the said Judgment has held is that while Art: 310 provides for a
tenure at pleasure of the President or the Governor,
Art. 309 enables the legislature or, the. executive,
as the case may be, to make any law or rule in regard,
inter alia, to conditions of service without impinging ·upon the overriding power recognised , under
Art. 310. In other words, in exercising the power
conferred by Art. 309, the extent of the pleasure recognised by Art. 310 cannot be affected, or impaired.
In fact; while stating the conclusions in the form 'of
propositions, the said judgment has observed that
the Parliament or the Legislature can make a law regulating the conditions of service without affecting
0) A.LR. 1963 Assam 94
(2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the. powers· of the President .or, the Governor under
Art: 310 read with Art. 31L · It has also been stated
Mori Ram Dekaat the same place that the power .fo dismiss a public
ere.
"· servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Art. 154
v.
. _and, therefore, cannot be delegated by the Governor
General
to a subordinate officer and can be exercised by
Manager, N.E.F.him only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.
Railways,' · In the context, it would be clear that this latter obMaligaon,
seivation · is not intended to lay down that a law
Pandu, eic. - cannot be made under Art. 309 J or. a Rule cannot
· be framed under the proviso to the said Article
Gajendragadkarprescribing the procedure by which, and the authority
J.
by· whom, the said pleasure can be ·exercised.. This
. observation which is mentioned as proposition number
(2) must be read along with the subsequent propositions specified as (3), (4), (5) & (6). -The only point
made. is that ..whatever is done under Art. 309 mus~!\
be· subject to the pleasure prescribed by Art. 310.\
' Nayudu J. was, therefore, in error in holding that the
: majority deci~ion of. this Court in the case of Babu
Ram Upadhya< 0 supported . _his· broad· • and . unqualified · conclusion that R. 149(3) was invalid
for the sole reason that the power to terminate the services had been delegated to the Railway Administration.
·. In the result, the four appeals in the first group
succeed and. are allowed. The writ petitions filed
. by the four appellants in the three High Courts are
granted and orders directed to be issued in terms of
"the prayers :made·by them. The appellants would
be entitled to their costs from the respondents. The
three appeals in the second group fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees in each group.
Subba Rao J. ·· .·.• . SUBBA RAO J ...:. I agree that the impugned . rules
infringe both .Art. 14 and Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and are, therefore, void.- On Art. 14, I have
nothing more to say. But on.the.impact ofthe said
rules on Art. 311 of the Constitution, I would prefer
·· ·to. give my own reasons.
. ·
· . The short but difficult question · is whether
r. 148 of the Indian· Railway Establishment Code,
1963
(1) (19611 2 S.C.R. 679.
•
-
5 S.C.R.
•
-
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
Vol. I (1951) and r. 149 of the revised edition of the
1963
said Code of the year 1959 replacing r. 148 of the
-Code of 1951 edition impinge upon the constitu- Mori Ram Deka
tional safeguard given to a person holding a civil
etc.
post under the Union Government under Art. 311(2)
v.
of the Constitution. While Art. 311(2) of the ComtiGeneral
tution prohibits the State from dismissing or removing Manager, N.E.F.
or reducing in rank a civil servant until he has been Railways,
given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause Maligaon,
against the action proposed to be taken in regard Pandu, etc.
to him, rr. 148 and 149 of the said Code in effect,
enable the Government to terminate his services Subba Rao J.
after issuing the prescribed notice thereunder. Prima
facie the said rules are in conflict with Art. 311(2)
of the Constitution. Broadly stated, the contention
of the State is that a Union civil servant holds his
office during the pleasure of the President, that Art.
311 is not really a limitation on the exercise of that
pleasure, that it only prescribes safeguards against
the imposition on him of three unmerited specified penalties, viz., dismissal, removal and reduction
in rank, and that the termination of his services for
a reason other than misconduct personal to the civil
servant is not comprehended by any of the said penalties. The further argument is that the "doctrine of
pleasure" implies that a civil servant has no right
to an office even in a case where he has a substantive
lien on a post and that in any event he has none when
there is a specific rule that his services can be terminated
after the prescribed notice.
This Bench of seven Judges has been constituted
to steer clear of conflicting observations, if any,
found in the judgments of thif Court and to arrive
at a conclusion of its own unhampered by such observations. I would, therefore, proceed to consider
the relevant provisions in accordance with the natural
tenor of the expressions used therein and then to
scrutinize whether any of my conclm ions would
be in conflict with any of the decisions of this Court.
At the outset I must make it clear that I propose to
confine my discussion only to the question of terrni-
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964)
•'
nation of services of a permanent civil servant. None
of the observations I may make is intended to have
. -Mot1 Ram Deka any bearing on the question of termination of the
etc..
services of other categories of servants.
1963
"-
v.
General
As the argument of the learned Additional SoliManager, N.E.F. citor-General is based upon the doctrine of pleasure,
Railways
it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain
Maligaon'
the precise scope of the doctrine in the context of
. Pandu, et;. the Indian Constitution.
Article 309 is subject to the provisions of the
Subba Rao 1· Constitution and, therefore, is subject to Art. 310
thereof. Article 311 imposes two limitations on the
doctrine of pleasure declared in Art. 310. The gist
of the said provisions is this: Under Art. 309 of
the Constitution the appropriate Legislature may
regulate the recruitment and conditions of service
of persons appointed to public services and posts
in connection with the affairs of the Union or any
State; and until provision in that behalf is made,
the President or such person as he may direct may
make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the said
services and posts in connection with the affairs of
the Union. In its ordinary meaning the expression
"conditions of service" takes in also the tenure of
a civil servant. Under Art. 310, such a civil servant
holds office during the pleasure of the President;
but Art. 311 imposes two conditions to be satisfied
before a civil servant can be dismissed, or removed
or reduced in rank, namely, (i)he shall not be dismissed,
removed or reduced in rank by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and (ii)
he shall be given a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. A combined reading of these provisions
indicates that the rules made under Art. 309 are subject
to the doctrine of pleasure; and that the doctrine
of pleasure is itself subject to two limitations imposed
This tenure at pleasure
thereon under Art. 311.
is a concept borrowed from English law, though it
has been modified to suit the Indian conditions,
~
(
...
J
f
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
/l
The English law on the doctrine of tenure at pleasure
1963
has now become fairly crystallized. Under the English
--law, all servants of the Crown. hold office during Moti Ram Deka
the pleasure of the Crown. The right to dismiss
etc.
at pleasure is an implied term in every contract of
General
employment under the Crown. This doctrine is not Manager, N.E.F.
based upon any prerogative of the Crown but on Railways,
public policy. If the terms of appointment defi- Maligaon,
nitely prescribe a tenure for good behaviour or ex- Pandu, etc.
pressly provide for a power to determine for a cause,
such an implication of a power to dismiss at pleasure Subba Rao J.
is excluded, and an Act of Parliament can abrogate
or amend the said doctrine of public policy in the same
way as it can do in respect of any other part of common law. (see The State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya (1) •
.'
...,,.
'
l
Section 96-B of the Government of India Act,
1915, for the first time in 1919, by an amendment,
statutorily recognized this doctrine, but it was made
subject to a condition that no person in the service
might be dismissed by an authority subordinate to
that by which he was appointed. Section 240 of
the Government of India Act, 1935, imposed another
limitation, namely, that a reasonable opportunity
of show ng cause against the action proposed to be
taken in regard to a person must be given to him.
But neither of the two Acts empowered the appropriate
Legislature to make a law abolishing or amending
the said doctrine. The Constitution of India practically
incorporated the provisions of s. 240 and s. 241 of
the Government of India Act, 1935, in Arts. 309
and 310. The English doctrine has been enlarged
in one direction and restricted in another: while
Parliament has no power to deprive the President of
his pleasure, the said pleasure is made subject to two
limitations embodied in Art. 311. The English concept
is considerably modified to suit the conditions of
our country. It is, therefore, not correct to say that
Art. 311 is not a limitation on the power of the President to terminate the services of a Union civil servant
at his pleasure. To accept the argument that the
(1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679, 696.
736
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
relevant expression in Art. 311 shall be so construed as
. to give full sway to the doctrine is to ignore the limiMoti Ram Dekatations on that doctrine. Both Art. 310 and Art.
etc.
311 shall be read together and, if so read, it is maniv.
fest that the said doctrine is subject to the said two
General
conditions.
1963
Manager, N.E.F.
Railways,
What is the scope of the relevant words, "dismisMaligaon,
sed" and "removed" in Art. 311 of the Constitution?
Pandu, etc. The general rule of mterpretation which is common
Subba Rao J.
to statutory provisions as well as to constitutional
provisions is to find out the expressed intention of
the makers of the said provisions from the words
of the provisions themselves. It is also equally
well-settled that, without doing violence to the language
used, a constitutional provision shall receive a fair,
liberal and progressive construction, so that its true
objects might be promoted. Article 311 uses two
well-known expressions, "dismissed" and "removed".
The Article does not, expressly or by necessary implication, indicate that the dismissal or removal of a
Government servant must be of a particular category.
As the said Article gives protection and safeguard
to a Government servant, who will otherwise be at the
mercy of the Government, the said words shall ordinarily be given a liberal or at any rate their natural
meaning, unless the said Article or other Articles of
the Constitution, expressly or by necessary implication, restrict their meaning. J do not see any indication anywhere in the Constitution which compels
the Court to reduce the scope of the protection.
The dictionary meaning of the word "dismiss" is
"to let go; to relieve from duty''. The word "remove"
means "to discharge, to get rid off, to dismiss". In
their ordinary parlance, therefore, the said words
mean nothing more or less than the termination of
a person's office. The effect of dismissal or removal
of one from his office is to discharge him from that
office. In that sense, the said words comprehend every
termination of the services of a Government servant.
Article 311 (2) in effect lays down that before the services of a Government servant are so terminated,
,
'
...
'
•
5 S.C.R.
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
737
he must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing
1963
cause against such a termination. There is no justification for placing any limitation on the said ex- Moti Ram Deka
pressions, such as that the dismissal or removal should
etc.
have been the result of an enquiry in regard to the
Ge~eral
Government servant's misconduct. The attempt to Manager, N.E.F.
imply the said limitation is neither warranted by the Railways,
expressions used in the Article or by the reason given, Ma/igaon
namely, that otherwise there would be no point in Pandu, etc.
giving him an opportunity to defend himself. If ·
this argument be correct, it would lead to an extra- Subba Rao J
ordinary result, namely, that a Government servant
who has been guilty of misconduct would be entitled
to a "reasonable opportunity" whereas an honest
Government servant could be dismissed without any
such protection. In one sense the conduct of a party
may be relevant to punishment; ordinarily punishment is meted out for misconduct, and if there is no
misconduct there could not be punishment. Punishment is, therefore, correlated to misconduct, both
in its positive and negative aspects. That is to say,
punishment could be sustained if there was misconduct
and could not be meted out if there was no misconduct. Reasonable opportunity given to a Government
servant enables him to establish that he does not
deserve the punishment, because he has not been
guilty of misconduct. That apart, a Government
servant may be removed or dismissed for many other
reasons, such as retrenchment, abolition of post,
compulsory retirement and others. If an opportunity is given to a Government servant to show cause
against the proposed action, he may plead and establish that either there was no genuine retrenchment or abolition of posts or that others should go
before him.
Now let me see whether the history of this
constitutional provision countenances any such limitation on the meaning of the said expressions. As
we have already noticed, the concept of tenure at
pleasure was first introduced in the Government
of India Act, 1919. Under s. 96-B of that Act,
1/SCl/64-47
738
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and
of rules made thereunder, every person m the
Moti Ram Deka
civil service of the Crown in India holds office
etc.
during His Majesty's pleasure, and may be emplov,
yed in any manner required by a proper authority
General
within the scope of his duty, but no person in
Manager, N.E.F.
that service may be dismissed by any authority
Railways,
·subordinate to that by which he was appointed ... "
Maligaon
It will be seen that under this section the said concept
Pandu, etc. was introduced subject to a condition; it may also
be noticed that the section used only one word
Subba Rao J.
"dismissed". In England, under that doctrine, services of a Government servant, whether he is a permanent or a temporary servant, can be terminated without
any cause whether he is guilty of misconduct or not.
Therefore, when the word "dismissed" is used in
s. 96-B of the Act in the context of the exercise
of His Majesty's pleasure, that word must have
been used in the natural meaning it bears, i.e. terminated. But that section was subject to the
provisions of the rules made under that Act. In
exercise of the power conferred under the Act on
the Secretary of State for Tndia in Council, he
framed certain rules in December 1920 and with
subsequent modifications they were published on May
27, 1930. The said rules were designated as the Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.
Rule 49 of those Rules provided for certain penalties
and cl. (6) thereof dealt with "Removal from the
civil service of the Crown, which does not disqualify from future employment'', and cl. (7) provided for dismissal from the civil service of the
Crown, "which ordinarily disqualified from future
employment". The explanation to that rule read
thus:
The termination of employment:(a) of a person appointed on probation during
or at the end of the period of probation,
in accordance with the terms of the appointment and the rules governing the probationary
·
service; or
1963
r
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
739
(b) of a temporary Government servant appoin1963
ted otherwise than under contract, in accordance with rule 5 of the Central Civil Services Moti Ram Deka
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1949; or
etc.
v,
..
-
. .,.,.._-
.;.
(c) of a person engaged under a contract, in
General
accordance with the terms of his ~ont_ract Manager, N.E.F.
does not amount to removal or d1sm1ssal Railways,
within the meaning of this rule or of Maligaon,
rule 55."
Pandu, etc.
The explanation makes it clear that the three specified categories of termination covered by the expla- Subba.Rao J.
nation would amount to dismissal or removal but
for the explanation. That is to say, the expression
"termination" is synonymous with the term "dismissal"
or "removal". Rule 55 of the Rules provided a
machinery for dismissing or removing or reducing
in rank a Government servant; he should be given
thereunder an adequate opportunity to defend himself. Then came the Government of India Act,
1935. In s. 240 thereof, the expression used was
"dismissed" and that term, in the context of the exercise of His Majesty's pleasure, could have meant
only "termination" of services, though in view of
the explanation to r. 49 of the Rules quoted above,
the three specified categories of termination mentioned
in the explanation might, by construction, be excluded
from the natural meaning of the word "dismissal".
Then we come to Art. 311 of the Constitution, which
with certain modifications incorporated the provisions
of s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. It
introduced the expression "removed" in addition
to the word "dismissed" presumably inspired by
rr. 49 and 55 of the Rules. The natural meaning of
the said terms takes in every act of termination of
service; but, if construed with the help of r. 49 of the
Rules, their meaning may be cut down by excluding
the three categories of termination covered by the
explanation in the manner prescribed therein. If
the termination was otherwise than that prescribed
therein, it would still be dismissal or removal. If
so, the history of the constitutional provisions may
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
lead to the conclusion that though the words "dismissed" and "removed" are words of widest connotaMoti Ram Deka ti on, namely "termination" of service of any category
etc.
held under the Union, they were used in the limited··
v.
sense they bear in r. 49 of the Rules, that is to say
General
termination of employment excluding the three cateManager, N.E.F. gories mentioned in the explanation. So far the
Railways,
words "removed" and "dismissed" are concerned,
Ma/igaon
r. 49 shows that there is no appreciable difference
Pandu, etc. between the two except in the matter of future
employment; and Art. 311, presumably, copied the
Subba Rao J. two words from r. 49.
1963
Therefore, whether the natural and dictionary
meanings of the words "dismissal" and "removal"
were adopted or the limited meanings given to those
words by r. 49 were accepted, the result, so far as a
permanent employee was concerned, would be the
same, namely that in the case of termination of services of a Government servant outside the three categories mentioned in the explanation, it would be dismissal or removal within the meaning of Art. 311
of the Constitution with the difference that in the
former the dismissed servant would not be disqualified from future employment and in the latter ordinarily
he would be disqualified from such employment.
'
If so, it follows that if the services of a permanent
Government servant, which fall outside the three
categories mentioned in the explanation, were terminated, he would be entitled to protection under Art.
311 (2) of the Constitution.
With this background let me now scrutinise the
leading judgment of this Court on the subject, namely,
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India 0>. That
was a case of reversion of a Government servant
who was officiating in Class II Service as Assistant
Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, to his substantive post in Class III Service. This Court, speaking
through Das C.J., gave an exhaustive treatment to
the scope of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, parti(1) [1958] S,C.R. 828.
;.
r
-
5 S.C.R.
-
•
, .....
_"' Y'
,/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
741
cularly with reference to the meaning of the expressions
"dismissed", "removed" or "reduced in rank" found
therein. A careful reading of the judgment shows
1963
that this Court has heavily relied upon r. 49 of the
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Moti Ram Deko
Rules, and its explanation, and attempted to give
etc.
a legal basis for the said provisions. On that basis,
v.
having considered the different aspects of the problem,
General
the Court has laid down the following two tests, Manager, N.E.F.
at p. 863, to ascertain whether a person is dismissed
Railways,
or removed within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Maligaon
Constitution; (1) Whether the servant had a right to Pandu, etc.
the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited
with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore re- Subba Rao J.
ferred to i.e., loss of pay and allowances, loss of his
seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or
postponement of his future chances of promotion.
If an officer had a right to a post or rank and if the
termination of his services deprived him of that right,
the said termination would be dismissal or removal
as punishment. So too, if the termination had the
effect of the officer being visited with evil consequences,
then whatever may be the phraseology used for putting
an end to his services, it would be dismissal as punishment. The motive operating on the mind of the authority concerned or the machinery evolved or the method
adopted to put an end to his services are not relevant
in considering the question whether he was dismissed,
if he had a right to the office or if he had been visited with evil consequences, though the said circumstances may have some relevance as other decisions
of this Court disclose, in ascertaining whether he
was discharged with a stigma attached to him. While
conceding that this decision does not in terms specifically lay down that even in the case of a person
holding a permanent post, if there was an appropriate
term in the conditions of service that his services could
be terminated by notice, Art. 311 of the Constitution would not be attracted, it is contended that
raison d'etre of the decision and some passages therein
lead to that conclusion. Some of the passages relied upon may be extracted:
742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
At pp. 857-858:
"It has already been said that where a person
Moti Ram Deka
is
appointed substantively to a permanent post
·etc.
in
Government service, he normally acquires a
v.
right to hold the post until under the rules, he
General
attains
the age of superannuation or is comManager, N.E.F.
pulsorily
retired and in the absence of a contract
Railways,
express
or
implied, or a service rule he cannot
Maligaon,
be
turned
out
of his post unless he is guilty of
Pandu, etc.
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications and appropriate proceedings are
Subba Rao J.
taken under the service rules read with A rt.
1963
311(2)."
At p. 862:
"As already stated if the servant has got a right
to continue in the post, then, unless the contract
of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency
or other good and sufficient cause."
These passages certainly lend support to the argument
of the learned counsel, but the qualifying clauses
on which reliance is placed are only incidental observations. The main principles relevant to the present
enquiry were laid down by the Court clearly and precisely at p. 860, thus:
"Shortly put, the principle is that when a servant
has right to a post or to a rank either under the
terms of the contract of employment, express
or implied, or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the termination of the
service of such a servant or his reduction to a
lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right
to hold that post or that rank and to get the
emoluments and other benefits attached thereto."
The following observation further pinpoints the
principle;
"One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a government servant
-
.•
-
--
..
SS.C.R.
,
,,
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
743
1963
is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether
had
the
the servant, but for such termination,
Moti Ram Deka
right to hold the post."
This decision, therefore, clearly Jays down, without
e~c.
any ambiguity, that if a person has a right to hold
Gen~ral
office un~er . the servi_ce rul~s or under a contract, Manager, N.E.F.
the termmat10n of hts services would attract Art; R ilways
311 of the Constitution. It also lays down that a ua l"gaon'
a' etc.'
Person holding· a substantive lien on a permanent Pandu,
post has a right to such office. It does not say, expressly or by necessary implication, that even if a person Subba Rao J.
is deprived of such a right, it will not be punishment,
unless it is inflicted for misconduct in the manner
prescribed by the service rules.
Learned Additional Solicitor-General further relied upon the decisions of this Court· holding that a
rule empowering the Government to compulsorily
retire a permanent Government servant before the
age of superannuation did not violate Art. 311 of
the Constitution and contended that, on parity of
reasoning, the impugned rules should likewise be
valid. It was asked, with c;9nsiderable force, what
relevant distinchun there could be between the said two
categories of rules in the context of the question whether
the termination of services was dismissal or not within
the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution? Ih the
case of a Government servant, the argument proceeded, in eit1'er case he was deprived of his title to office
and, therefore, both cases were equally covered by
the principle laid down in Dhingra's case<t). This
argument certainly deserves serious consideration.
The relevant rules pertaining to compulsory retirement of a permanent Government servant considered by this Court in the various decisions relied
upon by learned counsel may now be.· noticed. In
Shyam Lal's case< 2 > which is the sheet-anchor of
the appellants' argument, the rule under consideration was Note 1 to Art. 465-A of the Civil Services
Regulations. The said Note read:
{l) [1958) S.C.R. 828
[2) [1955) 1 S.C.R, 26
744
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
..
'
1963
"Government retains an absolute right to retire
any officer after he has completed twenty-five
Moti Rnm Deka
years qualifying service without giving any reaetc.
sons, and no claim to special compensation
v.
on this account will be entertained. This right
General
will not be exercised except when it is in the
Manager, N.E.F.
public interest to dispense with the further serRailways,
vices of an officer."
Ma/igaon
The rule considered in The State of Bombay v. SaubhagPandu, etc. chand M. DoshiOJ
was r. 165-A of the Bombay
Civil
Services
Rules,
applicable
to the State of SaurashSubba Rao J.
tra, and it read:
"Government retains an absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has completed 25 years qualifying service or 50 years
of age, whatever the service, without giving
any reason, and no claim to special compensation
on this account will be entertained. This right
will not be exercised except when it is in the public
interest to dispense with the further services
of a Government servant such as on account
of inefficiency or dishonesty."
Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, was under consideration
in Balakotaiah v. The Union of India< 2 > and it read:
"A member of the Railway Service who, in the
opinionofthecompetentauthorityis engaged in or
is reasonably suspected to be engaged in subversive
activities, or is associated with others in subversive
activities in such manner as to raise doubts about
his. reliability, may be compulsorily retired from
service, or have his service terminated by the
competent authority after he has been given
due notice or pay in lieu of such notice in accordance with the terms of his service agreement:
Provided that a member· of the Railway
Service shall not be retired or have his service
so terminated unless the competent authority
is· satisfied that his retention in public service
is prejudicial to national security, and unless,
(I) (1958] S.C.R. 571.
(2) [1958] s.c.R. 1052·
-
J.
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
745
where the competent authority is the Head of
1963
a Department, the prior approval of the GoverMoti Ram Deka
nor-General has been obtained."
In Union of India v. Jeewan Ram (I) this Court had
etc.
to consider sub-rr. (3) and (4) of r. 148 of the Indian
v.
Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I. The rule which
General
was under scrutiny in Dalip Singh v. The State of Manager, N.E.F.
Punjab(2) was r. 278 of the Patiala State Regulations,
Railways,
which read:
Ma/igaon
"For all classes of pensions the person who Pandu, etc.
desires to obtain the peniion is required to submit
his application before any pension is granted Subba Rao J.
to him.
The State reserves to itself the right to retire
any of its employees on pension on political
or on other reasons."
The cases of Shyam Lal and Doshi were decided
before Dhingra's case and the cases of Dalip Singh and
Balakotaiah, after Dhingra' s. In all the cases, under
the relevant rules the age of superannuation was
fixed but the order of compulsory retirement was
made before the Government servant reached the
age of superannuation. The rule in Shyam Lal's case
ex facie declares that the right will not be exercised
except when it is in the public interest to dispense
with the further services of an officer indicating thereby
that the compulsory retirement is imposed as punishment for some sort of dereliction of duty on his
part and, therefore, the termination of service under
that rule necessarily carries a stigma with it. The
rule in Doshi's case (3) is more emphatic than that
in Shyam Lal's case: the rule in Doshi'scaseelaborates
what is implicit in the rule considered in Shyam Lal' s
case and declares that the right there under shall be
exercised by the Government only in the case of
inefficiency or dishonesty of the Government servant.
Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules considered in Balakotaiah' s
case (4) expressly says that the order of compulsory
retirement will be made for misconduct defined therein.
(1) A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 905.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 571.
(2) [1961] l S.C.R. 88.
(4) [1958] S. C.R. 1052.
746
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
The rule in Dalip Singh' s caseOl gives a very wide
power to the State to retire any of its employees on penMoti Ram Deka sion on political or other reasons before the age
etc.
of superannuation. Jn short the rules dealt with in
.v.
the first three decisions expressly conferred an absolute
General
power on the appropriate authority to terminate
Manager, N.E.F. the services of a Government servant for misconduct,
Railways,
and the rule in the fourth decision went further and
Maligaon,
enabled the appropriate authority to dismiss the
Pandu, etc. servant for any reason. It may also be noticed that
in Doshi' s caes<ZJ this Court expressed the view that
Subba Rao J. "when there is no rule fixing the age of compulsory
retirement or if there is one and the servant is retired
before the age prescribed therein, then that can be
regarded only as dismissal or removal within Art.
311 (2) of the Constitution". The emphasis appears
to be more on the existence of a rule of compulsory
retirement than on the character of the termination
itself. But this reservation was not accepted by the
Court in Dalip Singh' s case< 1J, that is to say, the emphasis is shifted to the existence of a rule of termination detracting from the permanency of the post.
Pausing here a moment, I ask myself the question
whether these decisions can be reconciled with the
aforesaid principles laid down in Dhingra' s case(3).
In Dhingra's case this Court held that a termination
of the services of a Government servant, who. has
substantive lien on a permanent post, that is to say
a title to his office, is dismissal or removal within
the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Jn
the aforesaid three decisions the Government servant
concerned had substantive lien on a permanent post,
but he was compulsorily retired before the age of
superannuation depriving him of his title to the post.
It is neither the phraseology used in respect of nor the
nomenclature given to the act of termination of service
that is material but the legal effect of the action taken
that is decisive in considering the question whether
a Government servant is dismissed or not. Whether
the services of a permanent Government servant are
1963
---
(!) (1961] I S. C. R. 88
(2) [1958] S. C. R. 571
(3) [1958) S.C.R. 828.
5 S.C.R.
•·
•
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
747
terminated by giving him 15 days'. notice or whether
1963
his services are dispensed with before the age of
superannuation by way of compulsory retirement Mori Ram Deka
under or outside a rule of compulsory retirement, the
etc.
termination deprives him of his titJe·to the permanent
v.
post. If in the former case it amounts to dismissal,
General
in the latter case it must be equally so. I would, Manager, N.E.F.
prefer the principle laid down in Dhingra' s case OJ in
Railways,
the matter of termination of the services of a per- Maligaon,
manent Government servant to that laid down in the Pandu, etc.
said other decisions.
Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code, Subba Rao J.
Vol. I, was considered both in Balakotaiah's case (2)
and in Jeewan Ram's caseOl: in the former, though
there were some observations in support of the appellants' contention, the question of construction of
the rule was expressly left open, and in the latter,
though the Government servant concerned was discharged under that rule, the decision proceeded on
the basis that he was expressly removed for misconduct.
A number of decisions of the High Courts are
cited. I have gone through them carefully. I am not
referring to them in detail, as, though some of
the judgments contain instructive discussion on the·
subject, they practically extended the principle of
Shyam Lal's case(4) and held that the termination of
service, such as under r. 148(3), was not dismissal
within the meaning of Art. 311 of the constitution.
As, in my view, Shyam Lal's case must yield to Dhingra's
case, a further discussion of the said decisions is
not called for.
The effect of the two rules is the same; the
difference is only superficial, which lies more in clever
· drafting than in their content.
Take for instance
the following two rules: (i) the Government may terminate the services of a permanent Government servant
at any time, or after a specified period but before the
normal superannuation age, by way of compulsory
retirement; and (i1) the Government may· terminate
{I) [1958] ~CCR. 828-- ~
(3) A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 905
(2) [1958] s. c. R. 1052.
(4) [1955] l S. C. R. 26.
748
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
the services of a permanent civil servant by giving
him 15 days' notice. Arbitrariness is writ large on
Moti Ram Deka both the rules: both the rules enable the Government
etc.
to deprive a permanent civil servant of his office
v.
without enquiry. Both violate Art. 311(2) of the
General
Constitution. Both must be bad or none at all.
Manager, N.E.F.
The following principles emerge from the aforeRailways,
said discussion. A title to an office must be disMaligaon
tinguished from the mode of its termination. If
Pandu, etc. a person has title to an office, he will continue to have
it till he is dismissed or removed therefrom. Terms
Subba Rao J. of statutory rules may provide for conferment of
a title to an ofhce and also for the mode of terminating
it. If under such rules a person acquires title to an
office, whatever mode of termination is prescribed,
whatever phraseology is used to describe it, the termination is neither more nor less than a dismissal or
removal from service; and that situation inevitably
attracts the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The argument that the mode of termination
prescribed derogates from the title that otherwise
would have been conferred on the employee mixes
up two clear concepts of conferment of title and the
mode of its deprivation. Article 311 is a constitutional protection given to Government servants, who
have title to office, against arbitrary and summary
dismissal. It follows that Government cannot by
rule evade the provisions of the said Article. The
parties cannot also contract themselves out of the
constitutional provision.
Once that principle is accepted the cases dealing
with compulsory retirement before the age of superannuation cannot also fall outside the scope of Art.
311 of the Constitution. Age of superannuation is ,
common to all permanent civil servants: it depends
upon an event that inevitably happens by passage
of time, unless the employee dies earlier or resigns
from the post. It does not depend on the discretion
of the employer or the employee; it is for the benefit
of the employee who earns a well-earned rest with
or without pensionary benefits for the rest of his
life; it has, by custom and by convention, become
1963
4-
-
]
r
~
·!
)"
-<'
•
1
~·
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
749
an inextricable incident of Government service; and
1963
it is an incident of a permanent post. Notwithstanding
. -the rule fixing an age of superannuation, a person Mott Ram Deka
appointed to such a post acquires title to it. The
etc.
same cannot be said of a compulsory retirement
v.
before the age of superannuation. It is not an inciG~neral
dent of the tenure; it does not work automatically; Manager, N.E.F.
it is not conceived in the interest of the employee; Railways,
it is a mode of terminating his employment at the
Maligaon
discretion of the appointing authority. In effect, Pandu, etc.
whatever may be the phraseology used in terminating
the services of a Government employee, it is punish- Subba Rao J.
ment imposed on him, for it not only destroys his
title but also inevitably carries with it a stigma. such
a termination is only dismissal or removal within
the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution.
I would, therefore, with greatest respect, follow
the principle laid down in Dhingra' s case(lJ in respect
of permanent servants in preference to that accepted
by Shyam Lat's case (2) and the subsequent decisions
following it.
Now let me turn to the relevant rules of the Indian
Railway Establishment Code, hereinafter called the
Code. The Code is in two volumes. The first volume
embodies all rules governing the service conditions of
railway servants with the exception of those rules which
correspond to the Fund.amental Rules, Supplementary
Rules, Pension Rules and the Civil Service Regulations applicable generally to all civil servants under
the Government of India. The excepted rules are
included in Vol. II of the Code. Fundamental Rules
embodied in Vol. II of the Code describe, inter alia,
the cadre-strength, the different posts in the cadre
and the nature of the appointments made in respect
of such posts. Broadly the posts are divided as
permanent, officiating, temporary and for definite
periods. Rule 2003 (14) defines lien to mean the
title of a railway servant to hold substantively either
immediately or on the termination of a period or
periods of absence, a permanent post, including
a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substan(1) [1958] S. C.R. 828.
(2) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 26.
750
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964)
Under r. 2006, "Unless in any case it be otherwise provided in these Rules, a railway servant on
Mot• Ram Deka substantive appointment to any permanent post acquires
etc.
a lien on that post and ceases to hold any lien
_ v.
previously acquired on any other post".
Under
General
_r. 2009, "A railway servant's lien on a post may,
Manager, N.E.F. in no circumstances be terminated even with his
Railways,
consent, if the result' will be to leave' him without a
Maligaon,
lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post."
Pandu, etc.
Rule 2042 provides that the pay and allowances of
a railway servant who is removed or dismissed from
Subba Rao J. service ceases from the date of the order of removal
or dismissal. Rule 2046, under the heading "Compulsory Retirement", fixes the age of superannuation for
different categories of service. These rules clearly
lay down that a railway servant on a substantive
appointment to a permanent post acquires a lien
on that post and he does not lose it till he attains
the age of superannuation or is dismissed or removed
in the manner prescribed; that is, he acquires a title
to hold substantively a permanent post. It is not of
much. relevance to give any particular nomenclature
to that post. It may riot be a life tenure. It may
not also be a permanent post in the literal sense of
the term, but it confers a title to that post with all
the advantages appertaining to that post and ordinarily
it comes to an end only on the incumbent attaining
the age of superannuation, with or without pensionary
benefits. Briefly stated, the aforesaid Fundamental
Rules embodied in Vol. II of the Code create offices
of stability and security which for all practical purposes are permanent posts. Jf so, the termination
of services of such a servant can only -be dismissal
or removal, for he will be deprived of his title to the
said office. If that was the legal position, for the
reasons already given, the said r. 148(3) and r. 149,
conferring a power on the appointing authority to
remove such a permanent servant on notice would
infringe the constitutional protection given to a
Government servant under Art. 311 of the Constitution. A permanent post and such rules cannot stand
together: the latter must inevitably yield to the former.
1963
· tively.
. --
,_
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
I, therefore, hold that r. 148(3) and r. 149 of · 1963
the Railway Establishment Code, being violative
-of the provisions of Arts. 14 and 311 of the Constitu- Moti Ram Deka
tion are void and unenforceable.
etc.
In the result, I agree that Civil Appeals Nos.
v.
711 to 713 of 1962 and Civil Appeal No. 714 of 1962
General
should be allowed with costs and that Civil Appeals Manager, N.E.F.
Nos. 837 to 839 of 1963 should be dismissed with Railways,
costs.
Ma/igaon
DAS GUPTA J.-The principal question raised in Pandu, etc.
the four appeals which have been numbered 711 t6 714
of 1962 is as regards the validity of Rule 148 (3) of Das Gupta J.
the Indian Railway Establishment Code in respect
of certain non-pensionable railway servants that their
services shall be liable to termination on notice for
the period as prescribed therein. The appellantsall railway employees-whose services had been terminated on notice in accordance with the above
provision and who have failed to obtain relief against
the orders of termination challenge the validity of
this provision on two grounds. Their first contention
is that this Rule in providing for termination of service
on mere notice contravenes the provisions of Art.
311(2) of the Constitution; secondly, it is contended
that the Rule violates Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It will be necessary to examine these two grounds
separately.
Is the termination as provided for in the above
provision, in Rule 148 (3) 'removal' or 'dismissal'
within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution? That is the question that falls to be answered
for deciding the first grounds. To answer this again
we have to determine first the connotation of
the two words 'removal' and 'dismissal' as used in
Art. 311(2). In my opinion, this matter is completely
covered by· numerous decisions of this Court.
Before turning to the decisions however it will
be convenient to examine the matter in the context
in which Art. 311 (2) appears in the Constitution
and also the historical background of the protection
afforded thereby. For this purpose it is necessary
first to consider the three Articles of the Constitu-
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
tion, viz., Arts. 309, 310 and 311. They are in these
words:Moti Ram Deka
"309. Subject to the provisions of this Conetc.
stitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature
v
may regulate the recruitment, and conditions
General
of service of persons appointed, to public services
Manager, N.E.F.
and
posts in connection with the affairs of the
Railways,
Union
or of any State :Maligaon
Pandu, etc.
Provided that it shall be a compelent for the
President or such persons as he may direct in
Das Gupta J.
the case of services and posts in connection with
the affairs of the Union and for the Governor
or Rajpramukh of a State or such person as he
may direct in the case of services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the State, to
make rules regulating the recruitment and the
conditions of service of persons appointed to
such services and posts until provisions in that
behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this Article, and any
rules so made shall have effect subject to the
provisions of any such Act.
310. (I) Except as expressly provided by
this Constitution every person who is a member
of a defence service or of a civil service of the
Union or of an all-India service or holds and
post connected with defence or any civil post
under the Union, holds office during the pleasure
of the President, and every person who is a member
of a civil service of a State or holds any civil
post under a State holds office during the pleasure
of the Governor or, as the case may be, the Rajpramukh of the State.
(2) Notwithstanding that a person holding
a civil post under the Union or a State holds
office during the pleasure of the President or,
as the case may be, of the Governor or Rajpramukh of the State, any contract under which a
person, not being a member of a defence service
or of an all India service or of civil service of the
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
753
Union or a State, is appointed under this Consti1963
tution to hold such a post may, if the President
-or the Governor or the Rajpramukh as the case Moti Ram Deka
may be, deems it necessary in order to secure the
etc.
services of a person having special qualifications,
v.
provide for the payment to him of compensation,
General
if before the expiration of an agreed period that post Manager, N.E.F
is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected with Railways,
any misconduct on his part, required to vacate Maligaon
that post.
Pandu, etc.
311. (1) No person who is a member of a Das Gupta J.
civil service of the Union or an all-India service
or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post
under the Union or a State shall be dismissed
or removed by an authority subordinate to that
by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until
he has been given a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against the action proposed to
be taken in regard to him.
Provided that this clause shall not apply(a) where a person is dismissed or removed
or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct
which has led to his conviction on a criminal
charge;
(b) where an authority empowered to dismiss
or remove a person or to reduce him in rank
is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded
by that authority in writing it is not reasonably
practicable to give to that person an opportunity
of showing cause; or
(c) where the President or Governor or
Rajpramukh, as the case may be, is satisfied that
in the interest of the security of the State it is not
expedient to give to that person such an opportunity.
(3) If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give to any person an opportunity of showing cause under clause (2), the
decision thereon of the authority empowered
l/SCI/64-49
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce
him in rank, as the case may be, shall be final."
Moti Ram Deka
It has to be noticed that both Articles 309 and
etc.
v.
310 are subject to Art. 311. In other words, if any
General
rule is made under Art. 309 as regards the conditions
Manager NE F of service of a government servant in the matter of
' · · ·his dismissal or removal or reduction in rank it has
Railways,
Ma/igaon,
to comply with the requirements of Art. 311. Again,
Pandu, etc. before any order dismissing or removing or reducing
a government servant in rank is made by the President
Das Gupta J. or the Governor in exercise of his pleasure, the President or the Governor has to comply with the requirements of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Under
Art. 310 all servants of the State hold office at pleasure
--of the President or the Governor as the case may
be. That by itself means that the officer has no right
to be heard before his services are terminated. To
this Art. 311 provides an exception in the case of
removal or dismissal. It is easy to see that if every
termination of service amounted to dismissal or
removal the resultant position will be that every
officer would have the right to be heard before any
action could be taken under Art. 310. That would
leave no field in which Art. 310 could operate. This
by itself is sufficient to show that not all kinds of termination of service were intended to come within Art.
311. Reading Articl~s 310 and 311 together it will
be reasonable to . understand them to say that the
officer will have the right to be heard before his services
were terminated by dismissal or removal but in all
other cases of termination of his service he will not
have any such right.
I have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the
extreme proposition urged on behalf of the appellants that the words dismissal or removal in Art.
311 include every kind of termination of service.
This brings us to the question : what kinds of
termination of service come within the words dismissal
or removal and what kinds are not. Taking the
second part of the question first, it is not difficult
1 to mention at least two kinds of termination which
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS
755
cannot reasonably be included within the words
1963
dismissal or removal. Take for instance the case
where a government servant resigns his post but Moti Ram Deka
the resignation is not under the rules effective beetc.
fore it has been accepted by his superiors. Here,
v.
termination results only when the superior officer
General
accepts the resignation. It may be correct to say Manager, N.E.F.
that thereby he terminates the service. But it could Railways,
not reasonably be said that the superior officer has Maligaon,
removed the servant from service or dismissed him Pandu, etc.
from service. Such removal or dismissal was not
necessary at all because of the resignation. Take Das Gupta J.
again the case of a servant who has been appointed
to an office for a period of three years. When the
three-year period ends he is asked to go. There
is termination of service. But nobody would say
that the superior officer by asking him to go at the end
of the period had dismissed him or removed him
from service. The real question however is not so
much as what in common parlance would be understood to be the dismissal or removal but what· the
Constitution intended by these words.
In this connection it will be helpful to examine
the use of the words dismissal and removal in the
earlier Constitution Acts. The Charter Act of 1793
mentions in s. 36 that nothing in this Act contained
shall extend, or be construed to extend to preclude
or take away the power of the Court of Directors of
the said Company from removing or recalling any
of the officers or servants of the said Company, but
that the said Court shall and may at all times have
full liberty to remove, recall, or dismiss any
of such officers or servants, at their will and pleasure,
in the like manner as if this Act had not been passed.
Section 35 made it lawful to and for the King's Majesty,
his heirs and successors, by any writing or instrument
under him or their sign· manual, countersigned by
the President of the Board of Commissioners for
the affairs of India, to remove or recall any person or
person holding any office, employment, or commission,
civil or military, under the said United Company
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
in India for the time being. In the Charter Act
of 1833, similar provisions were enacted in ss. 74
· Moti Ram Deklland 75. Section 74 make it lawful "for His Majesty
etc.
by any Writing under His Sign Manual, counterv.
signed by the President of the said Board of ComGeneral
missioners, to remove or dismiss any person holding
Manager, N.E.F. any office, employment or commission, civil or miliRailways,
tary, under the said Company in India, and to vacate
Maligaon,
any Appointment or Commission of any person to
Pandu, etc. any such office or employment."
Section 75 ran thus:.Das Gupta J.
"Provided always, and be it enacted, that
nothing in this Act contained shall take away
the Power of the said Court of Directors to
remove or dismiss any of the officers or servants
of the said Company but that the said Court
shall and may at all Times have full Liberty
to remove or dismiss any of such officers or servants at their will and pleasure .......... "
1963
When the Act of 1858 transferred the government of India to Her Majesty the Queen of England
section 38 of the Act provided that.
"Any writing under the Royal Sign Manual
removing or dismissing any person holding any
office employment or commission, civil or military
in India, of which, if this Act had not been passed,
a copy would have been required to be transmitted
or delivered within eight days after being signed
by Her Majesty to the Chairman or Deputy
Chairman of the Court of Directors, shall, in
lieu thereof, be communicated within the time
aforesaid to the Secretary of State in Council."
It seems to me that in making these statutory
provisions as regards dismissal or removal of public
servants the British Parliament had in mind those
servants only who had acquired such a right to the
post under their conditions of service that but for
such statutory provisions their dismissal or removal
would have been unlawful. If their service was
terminable by the ordinary law of the land there
'•.
5 S.C.R.
757
STJPREME COURT REPORTS
would have been no need in s. 36 of the 1793 Act
1963
or s. 75 of the 1833 Act to speak of the right of the
-·-·
Court of Directors of the Company to remove or Moti Ram Deka ·
dismiss the Company's officers or servants at their
etc.
will and pleasure. It is clear that by these provisions
v.
the British Parliament was emphasizing the right
General
of the Court of Directors of the Company to remove Manager, N.E.F.
or dismiss such servants whose services would not Railways,
have been terminable under the ordinary law of master Ma/igaon,
and servant. It is also legitimate to read the provisions Pandu, etc.
making it lawful for the King of England to remove or
dismiss the Company's servants (s). 35 in the Charter Das Gupta J.
Act of 1793 and s. 75 of the Charter Act of 1833)
as intended to terminate the service of the same class
of servants, viz., those whose services were not terminable under the ordinary law of the land ..
In the light of this legislative history, the words
removal and dismissal in s. 38 of the Act of 1858
and thereafter in the Government of India Act, 1915
(Section 95 and s. 96B) cannot but be read also to
mean termination of service of such servants only
who would not have been liable to termination under
the ordinary law of master and servant. In other
words, only those servants who by their terms and
conditions of their appointment to the service
had acquired a right to continue for a particular
period which could not under the ordinary law be
put an end to were intended to get the benefit of
these provisions as regards dismissal or removal.
By the time the Government of India Act, 1935,
came tc be enacted by Parliament rules had been framed
. by the Secretary of State in Council under s. 96B
of the Government of India Act, in which these words,
removal and dismissal, were used. Among the rules
framed under this section in 1924 was Rule XIII,
which was in these words:"Without prejudice to the provisions of
any law for the time being in force, the Local
Government may for good and sufficient reasons:(1) Censure
(2) Withhold promotion from
0
..•(
•..
[
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1963
(3) Reduce to a lower post
(4)
Suspend
Moti Ram Deka
(5) Remove, or
etc.
(6) Dismiss
v.
General
any ofhcer holding a post in a provincial or subordiManager, N.E.F. nate service or a special appointment."
Railways,
.
Maligaon
In the fresh set of rules framed in 1930 Rule
Pandu,
49 took !he place of Rule XIII of the earlier Rules
and was m these words:Das Gupta J.
" R. 49. The following penalties, may, for good
and sufficient reason and as hereinafter provided,
be imposed upon members of the services comprised
in any of the classes (1) to (SJ specified in Rule XIV
namely:(i) Censure,
(ii) withholding of increments or promo·
ti on
(iii) reduction to a lower post or time-scale,
or to a lower stage in a time-scale,
(iv) recovery from pay of the whole or part
of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders,
(v) suspension,
(vi) removal from the civil service of the
crown, which does not disqualify from
· future employment,
(vii) dismissal from the civil service of the
crown, which ordinarily disqualifies from
future employment.
Explanation-The discharge-
et;.
(a) of a person appointed on probation,
during the period of probation,
(b) of a person appointed otherwise than
under contract to hold a temporary appointment,
on the expiration of the period of the appointment,
,,
I
l
5 S.C.R.
.
\
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
1963
(c) of a person engaged under contract,
in accordance with the terms of his contract,
does not amount to removal or dismissal Moti Ram Deka
within the meaning of this Rule."
etc.
These Rules show that the Secretary of State
G v.
1
in Council considered removal and dismissal from M. ener~E
F
the service of the Crown only as penalties. Explana-· an;_g.~r, · · ·
tion to Rule 49 of the 1930 Rules also shows that ~' ~ays,
discharge from service of a person who had not
a/lgaon,
acquired a right to the post was not considered to be Pandu, etc.
removal or dismissal.
Das Gupta/.
When the British Parliament made special provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 as regards removal or dismissal of persons in the civil
service of the Crown it had before it not only the
history of these words-removal and dismissalin the Charter Act 1793, Charter Act of 1833, Government of India Act, 1858, the Government of India
Act, 1915 but also these Rules framed by the Secretary
·
of State in Council.
It is reawnable to think therefore that in making
these special provisions in the 1935 Act the British
Parliament proceeded on the basis that only terminations of service by way of punishment which could
not have been inflicted under the ordinary law of
master and servant would come within these wordsremoval and dismissal. Primarily such terminations
by way of punishment could be made only in respect
of those servants who had not acquired a right to
continue in service. It might however be said that
even where there was no such right and termination
could have been effected therefore under the ordinary
law of contract between master and servant any termination which carried with it loss of benefits already
acqmred, say, forfeiture of pension or of provident
fund was also contemplated to come within these
words. Termination in no other case could be
said to be by way of punishment and in the light of
the previous history of the use of the words-removal
and dismissal-in connection with the civil servants
of the crown it appears to be abundantly clear that
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1964)
in the Government of India Act, 1935 the words
removal and dismissal were not intended to include
Moti Ram Deka such other terminations.
e~c.
When the Constitution was framed the provisions
G · 1
as regards removal and dismissal as contained in
M.
ener~ E F s. 240 of the Government of India Act were embodied
anager, · · •in Arts. 310 and 311 with practically little change.
Railways,
Nothing has been shown to us to indicate that the
Maligaon,
Pandu, etc. Constitution makers could have meant by these
words-removal and dismissal-in Art. 311, anything
Das Gupta J. different from what the British Parliament had intended
to include under those words in the Government of
India Act, 1935.
The above consideration of the context and previous legislative history leads to the conclusion that
the words 'removal' or 'dismissal' in Art. 311 meant
only such terminations of service where the servant
had acquired a right to continue in the post which
right was cut short by the termination and such other
terminations even where there was no such right,
as resulted in loss of acquired benefits.
)
Turning now to the decided cases we find that
the question now under consideration was fully
discussed in this Court's decision in Parshotam Lal
Dhingra v. Union of India(!). After an exhaustive
discussion of appointments of Government servants
tu a permanent or temporary post, substantively or
on probation or on an officiating basis, and numerous
rules of service in connection with such appointments,
Das C.J. speaking for the majority of the Court
recorded the conclusion thus:"It follows therefore that if the termination
of service is sought to be brought about otherwise than by way of punishment, then the government servant whose service is so terminated
cannot claim the protection of Art. 311(2)."
The learned Chief Justice went on to say:"The foregoing conclusion however does
not solve the entire problem, for it has yet to
I
1963
(!)
[1958] s.c.R. 829.
J
,·
5 S.C.R.
'
I
•I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
be ascertained as to when an order for the ter1963
mination of service is inflicted as and by way of
-punishment and when it is not. It has already Moti Ram Deka
been said that where a person is appointed subetc.
stantively to a permanent post in Government
v.
service, he normally acquires a right to hold
General
the post until under the rules, he attains the age of Manager, N.E.F.
superannuation or is compulsorily retired, and Railways,
in the absence of a contract express or implied, Maligaon,
or a service rule, he cannot be turned out of his Pandu, etc.
post unless the post itself is abolished or unless
he is guilty of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency Das Gupta J.
or other disqualifications and appropriate proceedings are taken under the service rules read
with Art. 311(2). Termination of service of
such a servant so appointed must per se be
a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture
of the servant's rights and brings about a premature end of his employment. Again, where
a person is appointed to a temporary post
for a fixed term of say five years his service cannot, in the absence of a contract or a service
rule permitting its premature termination be terminated before the expiry of that period unless he
has been guilty of some misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other disqualifications and appropriate proceedings are taken under the rules
read with Art. 311(2). The premature termination of the service of a servant so appointed
will prima facie be a dismissal or removal from
service by way of punishment and so within the
purview of Art. 311(2).
At page 862, the learned Chief Justice again
observed:In short, if the termination of service is
founded on the right flowing from· contract or
the service rules then, prima facie, thr~ termination
is not a punishment and carries with it no evil
consequences and so Art. 311 is :10t attracted.
But even if the Government har., by contract
or under the rules, the right to• terminate the
762
1963
Mati Ram Deka
etc.
v.
General
Manager, N.E.F.
Railways,
Maligaon,
Pandu, etc.
Das Gupta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment
of dismissal or removal or reducing in rank,
the Government may nevertheless, choose to
punish the servant and if the termination of
service is sought to be founded on misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification,
then it is a punishment and the requirements
of Art. 311 must be complied with."
At page 863, the learned Chief Justice observed
thus:"Thus if the order entails or provides for
the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss
of his seniority in Iris substantive rank or the
stoppage or postponement of his future chances
of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the government had
purported to exercise its right to terminate the
employment or to reduce the servant to a lower
rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality
the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty."
Several years before this the question : what
is meant by the words 'removal' or 'dismissal' had
been considered by this Court in Shyam Lal v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh< 1 l. Shyam Lal, the appellant, had been ordered to retire compulsorily under
the provisions of Art. 465A of the Civil Service Regulations. On behalf of the appellant it was urged
inter alia that this order was invalid as the provisions of
Art. 311(2) of the Constitution had not been complied
with. In dc-ciding that the compulsory retirement did
not amount.to dismissal or removal within the meaning
of Art. 31 lC) of the Constitution the Court laid down
that (I) eveiy termination of service does not amount
to removal ~)r dismissal and (2) that dismissal or removal is a j1unishment imposed on an officer as a
penalty which involves loss of benefit already earned
(I) [1955] (I) S.C.R. 26.
i
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
It was pointed out that on compulsory retirement
/963
an officer would not suffer any diminution of the
accrued benefit and though in a wide sense the officer Moti Ram Deka
might consider himself punished by the deprivation
etc.
of the chance of serving and getting his pay till he
v.
attains the age of superannuation and thereafter
General
to get an enhanced pension, there is clearly a distinc- Manager. N.E.F.
tion between the loss of benefit already earned and· Railways,
the loss of prospect of earning something more; Maligaon,
where the officer did not lose the benefit already Pandu, etc.
earned the same was not dismissal or removal. At
page 42 of the Report the Court said:Das Gupta J .
•
>
:> ..
"Finally, Rule 49 of the Civil Service
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules clearly
indicates that dismissal or removal is a punishment. This is imposed on an officer as a penalty.
It involves loss of benefit already earned."
In Doshi' s Case<l l the Court had to considtr an
order of compulsory retirement made under Rule
165A of the Bombay Civil Service Rules as amended
by the Saurashtra Government which gave the Government an absolute right to retire any government
servant after he had completed 25 years of qualifying
service or 50 years of age whatever his service without
giving any reason. It was held that such an order
was not 'removal' or 'dismissal' under Art. 311 of
the Constitution. Speaking for the Court Venkatarama Aiyar J. said:"Now the policy underlying Art. 311(2)
is that when it is proposed to take action against
a servant by way of punishment and that will
entail forfeiture of benefits already earned by
him, he should be heard and given an opportunity
to show cause against the order. But that
consideration can have no application where
the order is not one of punishment and results
in no loss of benefits already accrued, and in
such a case there is no reason why the terms of employment and the rules of service should not
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 571.
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
be given effect to. Thus, the real criterion
for deciding whether an order terminating the
Moti Ram Deka
services of a servant is one of dismissal or removal
etc.
is to ascertain whether it involves any loss or
v.
benefits previously earned. Applying this test,
General
an order under R. l 65A cannot be held to be
Manager, N.E.F.
one of dismissal or removal, as it does not enRailways,
tail forfeiture of the proportionate pension due
Maligaon,
for past services."
Pandu, etc.
Hartwell's Case nJ was one of termination of a
temporary servant under the U.P. Subordinate AgriDas Gupta J.
cultural Service, who for some time served in a temporrary capacity in the U.P. Agricultural Service. He
was first reverted to his original appointment in the
Subordinate Agricultural Service by an order dated
May 3, 1954 and later a notice dated September
13, 1954 was served on him terminating his services
in the Subordinate Agricultural Service. The notice
purported to be under Rule 25 CJ. 4 of the Subordinate
Agricultural Service Rules. The Court held that the
termination of the appellant's services under this rule
I
did not amount to dismissal or removal within the
I
meaning of Art. 311 as it was in accordance with the
terms of the conditions of service applicable to the
appellant. Imam J. speaking for the Court observed:"In principle, we cannot see any clear distinction
between the termination of the servjces of a
person under the terms of a contract governing
him and the termination of his services in accordance with the terms of his conditions of service.
The order complained against did not contravene
the provisions of Art. 311 and was therefore
a valid order."
The proposition that it is not every termination
of service of an employee that falls within the operation of Art. 311 and that it is only when the order is
by way of punishment that it is one of dismissal or
removal was re-affirmed by this Court in Balakotich v.
The Union of lndiaC3J. Reaffirming also the criteria
indicated in Dhingar' s CaseC3J as to what amounted
1963
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 509.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 1052.
(3) [1958] S. C. R. 829.
..
-·
-
..
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
to punishment for the purpose of Art. 311, Venkata1963
rama Aiyar J. speaking for the Court observed:"
.
Moti Ram Deka
The question as to what would amount
tc
to punishment for the purposes of Art. 311
ev. ·
was also fully considere.d in Parshotam Lal
G neral
!Jhingra's. CaseOl. It was . ther~in held _that Mana eer, N.E.F.
if a person ha~ a nght to contmue m otIJce either R!lways,
under the service rules or. un~er a spe_c1al agi;-ee- Maligaon,
ment, a premature termmat10n of his services p du tc
would result in loss of benefits already earned
an ' e ·
and accrued, that would also be punishment."
Das Gupta J.
Proceeding to apply this proposition to the
facts of the case before it the Court said:"In the present case, the terms of employment provide for the services being terminated
on a proper notice, and so, no question of premature termination arises. Rule 7 of the Security
Rules preserves the rights of the employee to
all the benefits of pension, gratuities and the like,
to which they would be entitled under the rules.
Thus, there is no forfeiture of benefits already
acquired. It was stated for the appellants that
a person who was discharged under the rules
was not eligible for re-employment, and that that
was punishment. But the appellants are unable to
point to any rule imposing that disability. The
order terminating services under R. 3 of the Security Rules stands on the same footing as an order
of discharge under R. 148, and it is neither one
of dismissal nor of removal within the meaning
of Art. 311."
The law as thus settled by this Court was again
applied in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab.<2> Dalip
Singh who had been Inspector-General of Police,
PEPSU, was compulsorily retired from service by the
Rajpramukh by an order dated August 18, 1950
which ran as follows:"His Highness the Rajpramukh is pleased to
retire from service Sardar Dalip Singh, Inspector(!) J195SJ s. c. R. 829.
(2) [1961] 1 s.c.R. 88.
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
General of Police, PEPSU, (on leave) for administrative reasons with effect from the 18th
Moti Ram Deka
August, 1950."
etc.
The appellant brought his suit asking for a declarav.
tion that the order by which he was removed from
General
the post of Inspector-General of Police was unManager, N.E.F. constitutional, illegal, void, ultra vires and inoperative.
Railways,
Among the grounds on which this declaration was
Maligaon,
sought was that the compulsory retirement of the
Pandu, etc.
appellant which had been made under Regulation
278 of the Patiala State Regulations, was removal
Das Gupta J. from service within the meaning of Art. 311 of the
Constitution. Admittedly the requirements of Art.
311(2J had not been complied with in this case and
so the question had to be decided whether such a
retirement was removal or dismissal within the meaning of Art. 311. The question was answered by this
Court in the negative for the reasons that the order
did not amount to punishment because though an
enquiry had been held against him the charges or
imputations against him had not been made the
condition of the exercise of the power of retirement
and further because the officer was not losing the
benefits he had already earned, as full pension was
ordered to be paid. To emphasise the point that where
compulsory retirement was in accordance with the
rules of service it could not ordinarily be said to be
by way of punishment, the Court pointed out that
where a rule of service provided for compulsory
retirement at any age whatsoever irrespective of the
length of service put in, a retirement under such a.
rule would not be regarded as dismissal or removal.
An observation in Doshi's Case OJ which might
appear to indic~te otherwise was not followedit being pointed out that in Doshi' s Case this matter
did not fall to be considered. Under Rule 278
the State reserved to itself the right to retire any of
its employees on pension on political or on other
reasons. It did not mention any particular age for
retirement under this Rule. Care was taken in this
case to mention that if the rule would result in loss
1963
(1) [1958] S. C.R. 571,
"
-
-.
,'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
of pension already earned, the termination would
1963
amount to removal or dismissal.
It is thus clear both on principle and on authority Moti Ram Deka
that the words removal and dismissal in Art. 311
etc.
of the Constitution mean and include only those
v.
terminations of service, where a servant had acquired
General
a right to continue in the post on the basis of terms Manager, N.E.F.
and conditions of service, and such other terminations,
Railways,
where though there were no such right. the order
Maligaon
has resulted in loss of accrued benefits; and that pan du, etc.
terminations of service which did not satisfy either
of these two tests do not come within any of these Das Gupta J.
words.
Applying these tests to the termination of service
under the provision of Rule 148 (3) of the Railway Code
that "the service of other (non-pensionable) railway
servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either
side." I am of opinion that neither of these is satisfied. There is no doubt that this Rule applies not
only to temporary railway servants but also to those
railway servants who have been substantively appointed
to permanent posts in the railways. A "permanent
post", under the Fundamental Rules applicable to
the railways means a post carrying a definite rate of
pay sanctioned without limit of time. On substantive
appointment the government servant has a lien on
such post, i.e., the right to hold it substantively.
The right however is limited by all the terms and conditions of service. One of such conditions is in the
provision in the Rule for compulsory retirement.
Rule 2046 of the Railway Code which corresponds
to Fundamental Rule 56 provides that generally
the date of compulsory retirement of a railway servant, other than a ministerial servant, is the date on
which he attains the age of 55 years. He may be
retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement with the sanction of the competent authority
on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing,
but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years
except in very special circumstances. Clause 2 of
Rule 2046 provides the rule of compulsory retirement
for ministerial servants. Those government servants
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
who have entered government service on or after
the 1st April, 1938, and those who being in government
Moti Ram Deka service on the 31st March, 1938 did not hold a lien
etc.
or a suspended lien on a permanent post on that
v.
date, shall ordinarily be required to retire at the age
General
of 55 years, but if he continues to be efhcient, should
Manager, N.E.F. ordinarily be retained in service upto the age of 60
Railways.
years but that he must not be retained after that age
Maligaon
except in very special circumstances, which must be
Pandu; etc.
recorded in writing, and with the sanction of the competent authority.
Das Gupta J.
These rules have been modified from time
to time but generally speaking a rule has always
existed fixing the age beyond which a railway servant
will not be allowed to be retained in service. If
such a rule of compulsory retirement had not existed,
the servant would have had the right to continue
in the service till his death. The rule however limits
that right, by providing in effect that the service
would be terminated at a certain age. Rule 148(3)
is just another rule, limiting the servant's right to
continue in service. lt is as much a condition of
service as Rule 2046 and in deciding the nature and
extent of the right of a railway servant to whom Rule
148(3) applies to continue in service, Rule 148l3J
is of as much importance as Rule 2046. A railway
servant to whom Rule 148(3) applies has two limitations put on his right to continue-(l) termination
on attaining a certain age and (2) termination on
service of a notice under Rule 148(3). Where the
service is terminated by the order of retirement
under Rule 2046, the termination is of a service where
the servant has not the right to continue. So, it
is not 'removal' or 'dismissal'. Equally clearly and
for the same reason, when the service is terminated
by notice under Rule 148(3), the termination is not
'removal' or 'dismissal'.
It has not been suggested that the second test of
loss of accrued benefits is satisfied . in terminations
under Rule 148(3). If in any particular instance the
order of termination entails loss of accrued benefits
that will happen not because of anything in R. 148(3)
1963
--
'
5S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
but for some extraneous action. Where that hap1963
pens it will be right to consider such terminations
as removal or dismissal. But that consideration Moti Ram Deka
is foreign to the provisions of Rule 148(3).
etc.
v.
I have therefore come to the conclusion that
General
the first ground raised by the appellants in challenging Manager, N.E.F
the validity of Rule 148(3)., viz., that it contravenes Railways,
the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution must Ma/igaon,
be rejected.
Pandu, etc.
It is necessary now to consider the second ground Das Gupta J.
urged by the appellants, viz., that Rule 148(3) contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. Two contentions
are urged in support of this ground. First, it is urged
that the Rule gives no guidance to the authority who
would take action on it as regards the principle to
be tollowed in exercising the power. Secondly, it
is urged that the Rule discriminates between railway
servants and other public servants. In my opinion,
there is considerable force in the first contention.
Classifying the statutes which may come up for consideration on a question of its validity under Art.
14 of the Constitution in Ram Krishna Dalmia v.
Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors. '' 1 this Court observed
under the third class of such statutes thus:"A statute may not make any classification
of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion
of the Government to select and classify persons
or things to whom its provisions are to apply.
In determining the question of the validity or
otherwise of such a statute the Court will not
strike down the law out of hand only because
no classification appears on its face or because
a discretion is given to the Government to make
the selection or classification but will go on to
examine and ascertain if the statute has laid
down any principle or policy for the guidance
of the exercise of discretion by the government
in the matter of the selection or classification."
~
(1)- [1959] S.C.R. 279.
1/SCl/64-49
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Applying the principle laid down in the above case
to the present Rule I find on scrutiny of the Rule
Moti Ram Deka that it does not lay down any principle or policy for
etc.
guiding the exercise of. discretion by the authority
v.
who will terminate the service in the matter of selecGeneral
tion or classification. Arbitrary and uncontrolled
Manager, N..E.F. power is left in the authority to select at its will any
Railways,
person against whom action will be taken. The
Ma/igaon,
Rule thus enables the authority concerned to discrimiPandu, etc. nate between two railway servants to both of whom
Rule 148(3) equally applied by taking action in one
Das Gupta J. case and not taking it in the other. In the absence of
any guiding principle in the exercise of the discretion
by the authority the Rule has therefore to be struck
down as contravening the requirements of Art. 14
of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary for me to consider the other
contention as mentioned above, which has been urged
in support of this ground.
My conclusion therefore is that though the
provisions of Rule 148(3) in respect of certain nonpensionable railway servants that their services shall
be liable to termination on notice for the period
prescribed therein does not contravene Art. 311(2)
of the Constitution, it contravenes Art. 14 of the
Constitution and consequently is void.
I would accordingly allow with costs the four
appeals (C.A. Nos. 711-713/62 and C.A. No. 714/62)
set aside the order of the High Court and order that
appropriate writs be issued in favour of the appellant
as prayed for.
The other three appeals (C.A. Nos. 837-839
of 1963) challenge the decision of the Assam High
Court in favour of three railway servants whose services
had been terminated under Rule 149 of the Railway
Code, that these terminations were invalid. Rule
149(3) is in practically the same terms as Rule 148(3)
and provides for the termination of certain railway
servants on notice on either side for the period prescribed. As, however, before November 1957 non1963
--
;I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
pensionable service had been brought to an end,
1963
and option was given to non-pensionable servants
-either to opt for pensionable service or to continue Moti Ram Deka
under their previous terms and conditions of service,
etc.
Rule 149(3) mentions permanent railway servants
v.
generally without any reference to their being nonGeneral
pensionable. The validity of his Rule was attacked Manager, N.E.F.
on behalf of railway servants on the same ground Railways,
as have been considered with regard to Rule 148(3). Maligaon,
For the reasons already given when discussing Rule Pandu, etc.
148(3) I am of opinion that Rule 149(3) does not
contravene Art. 311(2) of the Constitution but con- Das Gupta J.
travenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. The terminations of service under Rule 149(3) of the Railway
Code were therefore rightly held by the High Court
to be invalid. I would accordingly dismiss these
appeals with costs.
l
•
SHAH J.-Except as expressly provided by the
Constitution, every member of the defence services
or of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service
holds office during the pleasure of the President and
every member of a civil service of a State holds office
during the pleasure of the Governor of the State: Art.
310(1). This is the normal tenure of office of persons
serving the Union or the State. The doctrine of
holding office at pleasure applies even to a person
with special qualifications employed under a contract,
with the reservation that compensation may be paid
to such person if before the expiry of the agreed period
the office is abolished, or for reasons not connected
with misconduct on his part, he is required to vacate
that post: Art. 310(2). The power to terminate at
pleasure vested by the Constitution in the President
or the Governor, as the case may be, is not liable
to be restricted by any enactment of the Parliament
or the State Legislature: it may be exercised only
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and
being outside the scope of Arts. 53 and 154 of the
Constitution cannot be delegated : State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya< 1 > It is open to the
(1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679.
Shah J.
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact Acts ·
subject to the provisions of the Constitution to regulate
Moti Ram Deka recruitment and conditions of services and posts in
etc.
connection with the affairs of the Union or a State
v.
(Art. 309), and until such legislation is enacted,-it
General
may be observed that the Union Parliament has not
Manager, N.E.F. enacted any general legislation governing public
Railways,
servants employed by the Union-the President or the
Maligaon,
Governor or such person as may be directed in that
Pandu, etc. behalf may make rules regulating the recruitment
and conditions of service of persons appointed to
Shah J.
such services and posts, and the rules so made by the
President or the Governor shall have effect, subject
to the provisions of any such Acts. The power of
the President or the Governor under Art. 310 (which
is wholly independent of the power conferred by the
rules or legislation under Art. 309), and the power
conferred by legislation enacted or rules made or
continued by virtue of Art. 309 are subject to certain
restrictions contained in Arts. 311 & 314. Article
314 grants certain special protections to mem hers
appointed by the Secretary of State or the Secretary
of State in Council to a civil service of the Crown in
India and who continue on and after the commencement of the Constitution to serve under the Government
of India or a State. Article 311 provides, subject
to the proviso to cl. (2), two safeguards to all public
servants who are members of the civil service
of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of
a State who hold civil posts under the Union. or the
States. These safeguards are1963
. -
"(!) that such members of the service shall not
be .dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed; and
(2) that he shall not be dismissed or removed
or reduced in rank until he has been given
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken
in regard to him."
~ .
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
The proviso to cl. (2) of Art. 311 excludes three
1963
specific classes of cases from the protection of the
second guarantee.
Moti Ram Deka
•
Guarantees under Art. 311 are, except to the
e~c.
ext~nt specifically provided, absolu.te ~nd are not
Gen~ral
s.ubject to the. exercise of power, legislative o.r execu- Manager, N.E.F.
ttfve.h A ccordmgly the plebasure of. thde .President or
Railways,
o t e 0 overnor cannot e exercise m a manner Ma/igaon,
inconsistent with cl. (2) of Art. 311. Article 310 Pandu. etc.
must therefore be read subject to Art. 311(2), and·
the rules made or legislation enacted under Art.
Shah J.
309 must also be read subject to Art. 311. It must be
emphasized that the guarantees protect all servants,
whether appointed to substantive posts, or employed
temporarily or on probation, or for limited duration
under contracts, but they do not encompass all penalties or terminations of employment. The guarantee
under cl. (1) is against dismissal or removal by an
authority subordinate to that by which the public servant was appointed, and under cl. (2) against dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank without being afforded
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against
the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The
guarantee under cl. (2) does not affect the investment
of power to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a member
of the civil service; it merely places restrictions upon
the exercise of the power. Temporary servants, servants on probation, officiating servants and even those
holding posts under contracts-all have the protection
of Art. 311. But the consequences of mere determination of employment in the very nature of things
must vary according to the conditions or terms of
employment. Mere determination of employment of
temporary servants, or probationers, and of servants
whose tenure is governed by contracts, will not ordinarily amount to dismissal or removal, for, dismissal
or removal according to the rules implies determination as a disciplinary measure.
The appellants in appeals Nos. 711 to 714 of
1962 are public servants employed in the Railways
under the management of the Government of India
,__.-
774
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
and were governed by the rules made under Art.
309, and their services were terminated in purported
Moti Ram Deka exercise of powers under Rule 148(3). Rule 148, the
etc.
validity of which is challenged by the appellants in
v.
these appeals, was originally framed in 1951 in exercise
General
of the authority conferred by Art. 309, and was later
Manager, N.E.F. modified so as to exclude from its operation deterRailways,
ruination of employment operating as dismissal or
Ma/igaon,
removal as a disciplinary measure. The first clause
Pandu, etc. deals with a temporary railway servant who holds
no lien on a permanent post under the Union. Such
Shah J.
a person need be given no notice of termination of
employment, if the termination is due to the expiry
of sanction to the post, or of the officiating vacancy
or is due to mental or physical incapacity, or where
it amounts to removal or dismissal as a disciplinary
measure. Clause (2) deals with apprentices. Clause (3)
deals with· (non-pensionable) railway servants, who
are substantively appointed to permanent posts.
Clauses (3) & (4) provide:
"(3) Other (non-pensionable) railway servantsThe service of other (non-pensionable) railway
servants shall be liable to termination on notice
on either side for the periods shown below. Such
notice is not however required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after
compliance with the provisions of clause (2) of
Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on
attaining the age of superannuation, and termination of service due to mental or physical incapacity:·
(a) Probationary officers and officers on probation other than those in the Medical
Department. ............. 3 months' notice
(b) Officers on probation in the Medical Department
.......... 1 month's notice
(c) Permanent Gazetted
Officers
.......... 6 months' notice
(d) Permanent Non-gazetted
employees
.......... 1 month's notice.
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
"(4) In lieu of the notice prescribed in
1963
this rule, it shall be permissible on the part
of the Railway Administration to terminate the Moti Ram Deka
service of a railway servant by paying him the
etc.
pay for the period of notice."
v.
.
General
In this group of appeals (Nos. 711-714 of 1962) M
N EF
the principal question raised by the appellants is an;g~(' · · ,
that the third clause of Rule 148 is invalid. The Ma~.ways,
clause declares that the service of any railway servant R a~gao~,
who holds non-pensionable employment is liable to be
an u, e c.
terminated on notice on either side of the periods set
Shah J.
out in the Rule, but notice terminating employment by
the Railway Administration is not a condition of dismissal or removal or of retirement on attaining the age
of superannuation and of termination of service due
to mental or physical incapacity. The clause prescribes the mode of determination of employment
of non-pensionable railway servants by notice and
proceeds to state that in the specified cases no notice for
termination of employment by the Railway Administration shall be necessary. It, however, does not
follow that in the excepted classes of cases of the
right of the Railway Administration to terminate
employment is absolute or unrestricted: it is merely
intended to be enacted by cl. (3) that notice will be
necessary where on compliance with other appropriate
conditions, there is retirement on attaining the age
of superannuation, or determination of employment
in compliance with the provisions of the Constitution,
or for mental or physical incapacity.
Clause (3) of Rule 148 is impugned by the appellants on two principal grounds:
(1) that it is inconsistent with the protection
which is guaranteed to all public servants
by Art. 311 (2) ; and
(2) that it contravenes the fundamental freedom
under Art. 14 of the Constitution in that
certain classes of railway servants are selected
for special prejudicial treatment when no
such conditions of service are applicable in
any other public employment and that in
776
1963
Moti Ram Deka
etc.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
any event an arbitrary power is conferred
upon the authority competent in that behalf
under the rules to terminate employment
without any principle to guide him.
Ge:~ral
Under the first head it is urged that termination by
Manager NE F notice of employment of non-pensionable servants
Rail~ay; · ·under Rule 148(3) being 'removal from service, in the
Ma/igaon'
absence of rules prescribing machinery for affording
Pandu et~
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the
_:._ · action proposed to be taken in regard to such employees,
Shah J.
the Rule infringes the constitutional guarantee under
Art. 311 and is void. This plea assumes that every
termination of employment by notice under Rule
148(3) amounts to removal. But on the plain text
of cl. (3) it is evident that the right to determine employment by notice cannot be exercised in the excepted
cases and since dismissal or removal as a disciplinary
measure falls within those excepted cases, the President
has, by framing cl. (3) of Rule 148, clearly expressed
the intention that determination of employment which
amounts to dismissal or removal cannot be effected
by notice. In terms the clause makes a distinction
between determination of employment by notice and
determination of employment as a disciplinary measure,
retirement on superannuation, and termination for
reasons of physical or mental incapacity: it does not
confer authority upon the Railway Administration
to terminate employment of a public servant holding
a substantive post, as a disciplinary measure.
The Rule is framed under Art. 309, and undoubtedly makes the tenure of a public servant appointed
even substantively to hold a permanent post precarious.
Ordinarily a railway servant appointed substantively
to a permanent post would, under the rules governing
employment, continue in service till he attains the
age of superannuation but that tenure is made subject
to compulsory retirement after he attains the prescribed
age if the railway servant belongs to certain specified
classes: vide Rule 2046(2) & (3) of the Railway Code,
1958, and to discharge from employment under
Rule 148(3) if his service is non-pensionable. Inci-
•
.
5 S.C.R.
•
.....
...
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
dents relating to termination of employment on
1963
superannuation, on orders of compulsory retirement,
and on discharge from service under Rule 148(3) are Moti Ram Deka
parts of an organic scheme of rules governing the
etc.
tenure of office of railway servants which also includes
v.
provisions relating to dismissal, removal or reduction
·General
in rank as a disciplinary measure. By being appointed Manager, N.E.F.
to a post a railway servant becomes entitled to the
Railways.
pay and allowances, increments subject to efficiency- Ma/igaon,
bar, leave, gratuity, pension etc. These are also Pandu, etc.
incidents of employment of the same character as
the incident of determination of employment by
Shah J.
compulsory retirement, discharge by notice and dismissal or removal.
In considering what the expression "dismissed
or removed" used in Art. 311 means, a brief review of
the relevant legislative history dealing with the tenure
of office of civil servants in the employment of the
Government of India may be useful. It is sufficient to
note that since the earliest time all persons holding
office-civil or military-under the East India Company were liable to be removed at the pleasure of the
King of England: see s. 35 Charter Act 1793 (33
Geo. Ill Ch. 2): and 74 Charter Act 1833 (3 & 4
will IV Ch. 85). These provisions however did not
take away the power of the Court of Directors to
remove or dismiss any of its officers or servants not
appointed by the Crown in England. The same
tenure of service prevailed after the British Crown took
over the governance of India, the power to make
regulations in re!a:tion to appointments and admission
to services and matters connected therewith being
vested in the Secretary of State in Council: s. 37 Government of India Act 1858 (21 & 22 Viet. Ch. 106). For
the first time under the Government of India Act,
1919 (9 & 10 Geo. V. Ch. 101) some protection was
conferred upon the civil servants. By the first clause
of s. 96-B the tenure of office of every employee under
the civil service of the Crown was during pleasure
of His ·Majesty, but dismissal from service by an
authority subordinate to that by which the officer
778
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
was appointed was prohibited. The. power of the
Secretary of State for India in Council to make rules
Mori Ram Deka regulating classification of civil services, method of
etc.
recruitment, conditions of service, pay, allowances,
v.
discipline and conduct was reaffirmed. This was
General
followed by ss. 240 to 243 of the Government of India
Manager, N.E.F.Act, 1935 (26 Geo. V. & 1 Ed. 8 Ch. 2) which made
Railways,
detailed provisions relating to the tenure of office of
Maligaon,
persons employed in civil capacities, recruitment and
Pandu, ere. conditions of service and rules to be made in that
behalf including rules applicable to railway, custom,
Shah J.
postal and telegraph services, and special provisions
relating to the police. By s. 240, a guarantee against
dismissal without being afforded an opportunity of
showing cause to persons employed in civil capacities
was provided. By cl. (1) except as provided by the
Act, every member of a civil service held office during
His Majesty's pleasure: by cl. (2) it was enacted
that "no such person shall be dismissed from service,
by any authority subordinate to that . by which he
was appointed" and by cl. (3) it was enacted that
"No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed
or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him". This was the
guarantee of protection conferred by the Government
of India Act 1935 upon members of the civil services
and has since been affirmed by the Constitution in
Art. 311 in almost the same terms-the slight verbal
alteration substituting "dismissed or removed" for
"dismissed" having made no variation in the content
of the guarantee. In 1930 Rules were promulgated
by the Secretary of State for India in Council under
s. 96-B(2) of the Government of India Act, 1919,
called the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules.
These Rules did not in terms apply to railway servants,
who were governed by a set of rules published as the
Railway Establishment Code, but these were for all
practical purposes in terms similar to the Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which
may be called 'the General Rules'. Under cl. 49
of the General Rules penalties which could be imposed
1963
••
5 S.C.R.
>
.
•
SUPREME SOURT REPORTS
779
upon civil servants were enumerated and cl. 55
1963
provided that no order of dismissal, removal or
-reduction shall be passed upon a civil servant Moti Ram Deka
unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds
ere.
on which it is proposed to take action and he has
v.
been afforded adequate opportunity of showing cause
General
against the action proposed to be taken. These Ma,,ager, N.E.F.
Rules remained in force after the Government of India Railways,
Act, 1935, was brought into operation. Even after Maligaon,
the Constitution was brought into force, the rules Pandu, etc
continued to remain in operation till 1955, when
a new set of rules were promulgated, but thereby
Shah J.
in Rules 49 & 55 no substantial variation was made.
It is clear that under the scheme of rules governing
the employment of civil servants which obtained
prior to the Constitution dismissal or removal had
acquired a definite connotation, and when the Constitution-makers adopted the scheme of protection
of public servants in the same form in which it prevailed earlier, an intention to attribute to the expression
"dismissed and removed" the same content may be
assumed in the absence of any expressed intention
to the contrary. Since the constitutional guarantee
of protection to public servants is couched in the same
terms, the expression "removal" in the Service Rules
having the same meaning as "dismissal" i.e., determination of employment as a disciplinary measure for
misconduct, subject to the slight variation that an
employee removed from service is not disqualified
from future employment in public service, whereas
a dismissed employee is so disqualified, it may reasonably be held that in the context of this development
under the Constitution the expression "dismissed or
removed" has not acquired a wider signification to
include all terminations of public employment, whatever be the cause.
Apart from the historical evolution of the guarantee, there is inherent indication in the constitutional
provisions that it was not the intention of the
Constitution-makers to include in the expression
"dismissed or removed" all terminations of employ-
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964 J
ment. Guarantee of reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against the action proposed to be
}Jou Ram Deka taken in regard to a public servant, would be
etc.
wholly inappropriate in cases of superannuation,
v.
expiry of the contractual priod of employment,
General
expiry of the priod of probation or temporary
Manager, N.E.F. employment, and resignations. · It would be futile in
Railways,
such cases to provide for "showing cause". The
Maligaon,
use of the expression "action proposed to be taken
Pandu, etc.
in regard to him" also suggests that termination of
employment is of the nature of penal action.
Shah J.
There is yet another ground which must be taken
into account. For nearly two centuries prior to
the Constitution tenure of public servants has been
expressly declared to be during the pleasure of the British Crown and that tenure has been repeated in the
Constitution in Art. 310(1) with appropriate variations
entrusting the power to the President or the Governor,
as the case may be. Vitality of this declaration is
emphasized in cl. (2) of Art. 310 so as to enable the
President or the Governor to terminate even contractual employments at their respective pleasure. If
the Constitution-makers intended that every termination of employment amounted to dismissal or removal
within Art. 311, the provision of Art. 310, solemnly
declaring that members of the services civil and defence
hold office during the pleasure of the President is
reduced to a meaningless formula having no practical
content. The argument that it continues to apply
to probationers and temporary employees ignores
the plain words of the Constitution, beside unduly mini. mising the content of the guarantee in Art. 311 which
protects all public servants--temporary, probationers,
contractual as well as those holding substantive posts.
There is also a consistent body of authority
which has taken the view that the expression "dismissed or removed" within the meaning of Art. 311
of the Constitution involves determinaion of employment as a disciplinary measure-that is termination
of employment on some ground personal to · the
officer concerned, such as incapacity or imputation
1963
. --
•
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
781
of charge against him which renders it inexpedient or
1963
undesirable that he should continue in public employ. _..
ment: Salish Chandra Anand v. Union of IndiaW;Motl Ram Deka
Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & The Union of
etc.
Indid 2 >; and Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of
v.
India (3J.
General
Manager, N.E.F.
..
In considering whether termination of employRailv»ays,
ment of a public servant amounts to dismissal or Maligaon,
removal, the primary test settled by a uniform course Pandu, etc.
of authority is: does the termination amount to
ShahJ.
punishment of the public servant, i.e., has it the effect
of depriving the public servant concerned of the rights
which he has already acquired as a public servant, or
does it involve evil consequences such as forfeiture
of pay or allowances or other benefits which
by the rules governing the tenure he has earned, or
impute a stigma? A public servant appointed substantively to a post normally acquires a right to hold the
post until he attains the age of superannuation, and
in the absence of a contract or service rules governing
the tenure, discharge from service would deprive him
of the right he has to the post. Such deprivation of
rights already accrued, or involving evil consequences,
must in all cases amount to dismissal or removal,
for, it amounts to imposing punishment. But mere
termination of the right to hold a post not as a disciplinary measure, but according to the contract or rules
governing his appointment and tenure, cannot be so
regarded, because the rules which govern his right
to the post make determination in the manner provided
inherent in the right. By appointment to an office
a public servant does not acquire a right to hold it
for his natural life time or even during good behaviour.
His right to hold it is during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, according as his employment
is under the Union or the State: the right is also subject to the contract or rules governing the employment. Rules framed under Art. 309 relating to superannuation, to compulsory retirement on attaining
(I} [1953] S.C.R. 655.
•
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26·
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 828 .
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964)
.-
a certain age, or completing a specified period of
.service, or to determination of employment of temMotz Ram Dekaporary or quasi-permanent servants, or those on proetc.
bation, form conditions of service, and govern the
v.
tenure, and it is difficult to perceive any distinction
General
between those conditions of service, and the condition
Manager, N.E.F. which expressly provides for determination of employRailways,
ment otherwise than as a matter of disciplinary meaMaligaon,
sure. The title of a railway servant holding a nonPandu, etc. pensionable office is subject to the condition of determination by notice under Rule 148(3) which as
Shah J.
the clause expressly provides is not according to its
terms exercisable as a disciplinary measure. It cannot
be assumed that on acquisition of the office, a railway
servant becomes entitled to a right to the post free
from the conditions attaching thereto by the rules
governing his employment. He is liable to vacate the
office on superannuation, on compulsory retirement, on notice of determination, and on dismissal
or removal alike, i.e., on the supervention of the
prescribed conditions determination of employment
of the prescribed class results, and not otherwise.
Terminations resulting from causes other than dismissal or removal are solely governed by the rules,
but in the matter of dismissal or removal, beside the
conditions prescribed by the appropriate rules, the
overriding provisions of the Constitution must be
complied with.
1963
Under the Indian Railway Establishment Code,
Vol. II, "lien" is defined in Rule 2003(14) as meaning
the title of a railway servant to hold substantively,
either immediately or on the termination of a priod or
periods of absence, a permanent post, including a tenure
post, to which he has been appointed substantively.
Evidently lien is the title which the railway servant
has to a post, and a public servant appointed substantively must always till he is superannuated have
lien on a specific post. On substantive promotion
his lien would attach to another post, his earlier
lien being superseded. While a railway servant appoin-
<
5 S.C.R .
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
ted to another post substantively must have a lien to
1963
that post, it cannot be assumed that his lien continues
. -to attach to any particular post. The lien is however Mot• Ram Deka
subject to the rules: it does not in any manner confer
etc.
a right to hold a post indefinitely.
v.
General
Counsel for the appellants contended that all Manager, N.E.F.
the appellants in this group of appeals were permanent Railways
employees, and even superannuation did not put Maligaon:
an end to employment, since under the rules the super- Pandu, etc .
.annuated employees had a right to pension. It
is impossible to hold that a superannuated employee
Shah J.
continues to remain employed. His employment is
at an end: he is under no obligation to serve and earns
no remuneration. The pension is but a payment
made by the State for services already rendered and
not in lieu of services being rendered, or which the
public servant may be called upon to render.
There can therefore be no distinction in principle
between termination of employment of the employee
attaining the prescribed age of superannuation, and
termination of services in the manner prescribed by
the rules, by notice, or by an order of compulsory
retirement. In all cases employment comes to an end.
Though the causes which result in termination are
different, the effect is the same, viz., the public servant
ceases to be employed.
...
-.
The argument that on being appointed to a public
service, the employee acquires right to continue in
employment, proceeds upon a misconception of the
nature of appointment to a public post. Appointment to a public post is always subject to the pleasure of
the President, the exercise of such pleasure being
· restricted in the manner provided by the Constitution.
A person appointed substantively to a post does not
acquire a right to hold the post till he dies, he acquires
thereby merely a right to hold the post subject to
the rules i.e., so long as under the rules the employment
is not terminated. If the employment is validly terminated, the right to hold the post is determined even
apart from the exercise of the pleasure of the President
or the Governor. There is in truth no permanent
784
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
•
appointment of a public servant under the Union
.or the State. Nor is the appointment to a public
Moti Ram Dekapost during good behaviour, i.e., a public servant
etc.
cannot claim to continue in office so long as he is
. v. .
of a good behaviour. · Such a concept of the tenure
. General
of a public servant's office is inconsistent with Arts.
Manager, N.E.F. 309 and 310 of the Constitution .
1963
. Railways,
Maligaon
Pandu, et~.
Shah J.
It may be recalled that the guarantee under Art.
311 protects a public servant against dismissal or removal or reduction in rank as a disciplinary measure.
But if the determination of service does not amount
to dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure, there
is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such
determination provided it is consistent with Art.
309 of the Constitution. The tenure of office
is subject to Art. 310, prescribed by Art. 309
that is the governing code. The rules cannot
undoubtedly provide for dismissal or removal otherwise than in a manner consistent with Art. 311.
Nor can an authority acting under the rules validly
terminate an appointment to a post in a manner
contrary to the Constitution or the rules. Article
311 however covers only a part of the field governing
the tenure of employment and in substance provides
for a procedure for exercising the right to determine
employment in certain specified classes of cases.
To hold that this determination of employment
must in all cases, whatever may be the source or
the power in the exercise of which it is determined,
is to attribute to it a more exalted effect than is warranted by the scheme of the Constitution disclosed by
Arts. 309 and 310.
The view which I have expressed is consistent
with an overwhelming body of uniform authority
dealing with different classes of cases in this Court,
and we are asked to ignore the principle derived from
that body of authority not on the ground of any
demonstrable error but on the sole ground of a possible
misuse of the powers entrusted to the Railway Administration and that was, as I understood, practically
the only argument advanced at the Bar to justify a
-
<.
5 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
departure from the settled course of authority. But
1963
in considering whether cl. (3) of Rule 148 infringes
the constitutional guarantee under Art. 311(2), the Moti Ram Deka
Court will not assume that in exercising the power
etc.
to determine employment the authority competent in
v.
that behalf may not act honestly. The presumption
.General
always is that the high officials in whom the power Manager, N.E.F.
is vested will perform the duties of their office honestly.
Rail•·ays,
A mere possibility that the power may in some Maligaon,
cases be misused or abused, will not per se induce Pandu, etc.
the Court to deny validity to the entrustment of the
power. The impact of Art. 311 upon Rule 148(3)
Shah!.
must be adjudged in the light of action which may be
taken bona fide under the Rule. If in a given case
the order is not bona fide, and is intended to comouflage
an order of removal from service as a disciplinary
measure, the protection of Art. 311(2) would undoubtedly be attracted, for such an order cannot
be regarded as made in exercise of authority conferred by Rule 148(3). But the Court will not adjudge
the rule invalid on the assumption that the rule may
possibly be abused and may be made a cloak for
imposing a punishment on a public servant or that
the provision. might be utilised for a collateral purpose.
I will briefly refer to some of the illustrative
decisions of this Court. In Satish Chandra Anand's
case( 1l discharge from service by notice of a public
servant employed under a contract for the duration
of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation
of the Union was held not to attract the protection
of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The public servant
in Satish Chandra Anand's case (l) was continued
in service after expiry of the period of his original
employment, under a contract for the duration of
the Organisation on condition that he was to be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service)
Rules, 1949, which provided, inter alia, for termination
of the contract by a month's notice on either side.
This Court held. that to termination of his service
•
(!) [1953] S.C.R. 655 .
1/SCI/64-50
786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964)
by notice according to the rules governing his employment, Art. 311 had no application. In the view of the
Moti Ram Deka Court the case was not of dismissal or removal from seretc.
vice, because the State has power to enter into contracts
v.
of temporary employment and impose special terms
General
not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who
Manager, N.E.F. chose to accept the terms and entered into the conRailways,
tract were bound by them, even as the State was bound.
Maligaon,
This was a case of a premature termination of a contractPandu, etc. ual employment in exercise of a power reserved by
Rules. The view expressed in Satish Chandra Anand's
Shah J.
caseOl was approved in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's
caseC2J.
Several cases dealing with termination of employment of temporary employees or employees on probation have since arisen, and it has consistently been
held that mere termination of employment of these
employees not on the ground of any misconduct
did not amount to dismissal or removal within the
meaning of Art. 311. In Hartwell Prescott Singh
v. The Uttar Pradesh Government and others (3) an
order discharging a temporary employee from service
by giving him a month's notice as prescribed by Rule
25(4) of the U.P. Subordinate Agricl.llture Service
Rules, by which he was governed, was held not to
amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning
of Art. 311. It was observed in that case that in
principle there was no distinction between the termination of service under the "terms of a contract"
and that in accordance with the "terms of conditions of service".
In Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (2J, Das, C.J.,
who entered upon an exhaustive review of the Rules
governing service conditions of public servants of
different classes (and with him all other members of
the Bench except Bose J., agreed) observed at p.
1963
-
842:
" . . . in the case of an appointment to
a permanent post in a Government service on
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 655.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
(3) [1958] S. C. R. 509.
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
probation or on an officiating basis, the servant
1963
so appointed does not acquire any substantive
right to the post and consequently cannot com- Moti Ram Deka
plain, any more than a private servant employed
etc.
on probation or on an officiating basis can do,
v.
if his service is terminated at any time. Likewise
General
an appointment to a temporary post in a Govern- Manager, N.E F.
ment service may be substantive or on probation Railways,
or on an officiating basis. Here also, in the Maligaon,
absence of any special stipulation or any specific Pandu, etc.
service rule, the servant so appointed acquires
no right to the post and his service can be termiShah J.
nated at any time except in one case, namely,
when the appointment to a temporary post is
for a definite period."
In The State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore PrasadOl
Sinha C.J., speaking for the Court summarised certain
propositions governing the tenure of temporary public servants of which the following two are material:
"(l) Appointment to a post on probation gives
to the person so appointed no right to the post
and his service may be terminated, without
taking recourse to the proceedings laid down in
the relevant rules for. dismissing a public servant,
or removing him from service.
.,
(2) The termination of employment of a
person holding a post on probation without any
enquiry whatsoever cannot be said to deprive him
of any right to a post and is, therefore, no punishment."
In The State of Orissa and another v. Ram Narayan
Das C2l this Court held that a probationer may be
discharged in the manner provided by Rule 55-B of
the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, and to such discharge from service Art. 311 (2)
did not apply, for mere termination of employment
does not carry with it any evil consequences and an
order discharging a public servant, even if he is a
(I) [1961] 2 S. C. R. 590.
(2) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 606
788
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
probationer, on the result of an enquiry on charges
v.
probationer after an enquiry to ascertain whether
1·
-~
of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disMoti Ram Deka qualification, may appropriately be regarded as one
etc.
by way of punishment, but an order discharging a
General
he was fit to be confirmed, is not of that nature.
Manager, N.E.F. .
Railways,
In S. Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab OJ
Ma/igaon,
it was held that the protection of Art. 311 is availPandu, etc.
able only where dismissal, removal or reduction in
Shah J.
rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment,
and one of the tests for ascertaining whether the
termination of service was by way of punishment is
whether under the Service Rules, but for such termination, the servant has the right to hold the post.
The same view was expressed in Union Territory,
Tripura v. Gopal Chandra Dattal 2 ) and in Ranendra
Chandra Bannerjee v. The Union of India(3).
Two cases on the other side of the line, which
emphasize the distinction between a mere order of
discharge of a temporary servant, and an order dismissing a public servant as a disciplinary measure
may be noticed. In Madan Gopal v. The State of ·
Punjab and others (4), this Court pointed out that
where the employment of a temporary government
servant, even though liable to be terminated by notice
of one month without assigning any reason, is not
so terminated, and the appointing authority holds
an enquiry into his alleged misconduct, the termination of service is by way of punishment, because
it casts a stigma on his competence and thus affects
his career. In such a case the public servant 1s
entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. In Jagdish Mitter v. The Union of India (5)
it was held that an order discharging a temporary
servant from employment by notice after recording
that he was "found undesirable to be retained in
Government service" was one casting a stigma, and
(1) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 416.
(2) [1963] Supp. 1 s.c.R. 266.
(3) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 135.
(4) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 716.
(5) A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 449.
•
5 S.C.R.
'».
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
was therefore an order of dismissal attracting the
1963
application of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.
.There is still another class of cases which illustrate Moti Ram Deka
the rule that termination of employment otherwise
etc.
as a disciplinary measure does not amount to disv.
missal or removal. This Court has held that rules
General
providing for compulsorily retiring public servants Manager, N.E.F.
holding posts substantively are valid, and that termi- Railways,
nation of employment consequent upon such compul- Ma/igaon,
sory retirement does not amount to dismissal or removal Pandu, etc.
from service so as to attract the protection of Art.
311(2).
Shah J.
In Shyam Lal's case(IJ challenge to the validity
of termination of employment of a member of the
Indian Service of Engineers compulsorily retired after
he completed service for 25 years was discountenanced
by this Court on the ground that compulsory retirement
under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, after a public servant had served for
25 years, did not amount to dismissal or removal
within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution.
It was observed that the word "removal" used synonymously with the term "dismissal" generally implied
that the officer was regarded as in some manner blameworthy or deficient, the action of removal being
founded on some ground personal to the officer ·involving levelling of some imputation or charge against
him. But there was no such element of charge or
imputation in the case of compulsory retirement
which did not involve any stigma or implication of
misbehaviour or incapacity, for, by the compulsory
retirement the person concerned did not lose any
benefit he had earned and loss of future prospects
of earning could not be taken into account in considering whether the order of compulsory retirement
amounted to imposing punishment.
In The State of Bombay v. Subhagchand M.
Doshi( 2 ) it was held that Rule 165-A of the Bombay
Civil Services (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules
adopted by the State of Saurashtra, subject to amendment, authorising the State Government to compulsorily
(If1T955] I S.C.R. 26.
(2) [1958) S.C.R. 571.
790
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
retire any public servant who had completed 25 years
of qualifying service or had attained the age of 50
Moti Ram Deka years, without giving any reason was not violative of
etc.
Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, as the order made
.v.
under Rule 165-A was not one of dismissal or removal.
General
Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed at p. 579 (obiter
Manager, N.E.F. as was pointed out in a later case):
.
Railways
.
M f'g
'
"It should be added that quest10ns of the
0
0
P Ju ~~~
above character could arise only when the rules
an '
•
fix both an age of superannuation and an age
Shah .1.
for compulsory retirement and the services of
a civil servant are terminated between these
two points of time. But where there is no rule
fixing the age of compulsory retirement, or if
there is one and the servant is retired before
the age prescribed therein, then that can be reregarded only as dismissal or removal within
Art. 311(2)."
In P. Balakottaiah v. The Union of India and
othersOJ an order for compulsory retirement under
Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, was challenged as contravening
Art. 311 (2). The public servants concerned in those
appeals were railway servants and their services were
ter.minated on the ground that the General Manager
of the Railways had reason to believe that they were
guilty of "subversive activities". Notices were issued
to them under s. 3 of the Rules to show cause against
certain charges.
The Committee of Advisers en- .
quired into the charges and the explanations furnished
by the public servants found the charges true. The
General Manager acting on the report of the Committee terminated the services of the railway servants
concerned giving them .a month's salary in lieu of
notice. It was held by this Court that it is not
every termination of the services of an employee
that falls within the operation of Art. 311, and that
it is only when the order is by way of punishment
that it is one of dismissal or removal under that Article.
It was further observed at p. 1065:
1963
--
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1052.
,I(
{
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
791
"In the present case, the terms of employ1963
ment provide for the services being terminated
-on a proper notice, and so, no question of prema- Moti Ram Deka
ture termination arises. Rule 7 of the Security
etc.
Rules preserves the rights of the employees
v.
to all the benefits of pension, gratuities and the
General
like, to which they would be entitled under the Manager, N.E.F.
rules. Thus, there is no forfeiture of benefits Railways,
already acquired.
.
.
.
The order Ma/igaon,
terminating the services under R. 3 of the Security Pandu, etc.
Rules stands on the same footing as an order
Shah J.
of discharge under R. 148, and it is neither one of
dismissal nor of removal within the meaning of
Art. 311."
The Court in that case appeared to express the opinion, though it was not necessary for deciding the
case, that an order of discharge under Rule 148(3)
was neither one of dismissal nor removal within the
meaning of Art. 311(2).
In Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case 0) the Court
also considered the question whether an order of
compulsory retirement of a public servant under
the appropriate rules governing him amounts to dismissal or removal from service. At p. 861, Das C.J.,
· speaking for the majority of the Court observed:
" .
.
every termination of service is not
a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A
termination of service brought about by the
exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal,
.
.
.
.
.
Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating
the conditions of service is not tantamount
to the infliction of a punishment and does not
attract Art. 311(2), as has also been held by this
Court in Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh.
In either of the two above-mentioned cases the
termination of the service did not carry with it
the penal consequences of loss of pay, or all0wances under r. 52 of the Fundament!ll Rules."
(!) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
792
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
In a still more recent case-Dalip Singh v. State
of PunjabOJ it was held by this Court that an order
Mati Ram Deka of compulsory retirement of a public servant for
ere.
administrative reasons under R. 278 of the Patiala
v.
State Regulations-which Regulations did not fix
General
the minimum age or length of service after which
Manager, N.E F. an order of compulsory retirement could be made,Railways,
was not one of dismissal or removal from service
Maligaon,
within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution,
Pandu, etc. because retirement under a Service Rule which provided
for compulsory retirement at any age irrespective of
Shah J.
the length of service put in, cannot necessarily be regarded as dismissal or removal within the meaning of
Art. 311, and the observations (hereinbefore quoted)
made by Venkatarama Aiyar, J., in Saubhagchand
Doshi's case(2) were for the purposes of deciding that
case obiter, and that it was not a general rule that
an order of compulsory retirement not amounting
to dismissal or removal can take place only under a
rule fixing the age of compulsory retirement.
1963
--
These decisions which examine diverse facets of the
tenure of employment of public servants, establish
beyond doubt that mere determination of employment
of a public servant whether he be a temporary employee, a probationer, a contractual appointee or substantively holding a permanent post will not attract the
provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, unless the
determination is imposed as a matter of punishment.
All these decisions weave a clear pattern of employment
of public servants who are governed by Rules providing for premature determination of employment.
Such determination of service, founded on a right
flowing from contract or the service rules, is not
punishment and carries with it no evil consequences.
It does not deprive the public servant of his right
to the post, it does not forfeit benefits already acquired,
and casts no stigma upon him.
.
A railway employee who has accepted employment on the conditions contained in the rules cannot
after having obtained employment, claim that the
(i) [1961] S.C.R. 88.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 571.
5 S.C.R.
'
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
conditions which were offered to him and which he
1963
accepted, are not binding upon him. The sole ex.ception to that rule is in cases where the condition Motz Ram Deka
prescribed by contract or statutory regulations is
etc.
void as inconsistent with the constitutional safeguard,
G v.
/
the exception being founded not on any right in the U
enera
public servant to elect, but on the invalidity of the anager' NE F.
·
· d'mg Railways,
covenant or regu1at10n.
If the principl e of the bm
Maligaon,
nature of the rules as condition of employment is Pandu, etc.
valid, I am unable to see any distinction between cases
Shah J.
of termination of employment resulting from attaining the age of superannuation or from orders of compµlsory retirement, terminating contracts, terminating
temporary employment, or employments on probation,
and orders terminating employment after notice under
Rule 148(3). If Rule 165-A of the Bombay Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
as amended, which fell to be considered in SaubhagChand Doshi' s case <1l was not invalid, if Rule 3
of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National
Security) Rules, 1949, which fell to be considered in
P. Balakottaiah' s case<21 was not invalid, if Rule
278 of the Patiala State Regulations which fell to
be considered in Dalip Singh' s case 0) was not
invalid, if Rule S(a) of the Central Government
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which
fell to be considered in Satish Chandra Anand' s case (4J
was also not invalid, it is difficult to appreciate
any ground either of logic or of law on which the
vice of invalidity as infringing Art. 311(2) may be
attributed to Rule 148(3 ). The termination of employment under Rule 148(3) does not involve the public
servant concerned in loss of any right which he has
already acquired, .it does not amount to loss of a
post to which he is entitled under the terms of his
employment, because the right to the post is necessarily
circumscribed by the conditions of employment which
include Rule 148(3) and does not cast any stigma
upon him. In the result I am unable to agree that
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 571.
(3) [1961] S.C.R. 88.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 1052.
(4) [1953] S.C.R. 655.
794
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
Rule 148(3) was invalid as infringing the guarantee
of constitutional protection under Art. 311(2).
Moti Ram Deka
.
In appeals Nos. 837-839 of 1963 the quest10n as
1
e c.
to the validity of the Rule 149(3) falls to be determined.
That
Rule was substituted for the original Rule 148(3)
G v.
/
M
ener~ E F some time in year 1959. Rule 149 deals, by its first
anager, · · ·clause, with temporary railway servants and cl. (2)
Railways,
·
deals with apprentices. We are not concerned in
Ma/igaon,
these appeals either with temporary railway servants
Pandu, etc.
or with apprentices. In this Rule cl. (3) deals with
Shah J.
the other railway servants. It provides:
"The service of other railway servants shall
be liable to termination on notice on either side
for the periods shown below. Such notice is
not, however, required in cases of dismissal
or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of clause (2) of Article
311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining
the age of superannuation, and termination of
servke due to mental or physical incaoacity."
The Rule then proceeds to set out the different periods
for which notice may be given terminating employment. Clause (4) of the Rule provides for payment
in lieu of notice. Rule 149(3) makes a departure from
Rule 148(3). The latter Rule applied only to members
of the non-pensionable service, whereas Rule 149(3)
applies to all members of the railway service holding
substantive appointments, and brings within its fold
all employees--even those who have entered employment before the date on which the Rule was framed.
But if by the terms of his appointment a railway
servant who was not governed by Rule 148(3) is
brought within Rule 149(3) so as to make his employment precarious by exposing him to liability to termination of employment, different considerations may
apply. For reasons which I have already set out
the conditions of service validly made under Art.
309 of the Constitution and in existence on the
date when a public servant enters service would be
binding upon him. There is nothing in Rule 149(3)
which renders determination of employment in the
1963
---
I'
\.
5 S.C.R.
'
•
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
795
manner provided therein per se inconsistent with
1963
Art. 311. But exercise of the power by the Railway
Administration to determine employment of persons Moti Ram Deka
who were otherwise not subject to the new condition
etc.
of service would, in my judgment, amount to imposv.
ing a penalty of dismissal or removal. Therefore . General
termination of services of a person who held appoint- Manager, N.E F.
ment to a substantive post and was entitled under Railways,
the previous rules to continue until he attained the Maligaon,
age of superannuation, or till compulsory retirement, Pandu, etc.
Rule 149(3) made applicable to him after he entered
service would per se amount to dismissal or removal
Shah J.
and it would be inconsistent with Art. 311. This
is not because the Rule is invalid, but because it
would expose the public servant concerned to forfeiture, by amendment of the rules which were in
existence at the time when he entered service, of
rights which he had already acquired.
The alternative ground of invalidity that the
rule infringes the fundamental right of equal protection
of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution may
now be considered. This ground was set up under
two broad heads.
•
(1) There is no other public employment
under the Government of India in which conditions
similar to these contained in Rule 148(3) or
Rule 149(3) exist, and therefore discrimination
between public servants employed in Railways
and public servants employed in other branches
of public undertakings or Administrative Services
without any rational basis to support it, infringing
the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art.14
of the Constitution, results.
The argument posed in this form does not appear
to have been raised before the High Court and no
investigation has been made whether similar conditions of service do or do not exist in other public
employments. In any event, employment in the Railways is in a vitally important establishment of the
Union in which the employees are entrusted with
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964 J
valuable equipment and a large measure of confidence
has to be reposed in them and on the due discharge
. -Moti Ram Deka of the duties the safety of the public and the effietc.
cient functioning of the governmental duties depend.
v.
Not only the travelling public, but the Union and the
General .
States have in a considerable measure to depend upon
Manag~r, N.E.F. rail transport for the functioning of the governmental
Railways,
machinery and its welfare activities. It would be posMaligaon,
sible even for one or a few employees of the Railway
~~~
. .
to paraIyse commumcat10ns
and movement of essential supplies leading to disorder and confusion.
Shah J.
The Railway service has therefore a special responsibility in the smooth functioning of our body politic
and a doctrinnaire approach to equality of conditions
of service in different branches of public employment,
irrespective of the nature of the duties performed,
irrespective of the possibility of harm to the community
which misguided members or units may be capable
of doing, and irrespective of the necessity to entrust
special powers to terminate employment in deserving
cases may not be permitted. If for the purpose of
ensuring the interests and safety of the public and
the State, the President has reserved to the Railway
Administration power to terminate employment under
the Railways, it cannot be assumed that such vesting
of authority singles out the railway servants for a
special or discriminatory treatment so as to expose
the Rule which authorises termination of employment to the liability to be struck off as infringing
Art. I 4. Article 14 undeniably forbids class legislation, but it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. Legislation
satisfying the test of classification founded on an
intelligible differentia distinguishing persons, objects
or things grouped together from others left out
of the group, such differentia having a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute, has consistently been regarded as not open
to challenge on the ground of infringing the equality
clause of the constitution. The special conditions
in which the Railways have to operate and the interests
1963
;'
-
5 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
797
of the nation which they serve justify the classifi1963
cation, assuming the argument of classification to
-be factually correct. It need hardly be pointed out Moti Ram Deka
that the basis of classification need not be expressly
etc.
mentioned by the impugned statute: it may be gathered
v.
from the surrounding circumstances known to or
General
brought to the notice of the Court.
Manager, N.E.F.
Railways
(2) Rules 148(3) and Rule 149(3) are so frame d M r
'
as to lead to discriminatory freatment of P adigaon,
. of
an u' etc.
R at.1way servants, because by th e exercise
the arbitrary and uncontrolled power thereby
Shah J.
conferred, exercise of which is not to be
tested by any objective standard, service of
any public servant falling within the classes
to which they apply may be terminated.
Conferment of such a power leads to denial
of the equal protection of the laws.
Rule 148(3) as it stood applied only to non-pensionable services and not to pensionable services, and
Rule 149(3) applies to all railway servants holding
posts pensionable and non-pensionable. In dealing
with a similar argument in Satish Chandra Anand' s
case(!) in the context of termination of employment of a servant employed on a contract for the
duration of an Organisation but whose tenure was
governed by the Central· Civil Services (Temporary
Service) Rules, 1949, Bose, J., observed at p. 659:
"There was no compulsion on the petitioner
to enter into the contract he did. He was as free
under the law as any other person to accept or
to reject the offer which was made to him. Having
accepted, he still has open to him all the rights
and remedies available to other persons similarly
situated to enforce any rights under his contract
which have been denied to him, assuming there
are any, and to pursue in the ordinary courts of the
land such remedies for a breach as are open to
him to exactly the same extent as other persons
similarly situated. He has not been discriminated
against and he has not been denied the protection
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 655.
798
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
[1964 J
of any laws which others similarly situated could
claim."
Moti Ram Deka
etc.
These observations in my judgment would, with apv.
propriate variations, be applicable in considering
General
the validity of Rules 148(3) & 149(3). In adjudging
Manager NE F whether there is by the impugned rules a denial
Raili:•ay;, · ·of the equal protection of the laws, no rational
Maligaon,
ground of distinction can be found between an emPandu, etc. ployee who is but for the rule for termination of employment by notice, by the contract entitled to continue
Shah J.
in employment for a specified duration, and one who
is appointed to a substantive post till superannuation.
In one case the employment is for a period defined
or definable, in the other there is employment till
superannuation, and in both cases liable to be terminated by notice. If with his eyes oren, a candidate for
employment accepts a post permanent or temporary,
tenure of which is governed by Rules, he cannot after
accepting the post seek to avoid the onerous terms
of employment. This is not to say that acceptance
of covenants or rules which are inconsistent with the
Constitution is binding upon the public servant by
virtue of his employment. Such covenants or rules which
in law be regarded as void, would not affect the
tenure of his office.
1963
The law which applies to railway servants falling
within the class to which Rules 148(3) and 149(3)
apply is the same. There are no different laws applicable to members of the same class. The applicability of the law is also not governed by different
considerations. It is open to the appointing authority
to terminate appointment of any person who falls
within the class. There is therefore neither denial
of equality before the law, nor denial of equal protection of the laws. All persons in non-pensionable
services were subject to Rule 148(3). There was no
discrimination between them: the same law which
protected other servants in the same group-nonpensionable servants-protected the appellants in appeals Nos. 711-714 of 1962, and also provided for
determination of their employment.
I
,·
~
., •
5 S.C.R.
•
•
l
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
799
The Rule, it is true, does not expressly provide
1963
for guidance to the authority exercising the power
-conferred by Rule 148, but on that account the Rule Moti Ram Deka
cannot be said to confer an arbitrary power and be
ere.
unreasonable, or be in its operation unequal. The
v.
power is exercisable by the appointing authority
General
who normally is, if not the General Manager, a senior Manager, N.E.F.
officer of the Railways. In considering the. validity
Raihrays,
of an order of determination of employment under Maligaon,
Rule 148, an assumption that the power may be exer- Pandu, etc.
cised mala fide and on that ground discrimination
may be practised is wholly out of place. Because of
Shah J.
the absence of specific directions in Rule 148 governing
the exercise of authority conferred thereby, the power
to terminate employment cannot be regarded as an
arbitrary power exercisable at the sweet will of the
authority, when having regard to the nature of the
employment and the service to be rendered, the importance of the efficient functioning of the rail transport
in the scheme of our public economy, and the
status of the authority invested with the exercise
of the power, it may reasonably be assumed that
the exercise of the power would appropriately be
exercised for the protection of public interest on
grounds of administrative convenience. Power to
exercise discretion is not necessarily to be assumed
to be a power to discriminate unlawfully, and possibility
of abuse of power will not invalidate the conferment
of power. Conferment of power has necessarily
to be coupled with the duty to exercise it bona fide
and for effectuating the purpose and policy underlying the rules which provide for the exercise of the
power. If in the scheme of the rules, a clear policy
relating to the circumstances in which the power is
to be exercised is discernible, the conferment of power
must be regarded as made in furtherance of the scheme,
and is not open to attack as infringing the equality
clause. It may be remembered that the rules relating
to termination of employment of temporary servants
and those on probation, and even those relating to
compulsory retirement generally do not lay down any
specific directions governing the exercise of the powers
800
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
conferred thereby. The reason is obvious: the appointing authority must in all these cases be left
Moti Ram Deka with discretion to determine employment having reetc.
gard to the exigencies of the service, suitability of the
v.
employee for absorption or continuance in the cadre,
General . and the larger interests of the public being served by
Manager, N.E.F. retaining the public servant concerned in service. In
Railways,
my view Rule 148(3) cannot, therefore, be regarded
Maligaon,
as invalid either as infringing Art. 311(2) of the
Pandu, etc.. Constitution or as infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution. For the same reasons Rule 149(3) cannot also
Shah J.
be regarded as invalid.
But the orders imposing upon the public servants
determination of employment in exercise of the powers
under Rule 149(3) made applicable to them when
prior to the date on which the Rule was framed they
were not applicable to them, would be void as infringing Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. As, however, on
this part of the case there has been no investigation
by the High Court, I would remand appeals Nos.
837-839 of 1963 to the High Court and dismiss appeals
Nos. 711-714 of 1962.
f•
1963
--
f
-
,.
i:
;·
ORDER BY COURT
In accordance with the opinion of the majority
Civil Appeals Nos. 711-713 of 1962 and Civil Appeal
No. 714 of 1962 are allowed with costs. The writ
petitions filed by the four appellants in the three High
Courts are granted and Orders directed to be issued
in terms of the prayers made by them. Civil Appeals
Nos. 837-839 of 1963 are dismissed with costs. One
set of hearing fees in each group.
,
'
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