VRIDDHACHALAM PILLAI versus CHALDEAN SYRIAN BANK LTD., ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 3 December 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 647 | 1963 INSC 242
Key facts
- Decided
- 3 December 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 547/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 647
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 242
Text of the judgment
'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
VRIDDHACHALAM PILLAI
v.
CHALDEAN SYRIAN BANK LTD.,
AND
ANOTHER
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO,
K.N. WANCHOO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
,,
1963
December 3
Hindu Law-Partition-If bonafide-Onus of proof-Father's
debt-Liability of joint family property for antecedent debt-Personal
law and lex situs-Which applicable ?
Kalayanasundaram and the ll.lembers of his family were permanent residents of Palghat in the then State of Madras. He
and his son, the appellant, formed members of an undivided Hindu
family. The family had properties not only in Palghat but also in
Cochin.
.,
-
In 1945, Kalayanasundaram entered into many contracts
with the Government of India for the supply of black pepper.
As he had no ready money to implement those contracts, he approached the Respondent Bank for funds to finance those contracts.
For that purpose, he executed three promissory notes in favour of
the bank for a total sum of Rs. 1,10,000. He also deposited title
deeds of his properties with the Bank as security. As Kalayanasundaram did not pay the borrowed amount, the Bank filed a suit against
him on June 17, 1948. But even before that date, a deed of partition was executed on June 3, 1948 between Kalayanasundaram and
the appellant, his son, by which the properties of the family in the
Cochin State were divided into two equal parts, the father taking over
himself the liability to pay the amount due to the Bank. It was stated
in the deed of partition that the debt due to the Bank was
a personal debt of the father and hence was not binding on the
son.
To the mortgage suit filed by the Bank, several defences were
raised. However, the trial court decreed the suit against the father
and there was no appeal against that. Against the decision of the
trial Judge that the Bank had no right to obtain a mortgage decree
against the appellant and his half share in the family property,
an appeal was filed by the Bank which was accepted by the High
Court which modified the decree by passing a mortgage decree
agninst the appellant qua his share as well. The appellant came
to this court in appeal after obtaining a certificate of fitness.
The contentions raised by the appellant in this Court were that
the finding of the High Court that the partition of the family properties effected between the appellant and his father was not bonafide was not justified on the admitted facts and was based on
\
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
erroneous reasoning, that the High Court erred in holding that the
Hindu Law as understood and applied by the Courts in the preVriddhachalam vious Cochin State could determine the liability of the appellant
Pillai
who was a resident of Palghat and that the High Court erred in
holding that the mortgage evidenced by Ex. 'E' was to any extent
v. S . for the discharge of antecedent debts. Dismissing the appeals,
Chaldean ynan
Bank Ltd. and
Held: (i) The finding of the High Court that the partition of
another
family properties effected between the appellant and his father was
not bona fide, was correct. The partition deed did not set apart sufficient property for the share of the father to enable him to discharge
all his" debts. Moreover, onus should have been placed on the appellant to establish that the nature of the arrangement under the
partition was such as made proper and .adequate provision for the
discharge of the debt, but actually the onus was wrongly placed
on the Bank.
.
(ii) The view of the High Court that when the transactions
took place, British India and Cochin State were independent
sovereign states and according to Private International Law, it
was the law of the situs of the property that should govern the
contracts relating to it, was not correct. The rule was not any
statutory law which was binding on parties who had dealings in
regard to land in that State. Taking the Cochin State itself, the
power of a person to dispose of property or to encumber it depends
upon whether he is a Hindu, Muslim or Christian and in each case
the right of the owner to dispose of the property depends upon
his personal law as modified by any statute applicable to that community to which he belongs. There is no situs which can be applied irrespective of the personal law governing the owner. In the present
case, Kalayanasundaram and his family were permanent residents
of Palghat. The law applicable was the law laid down by the
Privy Council and accepted by the Full Bench decisions of the Madras
High Court and finally laid down by the Supreme Court. When
the Bank dealt with Kalayanasundaram, it must be taken to have
contracted with him on the basis of such a law being applicable
to the transaction.
(iii) There was a real and factual antecedency between the
loan of Rs. 80,000 for which the draft was given on November
16, 1945, and the previously existing indebtedness of Rs. 1,09,000,
and odd in the over drafts account No. 1 and 2 of Kalayanasundaram
to the Bank which was discharged thereby.
A father can by incurring a debt, even though the same be
not for any purpose necessary or beneficial to the family, so long
as it is not for illegal or immoral purposes, lay the entire joint
family property including the interests of his sons open to betaken
in execution proceedings upon a decree for the payment of debt.
The father can, so long as the family continues undivided, alienate
the entirety of the family property for the discharge of bis antece-
1 .
(
-
5 S.C.R.
'
·.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
dent personal debts subject to their not being illegal or immoral.
1963
In other words, the power of the father to alienate for satisfying
his debts is co-extensive with the right of the creditors to obtain Vriddhachalam
satisfaction out of family property including the share of the sons
Pillai
in such property. Where a father purports to burden the estate
v
·
.
by a mortgage for purposes not necessary and beneficial to the
family, the mortgage qua mortgage would not be binding on the Chaldean Synan
sons unless the same was for the discharge of an antecedent debt. Bank Ltd. and
Where there is no antecedency, a mortgage by the father would
another
stand in the same position as an out and out sale by the father
of family property for a purpose not binding on the family under
which he receives the sale price which is utilised for his personal
needs. After the joint status of the family is disrupted by a partition, the father has no right to deal with the family property by
sale or mortgage even to discharge an antecedent debt, nor is the
son under any legal or moral obligation to discharge the post-partition debt of the father. Antecedent debt in this context means a
debt antecedent in fact as well as in time. The debt must be truly
independent and not part of the mortgage which is impeached.
The prior debt must be independent of the debt for which the mortgage is created and the two transactions must be dissociated in
fact so that they cannot be regarded as part of the same transaction.
Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad, 51 I.A. 129, Panna Lal v. Mst.
Naraini, [1952] S.C.R. 544, Chidambara Mudaliar v. Rootha Peruma/,
I.L.R. 27 Mad. 326 and Vankataramayya v. Vankataramana,
29 Mad. 200, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
547 of1961.
..
Civil Appeal No·
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
October 16, 1956 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal
Suit No. 135 of 1953 .
T.N. Subramania Iyer, M.S. Narasimhan and
M.S. Sastri, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, T.S. Venkateswara Iyer,
K. Jayaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondent
No. I.
December 3, 1963. The Judgment of the ·court
was delivered by
:.·
AYYANGAR J.-This appeal is directed against
the judgment of the High Court of Kerala and has
been filed on the strength of a certificate of fitness
Ayyangar J.
650
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964)
granted by the High Court under Art. !33(1)(a) of
the Constitution.
Vriddhachalam
The appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent-The Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd.-which for
Chaldean Syrian shortness we shall refer to as the Bank , for the reBank Ltd. and covery of certain sums due on a mortgage by deposit
another
of title deeds executed by Kalayanasundaram Pillai-the appellant's father who was imp leaded as the 1st
Ayyangar J. defendant and is now the 2nd respondent before us.
Pillai
v.
The mortgage on which the Bank laid this suit
was evidenced by Ex. 'E'-a memorandum recording
the deposit of title deeds of certain properties in
the former princely State of Cochin. The debt for
which the said deposit was made was the principal
and interest due on two promissory notes for
Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 30,000 respectively which were
marked as Exs. A & B in the case. It was not in dispute that the property ,which was the subject of mortgage belonged to the joint family composed of the I st
defendan·t and his son-the appellant. The appellant
was a minor on the date of the suit-transaction and
even at the date of the suit. To the suit that it filed
the Bank impleaded not merely Kalyanasundaram
and his minor son, but the latter's sisters and mother
and even the lessees of the mortgaged property.
These were defendants 3 to 11. They, however, have
dropped out of the proceedings at earlier stages and
the only parties to the appeal whose rights we are
called on to adjudicate are the Bank and the appellant.
The Bank's suit was decreed by the trial court against
the father-1st defendant and there was no appeal
against it and that decree is no longer in challenge.
The trial Judge however held that the Bank had no
right to obtain a mortgage decree against the appellant and his half share in the family property, but on
appeal by the Bank, the learned Judges allowed the
appeal. and modified the decree by passing a mortgage
decree against the appellant qua his share as well. It
is the correctness of this variation that is questioned
in this appeal.
..
.-.
....
5 S.C.R.
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
The execution of the promissory notes and the
1963
receipt of consideration therefore as recited therein
were admitted by the 1st defendant, as also the creation Vriddhachalani
of the security by the deposit of the title deeds of proPillai
perties and whatever contentions were raised in respect
v.
of these matters on behalf of the appellant have now Chaldean Syrian
been abandoned. Some point was made on behalf Bank Ltd. and
of the appellant regarding the suit debt being avyavaharanother
ika, but this also has been found against and given
up. The only question that survives is whether the Ayyangar 1·
mortgage evidenced by Ex. 'E' is binding on the appellant. Here again it is now common ground, that the
debt was a personal borrowing by the father, not
for any purpose binding on the joint family.
A few more facts have to be stated in order
that the precise range of the controversy in this appeal
might be properly understood. That Kalyanasundaram and the members of his family were permanent
residents of Palghat in the then State of Madras,
that he with the appellant formed members of an
undivided Hindu family and that the properties
which were the subject of the motgage were joint
family properties, none of these were in dispute.
The family possessed properties not merely in Cochin
but also in Palghat.
We shall now proceed to detail the circumstances
in which the borrowings which has given rise to this
litigation were made. In or about May 1945 Kalyanasunclaram entered into a contract with the Government
of India for the supply of 100 tons of black pepper
~nd also into further contracts of th~ same type later
m the year. He had apparently no ready cash to implement .these contracts and approached the Bank for
funds for financing the undertaking. For this purpose
he 1~xecuted three promissory notes in favour of the
Bank for a total of Rs. 1,10,000. The promissory
notes marked Exhibits A and B for Rs. 50,000 and
Rs. 30,000 respectively already referred to, were
executed on November 14, 1945 and the debt evidenced
by them was secured by a mortgage by deposit of
652
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
title-deeds of properties in the Cochin State and this
is the subject-matter of the proceedings giving ri~e
Vrzddh.achalam to this appeal. A few months later, on February
Pillai
20, 1946 he executed another promissory note which
v.
. is marked as Ex. 'C' for Rs. 30,000. That also was
Chaldean Synan accompanied by a further deposit of title deedsBank Ltd. and which is recorded in Ex. 'F' , but that was in part in
another
relation to the family properties in Palghat in the
State of Madras. As the amount due under these
Ayyangar J. notes was not repaid at the time promised, the Bank
filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises, in
the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Chittur, which
is in the Cochin State, for a mortgage decree in its
favour for the amount of all the three promissory
notes with the interest due thereon, though a mortgage
decree was sought only against the properties in Cochin
·which were set out in the Schedule to the plaint.
1963
. --
This suit was filed on June 17, 1948 but before
the filing of the suit certain events happened to which
it would be convenient to refer at this stage, because
they figure largely in the defences that were raised
in the suit on behalf of the appellant who was represented by his mother as guardian ad !item. On March
23, 1948 a petition for permission to file a suit in
Jonna pauperis was filed in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Palghat on behalf of the appellant by
his uncle as his next friend. To that suit were implea·ded as defendants Kalyanasundaram, the father, as
well as the mother and as many as 31 other creditors
of Kalyanasundaram including the respondent Bank.
The relief sought in the suit was the effecting of a
Partition of the family properties situated in Palghat
and for the delivery of the half-share therein to the
minor plaintiff. With this was coupled a prayer
for the setting aside of certain decrees which had
been obtained by certain of the creditors who were
impleaded as defendants, on the ground either that
the promissory notes or other documents on which
the decrees had been passed were not supported by
consideration, or that these debts were tainted with
illegality or immorality, the allegation being that
t
•
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
653
the father was leading a reckless and immoral life
1963
and was addicted to women. So far as the debt due
to the Bank was concerned, the allegation was, though Vriddhachalam
not expressed very clearly, that it was a borrowing
Pillai
for a personal business newly started by the father
v.
.
and would not, therefore, bind the minor's share Chaldean Synan
in the family properties. As already stated, the Bank Ltd. and
relief for partition in that suit was confined to the
another
properties at Palghat in Madras. While this application for leave to sue in forma pauperis was pending, ·Ayyangar 1 ·
a notice was issued on May 27, 1948 through a lawyer
purporting to act on behalf of the appellant, addressed
to his father, in which the partition of the properties
of the family situated in the Cochin State was demanded.
This notice was followed, by a deed of partition dated
June 3, 1948 by which the properties of the family in
the Cochin State were purported to be divided into
two equal parts, the father being directed to pay the
debts borrowed by him out of the share allotted to
him, the deed reciting an agreement with the father
that the minor should be free from any obligation to
discharge those debts. The debt due to the Bank
which is the subject of the present proceedings, was
among those the discharge of which the father undertook under this deed marked as Ex. VI. The deed
recited that this debt was a personal debt of the father
and was therefore not binding on the son and this
was assigned as the reason for the provision made for
its discharge by the father without any obligation being
laid upon the son in that behalf. One of the questions
arising in the appeal is as regards the effect of this
partition on the rights of the Bank to realise the
moneys due to it from the share allotted to the son
in the Cochin properties which were mortgaged
under Ex. 'E.'
Reverting to the proceedings giving rise to this
appeal, to the mortgage suit filed by the Bank several
defences were raised on behalf of the appellant. Tt
is not necessary to set out all of them but it would be
sufficient if those which have a bearing on the points
urged before us are mentioned. Before dealing with
I
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·
[1964]
the controversial issues we may state that there were
a few to which it is sufhcient to make a passing referVriddhachalam ence. There was a formal denial of the truth and
Pillai
validity of the promissory notes and the passing of
v.
consideration thereunder and also about the suffiCha!dean Syrian ciency or admissibility of the memorandum Ex. 'E'
Bank Ltd. and to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. These
another
do not appear to have been seriously pressed and
have been found in favour of the plaintiff-bank.
Ayyangar J. There was also an issue that the suit-debt was tainted
with illegality and immorality, but on the facts it
was such an untenable plea that it was easily found
against.
1963
Issue no. 2 ran:
"Whether the trade mentioned in the plaint was
a new trade started by the 1st defendant or an
ancestral trade and are not the debts contracted
by the father-the 1st defendant-for purposes
of the trade binding on defendant no. 2 even if
the said trade be not ancestral?"
This issue, at least the first part of it has been found
in favour of the appellant that the trade viz., the
supply of black pepper to the Government was a new
trade started by the 1st defendant and was not an
ancestral trade and that finding has not been disturbed
by the High Court and being a concurrent finding on
a question of fact was not naturally challenged before
us. Closely related to this is issue no. 14 which ran:
"Are the debts sued on incurred for family
necessity and binding upon the 2nd defendant?"
The learned trial Judge recorded a finding that the
debts sued on were not incurred for family necessity
nor for the benefit of the family. These findings also
which were not varied by the .High Court were not
questioned before us. Incidentally it should be mentioned that the learned trial Judge found, when dealing
with issue no. 9 which was a general issue relating
,;
1·
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
to the binding character of the debt on the appellant,
1963
that the mortgage was not for securing an antecedent debt, but this finding was reversed by the High Vriddhachalam
Court, the learned Judges holding that to the extent of
Pillai
Rs. 59,000 the mortgage loan went in discharge of
v.
antecedent debts and we shall have occasion to deal Chaldean Syrian
with this matter in detail later in this judgment.
Baiik Ltd. and
anather
The 13th issue ran:
"Is the partition set up by the defendants true
and bona fide and binding upon the family?"
This was answered in the affirmative and in favour
of the appellant by the learned trial Judge but that
finding has been reversed and the partition has been
found not to be bona fide by the High Court and that
is one of the points in controversy in. the appeal before us. Issue no. 10 was in these terms:
"Are the Defendants Cochin domiciles? Are
they not governed by the law of the Indian Union
being permanent residents of the Indian Union?"
An issue in this form arose because of the different
views entertained of the Hindu law as regards the scope
of the pious obligation of a son to discharge the debts
of the father which are not illegal or immoral. Jn
the view of Hindu lawyers the repayment of a debt
was conceived of not merely as a legal obligation which had been undertaken when the debt
was incurred but non-repayment was considered
a sin. The duty of relieving the debtor from this sin
was fastened on his male descendents to the third
degree. The duty being thus religious, it was held
not attracted if in its nature it was illegal, or immoral
i.e., avyavaharika. Whatever might have been the
extent of the son's liability according to the Hindu
law givers, under the Mitakshara law as administered
in all the States, the liability of the son, grandson,
great grand son etc., was not treated as a personal liability but as dependent on his becoming entitled to
Ayyangar J.
656
SUPREME C'OURT REPORTS
[1964]
family assets and that it extended to the entirety of
his interest therein, but no more. .
Vriddhachalam
.
.
.
Pillai
The authorities to which it 1s wholly unnecessary
v
to refer, have firmly established the following and the
Chaldea~ Syrian position is not in doubt:
Bank Ltd. and
(I) A father can by incurring a debt, even though
another
the same be not for any purpose necessary or beneficial
to the family so long as it is not for illegal or immoral
Ayyangar J. purposes, lay the entire joint family property inducting
the interests of his sons open to be taken in execution
proceedings upon a decree for the payment of that
debt.
1963
--
(2) The father can, so long as the family continues
undivided alienate the entirety of the family property
for the discharge of his antecedent personal debts
subject to their not being illegal or immoral.
In other words, the power of the father to alienate
for satisfying his debts, is co-extensive with the right
of the creditors to obtain satisfaction out of family
property including the share of the sons in such
property.
(3) Where a father purports to burden the estate
by a mortgage for purposes not necessary and beneficial to the family, the mortgage qua mortgage would
not be binding on the sons unless the same was for
the discharge of an antecedent debt.
Where
there is no antecedency, a mortgage by the father
would stand in the same position as an out and out
sale by the father of family property for a purpose '
not binding on the family under which he receives the
sale price which is utilised for his personal needs.
It need hardly be added that after the joint status
of the family is disrupted by a partition, the father
has no right to deal with the family property by sale
or mortgage even to discharge an antecedent debt,
nor is the son under any legal or moral obligation to
discharge the post-partition debts of the father.
·
(4) Antecedent debt in this context means a
debt antecedent in fact as well as in time, i.e., the
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
1963
debt must be truly independent and not part of the
mortgage which is impeached. In other words, the
prior debt must be independent of the debt for which Vridhachalam
the mortgage is created and the two transactions
Pillai
must be dissociated in fact so that they cannot be
v.
regarded as part of the same transaction.
Chaldean Syrian
Bank Ltd. and
Another
Privy Council
The latest of the rulings of the
in which the law as stated above was expounded is Ayyangar J.
reported as Brij Narain v. Mang/a Prasad(!). and this
Court in Panna Lal v. Mst. Naraini<Zl has expressly
approved and adopted the same.
•
• '
In Cochin and Travancore, however, the law
was understood somewhat differently. Both the High
Courts of Cochin and Travancore when these States
were under princely rule, held, following what they
considered as the logical result of certain earlier
decisions of the Privy Council, that a mortgage executed by a father, notwithstanding that the debt secured
thereby be not incurred for family necessity or benefit
but were purely personal, would be binding against
the joint family property in the hands of the son
even if the debt be not antecedent to the creation
of the mortgage on the doctrine of the latter's pious
obligation to discharge them. This was on the
principle enunciated by Bashyam Ayyangar in
Chidambara Mudaliar v. Kootha Peruma/Ol (a decision,
however, subsequently overruled by a Full Bench of
the Madras High Court in Venkataramayya V.
Venkataramana<4l on the ground that it was inconsistent
with several earlier rulings of the Privy Council) that
it was difficult to make any distinction between a
mortgage created for the discharge of an antecedent
debt and a mortgage created for a debt then incurred,
for in either case the debt not being avyavaharika
is binding upon the son and the enforcement of the
security exonerates the son from the burden of the
father's debt.
(I) 51 I.A. 129.
(3) LL.R. 27 Mad. 326.
l/SCI/64-42
(2) [1952) S.C.R 544.
(4) LL.R. 29 Mad 200.
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
It would, therefore, be seen that if it wf:re found
that the debt to the Bank was not incurred for purposes
Vridhachalam necessary or beneficial to the family, the question
Pillai
whether the Hindu law rule applicable was the one
v. . . as understood and applied in Cochin · or that
Chaldean Syrianexpounded in Brij Narain<1l would assume great
Bank Ltd. and importance, and for the ascertainment of the partiAnother
cular law , which applied, the place of domicile
of the family would have relevance.
AyyangarJ.
The 1earned Subordinate Judge found that the
family of the father · J st defendant-was a resident
of and domici' ed in Palghat and that therefore would
not be governed by the rule of Hindu law as understood
and applied by the High Courts of Travancore and
Cochin. The learned Judges of the High Court while
affirming the finding that the defendants were domiciled in and residents of Palghat and were not even
residents of Cochin, were still of the opinion that
as the propertie~ which were the subject of the mortgage
were in Cochin, the Cochin view of the Hindu law
was applicable to determine the rights of the parties
on the. basis of that interpretation of the law being
the lex situs and applying that law came to the conclusion that even if the mortgage--Ex. 'E' was concurrent
with and part of the same transaction as the debts
which it secured, the mortgage was binding on the
appellant's share in the family property. It was on
this line of reasoning that the learned Judges held
that even though of the mortgage debt under Ex. E,
only Rs. 59,000 was found by them as having been
utilised for discharging the antecedent de6ts of the
father, still the Bank was entitled to a mortgage decree
against the share of the appellant to the extent of the
entire mortgage money. This was one of the points
which. was canvassed before us, which we shall deal
· with in its proper place.
Pausing here and before setting out the points
urged before us by the appellant, there is one matter
that has to be mentioned merely for the purpose of
clarification. As already stated, the suit as originally
1963
(1) 51 I. A. 129.
5 S.C.R.
-~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
filed was for the recovery of the debt due under all
1963
the three promissory notes-Exs. A, B & C and the interest accrued thereon which totalled over Rs. 1,27,000 Vridhachalam
though the property against which the mortgage decree
Pillai
was sought was confined to the Cochin property which
v.
was covered by the memorandum of deposit-Ex. E. Chaldean Syrian
The learned Sub-Judge, however, held that the Bank Ltd. and
suit in so far as the debt under the pro,1ote Ex. C.
Another
for which properties in Palghat were given as security
could not be sued for in his Court and disallowed Ayyangar J.
the Bank's claim to that extent. That portion of the
decree has become final and was not challenged by
the Bank on appeal. It might be mentioned that the
Bank is stated to have subsequently filed a suit for
that sum in the court -in Palghat and has obtained
a decree thereon. We are setting out these matters
for pointing out that the appeal is practically confined
to the binding character of the mortgage-Ex. E in so
for as it secured the repayment of the debts evidenced
by. Exs. A & B.
Learned counsel for the appellant urged the following contentions in support of the appeal:
(I) The finding by the High Court that the partition of the family properties effected between the appellant and his father was not bona fide was not justified
on the admitted facts and was based on erroneous
reasonmg.
(2) The learned Judges erred in holding that the
Hindu Law as understood and applied by the Courts
in the previous Cochin State could determine the liability of the appellant who was a resident of Palghat.
(3) The learned Judges erred in their finding that
the mortgage evidenced by Ex. 'E' was to any extent
for the discharge of antecedent debts.
The first question that falls for decision and on
which the learned Judges of the High Court differed
from the trial Judge was in relation to the nature of
the partition which was evidenced by the registered
instrument marked Ex. VI-whether it was such
as could be termed bona fide and satisfied the
660
1963
Vridhacha/am
Pillai
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
,
requirements of a partition which would preclude
the creditor of the father from having recourse to the
share of the family property in the hands of the son.
.
v
Before we deal with the facts relevant to that
Chalded~ Syrian matter we consider it would be convenient to focus
Bank Ltd. and attention on the real points for determination in that
Another
context and for that purpose we shall extract a passage
from the judgment of this Court in Pannalal v. Mst.
Ayyangar J. Naraini( 1 ) where this is dealt with. Mukherjea, J.
explained the law on the point in these terms:
"The sons are liable to pay these debts even after
partition unless there was an arrangement for
payment of these debts at the time when the
partition took place .................. The question now comes as to what .is meant by an
arrangement for payment of debts. The expressions 'bona fide' and 'mala fide' partition
seem to have been frequently used in this connection in various decided cases. The use of
such expressions far from being useful does
not unoften lead to error and confusion. If
by mala fide partition is meant a partition the
object of which is to delay and defeat the crediditors who have claims upon the joint family
property, obviously this would be a fraudulent
transaction not binding in law and it would
be open to the creditors to avoid it by appropriate means. So also a mere colourable partition
not meant to operate between the parties can be
ignored and the creditor can enforce his remedies
as if the parties still continued to be joint. But
a partition need not be mala .fide in the sense
that the dominant intention of the parties was
to defeat the claims of the creditors; if it makes
no arrangement or provision for the payment
of the just debts payable out of the joint family
property, the liability of the sons for payment
of the pre-partition debts of the father will still
remain .................... An arrangement for
payment of debts does not necessarily imply
(I) [1952] S.C.R. 544.
(
5S.C.R.
'
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
that a separate fund should be set apart for
1963
payment of these debts before the net assets
are divided, or that some additional property 'Vridhachalam
must be given to the father over and above
Pillai.
his legitimate share sufficient to
meet
v.
the demands of his creditors. Whether there Chaldean Syrian
is a proper arrangement for payment of the Bank Ltd. and
debts or not, would have to be decided on the
Another
facts and circumstances of each individual case.
We can conceive of cases where the property Ayyangar J.
allotted to the father in his own legitimate share
was considered more than enough for his own
necessities and he undertook to pay off all his
personal debts and release the sons from their
obligation in respect thereof. That may also
be considered to be a proper arrangement for
payment of the creditor in the circumstances
of a particular case. Afterall the primary
liability to pay his debts is upon the father himself
and the sons should not be made liable if the
property in the hands of the father is more than
adequate for the purpose. If the arrangement
made at the time of partition is reasonable and
proper, an unsecured creditor cannot have any
reason to complain. The fact that he is no
party to such arrangement is, in our opinion,
immaterial. Of course, if the transaction is
fraudulent or is not meant to be operative, it
could be ignored or set aside; but otherwise
it is the duty of unsecured creditor to be on his
guard lest any family property over which he has
no charge or lien is diminished for purposes
of realization of his dues ............ Thus, in
our opinion, a son is liable, even after partition
for the pre-partition debts of his father which
are not immoral or illegal and for the payment
of which no arrangement was made at the date
of the partition."
There are one or two observations which it is
necessary to make before applying the law as here
laid down to the facts of the present case. In the
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
first place we are here concerned primarily with
the rights of the Bank as a secured. creditor to proceed
Vridhachalam against the security, ignoring the partition. To such
Pillai
a situation the law as explained in the judgment in
v.
Pannalal's ::ase (l) would not have immediate relevance,
Chaldean Syrian for: Mukherjea J. was dealing with the rights of an
Bank Ltd. and unsecured creditor of the father to proceed against
Another
the shares of the sons after a P!lltition. In other
words, the nature and bona fides of the partition and
.Ayyangar J. the right of the creditor to proceed agamst the share
allotted to the son in such partition would arise for
consideration only if the Bank were unable to establish
that the mortgage was as such not binding on the son.
This was the situation of the Bank when the learned
trial Judge found that the mortgage was not binding
on the appellant's share in the family property.
If, however, the mortgage were binding on the son
either because it was created to raise money for purposes binding on the family as necessary or beneficial
therefor or was executed in order to discharge an
antecedent debt of the father, the bona fides of the
partition and the allotment of property to the sons
cannot affect the rights of the secured creditor to
proceed against the properties allotted to the son which
are the subject of mortgage. In the present appeal,
in view of the conclusion we have reached, for reasons
which we shall discuss later in the judgment, that the
mort15age under Ex. 'E' was for securing the repayment of an antecedent debt, the bonafides of the partition would not have a crucial significance. Since
however the question of the reality or the binding
nature of the partition would arise in the event of the
mortgaged . property being found· in sufficient to discharge the decree and the creditor or the decree holder
thereafter seeks to proceed against properties allotted
to the share of the appellant which were not included
in the mortgage, we have thought it necessary and
proper to examine it.
,
1963
Proceeding then to deal with the matter, we
must first observe that the onus of proving that
(I) [1952] S.C.R. 544:
,.
'
5 S.C.R.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
the partition arrangement is fair and bona fide in the
1963
sense explained by this Court in Panna Lal's
case< 1 ) was upon the appellant, and that the approach Vridhacha/am
of the learned trial Judge to the question is vitiated
Pillai
by casting the burden of proving that the arrangement
v.
was ma/a fide on the creditor Ba°'k. And for this Chaldean Syrian
reason. At the moment the liability was incurred Bank Ltd. and
by the father the creditor had a right to _ proceed
Another
against the entirety of the joint family estate including
the share of the son since, the debt not being avyava- Ayyangar J.
harika, the son was under a pious obligation to discharge it out of family property. Subsequent thereto a
partition takes place by which the share of the son
in the property is separated and vested in him, free
from the rights and powers of the father. It is the
plea of the son that by reason of an arrangement
which he has entered into or which has been entered
into ou his behalf, he has discharged himself from
liability to the creditor - an arrangement to which
the creditor is not a party but which under the law
is binding on the creditor provided the arrangement
fulfils certain conditions. From this it would seem
to follow logically that the onus would be upon the
son to establish that the nature of the arrangement
under the partition was such, as made proper and
adequate provision for the discharge of the debt,
for that is the basis upon which his own discharge
from liability depends. The learned trial Judge
framed an issue regarding the partition being fair
and bona fides and binding on the .Bank 'but the entire
discussion on the facts relating to it proceeded on the
footing that the onus was upon the Bank to establish
that the partition was mala fide.
The ,next error of the learned trial Judge lay in
ignoring -the circumstance that the partition did not
make provision for the discharge of the entirety of
the debts of the father, nor did it take into account
all the properties of the family. The partition was
evidenced by a registered instrument dated June_ 3,
1948. The first feature of this deed is that. though the
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 544.
,,
"
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
family had properties both at Palghat in the then
State of Madras, as well as in the Cochin State, the
Vridhachalam partition deed which has been marked as Ex. VI dealt
Pillai
only with the properties in Cochin. These properties
v.
were divided into two parts which were stated to be
Chaldean Syrian equal in value and they were allotted respectively to
Bank Ltd. and the father and the minor son. It contained a recital
Another
that the father acknowledged that the debts incurred
by him were for his own personal purposes and were
Ayyangar J. not binding on the son and that as a consequence
of this state of affairs the debt due to the Bank was
directed to be discharged by the father-a direction
to which he expressed his agreement. The learned
trial Judge found that the total property at Cochin
was fetching an income of about 18 to 19 thousand
rupees a year and computing the market value of
the property on that basis considered that it made
ample provision for the discharge of the debt due
to the Bank. But he paid no attention to the fact
that besides the debts for the discharge of which
provision was made in Ex. VI, the father had incurred
several debts to creditors in Palghat and which the
son was under a pious obligation to repay but to this
we shall revert after setting out the grounds on which
the learned Judges of the High Court based their
finding.
As stated earlier, the learned Judges of the High
Court reversed the finding of the learned trial Judge
on this point. Briefly stated their reasons were two
fold: (1) That the partition was brought about in
order to forestall the action of the creditors of the
father, who sought to proceed against the family
properties and so the transaction bore the stamp
of ma/a fides. We have already referred to the suit
in for ma paupereis filed at the Sub-Court, Palghat
for the partition of the Palghat properties. In that
plaint, and this also has already been adverted to,
a large number of debts were set out and in regard to
some of them the plaintiff claimed the relief of having
them set aside on the ground that they were incurred
for illegal or immoral purposes and so were not binding
on him. The allegations in that plaint, therefore,
'
1963
f
5 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
made it clear that there were a number of creditors
1963
who had filed suits against the father and that he
was heavily pressed for discharging them. It was Vridhachalam
in that situation that the suit in Palghat was filed.
Pillai
And it was when things were in this state that the
v.
partition of the Cochin properties was brought about. Chaldean Syrian
This necessarily showed that the partition was not Bank Ltd. and
bona fide. (2) In the deed of partition-Ex. VI
Another
there is a recital that the debt due to the Bank was
not binding on the appellant. There was thus a re- Ayyangar J.
pudiation of liability on the part of the son and the
learned Judges held that such a repudiation would by
itself negative the partition being bona fide and binding
on the creditor. Learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that of the two reasons assigned by the
learned Judges for their conclusion that the partition
was not bona fide the first was insufficient and the
second irrelevant and immaterial. As regards the
first ground, he urged that at the most, it would occasion greater scrutiny and provided that, as found by
the learned trial Judge; the properties allotted to the
share of the father were fairly sufficient for the discharge of the debts binding on the son, the circumstances relied on would not per se render the arrangement ma la fide. Regarding the 2nd ground, he pointed
out that the fact that the father took over the liability
for the reason that the debt was not binding on the
son, was a matter of legitimate arrangement inter
se between the coparceners and would have no bearing
on the fairness or bona fides of the partition which
was concerned really with ascertaining whether the
property set apart for the father was or was not sufhcient for the discharge of the indebtedness which he
undertook. We see considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel, particularly with
the criticism of the second of the above reasons.
The recital as to the character of the debt as against
the son is a recital in a document to which the father
and the son are parties and if between them the son
repudiates the debt as binding on him, that is no
reason by itself for holding the partition to be mala
fide.
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
We agree that the real question for consideration
in such cases is whether sufficient property has been
Vridhachalam set apart for the share of the father to enable him to
P;//ai
discharge the debts which he has undertaken to disv.
charge. Examined from this point of view we are
Chaldean Syrian clearly of the opinion ·that the partition deed-Ex. ·
Bank Ltd. and VI does not satisfy this test. In the first place, we
Another
agree with the learned Counsel for the respondent
in his criticism that the learned trial Judge had really
Ayyangar J. no basis in the evidence for recording his finding as
regards the income from the property. That finding
was based not on any evidence adduced directed
to that point but by taking into account certain statements made to the Bank by Kalyanasundaram at
the time the loan was raised. As a matter of fact the
1st defendant in his cross examination stated :
"The properties partitioned and allotted to me
(under Ex. 6) will fetch a pattom of 2,000 and
odd (paras of paddy). I have got debt to the
extent of Rs. 80,000. It is the debt under Exs.
A & B. I have to pay other amounts to the bank.
I have to pay a debt of about Rs .. 2,00,000 to the
bank. In addition to that I have also got other
debts to the extent of more than rupees one
lakh.c The decrees obtained against me will
come to more than Rs. 50,000-{)0,000. They
are decrees obtained against me."
1963
This would disclose two infirmities in the appellant's
case: (1) No provision was admittedly made under
Ex. VI for the payment of all the debts of the father·
and there were considerably more debts payable
by him than those for which provision was made for
the discharge out of properties allotted to him. (2)
There was no acceptable evidence regarding the value
of the properties in Palghat and therefore one cannot
proceed on the basis that the share of the father
in the Palghat properties would be sufficient to discharge the debts not provided for under Ex. VI.
Learned counsel for the appellant faintly suggested
that for considering the bona fides of the partition
under Ex. VI only the debts incurred in Cochin and
1
5 S.C.R.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
on which suits could be laid in Cochin should be
1963
considered but this is obviously incorrect because
even assuming that in regard to each one of those Vridhacha/am
debts, a suit could not be instituted in the Courts
Pillai
in the Cochin State, undoubtedly the decrees obtained
v.
in the Madras State could be transferred for execution Chaldean Syrian
to Cochin and vice versa. In these circumstances, Bank Ltd. and
unless the entirety of the debts payable by the father
Another
were taken into account and sufficient and adequate
provision made for the discharge of these debts' from Ayyangar J.
and out of the share allotted to the father-either
his original share or any added assets to enable him
to do so -the partition cannot be held to be bona fide
. within the meaning of the decisions. We therefore
agree with the High Court, though not for the same
reasons, in its finding that the partition under Ex.
VI is not such as to be binding against the Bank.
We shall next deal with the second point which
relates to the reasoning on the strength of which
the learned Judges of the High Court granted a decree
to the bank for the entire sum of Rs. 80,000 and
odd covered by the two promissory notes 'A' & 'B'
notwithstanding their finding that only Rs. 50,000
and odd out of the loan of Rs. 80,000 went towards
the discharge of antecedent debts. We should add
that we are reserving for later consideration the
correctness of the grounds for holding that to the
extent of Rs. 59,000 the mortgage was for discharge
of antecedent debts which is the subject matter of
the third of the points raised by the Appellant.
Their reasoning may be set out in their own
words:
"When the plaint transactions took place British
India and Cochin State were independent sovereign states and according to Private International
law it is the law of the situs of the property that
should govern contracts relating to it."
On this principle they applied the Hindu Law as
administered in Cochin State to determine the rights.
of the creditor and 1,1nder .that law even a mortgage·
which was contemporaneous with the· debt-would·
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
be binding on the sons, provided the same was not
illegal or immoral, though the debt was not for a
Vridhachalam purpose binding on the family either by way of necesPillai
sity or benefit. On this basis they held that the bank
v.
was entitled to a mortgage decree for the entire sum
Chaldean Syrianeven though Rs. 20,000 and odd of it was held not
\Bank Ltd. and to be for the discharge of any antecedent debt. LearnAnorher
ed counsel for the appellant challenged the correctness
of this reasoning and the application of the rule of
Ayyangar J. the lex situs to a case like the present. We agree
that the learned Judges were not right in the view
they expressed about the applicability of this rule of
Private International Law. The rule that they applied
to determine the rights to immovable property in
Cochin was not any statutory law which was binding
on parties who had dealings in regard to land in that
State in which event their reasoning was unexceptional.
Taking the Cochin State itself, the power of a person
to dispose of property or to encumber it would have
depended upon whether he was a Hindu or a Muslim
or a Christian and in each case the right of the owner
to dispose of the property would depend upon his
Personal Law as modified by any statute applicable to
that community to which he belonged. There was
in the matter of dispositions of the type we have to
deal with in this case, no lex situs which could be applied
irrespective of a personal law governing the owner.
By way of example, let us take the case of a
testamentary power of disposition over immovable
property in that State. If the owner were a Christian
he might be entitled to dispose of property to the full
extent. If he were a Muslim, there would be a limitation on such a power based upon the rules of Muslim
Law applicable to him subject, of course, to any
statutory modifications thereof. In the case of a
Hindu, his .power to dispose of by will would depend
upon whether the property was self-acquired or
joint and whether he was a member of a Joint Hindu
Family-the existence of coparceners and the like.
The Cochin law itself, therefore, recognised that
Hindu Law was a Personal Law and that the rights
of ·dealing with property flowed from the Personal
1963
,
SS.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
Law of the owner. It is hardly necessary to cite
1963
authority for the position that Hindu Law is a Personal
Law. The matter might be further illustrated by Vridhachalam
another example. Even among the Hindus, there
Pillai
are persons governed by the Dayabhaga system
v.
of Hindu Law. If such a one acquired property Chaldean Syrian
in Cochin it could not be that the Dayabhaga not Bank Ltd. and
being prevalent in Cochin some system of lawAnother
not the Dayabhaga but either the Mitakshara or some
other system-would apply in the absence of course Ayyangar J.
of some valid statutory provision to determine either
the rights to property or its devolution. The reasoning of the learned Judges, therefore, proceeds upon
a basic wrong assumption that the Mitakshara law
as understood and administered in Cochin State was
some sort of lex situs which would apply to determine
the rights of parties whatever might be their Personal
Law i.e., Hindus following either the Mitakshara
as understood elsewhere or governed by some system
other than the Mitakshara or not being Hindus governed by some other system oflaw. As stated in Mayne's
Hindu , LawOJ though in a slightly different context:
•
•
"Prima facie any Hindu residing in a particular
province of India is held to be subject to the particular doctrines of Hindu Law recognised in
that province ............ This law is not merely
a local law, it becomes a personal law and a
part of the status of every family which is governed by it.. .............. .In this respect the rule
seems an exception to the usual principle, that
the lex loci governs matters relating to land,
and that the law of the domicil governs personal relations. The same rule as above would
• appl~ to any family which, by local usage, had
acqmred any special custom of succession or
the like, pe~uliar to . itself, . though diff~ring
fro111: .that either of .its ongmal, or acquired,
dom1c11. The reason is that in India there is no
l~x loci, every person being governed by the law of
his personal status."
(1) Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th Edn. para 56.
670
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
In the present case on the concurrent finding
Vridhachalam of the two courts that the family of the defendants
were permanent residents of and domiciled in Palghat
Pillai
it would follow that the binding character of the father's
Ch Id v. s . alienation by way of mortgage quoad the son had to
Ba ean ynan be judged in the light of the principles laid down
ank Ltd. and from very early times by the Privy Council and accepted
· Another
by the Full Bench decisions of the Madras High Court
Ayyangar J. and finally authoritatively expounded in Brij Narain
v. Mang/a Prasad< 1> which has received the approval
of this Court. When the Bank dealt with the 1st
defendant, it must be taken to have contracted with
him on the basis of such a law being applicable to
the transaction, so that there is no question of hardship
arising from the application of the British Indian Law
to determine the scope of the father's powers ..
This leads us to the third and last point urged
in the appeal as regards whether and to what extent
the debt under the mortgage evidence by Ex. 'E'
went towards the discharge of the antecedent debts
of the father for it is only for such amount that the
Bank can claim a mortgage decree against the share
of the appellant in the family properties.
Before examining the facts in relation thereto,
it is necessary to narrate briefly the manner in which
the attention of the Courts were directed to this point.
In its plaint the Bank averred that the debt was incurred for a family purpose, it being stated to be in connection with a family business. This was denied and it
is now common ground that the debt was incurred
merely for the starting of a new business by the father
and was not for any ancestral family business. So
far as the plaint went, the Bank had no case that the
debt secured by the mortgage was one binding on the
famJ!y · as being for a necessary purpose. Also in
terms there was no plea that the mortgage was binding
on the son's ·share '.by reason of the debt being for
the discharge of the antecedent indebtedness of the
father. The defence on behalf of the appellant was
threefold: Besides the usual formal denial of the
(!)
51 I.A. 129.
" :P,
!
I
-
...
•
5 S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
mortgage not being supported by consideration, the
1963
contentions raised were: (1) That the mortgage debt
was not binding on the appellant's share of the family Vridhacha/am
properties for the reason that the debt was not inPillai
curred for purposes which in law were either necessary
v.
or binding on the family, and (2) that the debts were Chaldean Syrian
tainted with illegality or immorality. The findings Bank Ltd. and
which were recorded on these three defences were
Another
concurrent and are no longer in controversy. It
was found that the mortgage was fully supported by Ayyangar J.
consideration, that the debt was not incurred for any
necessary or beneficial purpose of the family and
lastly that the purpose for which the debt was incurred was neither illegal nor immoral. In this
context it should be remembered that the suit was
filed by the bank on June 17, 1948 before Cochin
became part of the Indian Union. At that date there
could be no doubt that if the Courts at Cochin applied
the Hindu Law as understood by the High Court
of that State disregarding the circumstance arising
from the domicile of the mortgagors, the question
whether the debt secured by the mortgage was or
was not for discharging an earlier antecedent indebtedness of the father was immaterial and nothing more
was needed for the plaintiff to succeed in obtaining
a mortgage decree as against the entire family property
including the son's share therein than a finding by
the Court that the debt was not illegal or immoral.
In fact, even the allegation in the Bank's plaint that
the debt was for the purpose of financing a family
trade was superfluous, and the negativing of its averment in that regard would not have affected its rights
in any manner. In the circumstances, the Bank
could not be seriously blamed if it considered that the
question whether there was not an antecedent debt
which the mortgage under Ex. E discharged was not
relevant at all and made no averment asserting such
a fact. Accordingly no attention was apparently
paid by either party to this question. By the date, however, of the arguments before the learned trial Judge
the princely State of Cochin had acceded to the Indian
Union and had become a Part 'B' State under the
•
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Constitution. Founding himself on this circumstance
as also the fact that the defendants were permanent
Vridhachalam residents of and domiciled at Palghat learned counsel
Pillai
for the appellant submitted to the trial Judge that
v.
the Hindu Law as understood and expounded in
Chaldean Syrian Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad(I) would apply to deterBank Ltd. and mine the rights of the parties to the transaction and if
Another
that law were applied, on the finding that there had
been a partition in the family which was stated to be
Ayyangar J. fair under which a proper provision had been made
for the discharge of the debts of the father, coupled with ·
the finding that debts under Exs. A & B were not incurred for a family trade or for a purpose binding upon
the family, the mortgagee was not entitled to a decree
against the security under Ex. 'E' which could not
extend to the share allotted to the appellant under the
partition-Ex. VI. The learned trial Judge made an
incidental finding, or more correctly an observation
which it must be taken to be on the state of the pleadings, that the debts evidenced by Exs. A & B did
not go to discharge any antecedent liability of the
father. When the matter went up in appeal before the
High Court the learned Judges considered that even
if Brij Narain v. Mangla PrasadO)i was applied
and even if the finding that there had been no ancestral trade and that the debt had not been incurred
for a family purpose were accepted, there would
still be need to ascertain whether there was any antecedent debt of the father which had been discharged
by the execution of the promissory notes Exs. A and
B and the mortgage deed Ex. E. For this purpose
they called for a finding from the Subordinate Judge
under 0. XLI. r. 25, Civil Procedure Code and having
regard to the state of the pleadings and the evidence
they raised a specific issue on that point and directed
the Subordinate Judge to afford the parties a further
opportunity of adducing such evidence as they desired
on the matter. The Subordinate Judge accordingly
heard further evidence and recorded a specific finding
that the debts under Exs. A and B were not for the
purpose of discharging any antecedent debts which
1963
(I) 51 I.A. 129.
i
'
•
5S.C.R.
•
.
•
•
,. .~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
could really be termed to be independent transactions.
1963
The appeal was thereafter heard and the learned
Judges, after considering this finding, dissented from Vridhachalam
the view there expressed and held that out of the
Pillai
Rs. 80,000 which were the principal amounts covered
v.
by the two promissory notes-Exs. A & B, there was Chaldean Syrian
an antecedent debt to the extent of Rs. 59,000 and Bank Ltd. and
odd. Though on this finding, if the decision in
Another
Brij Narain v. Mangla PrasadO) were applied,
the bank would have been entitled to a mortgage Ayyangar J.
decree only in respect of the principal sum of Rs. 59 ,000
and odd and to a personal decree for the balance
to be recovered out of the share of the appellant in
the family property on the finding that the partitionEx. VI was not bona fide and therefore not impeding
the rights of the creditor, they, nevertheless proceeded
to grant a decree to the Bank for the entire sum due
on the two promissory notes-Exs. A and B for the
reason that they considered that the law applicable to
determine the rights of the Bank was not the Mitakshara law as understood and explained in Brij Narain's
CaseOl but the law as was understood and applied in
the decisions of the High Court of Cochin pnor to the
Constitution. We have already dealt with the correctness of the view of the High Court on this point.
What we are here concerned with is the finding
by the learned Judges of the High Court that out of
the sum of Rs. 80,000 covered by Exs. A and B a
sum of Rs. 59,000 and odd really went in discharge
of an antecedent debt and that to that extent, even applying the law as understood in what was formerly
British India, the Bank would have the right to a
mortgage decree as against the appellant. The learned
counsel for the appellant has strenuously contended
that this finding of the High Court is wrong and that
the entire transaction by which the father obtained
finances for implementing the pepper contract with
the Government of India was one single and entire
transaction and that it was not capable of being split
up, as the learned Judges of the High Court had done
(I) 511. A. 129.
J/SCl/64-43
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
in order to record a finding of antecedency for a part
of the suit-mortgage debt. On the other hand, the
Vridhacha/am learned counsel for the respondent has submitted
Pillai
to us that not only were the learned Judges of the High
v. . Court right in holding that Rs. 59,000 and odd was
Chaldean Syric.n an antecedent debt but that the learned Judges should
Bank Ltd. and have gone further and held that the entire sum of
Another
Rs. 80,000 covered by Exs. A and B was for the dis-charge of antecedent debts.
1963
Ayyangar J.
This question of fact was the principal matter
of contest before us. We shall start by briefly summarising the transactions between the !st defendautfather and the Bank. The first defendant entered
into a contract with the Government of India for the
supply to them of 2000 Cwts. of pepper in or about
May 7, 1945. The total cost of the supply was
Rs. 1,37,000. He entered into similar contracts later
in October and November 1945 and under these the
value of the goods to be supplied was respectively
Rs. 1,23,000 and Rs. 3,63,000. Even for implementing
the first contract of May 1945, the first defendant apparently had need to borrow. An application for a
loan was made on or· about the 4th or 5th of June
1945 and then the 1st defendant sent the documents
of title that .he held in respect of his properties in
Cochin and desired accommodation by way of an
over-draft for Rs. 50,000 from the Bank. The letter
by the 1st defendant to the Bank is not on the record
but it is seen that these documents were sent to the
legal Advisor of the Bank on June 6, 1945 and the
latter was directed to scrutinise them and inform the
Bank whether the documents were complete. They
were returned on the same day with a note stating that
the Bank should satisfy itself whether the ·particulars
set out in the letter were true and if this were so the
amount could be paid on a mortgage by deposit of
title deed. This letter of the Legal Adviser as well
as the request of the I st defendant was circulated
to the directors of the plaintiff-bank and the loan asked
for was sanctioned by the President of the Bank
on June 11, 1945 and the same was passed by the
.if
5 S.C.R.
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•
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
directors on the same day with a limit up to Rs. 50,000.
1963
But this was to be on a mortgage of the Cochin properties. However even before the request for the Vridhachalam
overdraft was circulated to the directors and their
Pillai
sanction obtained, the officers of the Bank, apparently
v.
acting on the instructions of the Secretary gave him Chaldean Syrian
loans to the extent of Rs. 45,000. A loan of Rs. 30,000 Bank Ltd. and
on a promissory note carrying interest at 6! % was
Another
granted on June 6, 1945 and two days later on a further
promissory note Rs. 15,000 was lent. The sum of Ayyangarl.
Rs. 45,000 and interest thereon was carried to the debit
of what is termed as a No. I account at the Palghat
branch of the Bank which was an overdraft account
with a limit of Rs. 50,000. It should be noticed that the
creation of the mortgage was long after this. Apparently, this overdraft account was opened under the directions of the Bank's head office at Trichur by a letter
dated June 18, 1945 (referred to in the opening entry)
carrying out the directions of the President of the Bank
dated June 11, 1945 to which reference has already
been made. The amount due on the two promissory
notes with interest due up to June 19, 1945 came to
Rs. 45,054/11/- and this was the debit with which the
account opened. Subsequently there were operations
in this account eitherway i.e., both by way of payment
in, as well as of withdrawal from this account and
on November 14, 1945 the date of the promissory
notes Exs. A & B the amount due under this account
was Rs. 50726/15/4. We shall be referring to how
this account was squared on November 20, 1945
after referring to the history of the No. 2 overdraft
account of the 1st defendant with the Bank.
The 1st defendant made a second application for
a loan on October 8, 1945 to the Bank for overdraft
accommodation up to a limit of Rs. 3,00,000. The
security that he offered for the fresh advance that
he required was the contracts entered into by the
Government of India which he said would be pledged
with the Bank and he suggested that the advances
might be made to him on the security of the Inspection Notes of the goods that he would be supplying
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
to Government. He also promised that the receipt
for Rs. 50,000 which had either been or would be
Vridhachalam deposited with the Government of India as security
Pillai
for the due fulfilment of the contract, would be pledged
v.
with them, so that they would be in a position to obtain
Chaldean Syrian payment of that sum from the Government themBank Ltd. and selves. The Bank, however, demanded that in addition
Another
to pledging the amounts which would be received
from the Government under the contract, the 1st
Ayyangar J. defendant should also create a mortgage by deposit .
of title deeds of properties in Palghat for the loan
that he desired. The proposal by the 1st defendant was
considered at a meeting of the Board of Directors
of the plaintiff-bank and it was resolved to give him
additional overdraft facility to the extent of Rs. 60,000
which was split into two parts (1) Rs. 30,000 on the
security of properties at Palghat in regard to which
a mortgage was to be created by deposit of title deeds,
and (2) a further sum of Rs. 30,000 to be advanced
by an increase in the overdraft limit of Rs. 50,000
on the Cochin properties. This resolution was passed
on November 4, 1945. But even before this resolution was passed and obviously in anticipation of
the decision of the Directors the overdraft account
No. 2 of the !st defendant with the Bank at Palghat
was opened on October 24, 1945 with a limit of Rs.
30,000. It would be seen that Exs. A & B were
executed on November 19, 1945 and the deposit of
title deeds and the memorandum .in connection therewith was also on the same date. Between the 24th
October 1945 and the 11th of November the 1st
defendant had operated on this No. 2 account both
by payment in, as well as by withdrawing from it
and as a result of these transactions the amount
owed by him to the bank on the 19th November
1945 was a sum of Rs. 59,952/12/5. The position on
November 19, 1945 when the loan under Exs. A & B
was raised and the mortgage Ex. E was executed was
therefore this. Under the No. 1 account the 1st defendant owed the Bank Rs. 50,726/15/4. On the No. 2 account the amount due to the Bank was
Rs. 59952/12/5. It was with this state of the account
.
1963
•
.
..,
5 S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
that Exs. A & B were executed and the loan of Rs.80,000
1963
secured by the suit mortgage was raised. This sum
of Rs. 80,000 was made available to the 1st defendant, Vridhachalam
not by the Bank itself adjusting the newly granted
Pillai
loan against the amounts due up to that date and
v.
keeping the Rs. 29,000 odd that would still have re- Chaldean Syrian
roamed due to it as an unsecured debt due from him. Bank Ltd. and
On the other hand, the head office of the Bank at
Another
Trichur handed over to the 1st defendant a draft
for Rs. 80,000 made out in favour of the 1st defendant Ayyangar J.
on its branch at Palghat. That the draft was handed
over to the 1st defendant is admitted. It was handed
over at a time when so far as the previous indebtedness was concerned, the bank held no security though
there might have been a promise to create one. This
draft was taken by the 1st defendant to Palghat and
was paid by him into his No. 2 account which therefore
became reduced from a debit of Rs. 59,952 and odd
to a credit of over Rs. 20,000. It was on this feature
and this operation on the account that the learned
Judges of the High Court relied on for their conclusion that the Rs. 59,000 odd was an antecedent
debt which was discharged by the draft of
Rs. 80,000 handed over by the Bank when Exs. A & B
were executed. It now remains to narrate how the
No. 1 account under which the 1st defendant was a
debtor to the extent of Rs. 50, 726 and odd becarr.e discharged. The 1st defendant drew a cheque in his own
name on November 20, 1945 from his No. 2 account in
which he had an overdraft limit to the extent of
Rs. 50,000 and paid this cheque into his No. 1 account.
There was a small balance of Rs. 726/15/4 due which
was paid in cash and that account was closed on
November 20, 1945. On these facts the question
now for consideration is whether this loan of
Rs. ?O,~ is or is not. sufficiently dissociated from
the hab1hty of the 1st defendant under the No. 1
and No. 2 accounts which existed before that date
for admittedly the entire sum was utilised to dis~
charge the debt remaining due to the Bank on Novem. her 20, 1945.
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Learned counsel for the appellant raised a sort
of preliminary objection that the learned Judges
Vridhachalam of the High Court having categorically found that
Pillai
there was an antecedent debt which was discharged
v.
by the suit-mortgage loan only to the extent of
Chaldean Syrian Rs. 59,000 and odd and there being no appeal by
Bank Ltd. and the Bank against the finding that the balance of the
Another
Rs. 80,000 had not gone in discharge .of an antecedent debt, the respondent was precluded from putting
Ayyangar J. forward a contention that the entire sum of Rs. 80,000
covered by Bxs. A & B went for the discharge of
antecedent debts. We do not see any substance in
this objection, because the respondent is entitled
to canvass the correctness of findings against it in
order to support the decree that has been passed
against the appellant.
1963
Coming now to the merits of the controversy,
the matter may be viewed thus. We are now concerned with the question whether Rs. 80,000 which were
borrowed under Bxs. A & B and in respect of which
a crossed draft for that sum made in favour of the
1st defendant was handed over to him went in discharge of antecedent debts. If the previously existing debt on 14.11.1945 of over Rs. 1,09,000 being
the total of the amount due under the No. 1 and 2
accounts was one owed to a third party and that
debt had in part been discharged by a demand draft
issued on the execution of Bxs. A & B and the creation
of a mortgage by virtue of Ex. E, there could be no
doubt that it would be an antecedent debt. That,
however, was not the case but the original indebtedness was to the Bank itself and that was discharged
by the suit-loan from the Bank. Learned counsel
for the appellant laid great stress on the fact that the
entirety of the transactions which resulted in the
grant of an overdraft facility of Rs. 1,10,000 covered
by Bxs. A, B & C should be viewed as a single and
entire transaction commencing from the grant of the
loans on June 6, 1945 in anticipation of security being
furnished, right up to the date when the suit-promissory
notes were executed and the mortgages by deposit
'I
5 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
of title deeds was created. We are, unable
1963
to accept this submission in its entirety. It is, no
doubt, true that the transaction with the Bank, so Vridhachalam
far as the debtor was concerned, was one by which
Pillai
he obtained a loan for financing the implementation
v.
of his contract with the Government of India for the Chaldean Syrian
supply of black pepper but that by itself would not be Bank Ltd. and
sufficient to negative such a financing being composed
Another
of independent transactions, though directed to the
same end. Learned counsel for the appellant did Ayyangar J.
not deny that this was possible nor did he contest
the position that if there was a real dissociation in
fact, the circumstance that the creditor was the same
or that the several loans that were made, were for
fulfiling the same purpose of the borrower would
not by themselves detract from there being real
antecedency for a later borrowing. It is, therefore,
essentially a question of fact and the matter has to
be viewed with reference (a) to the nature of the
transactions, and (b) the intention of the parties,
and (c) the inferences to be reasonably drawn from the
form which the parties adopted for putting through
their intention. It is in the context of these considerations that we are inclined to hold that there was
a real and factual antecedency between the loan of
Rs. 80,000 for which the draft was given on November
16, 1945 and the previously existing indebtedness
of Rs. 1, 09,000 and odd in the overdrafts account
No. 1 and 2 of the 1st defendant to the Bank which
was discharged thereby. On November 16, 1945
when the draft was handed over there was admittedly
a debt of over Rs. 1, 09,000 due from the 1st defendant
to the Bank. Though there had been an agreement
that the title deeds of the 1st defendant's Cochin
properties would be deposited with the Bank as
security, the same had not yet been done and the loan
therefore still continued to be a loan on the personal
security of the debtor. At that date this bank draft
for Rs. 80,000 was handed over to the debtor for
the purpose of discharging the previous loans due
to the Bank. Learned counsel might be right in
saying that the previous loan of Rs. 1,09,000 and odd
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1964)
might have been granted in anticipation of the execution
of the mortgage and the final determination of the
Vridh~ch~lam amount of the overdraft that should be permitted
Pillaz
to the I st defendant but that does not by itself conclude
.v. .
the matter. The learned trial Judge negatived the
Chaldean Syrian plea of the respondent that the Rs. 80,000 went in
Bank Ud. and discharge of an antecedent liability to the Bank by
Another
reason of the evidence of the Secretary of the Bank
in which he stated that this . sum of Rs. 80,000 was
Ayyangar J. adjusted towards the earlier debt-a statement which
was repeated by the !st defendant himself as P.W.3.
Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention
to this portion of the evidence and repeated the same
arguments. In our opinion, however, this statement
or this manner of describing how the draft was utilised
does not by itself militate against this loan of Rs.
80,000 discharging an antecedent debt. Factually that
the loan of Rs. 80,000 was adjusted by the Bank towards
the lst defendant's indebtedness is not correct, though
it is possible that if the transaction took that form
the submission on behalf of the appellant would have
greater force and substance. That however, was not
the form which the transaction took, and we cannot
but assume that the form reflected the intention of
the parties. If instead of handing over a demand
draft to the I st defendant, which has actually happened,
the Bank had credited the amount to the !st defendant
in his overdraft account then there would have been
an unity between the transaction which started on
June 6, 1945 and which culminated in the execution
of the two promissory notes--Exs. A and B and the
security for the repayment thereof-Ex. E so as to
render all of them a single transaction, but that was
not the method adopted by the creditor or the debtor.
When a fresh Joan of. Rs. 80,000 was granted under
Exs. A & B and a bank draft for that amount was
handed over, it was done without taking into account
the pre-existing liability for Rs. 1,09,000 and odd
owed by the 1st defendant to the Bank, so that when
the draft was handed over there was a total liability
of Rs. 1,89,000 payable by the !st defendant to the
Bank. If the appellant's father had failed to credit
1963
'
l'
,.
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
the demand draft into his No. 2 overdraft account
1963
which it was undoubtedly within his power to
do, his total indebtedness would have been Rs. Vridhachalam
1,89,000. He however paid the draft into his No. 2
Pillai
account so that the total indebtedness to the Bank
v.
on the two accounts became Rs. 109,000. From the Chaldean Syrian
No. 2 account a sum of Rs. 5,000 he drew to discharge Bank Ltd. and
·a liability of Rs. 50,000 under the No. I account,
Another
so that in effect No. 1 and No. 2 accounts were fully
discharged and Rs. 29,000 became thereafter outside Ayyangar J.
the security created under Ex. E by the 1st defendant
in favour of the Bank. In the circumstances we
consider that the entire loan of Rs. 80,000 went in
discharge of antecedent debts though the same was
owned by the 1st defendant to the same creditor.
Before concluding it is necessary to refer to a
variation which the High Court made as regards the
amount recoverable from the properties of the family
in Cochin. This was because of the construction
and effect of Ex. J which was the memorandum which
evidenced the deposit of the title deeds of the Palghat
properties and which was executed on April
23, 1946. Under Ex. J the property mortgaged was
not merely the properties in Palghat but the equity
of redemption of the Cochin properties which had
been the subject of mortgage under Ex. F for Rs.
80,000. In other words, Ex. E created also a second
mortgage on the Cochin properties. On a construction of Ex. J. the High Court held that the I st
mortgage of the Palghat properties was limited
to the excess over Rs. 30,000 in the overdraft account.
It followed from this that the Bank could recover
from the Chittur properties that excess and this was
found to be, looking into the debits of the account
of the !st defendant, to amount to Rs. 3,792/211.
The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore,
granted in addition to the amounts covered by Exs.
A and B a decree for Rs. 3792/2/1 recoverable from
the Cochin properties. In view of the fact that a
suit had already been instituted in the Palghat SubCourt for the entirety of the amount due to the extent
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
of Rs. 30,000 and interest due under Ex. C & F, the
learned judges added in their judgment a reservation
Vridhachalam which was incorporated in the decree that was drawn
Pillai
up in these terms:
1963
•J
'
v.
Chaldean Syrian
Bank Ltd. and
Another
Ayyangar J.
"If in the suit instituted by the plaintiff
in the Palghat Sub-court the plaintiff obtains
a decree for the whole amount due under Ex.
C and realises the same, the plaintiff will not
·be entitled to ignore the decree in this case
in respect of the above sum Rs. 3,792/2/1
and interest thereon".
Learned counsel for the appellant faintly suggested that the learned Judges were in error in passing
a decree for this further sum of Rs. 3792/2/l in this
suit. It is, however, unnecessary for us to go into
the merits as to whether the learned Judges were
right in the construction of Ex. J and the legal results
flowing therefrom as we are satisfied that the appellant
is not entitled. to raise this point. This was not one
of the points raised in. the gr_ounds of appeal to this
Court when an application was made for the grant
of a certificate of fitness, nor is this objection to the
decree to be found in the statement of the case filed.
In the circumstances, we need say no more about
it.
.,.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
.
...
I
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