R.P. KAPUR versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 November 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431 | 1963 INSC 228
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 November 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 647/1963
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 228
Text of the judgment
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
431
'Castle' being separately assessed at Bombay in the
1963
status of a registered firm apparently refer to assess-ment of that business in subsequent years and not Commissioner of
in the year of assessment 1951-52. The conclusion Income-tax,
of the Tribunal therefore suffers from a double
Punjab
infirmity: it assumes the only fact on which its conv.
clusion is founded and ignores other relevant matters Indian Woollen
on which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner re- Textile Mills
lied in support of his conclusion. The Tribunal
Shah J.
has therefore misdirected itself in law in arriving at
its finding, and in refusing to require the Tribunal
to state the case and to refer it, the High Court was,
in our view, in error.
The appeal is therefore allowed and the proceedings are remanded to the High Court with a direction
to proceed according to law. Costs in this appeal
will be costs in the High Court.
Appeal allowed and Case
remanded.
R.P. KAPUR
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N.
WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DYAL, JJ.)
..
Civil Service-Member of former Secretary of State's Service
suspended by Governor pending criminal proceeding-Validity
of order-Rule, if ultra vires-A// India Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1955, r.7-Constitution of India, Art.
247-Civil
314-Government of India Act, 1935, ss.241,
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, rr. 49, 56Fundamental Rules, r.53-Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules. 1954, r.3-India, (Provisional Constitution) Order,
1947, Art.7(1).-Indian Independence Act, 1947, s. 10
The appellant joined the Indian Civil Service in 1939 and was
posted in the province of Madras. After the transfer of power
under the Indian Independence Act on August 15,1947, he was
1963
November 19
432
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
transferred to the Punjab and later when the Indian Administrative
Service was constituted he became its member. On July 18,
R.P. Kapur 1959, he was suspended by the Governor of the State of Punjab
under r. 7(3) of the Indian Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
v.
1955, on the ground that a criminal case was pending against
Union of India him. He challenged the order of suspension by a writ petition
and A.nr.
in the Punjab High Court as being violative of the guarantee contained in Art. 314 of the Constitution and contrary to r. 49 of the
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules which
provided only for suspension as a penalty. His case was that
there was no provision immediately before January 26, 1950,
that provided for suspension otherwise than as penalty. The
High Court dismissed the petition.
He/d:-{per Gajendragadkar, Subba Rao, Wanchoo and
Shah, JJ). The general law of master and servant and s. 247 of
the Government of India Act, r. 53 of the Fundamental Rules and
rr. 49, 56 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, read together clearly show that members of the former
Secretary of State's Services were on August 14, 1947, liable to
suspension either as an interim measure or as a punishment. Interim
suspension could be imposed either by the Secretary of State as
the appointing authority or the Governor-General or the Governor,
as the case might be, as the statutory authority.
Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v Hotel Workers'
Union, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476 and T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem,
[1961] 1 S.C.R. 750, referred to.
It was not therefore correct to say that there could be no
suspension except by way of punishment under r.49 of the Appeal
Rules before 1947. In a case of interim suspension before 1947
there was however no right of appeal.
Article 314 of the Constitution, properly construed, affords
such protection to the members of the Secretary of State's
Services as they were entitled to immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. There can be no doubt that suspension
pending a departmental enquiry or a criminal proceeding falls
within the word 'disciplinary matters' used in that Article.
It was not correct to say that as independence was conferred
on India and the Services automatically terminated, there was
in law reappointment of all the former Secretary of State's Services,
and those serving in a province must be deemed to have been
reappointed by the Governor and that, consequently, the Governor
as the appointing authority had the power to order suspension.
Article 7(1) of India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947,
G.G.O. 14, read with s. IO of the Independence Act, 1947, in
the light of other relevant circumstances shows that the final decision whether or not the former members of the Secretary of
State's Services should continue was of the Government of India
. and that Government, therefore, must be deemed to have appointed
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
433
them to posts either under itself or in the Provinces. Section
196.1
24l(b) of the Government oflndia Act, as it then stood, and s.240(2)
of the said Act, as amended by G.G.O. 14, could not alter this R.P. Kapur
position.
v·.
State of Madras v. K.M. Rajagopalan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541, Union of India
referred to.
and ,for.
On the eve of the commencement of the Constitution i.e.
January 25, 1950, a former member of the Secretary of State's
Services could be suspended under the general law by the Government of India alone as the appointing authority as an interim
measure pending departmental enquiry or criminal proceeding
and by no other authority. He was liable to suspension as punishment under s. 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules. Rule 53 of the Fundamental Rules governed
pay during interim suspension or suspension as penalty. While
there was no appeal from an order of interim suspension, r. 56
of the Appeal Rules provided for an appeal from an order of suspension as penalty. It was this position which Art. 314 of the
Constitution sought to protect.
Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1955, violated the guarantee contained in Art. 314 in resp ct to
interim suspension and was to that extent ultra vires in so far as
it applied to the members of the Indian Administrative Services
who fell within els. (a) and (b) of r.3 of the Indian Administrative
Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1954. The Governor's Order under
r.7(3) directing interim suspension of the appellant must, therefore, be set aside. The proper procedure would be to approach
Government oflndia for such interim suspension.
The Accountant General, Bihar v. N. Bakshi, [1962] Supp.
I S.C.R. 505, referred to.
Per Dayal, J.-In view of the provisions of s. 241 of the Government of India Act as modified by the India (Provisional Constituion) Order, 1947, G.G.O. 14 of 1947, members of the Secretary
of State's Services who were holding posts under a provincial
Government immediately before the appointed day, i.e., August
15, 1947, and continued in service thereafter must be deemed
in view of art. 7(1) of the said Order to have been appointed to
the corresponding posts by the appropriate authority, the Governor
of the Province. That article generally applied to all appointments
on and after the appointed day. The appellant cannot be deemed
to have been appointed by the Governor-General or the Government
of India. It was not intended that merely because that Order
was made by the Governor-General, the deemed appointments
must be taken to have been made by him.
It would be anomalous to hold that the Governor, who was
in administrative control of the services, could not pass an interim
order of suspension against a person appointed by the Secretary
of State, though he could impose a penalty of suspension under
1/SCl/64-28
434
1963
R.P. Kapur
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
I
rr. 49 and 52 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which continued in force till the All India Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules came into force in 1955.
v.
The Indian Civil Services ceased to exist from August 15, 1947,
Union OJ India and the services of its members automaticaily terminated on August
14, 1947. The appellant's service, therefore, came to an end on
· and Anr.
August 14, 1947, but since he was serving under the Madras Government immediately before August 15, 1947, and continued to do
so thereafter he must be deemed to have been appointed by the
Governor of Madras to the post he was holding on the appointed
day.
Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1955, does not violate the provision of Art. 314 of the Constitution,
nor can the absence of a right of appeal against interim suspension
do so since the appellant had none before the Constitution. His
suspension by the Governor of Punjab under r.7(3) was, therefore
valid.
'I
State of Madras v. K.M. Rajagopalan, [1955) 2 S.C.R. S41,
considered.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 647 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
September 21, 1962, of the Punjab High Court in
Civil Writ No. 280 of 1962.
The appellant appeared in person.
S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N.S.
Bindra and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent (Union of
India).
Wanchoo J.
S.M. Sikri, Adro<:ate-General, Puniab, N.S. Bindra
and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent (State of Punjab).
November 19, 1963. The Judgment of P.B.
Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo and
J.C. Shah, JJ. was delivered by Wanchoo, J. Raghubar
Dyal, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
WANCHOO J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
granted by the Punjab High Court. The appellant
joined the Indian Civil Service in 1939 and was governed
in matters relating to discipline by the Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, (hereinafter referred to as the Appeal Rules) made by
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
1963
the Secretary of State for India in Council. He
continued in service till the transfer of power under
the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Under s.10 of R.P. Kapur
v.
that Act he continued to serve under the Government of India and was entitled to receive from the Union of India
and Anr.
Government of India or of the Province which he
might from time to time be serving the same conditions
of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, Wanchool.
and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters
or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of his
office, or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit as he was entitled to immediately before the transfer of power, which took place
on August 15, 1947. The same guarantee was extended to the appellant and all members of what
were the Secretary of State's Services before August 15,
1947 by Art. 314 of the Constitution. As the appellant's case is based on that Article we may set
it out:
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by this
Constitution, every person who having been
appointed by the Secretary of State or Secretary
of State in Council to a civil service of the Crown
in India continues on and after the commencement of this Constitution to serve under the
Government of India or of a State shall be entitled to receive from the Government of India
and the Government of the State, which he is
from time to time serving, the same conditions
of service as respects remuneration, leave and
pension, and the same rights as respects
disciplinary matters or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit as
that person was entitled to immediately before
such commencement."
We shall hereafter refer to such a person as
a member of the (former) Secretary of State's Services.
It appears that the appellant was in the Indian Civil
Service cadre in the State of Madras at the time of
transfer of power, though later he was transferred
to the Punjab. After the transfer of power the Indian
436
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1963
Civil Service as a Secretary of State's Service came
to an end and thereafter a new Service was constiR.P. Kapur tuted known as the Indian i\dministrative Service.
v.
Formal legal shape was given to the new Service
Union of India after the enactment of the All India Services Act,
and Anr.
No. LXI of 1951, and the Indian Administrative
Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, (hereinafter reWanchoo J.
ferred to as the Recruitment Rules) were framed
under Act LXI of 1951. By r. 3 of these Rules, the
Indian Administrative Service was to consist of(a) members of the Indian Civil Service, not
permanently allotted to the judiciary;
(b) members of the Indian Civil Service permanently allotted to the judiciary who have
been holding executive posts from the date
of the commencement of the Constitution
and who may be declared by the Central
Government to be members of the Service
. in consultation with the State Government;
(c) persons who, at the commencement of these
rules, are holding substantively listed posts,
other than posts in the judiciary;
(d) persons recruited to the Service before the
commencement of these rules: and
(e) persons recruited to the Service in accordance
with the provisions of these rules.
The appellant thus became a member of the
new Indian Administrative Service by virtue of these
rules and continued to serve in the Punjab. In 1955,
the Central Government framed the All India Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 (he:reinafter
referred to as the Discipline Rules) which were applicable to all members of the Indian Administrative
Service and the Indian Police Service.
On July 18, 1959, the appellant was suspended
with immediate effoct by the Governor of the Punjab
on the ground that a criminal case was pending against
him. The order also provided that for the period
of suspension the appellant shall be paid subsistence
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
1963
allowance which shall be equal to leave salary which
he would have drawn under the leave rules applicable
to him if he bad been on leave on half average pay R. P. Kapur
v.
with a further provision that in case the suspension
Union
of India
lasted for more than twelve months a further order
and
Anr.
fixing the rate of subsistence allowance shall be passed. This order appears to have been passed under
r. 7(3) of the Discipline Rules and in consequence Wanchoo J.
thereof the appellant remained under suspension.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the Punjab
High Court on February 16, 1962, challenging this
order of suspension. His contention was that he
was entitled to the guarantee contained in Art. 314
of the Constitution and the order of suspension passed
against him violated that guarantee and was therefore ineffective and invalid. He relied for this purpose
on r. 49 of the Appeal Ru:es, which provided for
suspension as a penalty. He contended that the
Appeal Rules which governed him and which must
be held to have continued to govern him in view
of the guarantee contained in Art. 314 provided
for suspension as a penalty only and that there was
no provision anywhere in any rule or statute immediately before January 26, 1950 on which date the
Constitution came into force, providing for suspension otherwise than as a penalty. Therefore it
was not open to the Governor to suspend him in
the manner in which he did so in the present case,
though it was not denied that he could be suspended
pending criminal proceedings provided the suspension was as a penalty under r. 49 of the Appeal Rules;
on the other hand mere suspension pending a criminal
case not inflicted as a penalty was not provided
at all by the Rules or the statute governing the appellant immediately before January 26, 1950. Therefore when the Governor proceeded to suspend him
under r. 7{3) of the Discipline Rules, he violated
the guarantee contained in Art. 314. The appellant
also contends that as it was not open to any authority
to suspend him except as a punishment immediately
before January 26, 1950, r.7 of the Discipline Rules
438
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
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which provides for suspension during disciplinary
proceedings or during the pendency of a criminal
R. P. Kapur charge insofar as it applies to him was ultra vires
v.
Art. 314 of the Constitution. He also attacked rr.3
Union of India and l O of the Discipline Rules as violative of Art.
and Anr.
314 of the Constitution, r.3 being concerned with
penalties to be imposed on members of the Indian
Wanchoo J. Administrative Service and r.10 with the right of
appeal. The contention in this connection was that
r.3 omitte? the penalty of suspension ~hich was to
be found m r.49 of the Appeal Rules with the result J
that suspension under r.7 was not open to appeal
under r.10 which provided for appeals against penaltie2 mentioned in r.3. Therefore the guarantee
under Art.314 was violated inasmuch as previously
whenever the penalty of suspension was inflicted
on a member of the Secretary of State's Services
it was open to him to appeal under r.56 of the Appeal
Rules. Therefore the scheme of the Discipline Rules
was such as to take away the protection to a member
of the Secretary of State's Service which was available to him· immediately before the Constitution
came into force and in consequence rr.3 and 10 also
violated the guarantee contained in Art. 314 and were
ultra vires. The appellant therefore prayed for an
;
appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature ~
of mandamus striking down rr.3,7 and IO of the Discipline Rules being violative of Art. 314 of the Constitution and also for an order striking down the order
of the Governor dated July 18, 1959, by which he ./I r
suspended the appellant and such other appropriate
relief as was just and proper.
1969
The petition was opposed by the State of Punjab
and its main contention was that rr. 3,7 and 10 of
the Discipline Rules were perfectly valid and did not
violate the guarantee contained in Art.314. It was
urged that Art. 314 only gave restricted protection to
the members of what were formerly the Secretary of
State's Services in respect of disciplinary matters and .....
stress was laid on the words "or rights as similar ,
thereto as changed circumstances may permit" appear-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1963
ing therein. It was also urged that suspension pending
departmental en9uiry or pending a criminal case was
not the same thing as suspension by way of punish- R.P. Kapur
v.
ment and that previous to January 26, 1950, there
could be suspension pending departmental enquiry or Union of India
and Anr.
pending a criminal case and that no appeal lay from
such suspension even then. It was also urged that suspension pending a departmental enquiry or pending WanchooJ.
a cirminal case was not a disciplinary matter at all
and was therefore not included within the sweep of
Art. 314 and in any case the rule relating to suspension even if it is connected with disciplinary matters
was liable to variation as changed circumstances might
demand and r.7 was framed in view of the changeed circumstances. It was also urged that removal
of suspension as a penalty under r. 3 could not affect
the guarantee contained in Art. 314, for the effect
of such removal was that there could be in future
no penalty of suspension against a member of the
Indian Administrative Service. Therefore as the penalty had gone r. 10 did not naturally provide for an
appeal against a penalty which did not exist. Rule
7 which provides for suspension does not provide
for any penalty and therefore there was no necessity
of providing for any appeal against it. It was urged
that a difference must be made between suspension
as a penalty and suspension as an interim measure
only pending a departmental enquiry or pending
a criminal case and if that difference was borne in
mind there was no reason for holding that rr.3 and
IO were ultra vires Art. 314. The respondent State
finally contended that the order of the Governor passed under r. 7(3) was perfectly valid and did not violate
the guarantee contained in Art. 314.
The High Court dismissed the petition. It was
of the view that it was inconceivable that under the
old rules prevailing before January 26, 1950, a civil
servant could never be suspended while an enquiry
into his conduct was pending. It was further of the
view that suspension during the pendency of an enquiry was a power inherent in an employer like the
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Government and the power to suspend was always
implied in the authority making the appointment. The
R. P. Kapur High Court
therefore rejected the contention
v.
of the appellant that under the old rules
Union of India no member of the Secretary of State's Services could
and Anr.
have been suspended except by way of punishment.
The High Court further held that even if the contenWanchoo 1· tion of the appellant be accepted that a member of
the Secretary of State's Services had a right of appeal
even where he was suspended during a departmental
enquiry there was a provision in the Discipline Rules
for a memorial to the President (see r.20J and that
in the opinion of the High Court gave a right as
similar to the right existing before January 26, 1950,
as the changed circumstances permitted. The High
Court therefore dismissed the petition. The appellant
then applied for a certificate which was granted;
and that is how the matter has come up before us.
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1963
The only question that has been debated before
us is with respect to suspension whether as a punishment or otherwise of a member of one of the Secretary
of State's Services, in this case the Indian Civil Service, members of which have become members of
the Indian Administrative Service under the Recruitment Rules; and it is only this question that falls
to be determined in the present appeal. But the
appellant has also challenged rr .3 and 10 of the Discipline Rules which do not deal with suspension
at all. In these circumstances we do not propose
to consider the vires of rr. 3 and I 0, for that does
not fall for decision as the order which is challenged
has not been made under r. 3 and relates only to
suspension. It is therefore unnecessary to decide
whether rr. 3 and 10 can in the changed circumstances apply to those members of the Indian Administrative Service who were at one time members of the
Indian Civil Service. We shall therefore express
no view one way or the other on the vires of r. 3 and
r. 10 and consider only r. 7 which deals with suspension. We should also like to make it clear that
what we say during the course of this judgmemt
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
441
1963
with respect to suspenion refers only to those members of the Indian Administrative Service who became
members thereof under r. 3 (a) and (b) of the Re- R.P. Kapur
V.
cruitment Rules and not to other members of the
Union
of India
Indian Administrative Service who were not members
and Anr.
before 1947 of the Indian Civil Service, for it is only
the former kind of members of the Indian Administrative Service who are entitled to the protec- WanchooJ.
tion of Art. 314 and the whole case of the appellant
is based on that protection.
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Let us therefore tum to Art. 314 which we have
already set out above. This Article came to be
considered by this Court in the Accountant General
Bihar v. N. Bakshi(ll. In that case, however, that part
of it was considered which related to "conditions of
service as respects remuneration, leave and pension",
and it was held that r. 3 of the All India Services (Overseas Pay, passage and leave salary) Rules, 1957, was
ultra vires having regard to the guarantee contained
in Art. 314 of the Constitution. That case
is an authority for the proposition that where
any rule is framed, which is inconsistent with the
guarantee contained in Art. 314 with respect to remuneration, leave and pension, that rule would be
bad. In the present case we are concerned with another part of Art. 314, namely, "the same rights as
respects disciplinary matters or rights as similar
thereto as changed circumstances may permit as
that person was entitled to immediately before such
commencement". The same principle will apply to
this part of Art. 314 also and if any rule is framed
which goes against the guarantee contained in this
part of Art. 314 with respect to members of what
were former Secretary of State's Services, it will be bad.
What Art. 314 provides with respect to disciplinary
matters is that the members of the former Secretary
of State s Services who continue to serve under the
Government of India or of a State would be entitled
to the same rights as respects disciplinary matters
or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances
(1) [1962] Supp. I. S.C.R. 505.
442
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
may permit. Stress has been laid on behalf of the
respondent on the words "rights as similar thereto
R. P. Kapur as changed circumstances may permit", and it is
. v.
. urged that in view of these words it was open in the
Union °1 India "changed circumstances" to frame rules in partiand Anr ·
cular with respect to suspension pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings.
Wanchoo J. These words in our opinion cannot bear this interpretation. What the words "changed circumstances"
mean is the change in circumstances due to transfer of power in August, 1947, and the coming into
force of the Constitution in January, 1950, and no
more. Therefore when Art. 314 speaks of "rights
as similar thereto as changed circumstances may
permit", it only means that a member of the former
Secretary of State's Services would have rights similar
to his pre-existing rights as the changed circumstances
resulting from constitutional changes may allow.
As an illustration take a case where a member of a
Secretary of State's Service could before August,
1947, be dismissed only by the Secretary of State;
but after the transfer of power and the coming into
force of the Constitution, circumstances have changed
and there is no Secretary of State, therefore
we have to look to the changed circumstances and find out which would be the authority to dismiss such a member in the changed circumstances.
If we do so, we find that the Government of India
can be the only authority which now in the changed
circumstances will have the power to dismiss such
a member in the absence of a specific provision
of law in force before January 26, 1950. These words
do not mean that as time passes circumstances change
and therefore new rules may be framed to meet the
new circumstances due to passage of time. The
words "changed circumstances" in Art. 314 only
refer to the constitutional changes which occurred
after the transfer of power in August, 1947, and the
coming into force of the Constitution in January
1950. Further, Art. 314 provides that the protection
is limited only to those rights as to disciplinary matters which a member of the former Secretary of State's
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
443
Services was entitled to immediately before the commencement of the Constitution i.e. on January 25,
1950. It is only those rights which are protected
and no more.
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Another ar~ent that is urged on behalf of
the respondent is that suspension pending a departmental enquiry or pending a criminal proceeding
cannot be said to be a disciplinary matter at all and
therefore the protection of Art. 314 does not extend
to such suspension. We cannot accept this argument. The words "disciplinary matters" with which
we are concerned appear m a constitutional provision
and must be given their widest meaning consistent
with what disciplinary matters may reasonably include. Suspension is of two kinds, namely, as a
punishment, or as an interim measure pending a
departmental enquiry or pending a criminal proceeding.
We shall deal with these aspect's of suspension in
detail later. So far as suspension as a punishment
is concerned, it is conceded that it is a disciplinary
matter. The dispute is only as to suspension pending
a departmental enquiry or pending a criminal
proceeding. There can in our opinion be no doubt
that suspension of this kind also must be comprised
within the wordi "disciplinary matters" as used
in Art. 314. Take the case of suspension pending
a departmental enquiry. The purpose of such suspension is generally to facilitate a departmental
enquiry and to ensure that while such enquiry is
going on-it may relate to serious lapses on the part
of a public servant-, he is not in a position to misuse
his authority in the same way in which he might
have been charged to have done so in the enquiry.
In such a case suspension pending a departmental enquiry cannot be but a matter intimately related to
disciplinary matters. Take again the case where
suspension is pending criminal proceedings. The usual
ground for suspension pending a criminal proceeding
is that the charge is connected with his position Iii
a government servant or is likely to embarass him in
the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude.
1963
R. P. Kapur
V.
Union of India
and Anr.
Wanchoo J.
444
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
In such a case a public servant may be suspended
pending investigation, enquir)' or trial relating to
R. P. Kapur a criminal charge. Such suspension also in our opinion
. is clearly related to disciplinary matters.
If the
. v.
Union °1 India trial of the criminal charge results in conviction,
and Anr.
disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against
the public servant so convicted. Even in case of acquittal
Wanchoo 1 · proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other
than honourable. The usual practice is that where
a public servant is being tried on a criminal charge,
the Government postpones holding a departmental
enquiry and awaits the result of the criminal trial
and departmental proceedings follow on the result
of the criminal trial. Therefore, suspension during
investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal
charge is also in our opinion intimately related to
disciplinary matters. We cannot therefore accept the
argument on behalf of the respondent that suspension pending a departmental enquiry or pending
investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal
charge is not a disciplinary matter within the meaning
of those words in Art. 314.
Before we investigate what rights a member
of the former Secretary of State's Services had with
respect to suspension, whether as a punishment
or pending a departmental enquiry or pending criminal
proceedings, we must consider what rights the Government has in the matter of suspension of one kind
or the other. The general law on the subject of
suspension has been laid down by this Court in two
cases, namely, The Management of Hotel Imperial
New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union< 1 >, and T. Cajee
v. U. Jormanik Siem< 2 ). These two cases lay down that
it is well settled that under the ordinary law of master
and servant the power to suspend the servant without
pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary
contract of service between the master and the servant
but must arise either from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such
contract. It was further held that an order
1963
(1) [1960] I. S.C.R. 476.
(2) [1961] I. S.C.R. 750.
.I
5 S.C.R.
"
•
.,
....
~
•
'
445
1963
of interim suspension could be passed against an
employee while inquiry was pending into his conduct
even though there was no specific provision to that R. P. Kapur
effect in his terms of appointment or in the rules.
v.
But in such a case he would be entitled to his remune- Union of India
ration for the period of his interim suspension if
and Anr.
there is no statute or rule existing under which it could
Wanchool.
be withheld.
~
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The general principle therefore is that an employer
can suspend an employee pending an enquiry into
his conduct and the only question that can arise
on such suspension will relate to the payment during
the period of such suspension. If there is no express
term in the contract relating to suspension and payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory
provision in any law or rule, the employee is entitled
to his full remuneration for the period of his interim
suspension; on the other hand if there is a term in
this respect in the contract or there is a provision in
the statute or the rules framed thereunder providing
for the scale of payment during suspension, the payment
would be in accordance therewith. These general
principles in our opinion apply with equal force in
a case where the government is the employer and
a public servant is the employee with this modification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of government, the employer in the case of
government, must be held to be the authority which
has the power to appoint a public servant. On
general principles therefore the authority entitled
to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his
conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may
eventually result in a departmental enquiry against
him. This general principle is illustrated by the provision in s. 16 of the General Clauses Act, No. X
of 1897, which lays down that where any Central
Act or ~egulation gives power of appointment that mcludes the power to suspend or dismiss
unless a different intention appears. Though this
provision does not directly apply in the present case,
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
it is in consonance with the general law of master
and servant. But what amount should be paid to
R. P. Kapur the public servant during such suspension will depend
v.
. upon the provisions of the statute or rule in that
Union of India connection.
If there is such a provision the
and Anr.
payment during suspension will be m accordance
therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public
Wanchoo 1 · servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during
the period of suspension. This suspension must be
distinguished from suspension as a punishment which
is a different matter altogether depending upon the rules
in that behalf. On general principles therefore the government, like any other employer, would have a right to
suspend a public servant in one of two ways. It may
suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may Je
called interim suspension. Or the Government m iy
proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and af1er
his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment
if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a
penalty. These general principles will apply to 111
public servants but they will naturally be subject to
the provisions of Art. 314 and this brings us to an investigation of what was the right of a member of t lie
former Secretary of State's Services in the matter of
suspension, whether as a penalty or otherwise.
1963
As Art. 314 only guarantees protection to thc,se
rights which were in existence immediately before 1he
Constitution came into force, all that is necessary is
to find out the position before August 14, 1947, when
the transfer of power took place and on January '.~5,
1950, just before the Constitution came into for :e.
Members of the Secretary of State's Services who i 're
protected under Art. 314 were appointed either by lhe
Secretary of State or by the Secretary of State in Couni :il.
Therefore on general principles it would have b( en
open to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of St tte
in Council, as the case may be, to suspend a member of
such Services as the appointing authority as an inteiim
measure pending a departmental enquiry or pend ng
a criminal proceeding if it thought fit to do so. What
.
'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
~~~·
-
1963
remuneration such a public servant would get during
such interim suspension would depend upon the rules
if any, and if there were no rules he would be entitled R. P. Kapur
v.
to his full emoluments during such interim suspension.
Union. of India ·
But it appears that as the Secretary of State or the Secreand Anr.
tary of State in Council was in London it was thought
proper for the sake of administrative convenience to
provide for suspension by authorities other than the Wanchoo J.
appointing authority. Reference in this connection may
be made to s. 247 (2) of the · Government of India Act.
1935, as in force .upto August 13, 1947. That subsection provided that "any order suspending any such
person (meaning thereby a member of the former Secretary of State's Services) from office shall, if he is serving
in connection with the affairs of the Federation, be made
by the Governor-General exercising his individual judg~
ment and, if he is serving in connection with the affairs.
of a Province, be made by the Governor exercising
his individual judgment". This sub-section therefore
made a specific provision for suspension by authorities
other than the appointing authority; this was in addition
to the general right of the employer (namely, the Secretary
of State who was the app01nting authority) to suspend
an employee (namely, a member of one of the former
Secretary of State's Services). Suspension in s. 247 (2)
cannot in our opinion be confined only to suspension·.
as a penalty. .The words are general and must be given
their full meaning and would include any kind of suspension, whether as a penalty or otherwise; and this .
power vested firstly in the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of State in Council, as the case may be, under
the general law of master and servant and also in the
Governor-General and the Governor, as the case may
be, by virtue of this provision of the statute.
Further s. 247 (3) also provided for remuneration
of a suspended member of one of the former Secretary
· of State's Services and laid down that "if any such
person .as aforesaid is suspended from office, his remuneration shall not during the period of his suspension
be reduced except to such extent, if any, as may be
directed by the Governor-General exercising his in-
,-
448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
'
divid~aljudgment or, as the-case may be, by the Governor exercising his individual judgment". Besides this
R. P. ,Kapur statutory provision relating to former Secretary of State's
u. _ v>f. l d-.0 Services, there was a general provision as to payment
nzon ° n ' to a government servant under suspension in Fundaand Anr.
mental Rule 53. That general provision is that a susWanchoo J~ - pended government servant is at least entitled to onefourth of his pay. This general provision was subject
to s. 247 (3) and in the case of members of the former
Secretary of State's Services, the Governor-General
or the Governor as the case may be, had to specify
the amount which could be even more than what was
provided by F.R. 53. Here again when F.R. 53 speaks
of suspension, it speaks of it in general terms. It applies
to all kinds of suspension whether. as a penalty or otherwise.
_ · -Further r. 49 of the Appeal Rules deals with penalties
and provides suspension as a penalty:- It also provides
for appeals in r. 56 etc. where suspension is inflicted
as a penalty for good and sufficient reasons. Rule 49
applied to the former Secretary of State's Services also
and thus these members were subject to the penalty
of suspension.
·
1963
A review therefore of the general law of master
and servant,_the provisions of the Government of India
Act, 1935, of the Appeal Rules and the Fundamental
Rules discloses that the position on August 13, 1947
with respect to members of the former Secretary of
- State's Services with respect to suspension whether
as a punishment or otherwise was as follows. Members
of the former Secretary of State's Services were liable
to suspension either as an interim measure or as a punishment. Where suspension was as an -interim measure
and not as ·a punishment, it could be imposed either
by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State in
Council as the appointing authority or by the Governor- --· General or the Governor as the case may be as the statutory authority. Suspension _could also be imposed
by the proper authority as a punishment under the Appeal Rules and such orders of suspension were subject
•to appeals as provided by the Appeal Rules. There
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
449
1963
was also provision for payment during suspension
in the shape of subsistence allowance which was governed
generally by F.R. 53 and in the case of members of R. P. Kapur
v.
the former Secretary of State's Services, F.R. 53 was
Union
of India
subject to s. 247 (3) of the Government of India Act,
and
Anr.
1935. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that there
could be no suspension except by way of punishment
under r. 49 of the Appeal Rules before1947isnotcor- Wanchoo J.
rect. It is equally clear that where suspension before 1947
was an interim measure and not as a punishment under
r. 49, there was no question of any appeal from such
an interim suspension pending a departmental enquiry
or pending a criminal proceeding. If the position
on January 25, 1950, stood as it was on August 13,
1947, the appellant could not susbstantially challenge
the order of the Governor passed on July 18, 1959,
for it would have been covered bys. 247 (3) of the Gov\
•
ernment of India Act, 1935, and the appellant could
) . not claim anything more under Art. 314 of the Constitution.
~ · But Art. 314 does not speak of the protection
which members of the All India Services had on August
13, 1947; it speaks of protection which they had immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
i.e. on January·25, 1950, and that brings us to a consideration of the changes that took place between 1947
and 1950 after the transfer of power on August 15,
1947 .
.
The effect of the transfer of power on the Secretary of
State'sServices in particular came up for consideration before this Court in State of Jvladrasv. K.M. Rajagopalan( 1 >
and it ~as held that "the conferral of Independence
on India brought about an automatic and legal termi~
nation of service on the date of Independence. But
all persons previously holding civil posts in India are
deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue
in service, except those governed by 'general or special
orders or arrangements' affecting their respective cases.
The guarantee about prior conditions of service and
the previous statutory safeguards relating to disciplinary
(!). [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541.
I SCl/64-29
l
~.
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964] ,
action continue to apply to those who are thus deemed
to continue in service but not to others". Section
R. P. Kapur 10 of the Indian Independence Act provides for the
v.
Secretary of State's Services and lays down that every
Union of India person who having b~en appointed by the Secretary
and Anr.
of State, or Secretary· of State in Council, to a civil
service of the Crown in India continues on and after
Wanchoo l. the appointed . day to serve under the Government
of either of · the new Dominions or of any
Province or part thereof, shall be entitled to receive
the same conditions of service as respects remuneration,
leave and pension and the· same rights· as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects
the tenure of his office, or rights as similar thereto as
changed circumstances may permit as that person was
entitled to. immediately before the appointed day, i.e.
August 15, 1947. • By virtue of this provision those
members of the Secretary of State's Services who continued to serve the Government of India or the Government of any Province from August 15, 1947, were
entitled to the protection of s. IO. What Rajagopalan's
case(ll decided was that the Government of India was
not bound to continue in service every member of the
Secretary of State's Services because of s. 10 of the Indian
Independence Act; but that the protection of that
section only applied to such members of the afore-said
services whose services the Government of India agreed
to continue after August 14, 1947. · In Rajagopalan's
case(ll the Government of. India did not agree to
continue Rajagopalan's services and thereforti he could
not claim the protection ofs. IO of the Indian Independence Act. . In the appellant's case his service continued
after the transfer of power and therefore he was entitled
to . the protection of s. IO of the Indian Independence
t\ct, which was almost in similar terms as Art. 314
of the Constitution so far as disciplinary matters were
concerned.·
· ··
On August 14, 1947, however, the India (Provisional
Constitution) Order, 1947, was.promulgated as G.G.0.14.
By that Order, s,, 247 of the Government of India was
substituted by a new section and sub-ss. (2) and (3)
,,,
4
-·.,..
1963
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541.
"'""·
.j· ·.·-·
,I
'
/~·
.~
.
,., .
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
451
1963
thereof to which we have already referred were repealed.
The substituted s. 247 read as under:R.P. Kapur
"Conditions of service of persons origi'}qlly rev.
cruited by Secretary of State-The cond1tlons of Union of India
service of all persons who, having been appointed
and Anr.
by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State
in Council to a civil service of the Crown in India, wanchoo J.
continue on and after the date of the establishment
of the Dominion to serve under the Government
of the Dominion or of any Province, shall(a) as respects persons serving in connection with
the affairs of the Dominion, be such as may
be prescribed by rules made by the GovernorGeneral;
(b) as respects persons serving in connection with
the affairs of a Province(iJ in regard to their pay, leave, pensions,
general rights as medical attendance and
any other matter which immediately before the establishment of the Dominion
was regulated by rules made by the Secretary of State, be such as may be prescribed
by rules made by the Governor-General;
and
(ii) in regard to any other matter, be such
as may be prescribed by rules made by
the Governor of Province."
It will be clear from this that sub-ss. (2) and (3)
of s. 247 disappeared on August 14, 1947. No rules
framed by the Governor-General under the new section
with respect to what we have called interim suspension
have been brought to our notice. Therefore no power
was left in the Governor-General or the Governor, as
the cast: may be, to suspend a member of the former
Secretary of State's Services as an interim measure and
only the appointing authority could suspend such a
public servant, which in the changed circumstances
would be the Government of India.. The explanation
for this may be that as the Secretary of State disappeared
and his place was taken by the Government of India,
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
it might not have been thought necessary to continue
-.- . the further powers conferred by s. 247 (2) in addition
. R.P. Kapur to the general power of the appointing authority to
. • Y• . . suspend. Be that as it may, the fact remains that on
.Umon of India August 14, 1947, s. 247 (2) disappeared and therefore
and Anr.
the Governor-General and the Governor Jost the power
to suspend as an interim measure a member of the former
Wanchoo J. Secretary of State's Services and such power could
only be exercised by the appointing authority which
in the changed circumstances must be deemed to be the
Government of India. As for suspension as a punishment that continued to be provided in the Appeal Rul<:s
and no change was made therein.
It has however been urged that as the conferral
of Independence on India brought about an automatic
and legal termination of service on the date of Independence, there must in law have been reappointment
of all members of the former Secretary of State's Services.
This reappointment in case of those serving in connection
with the affairs of a Province must be deemed to have
been made by the Governor of the Province concerned
and consequently the Governor will have the power to
suspend as the appointing authority. We are of opinion
that there is no force in this argument. The antecedent
circumstances with respect to such Services have been
fully dealt with in Rajagopalan's case'- 1 > and those circumstances show that the question of the retention of officers serving in these Services was dealt with between the
Government of India and His Majesty's Government
and it was the Government of India which decided
that all such officers should continue except those whom
the Government of India was not prepared to invite
to continue and in the case of this limited class the
Government of India agreed to compensation. It was in
consequence of this agreement between the Government
of India and His Majesty's Government that s. 10 of
the Independence Act provided that those officers
who continued would have the same conditions of service etc. as they were entitled to immediately before
August 14, 1947. The Governors of Provinces were
nowhere in the picture in this matter and we can see
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541.
\
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
1963
no warrant for holding that the appointment must
be deemed to be by the Governors of Provinces where
such officers were serving in connection with the affairs R.P. Kapur
v.
of a Province.
Union of India
and Anr.
•
It is true that the Indian Administrative Service
as an all-India Service was legally and formally Wanchoo J.
It is also true that under
constituted in 1951.
s. 10 of the Indian Independence Act members of
the former Secretary of State's Services continued
on and after August 14, 1947, to serve under the
Government of either of the new Dominions or
of any Province or part thereof. It is also true that
there are some passages in the correspondence between
His Majesty's Government and the Government of
India which suggest that His Majesty's Government
was thinking on the lines that members of the former
Secretary of State's Services will become members
of the Provincial Services. These however are not
conclusive of the matter and we have to find out what
actually took place after this exchange of correspondence
between the Government of India and His Majesty's
Government in connection with the former Secretary
of State's Services. We have already indicated that
s. 10 was incorporated in the Indian Independence
Act in consequence of this correspondence between the
Government of India and His Majesty's Government..
Thereafter we find that the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 (i.e. G.G.O. 14) was passed on
August 14, 1947, under powers conferred on the GovemorGeneral by virtue of s. 9 (l) (a) of the Indian Independence Act. Article 7 (I) of that Order is in these terms:
"(I) Subject to any general or special orders
or arrangements affecting his case, any person
who immediately before the appointed day is
holding any civil post under the Crown in connection
with the affairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of ·a Province other
than Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day,
be deemed to have been duly appointed to the
corresponding post under the Crownin connec-
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
tion with the affairs of the Dominion of India
or, as the case may be, of the Province."
R. P. Kapur Reading this provision along with the provision in
U. . vef d" s. 10 of the Indian Independence Act, it would in our
mon; 1n ia opinion be right to say that so far as the members of
.an Anr.
the former Secretary of State's Services are concerned
Wanchoo J. they must be deemed to have been appointed to the posts
on which they were serving at the time of conferral of
Independence, by the Government of India. The deemed
appointment under Art. 7 (I) ofG.G.O. 14 was "subject
to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting
his case'', and these arrangements are clear from the
correspondence which ensued between the Government
of India and His Majesty's Government. That cor··
respondence and the special orders or arrangements
contemplated by Art. 7 (1) of G.G.O. 14 show that
so far as the members of the former Secretary of State's
Services were concerned, it was the Government of India
which took the final decision whether to continue such
officers or not. It is true that in so doing it consulted
the various Provincial Governments and was to a
large extent guided by the views of the Provincial
Governments, particularly in connection with such officers who were serving in connection with the affairs of
the Provinces; even so, as the facts in Rajagopalan's
casel 1 l show, the final decision whether to continue or
not a member of the former Secretary of State's Services
was taken by the Government of India. In these cir··
cumstances it would in our opinion be reasonable to
hold that in the case of the members of the former
Secretary of State's Services it was the Government of
India which must be deemed to have appointed them afteir
the conferral of Independence on India to the respectivt:
posts which they were holding whether under the Government of India or under the Governments of Provinces.
This conclusion is reinfored .by the fact that the system
in force before 1947 was that all members of the Secretary
of State's Services were assigned to one Province or
other and from them such members as were necessarv
used to be on deputation to the Government of Indfa
for serving it directly. It would be very anomalous
1963
(1) {1955) 2 S.C.R. 541.
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
455
lf)63
indeed that the accident whether an officer was serving
on August 13, 1947, on deputation under the Government
of India directly or in the Province to which he· was R.P.Kapur
v.
assigned should determine who the appointing authority
must be deemed to be on the date of the transfer of Un ion of India
power. Such an anomaly could in our opinion never . and Anr.
have been intended and we have no doubt therefore
in view of the history dealt with in Rajagopalan's Wan.cfzoo J.
case<l J that on the conferral of Independence, even if
there was legal termination of the services of members
of the former Secretary of State's Services, the reappointment must be deemed to be by the Government of India
and not by the Governors of Provinces even in the · case
of officers who were serving in connection wi~h the
affairs of Provinces.
In this connection our attention has been drawn
to s. 241 (1) of the Government of India Act 1935 as
it then stood, which is in these terms:"(l )-Except as expressly provided by this Act,
appointments to the civil services of, and civil
posts under, the Crown in India, shall be made(a) in the case of services of the Dominion, and
posts in connection with the affairs of the
Dominion, by the Governor-General or such
person as he may direct;
(b) in the case of services· of a Province, and posts
in connection with the affairs of a Province,
by the Governor or such person as he may
direct."
This provision in our · opinion does not apply .in
the peculiar circumstances arising out of the transfer
of power in August 1947. It is a general provision
relating to appointments to civil services and civil posts
under the Dominion or under the Provinces. It has
in our opinion nothing to do with the case of members
of the civil services and holders of civil posts who were
deemedtohavecontinuedbyvirtueofArt. 7ofG.G.0.14
of August 14, 1947. Clause (b).of s. 241 (1) therefore
cannot in our opinion lead to the inference that in the
case of those members of the former Secretary of State's
(1) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 541.
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Services who were deemed to have been appointed
in connection with the affairs of a Province under Art.
R.P. Kapur 7 (1) of G.G.0. 14, the appointments must be deemed
. v.
. to have been made by the Governor. Such deemed
Union of India appointments in our opinion must depend for their
and Anr.
validity on Art. 7 of G.G.0.14 and not on s. 241 of the
Government of India Act which is not a deeming provi.Wanchoo J. sion and therefore we have to look to Art. 7 (1) to find
out by whom the appointments must be deemed to
have been made in the case of the members of the former
Secretary of State's Services. As Art. 7 opens with
the words "subject to any general or special orders
or arrangements affecting his case" (i.e. each individual
officer's case), it must be held in view of the history
which is elaborately set out in Rajagopalan's casel 1 > that
so far as members of the former Secretary of State's
Services were concerned, it was the Government of
India who must be deemed to have made the appointments in view of the special orders and arrangements
with respect to such officers.
Reliance in this connection was also placed on the
amendment of s. 240 (2) of the Government of India
Act by the same G.G.O. Section 240 (2) as it originally
stood provided that "no such person as aforesaid (meaning
thereby a member of a civil service of the Crown in
India or a person holding any civil post under the Crown
in India) shall be dismissed from the service of His
Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which
he was appointed". Amendment of this sub-section
became necessary as the Seci;etary of State for India
was disappearing and some authority had to be provided
which could dismiss members of the former Secretary
of State's Services. G.G.0; 14 therefore provided that
no member of a Secretary of State's Services who continued in service after August 14, 1947, shall be dismissed
by any authority subordinate to the Governor-General
or the Governor according as that person was serving
in connection with the affairs of the Dominion or of
a Province. This amendment gave power to the Governor
to dismiss even members of the former Secretary of
State's Services and stress has been laid on behalf of
1963
(!) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541.
5 S.C.R.
t
-
J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
1963
the respondent on this amendment and it is urged that
this shows that appointments of such members who were
serving in connection with the affairs of the Provinces R.P. Kapur
v.
must be deemed to have been made by the Governor
Union
of India
concerned. It appears however that the amendment
and
Anr.
by which the Governor could dismiss a member of the
former Secretary of State's Services may have crept
in by inadvertence, for it would prima f acie be against Wanchoo J.
the provisions of the guarantee contained in s.10 of the
Indian Independence Act. In any case this sub-section was
further amended by G.G.O. 34 and the power of dismissal was only vested in the Governor-General and
was taken away from the Governor. We are therefore
of opinion that no inference can be drawn from the fact
that for a short times. 240 (2) provided that the Governor
may dismiss a member of the former Secretary of State's
Services, that the appointments of such members who
were serving in connection with the affairs of the Province was by the Governor, and not by the Government
oflndia. Such an inference is in our opinion against
the conclusion which can be plainly drawn from the
history relating to the continuance and appointment
of the members of the former Secretary of State's
Services at the time of conferral of Independence and
the provisions of Art. 7 (1) of G.G.O. 14 of August
14, 1947.
The final position therefore on January 25, 1950,
with respect to suspension of a member of the
former Secretary of State's Services whether as a punishment. or as an i~.terim m~a~ure pending departmental
enqmry or pendmg a cnmmal proceeding was this.
Such member c?u~d be sus~ended _under the general
l~w by the appomtmg authonty, which in the changed
~ircu_mstances was th<: Government of India, as an
mter~m mea~u~e pendmg a departmental enquiry or
pendmg a crurunal p_roceeding, but there was no power
m any .other authonty to pass such an order of interim
suspension, for as we have already indicated the power
under s. 247 (2) was z:epealed by G:G.0_.14 of August
14, 19~7. Besides this. power of mtenm suspension
otherwise than as a purushment, the power to suspend
458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1963
as punishment continued under r. 49 of the Appeal
Rules and an order of suspension made in exercise of
R.P. Kapur that power was subject to appeal under r. 56 etc., therev.
of. So far as payment during the period of .interim
Union of India suspension or during the period of suspension as a
and Anr.
penalty is concerned, s. 247 (3) had disappeared and
therefore the general provision contained in ER. 53
Wanchoo J.
applied. That general provision has made some distinction between the members of the Indian Civil
Service and others; but that is a matter of detail, in
which it is unnecessary to go. So the position immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was
that members of the former Secretary of State's Services
could be suspended either as an interim measure pending
departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceeding
or as a punishment. Where suspension was as an interim measure and not as a punishment such suspension
could only be by the appointing authority, which in the
changed circumstances should be deemed to be the
Government of India. Such interim suspension was
not subject to any appeal. So far as suspension
as a punishment was concerned, r. 49 of the Appeal
Rules applied and the authorities specified in these
Rules could pass an order of suspension as a punishment and that order would be subject to appeal provided
in r. 56 and other rules therein. As to the payment
during the period of suspension that was governed by
F.R. 53. It is this position which was protected by
Art. 314 of the Constitution so far as suspension of
members of the former Secretary of State's Services
was concerned whether as an interim measure or as
a punishment.
Then we come to the Discipline Rules 1955. Rule
3 of these Rules provides for penalties and omits suspension as a penalty. Now if suspension had remained
a penalty underr. 3 of the Discipline Rules, the appellant
would have been entitled to the same rights as respects
suspension as a punishment or rights as similar thereto
aschangedcircumstances would permit in view. of Art.
314. But r. 3 of the Discipline Rules has altogether done
away with the penalty of suspension for members of
)
f
-
1
5 S.C.R.
i
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
1963
the Indian Administrative Service, which includes the
members of the Indian Civil Service under r. 3 (a) and·
(b) of the Recruitment Rules. Further rules corres- KP. Kapur
v.
ponding to the Discipline Rules was repealed by r.
Union
of India
23 of the Discipline Rules; so after the Discipline Rules
and
Anr.
came into force in 1955 suspension could no longer be
inflicted as a penalty on a member of the Indian Administrative Service (including members of the Indian Civil Wanchoo J.
Service who became members of the Indian Administrative Service). It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider whether the order of July 18, 1959, can be justified
as a punishment and if so whether the memorial provided
by r. 20 of the Rules is a sufficient protection for the
purpose of Art. 314 which speaks of "rights as similar
thereto as changed circumstances may permit". Nor
is it the case of the respondent that the appellant was
suspended by way of punishment by the order of July
18, 1959. The respondent justifies the said order under
r. 7 (3) of the Discipline Rules and thus the case of the
respondent is that the appellant was suspended not
as a punishment but that the order of suspension was
passed by the Governor as an interim measure which
he could do either pending a departmental enquiry
or pending a criminal charge. The appellant has thus
been suspended by the order of July 18, 1959, not as
a punishment but as an interim measure pending a
criminal charge against him; and this is what practically
in terms the order says, for it places the appellant immediately under suspension because a criminal case
wa.s pending against him. But as we have already
pomted out the power to pass an order of interim suspension in the case of a member of the former Secretary
of State's Services on January 25, 1950, was only in
the appointing authority, (namely, the Government
of India). The pcwer to suspend a member of the
Indian Administrative Service which the appellant
became by virtue of r. 3 of the Recruitment Rules as
punishment has disappeared from r. 3 of the Discipline
Rules 1955. The appellant therefore could not be
suspended by the Governor as an interim measure and
such suspension could only be by the Government
of India. The proper procedure therefore in a case
460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
where the State Government wants a member of the
former Secretary of State's Services to be suspended
R.P. Kapur pending departmental enquiry or pending investiga. v.
. tion, inquiry or trial of a criminal charge against him
Union of India is to approach the Government of India and ask
and Anr ·
it as the appointing authority to suspend such officer
as an interim measure. It is not open to the GovernWanchoo J. ment of India by framing a rule like r. 7 of the Discipline Rules to take away the guarantee as to Disciplinary matters contained in Art. 314. We have already
said that the guarantee in the case of a member of the
former Secretary of State's Services is that in disciplinary matters his rights would be the same or as similar
thereto as changed circumstances would permit as they
were immediately before the commencement of the
constitution. The right in the matter of interim suspension as distinct from suspension as a punishment was
that a member of the former Secretary of State's Services could not be suspended by any authority other
than the Government of India. That was guaranteed by
art. 314 and could not be taken away by framing a rule ·
liker. 7 of the Discipline Rules. We have already
referred to Bakshi's casec 1 > in which it has been held
that the rights guaranteed by Art. 314 of the Constitution could not be destroyed or taken away by the
Central Government in exercise of its rule-making
power. In the present case the right guaranteed to
a member of the former Secretary of State's Services
with respect to interim suspension (as distinct from suspension as a punishment is that such a member cannot be so suspended except by the appointing authority
which in the changed circumstances is the Government of India. That right has in our opinion been
violated by r. 7 of the Discipline Rules insofar as it
permits any authority other than the Government
of India to suspend pending a departmental enquiry
or pending a criminal charge a public servant
who was a member of the former Secretary of State's
Services. Rule 7 therefore insofar as it permits this
violation of the guarantee contained in Art. 314 with
respect to interim suspension (other than suspension
1963
(l) [1962) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 505.
l
---;
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
1963
as a punishment) is to that extent ultra vires Art. 314
i.e. insofar ·as it applies to the members of the Indian
Administrative Service who fall within els. (a) and (b) R.P. Kapur
v.
of r. 3 of the Recruitment Rules. It follows therefore
that the order of the Governor dated July 18, 1959, Union of India
and Anr.
purporting to be passed under r. 7 (3) of the Discipline
Wanchoo _
Rules is without authority and must be set aside.
1
T_his brings us to the question of relief to be granted
to the appellant. It appears that on September 11,
1963, the Governor passed an order by which he reinstated the appellant for the period from July 18,
1959, to April 4, 1963, and granted him his full emoluments for that period. The writ petition in the present
case was filed in February 1962. So the appellant is
apparently not entitled to any further relief in the matter
of his emoluments besides what has been granted to
him by the Governor. The order of reinstatement
contained therein is unnecessary in view of our decision
and the order granting full emoluments may be taken
to be in pursuance of our judgment.
We therefore allow the appeal and declare r. 7
of the Discipline Rules insofar as it applies to members
of the Indian Administrative Service who are members
thereof by virtue of r. 3 (a) and (b) of the Recruitment Rules to be bad to the extent to which it permits
an authority other than the Government of India to suspend as an interim measure (and not as a punishment)
such members of the Services. In consequence we
set aside the order of the Governor dat<;d July 18,
1959. As however the order of September, 1963, has
granted all such monetary reliefs to the appellant as
we could grant him on setting aside the order of July
18, 1959, no further relief can be granted to the appellant. We order the respondent the State of Punjab
to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court as well
as in the High Court.
RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-I am of opinion that this Raghubar Daya.
appeal should be dismissed.
J.
The appellant, a member of the Indian Civil
Service, was serving under the Government of Madras
immediately before the 'appointed day', i.e. August 15,
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
\-.·~
1947, as laid down in sub-s. (2) of s. l of the Indian
Independence Act, 1947 (10 & 11 Geo. 6, Ch. 30) hereinR.P. Kapur after referred to as the Independence Act. He continued
v.
to serve under the Government of Madras on and
Union °1 India after the appointed day.
Subsequently, he was .transand Anr.
ferred to the State of Punjab where he was serving on
R h ;-D /uly 18, 1959, when he was suspended by the Governor
ag u ':; · aya of Punjab as a criminal case was pending against
·
him. The appellant was a member of the Indian Administrative Service in 1959 and the order of suspension
appears to have been made by the Governor in exercise
of the power conferred by r. 7 of the All India Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, hereinafter referred
to as the Discipline Rules. The appellant challenges
the validity of this order on the ground that this rule
violates the provisions of art. 314 of the Constitution.
His contention is that prior to August 15, 1947, a member
of the Indian Civil Service could be suspended by way
of punishment in view of r. 49 of the Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, hereinafter
referred to as the Classification Rules and that there
was no provision for his suspension otherwise than
as a penalty and that his suspension, as a disciplinary
measure, though permissible, would have been then
treated as suspension by way of penalty and' therefore
as subject to an apeal under r. 56 of the Classification
Rules. No appeal is provided under the Discipline
Rules against an order of suspension under r. 7 which
therefore violates art. 3l 4of the Constitution as, according
to that artide, he was entitled to receive from the Government the same rights as respects disciplinary matters
or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances,
permitted as he was entitled to immediately before
·the commencement of the Constitution. He further
contends that sub-s. (2) of s. 10 of the Independence
Act guaranteed to him the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or rights as similar thereto as changed
circumstances permitted, as he was entitled to immediately before the appointed day.
1963
It was further contended, during the course of the
submissions in Court, that though prior to the appoin-
~.
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
ted day an order of suspension during the pendency
1963
of a departmental enquiry or of a criminal charge could
have been made only by the Governor-General or the R.P. Kapur
Governor, such an order thereafter and till January
v.
26, 1950 could be made only by the Governor-General, Unian of Indi17
and that therefore such a suspension order subsequent
and Anr.
to the commencement of the Constitution could be R h b D Y 1
. G overnment and not by t he G overn- ag u ar a 17
Illade by t he Umon
1
ment of Punjab and that for this reason too, r. 7 of the
·
Discipline Rules empowering the State Government to
make an order of such suspension violates art. 314.
I
I
I
~
'
\
'
I need not discuss the various points on which I
agree with my learned brother Wanchoo, J. I agree that
the expression 'changed circumstances' in art. 314 only
refer to the constitutional changes which occurred after
the transfer of power in August, 1947, and the coming
into force of the Constitution in January, 1950, that suspension during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings
or of a criminal charge is related to disciplinary
· matters within the meaning of those words in art. 314,
that from the appointed day there was no express provision in the Government of India Act or in the rules
framed thereunder empowering the Governor-General
or the Governor to suspend, otherwise as penalty,
officers appointed by the Secretary of State for India
and that any order of suspension pending enquiry
against a person appointed by the Secretary of State on
a day immediately before the coming into force of the
".::onstitutioh had to be made by the Government in the
exercise of the general power of suspension which .an
employer has with respect to his employee, that this
general power an employer has to suspend an employee
pending an enquiry into his conduct vests in the appropriate authority where the Government is the employer
and a public servant is the employee and that such an
authority in the case of Government, in view of the
peculiar structure of the hierarchy of Government,
be taken to be the authority which has the power to
appoint the public servant concerned. I am however.
further of opinion that the appropriate authority in
-this connection can also include officers superior to
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the appointing authority and that in the case of members
of All India Services serving under any state includes
R.P. Kapur the Governor who, as the executive head of State, has
v.
administrative control cover all officers serving
Union of India under the State Government. It would be anomalous
and Anr.
to hold that the Governor could not suspend a person,
R h -;;-D
appointed by the Secretary of State, during the pen1
ag u ;' aya dency of departmental proceedings or a criminal charge
·
against him, though he could have imposed a penalty of
suspension on such a person in view of rr. 49 and 62
of the Classification Rules which were in force between
the appointed day and January 25, 1950,andcontinued
in force subsequently, up to the coming into force of
the Discipline rules. I, however, do not rest my decision
on this view as, in my view, the appellant is to be deemed
to have been appointed by the Governor of Madras,
on the appointed day, to the post corresponding to
the post he was holding immediately before the appointed day under the Madras Government.
1963
I now deal with the question of the authority whieh
should be taken to be the appointing authority for
persons who had been appointed by the Secretary of
State to the Civil Services or to any post under the Crown
and who continued to serve the Government after
the appointed day. To determine this question it is
necessary to consider the following matters: (1) Did
the Service known as the Indian Civil Service, whose
members were to be recruited by the Secretary of State
for India in view of s. 244 (I) of the Government of
India Act, cease to exist on and from the appointed
day and, if so, whether any other All India Service
took its place immediately after it haa ceased to exist?
(2) If it ceased to exist, were the services of the members
of the Indian Civil Service terminated immediately
before the appointed day? (3) Which members of the
Service continued in service of the Government on
or after the appointed day. (4) Whether those who so
continued did so on account of their becoming
servants of the new Government under the provisions
of any Act, or their continuance in service was on account
of their fresh appointment. (5) If it was due to fresh
I
-
.(
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
appointment, which authority appointed them and to
which post or service .
•
•
1963
R.P. Kapur
Before I deal with the above questions, I may set
v.
out the relevant provisions which have a bearing in Union of India
this connection. The Independence Act was enacted
and Anr.
by the British Parliament on July 18, 1947, for setting
up in India two independent Dominions and to provide Raghubar Dayal
for necessary consequential matters. By sub-s. ( l l
J.
of s. l, two independent Dominions known as India and
Pakistan were to be set up from August 15, 1947.. Subsection (2) of that section provided for their being referred to as the new Dominions and August 15, 1947,
being referred to as the appointed day. One of the
consequences of the setting up of the new Dominions
was stated in sub-s. (1) of s. 7 to be that His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom was to have no
responsibility as respects the government of any of
the territories which, immediately before the appointed
day, were included in British India. Section 9 empowered the Governor-General to make such provisions
by order as appeared to him to be necessary or expedient for certain purposes mentioned therein. Subsections (1) and (2) of s. 10 of the Act read:
"(!) The provisions of this Act keeping in force
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935,
shall not continue in force the provisions of that
Act relating to appointments to the civil services
of, and civil posts under, the Crown in India by
the Secretary of State, or the provisions of that
Act relating to the reservation of posts.
(2) Every person who-
(a) having been appointed by the Secretary of
State, or Secretary of State in Council
to a civil service of the Crown in India continue~
on and after the appointed day to serve under
the Government of either of the new Dominions
or of any Province or part thereof; or
(b) having been appointed by His Majesty before
the appointed day to be a judge of the Federal
1 SC!/64-30
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
Court or of any court which is a High
Court within the meaning of the GovernR.P. Kapur
ment of India Act, 1935, continues on
v.
and after the appointed day to serve as
Union of India
a judge in either of the new Dominions,
and Anr.
shall be entitled to receive from the Governments
of the Dominions and Provinces or parts
Raghubar Dayal
which he is from time to time serving or,
J.
as the case m11y be, which are served by the
courts in which he is from time to time a judge,
the same conditions of service as respects
remuneration, leave and pension, and the same
rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as
the case may be, as respects the tenure of
his office, or rights as similar thereto as changed
circumstances may permit, as that person was
•
entitled to immediately before the appointed .
day'?.
The Governor-General, in the exercise of the powers
conferred on him by s. 9 made the India (Provisional
Constitution) Order, 1947 (G.G.O. 14 of 1947), hereinafter called the Provisional Constitution Order. Article
7(1) of this Order is:
"Subject to any general or special orders or
arrangements affecting his case, any person who
immediately before the appointed day is holding
any civil post under the Crown in connection with
the affairs of the Governor-General or GovernorGeneral in Council or of a province other than
Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day, be
deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with
the affairs of the Dominion of India or, as
the case may be, of the Province."
Sub-section (1) of s. 241 of the Government
of India Act, as modified by this Order, reads:
"Except as expressly provided by this Act,
appointments to the civil services of, and civil
posts under, the Crown in India, shall be made(a) in the case of services of the Dominion,
I'
and posts in connection with the affairs of the
1963
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
1963
Dominion, by the Governor-General or such
person as he may direct;
.
.
f p .
d
R. P. Kapur
(b) m the case of services o a rovince, an posts
in connection with the affairs of a Province, Union India
by the Governor or such person as he may direct."
and Anr.
Section 247 of the Government of India Act as modified
Raghubar Dayal
reads:
"The conditions of service of all persons who,
J.
having been appointed by the Secretary of State
or the Secretary of State in Council to:a civil
service of the Crown in India, continue on and
after the date of the establishment of the Dominion
to serve under the Government of the Dominion
or of any Province shall,(a) as respects persons serving in connection
with the affairs of the Dominion be such as
may be prescribed by rules made by the GovernorGeneral;
(b) as respects persons serving in connection
with the affairs of a Province(i) in regard to their pay, leave, pensions, general
rights as to medical attendance and any other
matter which immediately before the establishment of the Dominion was regulated by rules
made by the Secretary of State, be such as may
be prescribed by rules made by the GovernorGeneral; and
(ii) in regard to any other matter be such as
may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor
of the Province."
Sections 244 to 246 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, which dealt with Services recruited by the
Secretary of State was omitted from the Act by this
Order.
Reference may also be made to the announcement
by His Excellency the Viceroy on April 30, 1947.
It purported to relate to grant of compensation for
premature termination of their service in India to
members of the Civil Services appointed by the Secre-
:i
'
•
468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
1963
tary of State and to regular officers and British Warrant Officers of the Indian Naval and Military Forces.
R. P. Kapur Its first 7 paragraphs are set out at pp. 548 to 550
. v.
. in State of Madras v. K.M. Rajagopalan(l l. Its para
Union of India 8 stated inter alia:
. and Anr.
"In pursuance of their wish to give all possible
help
to the Government of India in building up
Raghubar Dayal
the
new services, His Majesty's Government
J.
agree that their obligation covers the claim.
to ultimate compensation of those British members
of the Services who are asked to serve on in
India and decide to do so."
It may also be mentioned that subsequent to
June 3, 1947, the Government of India made
enquiries through the Provincial Governments from
the members of the Secretary of State's Services,
including the Indian Civil Service, about their desire
to continue in service of the Government after the
transfer of power and also made enquiries from the
Provincial Governments themselves about their readiness to retain those officers in service who expressed
their desire to continue in service.
This Court had occasion to discuss the effect
of the steps taken by the Government of India prior
to the appointed day and of the provisions of the
Independence Act and the Provisional Constitution
Order in Rajagopalan's case(l) Rajagopalan was a
member of the Indian Civil Service and was serving in
the Province of Madras till August 14, 1947, when his
services were terminated, though he had expressed
his willingness to continue in the service of the Government of Madras on and after the appointed day.
What this Court directly held and observed in connection with the points urged before it in that case would
be mentioned at appropriate places in discussing
the five points I have formulated earlier.
·
This first two points were directly decided in
that case. This Court held that the Secretary of
State and his Services disappeared as from the appoin(1) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 541.
I
'
5 S.C.R.
,.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
469
ted day and that s. 10(2) of the Independence Act
1963
and art. 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order
proceeded on a clear and unequivocal recognition R. P. Kapur
of the validity of the various special orders and the
v.
individual arrangements made and amounted to an Union of India
implicit statutory recognition of the principle of
and Anr.
automatic terminatiol). of the Services brought about
-by the political change. It is clear therefore that the Raghubar Dayal
Indian Civil Service, one of the Secretary of State's
J.
Services, ceased to exist from the appointed day
and that the services of its members automatically
terminated on August 14, 1947.
This Court had not to consider whether any
All India Service was set up to take the place of the
Indian Civil Service on and from the appointed day,
as the termination of Rajagopalan's services was
held to be valid. There is nothing on the record
to show that any such new Service took the place
of the Indian Civil Service at the changeover, though,
subsequently, the Indian Administrative Service was
set up as an All India Service. When it was actually
set up is not known. Article 312 of the Constitution
states in cl. (2) that the Services known at the commencement of the Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service shall be
deemed to be services created by Parliament under
that article. The All India Services Act, 1951 (Act
LXI of 1951) defined an All India Service to mean
the service known as the Indian Administrative Service
or the service known as the Indian Police Service.
The Indian Administrative Service Recruitment
Rules, 1954, came into force in 1954 and its r. 3 dealing
with the constitution of the service provides inter alia
that the Service shall consist of (a) members of the
Indian Civil Service, not permanently allotted to
the judiciary; (b) members of the Indian Civil Service
permanently allotted to the judiciary who have been
holding executive posts from the date of commencement of the Constitution; (d) persons
recruited to the Service before the commencement
of those Rules. It appears therefore that all the
470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
members of the Indian Civil Service who continued
to serve the Government on and after the appointed
R. P. Kapur day were not made members of the Indian Administrav.
tive Service and that those who were made members
Union of India of the Service became members of such Service in
and Anr.
1954. If the Indian Administrative Service had been
-set up to replace the Indian Civil Service immediately
Raghubar Dayal on the appointed day and the erstwhile members
J.
of the Indian Civil Service had become its members,
the provisions of r. 3 (a) and (b) would have been
different from what they are. This indicates that the
Indian Administrative Service did not take the place
of the Indian Civil Service automatically after the
changeover on the appointed day and that therefore
the members of the Indian Civil Service who continued in service did not continue so as members of
any All India Service. The Viceroy's announcement
dated April 30, 1947, makes no mention of any All
India Service replacing the Indian Civil Service immediately on the transfer of power though it specifically mentioned in para 8 about the giving of all
possible help to the Government of India in building
up the new Services and to the members of the Secretary
of State's Services continuing to serve under the
Government in India after the transfer of power.
The provisions of art. 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order also do not refer to the persons in the
Secretary of State's Services to continue in service
as members of any All India Service though it specifically deals with the appointment of such other
employees of Government to the posts they had
held on the day immediately preceding the appointed
day.
I am therefore of opinion that the service of the
appellant as a member of the Indian Civil Service
came to an end on August 14, 1947, and that thereafter
he did not automatically or otherwise become member
of any All India Service on August 15, 1947.
In connection with point no. 3 formulated by
me. this Court said in Rajagopalan's case<tJ at p. 552
1963
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541
..•
'
5 s.c.R.
,.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
1963
that the continuance of service was contemplated
only in respect of such of the previous servants who
intimated their desire for the continuance of their R. P. Kapur
v.
services and whose offer in that respect was accepted,
Union
of India
and at p. 563 that sub-s. (2) ofs.10 of the Independence
and Anr.
Act had nothing to say as to who were the persons who
would continue in service and receive the benefit
that being obviously left to be provided by delegated Raghubar Dayal
legislation in the shape of Orders of the GovernorJ.
General and at p. 565 that in view of the provisions
of art. 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order,
all persons who were previously holding civil posts
were deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue in service excepting those whose case was governed
by general or special orders or arrangements affecting
their cases. It is clear therefore that only those
members of the Secretary of State's Services continued
in service who had been holding civil posts immediately before the appointed day and were deemed
to have been appointed to the corresponding post
in view of the provisions of art. 7 (1) of the Provisional Constitution Order.
The persons who had been holding civil posts
immediately before the appointed day did not automatically become servants of the new Government
on the appointed day. Article 7(1) of the Provisional
Constitution Order contemplates 'deemed appointment'
of such persons to their respective posts on that
day. The language of this article is not consistent
with any suggestion that they automatically, by the
force of the Independence Act or the Provisional
Constitution Order, became holders of the respective
posts on the appointed day. The language is very
much different from the language used in Arts. 374,
376, 377 and 378 of the Constitution which provide
for certain persons holding office immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution becoming, on
such commencement, holders of corresponding posts
-0n such commencement. The language is also different from that of Art. 375 of the Constitution which
deals with the continuance of courts, authorities
472
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
and officers after the commencement of the Constitution and reads :
R. P. Kapur
"All courts of civil, criminal and revenue jurisv.
diction,
all authorities and all officers, judicial,
Union of India
executive
and ministerial, throughout the terand Anr.
ritory of India, shall continue to exercise their
respective functions subject to the provisions of
Raghubar Dayal
this Constitution."
J.
There is no such expression in this article which
would indicate that any of these officers had to be
freshly appointed or would be deemed to have been
appointed to their respective posts on the commencement of the Constitution.
The language of art. 7(1) of the Provisional
Constitution Order correspond to some extent to
that of s. 58 of 21 & 22 Vic. Cap. CVI, 1858, an Act
for the better Government of India, which was passed
when the Government of India was transferred to
Her Majesty from the East India Company. Section
58 reads:
"All persons who at the time of the commencement of this Act shall hold any offices, employments, or commissions whatever under the said
Company in India shall thenceforth be deemed
to hold such offices, employments, and commissions under Her Majesty as if they had been
appointed under this Act. ............. "
The language of art. 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order, for purposes of comparison, may be
just noted, and is
" .... any person who immediately before the
appointed day is holding any civil post under
the Crown .... shall, as from that day,\ be deemed
to have been duly appointed to the corresponding
post under the Crown .... "
The language of s. 58 of the 1858 Act contemplated
a fresh appointment, though deemed appointment,
as is abundantly clear from the words 'shall .... be
deemed to hold such offices, employments, and com1963
""
•
i
5 S.C.R .
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
missions .... as if they had been appointed under
this Act. ... '.
1963
R.P. Kapur
.
'
•
I am therefore of opinion that the Provisional
v.
Constitution Order, by its art. 7(1), provided for Union of India
deemed fresh appointment of the members of the
and Anr.
Secretary of State's Services whose services had
terminated automatically on the day immediately Raghubar Dayal
preceding the appointed day.
J.
I will now deal with the last point as to which
authority would be deemed to have appointed the
persons who had been in the Secretary of State's
Services, to their corresponding posts on the appointed
day.
The Government of India Act, 1935, hereinafter
called the Act, as modified by the Orders of the Governor-General, was in force on that day and the authorities competent to make appointments on that day
would be deemed to have made the appointments
of the erstwhile servants in the Secretary of State's
Services. No other authority could have made those
appointments and therefore no other authorities could
be deemed to have made those appointments which
were deemed to be made in view of the provisions of
art. 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order.
Section 241 of the Act provided that the GovernorGeneral, or such person as he may direct, would
make appointments to the civil services of the Dominion
and civil posts in connection with the affairs of the
Dominion and that the Governor would make appointments to the services of a Province and posts in connection with the affairs of a Province. Such persons
of the .secretary of State's Services who were holding
posts m connection with the affairs of a Province
would therefore be appointed to the correspond·
ing posts,_ on the appointed day, by the Governor of
that ProVInce, as only he could have made appointments to t~o~e posts. I.t is. to be noticed that art. 7( 1)
of the ProV1s10nal Constitution Order refers to appointments to posts and not to appointments to Services
and that even prior to the appointed day the appoint-
474
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
ments, to the various posts in the Provinces, of members
of All India Services allotted to the cadre of the ProR. P. Kapur vinces were also made by the Governor and not
v.
by the Governor-General. In this respect, with regard
Union of India to all appointments to posts in connection with the
and Anr.
affairs of the Provinces there had been really no
change.
Raghubar Dayal
.
.
It ts contended for the appellant that his deemed
1
·
appointment to the post corresponding to the post
he had held on August 14, 1947, was by the GovernorGeneral or the Government of India. Article 7(1)
of the Provisional Constitution Order does not expressly provide so. Section 241 of the Act did not authorize
the Governor-General to make appointments to posts
in connection with the affairs of the Provinces. The
provisions of art. 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution
Order refer to all the persons employed in the civil
services and holding civil posts under the Crown
and are not restricted to those persons only who held
posts and had been appointed by the Secretary of
State. The mere fact that the Provisional Constitution
Order was made by the Governor-General would
not lead to the result that the deemed appointments
of all the persons serving under the Crown, whether
as members of civil services or as holders of posts,
had been made by the Governor-General. That
could not have been intended. All such employees
would be deemed to be appointed by the appropriate
authority on the appointed day and the appropriate
authority for the appointment of a particular employee
is to be found in s. 241 of the Act.
It is also true that the erstwhile members of the
Secretary of State's Services were not actually reappointed by the appropriate appointing authority and
that they were merely deemed to be so appointed
~n view of the provisions of art. 7(1) of the Provisional
Constitution Order whose purpose was to validate
the continuity of the service of such persons even
though they had not been actually appointed.
I see no reason why the provisions· of s. 241
of the Act be not applicable to the deemed appoint1963
,
~
'
5 S.C.R.
•
'
-
•
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
ments of such persons who had been in the Secretary
1963
of State's Services. Undoubtedly, it was not a special
provision for the deemed appointments at the parti- R. P. Kapur
cular occasion, but was of general application to
v.
appointments on and after the appointed day. Appoint- Union of India
ments, whether actual or deemed to be made by
and Anr.
the new Governments immediately on the changeover
of the Government, must be governed by its provisions. Raghubar Dayal
.
.
J.
This Court did not make any reference to s. 241
of the Act in Rajagopalan's Case.'1> This is not because
that section did not govern all the erstwhile members
of the Secretary of State's Services, but because the
Court was not concerned in that case with the question
of such fresh deemed appointments as Rajagopalan
did not continue in service as his services were held
to be validly terminated on August 14, 1947.
It has been urged in support of the appellant's
case that the retention of persons of the Secretary of
State's Services was dealt with between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government as would
appear from the various documents in connection with
the steps taken for the setting up of the two Dominions
and that only those ofhcers continued i11 service whom
the Government of India invited to continue and
that those who were not so invited were to be paid compensation.
It is not clear from the antecedent circumstances
that it was the Government of India which decided
about the continuance in service of such officers
of the Secretary of State's Services who had been
prior to the changeover serving under the Government of a Province. Even if it was the Government
of India which was to decide and invite the officers
to continue, such a decision and invitation cannot
amount to its appointing those officers to the va~ious
posts in connection with the affairs of a Provmce,
in view of s. 241 of the Act.
Of course, negotiations with respect to the. services took place between the Government of India
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541
476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
and
His Majesty's Government. A Provincial
Government could not have continued such negotiR. P. Kapur ations. I do not find any specific mention in any
v.
of the documents referred to in Rajagopalan's Case(IJ
Union of India to the effect that it was the Government of India
and Anr.
which decided which officers were to continue in
-service. The Viceroy's announcement dated April
Raghubar Dayal 30, 1947, practically sums up the result of the negotiJ.
ations between the Government of India and His
Majesty's Government. It is clear from what was
stated in paragraphs 3 and 6 of this announcement
that the undertakings and assurances with respect
to persons appointed by the Secretary of State and who
were to continue in service were given by the Government of India with respect to those who were to continue under its service and by the Provincial Governments with respect to those who would join the
Provincial Services. It is said in para 3, which
dealt with the terms of pay etc., that the Government
of India would then propose to Provincial Governments that they should give similar assurances
to members of the Secretary of State's Services
who agreed to join Provincial. Services.
It was said in para 6 :
"His Majesty's Government have been reviewing the whole position. They have noted
the undertaking which the Government of
India have given in regard to officers whom they
desire should continue to serve under the Government of India .... Many Indian members of the
Secretary of State's services will however become
members of provincial services and in their cases
His Majesty's Government's agreement that they
need not be compensated is conditional upon
the Provincial Governments guaranteeing the
existing terms of service.
If they are not
prepared to do so His Majesty's Government
reserve the right to reconsider the matter.
. It is therefore clear that ·the . Provincial
Governments were also concerned in the negotiations
though they were actually made by the Government
1963
(I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541.
.
'
-'
5 S.C.R.
.
•
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
1963
of India and had to agree to guarantee the existing
terms of service and safeguards in matters of disci·
pline and had also to agree to pay compensation.
R. P. Kapur
v.
It may look anomalous that some persons who Union of India
had been members of the Secretary of State's Services
and Anr.
may be deemed to have been appointed to their
respective posts, on the appointed day, by the Gover- Raghubar Dayal
nor of a Province if they had been holding posts under
1
the Provincial Government and others be deemed
·
to have been appointed by the Governor-General
if they happened to be then serving posts in connection
with the affairs of the Government of India or
the Dominion. Such an anomaly was bound to
come into existence and had been contemplated during
the negotiations between the Government of India
and His Majesty's Government. There was no other
choice open to the members of the Secretary of
State's Services who were serving under the Government of a Province when their services automatically
came to an end and when they desired to continue. in
Government service. Their wishes were ascertained
in the context o:f what was taking place. They knew
of the announcement by the Viceroy dated April
30, 1947. It was only with their consent that their
services were continued after the changeover. They
can therefore have no grievance for being appointed
to provincial services or posts under the Provincial
Governments and naturally, under its administrative
control. In fact, even prior to the changeover, such
persons had been under the administrative control
of the Provincial Government.
This Court, in Rajagopalan's Case(ll, refers at
p. 551 to the Government of India asking the Provincial
Governments, by its letter dated June 18, 1947, to
state, when forwarding the replies from the individual
officers, about their willingness or otherwise to continue
in service, whether for any reason they would prefer
such officer not to continue in service, notwithstanding
his desire to remain in service, and pointing out to
the Provincial Government that in case it did not
(l)-fi9S5]-2-S.C.R. 54r-- .
478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
desire to retain ·the services of such persons, the Provincial Government would be incurring the liability
R. P. Kapur to pay compensation. Such an enquiry indicates,
v.
to my mind, that the decision to continue such persons
Union of India in service after the changeover rested with the Proand Anr.
vincial Government and it was on this account that
it had to bear the liability to the compensation payable
Raghubar Dayal to such persons. Such a decision had to be taken
J.
by the Provincial Government because it was contemplated that officers serving under the Provincial Government wol).ld be appointed to their respective posts
after the changeover by that Government itself and
that the Government of India will have nothing to
do with their appointments. In the circumstances,
it follows that it was the Provincial Government
which invited such officers to continue in service
and not the Government of India.
1963
It is true that the Madras Government informed
Rajagopalan of the Government's decision not to
retain him in service after August 15, 1947, and stated
that a formal communication in that respect would
issue from the Government of India. The Government
of India in a way approved of the decision of the
Madras Government not to continue Rajagopalan
in service. But it does not follow that the Government
of India's approval was necessary for the Government
of Madras to continue under its service officers
whom it was prepared to· keep in service. The termination of service of such officers was prior to the
coming into force of the Act as modified by the Provisional Constitution Order and therefore the termination order had to be formally made by the Government of India. The order had to be passed prior to
the changeover and at that time it was proper that
any order about the termination of the services be
with the approval of the Government of India. The
fresh deemed appointment was to be made on August
15, 1947, immediately after the changeover and, in
view of the practical difficulties, such a fresh appointment was not actually made but was deemed to have
been made, as provided by art. 7(1) of the Provisional
5 S.C.R.
..
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
1963
Constitution Order. When the appointment was to
be made of persons serving under the Provincial
Governments, there was no necessity of obtaining R. P. Kapur
v.
prior approval of the Government of India to retain
Union
of India
such officers in service.
and Anr.
I am therefore of opinion that such members of
the Secretary of State's Services who were holding Raghubar Dayal
posts under a Provincial Government immediately
J.
before the appointed day and continued in service
on and after the appoh.ted day are to be deemed
to be appointed to the corresponding posts by the
Governor of the Province, in view of the provisions
of s. 241 of the Act.
The appellant was serving under the Madras
Government immediately before the appointed day.
He will therefore be deemed to be appointed by the
Governor of the Province of Madras to the post
he was holding on the appointed day. The Governor
of the Province was his appointing authority and
therefore he could be suspended on the day immediately before the commencement of the Dominion
by the Governor of the Province where he might
have been then serving. He can at best claim protection of his right of not being suspended pending
departmental enquiry or of a criminal charge by any
authority of a lower rank. Rule 7 of the Discipline
Rules does not provide for such suspension of a
person who had been a member of the Secretary
of State's Services by an authority lower than the
Governor. The appellant was suspended by the Governor of Punjab on July 18, 1959. He had no right
of appeal against such an order of suspension. The
Discipline Rules did not provide for an appeal against
such an order of suspension and, in not so providing, cannot be said to violate the provisions of
art. 314 of the Constitution as the appellant had no
right of appeal against such an order before the commencement of the Constitution. It follows that r. 7
of the Discipline Rules does not violate the provisions
of that Article and that the impugned order of
suspension was therefore valid.
480
1963
R.P. Kapur
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
I would therefore dismiss the appeal.
ORDER
Y.
Union of India
and Anr.
In accordance with the opinion of the majority
the appeal is allowed with costs in this Court and
in the High Court.
1963
JIVARAJBHAI UJAMSHI SHETH AND OTHERS
"
Nov.19
v.
CHINTAMANRAO BALAJI AND OTHERS
(A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Arbitration-Partnership Agreement-Arbitration clause-Formula of valuation on dissolution-Arbitrator appointed by deed of
reference-Validity of award questioned-Grounds on which award
can be set aside-Error apparent on the face of 1he records-
Arbitrator exceeding jurisdiction-Validity of Award-SeverabilityIndian Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), s. 30.
The appellants and the respondents entered into a partnership
in the business of manufacturing bidis. Under the agreement
a partner was entitled to retire after giving notice of six months
to all partners. It contained a clause for reference of disputes
between the partners relating to the business or dissolution of
the firm to arbitration. It also contained a clause providing how
four items including goodwill should be valued. According
to this clause goodwill was equal to five years net profits for, debts
due to the firm were to be taken not at their book value but at
85 % of that value, stocks of raw materials were to be valued at
book value and immovable properties were to be valued at their
purchase price or their book value. About two years later the
appellants desired to retire from the partnership and a deed
of reference was executed and a sole arbitrator was appointed.
This provided that the remaining partners shall continue the firm
and they shall make full payment to the retiring partners of such
amounts in such manner and on such conditions as shall be decided upon by the arbitrator. The arbitrator gave the award.
He fixed the value of the goodwill of the firm at Rs.32 lakhs including
in that amount the "depreciation and appreciation of the property,
dead stock and dues to be recovered." The award was filed in
the Court under s. 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.
I
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