STATE OF PUNJAB versus OKARA GRAIN BUYERS SYNDICATE LTD. AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 November 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 387 | 1963 INSC 225
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 November 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 439/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 387
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 225
Text of the judgment
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SS.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
dustrial Society v. Workmen and others( 1 > the question
1963
as to whether a transfer has been effected so as to
attract s. 25FF must ultimately depend upon the Managementof
evaluation of all the relevant factors and it cannot R.S. Madhoram
be answered by treating any one of them as of over·
& Sons
riding or conclusive significance. Having regard to
v.
the facts which are relevant in the present case, we Its Workmen
are satisfied that the appellant cannot claim to be G . -;;- dk
a successor-in-interest of the firm so as to attract a1en ';ga ar
the provisions of s. 25FF of the Act. The transfer
·
which has been affected by the firm in favour of the
appellant does not, in our opinion, amount to the
transfer of the ownership or management of an under·
taking and so, the Tribunal wa~ right in holding that
s. 25FF and the proviso to it did not apply to the
present case.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
STATE OF PUNJAB
v.
OKARA GRAIN BUYERS SYNDICATE LTD.
AND ORS.
(AND CONNECTED APPEALS)
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SOBBA RAO, K.N.
WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGARAND
J.R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)
Statute, interpretation of-State, if bound by statute-"Person",
if includes State-Displaced persons' (Debts Adjustment) Act,
1951, scope of.
The thirteen respondents who were displaced creditors from
West Pakistan filed at various places before the Tribunals created
under the Displaced Persons' (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, petitions
(1) [1963) Supp. I S.C.R. 730.
1963
November Jj
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
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1963
under s. 13 of the Act claiming certain amounts from the State
of Punjab. A preliminary objection was raised by the appellant
State of Punjab that these petitions were not maintainable against the State. The
v
objections were rejected by the Tribunals which held that the
· .
claims were maintainable. The State went in revision to the High
Okara Gram Court but those revisions were also rejected. The State came to
Buyers Syndicate this Court by Special Leave.
Ltd. and others
The contentions raised before this Court were that what was
claimed from the Government was not a "debt" within the meaning
of the Act of 1951 and that the State of the Punjab was not a
"person" against whom an application under s. 13 of the Act
could be made. It was also contended that the State was not
bound by the statute.
Held: What was claimed from the State was a debt and the
applications under s. 13 of the Act against the State of the Punjab
were maintainable.
The test for determining whether tbe Government is bound
by a statute is whether it is expressly named in the provision which
it is contended binds it, or whether it is manifest from the terms
of the statute that it was the intention of the legislature that it
shall be bound and the intention to bind would be clearly made out
if the beneficient purpose of the statute would be wholly frustrated
unless the Government were bound.
Section 32 of tjte Act provides that the debts owing by the
State to a displaced debtor ought to be ascertained for determining
the paying capacity of the debtor and relief afforded to the displaced
debtor on the basis that such debts dne to him are realisable assets
within ihe scope of the Act. It follows that the debt due by the
Government or by the State is within the Act by necessary implication because the same is necessary for working out the relief
to which a displaced debtor who files an application under s. 5
or s. 11(2) is entitled. Section 32 contemplates a balancing of
credits and debits with a view to adjust them in a manner consonant with equity and justice of the case as felt by the legislature.
The entire scheme will go awry and the balance and harmony
which are intended to be brought in would be nullified and disharmony brought into the working of the Act if the contention of the
appellant that the State is not bound by the Act is accepted.
The rule of interpretation of statutes that the State is not
bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or
by necessary implication is good law in India.
As it cannot be said of the State that it either voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, the
State may not be within the contemplation of the expression
"person" against whom claims could be made under s. 13 on .that
basis. However, it is not correct to say that the State is not. a
constitutional or even juristic entity for the reason it does not
partake the characteristics of or satisfy in whole the definition
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of a corporation. The State is an organised political institution
1963
which has several of the attributes of a corporation. Under
Art. 300 of the Constitution, the Government of the Union and State of Punjab
the Government of a State are enabled to sue and be sued
v
in the name of Union of India and the Government of the State
· .
as the case may be. It is not improper to speak of the Union Okara Gra.m
and the State as constitutional entities which have attributes de- Buyers Syndicate
fined by the Constitution. So in order to carry out the beneficent Ltd. and others
purpose of the statute it must be held to be a person under s. 13.
A comparison of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits)
Act, 1948 with that of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment)
Act, 1951 shows that the later Act has definitely a more extended
scope and is designed to secure substantive advantages to displaced
persons which were wholly foreign to the Act of 1948 which had
a very limited scope.
Roberts v. Ahern, I C.L.R. 406, Director of Rationing and
Distribution v. The Corporation of Calcutta, [1961] I S.C.R. 158,
M/s. Nagi Brothers v. The Dominion of India, LL.R. 4 Punjab
358, Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271, State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati
Kumari, [1961] I S.C.R. 728, State of West Bengal v. Union of
India, [1964] I S.C.R. 371 and Advani v. Union of India, I.L.R.
1955 Born. 970, referred to.
CIVIL APPEALS Nos. 439 TO 451 OF 1961.
. Appeal3 by special leave from the judgment
and order dated August l, 1958, of the Punjab High
Court in Civil Revisions Nos. 229 to 241of19)3.
S.M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of
Punjab, N.S. Bindra and R.N. Sachthey, for the appellants.
S.K. Kapur, K.K. Jain for B.P. Maheshwari
for respondent No. l(A) (in C.A. No. 439/61.)
'
Sardar Singh, for respondents Nos. 2(A), 3(A)
4(A), 5,6,7,8(A),9,10,11,12, and 13tA).
Dau/at Ram Prem and R.N. Sachthey for respondent No. 13 (B) (Union of India).
'
November .15, 1963. The Judgment of the
Court was dehvered by
AYYA~GAR J.--Section 13 of the Displaced Persons
(Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (Central Act LXX of
1951) which will be referred to hereafter as the Act
enacts:
'
Ayyangar J.
390
1963
State of Punjab
v.
Okara Grain
Buyers Syndicate
Ltd, and others
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
•
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"13. Claims by displaced creditors against persons who are not displaced debtors. At any time
within one year after the date on which this
Act comes into force in any local area, any displaced creditor claiming a debt from any other
person who is not a displaced person may make
an application, in such form as may hie prescribed, to the Tribunal within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction he or the respondent or,
if there are more respondents than one, any
of such respondents, actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries on business or personally
works for gain, together with a statement of
the debt owing to him with full particulars thereof."
•
~
The respondents in each of these 13 appeals,
which have been consolidated for hearing are "displaced credit01 s" and the point arising for decision
in them is whether they could make a claim under
this provision against the State of Punjab. A petition
claiming such relief was filed by the respondent in
Civil Appeal 439 of 1961 before the Subordinate
Judge, Amritsar who was the Tribunal created under
the Act for the purpose of receiving claims under s. 13
and, similarly, the contestmg respondents m the other
12 appeals 440-45lof 1961 made similar claims before
the Subordinate Judge, Hissar. Immediately the claims
were filed and notices issued to the State of Punjab,
a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the
applications was raised by the State and the Tribunal
at Amritsar passed an order on May 7, 1953 rejecting
the preliminary objection and holding that on a proper
construction of s.13 the claim was maintainable
before it. Similar objections were also rais,ed before
the Subordinate Judge, Hissar who, by orde:rs passed
on May 25, 1953, similarly over-ruled the preliminary
objections and held that the claims were maintainable
before him. The State thereafter filed revisions in
all the 13 cases to the High Court of Punjab. These
petitions came in the first instance before a learned
Single Judge who directed that they should be placed
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before a Division Bench and the two learned Judges
1963
constituting the Division Bench after referring briefly
.
to the arguments urged on behalf of the State in support State 01 Pun1ab
of their contention that the State was not a 'person'
v.
against whom a claim could be made under s.13 Okara Grain
of the Act, expressed their opinion that the matter Buyers Syndicate
deserved to be decided by a larger Bench and the Ltd. and others
cases were thereupon placed before the Chief Justice
-for constituting a Full Bench for deciding the point Ayyangar J.
of law which was formulated in these terms:
"Whether an a2plication under s.13 of the
Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951
i~ not maintainable against the State of Punjab".
A Full Bench of three Judges accordingly heard arguments upon the pomt raised and held by a unanimous
judgment that the applications were maintainable and
in doing so over-ruled two earlier decision~ which
had taken a contrary view. The revision petitions
were thereafter posted for final hearing before the
learned Chief Justice who had originally heard them
as a Single Judge and who, giving effect to the views
expressed by the Full Bench, dismissed them. The
State ot Punjab thereafter applied to this Court for
special leave and this being granted, the appeals
are now before us.
As would be seen from the foregoing, the only
question that arises for consideration is whether
under s. 13 of the Act a "displaced creditor" Could
make a claim against the Government either of the
State or of the Union, subject to the limitation of
one year referred to in the opening words of the
provision. It is not in dispute that each one of the
~o!1testing resp~:mdents is "a displaced person" nor
is 1t the contention that.the State is a displaced person.
These two matters bemg put aside the submission
!'f th~ app~llant in br!ef !s t~o fold: (1) that what
~s claimed m the apphcat1ons filed against the State
~s not "a debt" within the definition of the term
~n .the Act to be presently referred to and (2) that even
!f 1t be h~ld that. the sum claimed 1s a "debt" the same
is not being claIIDed from a person of whom it could
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1963
be said that he or it "actually and voluntarily resides
- - . or carrie1> on bu1>iness or personally works for gain;
State 0! Pun;ab Both these arguments stem from a single postulate
· v. . and that is that the State i~ not within the scope of
Okara Gram the enactment, not being named expressly or by neBuyers Syndicate cessary implication, and hence is not bound in resLtd. and others pect of the liabilities, if any which the respondents
- - 1 might have against it by the provisions of the Act,
.Ayyangar · and therefore is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
tribunals created by the Act. It is the further contention that far from the intention of the enactment being
to bind the State, the language that it employs and
the provisions that it enacts, both from the point
of view of the positive provisions as we!l as the omissions, tend strongly to establish that the State. was
outside the Act. These submissions were supported
by an elaborate and able argument· which covered
a very wide ground of constitutional law and general
jurisprudence which we shall notice and deal with,
in their proper place. It would be seen from this
brief statement of the points invloved that nothing
very much turns on the facts of the case. We would,
however, set out the facts in one otthe appeals, Civil
Appeal 439 of 1961, merely as illustrative of the type
of claims involved in these appeals. We should,
however, hasten to add that in regard to most of
these applications made by the respondents to the
Tribunal there is a dispute about the facts themselves
and about the genuineness and the quantum of the
claim which have not yet been investigated, since
only the preliminary objection to the maintainability
of the applications has been decided and not the
merhs of the claims or the defence.
In Civil Appeal 439 of 1961 the facts as stated.
in the application were briefly as follows: The
respondent• are M/s. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate
Ltd. They were originally carrying on business
in Okara in District Montgomery of the undivided
Punjab-now in Pakistan. The Government of the
then undivided Punjab instructed the respondents
to suJlply 210 bags of imported maize to ~"1/s Anil
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Starch Products Ltd., Ahmedabad in August 1947.
1963
The respondents accordingly carried out these instructions and despatched the goods by train. Delivery Staie of Punjab
of the same was taken by M/s Anil Starch Products.
v.
.
Subsequent to the partition of India the respondents Okara Gram
transferred their place of business from Okara to Buyers Syndicate
Amritsar and the Company was duly registered with Ltd. and others
the Registrar of Companies in the State of Punjab.
-In July 1948 after the respondents moved over to Ayyangar J.
Amritsar, they submitted to the State Government
their bill for the value of the maize supplied, being
a sum of Rs. 3059/9/-. The respondents were then
informed that the Ami Starch Products had made
payment of the said sum of Rs. 3059/9/- to the DirectorGeneral of Food Supplie,, East Punjab in or about
October-November, 1948. This was brought to the
notice of the Government of the State of Punjab
which was required to make the payment to the respondents but as no payment was made, they made an
application against the Government under s. 13 of
the Act to the Subordinate Judge who was constituted as the Tribunal under the Act. In this they
claimed payment of Rs. 3059/9/- together with interest
at 6% from the 15th August, 1947 till the date of
the application. We might mention that it was not
in dispute that under the relevant constitutional
instruments to which we shall refer later, if the claim
were true, it would be enforceable by suit against
the appellant-State.
As stated earlier, nothing turns in these appeals
on the merits of the claim or about the defence to it
on the merits by the State, but we are only concerned
with the preliminary objection to the maintainability
of the application based upon the provisions of the
Act on the ground that what is claimed from the
Government of the State is not a "debt" within the
Act and that the State of Punjab is not a "person"
against whom an application under s. 13 of the Act
could be made.
As a step leading to the consideration of these
submissions it would be necessary to advert to and
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
read certain of the provisions of the Act which have
. a bearing on the matter in controversy. Section 2
State of Pun1ab contains the definitions of the terms used in the Act
v·
and it enacts :
Okara Grain
"2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context
Buyers Syndicate
Ltd. and others
otherwise requires.-·
1963
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(6) 'debt' means any pecuniary liability, whether
payable presently or in future, or under a decree
or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise,
or whether ascertained or to be ascertained,
which(c) is due to a displaced person from any other
person (whether a displaced person or not)
ordinarily residing in the territories to which
this Act extends;
. . . .
but does not include
any pecuniary liability due under a decree passed
after the 15th day of August, 1947, by any court
situate in West Pakistan or any pecuniary liability
the proof of which depends merely on an oral
agreement;''
to quote only what is material for these appeals.
A definition of the expression "displaced person"
used in cl. (c) above is to be found in sub s. (10) which
reads:
"2. (10) 'displaced person' means any person
who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of ndia and Pakistan, or on account of
civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances
in any area now forming part of West Pakistan,
has, after the 1st day of March, 1947, left, or
been displaced from, his place of residence in such
area and who has been subsequently residing in
India, and includes any person who is rc:sident in
any place now forming part of India and who for
that reason is unable or has been rendered unable
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395
to manage supervise or control any immovable
1963
property belonging to him in West Pakistan, but
.
does not include a banking company;"
State 01 Pun;ab
Special provisions have been made in the Act in regard Ok vG. .
l .
d
d. l d b k"
.
d
ara ram
to c auns u~ to 1dsp acnke . anbmg cbomp(ames and Buyers Syndicate
the phrase 'dtsp 1ace ba ' JS, y su -s. 7), state Ltd d th
to mean:
. an o ers
"2. (7) 'Displaced bank' means a banking com- Ayyangar J.
pany which, before the 15th day of August, 1947,
carried on the business of banking, whether
wholly or partially, in any area now forming
part of West Pakistan and is declared to be
a displaced bank within the meaning of this Act
by the Central Government by notification in the
Official Gazette;"
Sub-section (8) contains the definition of 'displaced
creditor' which it states means:
"(8). 'Displaced creditor' means a displaced person to whom a debt is due from any other person,
whether a displaced person or not;"
while sub-s. (9) defines 'displaced debtor' and it
runs:
"(9). 'Displaced debtor' means a displaced person
from whom a debt is due or is being claimed;"
Sub-section (12) defines 'Tribunal' and it runs:
"(12). 'Tribunal' means any civil court specified
under section 4 as having authority to exercise
jurisdiction under this Act;"
There are, however, some substantive provisions which
have a bearing on the proper construction of s. 13,
but we shall defer reference to them at this stage.
On the terms of s. 13 of the Act set out earlier
the matters in controversy may be i.tated thus: Start~
ing from the premise, as to which there is no contest,
that the respondent is "a displaced person", the questions to be considered are: ( 1) Is he a <lisp laced
creditor? This would, having regard to the definition of the term 'displaced creditor' in s. 2(8),
depend upon (2) whether the claim made by him is
a "debt" which would be the second point for con-
396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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sideration viz., is the sum claimed as due from the
State a "debt" within the meaning of s. 2(6) (c)
State 0! Punjab and lastly (3) Would the State be 'any other person'
v.
within s. 13?
Okara Grain
Now, what is invoked by the learned AdvocateBuyers Syndicate General is the well-known rule of construction which
Ltd. and others in the phraseology which is apt to the constitutional
Ayyangar J set up in the U.K. is expressed in the proposition
· that "the Crown is not bound by a statute unless
it appears that it is brought within it by express words
or by necessary intendment." We shall in due course
consider the scope of this rule of construction which ·
has been held by this Court to be applicable to the
interpretation of Indian statutes both pre as well
as post-Constitution, but at this stage it is sufficient
to mention three matters in relation to it. The first
is that the expression "Crown" or "King" in the
rule has to be understood as referring to the Executive
Government of the State in the context of our Constitution. If authority were needed for what we
consider so obvious a proposition it is to be found in
the judgment of Griffith, C.J. in Roberts v. Ahernc 1 >.
The next is that it is common ground that there is
no ex.press mention of the State or the Government
of the State in the Act now under consideration.
Lastly, the rule is merely one of construction which
raises an initial presumption in its favour, not any
hard and fast rule. It 1s a rule intended to give effect
to the intentions of the legislature and consequently
if there is either in the purpose of the Act or in its
provisions a manifestation of a clear intention to
the contrary, the presumption would be rebutted
and the State would be bound. There being, in the
cases before us, no contention that there is any lack
of legislative power for the Union Parliament to
bring in the debts due to or owing by the Government of the State and the Union within the ambit
of the enactment, the whole question is whether
by the provisions it has enacted Parliament has manifested a clear intention to include these debts also
within the scheme of the Act.
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(1) 1 C.L.R. 406 at p. 418.
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397
As preliminary to the detailed consideration of
1963
the provisions of the Act, it would be useful to appre-- .
ciate the historical background of this legislation which State of Pun1ab
seeks to confer certain substantive and adjectival
v.
benefits on persons, who owing to the situation created Okara Gt~in
by the partition of the country in 1947 were forced Buyers Syndicate
to migrate from what is now West Pakistan into Ltd. and others
the present State of Punjab.
Ayyangar J.
Prior to partition, under s. 176 of the Government
of India Act, 193) the Provincial Government of the
Punjab could be sued by the name of the Province
in regard to claims arising against the State on contracts
entered into by it. When the partition of India was
effected and the State of the Punjab was divided between Pakistan and the rest of India, provision had
necessarily to be made in regard to the claims which
persons had against the former province of undivided
Punjab. This was effected by the Indian Independence (Rights, Property & Liabilities) Order, 1947
which in its 8th paragraph dealt with contracts entered into by the Governor-General before the 15th
August, 1947 (the appointed day) as well as by the
undivided province of the Punjab. Paragraph 8(3)
ran:
"8. (3) Any contract made on behalf of the Province of the Punjab before the appointed day
shall, as from that day,(a) if the contract is for purposes which as from
that day are exclusively purposes of the Province
of East Punjab, be deemed to have been made
on behalf of that Province instead of the Province
of the Punjab; and
(b) in any other case be deemed to have been
made on behalf of the Province of West Punjab
instead of the Province of the Punjab;
and all rights and liabilities which have accrued
or may accrue under any such contract shall, to
the extent to which they would have been rights or
liabilities of the Province of the Punjab, be rights
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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or liabilities of the Province of East Punjab or the
-Province of West Punjab, as the case may be".
State of Puniab
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v
It was not disputed that rn regard to the claims which
Okara Grain were the subject of the applications from which the
Buyers Syndicate appeals before us arise, if tenable on the merits,
Ltd and others would be claims which could be properly made against
·
the State of Punjab. Reading this provisiolll in conAyyangar J. junction with Art. 300 of the Constitution the result
would be that if a suit for enforcing the claim were
filed against the appellant State, apart from any contention on the merits or based on any plea of limitation, there could be no defence to the suit, save
that untler procedural law of India as eriacted in the
Civil Procedure Code, as understood by a long course
of decisions interpreting the provisions of the Code,
the suit would have to be filed in the Court having
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the cause
of action for the suit arose. Very soon after partition the Indian legislature enacted the Displaced
Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, 1948 which received the assent of the Governor-General on September 4, 1948. It was a temporary enactment which
was to be in force for three years and it replaced an
earlier ordinance of the same name--Ordinance
XVIII of 1948 containing identical provisions. Its
principal object was to provide for and validate certain
suits which had been instituted in India, though
the cause of action therefor had arisen in tierritories
which became Pakistan and for extending the period
of limitation for the institution of suits by displaced
persons. Section 4 of the enactment which constituted its core ran:
"4. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(V of 1908) or in any other law relating to the
local limits of the jurisdiction of Courts or
in any agreement to the contrary, a displaced
person may institute a suit in a Court within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction he or the defendant or any of the defendants, whi:re there
are more than one at the time of the commence-
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399
ment of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides,
1963
or carries on business, or personally works for
-gain, ifState of Punjab
(i) the defendant, or where there are more
v.
than one, each of the defendants, actually Okara Gra.in
and voluntarily resides or carries on business, Buyers Syndicate
or personally works for gain in India and Ltd. and others
is not a displaced person;
-Ayyangar J.
(ii) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises
or has arisen in a place now situate within
the territories of Pakistan;
(iii) the Court in whicli the suit is instituted
is otherwise competent to try it; and
(iv) the suit does not relate to immovable
property."
At the time when this enactment lapsed on the expiry of the period of 3 years which was its life, came
the Act which was a comprehensive piece of legislation designed to redress not merely the procedural
difficulties to obviate which was the main object
of the temporary Act of 1948, but the enactment
of substantive provisions to alleviate the hardships
of those who after suffering, in most cases, grievous
Joss of property in Pakistan were forced to migrate
to the Punjab.
Pausing here, we might mention, and there
was no dispute as to this, that so far as private individuals i.e., all parties other than the Government of
the Union or of the State, were concerned, the enactments of 1948 and 1951 effected the necessary alterations in the procedural law as to the forum to which
displaced persons could resort in which proceedings
should be instituted to overcome the difficulties consequent on the entire cause of action having arisen
in Pakistan. The contention of the appellant-State
before us was that as regards causes of action against
the State, the matter was left where it was.
The judgment of the Full Bench of the High
Court negativing this contention is an elaborate
one, but its reasoning may be summarised as resting
on the following postulates: (I) unless there was
400
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1963
an explicit exemption of the State from the operation
- - . of any particular statute, the State was bound by its
Stare 0! Pun1ab provisions, (2) that the object of the Displaced Persons
v. .
(Institution of Suits) Act of 1948 and the present Act
Okara Gram.r was to supplement the Independence (LiabiJ:ities)
Buyers Syndicate order, 1947 and to furnish the adjectival relief to the
Ltd. and others substantive rights conferred by it against the State,
(3) that unless the construction contended for by
Ayyangar 1· the respondent was accepted, most persons who had
claims against the State of the type contemplated
by para 8(3) of the Independence (Liabilities) Order,
1947 would be remedyless-a circumstance which would
be repugnant to the basic idea underlying the Indian Independence (Rights, Property & Liabilities) Order,
(1947). The learned Advocate-General contested the
correctness of each one of these and submitted to us
an elaborate argument which may be summarised thus:
(1) This Court has, in Director of Rationing
and Distribution v. The Corporation of Calcutta &
Ors .,Cl> accepted as correct the rule of construction
adopted in the U.K. that the State is not bound by
a statute unless it is so provided in express terms
or by necessary implication. Applying this principle
of interpretation to the terms of the Act, far from
the State being expressly named as being bound,
there are indications arising from the nature and description of the persons brought within the scope of
the enactment which clearly exclude the State and
the obligations of the State from its purview.
(2) The Act was preceded by the Displaced
Persons Suits Act 1948 which employed substantially
the same phraseology as the Act now under consideration. The scope of the earlier Act, viz., the liability
of the Government was the subject of adjudication
before the High Court of Punjab in Mis Nagi Bros.
v. The Dominion of India< 21 , where it had been held that
the provisions of its s. 4 was held not to permit suits
against the Dominion of India for the reason that
the State was not a "person" within its terms. The
re-enactment of the law, on the expiry of the Act
(I) [1961] I.S.C.R. 158.
(2) I.L.R. 4 Punjab 358.
r
"
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
of 1948, adopting substantially the same phraseology
1963
in s. 13 and other relevant sections to indicate the
"person" against whom the claim could be made State 01 Punjab
was. therefore a legislative confirmation of that ruling
v. .
and a strong indication that Parliament intended Okara Gram
the same result.
Buyers Syndicate
.
.
. h b
d Ltd. and others
(3) LastIy, the hardsh1p which m1g t e cause
__
in cases where claimants might be left without remedy Ayyangar J.
in case the construction for which he contended
was accepted, must in the nature of things be in a
few marginal cases at the most, and even if they were
more widespread, would not by itself be a factor
which could weigh either to rebut the presumptive
rule that statutes do not bind the State, or the other
argument arising from legislative confirmation of
previous judicial construction, particularly when according to him no ambiguity existed in the construction
of the Act or the language employed in its various
relevant provisions.
We shall now proceed to deal with the submissions
in the order in which we have set them out. The
learned Advocate-General is right when he says
that this Court in Director of Rationing and Distribution
v. The Corporation of Calcutta and Ors.<ll
has accepted the continued applicability of the
principle of construction of statutes laid down by
the Privy Council in Province of Bombay v. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Bombay.< 2 l Jn the case of
Director of Rationing< 1 J, s. 386(1) of the Calcutta
r.1unicipal Act forbade any "person" to use or permit
to be used any premises for the purposes named
otherwise than or in conformity with the terms of
the licence granted by the corporation. The question
that was considered by this Court was whether the
Director of Rationing representing the Food Department of the Government of West Bengal was subject
to this provision. The High Court of Calcutta
had held that in the absence of any provision in the
enactment exempting the Government from the operation of s. 386 the Government of West Bengal as well
(I) [1961] T S.C.R. 158
(2) [1946] L.R. 73 I.A. 271.
l/SCI/64-26
402
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
as the Director of Rationing were also bound. It
was from this decision that the appeal was preferred to
State of Punjab this Court. This Court allowed the appeal and held
v.
. that the decision of the Privy Council in Province of
Okara Gram Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Buyers Syndicate Bombay<lJ
laid down the correct rule of
Ltd. and others interpretation of statutes and that the coming into
force of the Constitution did not make any difference
Ayyangar 1 · as regards the applicability of that rule. Sinha C.J.
observed:
"The rule of interpretation of statutes adopted
in England and applied by the Privy Council
to an Indian statute in Province of Bombay
v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay
(1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271) that the State is not
bound by a statute unless it is so provided in
express terms or by necessary implication, is
still good law."
The next question to be considered is the scope
of this rule of construction. In this connection learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention
to the following paragraph:
"It is well-established that the common law of
England is that the King's prerogative is illustrated by the rule that the Sovereign is not necessarily bound by a statutory law which binds
the subject. This is further enforced by the rule
that the King is not bound by a statute unless
he is expressly named or unless he is bound by
necessary implication or unless the statute, being
for the public good, it would be absurd to exclude
the King from it. Blackstone's Commentaries,
(Vol. I, 261-262) accurately summed up the legal
position as follows:"The King is not bound by any act of Parliament, unless he be named therein by special
and particular words. The most general words
that can be devised ...... affect not him in the
least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish
~
1963
--
(!)
[1946] L.R. 73 I.A. 271
j
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.
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
any of his rights or interests. For it would
1963
be of most mischievous consequence to the
public, if the strength of the executive power State of Punjab
were liable to be curtailed without its own exv.
press consent by constructions and implication Okara Grain
of the subject. Yet, when an act of Parliament Buyers Syndical'
is expressly made for the preservation of public Ltd. and others
rights and the suppression of public wrongs, and
does not interfere with the established rights of the Ayyangar J.
crown, it is said to be binding as well upon the
king as upon the subject; and, likewise, the king
may take the benefit of any particular act, though
he be not specially named". (Quoted at p. 355 of
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol.X)
(italics ours).
Based on this passage, particularly the words italicised,
his submission was that the Act now for interpretation
is one enacted for the public good and that consequen·
tly the presumption would be that the executive govern·
ment was bound by it. We consider that the passage
extracted is not capable of that construction. It
has to be read not in vacuo and divorced from the
rest of the judgment but in conjunction with the
express approval of the rule of construction as explained by the Privy Council in Province of Bombay
v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay( 1 )
Lord du Parcq dealt with the submission regarding
statutes "enacted for the public good" being exceptions to the rule in these terms:
"It was contended on behalf of the respondents
that whenever a statute is enacted 'for the public
good' the Crown, though not expressly named,
must be held to be bound by its provisions and
that, as the Act in question was manifestly intended to secure the public welfare, it must
bind the Crown. This contention, which did
not meet with success in the High Court, was
again raised before their Lordships. The proposition which the respondents thus sought to maintain
is supported by early authority, and is to be
found in Bacon's Abridgment and other text-books
(I) [1946] L.R. 73 I.A. 271
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964] /-
but in their Lordships' opinion it cannot now be
regarded as sound except in a strictly limited
State of Punjab
sense. Every statute might be supposed to be
v.
'for the public good', at least in intention, and
Okara Grain
even when, as in the present case, it is apparent
Buyers Syndicate
that one object of the legislature is to promote
Ltd. and others
the welfare and convenience of a large body
of the King's subjects by giving extensive powers
Ayyangar J.
to a local authority, it cannot be said, consistently
with the decided cases, that the Crown is necessarily bound by the enactment."
We consider that the principle here explained should <
also be deemed to have been approved of and accepted
by this Court in the Director of Rationing case< 1 >
In another passage in the same judgment
Lord du Parcq explained the scope and ambit of ,
the rule which have in terms relevance to the question
arising in these appeals. The learned Lord said:
"The general principle to be applied in considering whether or not the Crown is bound
by general words in a statute is not in doubt.
The maxim of the law in early times was that no
statute bound the Crown unless the Crown was
expressly named therein .............. But the .
rule so laid down is subject to at least one ex,.
ception. The Crown may be bound, as has r
often been said, 'by necessary implication'. If,
that is to say, it is manifest from the very terms
of the statute, that it was the intention of the
legislature that the Crown should be bound, ._ {
then the result is the same as if the Crown had
been expressly named. It must then be inferred
that the Crown, by assenting to the law, agreed
to be bound by its provisions'"
He added a little later:
"In the present case the High Court disposed
of the submission by a finding that, on the material
before them, it was not shown to be for the
public good that the Crown should be bound
by the Municipal Act. This is, perhaps, not
a wholly satisfactory way of dealing with the - 1963
-
(1) [1961] l S.C.R. 158.
-; 5 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
respondents' contention, which was, not that
1963
the court must consider whether it is for the
public good that the Crown should be bound State of Punjab
by a particular Act, but that wherever an Act
v.
is 'for the public good' it must be taken to bind Okara Grain
the Crown. Their Lordships prefer to say that Buyers Syndicate
the apparent purpose of the statute is one element, Ltd. and others
and may be an important element, to be considered when an intention to bind the Crown is Ayyangar J.,
alleged. If it can be affirmed that, at the time
when the statute was passed and received the
royal sanction, it was apparent from its terms
that its beneficent purpose must be wholly frustrated unless the Crown were bound, then it may
be inferred that the Crown has agreed to be
bound"·
In the view we take of the construction of the provisions of the Act before us, in the light of the principles
of construction formulated by Lord du Parcq, we
do not consider it necessary to examine whether there
are any further limitations, qualifications or exceptions to the rule as applied to Indian statutes as
have been accepted in the United Kingdom which
have been set out and expounded at pages 438-443
of the sixth edition of Craies on Statute Law. We shall
therefore proceed to examine the provisions of the
Act on the footing that the test for determining whether
the Government is bound by a statute is whether it
is expressly named in the provision which it is contended binds it, or whether it "is manifest that from the
terms of the statute, that it was the intention of the
legislature that it shall be bound", and that the intention to bind would be clearly made out if the beneficent purpose of the statute would be wholly frustrated
un~ess the Government ~ere bound. We might here
pomt out that a question such as has now arisen
has been before this Court on at least two ear lier
occasions. In the State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati
Kumari' 1 J the question raised was whether Government was ~~und by the provisions of 0. XXXIX. r. 2(3)
of the C1v1l Procedure Code where the expression
(1) [1961] l S.C.R. 728.
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964] r
used to designate the party subject to be proceeded
. against was "person". This Court held that in the
State 01 Pun1ab context of the other provisions of the Order and the
v. . other relevant law, the word "person" was intended to
Okara Gram include in its connotation the state where it was a
Buyers Syndicate party against whom any order of injunction had
Ltd. and others been passed. A similar question also arose in The
State of West Bengal v. The Union of lndia<u filed in
A.yyangar J. this Court against the Union of India and others.
Sinha, C.J. speaking for the majority observed:
1963
-
"The rule that the State is not bound, unless
it is expressy named or by necessary implication
in the statute is one of interpretation. In considering the true meaning of words or expression
used by the Legislature the Court must have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute
to be read in its entirety. The Court must ascertain the intention of the Legislature by directing
its attention not merely to the clauses to be
construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law,
and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs."
We shall therefore proceed to consider the terms
of the Act in the light of these principles and see
whether debts due to displaced persons by the Government are within its scope, by reason either of the words
used or by reason of the same being necessitated by the
policy, purpose or provisions of the Act.
As regards the phraseology used in the enactment,
the submission of the learned Advocate-General was
simple. Assuming that on the merits the claims
made by the contesting respondents in the several
appeals were enforceable against the State of Punjab
he submitted that the earlier legislation referred to
by the learned Judges of the Full Bench could not
and did not materially assist in the construction of
the Act. Under s. 8 of the Indian Independence
(I) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371.
f
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•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
(Rights, Property & Liabilities) Order, 1947, the
1963
right of the respondents would, reading it along with
Art. 300 of the Constitution, be merely a right to State of Punjab
institute a suit and that could be no justification for
v.
holding that the respondents were conferred rights Okara Grain
to file applications under s. 13 of the Act unless its Buyers Syndicate
terms were satisfied. In order that a claim may Ltd. and others
fall within s. 13 it should satisfy the requirements
of the section relating to the nature of the claim: Ayyangar J.
(l) it must be to a displaced creditor (that, of course,
was satisfied in the sense that he was a displaced
person to whom amounts were due; (2) such a person
must be claiming "a debt" i.e., a debt falling within
s. 2(6) (c) i.e., a debt due from "a person" "ordinarily
residing" in the territories to which the Act extends,
and (3) such person should be one who is not a "displaced person." "Person" is not defined in the
Act, but in the absence of any express provision therefor or by reason of any necessary implication arising
from the provisions of the Act, the State or the Government of the State would not be a 'person'. This
was particularly so in view of the description of the
"person" referred to or described in the relevant
provisions viz., of whom it could be said that he
"actually or voluntarily resided" or "carried on
business or personally worked for gain". It is only
"a person" who had these attributes or to whom these
characteristics could be attributed that was intended
to be brought within the term 'person' and as it could
not be said of the State that it either "voluntarily
resided" or "carried on business" or "personally
worked for gain" such a body was not within the
contemplation of the expression 'person' against whom
claims could be made under the section. In support
of this submission, based on the connotation of the
term 'person' as used in this Act, we were referred to
the decision of the Bombay High Court pronounced
by Chagla, C.J. in which the identical question now
debated before us viz., the construction of s. 13 of
the Act was considered and it was held that no application under that section could be made against the
Union Government. The learned Advocate-General
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
naturally relied very strongly on this judgment as
-correctly interpreting s. 13 and his complaint was
State of Punjab that the learned Judges of the Full Bench of the Punjab
v.
High Court when dealing with this question in the
Okara Grain proceedings which had given rise to these appeals,
Buyers Syndicate were in error in refusing to follow the decision of the
Ltd. and others Bombay High Court.
The decision of the Bombay High Court is re1
Ayyangar · ported in A dvani v. Union o.f Jn diat 1l.
An application under s. 13 of the Act had been filed before the
Judge of the City Civil Court Bombay-the appropriate
tribunal under the Act-making a claim against
the Union of India. The learned Judge who heard
the application took the view that the Union of India
was not bound by Act LXX of 1951 and that s. 13
would not enable a displaced person to make an
application against the Union of India. The matter
was brought up in appeal to the High Court and the
learned Judges dismissed the appeal. The reasoning
adopted for their conclusion was exactly identical
with the submissions made to us on the construction
of s. 13 we have summarised a little while before
which laid stress on the definition of"debt" ins. 2t6)lc)
being inappropriate to a debt owed by a State having
regard to the description of the person by whom it
was payable. The question whether the Union of
India would be "a person ordinarily residing in theterritory of India to which the Act extends" was,
itt this context, examined in great detail, .on the assumption that the Union of India might be "a person"
i.e., an artificial or a juristic "person" within the
Act. Chagla, C.J. then referred to a long catena of
cases in which it had been held that it could not be
predicated that the Government resided in any place
or that it carried on any business in any particular
place. It was, therefore, held that the claim made
was not a debt under s. 2(6)tc) and therefore the
application was not maintainable. We see force
in the submission of the learned Advocate-General
and if the matter bad to be decided solely on the
basis of the expressions used to define the word "debt"
,.
1963
(!)
I L.R. 1955 Bom. 970.
r
f
f
5 S.C.R.
•
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'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
and the description of the "person" against whom
1963
proceedings could be taken under s. 13 of the Act,
there would undoubtedly be grave difficulties in the State 01 Punjab
way of accepting the view that "person" was intended
v.
to include the Government of the Union or of the Okara Grain
State.
Buyers Syndicate
Ltd. and others
But the matter does not stop here, an d the ques_
tion depending, as it is, on "the intention of the legisla- Ayyangar J.
ture" cannot be answered without an examination
of the provisions and purposes of the Act for ascertaining as Lord du Parcq said, "whether its beneficent
purpose would be wholly frustrated unless the Crown
were bound"· It was the same enquiry that was
envisaged by this Court when it said in the West
Bengal suitul
"1 he Court must ascertain the intention of the
legislature by directing its attention not merely
to the clauses to be construed but to the entire
statute; it must compare the clause with the
other parts of the law, and the setting in which
the clause to be interpreted occurs."
Before, however, we do so, it is necessary to
advert to an argument addressed to us by the respondent that the expression "person" used in the Act
must be held to include the State, inasmuch as not
merely natural persons but artificial and juristic
entities like companies and corporations as well as
unincorporated bodies are expressly brought within
the Act.
In this connection strong reliance was
placed on the definition of 'displaced person' accordmg to which only 'banking companies' were excluded
thus indicating that other companies were within it.
If companies other than banking-compames, besides
firms and associations of persons were included in
the word 'person' it was submitted for the respondent,
there was no anomaly or impropriety in including
the State also as an entity which could be comprehended by the word 'person'. lt was urged that if the
reason for excluding the State from the connotation
of the expression "person" was that no "actual or
(1) [1964] l s.c.R. 371.
410
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
1963
voluntary residence" could be attributed to it, the
~same would equally apply to companies, as well as
State 01 Punjab firms and associations of persons in regard to whom
v.
no doubt was cast on their being included within the
Okara Grain scope of the Act. In this connection it was pointed
Buyers Syndicate out that it was only in a very notional or artificial
Ltd. and others sense that residence could be attributed to artificial
Ayyangar 1 ·
persons like firms or unincorporated associations or
to corporations, the submission being that if these
bodies could be included there was no reason why
the concept of notional residence could not be extended to a juristic entity like a State.
The learned Advocate-General submitted to us
an elaborate and erudite argument as to whether
the State was a corporation in any sense, the conclusion
which he desired us to draw being that though the
State was a body politic, it had not the characteristics
of a corporation. In this connection he referred
us to various writers on Public International Law
and on Political Science and to certain decisions of
the American Courts. We do not, however, feel
called upon to examine these submissions and pronounce upon their correctness in view of the conclusion we have reached on a construction of the
provisions of the Act. We would, however, make
two observations: (!) that the mere fact that certain
artificial entities like corporations are brought within
the scope of the Act, would not by itself rebut the
presumptive rule of construction that the State is
not bound by a statute unless it is brought within
its scope expressly or by necessary implication, (2)
it would not be correct to say that the State is not
a constitutional or even juristic entity for the reason
that it does not partake the characteristics of or satisfy
in whole, the definition of a corporation. The State
is an organised political institution which has several
of the attributes of a corporation. Under Art. 300
of the Constitution, the Government of the Union
and the Government of a State are enabled to sue
and be sued in the name of Union of India and of the
Government of the State, as the case may be. It
· would not, therefore, be improper to speak of the
f
•
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
Union and the State as constitutional entities which
1963
have attributes defined by the Constitution.
.
State of Punjab
From the above 1t follows that the respondent
v
does not gain any advantage for the decision of the Okara Grain
matter now under debate by being able ~o establ.ish Buyers Syndicate
that the State or the Government of.a State IS an entity, Ltd. and others
nor the appellant by demonstratmg that the State
is not a juristic person of the same type as a corpora- Ayyangar J.
tion. We do not therefore propose to deal any further
with this point.
We shall now proceed to detail the substantive
provisions of the enactment which bear upon the
question now at issue. That it was a beneficent
piece of legislation enacted to afford relief to persons
who had suffered displacement by reason of the
partition is not in dispute. The hardship which
such persons suffered either as creditors or as debtors
was the subject of alleviation by the Act. In broad
outline without going into minute details the substance
of the remedial provisions was this: As regards
displaced creditors the relief afforded to them
was by permitting them an inexpensive procedure
for enforcing their claims together with prescribing
the forum which made substantial departures from
the principles which underlay s. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code which obviously could not wholly fit
into the problems created by partition. The relief
afforded to displaced debtors was naturally more
extensive. Besides certain special provisions in respect
of secured debts there were elaborat: provisions
for scaling down debts due to unsecured creditors,
the principle underlying being that the debtor should
be left with enough to live, while the credit ors should
between themselves take the entirety of the property
save that which was left to the debtor. There was a
sort of distribution of the assets among the proved
creditors. The benefits provided for the displaced
debtor and to the displaced creditor were an integrated
scheme; the one running into the other.
Chapter II in which s. 13 occurs is headed
'Debt Adjustment Proceedings'. It opens with
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
s. 5 which deals with applications by displaced debtors
for the adjustment of their debts. That section runs,
State of Punjab to quote only the material words:
Okar:Grain
"A displaced debtor may make an application
for
the adjustment of his debts, to the Tribunal
Buyers Syndicate
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction he
Ltd. and others
actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
Ayyangar J.
husiness or personally works for gain."
Sub-section (2) specifies what the application shall
contain and among the matters to be included in the
application are: (l) a schedule containing full particulars of all his debts, whether owed jointly or individually, with the names and addresses of his creditors and
his joint-debtors .................. (2) a schedule of
all his properties, both movable and immovable,
including claims due to him. The purpose of these
schedules would be apparent from s. 32 which deals
with the manner in which the debts of a displaced
debtor are to be scaled down and· to which we shall
draw attention later. Sections 6 to 9 lay down the
procedure regarding applications made under s. 5,
the object of the procedure being the ascertainment
of the total of the debts owing by a displaced debtor
and the total amount of his assets, the relief which
the Act grants on the basis of this ascertainment
being the subject-matter of later provisions. Sections
IO to 14 deal with the converse case of claims by
displaced creditors first against displaced debtors
and next against debtors who are not displaced debtors.
In their case also the procedure is directed to the
ascertainment of the genuineness and the quantum
of the claims in the presence of the interested parties.
The interrelation between these two sets of provisions
is perhaps brought out by s. 11 which enacts:
"Procedure on . creditor's petition.( I) Where an application under section 10 has
been made, the Tribunal shall cause notice thereof to be served on the displaced debtor calling
upon him either to show cause, if any, against
the application or to make an application on
his own behalf under section 5.
1963
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5 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
(2) If, in response to a notice under sub-section
1963
(lJ, the displaced debtor makes an application
-in accordance with the provisions of section 5, State of Punjab
the Tribunal shall proceed further in the matter
v.
.
as if it had commenced with an application by Okara Gram
the displaced debtor under section 5, and all the Buyers Syndicate
other provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly; Ltd. and others
but, if the displaced debtor does not choose
-to make any such application, the Tribunal Ayyongor J.
shall, after considering such evidence, if any,
as may be produced before it, determine the
claim and pass such decree in relation thereto
as it thinks fit.
t3J The period of limitation specified in subsection ( l) of section 5 in respect of an application by. a displaced debtor shall not apply to
an application made under sub-section (2)."
It was features of this type that we had in mind when
we said that the provisions regarding the relief to
displaced debtors and displaced creditors had to be
read together since the Act dealt with them as one
integrated whole-the one running into and determining
the other.
~. Y
Some of the reliefs to which displaced debtors
making applications under ss. 5 and 11 (2) would be
entitled are dealt with in ss. 15, 16 and 17 but to
these it is not necessary to refer as they are not material
for the purposes of the point arising for decision.
What is, however, of more immediate relevance are
the provisions in Ch. III in which s. 32 occurs which
is headed 'Reliefs'. Section 29 which is the first of
the sections in this Chapter and those following it set
out the reliefs which shall be available to displaced
debtors. They include s. 29-Cesser of accrual of
interest, s. 30-Exemption from arrest or imprisonment for the recovery of any debt, and s. 31- an enlargement of the scope s. 60 of the Civil Procedure
Code as regards property which shall not be liable to
attachment in the case of displaced debtors. Next,
we come to s. 32. This section runs:
414
1963
State of Punjab
v.
Okara Grain
Buyers Syndicate
Ltd. and others
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
"32. Scaling down of debts.-(1) Where, on
the application of a displaced debtor under
section 5 or sub-section (2) of section 11, the
Tribunal has determined the amount due in
respect of each debt in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, it shall proceed to determine the paying capacity of the debtor.
(2) If the paying capacity of the debtor is equal
to or exceeds the aggregate sum of all the debts
so determined (exclusive of any debt in respect
of which the creditor has elected to retain the
security in accordance with the provisions of
section 16), the Tribunal shall pass a decree
for the aggregate sum so determined, specifying the amount due to each creditor and shall
allow repayment thereof in instalments, in accordance with the provisions contained in section
33, unless for reasons to be recorded it directs
otherwise.
(3) If the paying capacity of the debtor is less
than the aggregate sum referred to in sub-section
(2 ), the Tribunal shall divide the decree into
two parts and provide in the first part thereof
(hereinafter referred to as the first part of the
decree) that the sum equivalent to the paying
capacity shall, subject to the provisions contained
in section 33, be realised from the assets of the
debtor in India, and provide in the second part
thereof (hereinafter referred to as the · second
part of the decree) that the balance shall be realised, subject to the provisions contained in subsection (6), from any compensation which the
debtor may receive:
Provided that if no such compensation is
received, the balance shall be irrecoverable.
( 4) A creditor who has elected to retain his security under section 16 shall have no right to realise
any money due to him from the assets of the
debtor in India, but nothing in this sub-section
shall affect any of the rights given to him by
section 16.
•
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•
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5 S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
t5) A creditor shall have the right at any time
1963
at least six months before the receipt by the
-- .
debtor of compensation to apply that the whole State of Pun1ab
or the balance of the first part of the decree,
v·
in so far as any debt due to him is concerned, Okara Grain
may be added to the second part of the decree, Buyers Syndicate
and thereupon he shall have no right to realise Ltd. and other>
any money from the assets of the debtor in India.
--.
A.yyangar J.
(6) For the purposes of this Act, the amount
payable from the · compensation for the satisfaction of the second part of the decree shall
be that amount as bears to the aggregate amount
of all the debts in the second part of the decree
(including therein any sum added to it under
sub-section (5) and the sum determined in favour
of the secured creditor in the manner specified
in the proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (3)
of section 16) as the compensation in respect
of the property of the debtor payable to him
under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950
(XLIV of 1950) bears to the verified claim; and
the balance of the compensation, if any, shall
be refunded to the displaced debtor.
(7) Every instalment paid by the displaced debtor
in respect of the first part of the decree and any
sum payable from the compensation in accordance with sub-section (6) shall be distributed
rateably amongst the decree-holders, if more
persons than one are entitled thereto:
Provided that the secured creditor who has
not elected to be treated as an unsecured creditor
under section 16 shall be entitled to a prior charge
on the amount payable from the compensation.
(8) Where a displaced person receives compensation by way of exchange of property, then, subject
to the prior charge, if any, of a creditor under
section 16, the aggregate sum payable in respect
of the second part of the decree shall be a second
charge upon the property received by way of
exchange bears to the value of the original property
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
)"
i.
1963
verified and valued under the Displaced Persons
(Claims) Act, 1950 (XLIV of 1950).
State of Punjab
(9) Where a displaced person makes a default
V.
in
the payment of any instalment fixed in respect
Okara Grain
of
the first part of the decree or does not pay
Buyers Syndicate
the amount determined in accordance with subLtd. and others
section (4) of section 16 or sub-section (8) of this
section for which the first or the second charge
A. yyangar J.
may have been created upon the property received
by way of exchange, the creditor may apply
for the execution of the decree by the attachment and sale of the attachable assets of the
judgment-debtor or by the sale of the property
obtained by way of exchange upon which the
charge has been created, as the case may be,
and the amount realised by such execution shall
be distributed rateably among the decree-holders:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall affect the rights of any chargeholders.
(IO) For the purposes of this Act, where the
compensation is paid in cash, the amount which
shall be available for purposes of satisfaction
of the debts in the second part of the decree
shall in no case exceed seventy-five per cent of
the amount of such compensation; and where
it is by way of exchange of property, the extent
of the property which shall be available for the
said purposes shall in no case exceed seventyfive per cent in value of such property.
Explanation.-In this section the expression 'paying capacity' means the aggregate of the market
value of all the attachable assets in India of the
displaced debtor plus the income which is likely
to accrue to him for the next three years succeeding, excluding from the computation of such
income a sum calculated at the rate of two hundred
and fifty rupees a month."
It is manifest that the basic idea of s. 32 is as
follows: When a displaced debtor has made an
application under s. 5 or s. 11(2) the Tribunal first
r
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t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
ascertains under ss. 5 to 9 the amount of the debt
1963
due in respect of each creditor. Next, it proceeds
-to determine "the paying capacity" of the debtor and State 01 Punjab
the relief open to the displaced debtor, or expressed
v.
in an other way, the reduction in the debt which his Okara Grain
creditors must suffer, is directly dependent on the Buyers Syndicate
paying capacity compared with the total indebtedness Ltd. and others
of the displaced debtor.
•
•
Ayyangar J.
Now, the question anses how thts "paying capacity" is to be determined. The expression "paying
capacity" is defined by the Explanation to the section
as meaning "the aggregate of the market value of
all the attachable assets in India of the displaced
debtor plus the income which is likely to accrue to
him for the next three years succeeding, excluding
from the computation of such income a sum calculated at the rate of two hundred and fifty rupees a
month". It needs little argument to show that a
debt which has accrued due to a displaced debtor
from the State would be an attachable asset in India
and if this were so, it is the requirement of s. 32(1)
that the Tribunal shall take into account that asset
also for determining "the paying capacity" of the
"debtor". So far as the Explanation to s. 32 is
concerned, it could not be the contention that the
expression "attachable assets in India belonging to
the displaced debtor" should be exclusive of the
amounts in regard to which the State is indebted to
the displaced debtor.
The expression "attachable
assets" would bring in s. 60 of the Civil Procedure
Code, and whatever be the limitations on the execution of decrees against Government under s. 82 of the
Civil Procedure Code, debts due by the State to a
judgment-debtor are certainly attachable. The contrary construction of the words in s. 32 viz., that
debts due by the State are not assets" besides being
inconsistent with the express terms of the Explanation,
would also render the entire scheme of scaling down
provided for in sub-ss. (2) to (10) infructuous and
unworkable. The conclusion that for the purpose
of s. 32 a debt due by the State is within the Explanation and that it has to be taken into account for deterI SCl/64-27
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
mining the paying capacity would appear to be reinforced bys. 47 which runs in these terms:
State of Punjab
"47. Effect of failure on the part of displaced
v.
debtor
to disclose certain matters.-Where a
Okara Grain
displaced
debtor has not mentioned in the releBuyers Syndicate
vant schedule to his application any debt owing
Ltd. and others
by him or any property, movable or immovable,
belonging to him, whether such property
Ayyangar J.
is liable to attachment or not liable to attachment at all, nothing contained in this Act shall
prevent(a) in the case of the debt, the creditor from
instituting any proceeding for the recovery thereof under any law for the time being in force
other than this Act; and
(b) in the case of the property, from being attached or otherwise dealt with under any such law."
It is manifest that the 'property' referred to in the
schedule prescribed under s. 5(2) (iii), the expression
"attachable assets" in the Explanation to s. 32, and
the words "property movable or immovable" in
s. 47 must all bear the same connotation. If a
debt due to a displaced debtor is not within s. 5 it
could not be within the other provisions just now
referred to. If that were the proper construction,
the result would be that the displaced debtor could
obtain the entire benefit provided for by s. 32(2) and
(3) etc. and later if he realised any dues from the State
keep the same to himself free of the claims of all
his creditors. It is obvious that such a result could
not have been intended and, therefore, it must be
held that such a debt as an asset must be included
in the schedule of properties referred to in s. 5 and
that so far as s. 32 is concerned the debts owing by
the State to a displaced debtor ought to be ascertained
for determining the paying capacity of the debtor
and relief afforded to the displaced debtor on the
basis that such debts due to him are realisable assets
within the scope of the Act. It would follow that
the debt due by the Government or by the State is
within the Act by necessary implication, because the
1963
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'
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1.
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
same is necessary for working out the relief to which
1963
a displaced debtor who files an application under
s. 5 ors. 11(2) is entitled. We have already made State of Punjab
reference to s. 11. Its first sub-section deals with
v.
an application by a displaced creditor who seeks Okara Grain
to enforce his claim against a displaced debtor. The Buyers Syndicate
second sub-section permits the displaced debtor to Ltd. and others
make an application under s. 5 and the two-the
claim and what might be called a cross-claim-have Ayyangar l.
to be considered together, and the relief open to the
displaced person who might be a debtor or a creditor
have to be worked out conjointly.
No doubt, s. 13 is concerned with claims by
displaced creditors against debtors who are not displaced persons as contrasted with s. 10 under which
claims may be made against debtors who are displaced
persons. But this cannot make any difference. It
is not possible by any principle of construction to
hold that the debt due by the State to a displaced
debtor is within the Act for the purpose of ascertaining the paying capacity of the debtor notwithstanding
the definition of "debt" in s. 2(6)(c) but that the
State is not within the scope of s. 13 for the purpose
of the same liability being ascertained. This is so
because for the very purpose of determining paying
capacity under s. 32 the genuineness and the quantum
of the alleged debt due by the State is the subject
of enquiry and adjudication by the identical tribunal
which would be conducting the enquiry and make
the decision if the claim were made under s. 13 .
Adopting, therefore, the very principle for which
the learned Advocate-General contends we consider
that the test formulated by Lord du Parcq in Province
of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Bombay<ll :
" .................. Its beneficent purpose must
be wholly frustrated unless the Crown were
bound, then it may be inferred that the Crown
has agreed to be bound",
is satisfied in the case of the provisions of the Act
now before us. That the Act was passed for the
(1) [1946] L.R. 73 I.A. 211:
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
beneficent purpose of affording relief to those who
owing to the disturbances which followed the partition
State of Punjab of the country suffered grievous wrong is not in disv.
pute. What we have stated earlier about the impact
Okara Grain of s. 32 on the scheme of the Act which so far as
Buyers Syndicate relief to debtors is concerned constitutes the core
Ltd. and others of the enactment would be wholly frustrated and
defeated if the State were not bound by the Act is
Ayyangar J. equally beyond dispute.
1963
-
There is one other aspect also from which the
question may be viewed. This is as to whether
when a displaced debtor owes a debt to the State
he is bound to include that debt in the schedule which
he has to file under s. 5(2J(iJ. Now, let us see how
if such debts are not to be included, s. 32 would work.
The paying capacity would then be determined without
reference to such a debt. The other creditors will
receive satisfaction in the manner laid down in s. 32(2)
& (3) etc. but that would obviously be on the footing
that the debts of the displaced debtor are less than
what they really are. When once on the determination of the paying capacity the others receive adjustments there is no question of the government coming
in later to disturb that arrangement. What is allowed
under s. 32 to the displaced debtor cannot be the
subject of any attachment or seizure by government
for the payment. of debts because s. 3 of the Act
enacts:
"3. Over-riding effect of the Act, rules and orders·
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act, the provisions of this Act and of the rules
and orders made thereunder shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in
force, or in any decree or order of a court, · or in
any contract between the parties."
Every other law, decree of court having been superseded, the government would be left without remedy
to realise its dues. Section 32 contemplates a balancing of credits and debits with a view to adjust them
in a manner consonant with equity and the justice
1 1
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
of the case as felt by the legislature. The entire
1963
scheme will go awry and the balance and harmony
-which are intended to be brought in would be nulli- State of Punjab
fied and on the other hand disharmony brought
v.
into the working of the Act if the contention which Okara Grain
the learned Advocate-General supports were ac- Buyers Syndicate
cepted.
Ltd. and others
•
_..,,
Before concluding, it is necessary to add that
before holding that the presumptive rule of the State
not being bound by the provisions of any statute
has been overborne by necessary implication arising
from an examination of its purpose and provisions,
we have taken due account of the language used in
the Act both in s. 13 as well as in the definition of
'debt' and have arrived at the conclusion that that
language is not intractable nor such as to create any
insuperable obstacle in the way of such a construction.
Undoubtedly, ifs. 13 stood by itself read in conjunc·
tion with the definition of 'debt' in s. 2 l6), the submission that a debt due by Government was not within
them might have weight. But there is nothing in
s. 13 which would negative the construction at which
we have arrived after considering the scheme and
purpose of the Act. Taking first the terms of s. 13,
the contention that debts due by the Government
are not within the scope of the provision, is in ulti·
mate analysis based on the last portion of the section
which speaks of "actual ~nd voluntary residence" and
"carrying on business" not being capable of being
attributed to the Government. If, in this context,
one looked at s. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code it
will be found that when it dealt with Companies
and artificial persons it was not so much the residence
as the situs where the business was carried on that was
treated as being relevant for determining the forum,
for Explanation II to s. 20 reads:
"A corporation shall be deemed to carry on
business at its sole or principal office in India
or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any
place where it has also a subordinate office,
such place",
a•
Ayyangar J.
i .
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
thus departing somewhat from the concept of notional
residence attributed to artificial bodies like trading corState of Punjab porations in the law relating to income-tax. Expressed
v.
differently s. 13 proceeds on the basis of equating the
Okara Grain notional residence of artificial persons or bodies
Buyers Syndicate with the actual residence of natural persons and
Ltd. and others it is thus that though actual residence could not
be attributed to companies, it is admitted that debts
Ayyangar J. owing by them are within s. 13 of the Act. It is,
therefore, obvious that the reference to "actual residence" ins. 13 is due to the circumstance that primarily
natural persons are intended to be included by
the use of the words "any other person" and the
qualification of residence was necessary to be added
in order to fix the forum in which applications claiming sums due from them ought to be filed. From
this, however, it would not follow that every
attribute referred to should be satisfied by "every
person" against whom claims could be filed. The
next question is whetl1er there is any thing which
is clearly discernible in s. 2(6) which could be held
to negative the construction of a State being brought
within the scope of the enactment. Confining oneself to what is strictly material "Debt" is defined
as a pecuniary liability due to a "displaced person"
from "any other person" ordinarily residing in
the territory to which the Act extends. It was
because of the circumstance that such a condition of
residence would not be apt in the case of a State or
Government as regards which no residence could
be attributed, that it was said that fue debt due by a
State was not within the definition. That is, no
doubt, a weighty argument and if it stood alone its
effect could be overwhelming, but as against it, it must
be noticed that it is realty a part of the definition
which has to be applied in the absence of anything
to the contrary in the context and if on a consideration
of s. 13 and the other relevant provisions to which
we have referred it was the intention of the enactment
not to exclude the State from its operation, the definition clause could not per se negative such a construction.
The definition would, in the context of the other pro1963
-.-
. -··(
-.
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
visions, be read as applying the test of "residence" or "of
1963
carrying on business" exclusively to natural or artifi-- .
cial persons to whom such conditions would be apt. State of Pun1ab
The second point urged by the learned Advocatev.
.
General was about the legislative confirmation of Okara Gr~m
the meaning of the word "person" as excluding the Buyers Syndicate
State. We have already referred to the Displaced Ltd. and others
Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, 1948 and the circum- Ayyangar J.
stances in which it was enacted and the terms of its
s. 4. It is the interpretation which this section received
in M/s Nagi Bros. v. The Dominion of lndiac 1 i
a decision of the High Court of Punjab that forms
the basis of the contention now under discussion.
The question that arose for decision was whether
the terms of s. 4 could be availed of by a displaced
person to file a suit against the Union of India, the
contention of the latter being that it could be sued
only in a court which had territorial jurisdiction over
the area where the cause of action arose and that
since it could not be said to actually and voluntarily
reside or carry on business or personally work for
gain in any place in India, it could not be comprehended
within the term "person" in s. 4. This contention
was accepted by the Punjab High Court. Under
the general procedural law of India, as embodied
in the Civil Procedure Code, a suit in respect of a
transitory or personal cause of action could be filed
only (a) in a court within the territorial jurisdiction
of which the cause of action in whole or in part arose,
or (b) in the territorial jurisdiction of the court where
a defendant, or if the defendants were more than one
by one of them, voluntarily and ordinarily resided
or carried on his business (vide s. 20 of the Civil
Procedure Code). A long line of decisions starting
from very early days had construed s. 20 of the Civil
Procedure Code and had held that the Governmenteither of the State or at the Centre-could not be
said to reside ordinarily and voluntarily at any partic~lar place, nor to carry on. business at any place,
with the result that where a smt had to be filed against
the Government which was permitted and authorised
(I) I.L.R. 4 Punjab 358.
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
by the provisions of the Constitutional enactments
to which we have referred, the suit could be instituted
State of Punjab only in a court with territorial jurisdiction over the
v.
place where the cause of action for the suit arose.
Okara Grain Kapur, J. who rendered the decision held, following
Buyers Syndicatqhese earlier rulings on the construction of the Civil
Ltd. and others Procedure Code, particularly s. 20 and other like
enactments, that the provisions of s. 4 which enabled
Ayyangar 1· suits to be filed in India notwithstanding that the
cause of action arose in Pakistan could not be availed
of by displaced persons to file suits against the Govern·
ment-of the State or of the Union.
The net result of this construction was that in cases
where no part of the action arose within India, no
suit could be instituted against the State or the Union
Government notwithstanding that by the combined
operation of the Independence (Liabilities) Order,
1947 read with either s. 176 of the Government of
India Act, or Art. 300 of the Constitution, as the
case may be, a liability was cast on the Government
of the State and the Union to make good a claim.
This result might be unfortunate but if it was designed,
there was no escape from that conclusion.
The argument of the learned Advocate-General
was that when this enactment of 1948 lapsed by
efflux of time in 1951, its place was taken by the
Act and that as the same word "person" with the
qualifying expressions indicating his or its residence
or place of business were repeated in the Act without
any specific provision for claims against the State,
Parliament must be taken to have affirmed this decision, adopting its reasoning and that consequently,
in any event, the· general rule of interpretation about
the State not being bound by an enactment in which
it is not named expressly or by necessary implication
was doubly attracted and reinforced.
We are clearly of the view that this argument
does not deserve to be accepted. In the first place,
we are concerned solely with th.: interpretation of
the Act of 1951 and unless there was an ambiguity
it would be impermissible to refer to any previous
1963
--
-
5 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
legislation for construing the words in it. The exami1963
nation we have made of the Act read in conjunction
.
with the purposes it seeks to achieve which are State of Punjab
manifest in its various provisions have led us unv. .
mistakably to the conclusion which we have expres- Okara Gram
sed earlier. In the circumstances, there is no scop~ Buyers Syndicate
for invoking this external aid to the construction of Ltd. and others
the expressions used in the Act. Secondly, the scope Ayyangar J.
of the two enactments viz., the Act of 1948 and that
of 1951 are widely different, and the latter has a
definitely more extended scope and is designed to
secure substantive advantages to displaced persons
which were wholly foreign to the earlier law which
was but of very limited scope. Therefore even if
the language used in the two enactments were identical
-which is not even the case here-the same conclusion
would not necessarily follow having regard to the
differing scopes of the two pieces of legislation. It
could not therefore be said that the two Acts are in
pari maieria so as to attract the rule relied on. Lastly,
the rule of construction which is certainly not one of
a compelling nature, is generally adopted in the
construction of consolidating enactments where provisions which have appeared in earlier repealed statutes
which have recdved an uniform and accept:d judicial
int:rpretation are re-enacted. Obvicusly that is not
the case here. In the circumstances, we consider it
unnecessary to examine whether this solitary decision
on the construction of s. 4 of the Act of 1948, was
correct. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the second point urged.
·
The last submission was that the learned judges
were not right in considering that unless the construction of s. 13 which they accepted was correct, almost
the entire body of displaced creditors would be without
a remedy in respect of their claims against the Government of the State and the Union. Though the learned
Advocate-General started by saying that in every
case in which there could be a cause of action against
the State Government under para 8 of the Indian
Independence (Liabilities) Order, 1947, a suit would
426
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
lie after partition, even on the basis of s. 20 of the
. Civil Procedure Code, he had to concede that in a
State 01 Pun1ab number of cases the party would be without a remedy.
· v. . Apart from this admission, we consider that in a
Okara Grmn large number of cases the cause of action would have
Buyers Syndicate arisen in Lahore where the contract with the GovernLtd. and others ment of the Province of Punjab was concluded and
Ayya1Jgar J. it is possible that no part of the cause of action might
arise in India so as to permit a suit against the Gov.::rnment of the Punjab or of the Union if the provisions
of the Civil Procedure determined the forum therefor.
In our judgment nothing turns on the exact proportion
of the cases where the party would be without a
remedy. If the terms of the enactment were ambiguous and had to be interpreted in the light of the
circumstance whether the one construction or the
other would leave parties without a remedy, then
in that event something might depend on whether it was
only a marginal case that was beyond the provisions
of the Act or the bulk of the cases. That, however,
is not the position here. We have arrived at the
construction of the provisions of the Act, without
reference to the hardship which the opposite view
might cause to particular displaced creditors. It
is for this reason that we say that the question of the
relative number of creditors who would suffer hardship
is not strictly material for the decision. We have, therefore, thought it unnecessary to examine the precise
circumstances in which displaced creditors might or
might not be in a position to institute suits against
the State Government to enforce claims which foll
within para 8 of the Independence (Liabilities) Order,
1963
-
1947.
In these circumstances, we consider, though
for different reasons that the conclusion of the High
Court was right and that the revision petitions were
properly rejected.
The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed
with costs,-one hearing fee.
Appeals dismissed.
...
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