JAYANTILAL AMRIT LAL SHODHAN versus F.N. RANA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 November 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 294 | 1963 INSC 220
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 November 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 104/1963
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 294
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 220
Text of the judgment
294
1963
November 5
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
JAYANTILAL AMRIT LAL SHODHAN
v.
F.N. RANA AND OTHERS
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N.
WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)
Constitution of India, Arts. 2S8(1), 13(1)-Notification by
President entrusting functions to State Officer-If has force of
law-"Save as expressly provided in the Constitution", interpretation of-Delegation of powers by State officer-" Enquiry and Report
by Collector"-Nature of functions-Bombay Reorganisation Act,
1960 (11 of 1960), ss. 2(1i), 87-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of
1894), ss. 4, SA, 6.
The President of India issued on July 24, 1959, a notification
under Art. 2S8(1) of the Constitution entrusting with the consent
of the Government of Bombay to the Commissioners of Divisions
in the State of Bombay the functions of the Central Government
under the Act in relation to the acquisition of land for the purpose"
of the Union. By the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960,
two new states were constituted and the Baroda division was
allotted to the State of Gujarat. Purporting to exercise! he powers
entrusted by the notification issned by the President on July 24,
!9S9, the Commissioner of Baroda Division notified under s. 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, the appellants' land as being
needed for a public purpose, and authorised the Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad to perform the functions
of the Collector under the Act. After considering the objections
raised by the appellant to the proposed acquisition, the Special
Land Acquisition Officer submitted his report to the Commissioner,
who issued the declaration under s. 6(1) of the Act. The appellant
thereupon moved the High Court of Gujarat under Arts. 226 and
227 of the Constitution for a writ but his petition was dismissed.
The case of the appellant was that (I) the President's notification
under Art. 2S8(1) was ineffective after the partition since the consent of the Government of the newly formed State of Gujarat to
the entrustment of functions to its officers bad not been obtained
as required by Art. 2S8(1); (2) the proceeding under s. SA of the
Act being quasi-judicial in character, authority to make a report
thereunder could not be delegated by the Commissioner nor could
be consider such a report when made.
Held: (i) (per Gajendragadkar, Shah and Dayal JJ.) Article
258(1) of the Constitution in effect enables the President to do by
notification what the Legislature could do by legislation, namely,
to entrust functions relating to matters to which executive power
of the Union extends to officers named in the notification. Such
notification, therefore, amends the Act in respect of which it is
made by substituting as it were the words of the notification therein.
""
{·
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
295
So interpreted it cannot be said that the notification of the President
1963
had not the force of law within the meaning of s. 87 read with s. 2(d)
of the Bombay Reorganization Act.
Jayanti/al Amrit
It cannot be assumed simply because the President is the execu- Lal Shodhan
tive bead of the Union that the exercise by him of his power
v.
under Art. 258(1) has not the force of law.
F.N. Rana
The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, [1955] 1 S.C.R.
735, relied on.
Chanabasappa Shivappa v. Gurppadappa Murigappa, l.L.R.
1958 Mysore 48, approved.
Article 258(1) empowers the President to entrust to the State
only such executive functions as are vested in the Union and are
exercisable by him on its behalf; it does not authorise him to entrust
such powers as are expressly vested in the President by the Constitution and do not, therefore fall within the ambit of Art. 258(1).
The executive power of the Union extends to all matters in
respect of which Parliament has power to make law and in respect
of matters to which the power of Parliament extends.
The expression "save as expressly provided in the Constitution" in the proviso to Art. 73(1} is not susceptible of a limited
interpretation. A constitutional provision authorising the Union
to exercise its power over matters in respect of which the State
Legislature has also power to make law, has operation not withstanding the limitation enacted in the proviso.
It is well settled that functions which do not fall strictly within
the field legislative or judicial, must fall in the residuary class executive and be regarded as such.
(ii) The Indian Constitution does not make a rigid division
of functions and although it is possible to characterise with precision that an agency of the State is executive, legislative or judicial,
it cannot be said that a particular function exercised by any individual
agency necessarily bears the character of the agency exercising
the functions.
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State ofPunjab, (1955] 2 S.C.R.
225 and Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyamsundar, [1962) 2
S.C.R. 339, referred to.
The enquiry made by the Collector is not a judicial or quasijudicial enquiry and the report made by the Collector under s. SA
of the Land Acquisition Act is administrative. The Commissioner
therefore in appointing the Additional Land Acquisition Officer
as the Collector or acting on his report in pursuance of the functions
entrusted to him by the notification acted within the authority
conferred on him.
Per Subba Rao and Wanchoo, JJ.-Article 258(1) interpretted
in the light of the scheme and setting in which it appears and the
language it uses, clearly indicates that in giving the President the
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
power to entrust his functions, it is contemplating the entrustment
of the executive functions of the Union only and no other. The
Jayantilal Amrit 'functions' occurring in the Article, even if not expressly qu,alified
Lal Shodhan by the word 'executive', must in the context mean functions of the
same nature as the executive power of the Union.
v.
F.N. Rana
The words 'entrust functions' and 'with the consent of' indicate
that in entrusting his functions the President is creating an agency
which is more in consonance with carrying out the executive power
of the Union.
Article 258(1) is, therefore, capable of one meaning, viz.,
that it enables the President to entrust the State Government or
its officers, with its consent, to carry out functions which appertain
to the executive power of the Union vesting in him and no other
kind of power. It delimits not merely the field which ordinarily
must be List I of the Seventh Schedule but also the nature of the
functions which must be executive.
Amir Khan v. State, I.LR. [1962] 2 All. 310, disapproved.
The basic concept of law is that it should consist of a body
of rules which govern the conduct of persons forming the community in which it is enforced and which that community enforces
throttgh necessary machinery.
So judged, the notification issued by the President under Art.
258(1) of the Constitution has not the force oflaw within the meaning
of ss. 2{d) and 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960. It
is merely an executive order with the authority of law behind.
In order that the notification or order may have the force of law
it has to contain a rule or body of rules regulating the conduct
of a person or persons that can be enforced in a court of law,
having been passed by a body authorised to do so.
'Authority of law' must be distinguished from 'the force of
law' and every order that has the authority of law behind it would
not be one having the force of law unless it complies with the basic
concept of law. An order having the authority of law behind
it may be recognised by cottrts but unless it prescribes a rule of
conduct which a person or persons must obey there can be no question of its being enforced by a court oflaw or other authority.
It is not correct to say that when the Government names
the authority which will make the rules, its order has the force
of law. In so naming the Government performs an executive
function.
The notification of the President under Art. 258(1) is an executive order which the courts must recognise and an order of the
Commissioner of a Division in pursuance of it will have the same
effect as the order of the Central Government. But it cannot
be said that a notification of the President under Art. 258(1) effects
an 'amendment of the law in connection with which the order is
•
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
made. It was therefore, not correct to say that the definition of
1963
'appropriate Government' ins. 2(ee) of the Act was amended because
Jayantila/ Amrit
of the notification in question.
The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, (1955) 1 S.C.R. Lal Shodhan
735, distinguished.
v.
Madhubhai Amathalal Gandhi v. Union of India, [1961] 1
F.N. Rana
S.C.R. 191, Public Prosecutor v. Illur Thippayya, I.LR. [1949]_
Mad. 371, King Emperor v. Abdul Hamil, (1923) I.LR. II Pat. 134
and Ramendrachandra Ray v. Emperor, (1931) I.LR. XVlll Cal.
1303, held inapplicable.
State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, (1951] S.C.R. 682, considered.
Chanabassapa Shivappa Tori v. Gurupadappa Murgeppa Hanji,
I.LR. (1958] Mys. 48 and Haji K.K. Madu v. Food Inspector
Kozhikode, I.LR. [1961] Kerala 639, doubted.
The notification not being law was not saved under s. 87 and
the Commissioner of Baroda Division, therefore, had no power
to act under the notification in question since it had not the consent
of the State of Gujarat and his notifications for acquisition of the
property must be struck do-nn.
•
•
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 104 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 14, 1962, of the Gujarat High Court in Special
Civil Application No. 145of1961.
G.S. Pathak, G. Dutta, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N.S. Bindra
and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
November 5, 1963. The Judgment of P.B .
Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah and Raghubar Dayal JJ.
was delivered by Shah J. The dissenting Opinion of
K.N. Wanchoo and Subba Rao JJ. was delivered by
Wanchoo J.
SHAH J.-By notification published on September
1, 1960 under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I
of 1894, the Commissioner, Baroda Division, State
of Gujarat, exercising functions entrusted to him under
a notification dated July 24, 1959, issued by the President, under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution, notified
that a piece of land Part of Final Plot No. 686, Ellis
Shah J.
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Bridge Town Planning Scheme, belonging to the appe.
. llant was likely to be needed for a public purpose
Jayantzlal Amrzt viz., construction of a Telephone Exchange Building
Lal Shodhan in Ellis Bridge, Ahmedabad.
v.
Notice was thereafter served by the Additional
F.N. Rana
Special Land Acqui~ition Officer, Ahmedabad (who
was
appointed by the order of the Commissioner
ShahJ.
to perform the functions of a Collector), upon the
appellant under s. SA of the Act inviting objections to
the acquisition of the land. The appellant filed
objections to the proposed acquisition. The Additional
Special Land Acquisition Officer submitted his report
to the Commissioner, who issued a notification dated
January 11, 1961, under s. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, declaring that the land notified under the earlier
notification was required for the public purpose
specified in col. 4 of the schedule and that the
Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad, was appointed under cl. (el of s. 3 to perform
the functions of the Collector for all proceedings
to be taken in respect of the land and to take order
under s. 7 of the Act for acquisition of the land.
The appellant then moved the High Court of
Gujarat under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution
for a writ of mandamus or other appropriate write
setting aside the notifications dated September 1,
1960, and January 11, 1961, and the proceedings
under s. SA of the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894,
held in respect of the land of the appellant and the
decision of the Commissioner, Baroda Division, and
for a writ setting aside the notification dated January
19, 1961, under s. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
and for interim relief. This petition was dismissed
by the High Court. With certificate of fitness under
Arts. 132(1) and 133 (l)(c) of the Constitution granted
by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred.
In this appeal counsel for the appellant has raised
two contentions:-(1) That the Commissioner had in the events
that had happened no power to issue
the notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the
1963
...
'
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894, purporting
1963
to act upon the notification issued by the
President on July 24, 1959, under Art. 258(1)Jayantilal Amrit
of the Constitution entrusting the functions Lal Shodhan
of the Union Government relating to acquisiv.
tion of land to the Commissioners of Divisions F.N. Rana
in the State of Bombay, because those funcShah J.
tions {;Ould not be performed after the State
of Bombay ceased to exist, and the State
of Gujarat came into existence, and the consent of the Government of the latter State
to the entrustment of functions to its officers
had not been obtained; and
(2) that the proceeding under s. SA of the Land
Acquisition Act being quasi-judicial, authority
to make a report under that section could not
be delegated by the Commissioner, and that
the report made by the Additional Special
Land Acquisition Officer could not in any
event be considered by the Commissioner.
It may be useful to set out certain statutory
provisions in the context of the relevant constitutional
set up. By the Constitution as amended by the
Seventh Constitutional Amendment Act, 1956, legislative power in respect of acquisition and requisitioning
of property is vested. under entry 42 in the Concurrent
List in the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures. But by virtue of Art. 372, the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 relating to compulsory acquisition
of land for public purposes continues to remain
in force. The Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894,
authorises the appropriate Government by s. 4(1)
to publish the preliminary notification that land in
any locality is likely to be needed for any public
purpose, and upon the publication of such a notification the officers either generally or specially authorised
by the appropriate Government in that behalf are
clothed with authority, among other, to enter upon
and survey the land and to do all acts necessary to
ascertain whether the land is adapted for the purpose,
to set out the boundaries by placing marks and cutting
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
trenches etc. The expression "appropriate Government" is defined by cl. (ee) ofs. 3 in relation to acquisiJayantilal Amrit tion of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central
Lal Shodhan Government, and in relation to acquisition of land
v.
for any other purposes, the State Government. Any
F.N. Rana
person interested in any land notified under s. 4(1)
may within thirty days after the issue of the notificaShah J.
tion object in writing to the acquisition of the land
or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
The Collector must give to the objector an opportu- ·
nity to be heard and after hearing such objection and
making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks
necessary, he has to submit the case to the appropriate
Government with a report containing his recommendations on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the report is made final by sub-s.
(2) of s. SA. The expression "Collector" is defined
in s. 3(c) as meaning the Ccllector of a district, and
includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer
specially appointed by the appropriate Government
to perform the functions of a Collector under the
Act. By s. 6 the appropriate Government is authorised to make a declaration, if the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report under
s. 5A sub-s. (2) that any particular land is needed for
a public purpose. The declaration so made is by
sub-s. (3) of s. 6 conclusive evidence that the land is
needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as
the case may be. By s. 7 the appropriate Government or an officer appointed by the appropriate
Government in that behalf, may direct the Collector
to take order for the acquisition of the land declared
to be needed and the Collector then causes public
notice to be given informing the parties concerned
that the Government intends to take possession of
the land and that claims to compensation for all
interests in such land may be made to him. He
then holds an inquiry into the nature of the interest
of the person claiming compensation, and the objections
to the measurement of the land to be acquired and
to make an award setting out the true area of the
land, the compen~ation which in his opinion should
1963
-
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
be allowed for the land, and the apportionment
1963
of compensation among persons known or believed
~.
to be interested of whose claims he has information Jayanti/al Arnrit
(ss. 9 & 11). It is clear from this brief resume that Lal Shodhan
where land is acquired for the purposes of the Central
v.
Government, notification under ss. 4 and 6 may be F.N. Rana
issued by the Central Government and inquiries
Shah J.
may be made under ss. 5A and 9 and compensation
awarded by an Officer designated by the Act as the
Collector, who in the case of acquisition for the purposes
of the Union would normally be an officer specially
appointed in that behalf by that Government.
•
+
Jn exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 258
of the Constitution the President of India on July
24, 1959, issued a notification entrusting with the
consent of the State Government of Bombay, to the
Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Bombay,
the functions of the Central Government under the
Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, in relation to acquisi·
tion of land for the purpose of the Union within
the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the said
Commissioners subject to the same control by the
Government of Bombay as is from time to time
exercisable by that Government in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose of the State. At the date
of the notification the territory which· now forms the
State of Gujarat and in which the land in dispute is
situate was part of the State of Bombay, but on May
1, 1960,--called the appointed day-as a result of
the reorganisation of the State of Bombay under the
Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, out of the territory
of that State, two States were carved out-the State
of Maharashtra and the State of Gujarat, and the
territory covering the Baroda Division was allotted
to the State of Gujarat. To ensure a smooth bifurcation of the State of Bombay, provisions relating to
the continuance in office of the officers in the same
posts which they occupied before the appointed day,
and maintaining the territorial extent of laws were
enacted. Section 82 of the Bombay Reorganisation
Act, 1960, enacted that every person who, imme-
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
diately before the appointed day, is holding or dis. charging the duties of any post or office in connection
Jayantilal Amrit with the affairs of the State of Bombay in any area
Lal Shodhan which on that day falls within the State of Maharav.
shtra or Gujarat shall, subject to an order by a comF.N. Rana petent authority, continue to hold the same post
Shah J.
or office in that State and shall be deemed, as from
that day, to have been duly appointed to the post
or office by the Government of, or other appropriate
authority in that State. By s. 87 provi>ion was made
for maintaining the territorial extent of the
laws even after the appointed day. It was enacted·
that provisions of Part II (i.e. provisions relating to
the reorganisation of Bombay State into two States)
shall not be deemed to have effected. any change in
the territories to which any law in force immediately
before the appointed day extends or applies, and
territorial references in any such law to the State
of Bombay shall, untill otherwise provided by a
competent Legislature or other competent authority,
be construed as meaning the territories within that
State immediately before the appointed day. By
s. 2(d) of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960,
the expression "law" includes any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order, bye-law, rule, scheme, notification or other instrument having, immediately before
the appointed day, the force of law in the whole
or in any part of the State of Bombay.
1963
.
The notification issued by the President of India
on July 24, 1959, under Art. 258(1) in terms entrusted
certain functions under the Land Acquisition Act
to the Commissioners of Divisions in the State of
Bombay and it was recited therein that the consent
to such entrustment of the State Government of
Bombay had been obtained. It is common ground
that before the date of the notification issued by the
Commissioner, Baroda Division, who was then functioning as an officer of the State of Gujarat, under
s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act no order expressly
entrusting the functions of the Union Government
under the Land Acquisition Act to any officer in the
{
t,
•
,
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
303
State of Gujarat was issued by the President, and
1963
the authority of the Commissioner to notify for acqui.
.
sition of the land of the appellant was sought to beJayantzlal Amnt
derived solely from ss. 82 and 87 of the Bombay Re- Lal Shodhan
organisation Act.
v.
F.N.Rana
The appellant contended that the power exercisShah J.
able by the President being executive in character,
the functions which may be entrusted to a State
Government or to an officer of that State under Art.
258(1) are executive, and entrustment of such executive
authority not being "law" within the meaning of
s. 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, the Commissioners of the new State of Gujarat after May I,
1960, were incompetent, by virtue of the Presidential
notification, to exercise the functions of the Union
Government under the Land Acquisition Act.
Support to this plea was sought to be derived from
the division of Part XI of the Constitution into Ch.
I containing Arts. 245 to 255 dealing with distribution of legislative powers and Ch. JI containing Arts.
256 to 261 dealing with "administrative relations
between the States'', and it was submitted that Art.
258, occurring as it does in Cb. II of Part XI, must
be deemed to deal with matters administrative or
executive and not legislative. Founding the argument
upon the title of Ch. II and the character of the two
preceding Arts. 256 and 257 dealing with the exercise
of the executive power of the State so as to ensure
compliance with the laws made by Parliament, and
in a manner so as not to impede or prejudice the
exercise of the executive power of the Union which
extends to the giving to the State Governments directio?s as may be necessary for that purpose, it was
claimed that Art. 258 deals with the entrustment of
executive functions and that entrustment of executive
functions by notification issued by the President cannot
amount to law, within the meaning of s. 87 of the
Bombay Reorganisation Act.
The plea about the placing of Art. 258 in Ch.
II and the character of the two preceding Articles
as indicative of the character of the powers conferred
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
by Art. 258( 1) is not at all decisive: for cl. (2) of Art.
. 258, and cl. (3) of Art. 261, which occur in Ch. II,
Jayantila/ Amrit deal with matters legislative and judicial. At this
Lal Shodhan stage Art. 258 may be set out:
v.
"(1) Notwithstanding anything in this ConF.N. Rana
stitution, the President may, with the consent
Shah J.
of the Government of a State, entrust either
conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions in relation to
any matter to which the executive power of the
Union extends.
(2) A law made by Parliament which applies
in any State may, notwithstanding that it relates
to a matter with respect to which the Legislature
of the State has no power to make laws, confer
powers and impose duties, or authorise the
conferring of powers and the imposition of duties,
upon the State or officers and authorities thereof.
(3) Where by virtue of this article
powers
and duties have been conferred or imposed
upon a State or officers or authorities thereof,
there shall be paid by the Government of India
to the State such sum as may be agreed, or,
in default of agreement, as may be determined
by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice
of India, in respect of any "extra costs of administration incurred by the State in connection
with the exercise of those powers and duties."
By the first clause, the Pre>ident is authorised to entrust
with the consent of the State Government, to that
Government or its officers functions in relation to
any matter to which the executive power of the Union
extends. Clause (2) deals with the exercise of legislative authority of Parliament in matters exclusively
within its competence to confer powers and impose
duties upon the State or officer> and authorities
thereof. Clause (3) provides for payment of sums
determined in the manner prescribed by the Union
for the burden of extra costs incurred by the State
1963
-.-
<
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
305
in connection with the performance of duties and
1963
exercise of powers conferred or imposed by virtue
---'
of Art. 258.
·
Jayantilal Amrit
The High Court held that the entrustment of
functions under Art. 258(1) did not fall within the
executive power of the Union. Jn the view of the
High Court functions which were not judicial or
legislative would not necessarily be regarded as
executive, and that certain functions which did not
fall within the three recognised categories- legislative,
judicial and executive, may be pla<:ed in the category
of miscellaneous functions. But it is now well settled
that functions which do not fall strictly within the
fiel<l legislative or judicial, fall in the residuary cla~s
and must be regarded as executive.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 7,
Art. 409 p. 192 it is observed:
"Executive Functions are incapable of Comprehensive difinition, for they are merely the
residue of the functions of government after
legislative and judicial functions have been taken
away. They include, in addition to the execution
of the laws, the maintenance "of public order,
the management of Crown property and nationalised industries and services, the direction of
foreign policy, the conduct of military operations, and the provision or supervision of such
services as education, public health, transport,
and state assistance and insurance."
Similarly in Wade and Phillips, Constitutional Law
6th Edn, at p. 16 it is observed:
'
"Jt i~ customary to divide functions of government 1~t~ thr.ee classes, legislative, executive
(or adm1mstrat1ve) and judicial."
!n Rai ~ahih R.am Jawaya Kap~r v.The State ofPunjab(l>
m dealmg with the question whether publi~hing
printing and selling of text books for the use of student~
may be regarded as an executive function of the State
(I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 225.
I/SCI/64-20
Lal Shodhan
v.
F.N. Rana
Shah J.
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
[1964]
Government, Mukherjea C.J., speaking for the
Court observed:
Jayanti/a/ Amrit
"It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive
Lal Shodhan
definition
of what executive function means and
v.
implies.
Ordinarily
the executive power connotes
F.N. Rana
the residue of governmental functions that remain
after legislative and judicial functions are taken
Shah J.
away."
It cannot however be assumed that the legislative
functions are exclusively performed by the Legislature,
executive functions by the executive and judicial
functions by the judiciary alone. The Constitution
has not made an absolute or rigid division of functions
between the three agencies of the State. To the
executive, exercise of functions legislative or judicial
are often entrusted. For instance power to frame
rules, regulations and notifications which are essentially legislative in character is frequently entrnsted
to the executive. Similarly judicial authority is also
entrusted by legislation to the executive authority:
Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyamsundar(l),
In the performance of the executive functions, public
authorities issue orders which are not far removed
from legislation and make decisions affecting the
personal and proprietary rights of individuals which
are quasi-judicial in character. In addition to these
quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative functions, the executive has also been empowered by statute to exercise
functions which are legislative andjudicial in character,
and in certain instances, powers are exercised which
appear to partake at the same moment of legislative,
executive and judicial characteristics. Jn the complexity of problems which modern governments have
to face and the plethora of parliamentary business
to which it inevitably leads, it becomes necessary
that the executive should often exercise powers of
subordinate legislation: Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. 7, Art. 409. It is indeed possible to characterise
with precision that an agency of the State is executive,
legislative or judicial, but it cannot be predicated
(!) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339.
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
that a particular function exercised by any individual
1963
agency is necessarily of the character which the agency
bears.
Jayanti/a/ Amrit
,
But it is not necessary to dilate upon this matter
in detail. For the purpose of this case it would
serve no useful purpose to decide whether under Art.
258(1) by a Presidential notification only executive
functions of the Central Government may be entrusted to the State or to an officer of the State. By
the notification in question only "the functions of the
Central Government under the Land Acquisition
Act I of l 894, in relation to acquisition of land for
the purpose of the Union" have been entrusted
to the Commissioners of Divisions. The power exercisable by the appropriate Government under s. 55
of the Land Acquisition Act to frame Rules under
the Act has not been entrusted to the Commissioner.
Whether such a function can be entrusted does not
call for examination in this case. An argument
advanced at the Bar which proceeded upon an erroneous premise about the field in which Art. 258(1)
operates may however be noticed. That clause enables
the President to entrust to the State the functions
which are vested in the Union, and which are exercisable by the President on behalf of the Union: it does
not authorise the President to entrust to any other
person or body the powers and functions with which
he is by the express provisions of the Constitution
as President invested. The power to promulgate
Ordinances under Art. 123; to suspend the provisions
of Arts. 268 to 279 during an emergency; to declare
failure of the Constitutional machinery in States
under Art. 356; to declare a financial emergency
under Art. 360; to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of perwns appointed
to posts and services in connection with the affairs
of the Union under Art. 309-to enumerate a few
out of the various powers-are not powers of the Union
Government; these are powers vested in the President
by the Constitution and are incapable of beirg delegated or entrusted to any other body or authority
Lal Shodhan
v.
F.N. Rana
Shah J.
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
under Art. 258(1 ). The plea that the very nature
of these powers is such that they could not be intended
Jayanti/a/ Amrit to be entrusted under Art. 2 58t l) to the State or
Lal Shodhan officer of the State, and therefore that clause must
v.
have a limited content, proceeds upon an obvious
F.N. Rana fallacy. Those powers cannot be delegated under
Art. 258(1) because they are not the powers of the
Shah J.
Umon, and not because of their special character.
There is a vast array of other powers exercisable
by the President-to mention only a few-appointment of Judges : Arts. 124 & 217, appointment of
Committees of Official Languages Act: Art. 344,
appointment of Commissions to investigate conditions
of backward classes: Art. 340, appointment of Special
Officer for Scheduled Castes and Tribes: Art. 338,
exercise of his pleasure to terminate employment:
Art. 310, declaration that in the interest of the security
of the State it is not expedient to give to a
public servant sought to be dismissed an opportunity
contemplated by Art. 311(2)-these are executive
powers of the President and may not be delegated
or entrusted to another body or officer because
they do not fall within Art. 258.
The question which must be considered is whether
the notification issued by the President is law within
the meaning of s. 87 read with s. 2ld) of the Bombay
Reorganisation Act, 11 of 1960. It is necessary in
the first instance carefully to analyse the three stages
of the con5titutional process leading to the ultimate
exercise of function of the Union Government, by
the State or an officer of the State to whom the function
is entrusted. The three stages are(i) conferment of power upon the President
as the bead of the. Union to exercise the
functions of the Union;
•
(ii) entrustment of the function by the President
to the State Government or an officer of
the State .Government;
liii) exercise of the function by the State or its
officer, on behalf of the Union.
1963
~
,
5 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
By Art. 258(1) the President as the head of the Union
1963
is competent to entrust functions in relation to any
.
matter to which the executive power of the Unionlayanrilal Amnt
extends to any State Government, or officer of that Lal Shodhan
Government. These are functions of the Union
v.
and not of the President. There is no doubt thdt the F.N. Rana
investment of power or authority upon the President
Shah J.
i> part of the Constitution and has necessarily the
force of law. There is however controversy between
the parties about the true character of the entrustment of the functions by the President. The character
of the exerdse of the function so entrusted must
depend upon the field in which it operates and its
impact upon the citizens' rights.
The President is authorised by Art. 258( I) to
entrust functions with which the Union Government
is invested, provided the functions are in relation to
any matter to which the executive power of the Union
extends. By virtue of Art. 367, the General Clauses
Act, 1897, applies to the interpretation of the Constitution and s. (8) defines "Central Government" by
cl. (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after
the commencement of the Constitution, as meaning
the President and includes Ill relation to functions
entrusted undef cl. (1) of Art. 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Governme~t acting within the scope of the authority given
to 1t under that clause. By Art. 53 the executive
power of the Union is vested in the President and is
exercisable by him either directly or through officers
subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution and the e!'ecutive power .of the Union by Alt.
73 extends subject to the prov1s10ns of the Constitution:
(a) to the matters with respect to which Parlia-
ment has power to make laws; and
(b) to th~ ~x~rc!se of such rights, authority
and Junsd1ct10n as are exercisable by the
Government of India by virtue of any treaty
or agreements:
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Provided that the executive power referred to in sub-cl.
. (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in the ConstiJayantilal Amnt tution or in any law made by Parliament, extend
Lal Shodhan in any State to matters with respect to which the
v.
Legislature of the State has also power to make laws.
F.N. Rana Prima facie, the executive power of the Union extends
to all matters with respect to which Parliament has
ShahJ.
power to make laws and in respect of matters to which
the power of the Parliament extends. It was claimed
that by the use of the expression "save as expressly
provided in the Constitution" it was intended that
unless a provision in the Constitution expressly enacts
that the executive power of the Union shall, within
the meaning of Art. 73(1) proviso, extend to a matter
in respect of which the Legislature of a State has also
power to make laws, that provision cannot exclude
the operation of the proviso to Art. 73(1 ). But the
expression "save as expressly provided in the Constitution" is not susceptible of that limited interpretation. A provision in the Constitution conferring
authority upon the Union to exercise its powers in
matters with respect to which the Legislature of the
State has also power to make laws, operates notwithstanding the liffiltation enacted by the proviso.
Article 298, which, inter alia, extends the power of
the Union to the "acqui~ition" of property, is
one such provision. Our attention has not been
invited to any provision which makes an enactment
of the nature suggested by counsel for the appellant
excluding the operation of the proviso to Art. 73(1 ).
Articles 353, 360(3), 339(2), 256 and 257 on which
reliance was pla~ed, merely enact provisions in the
Constitution for giving directions to the State Governments in respect of certain specified matters or purpose,.
The form in which these provisions are couched do
not expressly provide that within .the field of their
operation Art. 73(1) proviso will not apply. The
language used, on the other hand, supports the view
that power is conferred upon the Union to do certain
things falling within the limits of the executive power,
even though normally the power in respect of that
matter may be exercised by the State Legislature
1963
.
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
by virtue of the legislative entry to which it relates.
1963
It is therefore open to the President, subject to the . ~
.
proviso to cl. (I) of Art. 73, with the consent of the Jayantzlal Amrit
State Government, to entrust executive power of the Lal Shodhan
Union relating to acquisition of land either to the
v.
State or any officers of the State.
F.N. Rana
'
'
We are in this appeal not concerned to ascertain
whether the exercise of powers entrusted to the
State or its officers has the force of law. We are
directly concerned with the nature of the power exercised by the President under Art. 258(1) entrustmg
functions to the State or its officers. The President
is indisputably the executive head of the Union,
but it cannot be assumed on that account that the
exercise of power by him under Art. 258(1) cannot
have the effect of law within the meaning of s. 87
of the Bombay Reorganisation Act.
By the notification dated July 24, 1959, issued by the President,
power was entrusted to the Commis&ioner, Baroda
Division, in respect of matters relating to acquisition
of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. By
item 42, List III, the subject of acquisition of property
falls within the Concurrent List and the Union Parliament has power to legislate in respect of acquisition
of property for the purpose of the Union, and by
virtue of Art. 73 (l)(a) the executive power of
the Union extends to the acquisition of property
for the Union. By Art. 298 of the Constitution
~he executive power of the .Union extends to the carrymg ~n of any tr.ade or busmess and to the acquisition,
holdmg and disposal of property and the making
of contracts for any purpose. The expression "acqui~ition, ~olding an.ct disposal of property" would,
111 our Judgment, mclude compulsory acquisition of
property. That is a provision in the Constitution
which within t~e meaning of the proviso to Art. 73(1)
expressly provides that the Parliament may acquire
property for th~ U?rnn a1:1d consequently executive
P.ower of the Umc.m m relat10n to compulsory acquisit10n of property rs saved thereby, power of the State
to acquire land notwithstanding.
Shah J.
312
· SllPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
.
In this background we may consider the effect
of the Presidential notification. It cannot be and
Jayanti/al Amrit has not been denied that it was open to the LegislaLal Shodhan ture by making an express provision in the Act tG
v.
entrust the functions ot the Central Government
F.N. Rana
that is to confer powers and impose duties under Art.
258(2) in relation to matters under ss. 4, SA, 7, 9 and
Shah J.
11 and related sections to Commissioners of Divisions
in the State.
Such entrustment of power would
not ·be open to challenge on the ground that it
was unauthorised. If entrusted by enactment, it
would have the force of law. It was open to the
Parliament by appropriate legislation mcorporated
in the Land Acquisition Act or otherwise to provide
that the power to issue notifications under ss. 4 &
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and to appoint the
Collector, be exercised by an officer to be named
by the appropriate Government. lsrne of a notification by the appropriate Government designating
the officer to exercise the powers would unquestionably have the force of law, within the meaning of
s. 2(d). Instead of making detailed provisions and
cato.loguing the entrustment of tunctions in the different
statutes which may be entr.isted to the authorities
of the State by the exercise of legislative power, the
Constitution has invested the President with authority
to entrust the functions to the Government of the
State or their officers. The effect of Art. 258(1)
is merely to make a blanket provision enabling the
President by notification to exercise the power whkh
.the Legislature could exercise by legislation, to entrust
function; to the officers to be specified in that behalf
by the President and subject to the conditions prescribed thereby. By the entrustment of powers under
the statute, the notification merely authorises the State
·or an officer of the State in the circumstances and
within the limits prescribed to exercise the specified
functions. Effect of the Presidential notification is
that, wherever the expression "appropriate Government" occurs in the Act in relation to provisions
for acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union,
the words "appropriate Government or the Commis1963
\
..
.
.
.
5 S.C.R. ,,' SUPRE1\1E COURT REPORTS~
\
'
-
-
-
__
313
..
--~~-"
sioneibfthe Division having territorial jurisdiction over.
1963
the area in which the land is situate'', -were deemed . to be substituted; In other words, by the is&ue of the. Jayantilal Amrit
Presidential. notification, the Land Acquisition Act. Lal_ Shodhan
must be deemed pro tanto amended; It would be
v.
difficult to regard such an amendment· a~ not having F.N. Rana
the force of law. - .
Shah J.
In this connection we may, refer to the ·decision
of this Court. in. The Edward Mills Company Ltd:
v. The State of Ajmer<• l, which illustrates the view.
which we have expressed. It was held.in the Edward. ·
Mills' case< 1 l that an order made under s. 94(3)
of the.Government of India Act, 1935, was, notwitb,.
standing the repeal of the Government of'Inaia Act,
1935, by Art. 395 of the Constitution; law. in force.
By s. 94(3) of the Government of India Act; 1935,. ·
a Chief Commissioner's Province had to be administered by the Governor-General. ai;ting to such extent
as be thinks fit through the Chief Commissioner to
be appointed by him m his. discretion. On March
16, 1949, the Central Government issued a notification in exercise of its powers under s. 94l3) of the ,
Government of India Act, 1935, directing. that .. the
functions of the appropriate Government under the
Minimum Wages Act, II of 1948;. would in respect
of evef} Chief Commissioner.'~ Province be exercised ·
by the Chief· Ccmmissioner. ··After the·. commence--ment of the 'Constitution the Chief Commhsioner:
of Ajmer purporting to act as the appropriate Government published a notification in terms of.s.-27 of the
Act of his intention .to include. "employment in the
textile mills" as an additional item 'in: Part. I of the
Schedule, and issued the final notification directing
that "the employment in textile industry" be added
in Part I of the schedule; The validity•of the orders
of the Chief Commissi.:mer. was challenged on ·the·
ground, among others, that the. order of the GovernorGeneral under. s .. 94(3) of the Government of India
Act was not "law in force" within the meaning, of
Art. 372 of the Constitution. It was urged that without
delegation of fresh authority by the President under
(I) [1955] l S.C.R. 735.
.
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Art. 239 of the Constitution, the Chief Commissioner
of Ajmer was not competent,· after the enactment of the
Jayantilal Amrir Constitution; to function as the appropriate GovernLa/ Shodhan ment under the Minimum Wages Act and therefore
v.
all steps taken by the Chief Commissioner under the
F.N. Rana . provisions of the Act including the issue of the final
notification fixing the minimum rates of wages for
Shah J. · the employment in the textile mills in the State of
-·· · Ajmer was'illegaland ultra vires. The question which
therefore fell to be determined in the Edward
Mills' case<1 J was whether the order made by the
Central Government under s. 94(3) of the Govern-·
ment of India Act, 1935, could be regarded as "law
in force" within the meaning of Art. 372 of the Constitution. It was urged that an-order may fall within
the definition ot existing law but it cannot be included
within the expression "law in force" in Art. 372 of
the Constitution.. Mukherjea J., speaking f;ir the
• Court in that case observed that there was no distinction between the expression "existing law" used
in Art.. 366(1) and the expression "law in force"
··occurring in Art. 372 of the Constitution, that the
, words "law in force" as used in Art. 372 are wide
enough to include not merely a legislative enactment
·· but also a regtilation or order which has the force
. of law, and that an-order made by the GovernorGeneral under s. 94(3) investing the Chief Commissioner
·with authonty to administer a province is really
in the nature of a legislative provision, which defines
the rights and powers of the Chief Commissioner
in respect of that province falls within the purview
of Art. 372 of the Constitution and being "law in
force" immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution continues to remain. in force under
cl. (1) of the Artide. Jn our view, the Edward Mills'
case< 1 >, strongly . supports the conclusion that the .
. notification issued by the President conferring authori;.
ty upon the Commissioner to exercise the powers
of the appropriate Government in the matter of land
acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act has the
force of law because even tho.igh issued by an execu1963
-
(1) [19551 I S.C.R. 735.
.
5S.C.R.
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
tive authority, the Courts are, if challenged, boand
1963
to recognise and give effect to the authority conferred
.
.
by the notification. We see no dhtinctlon in principle Jayanttlal Amrit
between the notification which was issued by the Lal Shodhan
Governor-General in Edward Mills' case< 1 l, and the
v.
notification with which we are dealing in this case. F.N. Rana
This is not to say that every order issued by an execuSlzah J.
tive authority has the force of law. If the order is
purely administrative, or is not issued in exercise
of any statutory authority it may not have the force
of law. But where a general order is issued even
by an executive authority which confers power exercisable under a statute, and which thereby in substance
modifies or adds to the statute, such conferment of
powers must be regarded as having the force of
law.
In Chanabasappa Shivappa v. Gurupadappa Murigappa<2l decided by the Mysore High Court under
s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, which
in terms is substantially the same as s. 87 of the Bombay
Reorganisation Act, 1960, and the definition of 'law'
as given in s. 2(h) of that Act is in terms identical
with the definition given in s. 2(d) of the Bombay
Reorganisation Act, the operation of a notification
issued by the Government of Bombay conferring
powers to try election petitions under the Bombay
District Municipal Act, 1901, after the reorganisation
of the State of Bombay under the States Reorganisation was, in our view, properly upheld.
The second que&tion on which argument was
advanced does not require much elaboration. By
s. SA of the Land Acquisition Act, power to hear
objections has to be exercised by the Collector as
defined in s. 2(c) of the Act. The power to hear objections is under the statute, not the power of the
appropriate Government, but of the Collector. The
expression 'Collector'· as defined in the Act is either
the Collector of a district or any officer specially
appointed by the appropriate Government to perform
the function of a Collector under the Act. The
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 735.
(2) l.L.R. (1958) Mysore 48.
316
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
statute itself confers authority to appoint a Collector
. for the purposes of the Act by the appropriate GovernJayantzlal Amm ment, and the Commissioner acting in pursuance
Lal Shodhan of the powers conferred upon him by Art. 258(1)
v.
appointed the Additional Special Land Acquisition
F.N. Rana
Officer, Ahmedabad, as Collector for the purposes
of s. 5A. In so appointing the Additional Special
Shah J.
Land Acquisition Officer the Commissioner exercised
the power which was statutorily vested in the appropriate Government.
1963
.
It may at once be observed that no materials
have been placed before the Court by the appellant
to support the contention which was at one stage
faintly advanced that the proceedings of the Colle~tor
were irregular or illegal. The Collector held an
inquiry as contemplated by s. 5A and made his report
to the Commissioner exercising the functions of the
appropriate Government and in pursuance of that
report the notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. Under s. 5A(2' every objection
to the acquisition of the land notified or of any land
in the locality has to be made to the Collector in
writing and the Collector has to give the objector
an opportunity of being heard either in person or
by pleader and he has, after hearing all such objections,
and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he
thinks necessary, to make a report of his recommendations on the objections. The report under s. 5A 1s
not a condition precedent to the issue of the is:sue
of the notification under s. 6. The appropriate Government may under the emergency clause in s. 17 take
possession of the land free from all encumbrances
and direct under sub-s. (4) of s. 17 that in the case
of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate
Government, the provisions of sub-s. (l) or sub-s.
(2) are applicable, the provisions of s. 5A shall not
apply. Again the Collector is not required to arrive
at any decision. He has to submit the case for the
decision of the appropriate Government together
with the record of the proceedings held by him and
a report containing his recommendations on the
I
SS.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
objections. Prima facie, such a report would be an
1963
administrative report, relying upon which the Govern~.
ment makes its decision under s. 6 whether or not Jayantilal Amrit
to notify the land for acquisition. The decision that Lal Shodhan
any particular land is needed for a publi<:: purpose
v.
is an administrative decision and it is for the purpose F.N. Rana
of arriving at that decision that the Act requires
Shah J.
that certain inquiries be made. It is true that the
Collector is required to follow the procedure prescribed and to give an opportunity to the objector of
being heard in person or by a pleader. It is, however,
open as s. SA expressly provides to the Collector
to make an independent inquiry, apart from the
enquiry on the objections submitted. It cannot in
the circumstances be said that the inquiry is a judicial
or a quasi-judicial inquiry. There was in the present
case no delegation of any judicial power vested in
the Central Government. The power to hold an
inquiry is statutorily vested in the Collector, and
the Collector has exercised that power. The Commissioner exercising his authority entrusted to him merely
appointed on behalf of the Central Government
the Additional Land Acquisition Officer as the Collector
and considered the report in pursuance of the functions entrusted to him under the notification issued
by the President. In so acting he did not act in any
manner inconsistent with the authority conferred,
or which could in law be conferred, upon him. The
second objection must also fail.
ln our view therefore the appeal fails and 1s
dismissed with costs.
WANCHOO J.-We regret we are unable to agree. Wanchoo J.
'
Thi.s is an ~ppeal on a certificate granted by the
Gujarat High Court. The appellant is the owner
in possession of Final Plot No. 686 of Ellis Bridge
Town Planning Scheme No. 3 in Ahmedabad measuri?-g 7,018 ~q. yards. On September 1, 1960, a notification was 1&sued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition
318
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Act, No. 1 of 1894 (heremafter referred to as the
. Act) by the Commissioner of Baroda acting under
Jayantzlal Amm powers entrusted to him by an order of the President
Lal Shodhan under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution. By this
v.
notification the Commissioner notified that 3,200 sq.
F.N. Rana yards out of this plot was needed for the construction
of a telephone exchange building. Further by this
Wanchoo 1· notification the Commissioner appointed the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad to
perform the functions of the Collector under s. 5A
of the Act in respect of this land. Thereafter necessary
action was taken under s. 5A of the Act and the Commissioner made a notification under s. 6 of the Act on
January 12, 1961, after considering the report of
the Collector appointed under the earlier notification
under s. 4 and by this notification the Commissioner
specified that 3,387 sq. yards would be needed for the
construction of the telephone exchange building m
Ellis Bridge out of plot No.686. Thereafter on February
22, 1961, the appellant filed the writ petition out of
which the present appeal has arisen and he challenged
the notification under s. 6 of the Act on three main
grounds, namely1963
-.-
(1) The notification dated July 24, 1959, under
Art. 258(1) of the Constitution could not invest the
Commissioner with the powers therein specified in
view of the fact that it was made at a time when the new
State of Gujarat which came into existence on May 1,
1960 did not exist, and the officers of the State of Gujarat could only be entrusted with these functions under
Art. 258(1) with the consent of the Government
of Gujarat. As the notification of July 24, did not
have the consent of the State of Gujarat, it could not
be available for the purpose of conferring any power
on the officers of the State of Gujarat after May
1, 1960.
(2) Even if the notification of July 24, 1959,
was effective after the coming into existence of the
State of Gujarat, the Commissioner could not appoint
the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer as
5 s.c.R;
319
-·----··
a Collector for the purpose of s. 5-A· of the Act, as
1963
that .would amount to delegation oC his delegated · -..
authority.
\
. · Jayantzlal Amm
.
Lal Shodhan
(3) The proceedmgs under s. 5-A of the Act
v.
are quasi-judicial proceedings and that is another
reason why the Commissioner could not delegate F.N. Rana
his functions under s. 5-A to any other officer.
Wanchoo J.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the Union
of Inclia and its contention in reply to the three· main
· ·
grounds was that- '
(1) the notification uncler Art. 258 dated July
24, 1959, had the force of law and therefore in view
of ss. 82 and 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act,
1960, No. XI of 1960, (hereinafter referred to as
the Reorganisation Act), the notification continued
to have full force and effect and the Commissioner
could act under the functions entrusted to him;
(2) the Commissioner had authority in view of
the notification under Art. 258(1) to appoint a Collector
within the meaning of s. 3(c) of the Act and there
was no question of any sub-delegation of delegated
authority _by the Commissioner; and
. (3) the functions under s. 5-A of the Act are not
quasi-judicial ·but administrative. ·Even if they are
quasi-judicial, they are . vested in the Collector or
any officer specially appointed by the appropriate
government to perform the functions of a Collector
under the Act, and this is exactly what was done
·
by the Commissioner. .
The High Court dismissed the petition holding
that the notification of July 24, 1959, under Art.
258(1) of the Constitution had the force of law and
·was therefore saved under s. 87 of the Reorganisation
Act. In consequence reading·s. 87 withs. 82 of the
Reorganisation Act, the Commissioner would have
the ·power to carry on the functions entrusted· to
·him by the notification of July 24, 1959. It further
held that the Commissioner had the authority by
virtue of the notification of July 24, 1959, · to appoint
any officer specially to carry on the duties assigned
·-.....,..
' SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·. 320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
'-.......'
to .the Collector under the Act and ·therefore the
officer so appointed could carry on the duties a~signed
Jayantilal Amrit to the Collector under the Act. · Finally, it held that
Lal Shodhan ', proceedings under s.- 5-A of the Act were administrav.
.tive in nature and there was therefore no question
F.N. Rana
, of delegation 'of any quasi-judicial functions either
-rby the notification dated July24, 1959, or bythe order
Wanchoo J, of the Commissioner appointing an officer specially
to carry on the duties of the Collector under the Act.
-- The appellaiif- thereupon applied for a certificate
which was granted; and that is how the matter has
·
come up before ·us.
'1963
·
-
The main question that falls for consideration
is the nature ·of the notification dated July 24, 1959,
:under Art .. 258(1) of the Constitution. The contention of the appellant is that Art. 258(1) deals
with entrustment of executive· functions only by
the President to the State Government or to its officers
with .its consent and has no application to entrustment of any· other functions of the President, whether
'legislative or quasi-judicial. Therefore any notification issued under Art. .258(1' can only amount to
an executive act of the President and cannot have
the force of law. Further, it is urged that even if
-the fact that the scope of Art. 258(1) is only confined
. to entrustment ot executive functions mav not be
decisive of the question whether a particular order
·passed under it is an executive act, the nature of the
order passed in the present case is such that it must
· be held to be executive in character and cannot be
a ;Jaw and have the force of Jaw. ·Consequently s; 87
· . of the Reorganisation Act will ·not apply to this
· order and it will not be saved as an order or notification
. 1having the force of law by that section.,. Lastly,
·it is urged that s. 82,by itself would not be sufficient
· to save .the power conferred on the Commis~ioner
;by 1the notification of July 24, 1959, for under that
section all.persons before the appointed day holding or
'discharging the duties of any. post or office in connection with the affairs of the State of Bombay in any area
which on that day falls within the State of Maharashtra
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
or Gujarat shall continue to hold the same post or
1963
office in that State and shall be deemed to have been
duly appointed to the post or office by the Govern- Jayantilal Amrit
ment of, or other appropriate authority in, that State. Lal Shodhan
This, it is urged, only means that the person holding
v.
the office of Commissioner immediately before the F.N. Rana
appointed day will continue to be a Commissioner
for the purpose of the State of Gujarat and will be Wanchoo J.
deemed to have been appointed to that office by the
State of Gujarat from the appointed day. But s. 82
will not have the effect of the Commissioner continuing to have the functions entrusted to him by the
notification of July 24, 1959, for the pre-condition
to his retaining such functions, namely, the consent
of the State of Gujarat, would be wanting.
It is not disputed on behalf of the Union of India
that if the notification dated July 24, 1959, has not
the force of law and s. 87 of the Reorganisation Act
does not apply to it, it will not &urvive after May
1, 1960, when the State of Gujarat came into existence.
It is however contended on behalf of the respondents
that Art. 258(1) contemplates entrustment not only
of executive functions but of all functions, whether
legislative or executive or quasi-judicial, and that
the order of July 24, 1959, has the force of law and
would be saved under s. 87 ot the Reorganisation
Act.
We must therefore proceed to consider whether
functions which can be entrusted to the State Government or to its officers with the consent of the State
Government under Art. 258(1) are only executive
functions or all kinds of functions, whether executive,
legislative or quasi-judicial. Article 258(1) reads
as follows :"(I) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the President may, with the consent of the
Government of a State, entrust either conditionally
or unconditionally to that Government or to
its officers functions in relation to any matter
to which the executive power of the Union
extends."
I SCI/64-21
322
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Stress is laid on behalf of the respondents on the
. word "functions" and it is urged that that word
Jayantzlal Amrzt is not qualified by the word "executive" and thereLa/ Shodhan fore it must be given the widest interpretation and
v.
would include all kind> of functions, whether exe<::utive,
F.N. Rana legislative or even quasi-judicial, if any. Further
it is urged that the words following the word ''funcWanchoo J. tions" in Art. 258(1) are only descriptive in nature
and do not mean that the functions which can be
entrusted are only executive functions. Reliance in
this connection is placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Amir Khan v. StateCl>, where
it was held with reference to s. 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is in the same terms
as Art. 258(1) that it was open to the GovernorGeneral to entrust his functions, even though they
may be legislative functions, under that section to
the Provincial Government.
1963
-.-
It is necessary therefore to examine the scheme
and setting of Part XI of the Constitution in which
Art. 258( 1) appears to decide whether the functions
which can be entrusted under Art. 258(1) can only
be functions in relation to the executive power of the
Union or whether they can be functions relating to
the legislative or quasi-judicial powers also. Part
XI deals with the "relations between the Union and
the States" and is divided into two chapters. The
first chapter containing Arts. 245 to 255 deals with
legi&lative functions and is mainly concerned with
the distribution of legislative powers between the
Union and the States. Article 245 gives the general
law-making power to Parliament and the legislatures
of the States. Article 246 distributes powers of
legislation in accordance with Lists 1, lI and III of
the Seventh Schedule between Parliament and the
legislatures of the States and vests additional power
in Parliament to make laws with respect to matters
in all the Lists with respect to territories not included
in a State. Article 247 gives power to Parliament
by law to establish additional courts for certain
(1) l.L.R. [1962] 2 All. 310.
'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
purposes. Article 248 gives residuary powers of
1963
legisiation to Parliament. Article 249 provides tor
-..
power of Parliament to legislate with respect to matters Jayanulal Amnt
in the State List in the national interest in certain Lal Shodhan
contingencies. Article 250 give~ power to Parliav.
ment to legi>late with respect to any matter in the F.N. Rana
State List if a proclamation of emergency i& in force.
Article 251 provides for rescluti.on of any inconsistency Wanchoo J.
between the laws made by Parliament under Arts.
249 and 250 and the laws made by the legislatures
of the States under Art. 246. Article 252 provides
for powers of Parliament to legislate for two or more
States by consent. Article 253 gives power to Parliament to legislate to give effect to international agreements. Article 254 provides for resolution of inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and
laws made by the legislatures of States with respect
to the Concurrent List. Article 255 makes certain
procedural provisions with respect to laws which
require some recommendation and previous sanction.
lt will thus be seen that all these Articles in Chapter
I deal with legislation.
•
-
'
Chapter II is headed "administrative relations"
and contains Articles from 256 to 263. It is divided
into three parts, namely, general, disputes relating
to water and co-ordination between States, and is
mainly concerned with seeing that the executive
power of the Union and of the States is smoothly
exercised where it is to be exercise'.l in the same territory.
Article 256 lays down that "the executive power of
every State shall be so exercisei as to ensure compliance
with the laws made by Parliament and any existing
laws which apply in that State, and the exe1:utive
power of the Union shall ell.tend to the giving of
such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose".
Article 257 provides for control of the Union over
States in certain case<; and lays down that the executive
power of a State shaU be w exercised as not to impede
or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of
the Union. It further lays down that the executive
324
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
power of the Union &hall extend to the giving of
directions to a State for certain purposes and also
Jayantilal Amrit for payment of certain sums in certain circumstances
Lal Shodhan by the Government ot India to the Government
v.
of a State. Then comes Art. 258, the first clause
F.N. Rana
of which we have already set out. The second clauee
provides that a law made by Parliament which applies
Wanchoo J. in any State may, notwithstanding that it relates
to a matter with respect to which the Legislature
of the State bas no power to make laws, confer powers
and impose duties or authorise the conferring of
powers and tne impo:.itlon of duties, upon the State
or officers and authorities thereof. This clause may
be contrasted with cl. (1). lTnder cl. (1) no entrustment of tunction can take place without the consent
of the State Government but under cl. (2) Parliament
may by Jaw confer powers and impose duties in certain
circumstances and the consent of the State Government is not necessary for this purpose. This clearly
brings out. the distinction between entrustment of f
functions which is exercise of executive power under f
Art. 258 (I) and the making of a law conferring powers '··-.:
and duties which in express terms is exercise of legislative power under Art. 258(2). Clame (3) provides
for payment of certain sums. Thi& clause in our
opiruon refers only to cl. (2), for there is no question
of settlement of payment after the consent of the
State Government has been obtained. If there is
to be any payment for carrying out functions entrusted
under Art. 258(1) it will be settled when consent is
obtained. Article 258-A is the counterpart of Art.
258( 1) and permits the Governor of a State with the
consent ot the Government of India, to entrust either
conditionally or unconditionally to that Government
or to its officers functions in relation to any matter
to which the executive power of the State extends.
Article 260 gives power to the Government of India
by agreement with the Government of any territory
not being the territory of India to undertake any
executive, legislative or judicial functions vested in
the Government of sucfl territory. This Article certainf
ly refers to legislative, judicial and executive functions
1963
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
325
but they are referred to expressly and the Constitution1963
makers did not content themselves with using only
-..
the word "functions". Article 261 provides for full Jayanulal Amm
faith and credit to public acts, records and judicial Lal Shodhan
proceedings. Clause (2) thereof lays down how such
v.
full faith and credit as provided in cl. (I) shall be F.N. Rana
given and says that it shall be done as provided by law
made by Parliament. Clause (3) provides that final Wanchoo 1 ·
judgments or orders delivered or passed by civil
courts in any part of the territory of India shall be
capable of execution anywhere within that territory
according to law. It will be seen that Art. 261 also
where it departs from dealing with executive functions
specifically mentions whether the functions are legislative or judicial. Article 262 deals with disputes
relating to water and gives power to Parliament by
law to provide for adjudication of such disputes.
Here again this Article does not deal with executive
functions and this is clear from the words used in
the Article. Article 263 deals with co-ordination
between States and provides for the setting up of
inter-State Councils and is obviou;ly of an executive
nature.
•
It will be seen therefore that where Chapter
II of Part XI dealing with administrative relations
deals with matters other than executive functions,
it has specifically referred to these other matters
which have to be dealt with by law or which are judgments of courts; otherwise the whole of Chapter
II of Part XI is concerned with the executive power
of the Union or the State and therefore deals with
executive functions.
It is true that the word "functions" in Art. 258
{l) is not qualified by the word "executive" and there-
fore it may prima facie appear that all kinds of fonctions
whether legislative or qua&i-judicial or executive
can be entrusted by the President to the State Gov<'rn~
ment or its officers with its consent. The wcrd
"functions" in Art. 258 (l) is governed by the words
following "in relation to any matter to which the execu·
326
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
tive power of the Union extend~". It is said that
these words are ·merely descriptive and are in
Jayanti/a/ Amrit accordance with Art. 73 which defines the executive
Lal Shodhan power of the Union. Under Art. J3 (1) (a) the execuv.
tive power of the Union extends to matters with re~pect
F.N. Rana
to which Parliament has power to make laws subject
to the proviso thereto. So the argument runs that
Wanchoo J. the President can ordinarily entrust any kind of function in relation to matters contained in List I and
it is immaterial whether such functions are executive,
legislative or even quasi-judicial, if any. It is true
that the President can under Art. 258(1) entrust his
functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; but we have to
ask the question whether it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers that such "functions" could
be of any kind, whether legislative, executive or even
quasi-judicial, if any, in view of the scheme and setting in which Art. 258(1) appears. Tt seems. to us
that when Art. 258(1) is giving power to the President
to entrust his functions to the Government of a State
or do its officers in relation to any matters to which
the executive power of the Union extends, the intention
is to entrust only executive functions and no other.
The word "functions" even though it is not qualified
by the word "executive" in Art. 258(1) must in our
opinion take its colour from what follows and if
that is so the functions to be entrusted must be of
the same nature as the executive power of the Union.
It is true that the words following the word "functions"
describe the field withm which the functions can be
entrusted and this field is to be found in accordance
with List I ordmarily; but it is in our opinion legitimate to hold that the words following the word
"functions" when they delimit the field in which the
functions can be entrusted also indicate the nature
of the functions to be entrusted and this to our mind
is clear from the use of the words "executive power"
in the clause following the word "functions" and it
is only executive functions therefore which can be
entrusted by the President under Art. 258(1) to the
Government of a State or its officers.
1963
-
{
(
f
5 S.C.R.
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
327
Further the language used in Art. 258(1) re1963
inforces the above conclusion. We may in this
connection emphasise the words "entrust functions" Jayantilal Amriz
and "with the consent of". Entrustment implies Lal Shodhan
agency and when the President is entrusting his funcv.
tions to the State Government or its officers, he is F.N. Rana
creating an agency to carry out his functions and
creation of such agency is more in consonance with Wanchoo J.
carrying out the executive power of the Union which
vests in the President. Jn this connection the language
of cl. (2) may be contrasted. Clause (2) speaks of
conferment of powers and imposition of duties by
law while cl. (I) speaks of entrustment of functions
which words are more appropriate to the creation
of an agency to carry out the executive power of the
Union. Again the "entrustment of functions" can
take place only with the consent of the State Government. Now the requirement of consent is another
pointer that the functions to be entrusted are executive
functions only resulting in the creation of an agency
other than that envisaged in Art. 53. Such entrustment with the consent of the State Government is
nothing more than the appointment of another to
act for the President in carrying out the executive
power of the Union. The concept of consent is also
germane to entrustment of executive functions to
another agency which i5 otherwise not bound to carry
out such functions. Generally speaking, one does
not make a law with the consent of another (and this
is so in spite of the special provision contained
in Art. 250 though it is usual to ask for consent when
one wants another to do some executive act for one.
Taking therefore the language used in Art. 258( 1)
it is to our mind capable of only one meaning
viz. that it enables the President to ask the State Government or its officers, with its consent, to carry out
functions which pertain to the executive power of
the Union vesting in him and to no other kind of
power.
If this entrustment were to be extended to functions other than executive some startling results will
328
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
follow. There are many provisions in the Consti. tution which give legislative power, delegated or otberJayantilal Amrzt wise, to the President and if the word "functions"
Lal Shodhan in Art. 258(1) includes within it legislative functions
v.
and the words that follow the word "functions" only
F.N. Rana prescribe the field within which these functions may be
entrusted i.e. ordinarily within the limit of List I,
Wanchoo J. and do not further delimit that the functions to be
entrusted within this field are executive functions only,
the result will be that even the legislative functions
of the President, where they relate to this field, can be
entrusted by him to the State Government or its
officers. As an example take Art. 123. It gives
power to President to promulgate Ordinances in
certain circumstances, which have the same force
and effect as an Act of Parliament. These Ordinances can ordinarily be made with respect to matters
in List I and also in List III. Therefore if the functions
which can be entrusted under Art. 258(1) can also
be legislative, Art. 258 would be conferring power
on the President to entrust his function of Ordinancemaking to the Government of a State or its officers
with respect to matters in List I ordinarily. Such
a startling result which would follow on the interpretation urged by the learned Attorney-General could
not possibly have been intended by the Constitutionmakers. It seems to us therefore that when Art. 258
(1) speaks of entrustment of functions in relation to
any matters to which the executive power of the
Union extends it not only delimits the field within
which the entrustment can be made (and that field
is ordinarily to be found in List I of the Seventh
Schedule) but it also delimits the nature of the functions
to be entrusted, namely, those functions must be
executive. Otherwise, if the words following the word
"functions" merely delimit the field and the functions
of any kind, be they legislative, executive or even
quasi-judicial, if any, relating to List I can be ordinarily entrusted to the State Government or its officers,
the result would be that even the Ordinance-making
power under Art. 123 insofar as it relates to List
I can be entrusted as a function relating to that List
1963
-.-
'
f
"
'
'
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
to the State Government or its officers. But obviously
1963
this could not possibly be the intention of the Constitution-makers. Similar other legislative powers of Jayanti/al Amrit
the President are to be found in Art. 98(3) and Art. Lal Shodhan
101 (2) where he is authorised to make rules, in Art.
v.
118(3) which also gives him power to make rules, F.N. Rana
in Art. 309 where also the President can make rules,
in proviso to Art. 320(3) where the President can Wanchoo J.
make regulations, in Art. 357 which provides for
exercise of legislative power when a proclamation has
been made under Art. 356, in Arts. 372 and 372-A
which provide for adaptation. A review of these
provisions would make it clear that where it was
intended that the legislative power of the President
can be delegated (i.e. entrusted to others), there is
a specific provision therefor in the Article itself. For
example Art. 309, which gives rule-making power
in connection with services, specifically lays down
in the proviso that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct to make rules
relating to recruitment and the conditions of service
of persons to be appointed to the Union services
and posts. Similarly Art. 357 provides that where
by a proclamation issued under Art. 356 it has been
declared that the powers of the Legislature of the
State shall be exercisable by or under the authority
of Parliament, it shall be competent to confer on
the President the power of the Legislature of the
State to make laws and to authorise the President
to delegate subject to such conditions as he may
think fit to impose, the power so conferred upon
any other authority to be specified by him in that
behalf. It will be seen therefore that where it was
intended by the Constitution that the legislative
power of the President could be delegated by him
to some other person, there is a specific provision
in that behalf in the Constitution. It is difficult
therefore to accept that Art. 258(1) provides for the
entrustment of the legislative functions of the President,
for example, with respect to matters contained in
List I by a kind of side-wind to the State Goven;iment
or to any of its office1 s. We are therefore of opjnion
330
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
that even though the word "function~" in Art. 258
. is not qualified by the word "executive", the effect
Jayant1lal Amrit of the words following
the word "functions" in
Lal Shodhan Art. 2580) is two-fold, namely, to delimit the field
v.
within which the entrustment can take place, namely
F.N. Rana
the field covered ordinarily by List I and also to dehmit the nature of functions to be entrusted, namely,
Wanchoo !.
·
executive functions. We may alsc pomt
out that
there are provisions practically in all Central Acts
conferring rule-making power on the Central Government. Under s. 3 (8)(b) of the General Clauses
Act No. 10 of 1897, the "Central Government"
means the President. So if the contention of the
learned Attorney-General is to be accepted, Art.
258(1) in effect authorises the President to entrust
the rule-making power under various statutes to the
Stdte Government or its officers. Such a result
would not have been intended by the Constitutionmakers when Art. 258(1) was put in the·Constitution.
It is argued that the President is not bound to entrust
legislative functions to the State Government or its
officers and would generally never do so. The fact
that the President will not do so is no reason for
interpreting Art. 258(1) in such a way as will run
against the clear intention of the Constitution-makers
deducible from the scheme and setting in which the
Article appears and so make it possible for such
startling results as we have referred to above. We
are therefore of opinion that Art. 258(1) when it
speaks of entrustment of functions is only confined
to executive functions of the President and no other.
In this view the decision in Amirkhan' s case with respect to s. 124(1) of the Government of India Act
1935 which is pari materia with Art. 258(1) must be
held to be incorrect.
1963
-.-
It is next urged on behalf of the appellant that
even 'if Art. 258(1) is confined only to executive functions, it was not open to the President to entrust this
particular function under Art. 258(1) to an officer
of tqe State Government in view of the proviso to
Art.· 73(1) which lays down the extent of executive
r
l
1
t
I
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
331
power of the Union. Article 73(1) lays down by
1963
sub-cl. (a) that the executive power of the Union
-:-- .
extends to matters with respect to which Parliament Jayantilal Amnt
has power to make laws. This would prima facie Lal Shodhan
include both Lists I and III. But the proviso lays
v.
down that the executive power referred to in sub-cl. F.N. Rana
(a) shall not save as expressly provided in this Constitution or in any law made by Parliament extend in Wanchoo l.
any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State ha& also power to make laws. The
effect of this proviso is that the executive power of
the Union will not normally extend to matters covered
by List III, unless they are brought in by one or other
of the two exceptions in the proviso. These two
exceptions are: (i) where there is an express provision
in the Constitution, and (ii) where any law made
by Parliament provides otherwise. The contention
on behalf of the appellant is that there is . no law
providing otherwise and there is no express provision
m the Constitution by which the power of entrustment could be extended to a case of acquisition of
land by the Union as the power to make laws in
respect of acquisition and requisitioning is covered
by entry 42 of List HI. Therefore, it is urged that
this being a matter relating to List III, the executive
power of the Union does not extend to it and therefore no order with respect to it can be made by the
President under Art. 258(1 ). We do not think it
necessary to express any opinion on this aspect of the
matter in view of our decision on other points raised
before us.
This brings us to the main question involved
in this appeal, namely, whether the notification dated
July 24, 1959, is law to which s. 87 of the Reorganisation Act applies. The first contention of the appellant
in this connection is that as Art. 258(1) deals with
entrustment of executive functions, an order passed
thereunder can be an executive order and cannot
be a law. Prima facie this may be so; but it is not
in our opinion conclusive of the matter, and we have
still to see the contents of the order passed under
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
Art. 258( 1) to see whether it satisfies the definition
. of Jaw as contained in s. 2(d) of the Reorganisation
Jayanti/al Amnt Act. Section 2(d) say> that law includes any enactLa/ Shodhan ment, ordinance, regulation, order, bye-law, rule,
v.
scheme, notification or other mstrument having,
F.N. Rana · immediately before the appointed day, the force of
law in the whole onn an)' part of the State of Bombay.
Wanchoo J. It will be seen that the definition is inclusive and has
not actually defined what law means. Further all
the terms, which have been included in s. 2(d) may
not necessarily be law and they will be law only
if they have the force of law. It is not disputed,
for example, that every order passed and every notification issued by the Government will not necessarily
be law and it is only such orders and notifications
as have the force of law which will be law within
the meaning of s. 2(d) and therefore law for
the purpose of s. 87 of the Act. We have therefore
to find out the exact connotation of the expression
"having the force oflaw" in order to determine whether
an order or notification is law within the meaning
of s. 2(d).
,.
1963
-
What then is the concept of law which must
in our opinion be borne in mind before deciding
whether an order or notification has the force of law?
"In the broadest sense in which the term 'law' should
be used, it signifies a command which obliges a person
or persons to a course of conduct. Being a command,
it must issue from a determinate person or group
of persons, with the threat of displeasure if the rule
be not obeyed." This concept 1s to be found in
Austin's Jurisprudence. But it was open to the
criticism that it would exclude customs or usages
which have the force of law, as customs or usages
are not commands which issue from a determinate
person or group of persons. Salmond therefore
broadened the concept of law and defined it as a
"body of principles recognised and applied by the
State in the administration of justice". Paton in
his book on Jurisprudence, second edition, at
p. 77 defines 'law' as follows:-
1
5 S.C.R.
•
''
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
333
"Law may shortly be described in terms of a legal
1963
order tacitly or formally accepted by a community,
and it consists of the body of rules which that Jayanti/al Amrit
community considers essential to its welfare and Lal Shodhan
which it ·is willing to enforce by the creation
v.
of a specific mechanism for securing compliance." F.N. Rana
It will be seen therefore whether law comes Wanchoo J.
as a command of a sovereign body or as a custom or
usage having the force of law, the basic concept
is that it should consist of a body of rules which
govern the conduct of persons forming the community
in which it is enforced and which that community
enforces through necessary machinery. lt fellows
therefore that if a notification or order made by
Government is to have the force of law, it must consist of a rule or body of rules regulating the course
of condm:t of a person or persons living in the community and further it should be enforceable by judicial
or other processes created for the purpose.
Let us see how this concept of law is satisfied
in the present case taking into account the definition
given in s. 2( d) of the Reorganisation Act. The
essence of that definition is that an order or notification in order to be law must have the force of law.
The expreRsion "force of law" must be distinguished
from "the authority of law". Many orders issued
by Government have the authority of law behind
them but "11 of them cannot invariably be said to
have the force of law, for in order that they may have
the force of law they mu't satisfy the basic concept
of law, i.e., they must contain a rule or body of rules
regulating the course of conduct of a person or persons
living in that community enforceable through courts
or other machinery provided therefor. Thus if an
order is issued under the authonty of law but it does
not prescribe a course of conduct regulating the action
of a person or persons living in the community, it
cannot be law, for such an order would not necessarily
require enforcement by courts or other machinery,
for no question of its breach requiring enforcement
arises as it prescfibes no course of conduct for the
334
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
community to obey. Such an order may have the
-:-- . authority of law behind it and in a State governed
Jayantzlal Amrzt by the rule of law it will usually be so. But "the
Lal Shodhan authority of law" as we have said already must be
v.
di>tinguished from "the force of law" and every
F.N. Rana order that has the authority of law behind it would
not be one having the force 'of law, unless it complies
Wanchoo J. with the basic concept of law as mentioned above.
It has however been urged that an order having "the
authority of law" would be enforced by courts and
therefore it may be said to have the force of law.
There is in our opinion a misconception in this argument. An order having "the authority of law"
behind it may be recognised by courts but unless
it pre~cribes a rule of conduct which a person or
persons living in the community must obey there
is no question of its being enforced by a court of law
or other authority. The recognition of an order
having the authority of law by courts or other authorities is in our opinion different from its enforcement
by courts or other authorities, and it is only when
the order can be enforced by courts or other authorities
that it can be said to have the force of law. The
court; or other authorities may even recognize orders
of Government which h.tve no direct authority of
law behind them but which are not opposed to any
law. Such orders cannot be said to have the force
of law and be enforceable by courts or other authorities and thus claim to have the force of law, for they
lack the basic concept of law as already referred to.
1963
Let us now look to the definition in s. 2(d) in
the light of this ba&ic concept of law and see how
the various terms included within "law" as having
the force of law satisfy this basic concept. The
first term included ins. 2(d) is enactment. An enactment has necessarily the force of law because it is
an expression of the legislative will and is expressly
enacted as law by the legislature and would nece~sarily
contain a bod} of rules which have to be obeyed
by persons living in the particular community. The
second term used in s. 2(d) is ordinance having
f
ll
>
'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33::!
the force of law. If an ordinance is passed, say
1963
under Art. 123 or Art. 213 of the Constitution, it
-stands exactly on the same footing as an enactment Jayantilal Amrit
and would necessarily have the force of law. If Lal Shodhan
it is another kind of ordinance, it can have the force
v.
of law if it lays down a binding rule . of conduct F.N. Rana
and the body passing it has the authority
of law to lay down such a binding rule of conduct. Wanchoo J.
Such an ordinance would usually be subordinate
legislation. The third term is regulation. A regulation may be a direct comma11d of the legislature in
which case it will stand on the same footing as an
enactment. Examples of this kind of regulations
are to be foun :l in the old regulations passed by the
Governor-General before 1857 under his law-makmg
power, some of which are still in force in this country.
Secondly, regulations may be a kind of subordinate
legislation and in such a case they are bound to consist
of a body of rules which regulate the conduct of
persons living in the community and are enforceable by courts or other authorities provided the
body passing the regulations has the authority to
do so. The fourth term is order. Orders may be
of two kinds: they may be merely executive orders
laying down no course of conduct for anybody,
though they rLay have the authority of law or may not
be opposed to any law and courts or other authorities
may recognise them. Another kind of orders will
be in the form of subordinate legislation laying down
rules of conduct which can be enforced by courts
or other authorities. An example of such orders
may be found in various orders passed under the
Defence of India Act, 1939, or the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. These orders lay down a body
of rules ~~ich . regulate the conduct of person or
persons hvmg m the community and are enforceable by cour::s or other authoritie>. The next term
is bye-law. Bye-laws are a well-known species of
subordinate l1~gislation. They lay down general rules
of conduct governing persons and are enforceable
by courts or other authorities if passed by a body
having the a.uthority of law to do so. The next
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
term is Rule. Rules are again a well-known species
of subordinate legislation laying down general rules
Jayanrilal Amrit of conduct and if they are passed by a body having
Lal Shodhan the authority to do so they are enforceable by courts
or other authorities. The next term is scheme.
F.N. Rana
Schemes may be of two kinds. They may embody
subordinate legislation containing a body of rules
Wanchoo J. binding on persons with whom they are concerned
and in such a case if passed by a body having the
necessary authority they will be enforceable by courts
or other authorities and would have the force of
law. But there may be another kind of schemes
which are merely executive in nature and they do
not contain any rules of conduct for any body to
follow. This will not have the force of law and will
not be enforceable by courts or other authorities,
as they lay down no rule of conduct which courts
or other authorities may enforce. The next term
is notification. Notifications again may be of two
kinds. Most government orders are notified
so that the public may know them. All of them have
not the force of law. Only such notifications have
the force of law which are a species of subordinate
legislation passed by a body having the authority
to promulgate them and. which lay down rules of
conduct for persons in the community to obey. But
there may be notifications which lay down no rule
of conduct. For example, all appointments, and
transfers of officers are notified through notifications
and these are merely executive orders for the purpose
of the information of public and do not lay down
any rule of conduct to be followed by persons in the
community. The last term is "other instruments"
and these again may be of two kinds, like schemes.
If they have the characteristic of subordinate legislation and contain a rule or body of rules to be followed
by persons living in the community they will have
the force of law and will be enforced by courts or
other authorities. But they can also be merely executive in nature; for example, sale-deeds, mortgage
deeds etc., are all instruments but have not the force
of law. Similarly treaties between sovereign powers
1963
,
--
(
'
5 S.C.R.
. '
.•
-
su:PREME COURT REPORTS
337
are also instruments but they have by themselves
1963
no force of law. That is why we find a &pecific provis.
.
ion in Art. 253 for legislation to give effect to inter.Jayantilal Am"t
national agreements.
Lal Shodha11
v.
It 1s therefo:re clear that in order that a notification F.N. Rana
or order may have the force of law 1t has to contain
a rule or body of rules regulaLing the "onduct of Wanchoo J.
a person or persons living in the commumty; 1t has
to be passea by a body which has the necessary authority for the purpose ana it is then that it will be enforceable by courts or other authorities and will have
the force of law. In ~hort, in order that a notification
or order may have the force of law it is not enough
that courts may recognise it if necessity arises; it
is further nece~.sary that the same should lay down
a rule or course of conduct which a person or persons
living in the community may be obliged to follow
and which therefore becomes enforceable by courts
or other authorities and acquires the force of law.
In this connection an argument was advanced
on behalf of the respondent that many statutes empower Government or an authority empowered by
it to make rules and that when the Government names
the authority which will make the rules, its order
ha& the force of law. We do not think that that is
the correct wa,y of looking at the matter. When
the Government names the authority in such a case,
it is merely performing an executive function, though
when the authority proceeds to frame rules it is making
subordinate legi:.lation which will have the force of
law for such rules will lay down a course of conduct
to be followed by a person or persons living in the
community the breach of which will be enforceable
by courts or other authodties. In all such cases
there are three stages; ll) conferment of power by
the law on the government or its nominee to make
rules, (2) nomination of the nominee by the government, and (3} exercise of the rule-making power
by the nominee. The first and the third are clearly
legislative acts but the second is in our view dearly
l/SCl/64-22
338
1963
Jayantila/ Amrit
Lal Shodhan
v.
F.N.Rana
WanchooJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
executive, for it is merely the designation of the person
or authority who will make the law.
Let us now examine the notification in the present
case on the basis of these principles. The notification says that in exercise of the powers conferred by
clause l l) of Art. 258 of the Constitution, the President
hereby entrusts, with the consent of the State Government, to the Commissioners of Divisions in the State
of Bombay, the functions of the Central Government
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)
in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose
of the Union within the limits of the respective territorial jurisdiction of the said Commissioners subject
to the same control by the Government of Bombay
as is from time to time exercisable by that Government in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose
of the State. In effect the notification app0ints the
Commissioners of Divisions to exercise the functions
of the Central Government under the Act for acquisition of land for Union purposes. It lays down no
rules of conduct for persons living in the community
to follow; it merely entrusts the powers of the Central
Government for cert3in purposes to the Commissioners of Divisions. lt is true that the notification
has the authority of law behind it, for it is made
under cl. (1) of Art. 258 of the Constitution and as
such if an order is passed by the Commissioner by
virtue of the powers conferred on him by the notification that order will be recognised by courts.
But
there is no question of enforcement of this notification
by courts, for no citizen can go and ask courts to
enforce this notification. The force of law arises
only when a notification lays down a rule of conduct
for citizens to follow and thus makes the notification
enforceable either at the instance of the citizens or
of government in case there is any breach of the
rule laid down. The mere fact that courts will take
notice and recognise it and it has the authority of law
behind it would not in our opinion be sufficient to
convert this notification into a law within the meaning
of "law" which we have already referred to. There
I
5S.C.R.
'
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
is nothing enforceable in this notification which is
1963
nothing more than an appointment of a particular
person to carry out certain duties which would other- Jayantilal Arnrlt
wise be carried on under the Act by the Central Govern- Lal Shodhan
ment. Such a notification cannot in our opinion
v.
have the force of law even though it has the authority F.N. Rana
of law behind it. It is that authority of law behind
it which makes it recognisable by courts. Even Wanchoo J.
so it cannot be said that the notifi~ation lays dcwn
a rule or body of rules regulating the conduct of a
person or persons living in the community, as such
there is no question of its being enforceable as a law
by courts or other authorities and therefore it has
not the force of law. The notification in our opinion
i& merely an executive order with the authority of
law behind it but has not the force of law, within
the meaning of that expression under s. 2(d) of the
Reorganisation Act.
It is however urged on behalf of the respondents
that the notification has the effect of amending the
definition of "appropriate government" contained in
s. 2 (ee) of the Act which is as follows:"the expression 'appropriate Government' means
in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose
of the Union, the Central Government, and,
in relation to acquisition of land for any other
purposes, the State Government."
It is submitted that the effect of this notification is
the addition of the words "where an order under
Art. 258(1) of the Constitution has been passed,
the officer to whom the functions of the Central
Government under the Act are entrusted." We see
no force in this argument. It is true, as we have
already said, that courts will recognise this notification and an order passed by the Commiss10ner of
a Division in pursuance of it will have the same effect
as the order of the Central Government; but we cannot
accept the argument that an order under Art. 258(1)
by the President entrusting certain functions to an
officer of the State Government can even amount
to the amendment of the law in connection with which
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the order has been made, No amendment to an
. enactment can be made except thro.ugh the legislative
Jayantilal Amm process provided in the Constitution and Art. 258(1)
I.al Shodhan does not provide for any legislative process for amendv.
ment of au enactment. It is true that the effect of
F.N. Rana the notification in this case is that the Commissioner
of a Division can do what the Central Government
Wanchoo J. can do under the Act but that does not mean that
the definition of the "appropriate Government" in
the Act is amended because of the order. We therefore reject this argument.
1963
-.-
It now remains to refer to certain cases which
were cited in this behalf. The main case on which
reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents
is The Edward Mills Co. Limited v. the State of Ajmer<1).
In that case this Court was dealing with an order
made under s. 94{3) of the Government of India
Act, 1935, and the question that arose was whether
such an order was a law in force capable of adaptaition.
This Court held that an order passed under s. 94 (3)
of the Government of India Act (which corresponded
to Art. 239 of the Constitution) which dealt with
the governance of Chief Commissioner's Provinces,
was a law in force within the meaning of Art. 372 of
the Constitution and could therefore be adapted.
That case in our opinion is clearly distinguishable
and must be confined to the facts therein. The order
in question there was passed under s. 94{3) of
the Government of India Act which, as we have
said already, c01responded to Art. 239 of the Constitution. In the present case we are concerned with an
order under Art. 258{1) of the Constitution. The provis10n correspondmg to Art. 258(1) is s. 1240)
in the Government of India Act. That case, therefore
is not a direct authority for a case like the present
which deals with Art. 258(1) corresponding to s. 124{l)
of the Government of India Act. Besides s. 94,
corresponding to Art. 239, dealt with the governance
of Chief Commissioners' Provinces, and governance
would include all kinds offunctions,whether executive,
(1) [1955] l S.C.R. 735.
/
<
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
legislative or judicial. In the present case we are
1963
concerned with Art. 258(1 ), which as we have already
-.held deals wi1:h the executive functions of the Union Jayar11llal Amrll
only and there is therefore no analogy between an Lal Shodhan
order passed under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution
v.
and an order passed under s. 94 (3) of the Govern- F.N. Rana
ment of India Act. On these considerations that WanchooJ.
case is of no help to the respondents.
The next case to which a reference may be made
is Madhubhai Amathalal Gandhi v. the Union ofJndia< 1 ).
In that case this Court was dealing with a notification under the Securities Contracts (Regulatio11)
Act, No. 42 of 1956. There was however no dispute
in that case on the question whether the notification
wa~ law or not and it was accepted without question
that the notification in dispute there was a law. In
these circum1.tances that case is of no help for the
proposition that every notification under a law would
necessarily have the force of Jaw.
The next case is The Public Prosecutor V1. Jllur
ThippayyaC2>. That was a case with respect to orders
issued under the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act. No. 24 of 1946, and. the orders were
held to hav<: the force of law. Those orders seem
to have laid down a body of rules governing the conduct
of persons with respect to matters covered by them
and would therefore be subordinate legislation. That
case is thus of no help to the respondents.
•
The next case is The '5tate of Bombay v. F.N.
Balsara< 3 >. That was clearly a case of subordinate
legislation inasmuch as the order there passed was
in pursuance of >. 139 of the Bombay Prohibition
Act, No. 25of1949, which gave power to the Government by general or special order to exempt any intoxicant or class of intoxicants from the operation of
any of the provisions of that Act. Such an order
would clearly have the force of law being subordinate
legislation and that was what was held in that case.
(1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 191.
(2) 1.L.R. [1949] Mad. 371.
(3) [1951] S.C.R. 682.
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Two other cases to which references may be
. made are : (1) King-Emperor v. Abdul Hamid,( 1 >
Jayanttlal Amrzt and Ramendrachandra Ray v. Emperor. (2 > In the
Lal Shodhan first case the Superintendent of Police passed an order
v.
under s. 30 of the Police Act prohibiting processions
F.N. Rana and the question waii whether it was law. The Patna
Wanchoo J. High Court held it was law and we think rightly.
The order was passed by the Superintendent of Police
under. authority vested in him by the Police Act and
it prescribed a course of conduct to be followed by
persons living within his police jurisdiction, disobedience of which was punishable. It could therefore
be enforced by courts and would have the force of
law. The other case dealt with a similar prohibitory
order under the Calcutta Pohce Act and would have
force of law for the same reasons. These cases also
do not help the respondents.
Reliance was also placed on two other cases,
namely, Chanabassapa Shivappa Tori v. Gurupadappa
Nurgeppa Hanji(a> and Haji K. K. Moidu v. Food Inspectors Kozhikode.( 4 > These two cases were certainly
concerned with two notifications which were held to
have the force of law. It is unnecessary to examine
these cases in detail as that would require the consideration of the various enactments under which the
notifications were made. All that we need say is
that the view taken by the High Courts as to the two
notifications being law in those two cases is open to
grave doubt.
We have therefore come to the conclusion that
Art. 258tl) contemplates only entrustment of executive functions; as such the presumption is that any
notification issued under that provision entrusting
such functions to an officer m a State is prima facie
an executive act and cannot have the force of law.
Further on examination of the notification in the
present case we are satisfied that the notification in
question is merely an executive order, in effect appointing certain officers to perform the functions of the
1963
.
(1) [1923] 1.L.R. II Patna 134. (2) [1931] I.L.R. LVIII Cal. 1303.
(3) [1958] I.L.R. Mys. 48.
(4) I.L.R. [1961] Kerala 639.
{
•
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
Cential Government in relation to the Act. It
1963
cannot therefore have the force of law and is thus
not a law under s. 2(d) of the Reorganisation Act. Jayantilal Amrit
It therefore does not continue under s. 87 of the Re- Lal Shodhan
organisation Act. The Commissioner of Baroda therev.
fore would have no power to act under the notifica- F.N. Rana
tion of July 24, 1959, after May 1, 1960, for the consent of the State of Gujarat was lacking to that noti- Wanchoo 1.
fication. The notifications therefore issued under
ss. 4 and 6 by the Commissioner acting under the
functions entrusted to him by this notification would
therefore be invalid and must be struck down. We
may add that since then the President has made another
notification under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution
whereby Commissioners of Divisions in the State
of Gujarat have been entrusted with functions under
the Act with the consent of that State. That notification i> however of July 12, 1961, and cannot cure
the present notific"tions under ss. 4 and 6 of the Act
as they are anterior in date.
In view of our decision on the nature of the
notification under Art. 258(1) dated July 24, 1959,
it is unnecessary to consider the other points raised
on behalf of the appellant.
We would therefore allow the appeal with costs,
set aside the order of the High Court and allow the
writ petition and strike down the notifications under
ss. 4 and 6 of the Act made by the Commissioner
of Baroda for acquisition of the appellant's property.
ORDER BY COURT
In accordance with the opinion of the majority,
the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org