CHAMPAKLAL CHIMANLAL SHAH versus THE UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 October 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 190 | 1963 INSC 214
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 October 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 472/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 190
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 214
Text of the judgment
190
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
to collect the tax as assessed and as decided in its
favour.by the High Court. But when the respondent fails
Thun~abhadra in the objections raised to prevent the matter coming to
Industries Ltd. this Court, we do not see any justification for the plea
v.
that costs should not follow the event but that the
The Government appellant should be deprived of it 5right to sosts.
of Andhra PraIn the result the appeal is allowed and the comdesh
mon judgment of the High Court in the three appeals
is reversed and the petitions for review-C.M.Ps
Ayyangar J. 4672, 4673 and 4674 of 1959 on the file of the High
Court are allowed with costs here and in the High
Court-one set of hearing fees.
Appeal allowed.
1963
October 23
..
CHAMPAKLAL CHIMANLAL SHAH
V.
THE UNION OF INDIA
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO,
K.N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND
J.R. MuDHOhKAR JJ.)
Government Servant-Central Civil Service-When is he
quasi-permanent-Permanent and Temporary servants-Termination of service-Difference in mode not discriminatory-Action
by way of punishment-Even temporary servant entitled to benefit
of Art. 311-Pre/iminary enquiry and departmental enquiry-Latter
does not attract Art. 311(2)-Constitution of India, Art. 311Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, rr. 3 and 5.
The appellant was in the service of Union of India, his appointment being temporary liable to be terminated on one month's
notice on either side. He was appointed in June 1949. On August
1954 he was informed that his services would be terminated from
September 1954. No cause was assigned for the termination of
his services and no opportunity was given to him of showing cause
against the action taken against him. Before such termination
the appellant was called upon to explain certain irregularities
and was also asked to submit his explanation and to state why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Certain
preliminary enquiries were held against him but he was not heard
therein. No regular departmental enquiry however followed
and the proceedings were dropped. Claiming that he is a quasipermanent servant he brought a suit against the Union of India
alleging that the termination of his service was not justified. He
prayed in the suit for a declaration that the termination of his
service was illegal. He also claimed arrears of salary. The
trial Court dismissed the suit and he appealed to the High Court
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without success. The present appeal was filed on a certificate
1963
granted by the High Court.
The first contention raised by the appellant was that he was Champaklal
a quasi-permanent employee and r. 5 of the Central Civil Service Chimanlal Shah
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 did not apply to him. Secondly
v.
it was contended that r. 5 was invalid as it was hit by Art. 16 of the The Union of
Constitution and in any event the action taken against him
was discriminatory and therefore hit by Art. 16. It was further
India
contended that even if the appellant was a temporary servant he
was entitled to the protection of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.
Held : (i) Sub-els. (1) and (2) of r. 3 should be read conjunctively and not disjunctively and both the conditions contained
therein should be fulfilled before a Government servant can be
deemed to be in quasi-permanent service. The Government
servant has to show that he has been in continuous Government
service for more than three years and that the appointing authority
has made a declaration under sul>-cl. (2) of r. 3. This being the
position, since no declaration has been made in his case, the appellant
cannot claim the benefits of r. 6 which places a quasi-permanent
servant and a permanent servant on the same footing in the matter
of termination of service. Hence he cannot claim the protection
of Art. 311(2) on the ground that he must be deemed to be in quasipermanent service.
B.M. Pandit v. Union of India, A.LR. 1962 Born. 45, Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828 and K.S.
Srinivasan v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 1295, distinguished.
(ii) R. 5 which provides for termination of the services of a
temporary Government servant by giving him one month's notice
is not hit by Art. 16. The classification of Government servants
into permanent, quasi-permanent and temporary is reasonable
and differences in the matter of termination of service between
these classes cannot be said to be discriminatory.
(iii) Where termination of service of a temporary Government
servant takes place as it has taken place in the present case, on the
ground that his conduct is not satisfactory there cannot be any
question of any discrimination. The contention of the appellant
that he was denied the protection of Art. 16 and was treated in
a discriminatory manner is rejected.
(iv) Temporary Government servants are also entitled to the
protection of Art. 311 (2) in the same manner as a permanent
Government servants, if the Government takes action against
them by meting out one of the three punishments i.e. dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank.
Purshottam Lal Dhingrav. Unionofindia, [1958]S.C.R.828.
Held, that when a preliminary enquiry is held to determine
whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry is
made out in the case of a temporary employee or a Government
servant holding a higher rank temporarily there is no question
192
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1963
of its being governed by Art. 311(2). Such a preliminary enquiry
may even be held ex parte. It is only when the Government decides
Champaklal to hold a regular departmental enquiry for the purpose of infiicChimanlal Shah ting one of the three _major punishments that the Government
servant gets the protec!ton of Art. 31 I.
v.
The Union of
Shyam/a/ v. State ~f U.P. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26 and Purshottam
, d'
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, explained.
in IQ
Held, that even if a departmental enquiry against the appellant
was contemplated it was not pursued and no punitive action was
taken against him on the basis of the memorandum issued to him.
Simply because the Government issued such a memorandum but
later decided not to hold a departmental enquiry for taking punitive
action, it cannot be said that the Government can never thereafter
proceed to take action under the terms of r. 5 even though it is
satisfied otherwise that the appellant's conduct and work are
unsatisfactory.
Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 716,
State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689,
State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan D:·s, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 606 and,
Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449 distinguished.
CIVIL APPELtATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 472 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
December 23, 1960, of the Bombay High Court
in First Appeal No. 464 of 1958.
R.K. Garg, S.C. Agarwala, D.P. Singh and M.K.
Ramamurthi, for the appellants.
S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor General, V.D.
Mahajan and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
October 23, 1963. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Wanchoo J.
WANCHOO J. This is an appeal against the
judgment and decree of the Bombay High Court
on a certificate granted by that Court. The appellant
was in the service of the Union of India. He was
appointed on June 11, 1949 as an officiating Assistant
Director Grade II in the office of the Textile Commissioner, Bombay and was working as such till September 15, 1954. The appointment was temporary and
his services were liable to be terminated on one month's
notice on either side. He was posted after the date
of his appointment in the Textile Commissioner's
office at Ahmedabad and continued to work there
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till Pebruary 1954. He was transferred to Bombay
1963
in February 1954 and was informed in August 1954
that his services would be terminated from September ~hampaklal
15, 1954. No cause was assigned for the termination Chimanlal Shah
of his services and no opportunity was given to him
v..
of showing cause against the action taken against The Union of
him. He therefore brought a suit in the City Civil
India
Court at Bombay, and his contention was that his
services had been terminated unjustifiably and mall- Wanchoo l.
ciously as the Regional Director of Production in
the Textile Commissioner's office at Ahmedabad
was against him. Because of this on December
29, 1953, the appellant was called upon to explain
certain irregularities and was also asked to submit
his explanation and to state why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him. The appellant
went on to state in the plaint that certain enquiries
were held against him behind his back but the matter
was not pursued and he was transferred to Bombay
in February 1954. While he was at Bombay he recieved
the notice terminating his services. He claimed that
he was a quasi-permanent employee under the Central
Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and no action under
r. 5 of the Rules could be taken against him. He was
further entitled to the protection of Art. 311 of the
Constitution and as his services were terminated
without complyinp: with that provision the order
was bad and liable to be set aside. It was further contended that if r. 5 applied to him, it was bad inasmuch
as it was hit by Art. 16 of the Constitution and in
any case the order passed against him was bad as
it was discriminatory. The appellant therefore prayed
that the order of August 13, 1954 by which his services
were terminated be declared illegal and inoperative
and he be declared a quasi permanent employee and
reinstated in &ervice. There was also a claim for
arrears of sala1 y and costs of the suit and such other
consequential reliefs as the court might deem fit to give.
The suit was opposed by the Union of India
and its main defence was that the appellant was not
a quasi permanent employee and that r. 5 of the Rules
1 SCI/64-13
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applied to him and that action was properly taken
.
under that rule when terminating the appellant's
Champaklal services by order dated August 13, 1954. It was
Chimanlal Shah also contended that r. 5 was perfectly valid and that
v.
there was no discrimination practised against the
The Union of appellant when his services· were terminated. It was
India
admitted that the memo. dated December 29, 1953
was issued to the appellant and he was directed to
Wanchoo J. submit his explanation in respect of the irregularities mentioned therein to the Under Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi and to state why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. It was
also admitted that from December 1953 onwards
some departmental inquiry was conducted against
the appellant but it was averred that the said departmental inquiry was not pursued as the evidence against
him was not considered to be conclusive. But as
the appellant's work was not found satisfactory,
be was transferred to Bombay in February 1954
to give him a chance of improvement. Ashia work
and conduct were ultimately found to be unsatisfactory, his employment was terminated under r. 5
of the Rules as he was a temporary employee.
1963
On these pleadings three main questions arose
for decision before the trial court, namely, (i) whether
the appellant was a quasi permanent employee and
r. 5 of the Rules did not apply to him; (ii) whether
r. 5 was invalid as it was hit by Art. 16 of the Constitution and in any case whether the action taken against
the appellant was discriminatory, and therefore hit
by Art. 16 of the Constitution, and (iii) even if the
appellant was a temporary government servant,
whether he was entitled to the protection of Art.
311 (2) of the Constitution in the circumstances
of this case. The trial court held on all these points
against the appellant and dismissed the suit. The
appellant then went in appeal to the High Court.
The High Court agreed with the trial court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then applied for
a certificate to appeal to this Court, which was granted;
and that is how the matter has come up before us.
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The first question that falls for consideration
1963
is whether the appellant was a quasi permanent employee and r. 5 did not apply to him. If the appellant ~hampaklal
is held to be a quasi permanent employee, he will Chimanlal Shah
be entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) and as
v.
admittedly the provisions of Art. 311 (2) were not The Union °1
complied with in the present case, his suit would have
India
to be decreed and no further question would arise
for decision. Rule 3 of the Rules, which falls for Wanchoo J.
consideration in this connection, is as follows:"A Government servant shall be deemed to be
in quasi-permanent service:(i) if he has been in continuous Government
service for more than three years;
(ii) if the appointing authority, being satisfied as
to his suitability in respect of age, qualifications,
work and character, for employment in a quasipermanent capacity has issued a declaration to that
effect, in accordance with such instructions as the
Governor-General may issue from time to time."
The contention on behalf of the appellant is
that as there is no conjunction "and" between the
two sub-clauses of r. 3, a Government servant must
be deemed to be quasi-permanent if he complies
with either of the two sub-clauses. It is urged that
a temporary government servant will become quasipermanent if he has been in continuous government
service for more than three years or if a declaration
is made in his favour as required by sub-cl. (ii). The
appellant thus reads the word "or " between the two
sub-clauses. On the other hand, the respondent
contends that looking at the scheme of the Rules
the word "and" should be implied between the two
sub-clauses and that both the clauses must be fulfilled
before a Government servant can be deemed to be
in quasi-permanent service.
In this connection our attention was drawn to
two cases of this Court in which this rule was mentioned. InParshotamLal Dhingra~v. Union of India,(1)
this Court, when referring to r. 3 at p. 858, used
(I) [1958) S.C.R. 828.
196
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
the conjunction "or" between the two sub-clauses.
Learned counsel for the appellant relies on this to
Champaklal show that we should read the word "or" between
Chimanlal Shah the two sub-clauses. We are however of opinion
v.
that this Court was not specifically dealing with the
The Union of interpretation of r. 3 in that case and what has been
India
said there about r. 3 was merely for purposes of illustration. The other case of this Court to which referWanchoo J. ence has been made is K.S. Srinivasan v. Union of
India.( 1 ) There while quoting r. 3 at p. 1307, this
Court used the word "and" between the two subclauses. That is probably due to the fact that the
brochure on "Central Civil Services (Temporary
Services) Rules 1949" printed by the General Manager,
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1959, contains
the word "and" between the two sub-clauses in r. 3.
That also in our opinion is not conclusive in favour
of the respondent, because it is not disputed before
us that in the Government gazette where the Rules
were first published, neither the word "and" nor
the word "or " appears between the two sub-clauses
of r. 3. This aspect of the matter was considered
by the Bombay High Court in B.M. Pandit v. Union
of India(") where the learned Judges pointed out
at p. 48 that they found from the copy of the gazette
of the Government of India in which these Rules
were :first published that neither the word "and"
nor the word "or" appeared between the two subclauses and this position is accepted on behalf of the
respondent before us. The question therefore arises
whether we have to read the two sub-clauses conjunctively or disjunctively. We may add that the Bombay
High Court in the case mentioned above read the
two sub-clauses conjunctively and we are of opinion
that that view is correct.
The object of these Rules obviously was to provide for some security of tenure for a large number
of temporary goverment servants who had to be
employed in view of World War II and also to provide
for former employees of the Governments of Sind,
the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan
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1963
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 1295.
(2) A.I.R. 1962 Born. 45.
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197
who had come to India on account of the Partition.
1963
This protection was afforded to temporary government servants and the government servants of the Champaklal
other type by the device of creating quasi-permanent Chimanlal Shah
service. Rule 3 provided in what circumstances a
v.
government servant shall be deemed to be quasi- The Union of
permanent. Quasi-permanent service is defined in
India
r. 2(2) as meaning "temporary service commencing
from the date on which a declaration issued under Wanchoo J.
r. 3 takes effect and consists of periods of duty and
leave (other than extraordinary leave) after that date."
R•1lc 3 therefore must be read with r. 2(b) which
defines "quasi-permanent service".
Under r. 2(b),
quasi-permanent service begins from the date on which
a declaration is issued under r. 3. It follows therefore that before a government servant can be deemed
to be in quasi-permanent service a declaration must
be issued under the second sub-clause of r. 3, for
that is the sine quo non for the commencement of
quasi-permanent service. Without such a declaration quasi-permanent service cannot begin. If therefore the appellant's contention were to be accepted
and a temporary government servant can be deemed
to be in quasi-permanent service, if only the first
sub-clause has been fulfilled, viz., that he has been
in continuous government service for more than
three years, there will be complete irreconcilability
between r. 2(b) and the first clause of r. 3. Therefore,
reading these two rules together the conclusion is
inevitable that we must read the two sub-clauses conjunctively and hold that both conditions must be
fulfilled before tr Government servant can be deemed
to be in quasi-permanent service, namely, (i) that he
has been in continuous government service for more
than three years, and (ii) that the appointing authority
after satisfying itself as to suitability in various respects for employment in quasi-permanent capacity
has issued a declaration to that effect. It is however
urged that the definitions in r. 2 have to be read subject
to there being nothing repugnant in the subject or
context and it is contended that in the context of
· r. 3 the two sub-clauses must be read disjunctively.
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We are of opinion that there is no force in this argument, and as a matter of fact the context of r. 3 itself
Champaklal requires that that rule must be read in harmony
Chimanlal Shah with the definition of "quasi-permanent service" in
v.
r. 2(b), for it could not possibly be the intention of
The Union of the rule making authority to create disharmony
India
between the definition in r. 2(b) and the provision
in r. 3. The contention on behalf of the appellants
Wanchoo J. that the two sub-clauses are independent and have
to be read disjunctively must be rejected and it must
be held that both the conditions in r. 3 must be satisfied before a government servant can be deemed to be
in quasi-permanent service.
·
This will in our opinion also be clear from the
scheme of the Rules following r. 3. Rule 4 provides
that "a declaration issued under r. 3 shall specify
the particular post or the particular grade of posts
within a cadre in respect of which it isr issued, and
the date from which it takes effect." This rule is
clearly meant to apply to all quasi-permanent employees and shows that no government servant can
be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service until
a declaration has been issued. Rule 6 provides that
"the service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination in the same
circumstances and in the same manner as a government servant in permanent service." Now under
the definition of r. 2(b), quasi-permanent service
begins with a declaration issued under sub-cl. (ii) of
r. 3. Therefore the protection ofr. 6 can only be given
to a quasi-permanent employee after a declaration
has been made. This again shows that a declaration
is necessary before a Government servant can claim
to be in quasi-permanent service. Rule 7 provides
that a ~overnment servant in respect of whom the
declaration has been issued under r. 3, shall be eligible
for permanent appointment on the occurrence of a
vacancy in the specified posts which may be reserved
for being filled from among persons in quasi-permanent
service. This again shows that a quasi-permanent
employee can become eligible for permanent appoint- .
ment only when a declaration has been issued under
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r. 3. Again r. 8 provides that a government servant
1963
in quasi-permanent service shall as from the date on
which his service is declared to be quasi-permanent Champaklal
be entitled to the same conditions of service in respect Chimanlal Shah
of leave, allowances and disciplinary matters as a
v.
government servant in permanent service holding The Union of
the specified post. Here again the benefit of r. 8
I11dia
can only be availed of by a quasi-permanent government servant in whose favour a declaration has Wanchoo J.
been made. Then r. 9 provides that a government
servant in quasi-permanent service shall be eligible
for a gratuity under certain circumstances. This
gratuity will be at the rate of half a month's pay for
each completed year of quasi-permanent service, such
gratuity being payable on the basis of the pay admissible to such government servant in respect of the
specified post on the last day of his service. This
again contemplates a declaration before the benefit
of r. 9 can be claimed by a quasi-permanent employee.
Rule 10 provides that where a government servant
in quasi-permanent service is appointed substantively to a permanent pensionable post, the entire period
of quasi-permanent service rendered by him shall
be deemed to be qualifying service for the grant of
gratuity and pension. Now under r. 2(b) quasipermanent service only commences after the declaration
and therefore unless a declaration is made, the benefit
of r. 10 cannot be taken by a quasi-permanent employee.
The scheme of the rules therefore clearly shows
that a declaration under r. 3 is necessary before a
temporary government servant can claim to be a
quasi-permanent employee. Otherwise if the two
sub-clauses of r. 3 were to be read disjunctively the
result would be that a person may become a quasipermanent employee under sub-cl. (!) but will get
none of the advantages mentioned above. We are
therefore satisfied that the scheme of the Rules and
the harmony that is essential between r. 2(b) defining
"quasi-permanent service" and r. 3 laying down how
a government servant can be deemed to be in quasipermanent service require that the two sub-clauses
should be read conjunctively and that two conditions
200
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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are necessary before a government servant can be
deemed to be in quasi-permanent service, namely,
~hampaklal (i) continuous service for .more than three years,
Chimanlal Shah and (ii) declaration as required by sub-cl. (ii) of r. 3.
v..
It is. not in dispute that though the appellant had
The Un'.on °1 been in service for more than three years by 1954,
India
no declaration· as required by sub-cl. (ii) of r. 3 has
ever
been made in his case. He cannot therefore
Wanchoo I.
claim to be in quasi-permanent service. It follows
therefore that he cannot c:laim the benefit of r. 6,
which lays down that the services of a government
servant in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to
termination in the same circumstances and in the
same manner as government servants in permanent
service. If he could claim the benefit of r. 6, he would
have been certainly entitled to the protection of Art.
311. As he is not entitled to the benefit of r. 6, he cannot claim the benefit of Art. 311(2) on the ground that
he must be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service.
The appellant therefor·e must be held to be still
in temporary service when his services were dispensed
with in August 1954. The rule that applies to a temporary government servant is r. 5 which lays down that-"(a) the service of a temporary Government
servant who is not in quasi-permanent service
shall be liable to termination at any time by
notice in writing given either by the Government
servant to the appointing authority, or by the
appointing authority to the Government servant.
(b) The period of such notice shall be one
month, unless otherwise agreed to by the Government and by the Government servant;
Provided that the service of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by
payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount
of his pay plus allowances, at the same rates
at which he was drawing them immediately
before the termination of his services, for the
period of the notice or, as the case may be, for
the period by which such notice falls short of
one month or any agreed longer period."
1963
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In short r. 5 gives power to the Government to ter1963
minate the services of a temporary government
servant by giving him one month's notice or on pay- Champaklal
ment of one month's pay in lieu of notice or such Chimanlal Shah
shorter or longer notice or payment in lieu thereof
v.
as may be agreed to between the Government and The Union of
the employee concerned. This rule is being attacked
India
on the ground that it is hit by Art. 16, which provides
that "there shall be equality of opportunity for all Wanchoo J.
citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State". We have not
been able to understand how this rule can possibly be
hit by Art. 16, which provides for equality of opportunity. These Rules show that there are two classes
of employees namely, (i) permanent employees, and
(ii) temporary employees, the latter being divided into
two sub-clauses (a) quasi-permanent, and (b) temporary.
It is well recognised that the Government may have to
employ temporary servants to satisfy the needs of a particular contingency and such employment would be
perfectly legitimate. There can also be no doubt, if such
a class of temporary servants could be recruited that
there would be nothing discriminatory or violative of
equal opportunity if the conditions of service of such
servants are different in some respects from those of permanent employees. Further we see no denial of equal
opportunity if out of the class of temporary employees
some are made quasi-permanent depending on length
of service and their suitability in all other respects
for permanent employment eventually and thus assimilated to permanent employees. It has been urged
OJ?. behalf of the respondent that t-st. 16 in any case
w11! n~t apply to matters relatmg to termination
of service. We ~o not think it necessary for present
purposes to ~ec1de whether Art. 16 would apply
to rules relatmg to termination of service. We
shall ass~me for the purposes of this appeal that
Art. 16 . w1~ apply even in the case of rules relating
th termmat19n of se;vice.
But we fail to see how
t e rule .which applies to one class of government
servants Ill the matter of termination but does not
apply to the other two classes can be said to violate
202
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[1964]
equality of opportunity provided in Art. 16. The
classification of government servants into these classes
Champak/al is reasonable and differences in the matter of terminaChimanlal Shah tion of service between these classes cannot be said
v.
to be discriminatory in the circumstances. In partiThe Union of cular the very fact that the service of a government
India
servant is purely temporary makes him a class apart
from those in permanent service and such governWanchoo J.
ment servant cannot necessarily claim all the advantages which a permanent servant has in the matter
of security of service. We are therefore of opinion
that considering the nature of the employment of
a temporary government servant, a provision like
that in r. 5 in respect of termination of service is a
reasonable provision which cannot be said to deny
equality of opportunity provided in Art. 16. The
attack therefore on r. 5 on the ground that it is hit
by Art. 16 of the Constitution must fail.
It is next urged that even if r. 5 is good, the order
by which the appellant's services were dispensed with
was bad, because it was discriminatory. In this
connection reference was made in the plaint to a
number of Assistant Directors whose services were
not dispensed with even though they were junior
to the appellant and did not have as good qualifications as he had. We are of opinion that there is
no force in this contention. This is not a case where
services of a temporary employee are being retrenched
because of the abolition of a post. In such a case
a question may arise as to who should be retrenched
when one out of serveral temporary posts is being
retrenched in an office. In those circumstances,
qualifications and length of service of those holding
similar temporary posts may be relevant in considering whether the retrenchment of a particular employee
was as a result of discrimination. The present however is a case where the appellant's services were
terminated because his work was found to be unsatisfactory. We shall deal with the question whether
termination in this case is liable to be set aside on the
ground that Art. 311 (2) was not complied with later;
but where termination of the service of a temporary
1963
I
'
·-1
5 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
203
government servant takes place on the ground that
1963
his conduct is not satisfactory there can in our opinion
be no question of any discrimination. It would be Champaklal
absurd to say that if the service of one temporary Chiman/al Shah
servant is terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory
v.
conduct the services of all similar employees must The Union of
also be terminated along with him, irrespective of
India
what their conduct is. Therefore even though some of
those mentioned in the plaint by the appellant were Wanchoo J.
junior to him and did not have as good qualifications
as he had and were retained in service, it does not
follow that the action taken against the appellant
terminating his services was discriminatory for that
action was taken on the basis of his unsatisfactory
conduct. A question of discrimination may arise
in a case of retrenchment on account of abolition
of one of several temporary posts of the same kind
in one office but can in our opinion never arise
in the case of dispensing with the services of a particular temporary employee on account of his conduct
being unsatisfactory. We therefore reject the contention
that the appellant was denied the protection of Art.
16 and was treated in a discriminatory manner.
We now come to the last question whether the
appellant was entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2)
of the Constitution, even though he was a temporary government servant. It is well settled that
temporary servants are also entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) in the same manner as permanent
government servants, if the government takes action
against them by meting out one of the three punishments i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank:
(see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India( 1 ).
But this protection is only available where discharge,
removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. It
is also not disputed that the mere use of expressions
like "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive
and in spite of the use of such innocuous expressions,
the court has to apply the two tests mentioned in
Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case( 1), namely-(!) whether
(I) (1958] S.C.R. 828.
.
'
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the servant had a right to the post or the rank or
(2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences;
Charnpaklal and if either of the tests is satisfied, it must be held
Chirnanlal Shah that the servant had been punished. Further even
v.
though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
The Union of disqualification may be the motive or the inducing
India
factor which influences the Government to take action
under the terms of the contract of employment or
Wanchoo J. the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists,
under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service
the motive operating on the mind of the Government
is wholly irrelevant. It is on these principles which
have been laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra' s case( 1 )
that we have to decide whether the appellant was
entitled to the protection of Art. 3 II (2) in this case.
Before however we consider the facts of this
case, we should like to make certain general observations in connection with disciplinary proceedings
It is well known
taken against public servants.
that government does not terminate the services
of a public servant, be he even a temporary servant,
without reason; nor is it usual for government to reduce
a public servant in rank without reason even though
he may be holding the higher rank only temporarily.
One reason for terminating the services of a temporary
servant may be that the post that he is holding comes
to an end. In that case there is nothing further to
be said and his services terminate when the post
comes to an end. Similarly a government servant
temporarily officiating in a higher rank may have to
be reverted to his substantive post where the incumbent of the higher post comes back to duty or where
the higher post created for a temporary period comes
to an end. But besides the above, the government
may find it necessary to terminate the services of a
temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct
or his suitability for the job and/or his work. The
same may apply to the reversion of a public servant
from a higher post to a lower post where the post is
held as a temporary measure. This dissatisfaction
with the work and.lor conduct of a temporary servant
1963
(I) [1958] s.c.R. 828.
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
205
may arise on complaint against him. In such cases
1963
two courses are open to government. It may decide
to dispense with the services of the servant or revert Champaklal
him to his substantive post without any action being Chimanlal Shah
taken to punish him for his bad work and/or conduct.
v._
Or the Government may decide to punish such a The Un'.on °1
servant for his bad work or misconduct, in which
India
case even though the servant may be temporary
he will have the protection of Art. 311 (2). But Wanchoo 1 ·
even where it is intended to take action by way of
punishment what usually happens is that something
in the nature of what may be called a preliminary
enquiry is first held in connection with the alleged
misconduct or unsatisfactory work. In this preliminary enquiry the explanation of the government
servant may be taken and documentary and even
oral evidence may be considered. It is usual when
such a preliminary enquiry makes out a prima facie
case against the servant concerned that charges are
then framed against him and he is asked to show cause
why disciplinary action be not taken against him.
An enquiry officer (who may be himself in the case
where the appointing authority is other than the
Government) is appointed who holds enquiry into
the charges communicated to the servant concerned
after taking his explanation and this inquiry is held
in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
This is what is known as a formal departmental enquiry
into the conduct of a public servant. In this enquiry
evidence both documentary and oral may be led against
the public servant concerned and he has a right to
cross-examine the witnesses tendered against him.
He has also the right to give documentary and
oral evidence in his defence, if he thinks necessary
to do so. After the enquiry is over, the enquiry
officer makes a report to the Government or the
authority having power to take action against the
servant concerned. The government or the authority
makes up its mind on the enquiry report as to whether
the charges have been proved or not and if it holds
that some or all the charges have been proved, it
determines tentatively the punishment to be inflicted
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
on the public servant concerned. It then communicates a copy of the enquiry officer's report and its own:
Champaklal conclusion thereon and asks him to show cause why
Chimanlal Shah the tentative punishment decided upon be not inflicv.
ted upon him. This procedure is required by Art.
The Union of 311(2) of the Constitution in the case of the three
India
major punishments, i.e., dismissal, or removal or
reduction in rank. The servant concerned has then
Wanchoo J. an opportunity of showing cause by making a representation that the conclusions arrived at at the departmental enquiry are incorrect and in any case the
punishment proposed to be inflicted is too harsh.
Generally therefore a preliminary enquiry is
usually held to determine whether a prima facie case
for a formal departmental enquiry is made out, and
it is very necessary that the two should not be
confused. Even where government does not intend
to take action by way of punishment against a temporary servant on a report of bad work or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is usually held to satisfy
government that there is reason to dispense with the
services of a temporary employee or to revert him
to his substantive post, for as we have said already
government does not usually take action of this
kind without any reason. Therefore when a preliminary enquiry of this nature is held in the case of
a temporary employee or a government servant
holding a higher rank temporarily it must not be
confused with the regular departmental enquiry
(which usually follows such a preliminary enquiry)
when the government decides to frame charges and
get a departmental enquiry made in order that one
of the three major punishments already indicated
may be inflicted on the government servant. Therefore, so far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned
there is no question of its being governed by Art.
311 (2) for that enquiry is really for the satisfaction
of government to decide whether punitive action
should be taken or action should be taken under
the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary
government servant or a servant holding higher
rank temporary to whilh he has no right. In short
1963
'
'i'::'
'
5 S.C.R.
-
"(
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
207
a preliminary enquiry is for the purpose of collec1963
tion of facts in regard to the conduct and work of
a government servant in which he may or may not Champaklal
be associated so that the authority concerned may Chimanlal Shah
decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned
v.
to the enquiry necessary under Art. 311 for inflic- The Union of
ting one of the three major punishments mentioned
India
therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be
held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction Wanchoo J.
of government, though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned
even at such an enquiry. But at that stage he has
no right to be heard for the enquiry is merely for the
satisfaction of the Government, and it is only when
the government decides to hold a regular departmental
enquiry for the purposes of inflicting one of the three
major punishments that the government servant gets
the protection of Art. 3!l and all the rights that that
protection implies as already indicated above. There
must therefore be no confusion between the two
enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds
to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of
inflicting on the government servant one of the three
major punishments indicated in Art. 311 that the
government servant is entitled to the protection of that
Article. That is why this Court emphasised in
Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case( 1 ) and in Shyamlal v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh( 2 ) that the motive or the
inducing factor which influences the government to
take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule is irrelevant.
In Shyamlal's case( 2 ) what happened was that
the gov~rnment. servant conc~rned was called upon
to expli;im certam matters which cast an imputation
upon him; but later it was made perfectly clear to
him by the government that it was not holding any
f9rmal ~e~ar.tmental enquiry against him with a
VIew to mfl1ctmg any of the three major punishments
alt~ough the government desired to give him an oppor~
tumty to show cause why he should not be compulOl [1958] I S.C.R. 828.
(2) [1955) I S.C.R. 2 c.
208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
sorily retired, and after considering his explanation
he was compulsorily retired under the relevant service
Champaklal rule. It was held in that case that this did not amount
Chimanlal Shah to punishment within the meaning of Art. 311 (2),
v.
even though there was some imputation at an earlier
The Union of stage and even though the servant ,concerned was
India
asked to explain why he should not be compulsorily
retired. As we have said already it is not usual for
Wanchoo J. government to take action against a public servant
without rhyme or reason and that is why in the case
of temporary servants or servants holding higher
ranks to which they have no right some kind of preliminary enquiry is usually held before the govern·
ment decides to dispense with their service or revert
them to their substantive posts. The mere fact that
some kind of preliminary enquiry is held against a
temporary servant and following that enquiry the
services are dispensed with in accordance with the
contract or the specific service rule (e.g. r. 5 in this
case) would not mean that the termination of service
amounted to infliction of punishment of dismissal
or removal within the meaning of Art. 311(2).
Whether such termination would amount to dismissal
or removal within the meaning of Art. 311(2) would
depend upon facts of each case and the action taken by
government which finally leads to the termination of
service.
Let us now turn to the facts of this case. On
December 29, 1953, a memorandum was given to
the appellant under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government of India. By that memorandum he was informed about four matters and
his explanation was called in that connection. The
first matter referred to his punctuality in attending
office and his absenting himself from duty without
prior intimation and instances in that respect were
brought to his notice. The second matter was with
respect to irregular claims for mileage allowance
in respect of his visits to mills some of which were
never made. Instances of these were also brought
to his notice. The third matter related to a certain
visit to a certain mill on a certain date which was
1963
f
f
Ji:---
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
209
never undertaken. The fourth matter was general
1963
relating to his work and conduct being not satisfactory and his not attaching due importance to the Champaklal
performance of his duties in accordance with the Chimanlal Shah
instructions of the Regional Director. He was rev.
quired to submit his explanation by January 6, 1954 The Union of
and also asked to state why disciplinary action should
India
not be taken against him.
The contention on behalf of the appellant is Wanchoo 1·
that this memorandum really amounted to a chargesheet against the appellant and he was asked to give
an explanation thereto and also to state why disciplinary action should not be taken against him.
Stress is laid on the last sentence of the memorandum
where the appellant was asked why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. It may be
conceded that the way in which the memorandum
was drafted and the fact that in the last sentence he
was asked to state why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him might give an impression
that the intention was to hold a formal departmental
enquiry against him with a view to punishing him.
But though this may appear to be so, what is important to see is what actually happened after this memorandum for the courts are not to go by the particular
name given by a party to a certain proceeding but
are concerned with the spirit and substance of it
in the light of what preceded and succeeded it. It
is true that in the written statement of the respondent
it is stated that from December 1953 onwards a
departmental enquiry was being conducted against
the appellant, though the written statement went
on to say that that departmental enquiry was not
pursued as the evidence was not considered to be
conclusive. In actual fact however it is not even
the case of the appellant that any enquiry officer
was appointed to hold what we have called a formal
departmental enquiry in which evidence was tendered
from both sides in the presence of the appellant.
This is clear from para 8 of the plaint in which it is
said that some enquiries appeared to have been held
after the memorandum of December 1953 but were
I SCI 64-14
210
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
not pursued further.
It is however clear that no
formal departmental enquiry as contemplated under
Champak/al Art. 311 (2) read with the relevant Central Services
Chimanlal Shah Rules was ever held after the notice of December 29,
v.
1953, as otherwise the appellant would have taken
The Union of part in such an enquiry and would have been entitled
India
to cross-examine witnesses produced against him
and would also have been entitled to lead evidence.
Wanchoo J. It seems therefore clear that though this memorandum was issued and the appellant was asked therein
to state why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him, no departmental enquiry followed that
memorandum and the matter was dropped. That
is further borne out by the fact that the appellant
was transferred from Ahmedabad to Bombay in February 1954, which would be most unlikely if a departmental enquiry was going on against him in Ahmedabad. The respondent's case in this connection is
that it gave up the departmental enquiry even though
it was contemplated and transferred the appellant
to Bombay in order to give him a chance of improvement. The appellant worked in Bombay for over
six months and thereafter the Government finally
decided to terminate his services under r. 5 as his
work and conduct were found unsatisfactory even
after his transfer to Bombay. On these facts there
can in our opinion be no doubt that even if a departmental enquiry was contemplated in December 1953
it was not pursued and no punitive action was taken
against him on the basis of the memorandum issued
to him on December 29, 1953; what appears to have
happened is that after the appellant was transferred
to Bombay where he worked for six months more,
the government came to the conclusion that his work
and conduct were not satisfactory and therefore
decided to terminate his services under r. 5. W;e
cannot accept the proposition that once government
issues a memorandum like that issued in this case
on December 29, 1953, but later decides not to hold
a departmental enquiry for taking punitive action,
it can never thereafter proceed to take action against
a temporary government servant in the terms of r. 5,
1963
f-·
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
211
even though it is satisfied otherwise that his conduct
1963
and work are unsatisfactory. The circumstances in
this case are in our opinion very similar to the facts Champaklal
in Shyamla/'s case\1 l, the difference being that in Chimanlal Shah
that case he was compulsorily retired and in this
v.
case the appellant's services have been terminated. The Union of
In Shyamlal's case( 1 l also at one stage, the governIndia
ment made imputation against his conduct but later
withdrew them and did not follow up the matter by Wanchoo l.
holding a departmental enquiry. This is exactly
what happened in the present case and it was more
than six months after that the appellant who had
in the meantime been transferred to Bombay was
discharged in the terms of r. 5 because his work
and conduct were found unsatisfactory. The order
terminating his services makes no imputation
whatsoever against him and in the circumstances
it cannot be said that the termination of his service
is visited with any evil consequences as explained
in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case( 2 l. We are therefore of opinion that on the facts of this case Art.
311 (2) has no application and the appellant was
not entitled to the protection of that Article before
his services were terminated under r. 5, for the termination of service here does not amount to infliction of the penalty of dismissal or removal.
'
It remains now to consider certain cases on which
reliance was placed on either side. Strong reliance
has been placed on behalf of the appellant on Madan
Gopal v. The State of Punjab(3J. In that case Madan
Gopal was a temporary government servant. A
charge-sheet was served on him on February 5, 1955
and he was charged with having taken bribes in two
cases. He was also asked to explain why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. He was
further asked to state if he wanted to be heard in
person and also to put forth any defence. It will
be clear that charges were served upon Madan Gopal
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
(3) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 716.
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
in that case while i;n the present case no charges were
ever served on the appellant and the communication
Champaklal of December 29, 1953 was headed as a memorandum.
Chimanlal Shah Further the charge-sheet in Madan Gopal's case Cl)
v.
besides asking him to state why disciplinary action
The Union of should not be taken against him also asked him to
India
state in his reply if he wanted to be heard in person
and wanted to put forward any defence, which clearly
Wanchoo J. showed that a departmental enquiry was going to
be held particularly when the charges were given
by the Settlement Officer who had apparently been
appointed the enquiry officer for the purpose. Further
in Madan Gopal's caseC1) an enquiry was held and a
report was submitted by the enquiry officer to the
Deputy Commissioner. The enqiury officer found
Madan Gopal guilty of the charges and recommended
that he should be removed from service immediately.
On the basis of this report an order was passed by
the Deputy Commissioner which stated in so many
words that it had been established that bribes had
been taken by Madan Gopal and that he accepted
the report of the Settlement Officer. The Deputy
Commissioner then went on to order that the services
of Madan Gopal were terminated on payment of
one month's pay in lieu of notice. Obviously in
that case a departmental enquiry was held by the
enquiry officer, a report was made to the Deputy
Commissioner who was apparently the authority
to dismiss or remove Madan Gopal and he passed the
order terminating his services on the basis of the
report, though he did not use the word "dismiss"
or "remove" in his order. In those circumstances
this Court held in conformity with what had been
said in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's caseC 2 l that the
mere use of the word "termination" would not conclude the matter and as the facts showed as they did
in Madan Gopal's caseC1) that the order was one of
dismissal or removal and was passed as a punishment after inquiry, Art. 311(2) should have been
complied with. The facts of that case in our opinion
are very different from the facts in the present case.
1963
(I) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 716.
(2) [1958] s.c.R. 828·
•
•
5S.C.R.
"
,_..-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
213
As we have already pointed out no departmental
1963
enquiry was really held after the memorandum of
December 29, 1953 in this case and no enquiry officer ~hampaklal
was appointed and no report was made by any enquiry Chiman/a/Shah
officer. Whatever might have been the intention
v.
behind the memorandum dated December 29, 1953, The Union °1
the matter was not pursued and the departmental
India
enquiry if it was ever intended to be held was dropped. Wanchoo J.
The appellant thereafter was transferred to Bombay
to give him chance of improvement and it was only
six months later when it was found that his work
and conduct were still unsatisfactory that government took action under r. 5 and dispensed with his
services. On the facts of the present case therefore it cannot be said that the order of dispensing
with the services of the appellant which was passed
in August 1954 was an order punishing the appellant
by imposing upon him the penalty of removal
or dismissal.
The next case is The State Qf Bihar v. Gopi Kishore
Prasad< 1 l. That was a case of a probationer and this
Court laid down five propositions therein. It is
the third proposition therein on which strong reliance
has been placed on behalf of the appellant. It is
in these terms :-
'
-
.J •
"But, if instead of terminating such a person's
service without any enquiry, the employer chooses
to hold an enquiry into his alleged misconduct,
or inefficiency, or for some similar reason, the
termination of service is by way of punishment,
because it puts a stigma on his competence
and thus affects his future career. In such a
case he is entitled to the protection of Art.
311 (2) of the Constitution."
It is urged on behalf of the appellant that this proposition means that as soon as any kind of enquiry is
held against a probationer-and the same it is said
will apply to a temporary employee as the two
(!) A.LR. 1960 S.C. 689.
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
stand more or less on the same footing-the protection of Art. 311(2) would be available. We are
Champaklal of opinion that this is reading much more in the
Chzmanlal Shah proposition then was ever intended by this Court.
v'.
In that case the Government after some kind of enquiry
The Um.on °1 said in the order terminating the services of the servant
India
concerned that confidential enquiries showed that
Wanchoo J. he had the reputation of being a corrupt officer and
that there was ample material to show that the report
about his resorting to corrupt practices was justified. The order further said that his work was wholly
unsatisfactory and in consideration of those matters,
it was provisionally decided to terminate the probation
and the government servant was asked to show cause
why he should not be discharged. His explanation
was then considered and the Government finally
decided to discharge him. The facts of that case
as they appeared from the copy of the government
decision showed that the government was actually
proceeding on the basis that Art. 311(2) was
applicable in that case and that is why some
enquiries were held and a provisional conclusion to
terminate the services of the officer concerned was
arrived at and he was asked to show cause against
that. In those circumstances this Court held that
as government had purported to take action under
Art. 311, the action was bad as the protection envisaged by that Article was not afforded to the servant
concerned. The third proposition therefore in that
case does not in our opinion lay down that as soon
as any kind of enquiry is held into the conduct of a
probationer or a temporary servant he is immediately
entitled to the protection of Art. 311. All that the
third proposition lays down is that if the government chooses to hold an enquiry purporting to act
under Art. 311 as was the case in that case, it
must afford to the government servant the protection
which that Article envisages.
1963
Gopi Kishore Prasad's casec 1 ) was considered
by this Court in a later case in the State of Orissa
(I) A.LR. 1960 S.C 689.
f
.
5 S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
215
v. Ram Narayan Das,< 1 ) which was also a case of a
1963
probationer. In Ram Narayan Das's case,<1l the
order was to the effect that the government servant ~hampaklal
was discharged from service for unsatisfactory work Chimanlal Shah
and conduct from the date on which the order was
v.
served on him. This Court in Ram Narayan Das's The Un~on °1
case< 1 l referred to the rules, which provided that
India
"where it is proposed to terminate the employment Wanchoo J.
of a probationer, whether during or at the end of the
period of probation, for any specific fault or on account
of his unsuitability for the service, the probationer
shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal
and given an opportunity to show cause against
it, before orders are passed by the authority competent to terminate the employment" and pointed out
that action in accordance with the rules would not
be hit by Art. 311. Gopi Kishore Prasad's case< 2 J
was distinguished in that case and it was pointed
out that the third proposition in Gopi Kishore Prasad's
case< 2 l referred to "an enquiry into allegations of
misconduct or inefficiency with a view, if they were
found established, to imposing punishment and not
to an enquiry whether a probationer should be confirmed," which means that where the Government
purports to hold an inquiry under Art. 311 read
with the Rules in order to punish an officer, it must
afford him the protection provided therein. The
third proposition therefore in Gopi Kishore Prasad' s
case< 2 l must be read in the context of that case and
cannot apply to a case wliere the government holds
what we have called a preliminary enquiry to find
out whe~her a temporary. serv~nt should be discharged
or ~ot m ac.cord_ance wit~ his contract or a specific
service rule m view of his conduct. The third proposition must be restricted only to those cases whether
of temporary government servants or others, where
government purports to act under Art. 311(2) but
ends up with a mere order of termination. In such
a case the form of the order is immaterial and the
termination of service may amount to dismissal or
(!)
[1961] I S.C.R. 606.
(2) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689.
216
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
removal. The same view has been taken in Jagadish
Mitter v. Union of lndia< 1 )
Champak/a/
. .
~e are. therefore of ?pmion tha.t on the fa.cts
Chimanlal Shah
v
of this case it cannot be said that the order by which
The U~ion of the appellants, .seryi~es were tei:minated und~r ~. 5
India
was an order mfhctmg the pumshment of d1sm1ssal
or removal to which Art. 311(2) applied. It was
Wanchoo J. in our opinion an order which was justified under
r. 5 of the rules and the appellant was not entitled
to the protection of Art. 311 (2) in the circumstances.
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed.
In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
1963
·-
Appeal dismissed.
1963
THE MAHALAXMI MILLS LTD.
October 13
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
BOMBAY
(And connected appeals)
(A. K. SARKAR, M. HrnAYATULLAH AND K. C. DAS
GUPTA JJ.)
v.
Income Tax-Depreciation-Computation of written down
value-Deduction of depreciation in earlier years-Scope-Saurashtra
Income Tax Ordinance, 1949, s. 13(5) (b)-Taxation Laws (Part B
States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950, para 2-Indlan
Income Tax Act, 1922 (11 ofl922), s. 10(5) (b).
The assessces were carrying on business in Bhavnagar which
was formerly an Indian State. In 1948 Bhavnagar became part
of the United State of Saurashtra and on March 16, 1949 the
Saurashtra Income-tax Ordinance was promulgated. For the
purpose of calculating the depreciation allowance to which the
assessees were entitled in computing the profits or gains of the
business, the written down value of the building, machinery etc.,
had to be ascertained in accordance with the provisions of the
Ordinance. Section 13(5) (b) of the Ordinance provided that
"the written down value meant, in the case of assets acquired
before the previous year, the actual cost to the assessee less all
depreciation actually allowed to him under this Ordinance or .........
which would have been allowed to him if the Indian Income-tax
(1) A.LR. 1964 S.C. 449.
,
...
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