SYED YAKOOB versus K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN & OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 October 1963 | [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64 | 1963 INSC 205
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 October 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 593/1963
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 205
Text of the judgment
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
[1964]
SYED YAKOOB
October 9
RADHAKRISHNAN & OTHERS
(P.B. GAJEN!JRAGADKAR, K. SUilllA RAO, K.N.
WANC!IOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUilAR DAYAL .I.I.)
K.S.
Certiorari-(Jrou1ul\· <~(issue-0'taKC carriage pcr111ir-1~rihu11al's
finding that applicant had 110 irorkshop at tern1.i11ii-Abse11ce <~l
reasons-if. error of la1v a1;pare11t on the face Qf the Record-1¥rit
jurisdiction of High Court-Co11stitutio11 o.f India, Art. 226-Motor
Vehicles Act, !939(4 of 1939), s. 47.
The Stale Transport Authority issued a notilication under
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, calling for applications for the grant
of two stage carriage permits for the route Madras to Chidambaram.
A large number of applications were received. The authority
granted the first permit to. one of the applicants and for the second
it decided to call for fresh applications. The appellant, as also
a number of other applicants, appealed to the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal confirmed the grant of the
first permit and as regards the second it allowed the appeal of the
appellant and directed that it should be granted to him. Respondent No. I moved the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution
for the issue of a writ of certiorari and the single Judge who heard
the matter held that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked relevant
considerations, and allowed irrelevant considerations to prevail
and so made the Rule absolute. A Letters Patent appeal was
preferred by the appellant. The Division Bench affirmed the order
of the single Judge on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal had
overlooked material considerations in favour of the respondent
No. I and dismissed the appeal. The appellant came to this
Court by special leave and it was contended on his behalf that in
issuing the writ of certiorari the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction
under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Heid: (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Shah and Dayal
J.J.). The contention raised on behalf of the appellant was well
founded and must prevail.
A \Vrit of certiorari is issued !'or correcting errors of jurisdic~
tion com1nitted by courts or tribunals, in cases \Vhcre they exceed
their jurisdiction or fail to exercise it or exercise it illegally or improperly, i.e. where an order is passed without hearing the party
sought to be affected by it or where the procedure adopted is opposed
to principles of natural justice.
The jurisdiction to issue a writ of cerriorari is a supervisory
one and in exercising it, the court is not entitled to act as a court
of appeal. That neces;arily means that the findings of fact arrived
at by the inferior court or tribunal arc binding.
,
...
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
An error of law apparent on the face of the record can, however,
1963
be corrected by a writ of cel"tioral"i, but not an error of fact however
grave it may appear to be.
Syed Yakoob
A writ of certiol"ari can also be issued if it is shown that in
v.
recording a finding of fact, admissible and material evidence has Ks Radhakrishnot been admitted, or inadmissible evidence affecting the impugned · ·
finding has been admitted . A finding of fact based on no evidence
nan
would also be an error of law and as such amenable to such a
writ.
But a finding of fact cannot be challenged in such a proceeding
on the ground that the relevant and material evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding. Adequacy or sufficiency of evidence
or an inference of fact to be drawn from the evidence or finding
of fact are entirely within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Hal"i Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, [1955] I S.C.R.
1104, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division
and Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1240 and Kaushalya Devi v.
Bachittal" Singh, A.LR. 1960 S.C. 1168, relied on.
It is neither possible nor desirable to define or describe all
cases of errors which can be said to be errors of law apparent on
the face of the record. Whether or not an error is such an error
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the
nature and scope of the law misconstrued or contravened.
It was not open to a party on the authority of the decision
of this Court in K.M. Shamnugam v. S.R. V.S. (P) Ltd., to come to
the High Court under Art. 226 to have all questions of fact reconsidered so as to invoke the plea of'public interest' under s. 47 of the
Motor Vehicles Act.
KM. Shannwgam v. S.R.V.S. (P) I.Id., l [1964] I S.C.R. 809,
held inapplicable.
In the present case the controversy centered round the fact
whether the respondent No. I had a workshop at Chidambaram,
one of the two terminii of the route and that the tribunal had
failed to duly consider some evidence in that connection. That
argument was an argument related to appreciation of evidence
and as such was outside the purview of a proceeding for a writ
of certioral"i. The High Court was therefore, in error in issuing
the wnt of certiorari.
In issuing a writ and in making it absolute, care should be
taken to draw the order accurately.
.
Unless allegations are made against them, the State Transport
Authority or the Appellate. Trib.unal should not be represented
through lawyers. The1r position ll1 ordinary cases is just the same
as that of courts and other tribunals.
.
Pel" Subba Rao J.-Where the tribunal ignores or fails to
rnvestigate a material circumstance germane to a question of public
I SCl/64-5
66
1963
Syed Yakoob
v.
K.S. Radhakrish-
nan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
interest under s. 47 of the Act put forward by a claimant
for permit and gives a finding against him, that finding is vitiated
by an error of law apparent on the face of the record and is liable
to be quashed by a writ of certiorari.
The High Court found that the State Transport Authority
and the Appellate Tribunal failed to consider the specific claim
of the respondent 1 as to the existence of his workshop at Chidambaram and was, therefore, right in setting aside their orders. The
High Court could not be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction under
Art. 226 of the Constitution.
This was a clear case where the Tribunal made a finding that
was based on no evidence and was contrary to the specific claim
made before it. Since the first respondent had secured the highest
number of marks, this claim, if substantiated, would tilt the balance
in his favour. This Court would not interfere in such a matter
in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 136 of
the Constitution to set aside the High Court's order.
<
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTJON: Civil Appeal No.
593 of 1963.
•
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated December J9, 1962, of the Madras High
Court in Writ Appeal No. 157 of 1961.
..
.I
M.C. Setalvad, and R. Gopalakris/11w11, for the
appellant.
G.S. Pathak, O.C. Afathur, J.B. Dadac!w11ji and
Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. 1.
A. Ra11ganadlza111 Chelly and A. V. Ra11gal/l, for
respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
The Judgment of P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N.
Wanchoo, J.C. Shah, Ragubar Dayal JJ. was delivered
by Gajendragadkar J. Subba Rao J. delivered a
dissenting opinion.
Gajendragadkar
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The short question which
J.
this appeal raises for our decision relates to the limits
of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing a writ
of certiorari while dealing with orders passed by
the appropriate authorities granting or refusing to
grant permits under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called 'the Act').
,
..
.
'
·~···
}
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
1963
The State Transport Authority, Madras, (hereinafter referred to as Authority) issued a notification
on the 4th July, 1956, under section 57(2) of the Syed Yakoob
Act calling for applications for the grant of two stage
v.
carriage permits to run as an express service on the K.S. Radhakrishroute Madras to Chida111baram. 107 applications were
nan
received in response to the said notification; some
of these were rejected as time-barred or otherwise Gajcndragadkar
defective, and the others which were in order were
J.
exa111ined by the Authority.
On the 8th May, 1957, the Authority found that
Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd., Madras, was the
111ost suitable a111ongst the applicants and granted
one per111it to it. As regards the second permit,
the Authority held that none of the other applicants
was suitable, and so , it refused to grant the said permit
to anyone of them: it decided to call for applications
afresh under s. 57(2) of the Act.
Against this order, appeals were preferred by
18 claiman\s for permits before the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called "the Appellate
Tribunal); amongst them was the appellant Syed
Yakoob and respondent No. I K.S. Radhakrishnan.
The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the grant of the
first per111it to the Provincial Transport (Pvt.) Ltd:
and so far as the second permit was concerned, it
allowed the appeal preferred by the appellant and
directed that the said second permit should be issued
to him; respondent No. ! 's claim for the said permit
was accordingly rejected. This order was passed
on the 7th July, 1958.
The validity of this order was challenged ~y
respondent No. I by his writ petition No., 4.4 of 19)9
filed in the High Court of Madras. Snmvasan J.,
who heard the writ petition held that the Appellate
Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in
deciding the question of. the .grant of the second
permit and allowe~ co1~siderallons not ~ermane to
the question to vitiate its order., That 1s why the
rule issued on the wnt pct1t1on filed by respondent
No. I was made absolute.
68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
This order was challenged by the appellant before
a Division Bench of the said High Court by an appeal
Syed Yakoob preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
v.
. Tl~e Division Bench has held that the order passed by
K.S. Radhakns!z- Snnivasan J. could be sustained on the ground that
nan
the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked material conG . siderations in favour of respondent No. 1, and so,
a;endragadkar it has affirmed the decision of the learned single Judge
1
·
on that grQund alone. In regard t'o the finding
of the rearned single Judge that an irreieyant
consideration had vitiated the finding of the Appellate
Tribunal, the Division Bench held that the consideration in question was not irrelevant, and so,
it differed from the view taken by Srinivasan J. In
the result, the appeal preferred by the appellant
before the Division Bench was dismissed. lt is
against this order that the appellant has come to
this Court by special leave and to his appeal he has
impleaded respondent No. I and has added the
Authority and the Appellate Tribunal as respondents
2 arid 3 . Mr. Setalvad for the appellant contends
that in issuing a writ of certiorari in respect of the
impugned order passed by the Appellate Tribunal,
the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction
under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion.
this contention is well-founded and must be accepted.
1963
The question about the limits of the jurisdiction
of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under
Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court
and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer
in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts
or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed
by inferior courts or tribunals without jursidiction,
or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise
jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where
in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court
or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance,
it decides a question without giving an opportunity
to be heard to the party affected by the order, or
where the procedure adopted in dealing with the
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5 S.C.R.
•__ )
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
1963
There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction Syed Yakooh
and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as
v.
an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily meansK.S. Radhakrish·
that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court
nan
or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence . --cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. Ga;endragadkm
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the
J.
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard
to 11 finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ
of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence,
or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence
which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with
this category of cases, however, we must always
bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for
a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant
and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal
was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence
led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn
from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ court. lt is within these limits
that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts
under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath
v. Syed Ahmed lshaquet 1 i, Nagendra Nath Bora v.
The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals,
Acssamt 2 i, and Kausha/ya Devi v. Bachittar Sing/i' 3 i.
It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately
describe what an error of law apparent on the face of
(I) [!955] l S.C.R.1104.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 1240.
(3) A.LR. 1960 S.C. 1168.
70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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[1964]
the record means. What can be corrected by a writ
has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error
Syed Yakoob oflaw as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the
v.
face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear
K.S Radhakrish· that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior
nan
Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or
. -Ga1endragadkar sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in
J.
disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons
which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases,
the impugned conclusion should be so plainly_ inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that
no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in
holding that the said error of law is apparent on the
face of the record. ft may also be that in some cases,
the impugned error of law may not be obvious or
patent on the face of the record as such and the Court
may need an argument to discover the said error;
but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected
by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said
error must, on the whole, be of such a character as
would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent
on the face of the record.· ff a statutory provision is
reasonably capable of two constructions and one
construction has been adopted by the inferior Court
or Tribunal, its conclusion may not. necessarily or
always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari.
In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable
to attempt either to define or to describe adequately
all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the
record. Whether or not an impugned error is an
error of law and an error of law which is apparent
on the face of the record, must always depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case and upon
the nature and scope of the legal provision which
is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.
1963
Jn the present case, the question raised by the
appellant presents no difficulty whatever. The point
which was raised before the High Court by respondent
.,
.
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
71
1963
No. 1 lies within a very narrow compass; it is a very
short and simple question of fact. It appears that
in dealing with the rival claims of the appellant and Sved Yakonb
respondent No. I for the second permit on the route
v.
in question, the Appellate Tribunal was ultimate!yK.S. Radhakrishinfluenced by the fact that the appellant had a worknan
shop at Madras which is one terminus of the route
. ---in question, whereas respondent No. l had a work- Ga1endragadkar
1·
shop and a place of business only at Cuddalore which
is an intermediate station on the route and did not
possess a workshop at either of the terminii of the
route; the other terminus being Chidambaram. In
fact, that appears to be the effect of the finding made
by the Authority also. Respondent No. 1 urged before
the High Court that in coming to the conclusion that
he had no workshop at Chidambaram, the Appellate
Tribunal had failed to consider material evidence
adduced by him. ft is on this narrow ground that
a writ has been issued in favour of respondent No. 1.
Mr. Setalvad contends that the question as to whether
respondent No. I had a workshop at Chidambaram
is a pure question of fact and the High Court had no
.. jurisdiction to interfere with the finding recorded by
the Appellate Tribunal and seek to correct it by issuing a writ of certiorari. In this connection, he relies
on the fact that both the Authority and the Appellate
Tribunal have, in substance, found that respondent
No. I had no workshop at either of the two terminii
on the route and the fact that no reasons have
been given in support of the said finding would not
justify the interference of the High Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 226.
Jt may be conceded that it
would have been better if the Appellate Tribunal
had indicated why it rejected the case of respondent
No. 1 in regard to his alleged workshop at Chadambaram, but we do not think that the failure of the
Appellate Tribunal to give a reason in that behalf, or
to refer specifically to the evidence adduced by respondent No.J, would, by itself, constitute such an
error in its decision as to justify the issue of a writ
of certiorari under Art. 226. Jn this connection,
we ought to add that it has not been suggested by
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
respondent No. l that in dealing with his claim for a
permit, admissible evidence which he wanted to adduce
Syed Yakoob had been excluded by the Tribunal from the record; the
v.
argument that some evidence was not duly considered
K.S. Radhakrish· by the Tribunal, would normally pertain to the realm
nan
of the appreciation of evidente and would, as such,
. - be outside the purview. of an enquiry in proceedings
Ga;endragadk"r for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226.
1963
J.
(.
It appears that when respondent No. I applied
for the permit, he sent a letter dated 11th July, 1956,
in which he had stated that he had a workshop at
Chidambaram and that he was running it in order
to maintain the service efficiently and without any •'
breakdown whatsoever. The argument is that this
letter has not been challenged by any party to the
proceedings and has been completely ignored by the
'
Authority and the Appellate Tribunal when they
reached the conclusion that respondent No. I did
not possess a workshop at Chidambaram. As we
have already pointed out, neither the Authority nor
the Appellate Tribunal has given reasons in support
of the findings of fact recorded by it; but the said •
fact alone does not, in our opinion, justify the conclusion of the High Court that the letter in question
had not been considered by the said Authorities,
and so, the High Court was not right in issuing a
writ of certiorari on that basis alone.
But apart from this aspect of the matter, the
record shows that the assertion of respondent No. l
that he had a workshop at Chidambaram was con- (
tradicted by one of the claimants for a permit and is
entirely inconsistent with the reports submitted to
the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal by the
department. D. Kanniah Pillai, one of the applicants
for the permit, had specifically averred in his application
that the other applicants amongst whom respondent
No. 1 was included, were all for away from the Headquarters having no workshop at Chidambaram. Thus,
it would not be right to assume that the claim made
by respondent No. I that he had a workshop at Chidambaram was not disnuted by any other competitor.
......
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
What is more significant, however, is the evidence
1963
supplied by the report made by the Regional Transport
Officer, South Arcot. This report is made under Syed Yokooh
different columns. Column 4 speaks about the possesv.
sion of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities K.S. Radhakrishand its location. The report is made in respect of
nan
each one of the applicants. In regard to respondent
No. 1 under column 4, the report shows that he was Gajendragadkar
maintaining a workshop as per Government Order
J.
at Cuddalore, and column 5 speaks about the location
of his residence or place of business as Cuddalore.
A similar report has been submitted about the appellant
and that shows that the appellant had workshop
facilities at Madras and that he had a residence and
place of business at the terminus.
When the present dispute went before the Appellate
Tribunal, a fresh report appears to have been
called for, and this report which has been made by
the Secretary, State Transport Authority, also shows
that respondent No. 1 had a workshop at Cuddalore
on the route, whereas the appellant had a workshop
at Madras. ft would thus be clear that on the question
as to whether respondent No. l had a workshop at
Chidambaram, there was his own as.sertion stating
that he had such a workshop. and there were the two
reports made by the Transport Officers which contradicted the said assertion; the said assertion was
also challenged by one of the applicants,· On this
state of the record, it was, we think, not permissible
to the High Court to consider these questions of fact
and to hold that the finding recorded by the Appellate
Tribunal was a finding without any evidence. To
say that material considerations were ignored by
the Appellate Tribunal in holding that respondent
No. 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram would
be plainly unreasonable when it is remembered that
the evidence disclosed a sharp conflict between the
versions of the parties, and the version of respondent
No. 1 was inconsistent with the reports made by
the Transport Officers which must have been treated
as more reliable by the Appellate Tribunal. There
74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
can be little doubt that if respondent No. I had owned
a workshop at Chidambaram. it would have been
Sred Yakoob mentioned in col. 4, because the said column is obv.
vi.ously intended to indicate all places where the
K.S. Radlwkrish- claimant owns a workshop and possesses repair
nan
facilities.
1963
Gajendragadkar
J.
Tt appears that before Srinivasan J. the appellant's
learned counsel conceded that the allegation made
by respondent No. I that he owned a workshop
at Chidam baram had not been challenged before the
Transport Authorities, and naturally Srinivasan J.
was considerably impressed by the said concession;
but as the Division Bench which heard the Letters
Patent Appeal has pointed out, the said concession
was not correctly made; in fact, the record distinctly
shows that the claim made by respondent No. I was
challenged by one of the applicants for permit and
was plainly inconsistent with the reports to which
we have just referred. Therefore, the concession
on which Srinivasan J., relied has been properly left
out of account by the Division Bench in dealing with
the appeal. The Division Bench thought that apart
from the said concession, it did appear that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked the claim made by
respondent No. l in his letter of the I Ith July, 1956.
As we have already indicated, we find it difficult to
sustain this finding. In our opinion, apart from the
fact that the plea raised by respondent No. I could
not be validly raised under Art. 226, even on the
merits the said plea is not well-founded. The question
on which respondent No. I sought for the intervention
of the High Court under Art. 226 was a simple question
of fact, and we are satisfied that on that question of
fact, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in coming
to the cvnclusion that the claim made by respondent
No. 1 about the existence of a workshop at Chidambaram was not well-founded; but even if the said
finding did not appear to the High Court to be satisfactory, that would be no reason for issuing a writ
under Art. 226. There was evidence in support of
the finding of the Appellate Tribunal and it is not a
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
75
case where the finding is based on no evidence at
1963
all. We ought also to add that though the Division
Bench was satisfied that the concession on which Sl'ed Yakooh
Srinivasan J., substantially acted had been wrongly
v.
made before him, its attention does not appear to K.S. Radhakrishhave been drawn to the reports made by the Transport
nan
Officers to which we have just referred. We have
. -no doubt that if the Division Bench had taken into Ga1endmgadkar
1·
account those reports, it would have hesitated to
confirm the finding made by Srinivasan J.
-
lt appears that Srinivasan J., was inclined to
take the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal
was vitiated by the fact that it took into account
certain irrelevant considerations. The Division Bench
has held that the said considerations cannot be said
to be irrelevant. These considerations centre round
the question as to whether preference should be given
to an applicant for permit who has his headquarters
at the terminus as against another who has only a
branch office at the said terminus. The practice
usually followed by the Tribunals under the Act
appears to be to give one mark under col. 3 to the
applicant who has his headquarters at the terminus
and give only 1;2 mark to an applicant who has only
a branch office at the terminus. Having held that
the consideration on which marks are thus allotted
cannot be said to be irrelevant, the Division Bench
has indicated that the policy underlying the said
practice may be open to doubt. In our opinion, it
would have been better if the Division Bench had not
expressed any opinion on this aspect of the matter,
particularly when it came to the conclusion that the
said matter was primarily for the decision of the
Appellate Tribunal.
Mr. Pathak for respondent No. l has relied on
a recent decision of this Court in K.M. Shanmugam
v. The S.R. V.S. (P) Ltd.< 1 i in support of his contention
that the error committed by the Appellate Tribunal
really amounted to a contravention of s. 47 of the
Act. He argues that the Appellate Tribunal was
(!J [T964].fs.c~1C809.
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
under an obligation, in considering the question about
the grant of a permit, to take into account the inSyed Yaknoh terests of publir generally under s. 47(a) and inasmuch
v.
as the Appellate Tribunal has ignored the fact that
K.S. Radhakris'1-respondent No. 1 owns a workshop at Chidambaram
nan
and thereby has refused his application for a permit,
. -the interests of the public generally have been sacrificed.
Gajendragadkar This argument prima facie appears to be far-fetched
1·
and fanciful; but Mr. Pathak urges that the observations made by this Court in the case of K.M. Shanmugam are in his favour. In our opinion, the said decision
does not lend any assistance to Mr. Pathak's contention. Jn that case, !his Court was satisfied that
"the Tribunal made a clear error of law inasmuch
as it held that in the case of the first respondent, as
it had a branch at Kurnbakonam, its other branch
at Manmargudi should be ignored." The judgment
shows that this Court took the view that it was obviously an untenable proposition to hold that even
if a company has a well-equipped office on a route
in respect of which a permit is applied for, it shall
be ignored if the company has some other branch
somewhere unconnected with that route, and it was
observed that that was precisely what the Appellate
Tribunal had held and that, according to the Court,
clearly was an error apparent on the face of the record.
Jt is in that connection that this Court referred to the
mandatory provisions of s. 47. We do not think
that this decision can be legitimately pressed into
service by Mr. Pathak in the present case. It is
only after it is proved that respondent No. 1 had a
workshop at Chidambaram that any subsequent
question about the interests of the public generally
can possibly arise. If, as in the present case, the
Appellate Tribunal has held that respondent No. l
did not own a workshop at Chidambaram, no consideration of public interests can arise at all, and
it is with this question that the present writ proceedings are concerned. We ought to add that the decision
in the case of K.M. Shanmugam cannot justify a
party whose application for permit has been rejected
by the authorities under the Act, to move the High
1963
•
•
s s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
Court under Art. 226 and invite it to consider all
1963
questions of fact on the plea that the decision on the
said questions of fact may assist him to invoke the 5;·ed Yakoob
provisions of s. 47. That clearly is not the effect
v.
.
of the said decision.
.K.S. Radhaknshnan
•
Mr. Pathak has also urged that even if we come
-to the conclusion that the High Court was not Gc(iendragadkar
competent to issue a writ in the present proceedings,
J.
having regard to the nature of the questions raised
before it by respondent No. I, we should not reverse
the decision of the High Court under Art. 136 of the
Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court under
Art. 136, though very wide, is exercised by the Court
in its discretion, savs Mr. Pathak, and he contends
that where the order under appeal furthers the ends
of justice, we should not reverse the said order on
technical grounds. We are not impressed by this
plea. It may be conceded that in a proper case
this Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction
under Art. D6 where the interests of justice patently
indicate the desirability of adopting such a course;
but we do not see how a plea of such a kind can be
entertained where it is clearly shown that the impugned orders passed by the High Court are without
jurisdiction. If Mr. Pathak's argument were to be
accepted, in a majority of cases if the High Court
interfered with questions of fact in issuing writs
of certior.1ri against the decisions of special Tribunals,
it may always be urged that what the High Courts
have done is in the interests of justice and this Court
should not interfere with the decisions of the High
Courts. In the circumstances of the present case,
we do not see how considerations of justice can really
arise. The Tribunals of fact have found that respondent No. I does not own a workshop at Chidambaram and having regard to the other relevant circumstances which the Tribunals have considered, the
fact that he does not own a workshop at Chidambararn has ultimately proved decisive against respondent No. l and in favour of the appellant. If
that be so, a decision based on facts found by the
78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Tribunal cannot be reopened on the plausible plea
that a further enquiry should be made btcause that
Syed Yakoob would be just. If findings of fact were allowed to
v. . . be disturbed by High Courts in such writ proceedings,
K.S. Radha/,mh-that may lead to an interminable search for correct
"""
findings and would virt1.1ally convert the High Courts
d
into
Appellate Courts competent to deal with questions
"
,
Gr,en
/
1
ragacKar
ff
Tl
.
I
l. l .
. .
.
J.
~
act.
lat 1s w 1~ we t_11!1 c, m enterta111mg pct1t1ons for wnts of cert10rari, 1t 1s necessarv to remember
that findings of fact recorded by special Tribunals
which have been clothed with jurisdiction to deal
with them, should be treated as final between the
parties, unless, of course, it is shown that the impugned
finding is cased on no evidence. Therefore, we
do not think the plea made by Mr. Pathak that in
the interests of justice we should refrain from ~etting
aside the order under appeal, can be upheld.
1963
There is one more point to which reference must
be made. It appears that in the writ petition filed
by respondent No. I he claimed that the orders passed
by the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal should
be set aside, and a rule was issued in terms of the prayer
made in the said petition. Ultimately, the said rule
has been made absolute. It is obvious that in the
writ petition, respondent No. l did not challenge
the grant of the permit to the Provincial Transport
(Pvt.) Ltd., but unfortunately, having regard to the
prayer made by respondent No. I in his writ petition,
the orders ultimately passed in the said proceedings
may, if technically construed, mean that the orders
of the Authority as well as the Appellate Tnbu nal
have been set aside and that clearly was not and could
not have been the intention of the High Court in issuing
the writ. lt would, we think, be better if in issuing
a writ on a writ petition and in making it absolute
in case the writ petition succeeds, care is taken to draw
the order more accurately.
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the order
passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ
•
•I
- ,...,
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79
'
-
'
;·
1963
petition filed by respondent No. I is dismissed: Respondent I to pay the cost of the appellant in this Court.
Syed Yakuub
Mr. Ranganathan Chetty who appears for resv.
p~ndent~ 2 and 3 has asked for his costs. We do not K.S. Radhakrisfi·
tl11nk tins request can be accepted.
It may be that
J1(/ 11
in such proceedings, the Authority and the Appellate
Tribunal are proper and necessary parties, but unless Gajendragadkar
allegations are made against them which need a reply · J.
from them, it is not usual for the authorities to be
represented by lawyers in Court. Tn ordinary cases,
their position is like that of courts or other Tribunals
against whose decisions writ proceedings are filed;
they arc not interested in the merits of the dispute
in any sense, and so, their representation by lawyers
in S!ich proceedings is wholly unnecessary and even
inappropriate. That is why we direct that respondents
2 and 3 should bear their own costs.
SUBBA RAO .T.--I have had the advantage of peru- Subba Raa J.
sing the judgment of my learned brother, Gajendragadkar J. I cannot agree. The facts lie in a small compass
and they are as follows: The State Transport Authority, Madras, called for applications for the grant of two
stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Chidambaram. 107 applications were received by the said Authority. The appellant and the first respondent are two
of the said applicants. The Staie Transport Autho·
rity gave one of the permits to the Provincial Transport
(P1 ivate) Limited, Madras: we are not concerned
with this permit. As regards the second permit, the said
Authority found none of the applicants suitable and,
therefore, refused to grant the same to any one of
them and directed fresh applications to be called for.
Against the said order, the appellant, first respondent
and others preferred appeals to the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal. The appellant herein was respondent 16 and respondent I herein was appellant
7 before the said Appellate Tribunal. The first respondent secured the highest total marks, viz., 7~,
under columns I to 5 under the scheme of marking
sanctioned by the State Government. The appellant
got only 41 marks. Ignoring the highest total of
80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
marks secured by the first respondent, the Appellate
Tribunal rejected his claim on the ground that he
Syed Yakoob had his workshop and place of business en route
K.S. Ra;hakrish- at Cuddalore and not at either of the terminii of the
nan
route. Excluding the first respondent, the Appellate
Tribunal, for the reasons mentioned in the order,
Subba Rao J. preferred the appellant in a competition between
him and appellant 14 before the Tribunal. The main
ground of preference was that the appellant had got
his workshop in the headquarters at Madras. In
the result, the Appellate Tribunal rejected the application of the first respondent and gave the permit to the
appellant. The first respondent filed a writ petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of
Judicature at Madras for the issue of a writ of certiorari
for quashing the order of the said Tribunal. The
said petition was heard by Srinivasan J., and he
quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal mainly
on the ground that the Tribunal did not take into
consideration a material and relevant circumstance
to the enquiry before it, namely, that the petitioner
had the necessary repair and maintenance facilities
at Chidambaram, one of the terrninii of the route
in question. ln that view the learned Judge quashed
the order of the Appellate Tribunal. On Letters
PatentAppeal, a Division Bench of the High Court,
consisting of Ramachandra Iyer C.J., and Venkataraman J., held that the learned Judge should not have
given a finding on the question whether the first respondent had the above said facilities at Chidambaram,
but agreed with him that the Appellate Tribunal had
overlooked the claim made by the first responden't
to the effect that he had such facilities at Chidambaram. Hence the appeal.
1963
Mr. Setalvad, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, contended that the Appellate Tribunal
had held on the material plac~d before it that the
first respondent had no such facilities at the terminal
and that, therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction
to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the
Appellate Tribunal.
5 S.C.R.
·-
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81
1963
Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the first respondent, argued that though the first respondent cle<irly
stated in his letter dated July 11, 1956, to the Transport Syed Yaktch
Authority that he had such facilities, the State Transv.
port Authority as well as the State Transport Appellate K.S. RadlwkrishTribunal had ignored that material circumstance
nan
which was germane to the question of public interest
under s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and, Sabha RaoJ.
therefore, the High Court had rightly quashed that
order under Art. 226 of the Constitution and directed
the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal on merits.
Alternatively he contended that though there might
be some material for the Appellate Tribunal to come
to the conclusion that the first respondent had no
such facilities, three learned Judges of the High Court,
on the admissions made and the material placed before
them, have held that the Tribunal did not decide that
question and that they only gave a further opportunity
to the Appellate Tribunal to decide the appeal on
merits and that in the circumstances it is not a fit
case for this Court to interfere under Art. 136 of the
Constitution.
The first respondent has a fundamental right to
carry on business in transport. The Motor Vehicles
Act is a law imposing reasonable restrictions in public
interests on such right. Under s. 47 of the said Act
the Regio11al Transport Authority shall, in considering
an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard,
inter alia, to the interests of the public generally. The
fact that the first respondent has a separate workshop
or at any rate has the necessary repair and maintenance
facilities at one of the terminii of the route, l'i::., at
Chidambaram, is certainly a consideration germane
to the question of public interest. Indeed, the scheme
of marking system suggested by the Government
also recognizes the importance of such facilities at
either of the terminii of the route. If the first respondent had placed before the authorities concerned the
said circumstance in support of his claim for a permit
and if that was ignored or not investigated into by
the said authorities, the High Court would certainly
I SCI/64-5
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
have jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution
to quash the order of the authorities and direct them
Syed Yakoob to ascertain whether the claim of the first respondent
v.
was true, and if it was true, to take that into consideraK.S. Radhakrish- tiun before issuing the permit to one or other of the
"""
claimants before them. Jn such an event the High
Subba Rau J. Court would not be interfering with the finding of
fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal based on
the material placed before it, but would only be
quashing the order on the ground that an important
and material circumstance was ignored or not investigated into by the Tribunal. If a Tribunal ignores
or fails to investigate a material circumstance put
forward by a claimant and gives a finding against
him, the said finding can certainly be said to be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the
record.
In the present case, the State Transport Authority
was considering the competing claims of 107 persons
for two permits. The said Authority gave its decision
on May 8, 1957. The first respondent filed his application for a permit on July 11, 1956. On the same day
he addressed a letter to the said Authority to the
following effect:
"Chidambaram is one of the terminii of this
proposed route. A separate office and workshop
are located at Chidambaram in order to maintain
the service efficiently and without any breakdown or whatsoever."
None of the innumerable applicants in his application
denied specifically the claim of thco first respondent
that he had a separate office and workshop at Chidarnbara•n. This fact was conceded before Srinivasan
J., though the learned Judge put the concession somewhat higher than was actually made. Nor did the
learned counsel for the appellant go back 011 the
limited concession before the Division Bench. But
one Kanniah Pillai, who was applicant No. 43-D,
stated in his application thus:
"The applicant Nos. 43, 57, 69, 78 and 81 are
residents of Chidambaram but No. 57 is a fleet
1963
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
owner. Nos. 69 and 78 have no workshop.
1963
No. 8 I is a new entrant. The rest all are far
away from the headquarters having no workshop Syed Yakoob
at Chidambaram."
v.
Except this vague and implied denial by Kanniah K.S. RadlwkrishPillai, there is nothing on the record to suggest that
"""
any other applicant denied the claim of the first res- Subba Rao J.
pondent. The fact remains that the appellant did
not at any stage of the proceedings refute the claim
of the first respondent.
With this background let me first look at the
order of the State Transport Authority. The said
'· Authority has ignored the said letter of the first r~s
pondent claiming to have a workshop at Chidambaram,
but it stated in an omnibus clause that the first res'
pondent and some of the other applicants were residents either in the middle or off the route and they
were not so well situated as an applicant who had
facilities at one end of the route with all the necessarv
facilities. ft may be stated that this is an implied
,.
finding against the first respondent, but the complaint
·· of the first respondent is that it is made in utter disregard of his claim. So too, the Appellate Tribunal
observed in its order disposing of the 18 appeals
before it that the first respondent, who had secured
• the highest number of marks, including those in
column 1 of the mark list, had his workshop and
place of business en route at Cuddalore and not at
either of the tenninii of the route. This observation
..;j was also made in utter disregard of the claim made
by the first respondent that he had a workshop 11t
Chidambaram, one of the terminii of the route, and
though the other applicants, except one, had not
denied the said fact. The High Court, therefore,
found on the material placed before it that the said
Authority as well as the Tribunal had failed to consider the specific claim made by the first respondent
in regard to his workshop at Chidambaram and,
therefore, rightly set aside the order of the Appellate
Tribunal so that the L\ppc!late Tribunal might con__...,) sider the claim made by the first respondent. I
-
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
.:.
-L
1963
Syed Yakoob
do not see any flaw in the reasoning of the High Court. ,...
Nor can I say that it has exceeded its jurisdiction
under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
v.
But, Mr. Setalvad contended that there was
nan
material before the Tribunal and that the Tribunal
gave its finding on the basis of that material. He
Subba Rao J. relied upon an extract from the report of the Regional
Transport Authority, South Arcot, dated January
31, 1957. That was a report sent by the said Authority
to the State Transport Authority. Against the name
of the first respondent in column 4 under the heading
"possession of workshop or repair or maintenance
facilities and its location" it is stated, "maintaining a ·"
workshop at per G.O. at Cuddalore". Again in the
report sent by the State Transport Authority to the
State Transport Appellate Tribunal, against the name
of the first respondent in column 8 under the heading
"Place of residence or principal place of business
and the nearest distance" the entry is "Cuddaloreon the route". This information given by the Transport Authority is presumably gathered from the earlier .. "
report of the Regional Transport Authority. Reliance
is placed upon a letter dated January 10, 1957, written
by the first respondent to the Secretary, State Transport Authority, in support of the contention that
even the first respondent, though on July 11, 1956, •
he claimed to have had a workshop at Chidambaram,
did not mention it therein. But a perusal of that letter
shows that he did mention that he had the sector
and terminal qualifications. Basing the argument ((
on the said documents, it was contended that there
was material on which the Appellate Tribunal could
have come to the finding which it did, viz., that the
first respondent had no workshop at either of the
terminii of the route. Firstly, these documents were
not expressly relied upon by the Tribunal for holding
that the first respondent bad no workshop at Chidambaram. Secondly, these documents were not relied
upori by the appellant either before Srinivasan J.,
or before the Division Bench to the effect that the
Appellate Tribunal gave a finding on the basis of the {.,-
K.S. Radhakrish-
-
~......_, 5 S.C.K SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
85
said material. Thirdly, one of the said documents,
1963
viz., the letter of the first respondent, does not support
the contention. The other two reports did not say Syed Yakoob
that the first respondent had no workshop at Chidamv.
.
baram. The officers who made the report did not K.S. Radhaknshmake any enquiry as regards the fact whether the first
nan
respondent had a workshop at Chidambaram on the Subba Rao J.
basis of the claim made by him. There is, therefore,
absolutely no evidence to controvert the first respondent's claim and that is the reason why the appellant
did not place the said documents before the High Court
in support of his contention that there was material
, before the State Transport Authority and the State
Transport Appellate Tribunal for holding that tne
first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram.
A perusal of the two orders shows that presumably
in view of the innumerable applications, the specific
claim of the first respondent was completely missed
by the Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal.
This is, therefore, a clear case of a finding made by
the Tribunal without any evidence to support it and
· by ignoring a specific claim made before it. 1 am,
therefore, of opinion that the High Court rightly set
aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
The next question is whether this is a fit case for
interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution in
exercise of this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder. Srinivasan J., and, on appeal, the Division Bench on the basis of the material placed and
the concession made before them, came to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal had ignored the
specific claim set up by the first respondent. The
first respondent had secured the highest number
o_f marks. His claim, if substantiated, would certainly
tilt the balance in his favour. The material placed
before us was not relied upon by the appellant before
the High. Court. The High Court gave a further
opportunity to the Appellate Tribunal to consider
the claim of the first respondent. Though the High
Court quashed the order of the Tribunal the observation in the judgment clearly shows that' the Tribunal
86
SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS
[1964]
,,...-,J
could reconsider the matter. Indeed, learned counsel
for the first respondent conceded that fact. The
.~red Yakooh appellant would have every opportunity to establish
v.
. that the first respondent has no workshop at ChidamK.S. Radhakmh-baram. Instead of following the straight course,
nan
he is trying to shut out further enquiry to arrive at
the truth. ln the circumstances l am of the view
Subba Rao .I. that this is not a case which calls for the exercise of
this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction to set aside
the order of the High Court.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs of the first respondent.
1963
ORDER BY COURT
In accordance with the opinion of the majority
the appeal is allowed and the Writ Petition filed by
Respondent No. l is dismissed. Respondent No. ·1
to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court. Respondents 2 and 3 to hear their own costs.
1963
Ocroher 9
MOHD. IKRAM HUSSAIN
v.
STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS
(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND K.C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
Habeas Curpus-Perition for custody of alleged wife-Power
of Court to order inquiry into facls-Contempt of Court-Punish- <:ct'.
ment for-Constitution ·of India, Art. 226-Code of C1·imina/ Procedure, 1898 (Act S of 1898), s. 491.
Proceedings under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and Art. 226 of the Constitution of India were started by one Mahesh
for a writ~ order or direction in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus
to release his alleged wife Kaniz Fatima alias Sheela from unlawful
detention by the appellant, her father and for delivery of the said
Kaniz Fatima to him. On August 26, 1960, the High Court passed
an order by which the objections of the appellant were ovenuled
and he was directed to bring before the Court Kaniz Fatima
alleged to be held in unlawful confinement. The appellant was
given ten days time to obey the direction. As the direction was (
not complied with and Kaniz Fatima was not produced in Court
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