MAKHAN SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 September 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 797 | 1963 INSC 188
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 September 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 80/1963
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 797
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 188
Text of the judgment
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
MAK.HAN SINGH
fl.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(AND CONNECTED APPEALS)
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. SuBBA RAo,
K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND
J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 352 and 359-Proclamation
order restricting enforc:ment of fundamental ·rights-Detention under Defence of India Act (Ll of
1962) and Defence of India Rules-Application for release .under
s. 491, Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898)-Mazntazn.
ability.
of emergency-President's
The appellants were detained under r. 30(1) of the Defence
of India Rules made by the Central Government under s. 3 of
the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962. They applied to the Punjab
and Bombay High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Prooedure and their case was that ss. 3(2)(15)(i) and 40 of the
Defence of India Act, 1%2, and r. 30(l)(b) of the Defence of India
Rules, which were continued under the Act, were unconstimtional
and invalid inasmuch as they contravened their fundamental rights
under Arts. 14, 21, 22(4), (5) and (7) of the Constitution and
that, therefore, they should be set at liberty. The High Courts held
that the Presidential Order which had been issued on November
3, 1962, under Art. 359( I) of the Constitution, after a declaration
of emergency under Art. 352, consequent on the Chinese invasion
of India, barred their right to move the said petitions and dismissed
them. These appeals raised two common questions in this Court,.
( 1) what was the true scope and effect of the Presidential Order
i<sucd under Art. 359(1), and (2) did the bar created by the
Order operate in respect of the applications under s. 491(1)(b)
of the Code. The Presidential Order was as follows:-
-
"G .S.~. 1464.-In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (I)
of article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares
that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the
Coi:istitution shall re:inain suspended for the period during
which. the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (I)
of article 352 thereof on the 26th October 1962 is in force, if
such person has been deprived of any such rights under the
Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or
order made thereunder."
"">'
By a later amendment of th~ Order Art. 14 was incorporated
into it.
1'63
,.
798
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puniab
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
Held: (per Gajcndragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah,
Das Gupta and Shah, Jj.) that the proceedings taken by the appellants in the High Courts under s. 491 ( l) (b) of the Code were
hit by the Presidential Order and must be held to be incompetent.
Article 359 of the-Constitution was not capable of t\VO interpretations and it was, therefore not necessary to decide the controversy raised by the parties as to whether that Article should be
interpreted in favour of the President's power granted by it or the
fundamental rights of the citizens.
The King (At the Prosecution of Arthur Zadig) v. Halliday,
[1917] A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206,
Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor, fl9431 F.C.R. 49, Nakkuda
Ali v. M. F. De S. /ayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66 and King Emperor
v. Vimalabai Deshpande, L.R. 73 I. A. 144, considered.
<
The words 'any court' in Art. 359(1), construed in their plain
grarmnatical meaning, n1ust mean any court of competent jurisdiction including the Supreme Court and the High Courts before
'vhich the rights specified in the Presidential Order can be enforced. It was not correct to say that the use of the words was neces·
saty so :ls to include such other courts as might be empowered in
terms 'of Art. 32(3). Nor was it correct to say that the words
could not include a High Court as its power to issue a writ under
A:rt. 226( l) was discretionary.
In judging whether a particular proceeding fell within the
purview of the Presidential Order the determining factor was not
its forn1 nor the words in which the relief was couched but the substance of it. If in granting the relief the court had to consider
whether any of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential
Order, had been contravened, the proceeding was within the Order,
whether it was under Art. 32(1) or 226(1) of the Constitution.
The right to move the court for writ of habeas corpus Under
s. 49l(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was now a statutory right and could no longer be claimed under the common law.
Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal 1.L.R. 54 Cal.
727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Map·
pillai, l.L.R. (1939] Mad. 708, Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum, L.R. 66 I.A. 222 and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji,
L.R. 72 I.A. 241, referred to.
Since the promulgation of the Constitution the two methods
by which a citizeri could enforce his right of personal freedom were
(i) by a writ under Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(1), or (ii) under
s. 49l(l)(b) of the Cocle of Criminal Procedure. Whichever
method he adopted if the right he sought to enforce was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution the matter must, come
within Art. 359(1) of the Constitution; That the court could
exercise its power under s. 49l(l)(b) suo motu could make no
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4 S.G.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
799
difference and Arts. 372, 225 or 375 could provide no valid ground
of attack. The suspension of the right to move any court, as under
the Presidential Order, must hecessarily suspend the Court's juris-
diction accordingly.
The right to challenge a detention order under s. 49l(l)(b) of
the Code had been enlarged by the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution and when a detenu relied upon such rights
in his petition under that section he was in substance seeking to
enforce his fundamental rights. The prohibition contained in
Art. 359( l) and the Presidential Order must, therefore, apply.
The expression "right to move any court" in Art. 359( l) and
the Presidential Order takes in all legal actions, filed or to be
filed, in which the specified rights are sought to be' enforced and
covers all relevant categories of jurisdictions of competent courts
under which the said actions would otherwise have been normally
entertained and tried.
Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commissioner Union Territory of Tripura, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442, referred to.
Even though the impugned Act may be invalid by reason of
contravention of Arts. 14, 21 and 22, as contended by the appellants, that invalidity could not be challenged during the period
prescribed by the Presidential Order and it could not be said that
the President could not because of such invalidity issue the order.
Where, however, the challenge to the validity of the detention
order was based on any right other than those mentioned in the
Presidential Order, the detenu's right to move any court could
not be suspended by the Presidential Order because the right was
outside Art. 359(1).
Where again the detention was challenged on the ground that
it contravened the mandatory provisions of the relevant Act or that
it was malafide and was proved to be so and in all cases falling
-
under the other categories of s. 491(1) of the Code excepting
those under s. 49l(l)(b), the bar of the Presidential Order
could have no application. So also the plea that the operative
provision of the law under which the order of detention was made
suffered from the vice of excessive delegation, was an independent
plea not relatable to the fundamental rights mentioned in the
Presidential Order and its validity had to be examined.
The plea that s. 3(2)(15)(i) and s. 40 of the impugned Act
suffered from excessive delegation must fail. The legislative policy
was broadly stated in the preamble and the relevant provisions of
ss. 3(1) and 3(2) gave detailed and specific guidance to the rule
making authority and it was not correct to say that the Act had
by the impugned sections delegated essentially legislative function
to that authority. Rule 30(1){b) which was consistent with the
operative provisions of the Att could not also be challenged on that
ground.
1963
Mnkhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
800
1963
· Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1%4]
In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc. [1951] S.C.R. 747,
Harishankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1
S.C.R. 380, Bhatanagars and Co. Ltd., v. The Union of India,
[ 1957] S.C.R. 701, relied on.
'
The impugned Act could not also be struck do,vn as a piece
of colourable legislation because the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
was already on the Statute book. The Parliament had power under
Entry 9, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and if
in view of the grave threat to the security of India it passed the
Act, it could not be said to have acted malafide.
If the Parliament thought that the executive would not be
able to detain citizens reasonably suspected of prejudicial activities
by a recourse to the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which provid~
ed for the required constitutional safeguards and the impugned
Act which it enacted did not, it could not be suggested that it was
acting malafide. Even if the impugned Act contravened Arts. 14
and 22 and the detentions thereunder were invalid, Art. 359( 1)
and the Presidential Order, which· were precisely meant to meet
such a situation, barred investigation on the merits during the
period prescribed by the Order.
-
The proceeding under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code is one proceeding and the sole relief that can be 'claimed under it is release
from the detention. If that could not be claimed because of the
Presidential Order it was unreasonable to say that a mere declaration that the impugned Act and the detention thereunder were
invalid could be made. Such a declaration is clearly outside the
purview of s. 49l(l)(b) of the Code as also of Arts. 226(1) and
32(1) of the Constitution.
The period for which the emergency should continue and the
restrictions that should be imposed during its continuance are
matters that must inevitably be left to the executive. In a dem&cratic state the effective safeguard against any abuse of power in
peace as also in emergency is the existence of enlightened, vigilant
and vocal public opinion.
liversidge v. Sir fahn Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, referred to.
The inviolability of individual freedom and the majesty of law
that sustains it are equally governed by the Constitution which
has made this Court the custodian of the fundamental rights on
the one hand and, on the other, provided for the declaration of the
emergency. Consequently, in dealing with the right of a citizen
to challenge the validity of his detention, effect must be given to
Art. 359( 1) and the Presidential Order . issued under it. The
right specified in that Article must be held to include such right
whether constitutional or constitutionally guaranteed and the words
"any court" must include the Supre~e Court and the High <;:ourt.
The Punjab and the Bombay High Courts were, therefore,
right in their decision that the applications under s. 491(1)(b). of.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
801
the Code were incompetent in so far as they sought to challenge
the validiry of. the detentions on the ground that the Act and the
Rules under which the orders were made contravened Arts. 14, 21
and 22(4)(5) and (7) of the Constitution.
Per Subba Rao, J. It was clear that s. 3(2)(15)(i) of the
Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30( l) (b) made under the Act
contravened the relevant provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution
and were, therefore, void.
Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2
S.C.R. 840, Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P., A.LR. 1963 S.C.1019,
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to.
-
Under the Constitution, every person has a right to move the
Supreme Court, the High Courts or any other court or courts
constituted by the Parliament under Art. 32 ( 3) for the enforcement of fundamental rights in the manner prescribed. But while
the right to move the Supreme Court is a guaranteed right, tho
right to move the others is not so.
Article 359, properly construed, meant that the bar imposed
by the Presidential Order applied not only to the guaranteed right
to move the Supreme Court but also the rights to move the other
courts under Art. 32 and Art. 226 of the Constitution.
There is no new rule of construction peculiar to war measures.
It is always the same, whether in peace or in war. The fundamental rule is that the courts have to find out the expressed intention of the Legislature from the words of the enactment itself.
Words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless
there is .imbiguity in the language in which case the court has
to adopt that meaning which furthers the intention of. the Legislature.
A constitutional provision such as Art. 359, however, cannot
-
he given a strained construction to meet a passing phase such as
the present emergency.
Rex v. Halliday, L.R. [1917] A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir fohn
Andmon, L.R. [1942] A.C. 206, Nakkuda Ali v. fayaratna, L.R.
[1951] A.C. 66, Gibbon v. Ogdm, (1824) 6 L. Ed. 23, discussed.
Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide in its
terms and gives a discretionary power to the High Courts. Unlike
Arts. 32 and 226, the exercise of the power is not channelled
through procedural writs or orders and their technicalities cannot
circumscribe the court's discretion.
Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal, (1927) I.L.R.
54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai,
I.L.R. 1939 Mad. 708, Matten v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum,
L.R. (1939) 66 I.A. 222, referred to.
&ction 491 is continued by Art. 372 and Art. 225 preserves
1963
M.rkha Singh
...
S1111e of
Pnnj"'1
802
1963
Makhan Si'ngh
v.
State of
Punjab
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
the jurisdiction of the High Court. The power it confers on the
High Court is not inconsistent either with Art. 32 Or Art. 226 or
any other Article of the Constitution and the section cannot, therefore, be said to have been impliedly superseded even to the extent
Art. 226 empowers the High Court to give relief in cases of
illegal detention. Though remedial in form the section postulates
the existence of the substantive right that no ~son can be deprived of his liberty except in the manner prescribed by law. It
assumes the existence of the rule of law and empowers High
Court to act suo motu. The rights, substantive and procedural:
conferred by it are different from those under Arts. 32 or 226 of
the Constitution. It places the onus on the custodian to prove
that the detention is legal and although in scrutinising the legality
of the detention the court may have to consider whether the law
offends any fundamental rights, that cannot make the proceeding
one for the enforcement of fundamental rights or the decision anything but one on the unconstitutionality of a law because
of infringement of fundamental rights generally.
....
The mode of approach to' the High Court under s. 491 of
the Code or the nature of the relief given thereunder cannot be .
equated with those under the Constitution. The absolute discretionary jurisdiction under it cannot be put on a par with the
jurisdiction under Art. 226 which is hedged in by constitutional
limitations.
Alam Khan v. The Crown, (1947) l.L.R. 28 Lahore 274,
Romji Lal v. The Crown, I.L.R. (1949) II E.P. 28, King-Emperor
v. Vimlabai Deshpande, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 144, referred to.
While s. 491 gives no right to enforce fundamental rights,
operating as it does as a check on arbitrary action, Art. 359 is concerned not with statutory powers but deals with the constitutional
right and the constitutional enforcement of it. It was not, therefore, correct to say that Art. 359 would be frustrated if S; 491
was allowed to stand for Parliament might amend that section any
time it liked.
The expression "right to move- any court for enforcement of such
of the rights conferred by Part III" in Art. 359 must refer only
to the right to move under Art. 32 or Art. 226 for the said specific relief and could not be applied to the exercise of the statutory
power of the High Courts under s. 491 of the Code and, consequently, the expression "all proceedings pending in any court for
the enforcement of the rights" must refer to the proceedings initiated in exercise of that right.
The dete~us could not, therefore, enforce their fundamental
rights under Arts. 21 . 32 and 14 while the Presidential Order lasted,
but that did not affect the High Court's power under s. 491 of
the Code.
The President's Order cannot bar the detenus from proving
oven wider Arts. 32(1) and 226 that the detentions were not made
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
803
under the Defence of India Ordinance or the Act as they were
outside the Ordinance or the Act or in excess of the power conferred by them or that the detentions were made malafide or in
fraudulent exercise of power.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
No. 80 of 1963.
JuRJSDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order
dated March 26, 1963, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Mis. No. 186 of 1963.
Criminal Appeals Nos. 86 to 93 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated February 21, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 155, 102, 108, 105, 104, 101 and 107 of 1963
and judgment and order dated February 1963 of the same
High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 99 of 1963.
Criminal Appeals Nos. 109 to 111 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated May 31,
1963 of the Maharashtra High Court in Criminal Applications Nos. 217, 218 and 114 of 1963.
Criminal Appeals Nos. 114 to 126 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated May 31,
1963 of the Maharashtra High Court in Criminal Applications Nos. 271, 265, 270, 267, 219, 220, 269, 264, 263, 266
and 273 of 1963.
Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated April 3, 1963, of the Maharashtra High Court
(Nagpur Bench) in Criminal Application No. 11 of 1963.
M. C. Setalvad, N. C. Chatterjee, A. V. Viswanatha
Sastri, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, C. B. Agarwala,
Sarjoo Prasad, D. R. Prem, A. S. R. Chari, S. G. Patwardhan, W. S. Barlingay, Etharajalu Naidu, Veda Vyas,
Raghubir Singh, K. T. Sule, Asif Ansari, Hardayal Hardy,
Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, S. N. Mukherjee, Durgabhai
Deshmukh, M. S. K. Sastri, G. B. Pai, Ganpat Rai, D. N.
Mukherjee, A. N. Sinha, Udayaratnam, K. V. Raghnatha
Reddy, /anardhan Sharma, K. R. Choudhury, B. P. Maheshwari, /. B. Goyal, A. K. Nag, Y. Kumar, Hardev Singh,
M. I. Khowaja, S. S. Shukla, K. K. Jain, Bishambar Lal
Khanna, S. Murthi, P. K. Chakravarti, P. K. Chatterjee,
A. George Pudussary, Girish Chandra Mathur, Udai Pratap
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
804
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puni•b
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Singh, Yogeshwar Prasad, M. R. Krishna Pillai, B. D.
Sharma, K. P. Gupta, T. S. Venkataraman, M. Veerappa,
T. R. Ramachandra, R. C. Prasad, Santosh Chatterjee,
N. N. Keshwani, K. fayaram, R. Ganapathy Iyer, Thyagarajan, R. Vasudeva Pillai, R. V. S. Mani, S. C. Majumdar,
Shaukat Hussain, K. Baldev Mehta, Mohan Behari Lal,
Sadhu Singh, V. G. Row, S. N. Kakkar, S. K. Kapur,
Parthasarathy, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, K. L. Mehta,
Satish Mehta, Brij Kishore Prasad, Ali Ahmad, V. A. Syeid
Muhammad, Narayanarayan Gooptu, Tapesh Roy, M:uihan
Bhaittia, Ajit Singh Banis and Brij "&ij Kishore, f. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, D. P. Singh,
M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, and S. C. Agarwal, for the
appellant (in Cr. A. No. 80 of 1963).
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, L. K. Kaushal,
Deputy Advocate-General, Punjab, D. D. Chaudhuri,
R. N. Sachthey and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent (in
Cr. A. No. 80 of 1963).
A. S. R. Chari, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi,
R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal for the appellant (in Cr. A.
No. 86 of 1963).
Hardev Singh and Y. Kumar, for the appellants (in
Cr. A. Nos. 87 to 93 of 1963).
L. D. Kaushal, Deputy Advocate-General, Punjab,
D. D. Chaudhri, R. N. Sachthey and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent' (in Cr. A. Nos. 86 to 93 of 1963).
A. S. R. Chari, 0. P. Malhotra, B. Parthasarathy, f. B.
Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the
appellant (in Cr. A. No. 65 of 1%3).
N. C. Chatterjee, and fanardan Sharma, for the ap~l
lant (in Cr. A. No. 109 of 1963).
K. T. Sule, fitendra Sharma and fanardan Sharma, for
the appellants (in Cr. A. Nos. lll and ll4 to 126 of 1%3)
and for the Detenue-Interveners Nos. 12, 14, 16, 18 and 37).
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. Bindra,
B. R. G. K. Achar, R. N. Sachthey and R. H. Dhebar, for
the respondents (in Cr. A. No. 65, 109 to lll and 114 to
126/1%3).
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General,
R. N. Sachthey and R. H. Dhebar, for intervener No. 1
N aunit Lal, for intervener No. 1.
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4 S.C..:.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for intervener No. 3.
S. P. Varma, for intervener No. 4.
M. Adhikari, Advocate-General, Madhya Pradesh and
I. N. Shroff, for intervener No. 5.
A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for intcrverner No. 6.
G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, Rajasthan, R. H.
Dhebar, R. N. Sachthey, for intervener No. 7.
C. P. Lal, for intervener no. 8.
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N. C. Chatterjee, Narayan Gooptu, Tapesh Roy, D. P.
Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal,
for intervener No. 69.
A. S. R. Chari, Narayan Gooptu, Tapesh Roy, D. P.
Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal,
for intervener No. 70.
A. S. Peerbhoy A. Desai, M. Rajagopalan and K. R.
Choudhari, for interveners Nos. 79 and 80.
September 2, 1963. The Judgment of P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah,
K. C. Das Gupta and J. C. Shah, JJ. was delivered by P.
B. Gajendragadkar, J. K. Subba Rao, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This group
of 26 crnrunal appeals has been placed for hearing and disposal before
a special Constitutional Bench, because the appeals constituting the group raise two common important questions
of Constitutional law. Nine of these appeals have been
preferred against the decisions of the Punjab High Court,
whereas seventeen have been preferred against the decisions of the Bombay High Court. All the appellants are
detenues who have been detained respectively by the Punjab and the Maharashtra State Governments under Rule
30(l)(b) of the Defence of India Rules (hereinafter called
the Rules) made by the Central Government in exercise
of the powers conferred on it by section 3 of the Defence
of India Ordinance, 1962 (No. 4 of 1962) (hereinafter
called the Ordinance). They applied to the Punjab and
the Bombay High Courts respectively under section 491
(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and alleged that
they had been improperly and illegally detained. Their
contention was thats. 3(2)(15)(i) ands. 40 of the Defence
1963
Makhan Singh
...
State of
Punjab
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puniab
Gajendragadkar, /.
[1%4]
of India Act, 1962 (No. 51 of 1962) (hereinafter called 'the
Act') and Rule 30(1)(b) under which they have been
detained are constitutionally invalid, because they contravene their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and
22(4), (5) & (7) of the Constitution, and so, they claimed
that an order should be passed in their favour directing the
respective State Governments to set them at liberty. These
petitions have been dismissed on the ground that the Presidential Order which has been issued under Art. 359 of
the Constitution creates a bar which precludes them from
moving the High Court under s. 491 ( 1) (b) Cr. P. C. That
is how the decisions of the two High Courts under appeal
raise two common questions of considerable importance.
The first question is : what is the true scope and effect of the
Presidential Order which has been issued under Art. 359
(1) ? The answer to this question would depend upon a
fair and reasonable construction of Art. 359( 1) itself. The
second question is : does the bar created by the Presidential
Order issued under Art. 359(1) operate in respect of applications made by detenues under section 491 ( 1) (b) of the
Code? The answer to this question would depend upon
the determination of the true character of the proceedings
which the detenues have taken under s. 491 ( 1) (b), considered in the light of the effect of the Presidential Order
issued under Art. 359(1). Both the Punjab and the Bombay High Courts have held against the appellants. Meanwhile, when similar petitions were made before the Alla-'
habad High Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 1618, 1759 and
1872 of 1963 Sher Singh Negi v. District Magistrate, Kanpur & Anr., the said High Court took a contrary view
and directed the release of the detenues who had moved
it under s. 491 (1) (b) of the Code. It is because the questions raised are important and the answers given by the
different High Courts have disclosed a sharp difference
of opinion that a Special Bench has been constituted to
deal with these appeals. If the two principal questions are
answered in favour of the detenues, a third question would
arise and that relates to the validity of the impugned sections of the Act and the relevant statutory Rules.
On the 8th September, 1%2, the Chinese aggressively
attacked the northern borde.r of India and that constituted
a threat to the security of India. That is why on
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4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
the 26th October, 1962, the President· issued a Proclamation under Art. 352 of the Constitution. This Proclamation declared that a grave emergency existed whereby
the security of India was threatened by external aggression.
On the same day, the Ordinance was promulgated by the
President. This Ordinance was amended by Ordinance
No. 6 of 1962 promulgated on November 3, 1962. On this
day, the President issued the Order under Art. 359(1),
suspending the rights of citizens to move any Court for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by Arts. 21 and
22 of the Constitution for the period during which the proclamation of emergency issued on October 26, 1962 would
be in force. On November 6, 1962, the rules framed by the
Central Government were published. Then followed
an amendment of the Presidential Order on November 11
1962. By this amendment, for the words and figures "article
21" the words and figures "articles 14 and 21" were substituted. On December, 6, 1962, Rule 30 as originally framed
was amended and Rule 30-A added. Last came the Act on
December 12 1962. Section 48 ( 1) of the Act has provided for the repeal of the Ordinances Nos. 4 and 6 of
1%2. Section 48(2) provides that notwithstanding such
repeal, any rules made, anything done or any action taken
under the aforesaid two Ordinances shall be deemed to
have been made, done or taken under this Act as if this
Act had commenced on October 26, 1962. That is how the
Rules made under the Ordinance continued to be the Rules
under the Act, and it is under Rule 30( 1) (b) that the appellants have been detained.
Before dealing with the points which have been raised
for our decision in the present appeals, it is necessary to
indicate briefly at the outset the general argument which
has been urged before us by Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the
appellants, and the learned Attorney-General on the other
side. Art. 359(1) which falls to be construed, occurs iH
Part XVIII of the Constitution which makes emergency
provisions. Whenever the security of India or any part
of the territory of India is threatened whether by war or
by external aggression or internal disturbance, the President may, under Art. 352, by proclamation, make a declaration to that effect. Articles 353 to 360 which occur in
this Part thm constitute emergency provisions. The learned
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puniab
Gai<ndragadkar, /.
808
1963
M11khan Singh
v.
Stt1k of
Punjllb
GajenJr•
gadk•r, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
Attorney-General contends that in construing an emergency provision like Art. 359(1), we must bear in mind the
fact that the said Article is intended to deal with a situation
which has posed a threat to the security of India, and so,
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III which are undoubtedly of vital importance to the democratic way of
life guaranteed by the Constitution have to be regulated
during an emergency, because the very security of the
nation is exposed to serious jeopardy. The security of the
nation on such a solemn occasion must have precedence
over the liberty of the individual citizens, and so, it is
urged that if Art. 359 is capable of two constructions, one
in favour of the fundamental rights of the citizens, and the
other in favour of the grant of power to the President to
control those rights, the Court should lean in favour of
the grant rather than in favour of the individual citizen's
fundamental rights.
In support of this argument, the learned AttomeyGeneral has relied on two decisions of the House of Lords.
In The King (At the Prosecution of Arthur Zadig) v.
Halliday,(') Lord Finlay L. C. who was called upon to construe Regulation 14B of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations Act, 1914, noticed the argument
that if the Legislature had intended to interfere with personal liberty, it would have provided, as on previous occasions of national danger, for suspension of the rights of
the subject as to a writ of habeas corpus, and rejected it with
the observations that the Legislature had selected another
way of achieving the same purposes, probably milder as
well as more effectual than those adopted on the occasion
of previous wars. He added that the suggested rule as to
~onstruing penal statutes and the provision as to trial of
British subjects by jury made by the Defence of the Realm
Act, 1915, have no relevance in dealing with an executive
measure by way of preventing a public danger.
The majority decision of the House of Lords in Lit1ersidge v. Sir fohn Anderson(') has also been relied upon
by the learned Attorney-General. In that case, the House
or Lords had to consider the true scope and effect of Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939.
(1) [1917] A.C. 260, 270.
2
( ) [1942] A.C. 206.
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME· COURT REPORTS
809
1963
Viscount Maugham in rejecting the argument of the detenu that the liberty of the subject was involved and that
Makhan Singh
the legislation dealing with the liberty of the subiect must
v.
be construed, if possible, in favour of the subject and
State of
against the Crown, quoted with approval the language of
Punpb
Lord Finlay, L. C., in the case of Rex v. Halhday(1).
Gajendra-Lord Macmillan who took the "1me view observed that
gadkar, /.
it is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to prO'
mote rather than to defeat its efficacv for the defence of
the realm. That is in accordance :.Vith a general rule
applicable to the interpretation of all statutes or statutory
regulations in peace time as well as in war time. Lord
Wright and Lord Romer .adopted the same approach. The
Attorney-General relies on the fact that this approach has
also been adopted by Gwyer, C. T.• in Keshav Talpade v.
The King Emperor( 2 ). In making his contention in regard to the proper approach which the Court should adopt
in construing Art. 359, the learned Attorney-General no
doubt contended that the question about the approach
would arise only if two constructions are reasonably possible. According to him, Art. 359 was capable of only one
construction and that is the construction which the High
Courts of Punjab and Bombay have accepted.
On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad has argued that Art.
359 is not an emergency legislation properly so called and
on the merits, he has strongly resisted the suggestion made
by the learned Attorney-General that if two reasonable
constructions are possible, we should adopt that which is
in favour of the grant of power to the President and not
in favour of the citizens' fundamental rights. He has relied on the minority speech of Lord Atkin in the case of
Liversidge(') and has argued that the view taken by Lord
Atkin should be preferred to the majority view which the
House of Lords adopted in that case. "In this country",
observed Lord Atkin, "amid the clash of arms, the laws
are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the
same language in war as in peace. It has always been one
of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty
for which on recent authority we are now fighting, that
the judges are no respecters of persons and stand between
1
( ) [1917] A.C. 260, 278.
(3) (1943) F.C.R. 49, 63.
( 3)
[1942] A.C. 206. •
~2-2 S. C. lndia/64
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
(iJ54]
the subject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty
by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is
Makhan Singh
justified
in law. In this case, I have listened to arguments
v •.
which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court
State of
Puniab
of King's Bench in the time of Charles I." Realising that
he was in a minority, Lord Atkin added that he protested,
Gaiendraeven if he did it alone, against a strained construction put
gadkar, /.
on words with the effect of giving an uncontrolled power
of imprisonment to the Minister. In this connection, Mr.
Setalvad referred to two subsequent decisions of the Privy
Council in which the view taken by Lord Atkin has been
accepted, vide Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. fayaratne('),
and King-Emperor v. Vimalabai Deshpande('). In the former case, Lord Radcliffe observed that indeed, it would be a
very unfortunate thing if the decision of Liversidge's
case came to be regarded as laying down any general rule
as to the construction of such phrases when they appear·
in statutory enactments, and he added that the said deci;
sion is an authority for the proposition that the words "if;
A. B. has reasonable cause to believe" are capable of mean-.
ing "if A. B. honestly thinks that he has reasonable cause
to believe" and that in the context and attendant circum·
stances of Defence Regulation 18B they did in fact mean
just that. In distinguishing the said decision, Lord Rad~
cliffe made the somewhat significant comment that the
elaborate consideration which the majority of the House
gave to the. context and circumstances before adopting
that construction itself shows that there is no general principle that such words are to be so understood. Mr. Setalvad has also invited our attention to the fact that the majority d~cision of the House of Lords in Liversidge( 3 ) has
not received the approval from jurists, ( vide Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes p. 276, footnote 54, Craies on
Statue Law p. 309, and Friedmann, Law in a Changing
Society p. 37.) Like the Attorney-General, Mr. Setalvad
also urged that the stage to choose between two rival constructions would not arise in· the present appeals because,
accordirig to him, the construction for which he c011tended
was the only reasonable construction of Art. 359.
( 1)
[1951] A.C. 66, 76.
3
J.1942] A.C. 206.
(
)
( 2)
73 I.A. 144.
I
-- 4- ,S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
1963
', '.' . In our opinion, it is unne~essaty to dcadc the merits ' ·of the rival contentions urged before us in regard to the
Singli
rule of construction and the approach·.which the Court Maklia1t
Y.
•\__- should adopt in construing Art. 359. It is' common ground
Slate of
that the question of approach would become relevant and
Pttlijllh
material only if we are satisfied that Art. 359 is reasonably
Gaji:riiltacapable of two alternative constructions. As we will pregailkat-, f.
Sently point out, after hearing counsel on both 5ides, we
have reached the conclusion that Art. 359 is reasonably
capable of only one construction and that is the •construe•
tion which has been put on it by the Punjab and Bombay
High Courts. That is why we are relieved of the task of
dealing with the merits of the controversy between the
'-. · parties on this point.
•
,
_ Let us then revert to the question of construing Art.
359. In doing so, it may be relevant and somewhat useful
to compare and contrast the provisions of Articles 358-and 359. Indeed, both Mr. Setalvad and the learned Attorney- General contended that Art. 359 should be interpreted in _
_the light of the background supplied by the. comparative
• \. examination of the respective provisions contained in Arts.
35S and 3~9 (I) & (2). The said two Articles read as
under:·
"358. While a Proclamation of Emergency is in opera~
tion, nothing in article 19 shall restrict the power oL
the State as defined in Part III to make any law or
to take any executive action which the State would but
for the provisions contained in that Part be competent
to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the
extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon-_
as the Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects
things done or omitted to be done before . the .law so
- ceases to have effect.
·
359. (I) Where a Proclamation of Emergency 1s _m
operation, the President may by order declare that the
right to move any Coun for the enforcement _of such
of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned
in the order and all proceedings pending iii any court
for the enforcement of the rights s0 -mentioned shall _
remain suspended for the period during which the
Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as
may be specified in the order.
·r
·'";--,;,~
~
.'v' '812
.
--
-
·' -.
·--
, . - SUPREME COURT REPORTS
..
[1964]
...........
' ' ''"<
. 1963 \ '
(2) Any order .made as aforsesaid may ·extend to the
·--\\1
whole or any part of the territory of India."
Makhan Singh
It would be noticed that as soon as a Proclamation of
.v.
' Emergency has been_ issued under' Art. 352 and so long as '
State of .
Punjab
. it lasts, Art. 19 is suspendea and the power of the legislatures as well as the executive 'is to that extent made wider.
Gajendr11The
-suspension' of Ari. 19 during · the pendency of the
gadl(_ar, J.
Proclamation of emergency removes the fetters created on
the legislative and executive powers by Art. 19 and if the
legislatures 'make .._ laws or the executive commits acts
which _are ! inconsistent· with the rights guaranteed by
.Art~ · 19, their validity is not open · to challenge either.
during the ·continuance of the emergency or even there- ..,.after. As soon as the Proclamation ceases to' operate; the
legislative enactments. passed and the · executive actions
taken during the course of the said emergency shall be
inoperative to the extent to which they conflict with the
rights guaranteed under/ Art. 19 ·because as soon as the
emergency is lifted, Art. 19 which was suspended during
the emergency is automatically· revived and begins to operate. Article 358, however, makes it clear that things -~ ~
done or omitted to be done during_ the emergency
cannot be challenged even after the emergency is over.
In -other 'words, the suspension of Art. 19 is complete
. during the period in question :ind legislative and executive
· ·action which contravenes Art. 19 cannot be questioned even
- after the emergency is over. ·
·
'Article 359, on the other hand, does not purport ex- _
pressly to suspend any of the fundamental rights. It authorises the President to issue an order declaring that the right .-to move any court for enforcement of such 1of the rights
in Part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any ci>un for the enforcement of the
rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamation is in force or for such
· . shorter period as may be specified in the order. What the
Presidential Order purports to do by virtue of the power
conferred on the President by Art. 359(1) is to bar the ·,_; _
remedy of the citizens to move any court for the enforce-ment of the specified rights. The rights are not expressly
suspend~d, but the citizen is deprived of his right to move
any court for their enforcement. That· is one important
.
.. -
·'
.
-
-
.
'
--
. .
<
''
4 S.C.R.
t
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
distinction between the provisions of Art. 358 and
Art. 359(1).
Before proceeding further, we may at this stage, in
parenthesis, observe that there has been some argument
before us on the question as to whether the fundamental
rights specified in the Presidential Order issued under
Art. 359 are even theoretically alive during the period specified in the said Order. The learned Attorney-General has
contended that the suspension of the citizens' right to move
any court for the enforcement of the said rights, in
law, amounts to the suspension of the said rights
themselves for the said period. We do not propose
to decide this question in the present appeals. We will
assume in favour of the appellants that the said rights
are, in theory, alive and it is on that assumption that we
will deal with the other points raised ill the present appeals.
The other distinction lies in the fact that the suspension of Art. 19 for which Art. 358 provides continues so
·long as the Proclamation of Emergency is in operation,
whereas the suspension of the right to move any court
which the Presidential Order under Art. 359(1) brings
. about can last dther for the period of the Proclamation or
for a shorter period if so specified by the Order.
It would be noticed that the Presidential Order cannot
widen the authority of the legislatures or the executive; it
merely suspends the rights to move any court to obtain a
relief on the ground that the rights conferred by Part III
have been contravened if the said rights are specified in
' the Order. The inevitable consequence of this position is
that as soon as the Order ceases to be operative, the infringement of the rights made either by the legislative enactment
or by executive action can perhaps be challenged by a
·citizen in a court of law and the same may have to be
tried on the merits on the basis that the rights alleged to
.have been infringed were in operation even during the
. pcndency of the Presidential Order. If at the expiration
·of the Presidential Order, Parliament passes any legislaticin
to protect executive action taken during the pendency of
' the Presidential Order and afford indemriity to the execu; tiu in that behalf, the validity ·and the effect .oli such !egisda~ 'action l)lay have to be' cl!tdlJlly scrutinisei.L· '
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, /.
814
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
Stat< of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964}
Since the object of Art. 359(1) is to suspend the rights
of the citizens to move any court, the consequence of the
Presidential Order may be that any proceeding whicl:i may
be pending at the date of the Order remains suspended
during the time that the Order is in operation and may be
revived when the said Order ceases to be operative; and
fresh proceedings cannot be taken by a citizen after the
Order has been issued, because the Order takes away the
right to move any court and during the operation of the
Order, the said right cannot be exercised by instituting a
fresh proceeding contrary to the Order. If a fresh proceeding falling within the mischief of Art. 359(1) and the
Presidential Order issued under it is instituted after the
Order has been issued, it will have to be dismissed as being
incompetent. In other words, Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it may constitute a sort of moratorium or a blanket ban against the institution or continuance of any legal action subject to two important conditions. The first condition relates to the character of the
legal action and requires that the said action must
seek to obtain a relief on the ground that the claimant's
fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order
have been contravened, and the second condition relates
to the period during which this ban is to operate. The ban
operates either for the period of the Proclamation or for
such shorter period as may be specified in the Order.
There is yet another distinction between the provisions
of Art. 358 and Art. 359(1). The suspension of Art. 19
for which provision is made under Art. 358 applies to the
whole of the country, and so, covers all legislatures and
also States. On the other hand, the Order issued under
Art. 359(1) may extend to ~he whole of India or may be
confined to any part of the territory of India. These,
broadly stated, are the points of distinction between
Art. 358 and Art. 359(1).
·
.
What then is the true scope and effect of Art. 359( 1) ?
Mr. Setalvad contends that the right to move any. court
for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by
Part III :is may be mentioned in the Order should be construed to mean the right to move the Supreme Court which
has been guaranteed by Art. 32(1). He suggests that as
one reads the relevant dause in Art. 359(1), one seems
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
815
to hear the echo of the right which has been constitutionally guaranteed by Art. 32(1). His argument, therefore, is that the only right of which a citizen can be deprived under Art. 359( 1) is the right to move the Supreme
Court, and so, his case is that even in regard to fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order, a citizen
is entitled to ask for reliefs from the High Court under
Art. 226 because the right to move the High Court flowing from Art. 226 does not fall within the mischief of
Art. 359(1).
This argument attempts to interpret the words "the
right to move for the enforcement of the specified rights"
in isolation and without taking into account the other
words which indicate that the right to move which is specified in the said Article is the right to move "any court".
In plain language, the words "any court" cannot mean only
the Supreme Court; they would necessarily take in all
courts of competent jurisdiction. If the intention of the
Constitution makers was to confine the operation of
Art. 359(1) to the right to move only the Supreme Court,
nothing could have been easier than to say so expressly
instead of using the wider words "the right to move any
court."
To meet this difficulty, Mr. Setalvad attempted to invoke the assistance of Art. 32(3). Art. 32(3) provides that
without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme
Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law
empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable
by the Supreme Court under clause (2). The argument
is that the Constitution contemplates that there may be
some other courts in the country on which the powers
. exercisable by the Supreme Court under Art. 32(2) may
be conferred, and so, the words "any court" may have been
intended to take within their purview the Supreme Court
and such other courts on whom the Supreme Court's
powers under Art. 32 (2) may have been conferred. This
argument is fallacious. The scheme of Art. 32 clearly indicates that the right to move this Court which itself
is a guaranteed fundamental right, cannot be claimed
in respect of courts falling under Art. 32(3). Art. 32(3)
merely provides for .the conferment of this Court's
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puniab
Gajendragadkar, /.
'816
SUPREME COURT REP-ORTS
[1964]
• t963
powers under Art. 32(2) on the courts specified in clause
(3). The right guaranteed by Art. 32(1) cannot be claimed
Makhan Singh
in
respect of the said other courts. Therefore, on a plain
v.
construction
of the relevant clauses of Art. 32, it is imposState of
sible to accept the argument that courts under Art. 32(3)
Punjab
must be regarded as having the same status as the Supreme
GajendraCourt and as such the right to move them must also
gadkar, f.
be held to constitute a fundamental right of the citizen
in respect of such courts.
Besides, it would be irrational to suggest that whereas the Constitution did not
confer on the citizens a guaranteed fundamental right
to move the High Court under· Art. 226, it thought of
·conferring such a guaranteed fundamental right in regard
to courts on which the Supreme Court's powers under
Art. 32(2) would be conferred by Art. 32(3). Therefore,
the attempt to suggest that the use of the words "any
Court" used in Art. 359 ( 1) i~ jilstified because they take
in the Supreme Court and some other courts, fails and
'the conclusion inevitably follows that the words "any
-court" must· be given their ·piairi grammatical meaning
"and must be construed to mean any court of competent jurisdiction. In other words; the words "any court"
include the Supreme Court and the High Courts before
which the specified rights can be enforced by the citizens.
In this connection, it was attempted to be argued that
the power of the High Court' to issue the writs or orders
specified in Art. 226 ( 1) is a •· diScretionary power and as
such, no citizen can claim to have a right to move the
High Court in that behalf, and ·So, it was suggested that
the proceedings contemplated by Art. 226(1) are outside
the purview of Art. 359(1). Iri our opinion, this argument
is not well-founded. It is true that in issuing writs or
orders under Art. 226(1), the High Courts have discretion
to decide whether a writ or· order should be issued as·
daimed by the petitioner; but the discretion conferred ori
the High Courts in that behalf' has to be judicially exer•
dsed, and having regard to the sclleme of Art. 226(1),
it cannot be said that a citizen has no right to move the
High COurt for invoking its jurisdiction under Art. 226(1):
Art. 226(1) confers wide powers•<>n the High Courts m
fSsue the· specified. writs, or «otfih appropriate orders ot
<lltections;,.having regard to the tiiiure of the 'said p'Owe~,
1
4 S.C.R.
-
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
817
and the object intended to be achieved by their conferment,
there can be little doubt that in dealing with applications
made before them the High Courts have to exercise their
discretion in a judicial manner and m accordance with
principles which are well-settled in that behalf. The High
Courts cannot capriciously or unreasonably refuse to entertain the said applications and to deal with them on the
merits on the sole ground that the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 (I) is discretionary. Therefore, it
is idle to suggest that the proceedings taken by citizens
under Art. 226(1) are outside the purview of Art. 359(1).
We must accordingly hold that the right to move any
·court under Art. 35.9(1) refers to the right to move any
court of competent jurisdiction.
The next question to consider is, what is the nature
of the proceedings which are barred by the Presidential
Order issued under Art. 359( 1) ? They are proceedings
taken by citizens for the enforcement of such of the rights
conferred by Part Ill as may be mentioned in the order.
If a citizen moves any court to obtain 11 relief '.ln the
ground that his fundamental rights specified in the Order
have been contravened, that proceeding is barred. In deter. mining the question as to whether a particular proceeding
falls within the mischief of the Presidential Order or not,
·what has to be examined is not so much the form which
the proceeding has taken, or the words in which the
relief ts claimed, as the substance of the matter and
consider whether before granting the relief claimed by
the citizen, It would be necessary for the Court to
enquire into the question whether any of his specified
fundamental rights have been contravened. If any relief
cannot be granted to the citizen without determining the
question of the alleged infringement of the said specified
Jun~amental rights, that is a proceeding which falls under
Art. 359(1) and would, therefore, be hit by the Presidential Order issued under the said Article. The sweep
of Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under
it is thus wide enough to include al! claims made by
.citizens in any court of competent jurisdiction when it
.fs show~ that the said claims cannot be effectively adjudi·cated upon without examining the question as to whether
.the citizen is in substance, seeking to enforce any of the
1963
M•fr.haa Singh
T.
State of
Punjab
Gajendra-
gadkar, T.
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
said specified fundamental rights. We have already seen
that the operation of Art. 359(1) and the Presidential
Makhan Singh
Order
issued under it is limited to the period during which
v.
the proclamation of emergency is in force, or for such
State of
Punjab
shorter period as may be specified in the Order. That
being so, we feel no difficulty in holding that proceedings
Gajendrataken by a citizen either under Art. 32(1) or under
gadkar, f.
Art. 226(1) are hit by Art. 359(1) and the Presidential
Order issued under it. In this connection it would be
legitimate to add that the contention of the appellants
which seeks to confine the operation of Art. 359(1) only
to the right to move the Supreme Court, would make the
said provision almost meaningless. There would be no
point in preventing the citizen from moving this Court,
while leaving it open to him to move the High Courts for
the same relief and then to come to this Court in appeal,
if necessary.
That takes us to the question as to whether proceedings
taken by a citizen under s. 491 (1) (b) are affected by
Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it.
Section 491 ( 1) (b), inter alia, provides that any High Court·
may, whenever it thinks fit, direct that a person illegally
or improperly detained in public custody be set at liberty.
It has been strenuously urged before us that the proceedings
for obtaining directions of the nature of habeas corpus
which are taken under s. 491(1)(b) are outside Art. 359(1),
and so, the Presidential Order cannot create a bar against
a citizen asking the High Court to issue a writ in the
nature of habeas corpus under the said provision. It is
necessary to examine this argument v~ry carefully.
It is well-known that after section 491 was enacted
in the Code of Criminal Procedure in the present form in
1923, the right to obtain a direction in the nature of a
habeas corpus became a statutory right m India. After
1923, it was not open to any party to ask for a writ of
habeas corpus as a matter of common law. This question
was elaborately considered by Rankin, C. J., in Girindra
Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal('), where the learned
C.J. ~onsidered the history of the development of the law
on this point and came to the conclusion that the relief
of a writ in the nature of a habeas corpus could be claimed
(
1
)
l.L.R. 54 Cal. 727.
\ ,
-
•
II
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
after 1923 solely under Cr. P. C. The same view was taken
by a full Bench of the Madras High Court in District
Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Mappitz.ai('),
where the said High Court held that it had no power to
issue a writ of habeas corpus as known to the English Common Law. Its powers are confined in that respect to those
conferred by s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which gives authority to issue directions of the nature of
habeas corpus. When this point was raised before the
Privy Council in Matthen v. District Magistrate·of Trivandrum(2), their Lordships observed that the reasoning of
Rankin C.J. in the case of Girindra Nath Banerjee(') was
so clear and convincing that they were content to adopt it,
as also to state that they were in entire agreement with the
views expressed by him. The same view was expressed
by the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Sibnath
Banerji('). Basing himself on these decisions, Mr. Setalvad contends that the statutory right to obtain relief under
s. 491(1) (b) is a right which is separate and distinct from
the Constitutional right guaranteed by the relevant Articles
of the Constitution, and so, Art. 359(1) cannot be said to
apply to the proceedings under s. 491 ( 1) (b).
In support of the same contention, Mr. Setalvad has
also pressed into service the provisions of Art. 372 by which
the existing laws are continued and he has invited our
attention to the provisions of Art. 225 and 375 to show that
the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts by s. 491
Cr. P. C. continues unless it is expressly taken away by
a competent piece of legislation.
In this connection, reliance has also been placed on
the fact that in the past whenever the operation of s. 491
was intended to be suspended, the legislature made a specific provision in that behalf and as an illustration, reference
is made to s. 10 of the Restriction and Detention Ordinance,
1944 (No. III of 1944). Section 10 specifically refers to
s. 491 of the Code and provides that no Court shall have
power tci make any order under the said section in respect of any order made under or having effect under the
Ordinance, or in respect of any person the subject of such
an order. It is urged that the Presidential Order is con(
1
)
( 1)
l.L.R. 1939 Mad. 708.
l.L.R. 5~ Cal. 727.
(2) 66 I.A. 222.
(') 72 I.A. 241.
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, /.
820
'1963
·Mal(hon Singh
v.
State of
Pun job
Gajefzdra-
.gadkar, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
fined only to proceedings taken for enforcement of constitutional rights and if it was intended that the proceeding>
under s. 491(1)(b) should also be prohibited, it was essential that the said provision should, in terms, have been
suspended by a competent piece of legislation.
Mr. Setalvad has also emphasised the fact that the approach in dealing with a proceeding under s. 491 (I) (b) is
different from the approach which the courts adopt in
dealing with proceedings under Art. 226 or Art. 32. In
invoking the jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Art. 226 ( 1), or that of the Supreme Court under
Art. 32(1), the Courts always enquire whether the party
concerned is aggrieved by the order against which complaint is made. Under s. 491(1)(b), however, the court
can take action suo motu and that brings out the difference
in the character of the two respective categories of proceedings. That, broadly stated, is the manner in which
Mr. Setalvad has raised ·his contention that proceedings
under s. 491 (1) (b) are outside the purview of the Presidential Order and do not fall within the mischief of
Art. 359(1).
There is no doubt that the right to' ask for a writ in
the nature of habeas corpus which could once have been
treated as a matter of Common Law has become a statutory right after 1923, and as we have. already seen after
s. 491 was introduced in the Cr. P. C., it was not open to
any citizen in India to claim the writ of habeas corpus on
grounds recognised by Common Law apart from the provisions of s. 491 (1) (b) itself. It has, however, been suggested by the learned Attorney-General that just as· the
common law right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus became a statutory right in 1923, a part of the said statutory
tight has now become a part of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, and so, after the Constitution came into force, whenever a detenu claims to be
released from illegal or improper detention, his claim can,
ih some cases, be sustained ·on the ground that illegal or
improper detention affects his fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts .. 19, or 21 or 23 as the case may be. If that be so,
it would not be easy to accede to the argument that the
said part of the statutory right recognised by s,49l(l)(b)
retains its distinc$vq ai;u:I ·lndepen~elJt character. even' .after
',..,
'
-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
1963
the Constitution came into force to such an extent that ·
it cannot be said to form part of the fundamental rights
Makhan Singh
guaranteed by the Constitution.
v.
It is true that there are two remedies open to a party
Stau of
Punjab
whose right of personal freedom has been infringed; he
may move the Court for a writ under Art. 226( 1) or Art.
Gaiendr,._
32( 1) of the Constitution, or he may take a proceeding
gadkar, f.
under'· 491(1)(b) of the Code. But it seems to us that
despite the fact that either of the two remedies can be
adopted by a citizen who has been detained improperly or
illegally, the right which he claims is the same if the·
remedv sought for is based on the ground that there has
been a breach of his fundamental rights; and that is a
right guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution, and so,
whatever is the form of the remedy adopted by the detenu,
the right which he is seeking to enforce is the same.
It is no doubt urged that under s. 491(1) (b) a stranger
can apply for the release of a detenu improperly or illegally
detained, or the Court itself can act suo motu. This argument is based on the provision that the High Court may,
whenever it thinks fit, issue the appropriate direction. The
learned Attorney-General contended that the clause "whenever it thinks fit" postulates that some application or petition has been filed before the Court and on perusing the
application or petition it appears to the Court fit to take
the appropriate action. In other words, his argument is
that the Court cannot take suo motu action under
s. 491(l)(b). He has also urged that a third person may
apply, but he must show that he has been duly authorised
to act on behalf of the detenu or he must at least purport
to act on his behalf. We do not think it necessary to
express any opinion on this part of the controversy between the parties. We are prepared to assume that the
court can, in a proper case, exercise its power undet
s. 49!(1)(b) suo motu, but that, in our opinion, does not
affect the decision of the question with which we are
concerned. If Art. 359( 1) and the Presidential Order
issued under it govern the proceedings taken under
!. '491(l)(b), the fact that the court can act suo motu will
not make any difference to the legal position for the simple reason that if a party is precluded from claiming his
release on the ground set out by him in his petition, the
822
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
Court cannot, purporting to act suo motu, pass any order
inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 359(1) and the
Makhan Singh
Order issued under it. Similarly, if the proPresidential
v.
ceedings under s. 491(1)(b) are hit by Art. 359(1) and
State of
Punjab
the Presidential Order, the arguments based on the provisions of Art. 372 as well as Arts. 225 and 375 have no valiGajendradity. The obvious and the necessary implication of the
gadkar, /.
suspension of the right of the citizen to move any
Court for enforcing his specified fundamental rights
is to suspend the jurisdiction of the Court pro Panto
in that behalf.
Let us take a concrete case which will clearly bring
out the character of the proceedings taken by the detenues
in the present cases. An application is made on behalf
of the detenu that he is illegally or improperly detained.
The State in its return pleads that the detention is neither
illegal nor improper because it has been effected under
rule 30( 1) (b), and in support of this return reliance is
placed on the provisions of s. 3(2) (15) (i) of the Act.
On receiving this return, it is urged on behalf of the
detenu that the provisions of s. 3(2) (15) (i) as well as
Rule 30(1) (b) are invalid because they contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens under Arts. 14,
21 and 22; and so, the sole issue which falls to be determined between the parties relates to the validity of the
relevant statutory provisions and Rules; If the impugned
provisions in the Act and the Rules are ultra vires, the
detention is illegal and improper, but if, on the other hand,
the said provisions are valid, the detention is legal and
proper. In deciding this point, the Court will naturally
have to take into account the provisions of s. 45(1) of the
Act. Section 45 ( 1) provides that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be
<:alled in question in any Court; and the reply of the
detenu inevitably would be that notwithstanding this provision, the· validity of the impugned legislation must be.
tested. This clearly brings out the true nature and character of the dispute which is raised before the Court by the
detenu in asking for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus
in the present proceedings.
,The question which thus arises for our decision is, can
it be said that the proceedings taken under s. 491(1)(b) are
. .,.
--
-
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
of such a distinctly separate character that they cannot fall
under Art. 359(1)? Under s. 491 as it stood before the
date of the Constitution, it would have been open to the
detenu to contend that the law under which he was detained was invalid, because it was passed by a legislature
without legislative competence. The validity of the law
might also have been challenged on the ground that the
operative provision in the law suffered from the vice of
excessive delegation. The detenu might also have urged
that in detaining him the mandatory provisions under the
Act had not been complied with. But before the Constitution was adopted, it would not have been open to
the detenu to claim that the impugned law was invalid
because it contravened his fundamental rights guranteed
by the relevant Articles of the Constitution. The right to
challenge the validity of a statute on the ground that it
contravenes the fundamental rights of the citizens has accrued to the citizens of this country only after and as a
result of the provisions of the Constitution itself, and so,
there can be no doubt that when in the present proceedings
the detenues seek to challenge the validity of the impugned statutory provision and the Rule, they are invoking
their fundamental rights under the Constitution. If s. 491
is treated as standing by itself and apart from the provisions
of the Constitution, the plea raised by the detenues cannot
be entertained in the proceedings taken under that section ;
it is only when the proceedings taken under the said section are dealt with not only in the light of s. 491 and of
the rights which were available to the citizens before 1950,
but when they are considered also in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution that the
relevant plea can be raised. In other words, it is clear
that the content of the detenu' s right to challenge the
legality of his detention which was available to him under
s. 491 ( 1) (b) prior to the Constitution, has been enlarged
by the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens by
the Constitution, and so, whenever a detenu relies· upon
his fundamental rights even in support of his petition made
under s. 491 (1) (b) he is really enforcing the said rights
and in that sense, the proceedings inevitably partake of the
character 0£ proceedings taken by the detenu for enforcing
these rights; that is why the argument that Art. 359(1)
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puniab
Gajendragadkar, /.
824
1963
Molchan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
and the Presidential Order issued under it do not apply
to the proceedings under s. 491 ( 1) (b) cannot be sustained.
The prohibition contained m the said Article and the
Presidential Order will apply as much to proceedings under
s. 49l(l)(b) as to those under Art. 226(1) & Art. 32(1).
In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emp-hasise
that in deciding the present question, we must take into
account the substance of the matter and not attach undue
or exaggerated importance to the form of the proceedings.
If the form which the proceedings take.is held to be decisive in the matter, it would lead to this irrational position
that an application containing the requisite averments in
support of a plea for the release of the detenu, would be
thrown out by the High Court if in form it purports to
be made under Art. 226, whereas it would be entertained
and mav indeed succeed if it purports to be made under
s. 491 (I) (b ). Indeed, this argument seems to suggest that
when die Constitution-makers drafted Art. 359, they intended that whenever an emergency arises and a Presidential Order is issued under Art. 359(1) in regard to the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 21 and 22, it would
be necessary to pass another piece of legislation providing
for an appropriate change or repeal of a part of the provision of s. 491(1)(b), Cr. P. C.; and since the legislature
has through oversight omitted to pass the necessary Act in
that behalf, proceedings under s. 491(1)(b). must be
allowed to be continued free from the bar created by the
Presidential Order. In our opinion, this position is wholly
untenable. Whether 'or not the proceedings taken under
s. 491(1)(b) fall within the purview of the Presidentiat
Order, must depend upon the construction of Art. 359(1)
and the Order, and in dealing with this point, we must
look at the substance of the matter and not its form. Before
giving relief to the detenu who alleges that he has been
illegally and impropely detained, is the High Court required to consider the validity of the operative provisions
of the impugned J\ct on the ground that they infringe the
specified fundamental rights? If yes, the bar created by
Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order must inevitably
step in even though the proceedings m form may have
been taken under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code. In our opinion, therefore, once it is shown that the proceedings und ~r
'
..
4 S.C.R.
~·
'
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
825
s. 491 ( 1) (b) cannot make a substantial progress unless the
validity of the impugned law is examined on the ground
of the contravention of the specified fundamental rights,
it must follow that the bar created by the Presidential
Order operates against them as much as it operates against
proceedings taken under Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(1). Thus,
the true legal position, in substance, is that the clause "the
right to move any court" used in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order takes in all legal actions intended to be filed,
or filed, in which the specified rights are sought to be enforced, and it covers all relevant categories of jurisdictions
of competent courts under which the said actions would
otherwise normally have been entertained and tried.
At this stage, we may conveniently refer to the recent
decision of this Court in Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. The
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puniab
Gajendragadkar, I
Chief Commissioner, Union Territory of Tripura('),
wherein this Court rejected the detenu's petition on the
ground that it was barred by the Presidential Order and
it refused to entertain the argument that the Ordinance and
the Act and the Rules framed thereunder were void for
the reason that they contravened Arts. 14, 21 & 22, with
the observation that the challenge made by the petitioner
in that behalf really amounted to "arguing in the circle".
If the Presidential Order precludes a citizen from moving
the Court for the enforcement of the specified fundamental
rights, it would not be open to the citizen to urge that the
Act is void for the reason that it offends against the said
fundamental rights. It is in order to prevent the citizen
from making such a claim that the Presidential Order has
been issued, and so, during the period of its operation,
the challenge to the validity of the Act cannot be entertained. Incidentally, it may be observed that a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus made by Mohan Chowdhury which
was rejected by this Court on the ground that it was barred
under the Presidential Order would, on the view for
which the appellants contend, be competent if it is presented before the appropriate High Court under
s. 491(1)(b) of the Code; and that incidentally illustrates
how exaggerated importance to the form of the petition
would lead to extremely anomalous and irrational consequences. Therefore, our conclusion is that the proceedings
(') [1964] 3. S.C.Jl.. 44".
53-2 SC India, 6~
•
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
taken on behalf of the appellants before the respective
High Courts challenging their detention on the ground
Makhan Singh
that the impugned Act and the Rules are void because they
V•
contravene Arts. 14, 21 and 22, are incompetent for the
State of
reason that the fundamental rights which are alleged to
.Punjab
have been contravened are specified m the Presidential
Gajendra~
Order and all citizens are precluded from moving any
gadkar, /.
Court for the enforcement of the said specified rights.
The next question to consider is the validity of the
Presidential Order itself which was issued on the 3rd
November, 1962. This is how the Order reads:
"G.S.R. 1464.-In exercise of the powers conferred by
clause ( 1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that the right of any person to
move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution
shall remain suspended for the period during which
the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause
(1) of article 352 thereof on the 26th October, 1962
is in force, if such person has been deprived of any
such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962
( 4 of 1962) or any rule or order made thereunder."
We have already stated that this Order was subsequently modified on the 11th November, 1962, by the
addition of Art. 14. The first argument which has been
urged against the validity of this Order is that it is inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 359( 1). It is argued
that the Order which the President is authorised to issue
under this Article must be an Order of general application;
in fact, the Order purports to be confined to persons who
have been deprived of any of the specified rights under the
Defence of India Ordinance, 1962, or any Rule or Order
made thereunder. In other words, there is no doubt that
this Order does not apply to persons who have been detained under the provisions of the earlier Preventive Detention Act No. 4 of 1950, and so, in limiting the application
of the Order to persons who have been detained under
the Ordinance, the President has acted outside the powers
conferred on him by Art. 359(1). In our opinion, this
argument cannot be sustained. The power conferred on
the President is wide enough to enable him to make an
Order applicable to all parts of the country and to all
•
-
•
4 S.C.R.
'
~-
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
citizens and in respect of any of the rights conferred by
Part III. This wide power obviously includes the power
to issue a limited order. What the Order purports to do
is to provide that all persons wherever they reside who
have been detained under the Ordinance or the Act, will
be precluded from moving any court for the enforcement
of the rights specified in the Order. It is not easy to see
how this Order can be said to contravene or be otherwise
inconsistent with the powers conferred on the President
by Art. 359(1).
It is then argued that the said Order is invalid because
it seeks to give effect to the Ordinance which is void. It
will be recalled that Ordinance No. 4 of 1%2 was promulgated on the 26th October, 1962, whereas the Order was
issued under Art. 359(1) on the 3rd November, 1962. The
argument is that during the period between the 26th October and the 3rd November the validity of the said Ordinance could have been challenged ori the ground that it
contravened Arts. 14, 21 and 22, and so, the said Ordinance
can be held to have been a still-born piece of legislation and
yet detentions effected under such a void law are sought
to be protected by the Presidential Order by depriving the
the detenues of their right to move any court to challenge
the validity of the orders of detention passed against them.
In our opinion, this argument is wholly misconceived. Vve
have already stated that for the purpose of these appeals,
we are prepared to assume that despite the issue of the
Order under Art. 359(1), the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 21 and 22 are not suspended; what is suspended is the enforcement of the said rights during
the prescribed period, and so, what is said about the invalidity of the Ordinance during the period between 26th
October and 3rd November is true even after the Order
was issued on the 3rd November. If the detenues are justified in contending that the Ordinance and the Act which
took its place contravened the fundamental rights guaranteed by A!ts. 14, 21 and 22, the said Ordinance and the
Act would be and would continue to be invalid; but the
effect of the Presidential Order is that their invalidity cannot be tested during the prescribed period. Therefore, the
argument that since the Ordinance or the Act is invalid,
the Presidential Order cannot preclude a citizen from test-
1963
Makhan Singh
••
Stat< of
Puniab
Gajrodragadkar, f.
828
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadk.ar, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
ing its validity, must be rejected.
The same argument is put in another form. It is urged
that we have merely to examine the Ordinance and Act
to be satisfied that Arts. 14, 21 and 22 (4), (5) and (7)
have been contravened and it is suggested that if these
infirmities in the Ordinance and the Act are glaring, it
would not be open to the President to issue an Order preventing the detenues from challenging the validity of the
said statutory provisions. That, in substance, is what is
described by this Court in Mohan Choudhury' s cas~(') as
"arguing in the circle". Therefore, we are satisfied that
the challenge to the validity of the Presidential Order is
not well-founded.
It still remains to consider what are the pleas which
are now open to the citizens to take in challenging the
legality or the propriety of their detentions either under
s. 49l(l)(b) of the Code, or Art. 226(1) of the Constitution. We have already seen that the right to move any
court which is suspended by Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it is the right for the enforcement
of snch of the rights conferred by Part III as may be
mentioned in the Order. If in challenging the validity of
his detention order, the detenu is pleading any right outside the rights specified in the Order, his right to move
any court in that behalf is not suspended, because it is outside Art. 359(1) and consequently outside the Presidential
Order itself. Let us take a case where a detenu has been
detained in violation of the mandatory provisions of the
Act. In such a case, it may be open to the detenu to
contend that his detention is illegal for the reason that the
mandatory provisions of the Act have been contravened.
Such a plea is outside Art. 359(1) and the right of the
detenu to move for his release on such a ground cannot be
affected by the Presidential Order.
Take also a case where tl1e detenu moves the Court for
a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention
has been ordered malafide. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the exercise of a power malafide 'is wholly outside the scope of the Act conferring the power and can
always be successfully challenged. It is true that a mere
allegation that the detention is malafide would not be
(
1
)
[1964] 3. S.C.R. 442.
-
r
-
4 S.C.R.
t
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
829
enough; the detenu will have to prove the malafides. But
if the malafides are alleged, the detenu cannot be precluded from substantiating his plea on the ground of the bar
created by Art. 359( 1) and the Presidential Order. That
is another kind of plea which is outside the purview of
Art. 359(1).
Section 491 ( 1) deals with the power of the High Court
to issue directions in the nature of the habeas corpus, and
it covers six categories of cases in which such a direction
can be issued. It is only in regard to that class of cases
falling under s. 491 (1) (b) where the legality of the detention is challenged on grounds which fall under Art. 359(1)
and Presidential Order that the bar would operate. In all
other cases falling under s. 491 ( 1) the bar would be inapplicable and proceedings taken on behalf of the detenu
will have to be tried in accordance with law. V./e ought
to add that these categories of pleas have been mentioned
by us by way of illustration, and so, they should not be
read as exhausting all the pleas which do not fall within
the purview of the Presidential Order.
There is yet another ground on which the validity of
the detention may be open to challenge. If a detenu contends that the operative provision of the law under which
he is detained suffers from the vice of excessive delegation
and is, therefore, invalid, the plea thus raised by the detenu
cannot at the threshold be said to be barred by the Presidential Order. In terms, it is not a plea which is relatable
to the fundamental rights specified in the said Order. It
is a plea which is independent of the said rights and its
validity must be examined. Mr. Chatterjee has urged before
us thats. 3(2)(15)(i) as well ass. 40 of the Act are invalid,
because they confer on the rule making authority power
which is often described as excessive delegation. It is,
therefore, necessary to consider this point. The Act which
took the place of the Ordinance was passed, because it was
thought necessary to provide for special measures to ensure the public safety and interest, the defence of India and
civil defence and for the trial of certain offences and for
matters connected therewith. Section 3(2) (15) (i) whose
validity is challenged purports to confer on the Central
Government power to make Rules. Section 3( I) reads
thus:
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendra-
gadkar, f.
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
"The Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, make such rules as appear to it necesMakhan Singh
sary or expedient for securing the defence of India and
v.
civil
defence, the public safety, the maintenance of
State of
public order or the efficient conduct of military operaPunjab
tions, or for maintaining supplies and services essenGajendrap
tial to the life of the community."
gadkar, /.
Section 3(2) provides that without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. ( 1) the rules may
provide for, and may empower any authority to make
orders providing for, all or any of the following matters;
then follow clauses (1) to (57), including several subclauses which provide for the matters that may be covered
by the Rules. Amongst them is cl. (15) (i) which reads
as under:"Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the
time being in force,-the rules to be made may provide for the apprehension and detention in custody of
any person whom the authority empowered by the
rules to apprehend or detain (the authority empowered
to detain not being lower in rank than that of a District Magistrate) suspects, on grounds appearing to that
authority to be reasonable, of being of hostile origin
or of having acted, acting, being about to act or being
likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the defence of
India and civil defence, the security of the State, the
public safety or interest, the maintenance of public
order, India's relations with foreign States, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part or area of
India or the efficient conduct of military operations, or
with respect to whom that authority is satisfied that
his apprehension and detention are necessary for the
purpose of preventing him from acting in any such prejudicial manner."
The argument is that in conferring power on the Central
Government to make rules, the legislature has abdicated
its essentially legislative function in favour of the Central
Government. In our opinion, this argument is wholly untenable. Right up from the time when this Court dealt
with Special References in 1951, In re The Delhi Laws Act,
1912 etc.(') the question about the limits within which
1963
(') [19511 S.C.R. 747.
-
r
-
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
the legislature can legitimately confer powers on its delegate has been examined on several occasions and it has
been consistently held that what the legislature is prohibited from doing is to delegate its essentially legislative function and power. If it appears from the relevant provisions
of the impugned statute that powers which have been
delegated include powers which can legitimately be
regarded as essentially legislative powers, then the legislation is bad and it introduces a serious infirmity in
the Act itself. On the other hand, if the legislature
lays down its legislative policy in clear and unambiguous
terms and leaves it to the delegate to execute that
policy by means of making appropriate rules, then such
delegation is not impermissible. In Harishanker Bagla
v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') where the validity
of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946, was challenged, this Court in upholding the
validity of the impugned statute held that the preamble and
the body of the relevant sections of the said Act sufficiently
formulate the legislative policy and observed tliat the
ambit and the character of the Act is such that the details
of that policy can only be worked out by delegating that
power to a subordinate authority within the framework of
that policy. The same view has been expressed in Bhatnagars and Co., Ltd., v. The Union of India('). In the
present cases, one has merely to reads. 3(1) and the detailed provisions contained in the several clauses of s. 3(2) to
be satisfied that the attack against the validity of the said
section on the ground of excessive delegation is patently
unsustainable. Not only is the legislative policy broadly indicated in the preamble to the Act, but the relevant provisions of the impugned section itself give such detailed and
specific guidance to the rule-making authority that it
would be idle to contend that the Act has delegated
essentially legislative function to the rule making authority. In our opinion, therefore, the contention that
s. 3(2) (15) (i) of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive
delegation must be rejected. What we have said about
this section applies with equal force to s. 4D. If the impugned sections of the Act are valid, it follows that Rule
30(1) (b) which is challenged by the appellants must be
(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380.
( 2 ) [1957] S.C.R. 701.
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, f.
832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
held to be valid since it is consistent with the operative
provisions of the Act and in making it, the Central Gov,Mokhan Singh ernment has acted within its delegated authority. This
v.
conclusion is, of course, confined to the challenge of the
State of
appellants based on the ground that the impugned proviPunjab
sions and the Rule suffer from the vice of excessive
Gajendradelegation.
gadkar, f.
If we had held that the impugned provision in the Act
suffered from the vice of excessive delegation, it would
have become necessary to consider what the effect of that
conclusion would have been on the merits of the controversy between the parties in the present proceedings.
If we had reached the conclusion that the impugned sections were invalid because they conferred power on the
rule-making authority which suffers from the vice of excessive delegation, the question would have arisen whether in
challenging the validity of the Order of detention passed
against him the detenu is enforcing his fundamental right
under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Art. 21 is one of
the articles specified in the Presidential Order and if
at any stage of the proceedings, the detenu seeks to
enforce his right under the said Article, that would
be barred. It may be urged that if the detenues had been
able to show that the impugned provisions of the Act were
invalid because they suffered from the infirmity of excessive delegation, the next step which they would have bern
entitled to take was to urge that their detention under such
an Act is void under Art. 21, because the law referred to
in that Article must be a valid law; and that would raise
the question as to whether this latter plea falls within
the ambit of Art. 359( 1) and the Prosidential Order
issued under it. We do not propose to express any
opinion on this question in these appeals. Since we
have held that the Act does not suffer from the vice
of excessive delegation as alleged, it is unnecessary to
pursue the enquiry as to whether if the challenge had been
upheld, the detenu would have been precluded from urging
the said invalidity in support of his plea that his detention
was illegal.
We must now turn to some other arguments which
were urged before us at the hearing of these appeals.
Mr. Sule contends that part of the Act containing the im1963
-
r
~·
4 S.C.R.
_'f
;/
'
....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
pugned sections was a colourable piece of legislation. His
argument was that since the Preventive Detention Act
No. 4 of 1950 was already on the statute book, it was
hardly necessary for the Legislature to have passed the impugned Act, and he urges that since the sole object
of the Legislature in passing the impugned Act was
to deprive the citizens of their fundamental rights
under Arts. 21 and 22, it should be deemed to be a
colourable piece of legislation. The legislative competence of the Parliament to pass this Act is not disputed.
Entry No. 9 in List I in the Seventh Schedule confers on
the Parliament jurisdiction to make laws in regard to the
preventive detention for reasons connected with defence,
foreign affairs, or the security of India as well as in regard
to persons subjected to such detention. If the Legislature
thought that having regard to the grave threat to the
security of India posed by the Chinese aggression, it was
necessary to pass the impugned Act notwithstanding the
fact that another Act had already been passed in that behalf,
it would be difficult to hold that the Legislature had acted
malafide and that the Act must, therefore, be struck down
as a colourable exercise of legislative power. It is hardly
necessary to emphasise that a plea that an Act passed by
a legislature competent to pass it is a colourable piece of
legislation, cannot succeed on such flimsy grounds.
Whether or not it was wise that this part of the Act should
have been passed, is a matter which is wholly irrelevant
in dealing with the plea that the Act is a colourabk piece
of legislation.
In this connection, we may refer to another aspect of
the same argument which has been pressed before us.
Before doing so, however, kt us briefly indicate the effect
of the relevant Articles. Article 14 guarantees equality
before law. Article 21 provides, inter alia, that no person
shall be deprived of his personal liberty, except according
to procedure established by law, and Art. 22(4), (S) (6)
& (7) lay down Constitutional safeguards for the protection
of the citizen whose personal liberty may be affected by
an order of detention passed against him. Article 22 ( 4)
requires that an Advisory Board should be constituted and
that cases of detenues should be referred to the Advisory
Board for its opinion as provided therein. Article 22(5)
1963
Mukhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, f.
834
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
imposes an obligation on the detaining authority to communicate to the detenu grounds on which the order of detention has been passed against him with a view to afford him
the earliest opportunity of making a representation against
the order. Article 22(6) provides that in giving notice
to the detenu under Art. 22(5), facts need not be disclosed
which the detaining authority considers to be against public interest to disclose, and Art. 22(7) prescribes certain
conditions which have to be satisfied by any law which
the Parliament may pass empowering the detention of
citizens. It is thus clear that the Constitution empowers
the Parliament to make a law providing for the detention
of citizens, but this power has to be exercised subject to
the mandatory conditions specified in Art. 22( 4), (5) &
(7). It is common ground that the Preventive Detention
Act of 1950 complies with these requirements inasmuch
as it has enacted sections 7 to 13 in that behalf. It is also
clear that these Constitutional safeguards have not been
provided for by the impugned Act.
The argument is that even if the Parliament thought
that during the period of emergency, citizens reasonably
suspected to be engaged in prejudicial activities should be
detained without affording them the benefit of the Constitutional safeguards guaranteed by Art. 22(4), (5) & (7),
the Parliament need not have enacted tbe Act and might
well have left the executive to take action under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, and since Parliament has
chosen to pass the Act under challenge and has disregarded the Constitutional provisions of Articles 14 and 22, the
exerci;e of legislative power by Parliament must, in the
context, be held to be a colourable exercise of legislative
power. This argument seems to assume that if the Parliament had expected the executive to detain citizens under
the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 without giving them
the benefit of the Constitutional safeguards prescribed by
Art. 22, their cases could have been covered if a Presidential Order had been issued under Art. 359(1) in respect
of such detentions.
The question is: is this assumption well-founded?
Assuming that the Presidential Order had suspended the
citizens' right to move any court for enforcing their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 21 and 22 and had made
·.
r
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
the said Order applicable to persons detained under the
Preventive Detention Act of 1950, could that Order have
effectively prevented the detenues from contending that
their detention was illegal and void? In such a case, if
the detenu was detained under the Preventive Detention
Act of 1950 and he challenged the validity of his detention
on the ground that the relevant provisions of the said
Act had not been complied with, would his challenge
be covered by Art. 359 ( 1) and the Presidential Order
issued under it? In other words, can it be said that
in making the said challenge, he was enforcing his
fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order?
If it is held that he was challenging the validity of
his detention because the mandatory provisions of the
Act had not been complied with, his challenge may be
outside Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order. If, on
the other hand, it is held that, in substance, the challenge is to enforce his aforesaid fundamental rights,
though he makes the challenge by reference to the
relevant statutory provisions of the Act themselves, that
would have brought his challenge within the prohibition of
the Presidential Order. Normally, as we have already
held, a challenge against the validity of the detention on
the ground that the statutory provisions of the Act under
which the detention is ordered have not been complied
with, would fall outside Art. 359(1) and the Presidential
Order, but the complication in the hypothetical case under
discussion arises because unlike other provisions of the Act,
the mandatory provisions in question essentially represent
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 22 and it is
open to argument that the challenge in question substantially seeks to enforce the said fundamental rights.
In the context of the alternative argument with which
we a re dealing at this stage, it is unnecessary for us
to dtcide whether the challenge in question would
have attracted the provisions of Art. 359(1) and the
Order or not. We are referring to this matter only
for the purpose of showing that the Parliament may
have thought that the executive would not be able to
detain citizens reasonably suspected of prejudicial activities
by taking recourse to the Preventive Detention Act of 1950,
and that may be the genesis of the impugned Act. lf that
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, f.
836
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
196.l
be so, it would not be permissible to suggest that in passing
the
Act, Parliament was acting malafide.
Makhan Singh
It is quite true that if the Act has contravened the
v.
Statt' of
citizens' fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 22, it
Punjab
would be void and the detentions effected under the relevant provisions of the said Act would be equally inoperaGajendrative; but it must be remembered that it is precisely in
gadkar, J.
this set of circumstances that Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it step in and preclude the citizen
from enforcing his fundamental rights in any court.
The said Article as well as the Presidential Order issued
under it indicate that there may be cases in which
the specified fundamental rights of citizens have been contravened by executive action and the impugned executive
action may be invalid on that account. That is precisely
why the said Article and the Presidential Order impose a
ban against the investigation of the merits of the challenge
during the period prescribed by the Order. Therefore, the
alternative argument urged in support of the plea that the
impugned provisions of the Act amount to a colourable
piece of legislation fails.
Mr. Parulekar who argued his own case before us
with remarkable ability, contended that a detenu cannot
be prevented from disputing the validity of the Ordinance,
Act and the Rules under the Presidential Order if he did
not ask for any consequential relief. His argument was
that the prayer made in his petition under s. 491 ( 1) (b)
consists of two parts; the first pray~r is to declare that the
impugned Act and the Order are invalid, and the second
prayer is that his detention should be held to be illegal
and his release should accordingly be ordered. The first
prayer, says Mr. Parulekar, cannot fall within the mischief
of the Order. because he is not enforcing any of his rights
when he asks merely for a declaration that the law is invalid, and he suggested that even if we take the view that
he is precluded from challenging the validity of his. detention by virtue of the said Order, we should not preclude
him from challenging the validity of the law merelv with
a view to obtain a declaration in that behalf. In our
opinion, this argument cannot be accepted. Whats. 359(1)
purports to do is to empower the President to make an
Order by which the right of the detenue to move the Court
1
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
1963
to challenge the validity of his detention on the ground
that any of his fundamental rights specified in the Order
Makhan Singk
have been contravened, is suspended, and so, it would be
v.
unreasonable to suggest that what the detenu cannot do
State of
Punjab
in order to secure his release, he should be allowed to do
merely for the purpose of obtaining an academic declaraGajendration. A proceeding taken under s. 49l(l)(b) like a petigadkar, /.
tion filed under Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(1) is intended to
obtain relief, and the relief in such cases means the order
for the release of the detenu. If the detenu is prohibited
from asking for an order of release on the ground that the
challenge to the validity of his order of detention cannot
be made during the pendency of the Presidential Order,
we do not see how it would be open to the same
detenu to claim a mere declaration either under s. 491,
Cr. P. C. or Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(1) of the Constitution. We do not think that it was open to the
High Court to consider the validity of the impugned Act
without relation to the prayer made by the detenu in his
petition. The proceedings commenced by the detenu by
means of his petition under s. 491 ( 1) (b) constitute one
proceeding and if the sole relief which the detenu seeks to
obtain cannot be claimed by him by virtue of the Presidential Order, it would be unreasonable to hold that he can
claim a different relief, viz., a mere declaration; such a
relief is clearly outside the purview of the proceedings
under s. 49l(l)(b) and Arts. 226(1) and 32(1).
During the course of the hearing of these appeals, it
has been strenuously pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad
that the emergency created by the Chinese act of aggression may last long and in consequence, the citizens would
be precluded from enforcing their fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order during the period that the
Order is in operation. That, however, has no material
bearing on the points with which we are concerned. How
long the Proclamation of Emergency should continue and
what restrictions should be impo>ed on the fundamental
rights of citizens during the pendency of the emergency,
are matters which must inevitably be left to the executive
because the executive knows the requirements of the situation and the effect of compulsive factors which operate
during periods of g~ave crisis, such as our country is facing
838
1963
Makhan Singh
. v.
State of
Puniab
Gajendragadkar, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
today. As Lord Wright observed in the case ot Liversidge(' ), "the safeguard of British liberty is in the gooci
sense of the people and in the system of representative and
responsible government which has been evolved. If extraordinary powers are here given, they are given because the
emergency is extraordinary and are limited to the period
of the emergency." The other aspect of Mr. Setalvad's
argument was that during the operation of the Presidential
Order, the executive may abuse its powers and the citizens
would have no remedy. This argument is essentially
political and its impact on the constimtional question with
which we are concerned is at best indirect. Even so, it
may be permissible to observe that in a democratic State,
the effective safeguard against abuse of executive powers
whether in peace or in emergency, is ultimately to be
found in the existence of enlightened, vigilant and vocal
public opinion.
The appellants have also relied upon the observations
made by Lord Atkin in the case of Eshuqbavi Eleko v.
Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria(').
"In accordance with British jurisprudence," said Lord
Atkin, "no member of the executive can interfere with the
liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before
a Court of Justice. And it is the tradition of British Jnstice that Judges should not shrink from deciding such
issues in the face of the executive." These noble sentiments so eloquently expressed by Lord Atkin as well as
his classic minority speech in the case of Liver!idgt evoke
a spontaneous response in the minds of all of us who have
taken the oath to administer law in accordance with our
Constitution and to uphold the fundamental rights of
citizens guaranteed by the Constitution. This Court is
fully conscious of the solemn duty imposed on it by
Art. 32 which constitutes it the Custodian and Guardian
of the citizens' fundamental rights. But we must remember that the democratic faith in the inviolable character of
individual liberty and freedom and the majesty of law which
sustains it must ultimately be governed by the Constitution
itself. The Corntitution is the law of laws-the paramount
(1) [1942] A.G. 206.
("). AJ.R. 1931 P.G. 248,
1
',
•
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
and supreme law of the country. It has itself enshrined
the fundamental rights of the citizens in the relevant Articles of Part III and it is no doubt the duty of this Court
as the Custodian of those rights to see that they are not
contravened contrary to the ·provisions of the Constitution.
But the Constitution itself has made certain emergency
provisions in Chapter XVIII with a view to enable the nation to meet grave emergencies like the present, and so, in
dealing with the question about the citizen's right to challenge the validity of his detention, we will have to give effect to the plain words of Art. 359( l) and the Presidential
Order issued under it. As we have already indicated, the
only reasonable construction which can be placed upon
Art. 35'}( 1) is to hold that the citizen's right to take
any legal proceeding for the enforcement of his fundamental rights which have been specified in the Presidential Order is suspended during the prescribed period.
It is, in our opinion, plain that the right specified in
Art. 39(1) includes the relevant right, whether it is statutory, ())nstitutional or Constitutionally guaranteed, and the
words "any court" refer to all courts of competent jurisdiction and naturally include the Supreme Court and the
High Courts. If that be so, it would be singularly inappropriate for this Court to entertain an argument which
seeks to circumvent this provision by suggesting that the
right of the detenu to challenge the legality of his detention under s. 491 ( 1) (b) does not fall within the scope
of the said Article. The said argument concentrates attention on the mere form of the petition and ignores the substance of the matter altogether. In the context, we think,
such a sophisticated approach which leans solely on unrealistic and artificial subtlety is out of place and is illogical, unreasonable and unsound. We must, therefore,
hold that the Punjab and the Bombay High Courts
were right in coming to the condusion that the detenues
befme them were not entitled to contend that the impugn·
ed Act and the statutory Rule under which they were
deained were void for the reason that they contravened
Arts. 14, 21 and 22(4), (5) & (7).
Before we part with these appeals, we ought to mention one more point. At the commencement of the hearing
of these appeals when Mr. Setalvad began to argue about
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
The State
of Punjab
Gajendra·
gadkar, f.
•
840
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Gajendragadkar, J.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the validity of the impugned provisions of the Act and the
Rules, the learned Attorney-General raised a preliminary
contention that logically, the appellants should satisfy this
Court that it was open to them to move the High Courts
on the grounds set out by them before the validity
of the said grounds is examined. He suggested that,
logically, the first point to consider would be whether
the detenues can challenge the validity of the impugned Act on the ground that they are illegally detained.
If they succeed in showing that the applications made
by them under s. 491 ( 1) (b) are competent and do not
fall within the purview of Art. 359(1) and the Presidential
Order, then the stage would be reached to examine the
merits of their complaint that the said statutory provisions
are invalid. If, however, they fail on the first point, the
second 'point would not fall to be considered. We then
took the view that since a large number of appeals were
placed for hearing before us and they raised important
issues of Constitutional Law, it would be better to allow
Mr. Setalvad to argue the case in the manner he thought
best, and so, Mr. Setalvad addressed us on the validity of
the Act in the first instance and then dealt with the question about the competence of the applications made under
s. 491(1) (b) of the Code. In the main, the same method
was adopted by the learned Advocates who followed
Mr. Setalvad on the appellants' side. Naturally, when
the learned Attorney-General made his reply, he also had
to address us on both the points. It appeared that as
regards the validity of the impugned provisions of the Act
and the Rules he was not in a position to challenge the
contention of the appellants that the Act contravened
Arts. 14, 21 and 22(4), (5) & (7). Even so, he strongly
pressed before us his original contention that we would not
reach the stage of expressing our opinion on the validity
of the Act if we were to uphold the preliminary objection
that the applications made by the detenues were incompetent. In our opinion, the learned Attorney-General is
right when he contends that we should not and cannot
pronounce any opinion on the validity of the impugned
Act if we come to the conclusion that the bar created by
the Presidential Order operates against the detenues in the
present cases. In fact, that is the course which this Court
....
-
-
4 S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
!Ml
1963
adopted in dealing with Mohan Choudhury's case('),
and we are satisfied that that is the only course which this
Makh•n Singh
Court can logically and with propriety adopt.
v.
In the result, we hold that the Punjab and the Bombay
The St•te
High Court are right in coming to the conclusion that the
of Puniat.
applications made by the detenues for their release under
s. 49l(l)(b), Cr.·P. C. are incompetent in so far as they Gajendragadk•r, j.
•eek to challenge the validity of their detentions on the
ground that the Act and the Rule under which they are
detained suffer from the vice that they contravene the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 21 and 22(4),
(5) and (7). Since these appeals were placed before the
Special Bench for the decision of the common questions of
law raised by them, we do not propose to examine the.
other contentions which each one of the appellants seeks
to raise in his appeal. Therefore, we direct that all the
appeals included in the present group should now be set
d~wn before a Constitution Bench and each one of them
should be dealt with in accordance with law.
SuBBA RAo J.-I have had the advantage of reading
Subba Rao, /.
the Judgment of my learned brother, Gajendragadkar J. I
regret my inability to agree with him wholly. I agree with
his conclusion in regard to the applicability of Art. 359 of
the Constitution to a right to move a court both under Art.
32 ( 1) and Art· 226 thereof, but not with his conclusion in
regard to the exercise of power by the High Court under
s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
These appeals raise questions of great importance touching apparently conflicting, but really harmonious, concepts of individual liberty and security of the State, for
the former cannot exist without the latter. My only justification for a separate treatment of the subject even on que- .
stions on which there is general agreement is my conviction
that on important questions I should express my thoughts in my own way. Broadly, two questions are posed
for the consideration of this Court, namely (i) whether s.
3(2) (15) (i) of the Defence of India Act, 1%2 (51 of 1%2),
hereinafter called the Act, and r. 30( 1) (b) of the Rules
made in exercise of the power conferred under the Act
are constitutionally void; and (ii) whether the Order made
by the President in exercise of the power conferred
on him under Art. 359(1) of the Constitution would be a
- ( 1 ) {1964] 3 S.C.R. 442.
34-2 S. c. India/84
842
1963
Makha11 Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Subka Rao, /.
[1964]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~ar against the maintainability of any action in any court to
question the validity of the detention order made under
the Act.
I shall deal with the two questions in the said order.
Before dealing with the first question it would be convenient to quote the impugned provisions of the Act.
&ction 3.-(1) The Central Government may by
notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as
appear to it necessary or expedient for securing the
defence of India and civil defence; the public safety, the
maintenance of public order or the efficient conduct of
military operations, or for maintaining supplies and
services essential to the life of the community.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may
provide for, and may empower any authority to make
orders providing for, all or any of the following
matters, namely :•
( 15) notwithstanding anything m any other law
for the time being in force,( i) the apprehension and detention in custody of any
person whom the authority empowered by the rules
to apprehend or detain (the authority empowered
to detain not being lower in rank than that of a
District Magistrate) suspects, on grounds appearing
to that authority to be reasonable, of being of hostile
origin or of having acted, acting, being about to act
or being likely to act in a manner prejudical to the
defence of India and civil defence, the security of
the State, the public safety or interest, the maintenance of public order, India's relations with
foreign States, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part or area of India or the efficient
conduct of military operations, or with respect to
whom that authority is satisfied that his apprehension and detention are necessary for the purpose of
preventing him from acting in any such prejudicial
manner,
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Rule 30.-( 1) The Central Government or the State
Government, if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from
-
-
, 4 S.C.R.
843
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India
and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, India's relations with foreign powers, the maintenance of peaceful conditions
in any part of India, the efficient conduct of military
operations or the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the life of the community, it is necessary
so to do, may, make an order-
*****.*
-
-
ilfi>I!=
(b) directing that he be detained.
Rule 30A.-(2) Everv detention order shall be
reviewed in accordance with the provisions hereinafter
contained.
(3) A detention order made by the Central Government or the State Government or the Administrator shall
be reviewed by the Central Government or the State Government or the Administrator, as the case may be.
( 4) A detention order made by an officer (who
shall in no case be lower in rank than that of a District Magistrate) empowered by the State Government or
the Administrator shall be reviewed :(a) in the case of an order made by an officer empowered by the State Government, by a reviewing
authority consisting of any such two officers
from among the following officers of that Government, that is to say, the Chief Secretary, a member of the Board of Revenue, a Financial Commissioner and a Commissioner of a Division, as may
be specified by that Government by notification in
the Official Gazette ;
(b) in the case of an order made by an officer empowered by the Administrator, by the Administrator
himself.
Under the said provisions the Central Government or the
State Government or an officer on whom the power to detain is delegated can direct the detention of any person
if the detaining authority is satisfied that his detention is
necessary for one or other of the reasons mentioned in
r. 30. No grounds of detention need be served upon the
detenu; no opportunity need be given to him 'to make representations or establish his innocence. The period of detention can be indefinite. The Central Government or the
'1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Puniab
Subba Rao, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
844
[196"]
1963
State Government or the Administrator of a Union Territory, as the case may be, is authorised to review the order
M•k haR Sin th of detention made by them. So too, a detention order
v.
made by an officer empowered by the State Government
St«te of
Punj•b
in that behalf can be reviewed by one or other of the officers
mentioned in r. 30A (4).
Sdb• R•o, ].
It is contended that the said provisions infringe Art.
22( 4) and (5) of the Constitution and, therefore, void.
This Court in Deepchand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(')
laid down the effect of a law made in infringement of fun. damental . rights; and observed :
"The result of the aforesaid discussion may be
summarized in the following propositions; (i) whether the Constitution affirmatively confers powers on
the legislature to make laws subject-wise or negatively
prohibits it from infringing any fundamental right,
they represent only two aspects of want of legislatiTe
power; (ii) the Constitution in express terms make~
the power of a legislature to make laws in regard to
the entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule subject
to the other provisions of the Constituion and th.reby
circumscribes or reduces the said power by the limitations laid down in Part III of the Constitution; (iii) it
follows from the premises that a law made in derogation or in excess of that. power would be ab initio
void wholly or to the extent of the contravention, ~s
the case may be; .................... "
This view was accepted by a later decision of this Court
in Mahandra Lal v. State of U.P.( 2 ).
It is, therefore, manifest that if the Act and the rules
framed thereunder infringed the provisions of Art. 22(4)
and (5) of the Constitution, they would be ab initio void ;
they would be stillborn law and any detention made thereunder would be an illegal detention. Articles 21 and 22
enshrine fundamental rights relating to personal liberty.
Clauses ( 4) to ( 6) of Art. 22 specifically deal with preventive detention. This Court has held in A. K. Go palan
v. State of Madras(') that the word "law" in Art. 21 means
State-made law or enacted law and that Art. 22 lays down
only the minimum procedural conditions which such a
(
1
)
( 2)
[ 1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8, 40.
A.LR. 1963 S.C. 1019.
(') [ 1950] S.C.R. 88.
. ·)"
-
•
-1 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
&i5
a statutory law cannot infringe in the matter of preventive detention. The minimum conditions are as
follows: ( 1) Parliament may make a law prescribing the
maximum period for which any person may be detained ;
(2) he shall not be detained for a period more than 3
months unless an Advisory Board constituted for that
purpose reports before the expiry of three months that there
is sufficient cause for detention; and (3) the authority
,making the order shall communicate to such person the
grounds on which the order has been made and afford him
the earliest opportunity of making representations against
the order. At the same time cl. (7) enables Parliament
to make a law prescribing the circumstances under which
and the class or classes of cases in which a person may
be detained for a period longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board. Clause
( 6) of Art. 22 enables an authority not to disclose facts
to the detenu which it considers to be against the public
interest to disclose. While els. (4) to ( 6) of Art. 22 provide
for the minimum safeguards for a detenu in the matter of
preventive detention, cl. (7) removes them enabling Parliament to make a law for preventive detention ignoring practically the said safeguards. The only outstanding safeguard, therefore, is that Parliament can only make . a
law in derogation of the said safeguards by defining the
circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases
in which a person may be so detained. Parliament did not
make such a law.
Neither the Act nor the rules made thereunder satisfy
the conditions laid down in that clause. The Act and the
rules do not provide for the maximum period of detention,
for the communication to the detenu of the grounds of detention, for affording him an opportunity of making
representations against his detention, or for an Advisory Board consisting of persons with the requisite qualifications. The power to review given to the detaining authority cannot conceivably satisfy the condition of an Advisory Board provided for under cl. ( 4) (a) of Art. 22. It
is, therefore, a clear case of Parliament making a law in
direct infringment of the relevant provisions of Art. 22 of
the Constitution, and therefore the law so made is void
under the said Article.
1963
Ala!t,_haM Sinth
v.
State of
PNOj«b
SMbba Rao, /.
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
In this context a relevant aspect of the argument advanced by the learned Attorney-General may be noticed.
°Makhan Singh He contends that, on a true construction of Art. 359(1)
v.
of the Constitution, if the requisite order is made by the
State of
President, a law can be made in infringement of Art.
Punjab
22 of the Constitution. Under Art. 359, the President
Subba Rao, /. may by order declare tmt the right to move any court for
the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part
III as may be mentioned in the order shall remain suspendeq
for the period during which a Proclamation of Emergency
~ in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in
the order. It is contended that when remedy is suspended
in respect of infringement of Art. 22, the right thereunder
also falls with it. It is said that right and remedy are reciprocal; and if there cannot be a right without a remedy,
there cannot also be a remedy without a right. In "Salmond
on Jurisprudence", 11th Edn., the following interesting
passage is found, at p. 531, under the heading "Ubi /us !bi
'1963
-
Remedi11m";
"Whenever there is a right, there should also be
an action for its enforcement. That is to say, the substantive law should determine the scope of the law of
procedure, and not vice versa. Legal procedure should
be sufficiently elastic and comprehensive to afford the
requisite means for the protection of all rights which
the substantive law sees fit to recognize. In early
systems this is far from being the case. We there
find remedies and forms of action determining rights
than rights determining remedies. The maxim
of primitive law is rather, Ubi remedium ibi jus."
I understand this passage to mean that a right pertains
to the substantive law and the remedy, to procedural law;
that where a right is provided by a statute a remedy, though
not expressly provided for, may necessarily be implied. But
the conver~, though obtained in primitive law, cannot be
invoked in modern times. To put it in other words,
the suspension of a remedy cannot abrogate the right
itself. Indeed, a comparative study of Arts. 358 and 359
of the Constitution indicates that it could not have been
the intention of the makers of the Constitution, for Art.
3'58 expressly suspends the right whereas Art. 359 suspends
the remedy. If the contention of the -learned Attorney
(
~·
.4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
General be accepted, both have the same effect: if that was
the intention of the makers of the Constitution, they would
not have expressed themselves in different ways in the two
articles. Where they intended to suspend the right, they
expressly said so, and where they intended only to suspend
the remedy, they stated so. We cannot, therefore, accept
this contention.
At this stage I may also notice the argument of the
learned Attorney General that Art. 359, by enabling the
President to suspend the right to move for the enforcement
of the fundamental rights mentioned therein, impliedly
permitted Parliament to make laws in violation of those
fundamental rights in respect whereof the right to move
the court is suspended. I cannot appreciate this argument.
It is one thing to suggest that in view of the amplitude of
the phraseology used in Art. 359", the right to move for
the enforcement of fundamental rights infringed by a void
law, even deliberately made by Parliament, is suspended
but it is a different thing to visualize a situation when
the Constitution permitted Parliament under the shelter
of executive fiat to make void law•. Indeed, a comparison
of Art. 358 and Art. 359-I shall deal with them in detail
later on-indicates the contrary. I cannot for a moment
attribute to the august body, the Parliament, the intention
to make solemnly void laws. It may have made the present impugned Act bona fide thinking that it is sanctioned
by the provisions of the ConstitutiQn. Whatever it may be,
the result is, we have now a void Act on the statute
book and under that Act the appellants before us have
been detained illegally. To use the felicitous language
of Lord Atkin, in this country "amid the clash of arms,
the laws are not silent; they may be changed, but they
speak the same language in war as in peace". The tendency
to ignore the rule of law is contagious, and, if our Parliament, which unwittingly made a void law, not only a!lows
it to remain on the statute book, but also permits it to be
;idministered by the executive, the contagion may spread
to the people, and the habit of lawlessness, like other habits,
dies hard. Though it is not my province, I venture to suggest, if I may, that the Act can be amended in conformity
with our Constitution without it losing its effectiveness.
This leads m to the question whether the appellants,
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Subba Rao, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
848
1963
· M•kh•n Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Subba Rao, f.
[1964]
who are illegally detained, can move this Court under
Art. 32 of the Constitution or the High Court under Art.
226 thereof or under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter called the Code. It would be con venient at this stage to read the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
Article 32.(1) The right to move the Supreme
Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
"
"
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on
the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other Court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or
any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2).
( 4) The right guaranteed by this article shall
not be suspended except as otherwise provided for
by this Constitution.
Article. 226 (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout
the territories in reiation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including
in !appropriate cases any Government, within those
territories directions, orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part
III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court by
clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power
conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of
article 32.
Article 358. While a Proclamation of Emergency
is in operation nothing in article 19 shall restrict the
power of the State as defined in Part III to make any
law or to take any executive action which the State
would but for the provisions contained in the· Part
be competent to make or to take, but any law so made
shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have
effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate,
-
•.
'·
..
1
-
'4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
except as respects things done or omitted to be done
before the law so ceases to have effect.
Artie!~ 359
-
-
(1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare
that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III
as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings
pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights
so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamation is in force or for such
shorter period as may be specified in the order.
Article 33 confers power on Parliament to plodify the
rights conferred by Part III in their application to Armed
Forces or the Forces charged with the maintenance of public
order; Art. 34 enables Parliament to impose restrictions
on the rights conferred by Part III while martial law
is in force in any area.
The contention of learned counsel for the appellants
on the construction of the said provisions may be classified
under the following heads: (1) Art. 358 permits the State
to make laws only in infringement of Art. 19 of the Constitution, and Art. 359 suspends only the right to move the
enforcement of the fundamental rights specified in the President's Order and, therefore, Art. 359 cannot be so construed as to enlarge the legislative power of Parliament
beyond the limits sanctioned by Art. 358 and, therefore,
it should be confined only to executive infringements of
the said rights. (Z) Article 359 does not permit the
executive to commit fraud on the Constitution by
doing indirectly what Parliament cannot do directly under
Art. 358 and Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. (3) For invoking Art. 359 two conditions must be complied with,
namely, (i) the party shall have a right to move any court,
and (ii) only for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by Part III. Such a right to move for such a relief is expressly conferred by the Constitution under Art. 32. Therefore, the President's order under Art. 359 would only
suspend the right to move under Art. 32 and not for approaching the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In
any view, those words are inappropriate to a pre-existing
.i:atutory right under s. 491 of the Code.
1963
Uakh•• Siazh
Y.
Se.te of
Pu•i•b
850
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
· State of
Punjab
Subba Rao, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
To appreciate the contentions from a correct perspective it is necessary at the outset to notice the nature of the
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and the
remedy or remedies provided for their enforcement. It
would be pedantic to go into the question whether fundamental rights provided for under our Constitution are
natural rights or primordial rights : whatever their origin
might have been and from whatever source they might
have been extracted, they are enshrined in our Constitution in Part III and described as fundamental rights. The
constitution declared under Art. 13(2) that the State shall
not make any law taking away or abridging the said
rights and. any law made in contravention of this clause
shall be void to the extent of the contravention. After
declaring such a law void, it proceeds to provide for the
mode of enforcement of the said rights. Article 32 ( 1)
makes the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the said rights
a guaranteed right. Appropriate proceedings are described in cl. (2) thereof, that is fo say, a person can move the
'aid Court for directions, orders, or writs in the nature
described thereunder for the enforcement of any of the
said rights. The right to move, therefore, is regulated by
the procedure prescribed thereunder. Article 226, though
it does not find a place in Part III of the Constitution, confers a power on every High Court throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to
issue such directions, orders, or writs in the nature described thereunder for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III. There is a material difference between Art. 32 and Art. 226 of the Constitution, namely,
while in Art. 32 the right to move the court is guaranteed,
under Art. 226 no such guarantee is given. But a fair
construction of the provisions of Art. 226 indicates that
the right to move, though not guaranteed, is necessarily
implied therein. As I have pointed out, under Art. 32 the
right to move the Court is given a practical content
by the provision indicating the different modes open to the
person who has the said right to approach the Supreme Court. Article 226 employs the same procedure for
approaching ·the High Court and that procedure must
necessarily be for the exercise of the right to move that
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
1963
court. When a power is conferred upon the High Court
and a procedure is prescribed for a party to approach that
Makhan Singh
court, it is reasonable to imply that the person has a
v.
right to move that court in the manner prescribed thereState of
Punjab
under. The only difference between Art. 32 and Art. 226
is that the Supreme Court cannot say, if it is moved in
Subba Rao, /.
the manner prescribed, that it will not decide on merits,
but the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction can
do so. The decision on merits is left to its discretion,
though the exercise of that discretion is regulated by convention and precedent. Further, Art. 32(3) also enables
Parliament to make a law empowering any other court
to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all
or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under cl. (2) thereof. One thing to be noticed is that
Parliament can only empower any other court to exercise
any of the powers exercisable under cl. (2) ; it cannot
confer the guaranteed right mentioned in cl. (1) on any
person to move that court. That is to say, the court or
courts to which such powers are given would be in the
same position as the High Court in respect of the enforce- •
ment of the fundamental rights. To put it shortly,
no person will have a guaranteed right to move any such
other court for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
A discretionary jurisdiction similar to that of the High
Court can only be conferred on them. For the same reason given in the case of the High Court, an aggrieved
party will also have a right to move those courts in the
manner prescribed.
This analysis leads us to the following position :
Under the Constitution every person has a right to move,
for the enforcement of a fundamental right, the Supreme
Court, the High Courts or any other court or courts constituted by Parliament by law in the manner prescribed
t.e., by one or other of the procedural writs or directions
or orders described thereunder.
With this background let me have a close look at
the provisions of Art. 359. The expressions used in Art.
3'59 are clear and unambiguous. Three expressions stand
out in bold relief, namely, (i) "right to moye'', (ii) "any
Coun'', and (iii) "for the enforcement of such of the
rights conferred by Part III". "Any Court" implies more
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
than one court, but it cannot obviously be any court in
India, for it must be a court where a person has a right
M •khan Sin th
to move for the enforcement of the fundamental
v.
rights. It can, therefore, be only the Supreme Court, High
State of
Punjab
Court or the courts or 'courts constituted by Parliament
under Art. 32(3). If the contention of learned counsel for
Subba Rao, f.
the appellants be accepted, the expi:ession "court" should
be confined to the Supreme Court. But the Article does
not say either Supreme Court or that the right to move
is the guaranteed one under Art. 32(1). The next question is, what do the words "right to move" mean? The
right to move is qualified by the expression "for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III".
Therefore, the right to move must be a right to move the
Supreme Court or the High Court in the manner prescribed by Art. 32(2) or Art. 226(1) of the Constitution
for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. The words
in the second limb of the Article viz., that "all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the
rights so mentioned shall remain suspended" only relate
to the proceedings instituted in exercise of the said right :
they do not throw any light on the scope of the
"right to move". This construction gives full meaning to
every expression used in the Article. If so construed, it
can only mean that the temporary bar that can be imposed
by an order of the President is not confined only to the
guaranteed right of a p,erson to move the Supreme Court
for the enforcement of his fundamental rights, but also
extends to the right of a person to move the High Court
or the Court or Courts constituted by Parliament for the
enforcement of such of the fundamental rights as mentioned in the order. I would, therefore, hold that the President's order under Art. 359 suspending the right to move
any court in respect of specified fundamental rights includes not only the right to move under Art.· 32 but also
that under Art. 226.
The more difficult question is whether Art. 359 can
be so construed as to empower the President to suspend
all actions which a person may take under a statute or
common law, if he seeks thereby to protect his liberty
against unlawful encroachment by State or its of_fic~rs. To
put it in other words, can a person, who 1s 11\egaUy
1
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
1963
detained under a void law, approach the High Court under s. 491 of the Code or file a suit in a civil court for
M•khan Si•gh
damages for illegal confinement or take any other legal prov.
ceedings open to him? Learned Attorney General contends
State of
Punjab
that "any court" in Art. 359 means any court in India and
that th'e expression "enforcement of fundamental rights"
Subb• Rao, /.
implies any relief asked for by a party if the granting of
such relief involves directly or indirectly a decision on the
question whether any of the fundamental rights specified in the President's order has been infringed. This
argument, if I may say so, completely ignores the scheme
of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, a person may
have three kinds of rights, namely, (i) fundamental rights,
(ii) constitutional rights, and (iii) statutory or common law rights. Under Art. 32(1) a person has a fundamental right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement
of his fundamental rights; under Art. 226, a person
has a constitutional right to move the High Court for the
enforcement of the said rights. Parliament, by law, in
exercise of its powers conferred on it under Art. 245, may
confer a right on a person to move any court for a
relief wider in scope than that provided by Art. 32 or
Art. 226 of the Constitution. Though Parliament may
not have power, except in the cases specified to circumscribe the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III, it can
certainly make a law enlarging the content of the substantive and procedural rights of parties bevond those conferred by Part III. Under this category there may also
be laws made by competent authority before the commencement of the Constitution, but continued under Art.
3n, which do not any way infringe the fundamental
rights created by the Constitution. Section 491 of the
Code is one of the pre-Constitution statutory provisions
continued under Art. 372 of the Constitution. It does not
in terms posit any right to move the High Court for the
enforcement of fundamental rights. Therefore, the argument of the learned Attorney General involves considerable strain on the express language of Art. 359, for, he in
effect asks us to equate the expression "a right to
move for the enforcement of fundamental rights" with
any relief asked for in any proceedings in any court, whether initiated at the instance of the party affected or not,
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1%4]
1963
or whether started suo motu by the· court, if it involves
a decision on the question whether a particular law was
Makhan Singh
void
for the reason thoi.t it infringed the fundamental rights
v.
mentioned in the President's order. In support of this
State of
contention he presses on us to hold that in .days of stress
Puniab
and strain i.e., when there is a threat of war and conse· Subba Rao, /. quently an emergency is declared, a court has to adopt
the principle of "strained construction" which will achieve the object behind Art. 359 of the Constitution and
the order issued by the President. I shall briefly examine
the decisions cited by him to ascertain whether any such
novel doctrine of construction of statutes exists.
Rex v. Halliday(') is a decision of the House of Lords
made in '1917 i.e., during the First World War. Regulation 14B of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation)
Regulation, 1914, empowered the Secretary of State to
order the internment of any person of hostile origin or
associations, where on the recommendation of a competent naval or military authority it appeared to him expedient for securing the public safety or the defence of the
realm. This regulation was authorized by the Defence
of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, s. 1, sub-section 1.
The House of Lords, by a majority, held that the Act conferred upon the King-In-Council power, during the
continuance of the war, to issue regulations for securing the
public safety and the defence of the realm and, therefore, the regulation was valid. It was urged there that
no such restraint of personal liberty should be imposed
except as a result of judicial enquiry. It was also contended that if the Legislature intended to interfere with personal liberty it should have provided for suspending
the right of the subject as to the writ of heabeas corpus.
The argument was negatived. Lord Atkin observed :
"The subject retains every right which those
statutes confer upon him to have tested and determined in a Court of law, by means of a writ of
Habeas Corpu~, addressed to the person in whose custody he may be, the legality of the order or warrant
by virtue of which he is given into or kept in that
custody. If. the Legislature chooses to enact that he
can be deprived of his liberty and incarcerated or
(') L.R. 1917 A.C. 260, 272.
·?•"'•
..
4 S.C.R.
-
(~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
1963
interned for certain things for which he could not
have been heretofore incarcerated or interned, that enSingh
actment and the orders made under it, if intra vires, Makhan
v.
do not infringe upon the Habeas Corpus Acts in any
State of
way whatever, to take away any rights conferred by
Punjab
Magna Charta, for the simple reason that the Act
Subba Rao, /,
and these Orders become part of the law of the
land."
This decision does not lay down any new rule of construction. Parliament is supreme in England. It its wisdom it did not take away the habeas corpus, but empowered the executive to issue regulations for public safety
and defence of the nation. The regulation made did not
exceed the power conferred by the Parliament. The
House of Lords held that the detention was in accordance
with law.
Nor does the controversial decision in Liverside v.
Sir fohn Anderson('), which was the subject of servere
criticism in later years, lay down any such new rule of
construction. There, the Secretary of State, acting in good
faith under reg. lSB of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, made an order in which he recited that he had
reasonable cause to believe a person to be of hostile
associations and that by reason thereof it was necessary to
exercise control over him and directed that that person
be detained. The validity of the detention turned upon
the construction of the express provisions of reg. 18B of
the said Regulations. In that regulation the expression used was "reasonable cause to believe any person to
be of hostile origin". The House of Lords, by a majority,
held that the expression meant that "the Secretary of State
t~mks fit to be reasonable". There was a powerful
dis.sent by Lord Atkin on the question of construction.
With the correctness of the construction put upon by the
majority on the said provision we are not concerned ·
but none of the learned law Lords laid down in thei;
speeches any new rule of construction peculiar to war conditions. Viscount Maugham observed :
''.My Lords, I think we should approach the constru.ct10n o'. reg. lSB of the Defence (General) Regulat10ns without any general presumption as to its
-(1) L.R.!9-i2A.C. 2ois,-219, 251.
856
1963
M •khan Sin gk
...
St•U of
Punjab
Subb• Rao, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
meaning except the universal presumption, applicable to Orders in Council and other like instruments,
that, if there is a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, we should prefer a construction which will carry into effect the plain intention
of those responsible for the Order in Council rather
than one which will defeat that intention."
Lord Atkin, in his dissenting judgment, protested against
the strained construction put on words with the effect of
giving an uncontrolled power of imprisonment to the
minister. Then he proceeded to observe :
"The words have only one meaning. They are
used with that mea~ning in statements of the common
law and iri statutes. They have never been used in the
sense now imputed to them."
These observations by the dissenting Lord may at the most
indicate that the majority in fact put a strained comtruction on the express words used in the regulation;
but they do not show that they have laid down any such
rule of construction. This is made clear by Lord Macnlillan when he stated:
"In the first place, it is important to have in mind
that the regulation in question is a war measure. This
is not to say that the courts ought to adopt in
wartime canons of construction different from tho~e
which they follow in peace time. The fact that the
nation is at war is no justification for any relaxation
of the vigilance of the courts in seeing that the bw
is duly observed, especially in a matter so fundamental as the liberty of the subject-rather the contrary. But in a time of emergency when the life of
the whole nation is at stake it may well be that a
regulation for the defence of the realm may quite
properly have a meaning which because of its drastic invasion of the liberty of the subject the courts
would be slow to attribute to a peace time measure.
The purpose of the regulation is to ensure public
safety, and it is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to promote rather than to defeat its efficacy
for the defence of the realm. That is in accordance
with a general rule applicable to the interpretation of
-
_,
-
4 S.C.R.
--
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
1963
all statutes or st:i.tutory regulations in peace time as
well as in war time."
Singh
These observations should be understood in the back- Ma~han
v.
ground of the earlier observation :
State of
"I do not agree that the critical phrase in the conPuniab
text in which I find it is susceptible only of one meanSuhba Rao, f.
ing, namely that for which the appellant contends.
Were it so it would be strange that several learned
Judges should have found it to possess quite a difl'er. "
ent meamng.
This judgment, therefore, is no authority for the position
for which it is relied upon. The decision in substance says that the rule of construction of a statute is the
same both in peace time and in war time and that when
there is :i.n ambiguity in the expressions used, the court
may give such meaning to the words used which arc capable of bearing that meaning as would promote rather than
defeat the object of the legislation. Indeed, the Privy
Council, in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratna('), confined the
interpretation put upon reg. 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, by a majority of the House of
Lords to the particular cricumstanccs of that case :i.nd they
did not accept that construction when similar words were
used in the Regulation 62 of the Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulations, 1945. I c:i.nnot, therefore, hold that
the said decisions suggested a new rule of construction
peculiar to war measures. The rules of construction are
the same in war time as well as in peace time. The fundamental rule of construction is that the courts have to
find out the expressed intention of the Legislature from
the words of the enactment itself. Where the language
is unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound
those words. in their natural and ordinary sense. But
where the words are ambiguous and reasonably capable
of bearing two meanings, the court may be justified in
adopting that meaning which would further the intention of the Legislature rather than that which would defeat it.
In the present case we are not dealing with a war
measure, but a constitutional provision which was designed to govern the afl'airs of our country for all times so
1
( )
L.R. 1 (1951] A.C. 66.
55-2 SC lndia/64.
858
1963
M«khan Sinzh
v.
Stat< of
Punjab
Subba Rao, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
long the Constitution remains in force ; and it cannot
certainly be strained to meet a passing phase in a country's
life. A strained construction put upon a statutory provison to meet a particular emergency may be rectified by a
subsequent enactment. But such a construction put upon
a constitutional provision might entail serious consequences. Even if Liversidge's case(') had laid down a new
rule of construction, that construction cannot be invoked
in the case of a constitntional provision.
In Gibbons v. Ogden(') the following rule of construction of a constitutional provision is stated :
"That which the words declare is the meaning of
an instrument ; and neither Courts nor legislatures
have the right to add or to take away from that meaning. This is true of every instrument, but when
we are speaking of the most solemn and ddiberate of
all human writings those which ordain the fundamental law of states, the rule rises to a very high degree of significance. It must be very plain, nay absolutely certain, that the people did not intend what the
language they have employed in its natural signification, imports, before a Court will feel itself at liberty
to depart from the plain reading of a constitutional pro.. "
v1s10n.
No doubt a constitution should receive a fair, liberal and
progressive construction so that the true objects of the
instrument may be promoted ; but such a construction
could not do violence to the natural meaning of the words
used in particular provision of the Constitution.
The relevant provisions of s. 491 of the Code read :
(1) Any High Court may, whenever it thinks fit,
. direct(a) that a person within the limits of its appellate
criminal jurisdiction be brought up before the
Court to be dealt with according to law ;
(b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in
public or priv"te custody within such limits be set
at liberty ;
*
*
*
*
*
*
Bearing in mind the said rules of construction, I ask
myself the question whether the exercise of the power un(1) [1942] A.C. 206.
( 2 ) (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23.
-
,.
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
859
der s. 491 of the Code can be equated with a right to
move the High Court to enforce such of the fundamental
rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution as may be
mentioned in the order of the President. It is nece~sary
to ascertain the correct scope of the section to answer
the question raised before us. The section is framed in
wide terms and a discretionary power is conferred on
the High Court to direct one or other of the things mentioned therein "whenever it thinks fit". Unlike Art. 32
and Art. 226, the exercise of the power is not channelled
through well recognized procedural writs or orders. With
the result the technicalities of such procedural writs
do not govern or circumscribe the court's discretion. A
short history of this section reinforces the said view.
Originally, the Supreme Courts in India purported to exercise the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus which the
Kings' Bench Division in England exercised. In 1861 Parliament passed Acts 24-25 Viet. Ch. 104 authorising the
establishment of High Courts of Judicature in India. The
Letters Patents issued under that Act in 1865 were
expressly made subject to the legislative powers of the
Governor-General in Council. The courts were given the
same jurisdic,tion, power and authority which the Supreme
Courts possessed but subject to the legislative power of
the Governor-General in Council. Pursuant to the power
so conferred, the Governor-General in Council passed successive Codes of Criminal Procedure in the years 1872,
1875, 1882 and 1898, and in 1923 by the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, some of the provisions of the Code
of 1898 were amended. The High Courts Act of 1861 authorized the Legislature, if it thought fit, to take away
the powers which the High Courts exercised as successor
to the Supreme Courts, and Acts of Legislatures passed in
1872 and subsequent years had taken away the power of
the High Courts to issue prerogative writs ; and instead
a statutory power precisely defined was conferred upon the
High Courts. That statutory power underwent various
changes and finally took the form of s. 491 of the Code,
as at present it stands. The attempt to resuscitate the
prerogative writs was rejected by the Calcutta High Court
in Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal(') and
(1) (1927) 1.L.R. 54 Col. 727.
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Subba Rao, /.
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1963
by the Madras High Court in' District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai('). The Privy Council
Makhan Singh
Matten v. District. Magistrate, Trivandrum( 2 ) approvin
v.
ed the said decisions and hdd that the said Acts
State of
Punjab
have taken away the power of the High Courts to issue
prerogative writs and thereafter the only power left m
Subba Rao, f . . the High Court was that conferred by the statute. By
reason of Art. 372 of the Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure, including s. 491 thereof, continued to be
in force until altered, repealed or amended by the competent Legislature or other competent authority. Article
225 of the Constitution expressly preserved the High
Courts' powers and jurisdiction, subject to other provisions
thereof. Admittedly, Parliament has not made any law
repealing s. 491 of the Code. The statutory power conferred on the High Courts under that section is not inconsistent either Art. 32 or with Art. 226 or with any
other Article in Part III or any other Chapter of the Constitution. So, it cannot be held that s. 491 of the Code
has been impliedly superseded by Art. 226 even to the
extent .it empowers the High Court to give relief to persons illegally detained by the State. Now what is the
scope of that section? Though s. 491 of the Code 1s
remedial in form, it postulates the existence of the substantive right. In India, as in England, the rule of law
was the accepted principle. No person can be deprived
of his liberty except m the manner prescribed by the
law of the land. If a person is illegally or improperly
detained in violation of the law of the land, the High
Court can direct his release "whenever it thinks fit" so
to do. The section prima facie does not predicate a formal application ; nor does it insist that any particular
person shall approach it. The phraseology usec\ 1s
wide enough for the exercise of the power suo motu by
the High Court. Nor does the section introduce an antithesis between the exercise of jurisdiction on application
and that exercised suo motu; that is to say, even if an application was filed before the High Court and for one
reason or other, no orders could. be passed thereon, either
because of procedural defect or because it was not pressed,
( 1)
( 2)
LL.R. 1939 Mad. 708.
L.R. ( 1939) 66 IA. 222.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
nothing prevents the High Court from acting suo motu
on the basis of the information brought to its notice. It
is said that various High Courts framed rules regulating
the procedure of the respective High Courts, but that fact
is not much relevance in the matter of construing the
section. Shortly stated, the High Court is given an absolute discretion to direct a person, who has been illegally
detained, to be released, whenever that fact is brought to
its notice through whatever source it may be. This jurisdiction existed long before the Constitution was made and
long before the fundamental rights were conferred upon
the people under the Constitution. The rights, substantive as well as procedural, conferred under Part III and
Art. 226 on the one hand and under s. 491 of the Code
on the other, are different. Under Arts. 32 and 226, an
affected party can approach the Supreme Court or the
High Court, as the case may be, only in the manner prescribed under Art. 32(2) or Art. 226 i.e., by way of
writs and orders mentioned therein : he must ask the
court for the enforcement of this fundamental right. The
relief implies that he must establish that he has a fundamental right, that his fundamental right has been infringed by the State and, therefore, the Court should give
the appropriate relief for the enforcement of that right.
Both the right as well as the procedure are the creatures
of the Constitution. Whereas s. 491 of the Code assumes
the existence of the "rule of law" and confers a power on
the High Court to direct persons in illegal detention
to be set at liberty. It is not bound by any technical procedures envisaged by the Constitution. If a person approaches the High Court alleging that he or some other
person has been illegally detained, the Court calls upon
the detaining authority to sustain the validity of the action. The onus of proof lies on the custodian to establish
that the person is detained under a legal process ; but if
it fails to establish that the person is detained under
law, the said person may be released. It is true that
the detaining authority will have to satisfy the court. that
the law under which the detention is made is a valid one.
It may also be true that in scruti.iiizing the '(alidity
of that law the court has to go into the question whether
the law offrnds any of the fundamental rights mentioned
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Subba Rao, /.
862
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964J
I
1963
in Part III of the Constitution. But that circumstance
does not by any process of involved reasoning make the
Makhan Singh said proceeding one initiated in exercise of the right to
v.
move the High Court for the enforcement of the petiState of
tioner's fundamental right. The distinction between the two
Punjab
lies in the fact that one is an enforcement of a petiSubba Rao, /. tioner's fundamental right and the other, a decision on
the unconstitutionality of a law because of its infringement
of fundamental rights generally.
Further, the right and the relief have a technical and
specific significance given to them by the Constitution. They cannot be equated with the mode of approach
to the High Court under s. 491 of the Code or with the
nature of ,the relief that can be given thereunder. The
expression "whenever it thinks fit" confers an absolute
discretion on the court to exercise its power thereunder
or not to do so, having regard to the circumstances of
each case. While the word "may" used in a statute was
sometimes construed as imposing a duty on the authority
concerned on whom a power is conferred to exercise the
same if the circumstances necessitated its exercise, the
expression "whenever it thinks fit" does not warrant any
such limitation on its absolute discretion. Though ordinarily a High Court may safely be relied upon to
exercise its powers when the liberty of a citizen is illegally violated by any authority, the said unlimited discretion certainly enables it in extraordinary circumstances to
refuse to come to his rescue. The absolute discretionary jurisdiction conferred under s. 491 of the Code
cannot be put on a par with the jurisdiction conferred
under Art. 226 of the Constitution hedged in by constitutional limitations. A brief reference to decided cases on
the scope of s. 491 of the Code will make my meaning
clear.
In Alam Khan v. The Crown('), the Full Bench of
the Lahore High Court has defined the scope of s. 491 of
the Code. Ram Lall, J., who spoke for the majority,
stated, after quoting the relevant part of the section :
"The language of the section places no limit on
the class of person or persons who can move a High
Court with relation to a person in custody and if the
( 1 ) (1947) I.L.R. 28 Lahore 274, 303.
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4 S.C.R.
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-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
863
1963
High Court on hearing the petition thinks fit to do
so, may make an order that he be dealt with accordMakhan Singh
ing to law."
v.
In Ramji Lal v. The Crown('), a Full Bench decision of
State of
the East Punjab High Court, Mahajan, J., as he then was,
Punjab
defined the wide scope of the section thus :
Subba Rao, /.
"Whatever may be the state of English law on the
subject so far as section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code is concerned it has been very widely worded and confers jurisdiction on the Court to issue directions whenever it thinks fit. The Court may be
moved by the prisoner or by some relation of his, or
it may act suo motu if it acquires knowledge that a
certain person has been illegally detained. The mode
and manner in which the Judge has to be satisfied
cannot affect the jurisdiction conferred on him under
section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code."
In King Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande('), a police
officer made an arrest of the respondents under sub-rule
1 of r. 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, which
read : "Any police officer . . . . . . . . may arrest without
warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects of having acted . . . . . . . . (a) in a manner prejudicial to the
public safety or to the efficient prosecution of the war."
The Judicial Committee held that the burden was upon
the police officer to prove to the satisfaction of a court
before whom the arrest was challenged that he had reasonable grounds of suspicion and that if he failed to
discharge that burden, an order made by the Provincial
Government under sub-rule 4 of r. 129 for the temporary
custody of the detenu was invalid. As the police officer
failed to discharge the onus, the Privy Council held
that the High Court was right in ordering the release
of the person from custody under s. 491 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. This shows that when a person is detained by a police officer, the burden of establishing that
the detention is valid is on him.
These authorities well establish that s. 491 of the
Code does not contemplate any right to move a court
by any affected party, but the court can exercise the
(') l.L.R. ( 19~9) II E.P. 28, 54.
2
( )
(1946) L.R. 73 I.A. IH.
864
1963
Makhan Singh
v.
State of
Punjab
Subba Rao, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
statutory power whenever it thinks fit, if the fact of illegal
detention of a person is brought to its notice.
The problem may be approached from a slightly different perspective. Three questions may be posed,
namely, (1) has any person the right to move the High
Court under s. 491 of the Code to enforce his fundamental right? (2) would it be necessary for a person detained or
any other on his behalf to allege that the detenu has a fundamental right and that it has been infringed by State
action and seek a relief for enforcement of that right?
(3) would it be obligatory on the Court to enforce the right
if the said right had been established? All the questions must be answered in the negative. Under s. 491
of the Code there is neither a right in the person detained to move the High Court for the enforcement of the
fundamental right nor there is an obligation on the part
of the High Court to give the said relief. It is only a
discretionary jurisdiction conceived as a check on arbitrary action.
·
There is another aspect of the question. Article 359
has nothing to do with statutory powers conferred by
Parliament. Article 359 expressly deals with the constitutional right _to move a court and the constitutional enforcement of that right. So far as ordinary laws are
concerned, Parliament can always amend the law, having
regard to the circutµstances obtaining at a particular point
of time ; for instance, Parliament could have amended s. 491 of the Code by repealing that section altogether
or by suitably amending it. Briefly stated, Art. 359
provides for the suspension of some constitutional rights
in . the manner prescribed thereunder. The statutory
rights are left to be dealt with by the appropriate Legislature in exercise of the powers conferred on them. · The
argument that the intention of the makers of the Constitution in enacting Art. 359 would be defeated, if s. 491 of the
Code .was salvaged, does not appeal to me. If Parliament
had amended s. 491 of the Code, which it should have
done if -it intended to do. so, this. alleged anomaly pointed out by the learned Attorney General. could not have
arisen. I would, therefore, hold that the expression
"right to move any Court for t~~ enforcem~i:t of such of
the rights conferred by Part III could legiumately refer
'r
-
-
4 S.C.R.
-/;,
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
1963
only to the right to move under Art. 32 or Art. 226 of •
the Constitution for the said specific relief and could not
Mak han Singh
be applied without doing violence to the language
v.
used to the exercise of the statutory power conferred on
State of
Punjab
the High Courts under s. 491 of the Code. If that be
so, the expression "all proceedings pending in any Court
Subba Rao, /.
for the enforcement of the rights" used in the second
limb of Art. 359 must also necessarily refer to proceedings initiated in exercise of the right to move envisaged
in the first limb of the article.
I shall now proceed to consider some of the minor
points raised at the Bar. Another argument advanced
on behalf of the respondents may also be briefly noticed.
It is said that while Art. 358 maintains the legislative incompetency to make laws in derogation of •fundamental rights other than those enshrined in Art. 19, Art, 359
enables the President by an indirect process to enlarge the
said legislative competency and, therefore, Art. 359
must be so read as to confine its scope only to executive
acts. I cannot agree. Article 359 does not ex facie enlarge the legis~ative competency of Parliament or a State
Legislature. It does not enable them to. make laws
during the period covered by the order of the President
infringing the fundamental rights mentioned therein.
It does not empower the Legislatures to make void laws ;
it only enables the President to suspend the right to move
the Court during the period indicated in his order.
Once that period expires, the affected party can move
the Court in the manner prescribed· by the Constitution.
Despite Art. 358 it may happen that void laws are made
and executive actions are taken inadvertently or otherwise ; and Art. 359 is really intended to put off the enforcement of the rights of the people affected by those
laws and actions till the expiry of the President's order.
The invalidity of the argument would be clear if it was
borne in mind that Art. 358 also saved executive acts
infringing Art. 19, but nonetheless Art. 359 gave protection against the exercise of the right ·to move. any court
in respect of such acts not saved by Art. 358. If the infringement of fundamental rights by executive action not
saved by Art. 358 could not be a basis for the exercise of a right to move during the period of suspension,
866
SUPREME COURT KEPORTS
[1964]
1963
by the same token, laws not saved by Art. 358 could not
equally be the basis for such an action during the said
Makhan Singh
period. Be it as it may, the phraseology of Art. 359 is
v.
wide enough to comprehend laws made in violation of
State of
Punjab
the specified fundamental rights.
Another argument advanced is, while Art. 358 read
Subba Rao, /.
with Art. 13(1) and (2), maintained the constitutional
position that all laws infringing fundamental rights other
than that enshrined in Art. 19 would be void during the
emergency, the President by issuing the order he did,
indirectly, in effect and substance, validated the laws infringing Arts. 14, 21 and 22, and, therefore, the issuing
of the said order must be held to be a fraud on
his powers. This argument has no merits. It is based
upon a misapprehension of the doctrine of fraud on powers. In the context of the application of the doctrine
to a statutory law, this Court observed in Gullapally
Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport. Corporation (1) thus :
"The legislature can only make laws within its
legislative competence. Its legislative fielc may be
circumscribed by specific legislative entrie.· or limited
by fundamental rights created by the Constitution.
The legislature cannot overstep the field of its competency, directly or indirectly. The Court will scrutinize the law to ascertain whether the legislature by
device purports to make a law which, though in form
appears to be within its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond it. If, in fact it has power
to make the law, its motives in making the law arc
irrelevant."
To the same effect are the observations in Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa( 2 ). On the same analogy,
the President cannot overstep the limits of his power
defined under Art. 359 of the Constitution. So long as
he does not exceed his power, the .effect of his order made
within bounds could not conceivably sustain the plea of
fraud on powers. Fraud on power implies that a power
not conferred is exercised under the cloak of a power
conferred. But if an act can legitimately be referred to
a power conferred, the intention of the person exercising
(') [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 319, 329.
( 2 ) [1954] S.C.R. I.
'-.
.
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4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
867
1963
the power or the effect of his exercise of the power is irrelevant. Now, on the construction placed by me on Art.
Makhan Singh
359, the President has clearly the constitutional power
v.
to suspend the aforesaid right. The fact that Parliament
State of
by taking shelter under that order may enforce void laws
Punjab
cannot make a valid exercise of a power of the President
Subba Rao, f.
one in fraud of his power.
The next argument is that the order issued by the
President is in excess of the powers conferred under Art.
359 of the Constitution. Under Art. 359, the argument
proceeds, the order made by the President can relate to
a period or the whole or a part of the territory of India
and cannot be confined to a class of persons. As the order
is restricted to persons that have been deprived of their
rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, it is said
that it is not sanctioned by the provisions of Art. 359.
There are no merits in this contention. Under the order
the right to move for the enforcement of the rights mentioned therein is suspended during the period of emergency
and it applies to the entire country. The fact that only
persons, who are deprived of their rights under the Defence
of India Ordinance, cannot exercise their right to move
the Court does not make the order one confined to a
class of persons. The Ordinance has force thronghour
India and ex hypothesi only persons affected would move
the Court. That does not mean that the order is confined
only to a class of persons.
The next contention is that the impugned section suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and that in any
view the relevant rules framed are in excess of the power
conferred upon the Government by the said Act. I
cannot agree with either of the two contentions. On this
aspect I have nothing more to add to that found in the
judgment of my learned brother.
But the order made by the President still leaves the
door open for deciding some questions even under Art.
32 or Art. 226 of the Constitution. The order is a conditional one. In effect it says that the right remains suspended if such person has been deprived of any such right under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962, or under any
rule or order made thereunder. The condition is that the
person should have been deprived of a right under the
868
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
Defence of India Ordinance or under any rule or order
made thereunder. If a person was deprived of such a right
Makhan Singh
not under the Ordinance or a rule or order made therev.
under, his right would not be suspended. If the order was
State of
made in excess of the power conferred upon the GovernPunjab
ment by the said Ordinance, it would not be covered by
Subba Rao, /.
that order. If the detention was made mala fide, it would
equally be not an order made under the Ordinance.
My view on the basis of the aforesaid discussion may
be stated thus : ( 1) The detenus cannot exercise their
right to enforce their fundamental rights under Arts. 21,
22 and 14 of the Constitution, during the period for which
the said right was suspended by the President's order.
(2) This does not preclude the High Court to release the
detenus in exercise of its power under s. 491 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, if they were imprisoned under a void law, though the voidness of the law arose out
of infringement of their fundamental rights under Arts.
14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. (3) The President's
order does not preclude, even under Art. 32(1) and Art.
226 of the Constitution, the petitioners from proving that
the orders of detention were not made under the Defence
of India Ordinance or the Act either because they were
made, (i) outside the provisions of the Ordinance of the
Act, or (ii) in excess of the power conferred under them,
or (iii) the detention were made mala fide or due to a
fraudulent exercise of power.
I would close with a few observations. In the view
I have taken, there are three courses open to Parliament :
either it can make a valid law without infringing the fundamental rights other than those enshrined in Art. 19
or amend s. 491 of the Code in order to maintain the enforcement of void laws, or do both. It is not ,for me to
suggest the right course.
In the result, the petitions will now go to the Constitution Bench for disposal on the said questions.
· ORDER BY COURT
In' accordance with the opinion of the majority the
constitutional points raised in the Appeals are dismissed.
Appeals to be set down individu·ally before a Constitution
·Berich for dealing with the. other• contentions raised in each
one of them.
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