S. PRATAP SINGH versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 September 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 733 | 1963 INSC 189
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 September 1963
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 80/1963
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 733
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 189
Text of the judgment
4 S.C.R.
.. ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
S. PRATAP SINGH
1963
v.
September 2
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(S. K. DAS, K. SOBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND
J. R. MuoHOLKAR, JJ.)
Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952,
rr. 3, 26(d), 8, 15-Grant of leave-Power to revoke-Date of
I.eave preparatory to retiren1ent-lf date of retirement-Conimunication of revocation after retirement-When effective-Right to
retire-Restriction on-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 19 and
23-Valzdity of r. 326( d).
-
'
Tape Record of Conversations-ff
legal
evidence-Weight
of.
Government-Order of revocation of leave and suspe:is.·on of
Civil Servant-Potver exercised mala fide and on extraneous considerations-High Court-Jurisdiction to interfere under Art. 226
of the Constitution.
The appellant \Vas a civil surgeon in the employ1nent of the
State of Punjab having joined the Punja!.> Civil Medical Service
in 1947. In 1956 he was posted to jullunder where he remained
till he proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement sometin1e in
December 1960. His leave was sanctioned on December 18, 1960,
and \Vas notified in the Punjab Gazette dated January 27, 1961.
On June 3, 1961, the Governor of Punjab passed orders suspending the appellant \Vith im1nediate effect and revoking his
leave as the Governn1ent had decided that a departmental enquiry
be instituted against him under s. 7 of the Punjab Civil Services
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. The Governor further
passed an order under r. 3.26( d) by \vhich "A government servant under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be
. . . . . . . . . . . . permitted to retire on his reaching the date of compulsory retiren1ent but should be retained in service until the
enqui;y into the charge is concluded and a - final order is passed
thereon." The order under r. 3.26(d) was that in view of the
appellant's reaching the age of superannuation on June 16 1961
h.e should be retained in service beyond that date till the ~01nple~
tlon of the departmental enquiry. These orders reached the appella.nt, ac~ording to .him, only on June 19, 1961, but they were
published 10 the Pun1ab Governn1ent Gazette Extraordinary dated
June 10, 1961. By a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the
Constitution of India before the High Court of Punjab, the appellant challenged the. leg~lity of the orders of suspension, revoc~tlon of .lea\:e, :etent1on 1n service after the date of superannua~1on an~ 1nstitutton of the departmental enquiry, on the grounds
inter a/ta, ( 1) that the rules governing his service did not empow7r the Governor to pass the impugned orders, and (2) that
the impugned orders were passed ma/a fide by or at the instance
734
1963
S. P<alap Singh
v.
The State of
Puniab
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
of the Chief Minister, who was in-charge of the department of
Health and who 'vas personally hostile to him by reason of cer·
tain incidents, and that the orders were promoted by the desire
on the part of the Chief Minister to wreak personally his vengeance
on the appellant.
HELD : (i) Under r. 8.15 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules there is no restriction on the power
of revocation of leave with respect to the time when it is to be
exercised, and the authority empowered to grant leave has the dis·
cretion to revoke it even after the officer to whon1 leave had been
sanctioned had proceeded on leave.
(ii) The date from which a Government servant is on leave
preparatory to retir.:n1ent cannot be treatCd as the date of his re·
tirement from service, and an order of suspension of the Government servant during such leave is valid.
(iii) Though the orders of suspension and revocation dated
June 3, 1961, were actually com1nunicated to the appellant only
after the date of his retirement, since he was on leave the said
orders were effective frOm the 1noment they were issued.
Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1963 S.C. 395 and
State of .Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh. [1961] 2 S.C.R. 371, distinguished.
(iv) The appe.llant had no absolute right to opt for retirement on his attain~ng the age of superannuation, that any such
option was subject to r. 3.26( d) which applied to him and that
his case came under that rule as he was on the date of his compulsory retirement under suspension on charges of misconduct.
( v) Whenever any charge of misconduct is under enquiry by
the Government, be it informally or formally, the Government is
competent to suspend the Government servant and, if the requirements of the case require, to take action under s. 3.26( d).
(vi) The provisions of r. 3.26( d) do not contravene Arts. 19
and 23 of the Constitution of India.
(vii) Rendering of the tape recorded conversation can be
legal evidence by ~ray of corroborating the state1nents of a person who deposes that the other speaker and he carried on that
conversation or even of the statement of a person who may depose that he overheard the conversation between the two persons
and what they actually stated had been tape recorded. Weight
to be given to such evidence will depend on the other factors which
may be established in a particular case.
Per Das, Subba Rao and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.-(i) Where
an authority exercising a power has taken into account as a
relevant factor so1nething which it could not properly take into
account, the exercise of the power would be bad. Where the
purposes sought to be achieved are mixed, some relevant and some
alien to the purpose, the difficulty is resolved by finding the
'" ..
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'
4 S.C.R
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'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
dominant purpose which impelled the action, and where; the power
itself is conditioned by a purpose, the courts would invalidate the
exercise of the power when an irrelevant purpose is proved to have
entered the mind of the authority .
(ii) The Court is not an appellate forum where the correctness of an order of Government could be canvassed and it has
no jurisdiction to substitute its own vie\v as to the necessity or
desirability of initiating disciplinary proceedings, for the entirety
of the power, jurisdiction in that regard is vested in law in the
Government. The only question which could be considered by
the court is whether the authority vested with the power has
paid attention to or taken into account circumstances, events or
matters wholly extraneous to the purpose for which the power was
vested, or whether the proceedings have been initiated mala fide
for satisfying a private or personal grudge of the authority against
the officer. If the act is in excess ot the power granted or is an
abuse or misuse of power, the matter is capable of interference and
rectification by the Court.
(iii) It is not correct to say that mala fides in the sense of
improper motive could be established only by direct evidence,
that is, that it must be discernible from the order impugned or
must be shown from the noting in the file which preceded that
order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same can be de·
duccd as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts.
Municipal Council of Sydney v. Cambell, [1925] A.C. 338,
Short v. Poole Corporation, [ 1926] 1 Ch. 66, Vatcher v. Paull,
[1915] A.C. 372, Sadler v. Shefield Corporation, [1924] 1 Ch. 483,
Earl Fitzwilliam v. Minister of T. &- C. Plonning, [1951] 2 K. B.
284 and General Assembly of Free Church v. Overatoun, [1904]
A.C. 515, relied on.
Per Dayal and Mudholkar, JJ. (dissenting). On the facts,
the dominant motive which induced the Government to take ac·
tion against the appellant was not to take disciplinary proceedings against him for misconduct \Vhich it bona fide believed he
had committed, but to wreak vengeance on him for incurring his
wrath and for the discredit that he had brought on the Chief
Minister; the impugned orders were vitiated by mala fides,
in that they were motivated by an improper purpose which was
outside that for which the power of discretion was conferred on
Government; and the said orders revoking the leave granted and
placing the appellant under suspension and directing an enquiry
into the charges against him, should be set aside.
Quaere. whether the provision in Art. 310(1) of the Constitution of India that "members of a Civil Service of a State hold
office during the pleasure of the Governor", conferred a power on
the State Government to compel an officer to continue in service
of the State against his will apart from service Rules which might
govern the matter even after the age of superannuation \Vas
reached.
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
736
. 1963
"· of
The State
Ayyangar, /.
[1964]
Crv1L APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 80
S. Pratap Singh
Punjab
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~
of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 4,
1962, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 961 of
!- ••
1961.
The appellant appeared in person.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Mohinder Singh
Punnu, Deputy Advocate-General, Punjab and B. R. G. K.
Achar for P. D. Menon, for the respondent.
September 2, 1963. The judgment of S. K. Das, K.
Subba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. The dissenting Opinion of Raghubar Dayal and J. R. Mudholkar, JJ., was
deli11ered by Raghubar Dayal, J.
AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal is against a judgment of
the High Court, Punjab, dismissing a petition filed by the
appellant in that Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution
and has been preferred pursuant to a certificate of fitness
granted under Art. 133(1) (c).
The appellant was a Civil Surgeon in the employment
of the State Government who had been granted leave preparatory to retirement, and subsequently, in June 1961,
orders were passed by Government (1) revoking the
leave he had originally been granted and recalling him to
duty, (2) simultaneously placing him under suspension
pending the result of an inquiry into certain charges of
misconduct, and (3) ordering a departmental inquiry against
.him. The legality of these orders was challenged by the
appellant in tlie petition that he filed in the High Court.
The petition was dismissed by the learned Judges, but on
application by the appellant, he was granted a certificate
of fitness on the strength of which he has filed the present
appeal.
The facts of the case leading up to the appeal before us
are set out by our learned Brother Dayal, J. in his judgment
fully and in great detail and so we have thought it unnecessary to cumber this ju<lgment with them. Two points were
urged before us by the appellant who argued the case in
person and presented the facts and the law with commend-
-
4 S.C.R.
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'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
1963
able clarity and moderation. The first of them was that every
one of the impugned orders of June 1961 (a) recalling him
S. Pratap Singh
from the leave previously granted, (b) placing him under
v.
suspension pending an inquiry, and ( c) starting an
The State of
inquiry against him were illegal for the reason that such
Punjab
action on the part of Government was contrary to and
Ayyangar, f.
not permitted by the relevant Service Rules applicable to
him. The second ground of challenge was that these orders,
assuming them to be within the power of Government on
a proper interpretation of the rules were passed mala fide, by
or at the instance of the Chief Minister, Punjab, who was
personally hostile to him by reason of certain incidents and
circumstances which he set out and that the impugned
orders were prompted by the desire on the part of the Chief
Minister to wreak pcrsoually his vengeance on the appellant.
The relevant rules on the topic as well as their interpretation have all been dealt in the judgment of Dayal, J., and
we agree in the main with his conclusion that the orders
impugned were not beyond the power of the Government.
We should, however, add that we should not be taken to
have accepted the interpretation which Dayal, J., has placed
on each one of the several rules which he has considered.
Besides, we should not be taken to have acceded to the
submission of the learned Attorney-General who appeared
for the respondent-State, that the provision in Art. 310(1)
of the Constitution that "members of a Civil Service of a
State hold office during the pleasure of the Governor", conferred a power on the State Government to compel an officer
to continue in service of the State against his will apart from
service rules which might govern the matter even after the
age of superannuation was reached, or where he was employed for a defined term, even after the term of his appointment was over. We consider that to construe the expression
"the pleasure of the Governor" in that manner would be
patently. u~warranted besides being contrary to what this
Court said m State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid('). In the view
which we have taken on the second ground of challenge to
the orders of Government we have not considered it necessary to examine in detail the several rules to which our
attention was drawn or their proper interpretation.
_W e_~hall now proceed to deal with the second point
1
( )
[1954] S.C.R. 786 at p. 799.
738
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Ayyangar, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
urged before us viz., that the order was passed ma/a fide
and so could not be allowed to stand. Before entering into
the details of the allegations made, the evidence in their
support and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, we
consider it useful to state the principles underlying this
branch of the law. The Service Rules which are statutory
vest the power to pass the impugned orders on the Government. The expression 'Government' in the context is the
functionary within the State who is vested with executive
power in the relevant field. Of course, the Constitution vests
the executive power in a State in the Governor but he is
constitutionally directed to act on the aid and advice of his
Ministers. In the case before us it is common ground that it
was the Chief Minister who was incharge of the Health
Department in which the appellant was employed and it was
therefore the Chief Minister as the Minister in-charge of that
portfolio who initiated these proceedings though the formal
orders of the Ministry were issued by the Secretaries etc. of
the Department in the name of the Governor. For the
purposes of the present controversy the functionary who
took action and on whose instructions the action was taken
against the appellant was undoubtedly the Chief Minister
and if that functionary was actuated by ma/a fides in taking
that action it is clear that such action would be vitiated.
In this context it is necessary to add that though the learned
Attorney-General at first hinted that he would raise a legal
contention, that even if mala fides were established against
the Chief Minister still the impugned orders could not be set
:iside, he did not further pursue the matter, but proceeded,
if we may say so rightly, to persuade us that mala fides was
not made out by the evidence on record. Such an argument,
if right, would mean that even fraud or corruption, leaving aside mala fides, would not be examinable by a Court
:ind would not vitiate administrative orders. As Lord Denning said in Lazarus Estates, Ltd. v. Beasfry(') :
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can
be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud."
In the circumstances we do not consider it necessary to
deal with this aspect more fully or in greater detail. If this
were put aside, the second ground of attack on the ord.ers
may be viewed from two related aspects-of ultra vzres
( 1)
[1956] 1 All E.R. 341, 345.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
739.
1963
pure and simpk and secondly as an infraction of the rule
that every power vested in a public body or authority has
S. Pratap Singh
to be used honestly, bona fide and reasonably, though the
v.
two often slide into each other. Thus Sir Lyman Duff,
The State of
Puniab
speaking in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Campbell(')
in the context of an allegation that the statutory power
Ayyangar, f.
vested in a municipal corporation to acquire property had
been used in bad faith which was held to have been proved
stated :
"A body such as the Municipal Council of Sydney,
authorised to take land compulsorily for specified purposes, will not be permitted to exercise its powers for
different purposes, and if it attempts to do so, the
Courts will interfere. As Lord Loreburn said, in
Marquess of Clanricarde v. Congested Districts
Board (79 J.P. 481) :
"Whether it does so or not is a question of fact."
Where the proceedings of the Council are attacked
upon this ground, the party impeaching those proceedings must, of course, prove that the Council, though professing to exercise its powers for the statutory purpose, is in fact employing them in furtherance of some ulterior object."
Similarly, in Short v. Poole Corporation(') Pollock M. R.
observed:
"The appellants (represented before the Court by
Maugham K. C.-afterwards Lord Maugham) do not
contest the proposition that where an authority is constituted under statute to carry out statutory powers with
which it is entrusted, ...... if an attempt is made to
exercise those powers corruptly-as under the influence
of bribery, or ma/a fide-for some improper purpose,
such an attempt must fail. It is null and void : see
Reg. v. Governors of Darlington School (6 Q.B. 682
715)."
'
In the same case Warrington, L.J., said:
"No public body can be regarded as having statutory
authority to act in bad faith or from corrupt motives
and any action purporting to be that of the body, but
proved to be committed in bad faith or from corrupt
-··---·-(') [1925] A.C. 338.
( 2 ) (1926] 1 Ch. 66, 85.
--·----
740
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
Tiu: Stat< of
Punjab
Ayyaniar, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
motives, would certainly be held to be inoperative.
It may be also possible to prove that an act of the
public body, though performed in good faith and without the taint of corruption, was so clearly founded on
alien and irrelevant grounds as to be outside the authority conferred upon the body, and therefore inoperative. It is difficult to suggest any act which would
be held ultra vires under this head, though performed
bona fide.
(Vide pages 90-91)."
It was really the first aspect of ultra vires that was stressed by Lord Parker when in Vatcher v. Paull(') at page
378 of the report he spoke of a power exercised for a
purpose or with an intention beyond the scope of or not
justified by the instrument creating the power. In legal
parlance it would be a case of a fraud on a power, though
no corrupt motive or bargain is imputed. In this sense,
if it could be shown that an authority exercising a power
has taken into account-it may even be bona fide and with
the best of intentions,-as a relevant factor something
which it could not properly take into account, in deciding
whether or not to exercise the power or the manner
or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of
the power would be bad. Sometimes Courts are confronted with cases where the purposes sought to be achieved
are mixed,-some relevant and some alien to the purpose.
The courts have, on occasions, resolved the difficulty by
finding out the dominant purpose which impelled the
action, and where the power itself is conditioned by a
purpose, have proceeded to invalidate the exercise of
the power when any irrelevant purpose is proved to have
entered the mind of the authority (See Sadler v. Sheffield
Corporation(") as also Lord Denning's observation Earl
Fitzwilliam etc. v. Minister of T. & C. Planning(')). This
is on the principle that if in such a situation the dominant purpose is unlawful then the act itself is unlawful
and it is not cured by saying that they had another purpose which was lawful.
As we said earlier, the two grounds of ultra vires and
mala fides are thus most often inextricably mixed. Treat(') [1915] A.C. 372.
(') [1924] 1 .Ch. 483.
(3) ( 1951] 2 !CB. 284, 307.
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
ing it as a question of ultra vires, the question is what
is the nature of the power?; has it been granted to achieve
S. Pratap Singh
a definite object?-in which case it would be conditioned by
v.
the purpose for which it is vested. Taking the present
The State of
Puniab
case of the power vested in Government to pass the impugned orders, it could not be doubted that it is vested
Ayyangar, /.
in Government for accomplishing a defined public purpose viz., to ensure probity and purity in the public services by enabling disciplinary penal action against the
members of the service suspected to be guilty of misconduct. The nature of the power thus discloses its purpose. In that context the use of that power for achieving an alien purpose-wreaking the minister's vengeance
on the officer would be mala fide and a colourable exercise of that power, and would therefore be struck down
by the Courts. In this connection we might cite a dictum
of Lord Lindley in General Assembly of Free Church etc.
v. Overtoun(') when the learned Lord said at page
695:
"I take it to be clear that there is a condition implied
in this as well as in other instruments which create
powers, namely, that the power shall be used bona
fide for the purposes for which they are conferred."
Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any
act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an
abuse or a misuse by Government of its powers. While
the ~nd!rect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal
1ll-w1ll 1s. not to be held established except on clear proof
thereof, 1t 1s obv10usly difficult to establish the state of
a _mai:'s mi.nd, for that is what the appellant has to establish 111 this case, though this may sometimes he done
(See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice(')). The difficult is
not less.e:ied when one has to establish that a person yin
the pos1t10'.1 of a minister apparently acting on the Iegiti!"at~ exemse of pow~r has, in fact, been acting mala fide
t' e sense of pursumg an illegitimate aim. we must
10\\ ever, . demur to the suggestion that mala fide in th~
dmse of ·.improper motive should be established only by
I~ct ~v1 ence that is that it must be discernible from the
or er impugned or must be shown from the notings in
r
'
741
(') [1904] A.C. 515, 695.
(') [1885] 29 C.D. 459.
742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
the file which preceded the order. If bad faith would
vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced
S. Prat•p Si•zh
as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved
v.
The State of facts.
Punjab
Pausing here, we might summarise the position by
•t~ting that the Court is not an appellate forum where
Ayyangar, ].
the correctness of an order of Government could be canvassed and, indeed, it has no jurisdiction to substitute its
own view as to the necessity or desirability of initiating
disciplinary proceedings, for the entirety of the power,
jurisdiction and discretion in that regard is vested by law
in the Government. The only question which could be
considered by the Court is whether the authority vested
with the power has paid attention ~o or taken into account
circumstances, events or matters wholly extraneous to
the purpose for which the power was vested, or whether
the proceedings have been initiated mala fide for satisfying a private or personal grudge of- the authority against
the officer. If the act is in excess of the power granted
or· is an abuse or misuse of power, the matter is capable
of interference and rectification by the Court. In such an
event the fact that the authority concerned denies the
charge of mala fides, or asserts the absence of oblique motives or of its having taken into consideration improper
or irrelevant matter does not preclude the Court from
enquiring into the truth of the allegations made against
the authority and affording appropriate reliefs to the party
aggrieved by such illegality or abuse of power in the
event of the allegations being made out.
Before entering on a discussion of the question whether the appellant has established that the action of Government was vitiated by mala fides, we consider it pertinent to make a few preliminary observation. In considering the evidence we have kept in view the high position which the Chief Minister holds in the State and are
conscious of the fact that charges of a personal nature
made against such a dignitary are not to be lightly accepted. We have also borne in mind that charges of personal hostility are easily and very often made by persons
who are subjected to penal or quasi penal proceedings
against those who initiate them, and have therefore made
full allowance for these factors, and we have examined
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
743
1963
and weighed \he evidence with anxious care. We would
only add that the fact that two of our brethren feel differently on this matter has heightened our responsibility S. Pratapv. Singh
and in the care to be bestowed in appreciating the eviThe State of
dence. The Constitution enshrines and guarantees the
Punjab
rule of law and Art. 226 is designed to ensure that each
Ayyangar, f.
and every authority in the State, including the Government, acts bona fide and within the limits of its power
and we consider that when a Court is satisfied that there
is an abuse or misuse of power and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to afford justice to
the individual. It is with these considerations in mind
that we approach the facts of this case.
The allegations in the writ petition filed by the appellant on this matter may be summarised as follows :
(1) The appellant was requested by the Chief Minister to perform an operation on his son-Surinder
Singh-in April 1960. The operation was performed. The Chief Minister desired that after the
operation his son should stay under the care
of the appellant at Jullundur during his convalescence. Surinder, however, left the appellant's
place and the Chief Minister became angry for
the supposed negligence of the appellant in permitting this to happen.
(2) The Chief Minister himself and the members of
his family made several requests to the appellant
to show undue favours to certain patients who
were recommended to the appellant. These were
complied with, but when subsequently the appellant refused to comply with further requests
the Chief Minister turned hostile.
(3) The Chief Minister's wife had been asking for
medicines to be sent to her by the appellant for
the use of herself and her relations from the
hospital stores of Jullundur. The appellant, however, sent her the medicines, though not from the
hospital but buying them himself in the market. The Chief Minister's wife also wanted
soi;ne expensive articles like Singer Sewing machines etc: to be sent to her gratis. This the appellant did but the refusal to comply with fur-
744
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Ayyan gar, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
ther demands of the same type angered the Chief
Minister.
(4) One Kirpa Singh was working as the manager
of an automobile concern known as National
Motors, Jullundur which was either directly or ·
indirectly owned by Surinder-the son of the
Chief Minister. The appellant at the instance of the
Chief Minister accommoc\atcd Kirpa Singh in his
own house and besides provided him with board.
This went on for about 7 months but in or about
April, 1960 the appellant desired Kirpa Singh to
look out for a lodging and board elsewhere and
the latter had to do so. This was a further came
of irritation and anger for the Chief Minister.
(5) Several matters recited above were in April 1960
or thereabouts and as a result of the hostility developed by reason of these the appellant was accused, in September 1960, of showing undue favours to Akali prisoners who were lodged at the
District Jail at Jullundur. This allegation was
false and was later not pressed.
(6) The Chief Minister desired to have the help or
the appellant as an expert to instruct the police
officers who were conducting the prosecution in
what is known as the Kamal Murder case. The
appellant had given some sort of assurance to the
Chief Minister that the prosecution would succeed. It failed before the Sessions Judge and subsequently the appeal by the State was dismissed
by the High Court of Punjab and finally an application for special leave was dismissed by this
Court. The Chief Minister became very angry
with the appellant because the assurance given to
him that the prosecution would succeed had been
belied and the Chief Minister felt chagrined at
the result.
(7) One Dr. Dhillon who was a Junior Medical Officer in the Punjab Medical Service accompanied
the Chief Minister as a medical attendant in
1956-57. Under the rules the Chief Minister
was not entitled to this type of medical attention. There was some dispute as regards the
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
745
1963
salary payable to Dr. Dhillon during the period
when he was with the Chief Minister. The appellant was requested to give a false certificate S. Pratapv. Singh
regarding the services of Dr. Dhillon. The Chief
The State of
Minister complained that though several yean
Punjab
had passed, Dhillon's salary for the 45 days that
Ayyangilr, /.
he had been with the Chief Minister had not yet
been paid to him, The appellant refused to comply this demand and this was a further source of
irritation and hostility.
The appellant's further case is that as a result of these
incidents or sources of irritation and displeasure of the
Chief Minister, the Chief Minister was thinking of taking
some steps against him and that he got a complaint
against him on October 29, 1960 which he sent up for
investigation. The charge then made against the appellant was that on July 5, 1960 he had refused to examine
a woman-patient who had come to the hospital with an
out-door chit and that the husband of the woman was forced to pay a sum of Rs. 16.00 for her examination at
his residence. On the excuse that this complaint had been
made, the appellant was transferred from Jullundur to
Amritsar by an order dated December 6, 1960. It was
•stated by the appellant that in the State officers were usually transferred only during the months March or April,
so· that the education of their children etc. might not be
interrupted by the change of station, but that his transfer
in December was therefore out of the ordinary and done
with a view to inconvenience and humiliate him and deprive him of his practice at Jullundur. The appellant
thus having realised the hostility of the Chief Minister and
not desiring to continue much longer in service, made an
application for leave preparatory to retirement. He was
reaching the age of 55 on June 15, 1961 and he applied
for leave until that period. His leave was sanctioned with
effect from December 18, 1960 and this was gazetted on
January 27, 1961. It is this leave that was revoked by the
impugned orders on June 3, 1961 and under these the appellant was placed under suspension and an inquiry was
started later in the matter.
Between these two dates-i.e., between December 1960
and June 1961, however, some events happened which
48-2 S. C. India/64
746
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
are set out in the petition require to be stated. It
.would be seen that when the leave preparatory to retireS. Pratap Singh
ment which was applied for was sanctioned, the Govern·
v.
ment had already with them the complaint made on Oc-·
The State of
tober 29, 1960 relating to the charge that the appellant had
Punjab
improperly demanded a sum of Rs. 16.00 from a patient
Ayyangar, f.
desiring treatment at the Jullundur hospital. That related to an incident of July 1960 and was apparently not
thought to be serious enough to justify the refusal of the
leave applied for. But after the leave was sanctioned, in
the issue of the Weekly newspaper Blitz dated the 15th
January, 1%1 there appeared ah article in which allegations were made against the Chief Minister. Several of the
allegations were those which we have mentioned earlier
as having been made · by the appellant in his petition
. and stated to be the reasons for the hostility of the Chief Mi. nister. The appellant however was not named as such in
. the article. It must however have been apparent to those
acquainted with the matter that it was the appellant
from whom these favours were sought or obtained by the
Chief Minister. It is the case of the appellant that the
. Chief Minister who was in Delhi at that time must have
been apprised of the contents of the article . even on January 13, 1%1 and this does not seem improbable becaus\:
it is common know ledge that copies of this weekly are
available in Delhi even two days before the date it bears.
In the absence of any affidavit from the Chief Minister, and
there is none on the record, it is not possible to say
whether the article in the Weekly was or was not seen
by him on the 13th. On that day-January 13, 1961, however, the Inspector (Vigi1ance), Jullundur addressed a
communication to the appellant enquiring whether the
appellant who had by then gone to Kanpur (it is to be
remembered he was then on leave) would come to Jullundur for clarifying certain points in relation to an inquiry
which had been ordered by the Punjab Government. It is
stated that this was in connection with the complaint regarding the improper receipt of Rs. 16.00 from a patient
who had come to the hospital for treatment in July 1960.
The Vigilance Inspector made some inquiries of tl1e appe!lant and examined the records at the hospital in February, 1961. On March 18, 1961 the appellant's wife
1963
4 S.C.R.
v
-
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
747
1963
wrote a letter to the 'Blitz' confirming the allegations
against the Chief Minister which had already appeared in
S. Pratap Singh
that paper in its issue of January 15, 1961 and in the same
v.
month-March 1961 the appellant's wife circulated
The State of
Members of Parliament and others with the details of the
Puniab
allegations found in the newspaper. It is the case of the
Ayy•ngt1r, f.
appellant that these matters occasioned the hostility of the
Chief Minister and that the impugned orders_ passed in
June 1961 were passed not bona fide for the purpose of
conducting an inquiry into his conduct but to harass and
humiliate him and thus wreak vengeance on him for the
part that he played in bringing down the reputation of the
Chief Minister by the disclosures. As we observed earlier, if the appellant is able to establish that the main object and purpose of the initiation of the inquiry was not
in the interest of the Service or to ascertain any misconduct on the part of the appellant, but that the dominant
motive and purpose was the harassment and humiliation
of the appellant for his refusal to yield to the demands of
the Chief Minister or the members of his family at some
stages, and in defaming him openly at the later stage, it
would clearly be a case of ma/a fides and the impugned
orders have to be set aside.
We shall first take up for consideration the several
allegations that have been made and see whether they had
been satisfactorily made out. Before proceeding further
it, is necessary to state that allegations of a personal character having been made against the Chief Minister, there
could only be two ways in which they could be repelled.
First, if the allegations were wholly irrelevant, and even
if true, would not afford a basis upon which the appellant
would be entitled to any relief, they need not have been answered and the appellant could derive no benefit from the
respondents not answering them. We have already dealt
with this matter and have made it clear that if they were
true and made out by acceptable evidence, they could
not be ignored as irrelevant ; (2) If they were relevant,
in the absence of their intrinsic improbability the allegations could be countered by documentary or affidavit evi<lance which would show their falsity. In the absence of
such evidence they could be disproved only by the party
against whom the allegations were made denying the
748
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Ayyangar, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
same on oath. In the present case there were serious allegations made against the Chief Minister and there were
several matters of which he alone could have personal
knowledge 'and therefore which he alone could deny, but
what was, however, placed before the Court in answer to
the charges made against the Chief Minister was an affidavit by the Secretary to Government in the Medical Department who could only speak from official records and
obviously not from personal knowledge about the several matters which were alleged against the _Chief Minister.
In these ;:ircumstances we do not think it would be proper to brush aside the allegations made by the appellant,
particularly in respect of those matters where they are
supported by some evidence of a documentary nature seeing that there is no contradiction by those persons who
alone could have contradicted them. In making this observation we have in mind the Chief Minister as well as
Mrs. Kairon against whom allegations have been made
but who have not chosen to state on oath the true facts according to them.
Before passing on to a consideration of the details of
·the several allegations there is one matter to which we
ought to make reference at this stage and that is the admissibility and evidentiary value of the tape-recorded talks
which have been produced as part of his supporting evidence by the appellant. The learned Judges of the High
Court without saying in so many terms that these were
inadmissible in evidence, this being the contention raised
by the respondent-State, have practically put them out
of consideration for the reason that tape-recordings were
capable of being tampered with. With respect we cannot agree. There are few documents and possibly no
piece of evidence which could not be tampered with, but
that would certainly not be a ground on which Courts
could reject evidence as inadmissible or refuse to consider
it. It was not contended before us the tape-recordings
were inadmis,sible. In the ultimate analysis the factor mentioned would have a bearing only on the weight to
be attached to the evidence and not on its admissibility.
Doubtless, if in any particular case there is a well-grounded
suspicion, not even say proof, that ·a tape-recording has
been tampered with, that would be a good gronnd for
-
-
4 S.C.R
"
.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
749
1963
the Court to discount wholly its evidentiary value. But
in the present case ~e do not see any basis for any such
suggestion. The tape-recordings were referred to by the S. Pratap Singh
v.
appellant in his writ petition as part of the evidence on
Th< Stat< of
which he proposed to rely in support of his assertions as
Punjab
regards the substance of what passed between him and the
Ayyangar, f.
Chief Minister and the members of the latter's family
on the several matters which were the subject of allegations in the petition. Before the written statement of
the State was filed, the respondent-State made an application to the Court on August 23, 1961 in which they averred:
"The respondents are not in a position to give a complete and full reply to the assertions made by the petitioner without inspecting the original records and
without knowing and (sic) renderings of the so-called
tape-recordings mentioned by the petitioner in his
aforesaid petition . . . . . . . . . . . . The applicant, therefore, prays that the petitioner may be ordered to place
on record . . . . . . . . the renderings of the so-called
tape-records."
On November 3, 1961 the Court passed an order in which
it recorded :
"As regards the renderings of the tape-records, on
which the petitioner relies, learned Counsel for the
petitioner . . . . . . . . undertakes to play the tape-recorder before the respondent within a fortnight from
the date of the putting in of the above renderings on
a date suitable to both the sides."
Again on December 14, 1961 the State made an application to the Court to modify the order dated November 3,
1961 by directing the appellant to play the tape-records in
the office of the Counsel for the State and allow the State
to re-tape-record the tape-recordings produced by the appellant, so that a correct copy of the tape-records was
available to the respondent-State before filing the written
statement. In the applications made by the respondent to
the Court for directions regarding the inspection of the
tape-records produced by the appellant, and seeking the
facility for re-recording, it was explicitly stated that this
was for the purpose of the State satisfying itself whether
the voices of the persons whose talks were purported to
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
-·-·
S. Pratap. Singh
v.
The State of
Puniab
Ayyangar, f.
[1964}
have been tape-recorded were truly the voices of those persons. The Court passed an order ;:in January 5, 1962
directing the appellant to file the original tape-records into Court to .be sealed in the presence of both the parties
and kept in custody of the Registrar of the Court, but
this was to be after the records were played before the respondent on January 11, 1962 in the office of the Registrar of the Court. This order was given effect to and
the State had the re-recorded copies in their possession to
verify the authenticity and correctness of the original~.
The written statement of the State was filed in February
1962 only after they had thus their own copies of the
tape-records, so that they were in a position to verify (a)
whether the voice recorded was that of the person whose
voice it professed to be ; (b) whether there had been any
interpolations or omissions ; and ( c) whether there had
been any other tampering with the records. In the counter-affidavit filed by the State there was no denial of the
genuineness of the tape-records, no assertion that the
voices of the persons which. were recorded in the tape-records were not those which they purport to be or that any
portion of the conversation which would have given a different colour to it had been cut off. \Ve should however
add that there was a vague statement regarding the taperecord of the talk between the Vigilance Inspector and the
appellant with which we shall deal later. It is in the light
of these circumstances and this history of the proceedings that the evidence afforded by the tape-recorded
talk has to be considere_d in appreciating the genuineness
of the talks recorded and in deciding whether the allegations made by the appellant are substantiated or not.
We shall now take up the allegations in the order in
which they appear it! the petition and in which we have
set them out earlier. The first relates to the incident connected with the operation on the Chief Minister's sonSurinder Singh. Now, in regard to this, Surinder has filed an affidavit in which he has denied that there was any
operation performed on him either by the appellant or by
any other. There is no documentary evidence that the
appellant performed the operation which he claims to have
performed in the shape of hospital records. The appellant's explanation for the absence of any such
-
-
4 S.C.R.
,
.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
1963
record was that the operation was necessitated by the nature of the disease which Surinder had contracted and for
S. Pratap Singh
this reason the Chief Minister desired the operation to be
v.
performed in secret. Accordingly the operation was perThe State of
formed not at Jullundur which is a big city where the
Pun1ab
Chief Minister and his family were well-known but in a
Ayyangar, /.
rural dispensary about 50 miles away from his headquarters town. The main points that were urged by the
learned Attorney General against the appellant's story
was : (!) that Surinder has denied it, (2) that no evidence
based on any hospital record had been produced to substantiate the story, (3) that the exact date on which the
operation was performed was not given, and (4) that
the tape-recorded talk would not substantiate the appellant's case that he performed an operation. It would be
convenient to take the tape-recorded talks first because it
is on them that the appellant relies for corroborating his
statement that he did perform an operation on Surinder
at the end of April 1960. There are three tape-recorded
talk:s which bear on this incident and these are numbered 6, 2 and 11. Talk no. 2 is the most important of them
and is a tape-recorded talk on the trunk-telephone between Mrs. Kairon (the Chief Minister's wife) and the appellant. In the course of the talk the record shows the
lady to have asked :
"Mrs. Kairon : How is the young lad ?
Ans. : Your young lad is alright.
Mrs. Kairon : Have you removed off the dressing ?
Ans. : The dressing has come off. There is no dressing
over the wound now.
Mrs. Kairon : And; there is no· discharge etc.
Ans. : There is no discharge now.
Mrs. Kairon : Is the wound not raw ?
Ans.: No.
Mrs. Kairon : Can he walk about now ?
Ans. : Slightly .................. ..
Mrs. Kairon : There is no other ulcer inside.
Ans. : No, he is quite alright now.
-
_...!,
Mrs. Kairon : The thing is that there can develop induration of the wound.
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Ayyangar, f.
Ans. : Is it ?
Mrs. Kairon : There is no other ulcer inside. As you
said ?
Ans. : No. He is quite alright now."
From the internal evidence furnished by this tape-record
itself it is seen that this talk was on May 1, 1960. Talk
no. 6 is said t0 be slightly earlier in date, being towards
the end of April 1960. That too is stated to be after the
operation and is a tape-recorded talk on a trunk-telephone
between Mrs. Kairon and the appellant. This talk was
necessitated, according to the appellant, by tlie fact that
Surinder had left the Circuit house at Jullundur, where
he had been directed to stay during convalesence, even
before he was completely healed and it was the negligence
of the doctor in permitting this to happen that is said to
have been one of the causes of the appellant incurring the
displeasure of the Chief Minister. There are portions
of this record which are also relied on to corroborate the
appellant that he perfomed an operation on Surinder and
to establish that the denial by Surinder is false :
"Mrs. Kairon : Dr. Sahib, did you test his (Surinder's)
urine ?
Ans. : Urine is quite alright.
Mrs. Kairon : When was it tested ?
Ans. : It was done that day.
Mrs. Kairon : Dr. Sahib, it is 8 days now.
Ans, : We got it tested 'here when he came."
The appellant submitted that the words "that day" which
we have emphasized. ~ere a reference to the day on which
the operation was performed. In the course of this talk
(No. 6) Mrs. Kairon made inquiries as to whether her
son Surinder was with the appellant and this inquiry was
made because she had information from other sources that
he had left Jullundur. When the appellant was asked
about this he said in the tape-recorded talk :
"You see, he has tried to be clever with me.
Mrs. Kairon : What ?
Ans. : This Surinder.
Mrs. Kairon : Oh, you know what Sardar Sahib said.
He said he did not expect this thing from you.
4 S.C.R.
. .
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
753
1963
Dr. P. Singh : From me ?
Mrs. Kairon : Yes.
S. Pratap Singh
Dr. P. Singh : Why.
v.
Mrs. Kairon : That he should go away from you.
The State of
Dr. P. Singh : No, not from me. From Circuit House.
Punjab
Mrs. Kairon : He got a trunk call booked and he got
Ayyan gar, /.
engaged in conversation elsewhere and I have found
out things from you.
Dr. P. Singh : Look what could I do.
Mrs. Kairon : He said why did you do it if you did
not have the strength to keep him.
Dr. P. Singh : He told me he will stay on for 3 or 4
days.
Mrs. Kairon : Sardar Sahib said he did not see much
sense in either of you."
The last of the tape-recorded renderings is that numbered
11 and it purports to record a trunk-call talk between Surinder himself and the appellant. Portions of it are relied on
by the appellant on both the points (a) that he performed
an operation on Surinder, and (b) that Surinder left
his care without his knowledge and thus made him incur
the displeasure of his parents :
"Surinder : Well Dr. Sahib. You better dictate to
me the prescription of that triple dye. I want to apply
it.
Ans. : When you come in the evening. You can take
it at that time.
Surinder : No. I want to apply now, in the morning.
Ans. : Then, you should have taken it yesterday and
then left. . .............. .
Surinder : Alright, it was a mistake. Now you tell me.
Dr. P. Singh : Otherwise it is alright now ?
Surinder : A little bit of stuff came out of it, sort of
blood.
Dr. P. Singh : It would be just a nominal sort of affair?
Surinder : Yes please."
The above is in so far as regards the operation .and next
as to Surinder leaving the appellant's care we were referred
to the following in the recorded talk :
"Dr. P. Singh : You went away, all on the quiet.
Su rind er : I had to come here.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS:
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Ayyangar, !.
[1%4}
Dr. P. Singh : Why ? With me your understanding
was .that you will go only after showing me in the
evenmg.
Surinder : I will come to you in the evening.
Dr. P. Singh : No, you will come today, but yesterady
you went away without notice. We came to know
of it only when the servant came and reported that
the rQOm is all vacant, and that Sardar Sahih has gone,
giving a go by."
The question is whether this last (No. 11) tape-recorded
talk does or does -not establish that the appellant's story
about his having operated on Surinder was true. In the
first place, Surinder, through the affidavit that he made,
denie.s that any operation was performed on him by the
appellant or by anyone else, does not deny that the voice recorded in talk no. 11 is his. Besides, Surinder while
stating in his affidavit that he was diabetic, admitted that
his urine had been examined by the appellant-a matter
referred to in talk no. 6 between Mrs. Kairon and the
appellant. Of course he did not say in his affidavit that
the examination of his urine referred to in this talk, was
that referred to by him in his affidavit but that is not very
material. Nor has he offered any explanation for his
statement in talk no. 11 of "a little hit of the stuff coming out". His version, however, as regards the recorded
talks was :
"I heard the tape-records prepared from the tape. records recorded by the petitioner. The renderings
· are not intelligible and clear and are denied."
If it was not intelligible, (we need hardly add that we do
not agree in this characterisation) how they could be denied is not clear, nor is one able to appreciate as to why the
talk should be unintelligible to him if they recorded what
he spoke. That is so Jar as rendering no. 11 is concerned. But in regard to renderings 2 and 6 which purport to
be a record of the talks between the appellant and Mrs.
Kairon there is no affidavit from Mrs. Kairon denying
the authenticity of her voice or of the talk, as recorded.
No doubt, Surinder in his affidavit denies that there
was any talk between the appellant and his mother re·
garding supply of medicines and he also states that the
tape-records referred to by the petitioner are all forged,
....
-
;.
'
'
--
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
1963
hut ifl the context the forgery attributed could only relate to that portion in which Mrs. Kairon is recorded to
S. Pratap Singh
have asked for medicines. If the state could get Surinder
v.
to file an affidavit in regard to the tape-recorded talk, we
The State of
Punjab
do not appreciate why no affidavit from Mrs. Kairon was
filed to give her version as to whether she really talked
Ayyangar, f.
with the appellant as recorded, and if she did so in what
respects the record was wrong. In the absence of any such
affidavit or statement by her on oath that the voice
recorded in the several talks aud in particular in talks 2
and 6 was not hers or that the record had been manipulated, we cannot but hold that the records are genuine and
that conversations took place as recorded.
The next question is whether these show that the
appellant performed the operation. We believe we have
extracted sufficient from these talks to show that they do
indicate unmistakablv that Surinder had undergone an
operation sometime before the beginning of May 1960.
The statement of Surinder, therefore, tbat he underwent
no operation by anyone must obviously be discarded as
untrue and no value can be attached to the denial contained in the affidavit that he has filed. If really he had
undergone an operation and questions regarding the condition of his wound, the occurrence of discharge etc. are the
subject of talks between Mrs. Kairon and the appellant
in talks 2 and 6 and between Surinder himself and the
appellant in talk 11, it stands to reason, in the absence of
any rational or reasonable explanation by Mrs. Kiaron,
that the 'appellant was the person who had performed
that operation.
The question that next falls to be considered is whether
the operation was entrusted to the appellant by the Chief
Minister or not Apart from the probabilities of the case, the
extracts we have made from the tape-recorded talks no. 2 &
6 and the reference to Sardar Saheb would indicate that
the Chief Minister was concerned in entrusting the operation to the appellant and the inference is more readily
drawn because in the face of the allegations in the affidavit and the tape-recorded talk between the appellant neither
Mrs. Kairon, nor the Chief Minister has placed her or his
version of the matter before the Court by making any
statement on oath. In the circumstances we have no
756
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Ayyangar, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
he£itation in holding that it was at the instance of the Chief
Minister that the appellant undertook the operation on the
Chief Minister's son.
It was next said that even assuming the above conclusion
were justified, the statement in the tape-recorded talk which
indicated the Chief Minister's displeasure at the conduct
of the appellant in permitting his son to leave Jullundur
before he was completely cured, was inadmissable in
evidence for proving what the Chief Minister said to his
wife and on that account we should hold that hostility on
the part of the Chief Minister owing to this incident was not
established. It is true that the statement of Mrs· Kairon as
to what the Chief Minister told her would be merely hearsay and would not be admissible in evidence as a statement
of the Chief Minister but the tape-recorded talk does show
that she herself was greatly displeased with the appellant
and it was really to emphasise the displeasure of the family
and its head that the Chief Minister's name was brought
in. In the circumstances we do not consider that the respondents derive any advantage from this technical objection
to the reception of the Chief Minister's statement secondhand. The leaned Attorney-General also submitted that
the exact date of the operation was not given nor was the
place where it was performed set out in the affidavits and
that these detracted from the value of the allegations but we
do not consider that in the face of the recorded talks and
the inference deducible therefrom that an operation was
performed by the appellant sometimes towards the end
of April 1960 very much turn on these factors. In making
this statement regarding the date we have in mind the
reference in talk no. 2 to "tomorrow" as being the 2nd of
May.
The next allegation relates to the requests made by
the Chief Minister himself and the members of his family
for undue favours to .be shown to certain patients who were
recommended for medical certificates or for special treatment
by the appellant at the hospital. This allegation was denied
by the State, but as stated earlier, the denial has little force
because the only persons who were in a position to contradict
the appellant have not come (orward to state anything on
oath. The allegation has, therefore, to be considered with
reference to the documentary evidence on which reliance
--
-
I
l
4 S.C.R.
...
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
1963
was placed. They are Exs. B-1 to B-19 which are recommendations by either the Chief Minister, his sons, his brother
S. Pratap Singh
or his sister introducing certain patients to the appellant
v.
and suggesting that they be attended to properly or their
The State of
Punjab
requests granted. That anything improper was required
to be done by the appellant or anything contrary to the
Ayyangar, f.
rules was expected to be done by him or was suggested is not
borne out by these documents. It is the appellant's submission that of these only two were not complied with-the
request contained in B-2 and B-5 but even as regards this
there is no such specific assertion on the record, nor is it
easy to see why the appellant refused to comply with these
requests. In the circumstances we are unable to hold that
this item of misunderstanding is made out. But we must
add that as these slips or chits were addressed to the appellant, some by the Chief Minister, others by one or other
of his two sons, still others by his brother and one by his
sister, they do establish that at the dates which they bear
the appellant was a great friend of the Chief Minister and
enjoyed the confidence of the Chief Minister and the member's of family.
The next item may be considered separately under two
heads; ( 1) Supply of medicines to the family of the Chief
Minister at the request of Mrs. Kairon and others, and (2)
the supply of two Singer Sewing machines to Mrs. Kairon.
Needless to say that these allegations have, no doubt, been
denied by the State, but there is no denial by the only
persons who could effectively contradict the appellant.
As regards the supply of medicines, the appellant's case is
that they were sent by post by registered packets or parcels
and in corroboration of his statement he has produced six
postal receipts of registered packets or parcels despatched to
Sardarni Partap Singh Kairon. These bear dates from 1957
to 1959 and they indicate that between Re. 1/- to Rs. 2/- was
paid as postal charges for their transmission. Surely, something must have oeen sent in these packets or parcels and
received by Mrs. Kairon but there is, on the side of the
respondent, no positive statement as to what these packets
contained. It, therefore, appears to us that it is not possible to discard the appellant's statement that these packets
contained medicines despatched to the Chief Minister's
wife, for the use of the memben of die family. It matters
758
S.UPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
little, for the purpose of this case, whether the medicines
were purchased at the cost of the appellant, as he says, or
S. Pratap Singh
were
taken from the hospital. But whichever happened, it
v.
is
clear
that articles of some value were despatched from
The State of
Punjab
time to time over this three-year period by the appellant
to Mrs. Kairon. The tape-recorded talks do lend support to
Ayyangar, f.
the appellant's story that he was required to send medicines
and that he complied with such demands. In talk no. 3
which was with Mrs. Kairon and is stated to have been in
August, 1959 :
"Appellant : I shall get the medicines delivered to you
today.
Mrs. Kairon : Those tablets too and the mixture too.
Appellant : What are those tablets ?
Mrs. Kairon : . . . . in those bottles were brown brown
tablets ......... .
Appellant : I shall send them straightaway.......... .
Appellant : I shall send you the injections also.
Mrs. Kairon : Alright."
Then we have talk no. 1 which purports to be a record
of conversion over the trunk-telephone between Mrs.
Kairon and the appellant and which is said to b.e in March
1%0, but for our present purpose the date is not very
material. We would extract the following from this talk :
"Mrs. Kairon : The medicines have been received.
Appellant : Leave the question of arrival of medicines
.,.-
Mrs. Kairon : You sent injections.
Appellant : I had sent you those injections.
Mrs. Kairon : Yes .... they were 4 injections.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..
Mrs. Kairon : Those tablets have not been received.
Appellant : Which tablets.
»
lJ S.C.R.
--
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
Mrs. Kairon : Those capsules.
Appellant : Those brown.
Mrs. Kairon : Yes.
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Puniab
Ayyangar, f.
-
-
Appellant : You had not asked for those.
Mrs. Kairon : Well. Does not matter.
Appellant : I will do it now."
Lastly, we have talk no. 2 which appellant had with
Mrs. Kairon and is stated to have been in May 1960 in
which the following passages occur :
"Appellant : The medicines that you had asked for
have arrived. When you come you take it.
Mrs. Kairon : You give it to Raghbir Singh (General
Manager, Roadways).
Appellant : You know those injections of B Complex
that. you had asked for.
Mrs. Kairon : Yes.
Appellant : You had asked for the B Complex injections. Isn't it ?
Mrs. Kairon : Yes.
Appeilant : I have got those here."
In the face of the support afforded by the documentary evidence and the tape-recorded talks, coupled with the absence
of any denial or explantion of these matters by the persons
who alone could deny them, we feel unable to attach any
value to the affidavit of Surinder denying that any medicines
were called for or supplied.
The appellant says that when demands of this type increased he refused further to comply with them, but there is
no positive evidence of any demand which he refused to
comply with and thus incur the anger or displeasure of the
Chief Minister. But notwithstanding the absence of that
type of evidence it is clear that until 1959, at least, as is
shown by these postal receipts and even till April-May
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196-t]
1963
1960-as disclosed by the tape-recorded talks, the appellant
was on the friendliest terms with the Chief Minister and
S. Pratap Singh
some explanation has to be forthcoming as to why there
v.
was
a sudden change of attitude from May 1960 or thereThe Stat< of
abouts and more particular! y after January 1%1. It is in
Pu11jab
the light of this circumstance tliat the evidence afforded
Ayyangar, f,
by the tape-recorded talks regarding the operation on
Surinder Kairon and of the article in the Blitz to which
reference has already been maae assume crucial importance.
The second head of this item relates to the supply of the
sewing machines. We consider that this portion of the appellant's case has- been established beyond reasonable doubt by
Exs. C-7 to C-10 which have all been referred to by Dayal,
J. in his judgment and we entirely concur with him in holding that this allegation has been completely proved. The
lprned judges of the High Court discarded the appellant's
case because of the affidavit of Mrs. Sodhi but we agree with
Dayal, J. that this would not explain either C-8 or C-10
which proved that a wooden case with the words 'Singer
Sewing Machine' stencilled or on a label at the top was
sent through the manager of the Punjab Roadways tci Mrs.
Kairon. The statements contained in the affidavits filed by
Sri Pahwa, the Roadways manager as well as by Om Pra~
kash, Clerk of the Punjab Roadways are most artificial
and apart from the discrepancies as regards the measurements and weight of the wooden box which was transported
by them, and the improbability of their having noted or
remembered the details without any written record then
made, they failed to offer any explanation for the label or
stencilling at the top referred to in Ex. C-9. Besides, the taperecorded conversation no. 3 between Mrs. Kairon and the
appellant in which there is a reference to the colour of the
machine that was sent, makes it clear that the appellant's
story of his having sent a machine to Mrs. Kairon is true.
It is somewhat surprising that though Ex. C-7 to C-10 were
annexures to the writ petition and the respondents had copies
of the tape-recorded talks with them before they filed their
statements, they contented themselves with filing these affidavits of Sri Pahwa and Om Prakash and Mrs. Sodhi and
abstained from letting the court know what Mrs. Kairon had
to say on the matter. This Sewing Machine incident was
in July 1959 and it shows that up to that date there was com-
.>
."
-
4 S.C.R.
y
•
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
1963
plete friendliness between the Chief Minister and the appellant. The appellant's further allegation that Mrs. KaiS. Pratap Singh
ron or the other members of the Chief Minister's family
v.
rlemanded of him the supply of other costly articles and
The State of
Punjab
that his refusal to comply with them angered the Chief
Minister, must be discarded as an embellishment for which
Ayyangar, f.
there is no support in the evidence placed before the court.
The next item of the source of hostility alleged by the
appellant is that he sent out of his house Kirpa Singh, the
manager of an automobile concern of the Chief Minister's
wn-Surinder-in or about March-April 1960 after having
permitted him to stay there for about 7 months. Surinder
has filed an affidavit in whicl1 he has denied his ownership of the automobile concern and also that Kirpa Singh
was provided with board and lodging by the appellant at
the instance of his father. Kirpa Singh also made an affidavit to the same effect. Two matters however, stand out
prominently. The first is that it cannot be doubted that
Kirpa Singh is a great friend both of the Chief Minister
and his son. Tape-record no. 15 which purports to record
the talk between Kirpa Singh and die appellant brings this
out. It was sought to discount die evidentiary value of
this talk by die circumstance that the appellant had brought
about this talk designedly in order to tape-record the conversation. We Jo not, however, agree that it has any such
effect. The reality of that talk and the correctness of the
tape-recording is not denied by Kirpa Singh in the affidavit
he filed and if he really spoke the words which diat record
shows he did the facts above stated are made out. That
Kirpa Singh was the manager of an automobile concern in
Jullunder is not in dispute but both Surinder as well as
Kirpa Singh, in their affidavits, have studiously refrained
from stating who the owner of that concern was beyond
stating that Surinder is not the owner. We consider this
averment most disingenuous and least frank. That Kirpa
Singh was afforded board and lodging at die appellant's
house is also admitted. It was not suggested diat Kirpa
Singh was a friend of the appellant otherwise than as a
friend of the Chief Minister and his son, and diis taperernrd 15 makes clear. It does not, dierefore, stand to
reason that the appellant would have undertaken the cost
and i ncoveniencc of provi<ling Kirpa Singh with board and
49-·2 S. C. India/64
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
lodging except to oblige the Chief Minister and his son
(2) It is also a fact that Kirpa Singh moved out of the
S. Pratap Singh
appellant's
place at the end of March 1960 having stayed
v.
The State of there from September 1959 (vi de Ex. D-1). The quesPunjab
tion immediately arises whether this was because of the
disinclination ori the part of the appellant to continue to
Ayyangar, J.
retain him in his house. Having regard to the other cirrnmtances which have already been . mentioned, of the
undercurrent of hostility borne by the Chief Minister which
started roundabout this time, we are inclined to accept as
true the appellant's version that he sent Kirpa Singh out of
his house in preference to the story of Kirpa Singh that he
went out of his own accord. If the Chief Minister was
obliged by the appellant providing board and lodging to
Kirpa Singh, it would not be a violent inference to draw
that the Chief Minister was angry with the appellant for
having sent Kirpa Singh out.
Some of the other matters set out as those which led
to the hostility of the Chief Minister are also made out, such
as for instance that the appellant's services were utilised by
the Chief Minister in connection with the Kamal murder
case ( vide talk no. 7 with the Chief Minister himself) but
as we consider them to be of minor sjgnific~nce, we do not
propose to deal with them in any detail, particularly as it
would be sufficient to proceed on the basis of the items earlier discussed.
Next we have the fact that notwithstanding that on the
29th of October 1960 there was some complaint received
by the department regarding his having improperly taken
Rs. 16 from a patient in July 1960, he was granted leave preparatory to retirement as and from December 18, 1960. In
other words, the Government had no idea at that date that
charges should be formulated against the appellant and that
his retirement should be postponed for completing such
an inquiry. We have then the circumstance that in all the
earlier Confidential Reports relating to the appellant there
was nothing wrong found with him and his conduct and
character were not the subject of any adverse comment. It
was only subsequently, long after the close of the year 1960,
that an adverse remark was made against the appellant in
respect of the year 1-4-59 to 31-3-60 and this was communicated to him only late in Februery 1961. The appellant
-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
1963
complains that this was really an after-thought an<l was
brought in long after that year was over in order to afford
S. Pratap Singh
some justification for the charges that were eventually
v.
made against him. What we have state<l earlier regar<ling
The State of
Punjab
the unfriendly feelings which <levelope<l with the Chief
Minister from about April-May, 1960 onwards seems to
Ayyangar, /.
lend some support to this suggestion.
We have next the circumstance connected with the article in Blitz which appeared in its issue dated January 15,
1961. That seems to be the starting point of the action taken
against the appellant, for on January 13, 1961 the Vigilance
Officer sent a communication to the appellant to offer his
explanation in regard to certain charges which were then
the subject of inquiry. In the order dated the 3rd June, 1961
by which the appellant was placed under suspension there
is reference to three inquiries-one dated October 29, 1960,
another of January 11, 1961 and the third dated April 17,
1961. The dates apparently are a reference to the dates of
the several complaints. The order refers to investigations
made by the Vigilance Department into certain complaints
against the appellant but though the bona fides of these inquiries as well as the bona fides of the action taken under
the impugned order were questioned the report of the Vigilance Inspector was not placed before the Court to enable it
to judge what exactly the complaints were and whether
they were the same as the charges listed in the charge-sheet
against the appellant. The above has to be judged in the
context of the feature that there is a tape-recorded conversation which the appellant had with the Vigilance Inspector
(tape-record no. 16) in the course of which the Inspector
appears to suggest that he himself did not believe in the reality of the complaints. In the counter affidavit filed by the
State it was stated that the Vigilance Inspector "who has
been made to hear a copy of the tape-records in question
has reported that the tape-records are unintelligible and as
such it is not possible to compare the renderings with it. He
has therefore reported that the talk, as disclosed in the rendering took place between him and the petitioner but that
the rendering appeared to have been twisted by the petitioner according to his own liking". The Vigilance Inspector himself made no affidavit nor was there any denial even
by the State that the voice recorded as that of the Vigilance
764
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Ayyan gar, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Inspector was really his. The tape-recorded talks have been
translated-the originals having been heard by the State
officials as well as by the Inspector and we do not see any
justification for the complaint that they were unintelligible.
There is, therefore, no reason why it was not possible to say
(a) that there was no talk, (b) if there was, what exactly
was its purport, and ( c) where and in what respects the
tape-recording departed from the truth either by way of
addition or omission. The talk, as recorded, as already
stated would appear to suggest that the Vigilance Inspector
did not believe in the truth of the complaint. That, however, might not be· very relevant for deciding whether the
complaint was true or false but i.n the face of that recorded
conversation is was certainly necessary for the State to produce the Inspector's report for countering the case of the
appellant that the charges wer~ invented for the purpose of
enabling the State to harass and humiliate him.
Lastly, it is rather curious that some of the charges
which are to be the subject of enquiry relate to a period long
anterior to June 1961. For instance, charge Z(b) is concerned with an illegal demand and receipt of sum of Rs. 100/from a patient who came to the hospital on March 13,
1957. Similarly, there are otl1ers which had been made earlier but had been dropped or their falsity had been admitted
on earlier occasions but were stated to have been revived
for the purpose of justifying this inquiry. In the view we
entertain that the action against the appellant was taken
because of the matters we have held proved and because of
the charges made against the Chief Minister in the article
in the Blitz it is not necessary to discuss minutely as to
whether the charges could be true or were merely invented. The facts establish that up to March-April 1960 the appellant was on the best terms with the Chief Minister and
the members of his family. He was going out of his way to
oblige the Chief Minister and do his bidding, though as an
officer of the position and status of the appellant this was
hardly conduct which should properly be expected of him.
Possibly, his being kept at Ju!Tunder without transfer for
four years was because of this failing on his part. From
April 1960 onwards we find that there is a change in the atti•
tude of the Chief Minister. The operation on Surinder and
the incidents connected with it and the sending out of Kirpa
-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
£96!
Singh relate to this period. This apparently led to the order
for his transfer from Jullunder to Amritsar. Having fallen
S. Pratap Singh
from grace, the appellant did not apparently consider it safe
v.
to continue in service and hence applied for leave preparaThe State of
tory to retirement and this was granted. Immediately
Punjab
he got to know that he had obtained this leave he was
Ayyangar, /.
apparently emboldened to make public the improper acts
which he himself had done for pleasing the Chief Minister
and curry his favour and the article in the Blitz was obviously inspired by him. When this came to the notice of the
Chief Minister in the middle of January 1961 stern action
followed-first the Vigilance Inspector's communication of
the 13th January followed by the adverse report against t11e
appellant for 1%0 in February 1961 and the further charges against him in April 1961 which led to the passing of
the impugned orders. In the circumstances we are satisfied
that the dominant motive which induced the Government
to take action against the appellant was not to take disciplinary proceedings against him for misconduct which it
bona fide believed he had committed, but to wreak vengeance on him for incurring his wrath and for the discredit
that he had brought on the Chief Minister by the allegations that he had made in the article which appeared in the
Blitz in its issue dated January 15, 1961 followed by the
communication to the same newspapers by the appellant's
wife, in which these allegations were affirmed and in large
part we have found to be true. We therefore hold that the
impunged orders were vitiated by mala fides, in that they
were motivated by an improper purpose which was outside
t11at for which the power or discretion was conferred on
Government and the said orders should therefore be set
aside.
We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order
dated June 3, 1961 revoking the leave granted and placing
the appellant under suspension and the order dated June
29, 1%1 directing an inquiry into the charges against him.
As the appellant has failed to make out the other point
about the orders being contrary to the Service Rules we direct that there shall be no order as to costs, here and in the
High Court.
Raghubar
RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-This appeal, on a . certificate
Dayal f.
granted by the High Court of Punjab, is directed against
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
its order dismissing the appellant's petition under Art. 226
of. the Constitution praying for quashing, by a writ of cerS. Pratap Singh
tiorari or other suitable directions, the orders of the Punjab
v.
The State of Government (i) suspending him; (ii) revoking his leave;
Punjab
(iii) compelling him to continue in service after he had
attained the age of superannuation, and (iv) ordering a
Raghubar
departmental enquiry against him.
Dayal].
The appellant, Sardar Partap Singh, Joined the Punjab Civil Medical Service, Class I, in 1947. He joined the
service as a direct recruit on August 21, 1947. His previous
service in the Indian Medical Service from 1934 to 1939,
in the Punjab Civil Medical Service from April 1940 to
June 1941 and in the Indian Military Service in temporary
rank till about the end of 1945, has no bearing on the
terms of his service as a member of the Punjab Civil Medical Service, Class I.
The appellant reached the Selection Grade of the Civil
Medical Service, Class I, in January 1955 and was transferred to Jullunder as Civil Surgeon in April 1956. He
remained there till he proceeded on leave preparatory to
retirement sometime in December 1960. His leave was sanctioned on December 18, 1960, and was notified in the Punjab Gazette dated January 27, 1961.
On June 3, 1%1, the Governor of Punjab ordered the
suspension of the appellant with immediate effect as the
Government had decided that a departmental enquiry be
instituted against him under r. 7 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. The Governor further passed an order under r. 3.26(d) of the Punjab Civil Srvices Rules. These rules were issued under the
proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and came into force
from April 1, 1953. They have been referred to as the
1959 rules in the judgment of the High Court and at the
hearing as they were amended from time to time and were
re-printed in 1959. We shall also refer to them as the 1959
rules. The Governor's order under r. 3.26(d) of these rules
was that in view of the appellant's reaching the age of
superannuation on June 16, 1961 he be retained in service
beyond that date till the completion of the departmental
enqmry.
The orders of the Governor were communicated to the
Director, Health Services, Punjab, by the Secretary to the
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
1963
Government in the Medical and Health Department by his
letter Annexure J dated June 3, 1961. The Director, Health S. Pratap Singh
Services, communicated these orders to the appellant by a
v.
letter, Annexure I, dated June 3, despatched under postal
The State of
Punjab
certificate. He further sent a copy of that letter and its
enclosures by registered post to the appellant on June 5,
Raghubar
1961. The registered cover was further marked 'express
Dayal, f.
delivery'. Copies of this letter were sent to the then Civil
Surgeon, Jullunder, and the Accountant General, Punjab,
for information.
On June 10, 1961, notifications about the Governor's
placing the appellant under suspension and fixing his headquarters at Chandigarh and about his revoking, with effect
from June 3, the leave preparatory to retirement which had
been sanctioned to him and retaining him in service until
the enquiry into the charges against him be concluded
and a final order passed, were published in the Punjab
Government Gazette Extraordinary dated June 10, 1961.
The Director, Health Services, Punjab, forwarded to the
appellant, with his letter dated 3/llth of July 1961,
a memorandum dated June 29, 1961, statement of charges
and statement of allegations which he had received from
the Secretary to Government, Punjab, Vigilance Department, for the appellant's submitting such explanation as he
might desire. This letter purported to be with reference
to enquiries nos. 70, 3 and 27 dated October 29, 1960, January 11, 1961 and April 17, 1961 respectively against the
appellant.
-
The appellant challenged, by his writ petition, the
legality of the orders of suspension, revocation of leave,
retention in service after the date of superannuation and
institution of the departmental enquiry, on various grounds.
The competency of the Governor to make the orders was
questioned. It was alleged that unjustified personal grievances arose between the appellant and Sardar Partap
Singh Kairon, Chief Minister of Punjab, in or about 1960
that the impugned orders were passed ma/a fide in the exer~
rise of power, if any, vested in the respondent, the State
of Punjab in the Ministry of Health, that this was an abuse
of power and was intended to feed the grudge of the Chief
Minister against him.
768
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
RaghubRr
Dayal, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
The respondent State refuted the contention that the
impugned orders were passed mala fide on account of the
alleged grievances of the Chief Minister and stated that the
Government was competent under rules governing the services of the appellant to pass the impugned orders and that
the appellant's allegations had nothing to do with the
orders suspending him and revoking his leave preparatory
to retirement
The High Court agreed with the contention for the
respondent and dismissed the appellant's petition. On the
appellant's application, it granted the necessary certificate
under Art. 133(1) ( c) of the Constitution. ·
The appellant has questioned the correctness of the
impugned orders, broadly speaking, on two grounds. One
is that the rules governing his service did not empower the
Governor to pass the impugned orders. The second is
that the impugned orders were passed mala fide as the
Chief Minister, who was in charge of the department of
Health, bore ill-will towards him.
The first contention has been urged before us in various
ways and we deal with the more salient and important aspects urged to support the contention that the impugned
orders could not have been passed by the Governor in
view of the various rules.
It is contended that leave, once sanctioned, cannot be
revoked after the officer has proceeded on leave. He can
only be recalled to duty. The appellant was not recalled
to duty as he was not posted to any post of a civil surgeon.
Rule 8.15 of the 1959 rules reads :
"Leave cannot be claimed as of right. When the
exigencies of the public services so require, discretion
to refuse or revoke leave of any description is reserved
to the authority empowered to grant it.
*
"
*
"
*
*
It follows therefore that the authority granting leave has
the discretion to revoke it. There is no restriction on the
power of revocation with respect to the time when it is
to be exercised. It can be exercised before the officer to
whom leave was granted proceeds on leave. It can also
be revoked after he has proceeded on leave. Revocation of leave simply means cancelling the leave granted.
-
-
4 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
1963
The exigency necessiating the revocation of leave may
arise after the officer has proceeded on leave. Rule 8.3 has S. Pratap Singh
no bearing on the question as it provides that the rules
v.
following it govern the procedure for making applications
The State of
Punjab
for leave and for granting leave in India. It deals with the
procedure and not with the right of the officer to leave
Raghubar
or with the power of the necessary authority to sanction
Dayal, f.
or refuse leave or revoke leave. Rule 8.42 deals with matters incidental to the recall from leave and in no way
affects the discretion of the authority to revoke leave. In
fact, recall to duty must follow the revocation of the leave
with respect to the period not availed of till then.
The next contention is that when a Government servant proceeds on leave preparatory to retirement, he ceases
to hold office and to be in the employment of Government
and that in fact he practically retires on the date he avails
of the leave and consequently no question of his suspension can arise. This contention, again, has no force. A
Government servant is in service till his service terminates
and the service can terminate only by dismissal, removal
or retirement. The date from which a Government servant is on leave preparatory to retirement cannot be treated
as the date of his retirement from service.
It is also urged that a Government servant on leave
preparatory to retirement cannot be suspended as suspension means a person's ceasing to work on the post he holds
and the public servant on such kave holds no office or post
and therefore he cannot be effectively suspended. Suspension of a Government servant, during the course of his
service, simply means that no work is to be taken from
him during the period of suspension. The Government servant does l!Ot work on a post during the period of
his suspension. If he is actually discharging the duty
of a certain office prior to suspension, · the order of
suspension would mean that he would cease to work
on and discharge the duties of that post. If at that
time he is not working on any post but is on leave,
no question of his actually ceasing to work or giving
up the discharge of duty arises, but that does not mean
that the order of suspension would be ineffective. The
Government servant, during suspension or on leave,
holds a lien on his permanent post in view of r. 3.13 unless
his lien is suspended or is transferred under the appropriate
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
rule and so has a title to hold that post when under suspension or on leave.
S. Pratap Singh
We may refer to the case reported as Khem Chand
v.
v.
Union
of India(') wherein the rule that a Government
The State of
Punjab
servant be deemed to be on suspension during the period
between the date of dismissal and the date of its being set
Raghubar
aside, was held valid. Suspension during such period is
.Dayal,/.
analogous to suspension during the period of leave after
revocation of leave for that period.
Another contention is that the order revoking the
leave must precede the order of suspension, ·and as the
order of suspension was before the revocation of his leave
it is bad. We do not agree with this contention. Notifications about the suspension and revocation of leave from
June 3, 1961, were issued on June 3, 1961. The order of
suspension bears an earlier number than the order about
the revocation of leave. The order in which the two orders
were issued does not affect in substance the validity of the
two orders so long as the Governor had the power to suspend the appellant and revoke his leave. Orders may be
issued in any sequence.
The next contention is that these orders of June 3
were actnally communicated to the appellant after the date
of his retirement and is therefore ineffective. The appellant's date of birth is June 16, 1906. The order of snspension reached the appellant, according to his statement, on
June 19, 1961, though it was despatched by the Director,
Health Services, Punjab, on June 3, 1961. The envelope
containing the letter was addressed to the appellant by his
Kanpur address which he appeared to have furnished to
the office. The appellant was apparently not at Kanpur
when the letter reached him and the letter took unduly
long on being redircted to the address where it was delivered to the appellant. There is not sufficient material on the
record to show when it was redirected and what caused
this delav. The Director, Health Services, not only addressed ai;i ;rdinary cover under postal certificate to the appellant but also followed it up by a registered letter on
June 5. The Government, not having received an acknowledgement of the appellant with respect to the receipt of the
orders of suspension etc., published the orders in the Punjab
(1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 229.
.
4 S.C.R.
.
-
-
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
Government Gazette extraordinary dated June IO. Ordinarily, the notification about these orders would have been
published in the Gazette in due course. They were published in the Gazette Extraordinary as the Government,
it appears from the written statement, had the impression
that the appellant was avoiding the receipt of the letters
addressed to him. There was a reason for their anxiety
to see that the orders could be made known to the appellant
as he was due to retire from June 16, 1961. The newspapers
also, according to the appellant's own petition, published in their issues of June 15 about the notification
concerning the respondent in the Gazette Extraordinary. The orders of the Government ordinarily take effect
from the moment they are issued except when they cannot
be effective due to their nature. An order of suspension
of the appellant when he was on leave could be effective
from the moment it was issued.
The appellant was on leave and was not discharging
any official functions. If he had been actually on duty,
the order of suspension would have taken effect from the
moment it reached him and from which moment alone
the appellant could have complied with that order by
ceasing to work any further in the discharge of his duties.
It is therefore immaterial whether the publication of the
orders in the Gazette Extraordinary amounted to sufficient
notice to the appellant of the various orders and whether
the letters communicating to him the orders reached him
after the due ·date of retirement. In the present case the
orders were effective from June 3, 1961, and their validity
and effect did not depend on the date of communication
to the appellant.
The case reported as Bachhittar Singh v. State of
Punjab(') is not apposite and does not support the contention. It was not a case of suspension. In that case a
Government servant preferred an appeal against his dismissal by the Revenue Secretary of Pepsu Government ta
the state Government of Pepsu. The Revenue Minister
recorded his opinion that instead of dismissing him he be
reverted to his original post. Thereafter, the State of Pepsu
merged with the State of Punjab. The remarks of the
_R~_venue Minister were not communicated to the appellant.
(1) AIR 1963 S.c-:- 395.
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Raghubar
Dayal, f.
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
Subsequent to the merger, the Chief Minister, Punjab, dismissed the appeal. This order was communicated to the
S. Pratap Singh
appellant. The remarks of the Revenue Minister of Pepsu
v.
The State of were held not to be an order of the State Government and,
Punjab
in the context of that case, it was said at p. 398:
"Before something amounts to an order of the State
Raghubar
Government two things are necessary. The order has
Dayal,/.
to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by cl. (1) of Art. 166 and then it has to be communicated."
The remarks of this Court in State of Punjab v. Sodhi
Sukhadev Singh(') and quoted in this case, do not go so
far and lay down that a final decision by the Council of
Minister becomes an order when the Rajpramukh acts upon
it by issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent.
The further following remarks should be construed in the
same context:
"Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by
that order before the State and that person can be
bound by that order. For, until the order is cominunicated to the person affected by it, it would be
open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter
over and over again and therefore till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more
than provisional in character."
These observations therefore refer to an order made in the
-cirrnmstances of that case. It is to be noted that in both
these cases, no formal order was at all made by the Government. The impugned orders in the present case were
formally issued by the Governor on June, 1961, and were
even published in tlie. Gazette extraordinary on June 10.
They were final orders. 01 course, the Governor could,
at any time, pass further orders superseding those orders.
The possibility of a cliange in the order is not the main
basis for considering whether a certain order is effective
or not.
The main contention of the appellant, however, is that
r. 3.26( d) of the 1959 rules is not applicable to him and that
if it be applicable, his case is not covered by the terms of
that rnle. The appellant joined the Punjab Civil Medical
( 1)
AIR 1961 S.C. 493, 512.
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
1963
Service, Class I, in 1947. At that time the Punjab Civil
Medical Services, Class I (Recruitment and Conditions of
S. Pratap Singh
Service) Rules, 1940, hereinafter called the Medical Rules,
v.
were in force. They were made by the Governor of PunThe State of
Punjab
jab in the exercise of powers conferred on him by cl. (b)
of sub-s. ( 1) and cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 241 of the GovRaghubar
ernment of India Act, 1935. Rule 13 of the Medical rules
IS :
-
-
"In respect of leave, pension and other cognate matters
not specifically mentioned in these rules, members of
Service shall be governed by such general rules as may
be framed in that regard by the Governor of the Punjab, under cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935."
The Punjab Civil Services Rules were also made by the
Governor of Punjab under s. 241 of the Government of
India Act and came into force from April 1, 1941. They
too were in force at the time the appellant joined service.
Rule 3.26 ( d) did not find place in the 1940 rules. The
1959 rules which, as already stated, really came into force in
1953, have this rule. It reads :
"A Government servant under suspension on a charge
of misconduct shall not be required or permitted to
retire on his reaching the date of compulsory retirement but should be retained in service until the enquiry into the charge is concluded and a final order
is passed thereon."
The contention for the appellant is that the rule with respect to the retirement of a Government servant relates to
a matter cognate to pensions and that therefore, in view of
r. 13 of the Medical rules, matters of his retirement would
be governed by the 1941 rules. We are of opinion that the
question of retirement of a Government servant on superannuation or otherwise is not a matter cognate to pensions.
Pension follows retirement and may be said to be incidental to it. Rule 13 of the Medical rules therefore does not
govern the terms of retirement of the appellant. It is
r. 17 of the Medical rules which would govern the matter
of his retirement. This rule reads:
"In all matters not expressly provided for in these rules
the members of the service shall be governed by such
general rules as may have been or may hereafter be
Dayal,/.
774
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Pt<njab
Raght<bar
Dayal,].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
framed by Government and by the provisions of the
Government of India Act, 1935."
It is clear from this rule that in the matter of retirement the
appellant would be governed by such general rules as
might have been made by the Government at the time the
Medical rules were made or as would be made by the Government subsequently. The latest general rules governing
the retirement of Government servants will govern the retirement of the appellant even if it be assumed that
the Medical rules still govern his conditions of service.
Rule 3.26( d) is therefore applicable to the appellant.
The further contention of the appellant is that this
rule applies to a government servant under suspension on
a charge of misconduct and therefore to a Government
servant against whom a formal departmental enquiry has
been instituted for enquiring into the charges of misconduct framed against him and that no such charge being
framed and no such departmental enquiry being instituted
prior to the order of suspension of the appellant on June
3, 1961, the order of suspension cannot be treated to be an
order under r. 3.26(d). We do not agree. There is no
Justification to give such a restricted meaning to the word
'charge' in this rule. The appellant refers to r. 7 of the
Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1952, hereinafter called the Punishment and Appeal Rules,
This rule reads:
"(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, no order of dismissal,
removal or reduction, shall be passed against a person
to whom these rules are applicable, unless he has been
given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
him.
(2) The grounds on which it is proposed to take
such action, shall be reduced to the form of a definite
.charge or charges which shall be communicate~ in
writing to the person charged and he shall be requtred
within a reasonable time to state in writing whether
he admits the truth of all, or any, of the charges, what
explanation or defence, if any, he has to offer and
whether he desires to he heard in person. If he so
,desires, or if the authority empowered to dismiss,
-
4 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
1963
remove or reduce him so directs, an oral enquiry shall
be held at which all evidence shall be heard as to such
S. Pratap Singh
of the charges as are not admitted."
v.
The State of
This rule comes into play only after a prima facie case
Punjab
is made out against a Government servant and not at the
state of a preliminary investigation into accusations made
Raghubar
against a Government servant. But it does not follow that
Dayal, f.
suspension is not permissible till this stage of making a
formal charge arrives. Rule 3.26(d) is of general application and therefore the expression 'charge of misconduct'
in this rule is not to be interpreted narrowly as meaning
'the charges formally framed and communicated to the
governmef!t servant concerned' with the intimation that a
formal departmental enquiry had been initiated against
him on those charges. The appellant's contention does not
find any support, as urged, from the last portion of this
rule which reads 'until the enquiry into the charge is concluded and a final order is passed thereon'. Of course, the
enquiry would be into the charges of misconduct on account of which the Government servant has been suspended and the suspension will continue till a final order is
passed on those charges. The requirements of the last
portion of this rule do not in any way lead to the conclusion that the enquiry into the charges refers to a formal
departmental enquiry into the charges framed and communicated to the Government servant in accordance with
r. 7 of the Punishment and Appeal rules. We are of
opinion that whenever any charge of misconduct is under
enquiry by the Government, be it informally or formally,
the Government is competent to suspend the Government
servant and if the requirements of the case require to take
action under r. 3.26(d).
It was contended that the appellant's suspension without calling him to explain the charges first, was had as the
proceedings to suspend him were of a quasi-judicial charact~r and the~efore necessitated the Government's obtaining
his explanat10n to the charges of misconduct before passing
the order of suspension. The order suspending the
G?v~rnfl1;ent servant pending enquiry is partly an ad:n1~1~trat.1ve order. . W~at has been held to be quasi1udmal 1s the enqmry mstituted against the Government
servant on the charges of misconduct, an enquiry during
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
776
[1964]
1963
.which under the rules it is necessary to have an explanation of the Government servant to the charges and to .have
S. Pratap Singh
oral evidence, if any, recorded in his presence and then
v.
to
come to a finding. None of these steps is necessary
The State of
before suspending a Government servant pending enquiry.
Punjab
Such orders of suspension can be passed if the authority
Raghubar
concerned, on getting a complaint of misconduct, consiDayal, J.
ders that the alleged charge does not appear to be groundless, that it requires enquiry and that it is necessary to
suspend the Government servant pending enquiry.
Explanation I to rule 2.2 (b), Vol. II, 1959 rules, supports the view that there can be suspension of a Government servant even prior to the issue of charges of misconduct to him, the Explanation being,
"Departmental proceedings shall be deemed to have
been instituted when the charges framed against the
pensioner are issued to him, or, if the officer has been
placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such
date''.
Bachhittar SinKh's Case(') is no authority for the contention that the initial order of suspension pending enquiry
must be made after obtaining the explanation of the Government servant concerned. That question did not at all
arise for consideration in this case.
In this connection we may also deal with another contention of the appellant that the 1941 or 1959 rules do not
empower the Government to suspend a government servant pending an enquiry. It is contended that the suspension contemplated by the rules is the suspension which
comes under r. 7.5, 1941 rules, or under rules 7.5 and 7.6
of. the 1959 rules. These rules do not invest the Government with the power of suspension, but only provide either
for certain periods during a Government servant's service
to be deemed to be periods during which he was under
suspension or during which he be placed under suspension
in view of the various exigencies mentioned in those rules.
No such formal rule is to be found in any of these rules.
The power of suspending a Government servant is vested
in the authority which appoints the Government servant in
view of s. 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
( 1)
A.LR. 1963 S.C. 395.
,
-
'
-
4 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
1963
The other substantial contention for the appellant in
connection witb the inapplicability of r. 3.26(d) to his case
S. Pratap Singh
is that, under the 1941 rules which governed his service
v.
initially, he had a right to opt for retirement on superanThe State of
nuation and that therefore the 1959 rules could not adPunjab
versely affect that right and empower the Governor to
Raghubar
retain the appellant in service after the date of superanDayal, /.
nuation without the consent of the appellant.
Rule 1.6 of tbe 1959 rules provides that nothing in
those rules shall operate to deprive any person of any right
or privilege to which he is entitled by or under any law
or by the terms of his agreement. Rule 5.28, Vol. II, 1941
rules reads:
"A Government servant in Superior service who has
attained the age of 55 years may, at his option, retire
on a Superannuation pension."
The contention of the appellant is that this rule gives him
the right to retire on superannuation pension on attaining
the age of 55 years and that therefore he cannot be retained
in service after he had attained that age without his consent, that he cannot be deprived of this right by the 1959
rules and that therefore r. 3.26(d) could not be applicable
to him after he had attained the age of 55 years.
There is nothing corresponding to r. 5.28 of Vol. II of
1941 rules in Vol. II of the 1959 rules. It appears that
r. 5.28 of the latter volume was cancelled. When the retirement of the appellant, as already held, is governed by the
1959 rules and not by the 1941 rules, the right, if any, given
by the 1941 rules to the appellant to opt for retirement
could not be said to be a right which comes within r. 1.6
of the 1959 rules as rule 1.6 preserves such rights to which
the Government servant be entitled by or under any law
or by the terms of his agreement. It contemplates such
rights which the law in force gives to the Government
servant at the time the 1959 rules are in force. When the
1941 rules do not govern him now, it cannot be said that
he has a right to opt for retirement on attaining the age
of 55.
Rule 5.28, aforesaid, is in Vol. II of the 1941 rules
which embodies the rules relating to pensions and provident fund and therefore the proper interpretation of that
rule would be that it provides for and permits the grant
50-2 S. C. lndia/64
778
1963
·s. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Raghubar
Dayal, f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1%4]
of superannuation to a government servant who has opted
to retire after attaining tile age of 55 years on being required by the Government, in the exercise of its powers
under r. 3.26 of Volume I, to continue in service. This is
clear from the sequence of rules in Volume II. Section
4 of Chapter V deals with superannuation pension. Its
part I deals with conditions of grant. This part has got
three rules 5.27, 5.28 and 5.29. The other part deals with
procedure. Now, r. 5.27 provides that superannuation pension is granted to a Government servant in superior service entitled or compelled to retire ~t a particular age. This
rule refers to the Government servant to whom superannuation pension is granted. Rule 5.28 follows this rule
under the heading 'conditions of grant' and therefore is
to be interpreted to mean that superannuation pension can
be granted to a Government servant in superior service
who is retired at his option after he has attained the age
of 55 years.
Assuming however that the appellant had a right to
retire on attaining the age of 55 years in view of this rule
or r. 3.26(a), that right is subject tor. 3.26(d) in as far
as this rule provides that no Government servant would
be permitted to retire on his reaching the date of compulsory retirement if he be under suspension on a charge of
misconduct.
It is also contended that r. 3.26(d) applies to those
Government servams whose date of compulsory retirement,
i.e., the date on reaching which they could be retired or
permitted to retire, precedes the date of superannuation
on which date they must retire. There is nothing in this
rule or in note no. 3 to r. 3.26 which should make us construe the expression 'date of compulsory retirement' to be
the date on reaching which they can be retired or permitted to retire prior to the actual date of superannuation. No
such rule was really necessary for such cases as it was not
incumbent on the State to require the officers reaching such
an age to retire. Requiring them to retire at that age
was an option with the Government. The expression
'date of coinpulsory retirement' in r. 3.26( d) must really
refer to the dates mentioned in the earlier clauses of r. 3.26
and they are tho'e on which the Government servant
attains the age of 55 years or any of the ages mentioned
•
A
;,
{
~·
..
...--
-
4 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
779
in clauses (b) and ( c) of that rule. Clause (b) provides
that certain Government servants should be required to
-
;..,
retire at the age of 60. Clawe (c)(i) provides for the
retirement of certain officers on reaching the age of 55
years and empowers the Government, however, to require
them to retire on reaching the age of 50 years in certain
circumstances. The expression 'required to retire' would
certainly refer to these officers whose cases come within the
preYiom clauses of r. 3.26 and may also be applicable to
GoYernment servants who may be required to retire under
any other rule in particular circumstances. The width of
the rule cannot clearly make the rule inapplicable to the
cases covered by the earlier clauses of r. 3.26.
The expression 'permitted to retire', again, would
refer to cases where the Government servant opts to retire
in vie..y of certain rules providing for his exercising such
an option. _. ,
The following observations at p. 579 of the case reported as The State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M.
Doshi (1) do not support the contention of the appellant.
They simply mean that the question under consideration
in that case could arise in those circumstances, the observation being:
"It should be added that questions of the above character could arise only when the rules fix both an age of
superannuation and an age for compulsory retirement
and the services of a civil servant are terminated between these two points of time."
The question raised in that case was whether the order
of compulsory retirement amounted to an order of dismissal
or removal or not.
We are therefore of opinion that the appellant had no
absolute right to opt for retirement on his attaining the
age of superannuation, that any such option was subject
to r. 3.26( d) which applies to him and that his case comes
under that rule as he was on the date of his compulsory
retirement under suspension on charges of misconduct.
It is true that no question of Government retaining a
Government servant in service on his attaining the age of
55 years arises if the officer had once retired on attaining
that age. If the Government desires to have the advant;ige
--c'f [J958f S.C.R. 571.
1963
S. Pr•UfJ Si#gh
T.
The State of
p..µ,;
Raghubar
D1yal, /.
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
of his services after he had retired, the only course open to
the Government is to reemploy him. No such situation
S. Pratap Singh
however arises in the present case when the impugned
v.
orders suspending the appellant, revoking his leave subseThe State of
quent to that date and retaining him in service after the
Punjab
date of superannuation in view of r. 3.26(d) had been
Raghubar
made prior to the date on which he was to attain the age
Dayal, /.
of 55 years.
It has also been contended that r. 3.26(d) infringes
the fundamental rights of the appellant as a citizen of
India under Art. 19 and 23 of the Constitution. We do
not agree. Rule 3.26(d) simply provides that the service
which the appellant took up voluntarily and on conditions
as be laid down by the relevant rules would continue in
certain circumstances even though the Government servant
has attained the age of superannuation. Further, ~'1Y restriction the rule imposes on any alleged fundamental right
under els. (f) and (g) of Art. 19 is a reasonable restriction
in the interests of the general public. The services to be
rendered by the Government servant subsequent to such an
age, in view of r. 3.26( d), is in no sense a service which can
. be equated with the expression 'begar' or 'forced labour' in
Art. 23. The appellant is not forced to do any work. He
remains under suspension and does no work. Even if it
be assumed that the retention in service of the Government
servant, in view of the provisions of r. 3.26(d), can come
within the expression 'forced labour' this rule would be
valid in view of Art. 23(2) which provides that nothing
in that Article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes. We are of opinion
that such retention would be for a public purpose, as it
is in the larger interests of the efficiency of the services
that a Government servant should remain within the control of the Government so long as the departmental enquiry against him on a charge of misconduct is not concluded and final orders are not passed.
It was also contended that some of the charges framed
against the appellant, if true, would constitute criminal
offences and that therefore criminal prosecution should have
been launched against him in place of the departmental
proceedings. There is nothing in the rules or the general
law which would support this contention. It is for the
...
-
-
4 s.c.R.
-
>
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
781
1963
Government to decide what action should be taken against
the Government servant for certain misconduct. Such a
S. Pra14p Sinzh
discretion in the Government does not mean that the prov.
vision for the departmental enquiry on such charges of
The SltJte of
misconduct is in violation of the provisions of Art. 14.
P11niab
The service rules apply equally to all the members of the
Raghubar
service i.e., to all persons similarly placed and are not
Dayal, f.
therefore discriminatory. The Government has the discretion in every case, considering the nature of the alleged
misconduct and other circumstances, whether a criminal
prosecution should be launched or not. The Government
is also free to conduct departmental proceedings after the
close of the criminal proceedings, if instituted._ There is
therefore nothing illegal in the Government instituting the
departmental proceedings against the appellant.
Before dealing with the allegation about the impugned
orders being made mala fide, we may deal with certain
general points raised by the appellant.
A grievance has been made that Sardar Pratap Singh
KaiFOn, the Chief Minister, was not made a party to the
proceedings on the writ petition. The appellant did not
implead him in the first instance. It was after the decision
of this Court in R. P. Kapur v. Sardar Pratap Singh
Kairon (1) that the appellant applied for the impleading of
the Chief Minister as the respondent in the petition. That
application was rejected by the High Court as no relief
had been claimed against him. The order cannot be said
to be wrong when the only ground mentioned for impleading the Chief Minister as a party was to make it incumbent on him to file an affidavit, which he was not
legally obliged to, if he was not a party.
A number of affidavits sworn by Mrs. Sodhi, Pahwa,
Yog Raj, Om Prakash, Surendra Singh Kairon and Kirpa
Singh were filed on behalf of the respondent in the Court
below. It is now contended that these affidavits should not
have been taken into consideration when no reference to
them has been made in the written statement filed on
behalf of the respondent. No such objection seems to have
been raised in the Court below. The allegations in the
petition and the affidavit of the appellant with respect to
matters concerning these persons were not accepted by the
(') [1961] 2 S.C.R. 143.
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
respondent. It was therefore not improper or irregular or
illegal for the State to have secured these affidavits and to
S. Pratap Singh
have filed them in Court. In fact, it should have secured
v.
The State of affidavit from the Chief Minister, Mrs. Kairon, the Inspector-General of Prisons and the Vigilance Inspector about
Punjab
the allegations concerning them. There is therefore no
Raghubar
force in this contention.
Dayal, f.
It has been contended that the allegations of facts made
by the appellant in the petition being not specifically controverted in the written statement and being not denied
by the persons most competent to deny them, should be
taken to be established. The contention really refers to the
allegations made against the Chief Minister and his wife
and about certain matters in the tape record.ed conversation
the appellant had with the LG. of Prison and the Vigilance
Inspector. The appellant has filed a rendering of the conversation alleged to have taken place between him and
these persons. These persons have not denied, by their
own affidavits, that they did not have the alleged conversations with the appellant, even though the officers of the
St_ate, on the application of the State, were allowed to listen
to the recorded tape conversation and to prepare their own
tape records of the renderings of the tape recordings filed
by the appellant in Court in order to enable the State to
verify the appellant's allegation that the tape-recorded
talks were between the appellant and the persons alleged.
Absence of such affidavits can at best lead the Court to
accept what was alleged to be stated by these persons in
the conversations, but cannot be sufficient to establish what
the person talking states to be the statements of other
persons. The tape recorded conversation between the appellant and the other person talking with him can only
be corroborative evidence of the statement of appellant
that the other persons had made such and such statements,
but cannot be direct or primary evidence that the third
person had stated what the other speaker had told the
appellant.
The High Court did not rely on the renderings of the
tape recorded conversation in view of the fact that such
tape recording can be tampered with. Tape recordings
can be legal evidence by way of corroborating the statements of a person who deposes that the other speaker and
-
-
4,S.C.R.
•
>
>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
1963'
he carried on that conversation or even of the statement of
a person who may depose that he over-heard the converS. Pratap Singh
sation between the two persons and what they actually
v.
stated had been tape recorded. Weight to be given to such
The State of
Punjab
evidence will depend on the other factors which may be
established in a particular case. It cannot be held, and it
Raghubar
has not been so held by the Court below, that the record
Dayal, f.
of the conversation on a tape record is not admissible in
evidence for any purpose and therefore we need not say
anything more about it.
The appellant did not give full details of his allegations
with respect to the reawns for the Chief Minister's being
displeased with him. He made certain statements in indefinite terms in the petition. He did not make them more
specific. His explanation for this is that he did oo as there
had been no specific denial of the general allegations by
the persons concernea. This is no good explanation for
his not making definite assertions of fact which could be
helpful to the Court in determining whether those facts
would have constituted good reasons for the Chief Minister's displeasure and for his acting malafide in getting the
various orders issued by the Governor. It was really for
the appellant, in the first instance, to make definite allegations in his p~tition. If he makes indefinite allegations,
there is nothing for the other party or the persons concerned to deny. They can take advantage of the vagueness
of the appellant's own allegations. Their reticence in that
regard cannot give an advantage to the appellant when he
himself is in default in not making definite allegations.
We now deal with the allegation that the Chief Minister bore ill-will against the appellant for certain reasons and
that the impugned orders were made malafide.
The Chief Minister's son, Surendra Singh Kairon, contracted a disease for which he had to be operated in April
1960. The Chief Minister asked the appellant to perform
the operation secretly, outside Jullunder. The appellant did
so. Surendra, however, before he was completely cured,
left Jullunder for a few days. This annoyed his mother
who conveyed to the appellant that the Chief Minister was
~dignant at the. appellant's inability to ensure that the boy
not ~eave !Us place. Thi~ .incident, it is alleged, culffiJnated rn acrimony and hosnlity on the part of the Chief
<li?
784
196}
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Minister towards the appellant. There is no allegation that
the boy suffered on account of his leaving the appellant's
S. Pratap Singh
house
prior to his being cured completely. There is nothing
v.
in
the
record of the alleged conversation between the
The State of
appellant and the wife of the Chief Minister, tape
Punjab
recorded talks nos. 6 and 2 in April and May respectively,
Raghubar
to show that the Chief Minister had asked the appellant to
Dayal,/
perform the operation. Any statement attributed to the
Chief Minister, by his wife, even if the talk was with her,
is not evidence of what the Chief Minister had stated, as
Sardarni Pratap Singh Kairon has not been examined.
Surendra has denied, in his affidavit, the appellant's performing any operation on him at the relevant time. In
these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the Chief
Minister did ask such a favour from the appellant and that
even if the appellant's allegation is correct, he felt so annoyed with the appellant at Surendra's leaving Jullunder for
a few days, be it from the house of the appellant or
from the Circuit House, as to break all such friendship with the appellant as has been alleged by him and
swing over to the other extreme and harbour such grudge
against him as to abuse his position as the Chief Minister,
get unjustified enquiries launched against him and get the
impugned orders passed.
Another allegation is that the Chief Minister himself
and his family members, made numerous recommendations
asking for undue favours pertaining to the sphere of the
appellant's duties and that when they went beyond the
limits of endurance, the appellant expressed his inability
to comply with some of the extremely unreasonable
demands. In support of this contention, the appellant filed
documents of the B-series, nineteen in number. None of
these documents, by itself, would show that the appellant
was asked to act in a manner which may be said to be not
in keeping with the proper discharge of his official duties.
The contents, by themselves, show that the writers, who
included the Chief Minister, his sons Surendra and Girendra
and his brother Jaswant Singh, recommended to the appellant certain persons for treatment, for admission in the
hospital or for grant of medical certificates. It is not to
be presumed that untrue certificates were required to be
issued. The appellant does not state in what manner he
4 S.C.R.
>
SOPREME COURT REPORTS
785
acted improperly and why he did so. The mere fact that
he was a friend of the Chief Minister would not justify
it. He held a responsible position and is expected to have
done his duty. In case he did not do his duty and thus
suffered from a weakness of character, his conduct can be
said to be due to his desire to remain in good grace with
the Chief Minister and thus gain some advantage in the
service, be it promotion, posting at a good station or protection from any adverse action in case he acted improperly
in the discharge of his official duties. There is nothing in
the petition to indicate how and when the Chief Minister
and the appellant became friends. The relationship between the Chief Minister and an efficient public servant
may be a close one, but would not amount to friendship
and therefore the explanation that the appellant showed
undue favours for some time to persons recommended by
the Chief Minister and his relations merelv on account of
friendship does not appear good and, even if the appellant's
allegation be correct, his showing undue favours would not
antagonize the Chief Minister. The appellant has not
shown which recommendations he did not comply with
and when such occasions arose. Therefore this allegation
does not establish the Chief Minister's bearing a grudge
against tlie appellant.
The other reason for the Chief Minister's grievance i5
said to be the appellant's ceasing to comply with the unreasonable requests of the family members of the Chief
Minister for medicines and other expensive articles. He
does not say which requests and when he did not comply
with. So long as he complied with those requests, they
would put him in good grace with the Chief Minister and
his relations. It is however denied that he did supply such
things. It appears from certain postal receipts filed by the
appellant that certain parcels were sent to Mrs. Pratap
Singh Karion in July and October 1957, March and
September 1958 and March 1959. The receipts do not show
that these parcels contained medicines. Tape recorded
talks nos. 1, 3, and 4 do refer to requests for and supplies
of medicines by the appellant. It is also alleged that among
the expensive articles supplied wer!'. two Singer sewing
machines. Cash memos for the purchase of two Singer
sewing machines by Sardar Bahadur Bagh Singh, father-in-
1963
S. Prataf1 Si111h
v.
T lie State of
Puniab
Raghubar
Dayal, f.
786
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1~64]
1963
law of the appellant in July 1959 and October 1959, have
been filed. In July 1959, a wooden box was sent to Mrs.
S, Pratap Singh
Kairon through Pahwa who was then the Traffic Manager
v.
of
the Punjab Roadways at Amritsar. Om Prakash brought
The State of
that box from the appellant's place to Pahwa. Both these
Punjab
persons, Om Prakash and Pahwa, have filed affidavits. They
Raghubar
describe the box to be of such a size that it could not
Dayal,/.
possibly contain the Singer sewing machine. Om Prakash
however had stated in the receipt, Annexure C. 9, that he
had received a box bearing label 'Singer Sewing Machine'
from Dr. Partap Singh. Tape recorded talk no. 3 in August
1959 records Mrs. Kairon's conversation about receiving a
machine and not liking it on account of its colour and
the appellant's telling her that they would deduct the
money in certain cont:lngencies. The State has not
filed any affidavit by her in denial of these statements.
The conversation shows that the appellant supplied a
Singer sewing machine to Mrs. Kairon and that some deduction could be made in the price in certain contingency.
There is no reason to disbelieve the appellant's statement
that he had supplied a Singer sewing machine and medicines to her. These supplies by the appellant would however ingratiate him with the Chief"Minister. There is
nothing on the record to indicate which requests for what
medicines and articles and when were refused by the appellant and thus gave cause for grievance to the Chief
Minister.
Another reason for the Chief Minister's harbouring a
grievance against the appellant is said to have arisen in
April 1960 on account of the appellant's asking the Chief
Minister's friend, Kirpa Singh, whom he had kept as a
guest for about 7 months, to leave the appellant's house.
Kirpa Singh was the Manager of National Motors at Jullunder. It is alleged in the petition that this firm was either
directly or indirectly owned by Surcndra Singh Kairon or
a close relation of his. This allegation is very vague. Both
Kirpa Singh and Surendra Singh have denied Surendra
Singh's having any concern with the National Motors at
. Jullunder. Kirpa Singh did stay at the appellant's house
in the alleged period. His letter Exhibit D-1, however
does not indicate that he felt annoyed at leaving the
appellant's house where he had stayed from September
-<
4. S.C.R.
--
-
·-,.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
1959 to the end of March 1960. In fact, Kirpa Singh,
1963
by his letter, expressed his thanks to the appellant. There S. Pratap Singh
could therefore be no reason for the Chief Minister
v.
to feel annoyed and bear grudge against the appellant on
The State of
account of Kirpa Singh not staying as a guest of the
Punjab
appellant from April 1960, even though Kirpa Singh
Raghubar
was a friend of the Chief Minister and was kept as
Dayal, /.
guest by the appellant at the instance of Surendra Singh,
as appears from the tape recorded talk no. 15.
The other two reasons for the Chief Minister's being
aggrieved with the appellant relate to what happened subsequent to April 1960. It is alleged that in September
1960, the Chief Minister sent a message through the Home
Secretary, Punjab, to the effect that he had been over liberal
towards the Akali prisoners in the District Jail. It is stated
in the written statement filed by the respondent that the
District Magistrate, Jullunder, made such a complaint to
the Home Secretary, who happened to be at Jullunder and
that the Home Secretary conveyed it to the appelbnt
at a meeting at which the Inspector-General of Prisons
and the Collector were also present. The matter was
closed as a result of what was talked about at the
meeting. Reference has been made in this connection
to the tape recorded conversation the appellant had
with the Inspector General of Prisons in November
1960. It appears from this conversation that exaggerated information had reached the Chief Minister and
made him send the message and that he was satisfied when
the I.G. of Prisons explained the matter to him. A Chief
Minister's sending a message to an officer about certain
complaint. received against him cannot be taken to indicate
his ill-will against that officer. He is bound to do so as
a part of his duty.
The next reason is said to be that the Chief Minister
had used the appellant extensively in the Karna! Murder
Case, off the record, when it was the subject matter of
an appeal. The Sessions Judge acquitted the accused in
that case in November 1959 and the High Court dismissed
the Government appeal in May 1960. The appellant did
his best to help the prosecution with instructions in connection with the medico-legal matters in the case and stated
to the Chief Minister that the outcome of the case would
788
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
~ favourable.
This is borne out from tape recorded talk
no. 7 recorded in April 1960. It is alleged that the disS. Pratap Singh
missal of the appeal by the High Court and the ultimate
v.
dismissal
of the Government petition for special leave to
The State of
P1mjab
the Supreme Ccurt in October 1960 displeased the Chief
Minister who expressed his displeasure to the appellant.
Raghtlbar
It can be imagined that the Chief Minister in these cirDayal,/.
cumstances would sarcastically speak to the appellant about
the strong assurances he had given about the outcome of
the case, but it is difficult to hold that that would make
the Chief Minister hostile to the appellant despite the
hardwork he had done, at his request, in helping the prosecution with the medico-legal aspect of the case. It is
significant to note that the appellant does not allege that
the Chief Minister expressed his displeasure to him in
May 1960, shortly after the High Court _dismissed the State
Appeal.
Another cause for the displeasure of the Chief Minister
is said to be the appellant's inability to comply with the
illegitimate contents of the instructions conveyed to him
by the Chief Minister in December 1956 in connection with
Dr. Dhillon's accompanying the Chiet Minister for a number of days as medical attendant. The nature of those instructions has not been disclosed. What part the appellant
played in the alleged subsequent developments with the
Accountant General, Punjab, and which were unpalatable
to the Chief Minister, has not been indicated. The incident took place in December 1957 and surely, even if true,
does not appear to have affected the aUeged friendly relations between the Chief Minister and the appellant up to
April 1960.
We have considered all the reasons set out by the appellant in his petition for the Chief Minister's bearing
grudge against him from May 1960 onward and are of
opinion that they, singly or cumulatively, fail to establish
that the Chief Minister had any grievance against the appellant.
The earliest definite incident which, according to the appellant, annoyed tlie Chief Minister, took place in the
beginning of April 1960, as Kirpa Singh was m:i.de to leave
his house at the end of March 1%0. We have held that in <
view of Kirpa Singh' s letter of thanks to the appellant, there
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
1963
could have been no cause for the Chief Minister to feel
displeased with the appellant. This inference finds support from the fact that the Chief Minister did not do any- S. Pratap Singh
v.
thing against the appellant soon after it, but on the other
The State of
hand, entrusted the appellant to perform an important
Puniab
operation secretly on his son Surendra in the end of April
Raghubar
1960, which could be only if he entertained good relaDayal, /.
tions with the appellant till then.
We have also held that the alleged inability of the
appellant to keep Surendra Singh at his place subsequent
to the appellant's performing the operation on him could
not have displeased the Chief Minister as no ill-effect followed. This view, again, finds support from the fact that
the Chief Minister did nothing against the appellant till
the end of October when an enquiry was instituted against
the appellant. The alleged incident about Surendra's
leaving Jullunder for a few days before he fully recovered
did not therefore lead to any animosity between the Chief
Minister and the appellant.
-
;..
-
>
The High Court, Punjab, dismissed the State appeal
in the Kamal Murder case in May 1960. The appellant is
said to have helped the prosecution at the appellate stage.
The Chief Minister could have had cause for dissatisfaction
but, as we have mentioned earlier, the dismissal of the appeal could not have given rise to such bad feeling in the
Chief Minister against the appellant as to lead to the
transfer of the appellant in October and to institute the
enquiry agaii;st him.
The recorded conversation between the appellant and
the LG. of Prisons in November 1960 tends to indicate that
the appellant's relations with the Chief Minister could not
have been bad in November 1960 as he had sought the
advice of the LG. of Prisons about his reporting to the
Government about the attitude of the District Magistrate
at that meeting. If the relations between the Chief Minister and the appellant were as bad as we are asked to believe,
such an idea in connection with the attitude of the District
Magistrate, even if it was improper, could not have occurred to the appellant at that time when the LG. of Prisons
himself had told him : 'In my opinion that matter was
hushed up'.
790
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
The appellant has, however, also urged certain matters as indicating the malice borne by the Chief Minister
S. Pratap Singh
towards
him and thus indirectly giving support to his alv.
The State of · legation that the Chief Minister had personal grievances
Punj•b
against him.
The appellant's transfer from Jullunder to Amritsar
Raghubar
was ordered in December 1960. Jullunder, according to the
Dayal, f.
appellant's statement in Court, i~ a coveted station for
Civil Surgeons. He liad over-stayed there the normal
period of three years. His transfer cannot be attributed to
malice of the Chief Minister, when an enquiry had been '(
instituted against him in connection with a complaint
regarding the discharge of his duties. Transfer, in such
circumstances, was the most natural order to be passed by
the Head of a Department. It may be that for the convenience of its officers transfers are usually ordered in
March and April and are not ordered shortly before the
period of retirement. But any transfer outside that period
or sometime before retirement, for administrative reasons,
cannot be said to be a transfer ordered ma/a fide.
The appellant's l:irother-in-law, who was officiating in
the Provincial Civil Service, Executive Branch, was ri:verted to the lower cadre on November 22, 1960, the reversion
being between the institution of a departmental enquiry
against the appellant and the orders of his transfer. This
is said to be evidence of the general ill-will which the
Chief Minister bore against the appellant. It is alleged in
the written statement that the reversion was on account of
the unsatisfactory conduct and work of the appellant's
brother. We cannot take this reversion to be mala fide as
there is nothing on the record that it has been so held in
any proceedings which could have possibly been taken by
the appellant's brother-in-law against his reversion. Subsequent cancellation of the reversion orders on his representation, as stated in Court by the appellant, does not, by
itself point to reversion being made mala fide.
The appellant preferred to take leave preparatory to
retirement and, as already stated, such leave was sanctioned to him. He proceeded on 1eave some time in December 1%0. Subsequently, things happened which could
have given cause to the Chief Minister for feeling aggriev- <
ed with the appellant. The Blitz of January 14, 1961 pub-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
791
1963
lished an article under the caption 'Punjab's latest scandal:
The sewing machine of Kairon family'. According to this
article, the Civil Surgeon paid the price for the sewing S. Pratapv.Singh
machine and supplied it to the Chief Minister's wife. It
The Sute of
also mentioned that the Roadways Official transported it.
Punjab
It de~cribed the appellant to be the henchman of the Chief
Raghub«r
Mini~ter and a handyman for his family members. It stated
Dayal,/.
that the Civil Surgeon is said to have despatched several
medicine parcels to the Chief Minister's wife by registered
post and that he was asked to supply them out of the hospital stock. It referred to the Chief Minister's son having
a garage in Jullunder and to the Boarding of the Manager
of the Garage with the Civil Surgeon. It also mentioned
about the recommendatory letters from the Chief Minister's ~ons, sister-in-law and brother to the Doctor. It referred to Dr. Dhillon's affair. Naturally, the Chief Minister
could have taken this article to be inspired by the appellant
and, more so when the appellant's wife published a letter
in the Blitz dated March 18, 1%1, practically admitting
what had been alleged in that article except such matters
which went against her husband. She stated that she
sent parcels of medicines by registered post and other
means to the wife of the Chief Minister and that the
Garage Manager stayed with them as required by the
Chief Minister's wife.
Between January and March, several things happened
which indicated to the appellant that the Government was
taking action against him. On January 17, 1961, the appellant received a letter dated January 13, 1961, from the
Inspector of Vigilance, District Jullunder, enquiring from
him about the place where and the date when he
could be contacted for ascertaining his view point on points
relevant to the enquiry ordered by the Punjab Government. This was in connection with the enquiry instituted
on October 29, 1960. It is alJeged for the appellant that the
Chief Minister could have seen the copy of the Blitz dated
January 14 at Delhi on January 13, 1961 and that he then
started vindictive proceedings against the petitioner and
used the Government machinery in a malicious manner
to satisfy his personal malice and vendetta. The implication
is that it was on the Chief Minister's knowing of the article
published in the Blitz dated January 14 that he directed
792
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1963
the Vigilance Inspector to issue the letter of January 13 to
the appellant for ascertaining the place and the date when
S. Pratap Singh
he
could interrogate him in connection with the enquiry.
v.
The. State of This is a far-fetched idea. The enquiry had been in pro_Punjab
gress since October 29 and it must have been in due ~ourse
that the Vigilance Officer wrote the letter dated January
&ghubor
13 to the appellant.
D~yal, /.
Whatever views the Vigilance Inspector expressed about
the various charges framed against the appellant in the taperecorded talk no. 16 on February 13, 1%1, even if they
be his real views in the matter, is no index of the fact
that the superior officers who had investigated the case had
formed a similar opinion and that the action taken by the
Government a few months later in formally framing
charges with respect to those matters was actuated by
malice. The letter, Annexure J, dated June 3, 1961 states
· that the evidence brought on record was sufficiently strong
to warrant serious action against him. Any views expressed by the Vigilance Inspector who had really no business
to express them when he was deputed to get the explanation
or the appellant's version about certain allegations against
him, is not sufficient, in our opinion, to look at this assertion in the letter with suspicion. In fact, if the Chief
Minister had started the enquiry in October on account of
malice and had prompted the Vigilance Inspector on
January 13 as a result of the publication of an article in
the Blitz of January J'), 1961, presuming that he had seen
that copy of the Blitz at Delhi on January 13, the Chief
Minister could have very well seen to the early submission
of the police report making out a case against the appellant
and would have taken action against the appellant much
earlier than June 3, 1961, when special steps had to be taken
to see that necessary legal action against the appellant is
complete before his date of retirement on June 16, 1961.
Surely, the Cliief Minister wuid have easily managed these
matters if he were actuated by malice and had been taking
keen personal interest simply with a view to wreak vengeance against the appellant who had the audacity to act
against his wishes even though he had submitted to them
for an appreciable time.
In February 1961, the appellant received a copy of the <
remarks entered in his annual confidential file for the
-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
1963
year April 1, 1959, to March 31, 1960: 'Professionally he is
reported to be somewhat about average. Yet, there has
S. Pratap Singh
been persistent complaints about his avarice and lack of
v.
integrity'. The appellant did not appear to have taken
The State of
any action in connection with the adverse remarks comPunjab
municated to him till June 29, 1961, except in so far that
Raghubar
he asked the Director of Health Services about the period
Dayal, f.
during which a representation against such remarks could
be made. In his representation dated June 29, 1%1, which
was submitted beyond the usual period for making representation, the appellant said:
"I atn constrained to point out that these observations
by Shri Kairon, Chief Minister (Govt. in the Health
Deptt.) do not reflect an honest opinion in the context of certain facts on record, a few of which are
outlined below."
and referred to the various matters stated by him in the
petition. The written statement shows that these remarks
were not made by the Chief Minister but were made by
the Secretary in the Health Department. We do not know
when these remarks were made. The mere fact that they
were communicated in February 1961 does not mean that
they were recorded near about that date. Annual remarks,
in the nature of things, must be made after some appreciable time from the close of the year as they are based on
the receipt of the remarks from the departmental heads,
who take their own time in submitting such remarks.
Even if they were made near about February 1%1, that
would not show that they were made maliciously on account of the Chief Minister's ill-will as, by that time, the
various complaints against the appellant which had come
to the notice of the enquiring officer, would have also come
to the notice of the Government. The complaints, according to the charge-sheet framed against the appellant, mostly
relate to the years 1959 and 1%0.
The tape-recorded conversations between the appellant and the Chief Minister and his wife were played at a
Press Conference on March 29, 1%1, at Chandigarh. This
led to some move for an adjournment motion in the Punjab Legislative Assembly on March 30.
In April 1961, the appellant's wife sent a pamphlet
'Acts of corruption by Shri Partap Sing Kairon and his
51-2 SC lnd;a'64
;
794
1963
S. Pratap Singh
v.
The State of
Puniab
Ragfiubar
Dayal,/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1'104]
family members' to the Members of Parliament and other
leading persons throughout the country. This conduct of
the appellant's wife would have again furnished cause for
grievance to the Chief Minister.
The question, however, is wh~ther these acts of the appellant and his wife giving cause for grievance to the Chief
Minister between January and A.pril 1961 can be said to
have led the Government to take the steps against the ap-pellant with regard to his suspension, revocation of leave,
extension of service and institution of a formal departmental enquiry out of malice or that such steps were taken
against him in due course. We are of opinion that the
steps cannot be said to be taken mala fide merely because
the appellant and his wife acted in a manner which could
undoubtedly provide cause for grievance to the Chief Minister. Nothing is on record to indicate why the appellant
and his wife felt so prompted as to have an inspired article
printed in the Blitz of January 14 and to have the appellant's wife's letter published in the Blitz in March 1%1
and her pamphlets distributed all over the country. Surely,
the appellant and his wife cannot be said to have done this
with the noble object of bringing the misdeeds of the Chief
Minister of Punjab to public notice and thereby to cause a
change for the better in the administration of the affairs in
the Punjab. The appellant was not a free man. He was
still in service, though on leave preparatory to retirement.
He was to retire in June 1961 and therefore he had to
observe the usual discipline enjoined on a public servant.
His wife too was not to act in a manner in which a public
servant's wife is not expected to act. It cannot be believed
that the appellant did not know what his wife was doing.
The conclusion is irresistable that the appellant and his wife
rushed to the Press so prematurely, even if they could be
said to be actuated with lauda~le. motives of bringing improvement in the administration of the State, to create a
shield for the appellant in case the police investigation that
was in progress against him culminated in the formulation
of formal charges against him and in the instituting of a formal departmental enquiry against him. The design was
on the part of the appellant and cannot be said to be
on the part of the Chief Minister, who can be responsible
4 S.C.R.
-
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
1963
for various orders of Government as the Minister-in-charge
of the department and as head of the Administration.
It has also been contended in connection with the alleg- Pratapv. Singh
ed m'ala fides that in view of r. 8.19 of the 1941 rules, the
The State
Government should have refused the leave in December
of Punjab
1960 if genuine complaints had been made against the apRaghubar
pellant and investigation was proceeding on them. The
Dayal,/.
leave was to be governed by the 1959 rules and r. 8.19 in
those rules did not make it incumbent on the Government
to refuse leave to the appellant in December 1960. The
rule is :
"Leave shall not be granted to a Government servant
whom a competent authority has decided to dismiss,
remove or compulsorily retire from Government ser. ,,
vice.
Government had not arrived at any such decision and therefore could not have and was not bound to refuse leave by
resorting to r. 8.19. Even the rule as it stood in the 1941
rules could not have justified the Government resorting to
it for refusing leave to the appellant. That rule was:
"Leave should not be granted to a Government servant who is to be dismissed or removed from service
for misconduct or general inefficiency, if such leave will
have the effect of postponing the date of dismissal or
removal, or to a Government servant whose conduct
is at the time forming, or is in the near future, likely
to form, the subject matter of departmental enquiry."
The rule was not mandatory. It was discretionary with the
Government to grant leave or not. The police was investigating into the complaint against the appellant in December 1960 and it would have been too much for the Government to form a definite opinion about the action to he
taken against the appellant then.
The grant of leave to the appellant in 1960 does not
therefore indicate that the Government had not received
any complaint against him by the time it granted him
leave and that the Government's subsequent action against
the appellant was mala fide.
Another submission for the appellant to establish his
case of mala fides against the respondent is that the Government having sanctioned him leave, need not have taken
recourse to suspending him and revoking his leave, but
796
1963
Pratap Singh
v.
The Suee
of Punjab
Raghub•r
Day•l, /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
could have taken adequate action against the appellant
under r. 2.2(b), Vol. II, 1941 rules, if he was found guilty
of grave misconduct as a result of the departmental prnceedings the Government was to institute against him. The
mere fact that Government took one type of action open
to them and not the other, is no ground to hold the Gov,
ernment action mala fide. Further, resort to r. 2.2(b) could
have been taken only if the appellant was found guilty
of grave misconduct and it would have been always a
debatable point whether the charges made out against him
established grave misconduct or simple misconduct. Action
under that rule can be taken only in limited circumstances.
We are therefore of opinion that it is not established
that the impugned orders were made by the Governor not
with the ostensible object of a proper departmental enquiry
against the appellant with respect to the complaints received against him, complaints found to have substance
by the police on investigation but were made with the
ulterior purpose of causing harassment and loss of reputation to the. appellant as he had been instrumental in
making public allegations tending to bring the Chief Minister of the State into disrepute.
-
We therefore dismiss the appeal.
BY COURT: In view of the opinion of the majority,
the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs
here and in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
•
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