P. C. WADHWA versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 August 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 598 | 1963 INSC 180
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 August 1963
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 720/1962
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 598
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 180
Text of the judgment
598
1963
August 27
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
P. C. WADHWA
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
(S. K. DAs, AcTING C.J., K. SuB~A RAo, RAcHUBAR DAYAL,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Police Service-Officer officiating in the senior tinie~scale
served with charge sheet-Before enquiry reverted to substantive
post-tvhether entitled as of right to promotion to senior scaleWhether order of reversion amounts to "reduction in rank"Constitution of India, Art. 311-lndian Police Service (Pay)
Rub, J 954, r. 3-lndian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, rr. 3,
4(1), 8, All India Service (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, 1955
Explanation 4, r. 3-lndian Police Service (Recruitnient) Rules,
1954, r. 3.
The appellant is a inernber of the Indian Police Service. I--le
joined the service in 1952 and \Vas confinned in 1953. In 1958
the appellant was promoted to officiate in the senior tin1e-scale
and was posted as Additional Superintendent of Police at Ferozepore, in the place of one Siasat Singh who was granted leaYe,
and his pay was fixed at Rs. 600.00 per month. He earned an
incren1ent and his pay was raised to Rs. 640.00 per month. In
July 1958 he \Vas served \.Vith a charge sheet and was called upon
to submit his defence and he submitted his reply. Before
the enquiry started he i,vas reverted to his substantive rank ot
Asstt. Superintendent of Police by an order dated November 3,
1958. I-Iis reversion was not due to "the return of the permanent
incumbent from leave or deputation" or for any ;;,idmin.i5trative
reason. Other officers junior to the appellant continued to offi.
ciate in the senior scale while he was reverted.
The personal file of the appellant which was produced both
before this Court and the High Court showed that the reason
given by the respondent for the reversion of the appellant \Vas
that he \Vas tried as Superintendent of Police and was found to
be immature and was not true. The file also n:vealed a note
made by the Senior Superintendent of Police on 6-10-58 to the
effect that as the regular enquiry into the conduct of the appel.
lant would take a long time it was advisable to revert him.
The appellant filed before the High Court of Punjab a peti~
tion under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India against the order
of reversion. The 1--Iigh Court disn1issed the pctitioll. 'The
present appeal was by way of special leave granted by this Court.
It \Vas contended that under the relevant rules governing the
Indian Police Service, a men1ber thereof was entitled as of right
to be promoted to a post in the senior scale as and when a vacancy (except a vacancy in the promotion guota) arose therein
and no one senior to him was available for that post, that
11pon the facts and circumstances of the case the order of reversion
was in effect a reduction in rank within the meaning of Art.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
311(2) of the Constitution and that inasmuch a• he was not
given an opportunity of shoiving cause against the said order ther~
was a violation of ~t.\rt. 311. I\elying on the principle laid do\vn
in Purshottam Lui Dhingra \'. Union of India, [1958] S.CJZ. 828
the appellant alternatively contended that the order of reversion
involved penal consequences and operated as a punishment.
The respondent denied that the appellant had any right to
be appointed to a vacancy to a senior scale as claimed by hi1n
since such appointment \Vas not automatic and it involved a process of selection. 'fhis bein~ the position the reversion order did
not amount to a reduction in rank so as to attract the provision
of Art. 311(2). As to the alternative contention of the appellant
the respondent re-plied that since the order of reversion \Vas made
for the reason that the appellant was found to he unfit and immature to hold a senior post, it could not be eai<l that his reve!'sion amounted to a punish111ent.
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Held : (per K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal an<l J. R. Mudholkar, JJ.) A consideration of the various rules would 1nake it
clear beyond doubt that a person in the junior ti1ne-scale of the
service is as much a cadre officer as one holding a post in ~he
senior ti.1ne-scale or a post ahove the time-scale. The efficiency
bar contained in r. 6(2) of the Pay Rules has no bearing on
the appointment of a person whose incre111ent has been barred
to a post in the senior scale. The wording of this rule lends support to the conclusion that in the service \Vhat counts is the
length of service of a member and not even whether he has
or has not passed the departn1ental examination. Had it been
the intention of the (}overnn1ent to bring in the elen1ent of
selection in ~o far as promotion of Assistant Superintendents
of Police to the posts of Superintendents of Police is concerned
exprc'.;S provisions would have found place in the rules.
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The whole scheme of the rules indicates that a person in
the junior scale of pay has a right to hold a post on the senior
scale of pay subject to the availability of a post in the senior~
scale of pay and his seniority in the junior scale of pay. If a
person ho_lding a post in the senior scale, though in an officiating
capactty, is found to be unfit to hold that post action will have
to be taken against him as required~ by r. 5 of Discipline and
Appeal llules because his reversion to a post in the lower scale
would a1nount to a reduction in rank within the n1eaning of Art.
311.
From the facts and circumstances of the case it is found tI1at
t~e appellant h~s not only been reduced in rank but his promotion to the senior scale also has been withheld and this could bedone only by holding a departmental enquiry.
:!'
The appellant was reverted to facilitate the <lepart1nenta!
enquiry a.gainst him and the order of the Government was therefore ma/a fide.
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union oj
India and
Anr.
600
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
Indio •nd
Anr.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
Held (per S. K. Das, Acting C.J. and 'N. Rajagopala Ayyangar J.) An officer in the junior scale has no right to go automa·
tically into the senior scale. On the contrary the suitability of a
cadre officer is a relevant consideration even in the matter of a
temporary appointment. The Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules,
1954, which provides for t\VO independent scales spread over\ a
period of years, seem to indicate that an officer in the junior scale
cannot claim such automatic promotion. The provision for
an efficiency bar at the stage "'·hen the salary of a junior officer
reaches Rs. 590.00 also lea<ls to this conclusion. The expression
"on appointn1ent to a post on the senior time~scale" occurring in
r. 4(2) and the provision in r. 8 which states that any member
of the service appointed to hold a post specified in Schedule II
shall be entitled, as long as he holds that post, to dra'~ the pay indicated for that post also support this conclusion. Explanation
(4) tor. 4 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1955, sho\vs clearly that a member of the service cannot claim
the right to officiate in a higher post merely by reason of his
seniority and even when he is officiating in a higher post
he may be reverted after a trial in that post or for adn1inistrative reasons and such a reversion does not amount to a
reduction in rank.
When a person is reverted to his substantive rank, the question of penal consequences in the matter of forfeiture of pay
or loss of seniority must be considered in the context of his substantive rank and not with reference to his officiating rank
fro1n which he is reverted for every reversjon must necessarily
1nean that the pay \vill be reduced to the pay of the substantive rank.
A matter of this kind has to be looked from the point of
view of substance rather than of form. All the relevant factors
should be taken into consideration and if on such a consideration
the conclusion is that the reduction is by way of punishment
involving penal consequences to the officer even though the Government has a right to pass the order of reduction the provisions of Art. 311 \vill be attracted and the officer must be given
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause ·against the proposed action.
On an examination of the facts and circumstances of the case
it is found that the appellant was reverted by way of punishment" but he \Vas given no opportunity of showing cause against
the action proposed to be taken against him. Therefore the
order of reversion was in violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution.
C1v1L APPELLATE JuR1so1cTION : Civil Appeal No. 720
of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated January 20, 1961, of the Punjab High Court in Civil
Writ No. 752/1959.
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4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
1963
The appellant appeared in person.
S. ·v. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General for India,
P. C. Wadhwa
Mohinder Singh Punnu, Deputy Advooate-General for the
v.
State of Punjab, N. S. Bindra, R. H. Dhebar, R. N. SachUnion of
they and P. D. Menon, for the respondents.
India and
Anr.
August 27, 1%3. The Opinion of S. K. Das, Acting
C.J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. was delivered by S. K.
S. K. Das
Das, Acting C.J. The Judgment of K. Subba Rao, RaghuAcg. C. f.
bar Dayal and Mudholkar, JJ. was delivered by Mudholkar, J.
S. K. DAS, Acting Chief Justice.-This is an appeal
by special leave. The appellant is a member of the Indian Police Service. He joined that service on October
3, 1952 as a result of a competitive examination ·held in
1951, and was posted in the State of Punjab. He was confirmed on November 30, 1953. The time-scales of pay
admissible to a member of the Indian Police Service consist of the junior scale, the senior scale and selection
grade ; see r. 3 of the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules,
1954. In pursuance of sub-rule (1) of r. 4 of the Indian
Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954. the Central Government made regulations known as the Indian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations, 1955.
Under these regulations, Punjab has 57 senior posts in
the Indian Police Service out of which some have to be
filled by promotion in accordance with r. 9 of the Indian
Police Service (Recruitment), Rules, 1954. T@ this aspect
of the case we shall advert later. The number of
junior posts is also laid down in the regulations. The
Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954, also lays down
in Schedule III-(a) posts carrying pay above the timescale of pay of the Indian Police Service under the State
Governments, (b) posts carrying pay in the senior timescale of the Indian Police Service under the State Governments, and ( c) posts carrying pay above the timescale or special pay in addition to pay in the time-scale
under the Central Government. The initial pay of a
direct recruit is fixed at the minimum of the junior timescale. The pay of a member of the Service in the junior
time-scale shall, on appointment to a post on the senior time-scale, be fixed at the corresponding stage in the
senior time-scale as shown in Schedule I of the Indian
39-2 S. C. India/64
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954; seer. 4 of the said rules.
The posts of Superintendents of Police are posts· in the
p, C. Wadhwa
senior time-scale.
v.
On January 27, 1958 the appellant was promoted to
Union of
India and
officiate in the senior time-scale and was posted as AddiAnr.
tional Superintendent of Police, Ferozepore. The order
dated January 18, 1958 stated that the appellant was perS. K. Das
mitted to officiate as Superintendent of Police and postAcg. C. /.
ed as Additional Superintendent of Police, Ferozepore,
vice Shri Siasat Singh granted leave from January 27,
1958. Because of this officiating promotion, the appellant's pay was fixed at Rs. 600.00 which is the lowest pay
in the senior scale. On April 19, 1958, the appellant was
transferred and posted as Additional Superintendent of
Police, Punjab Armed Police, Ferozepore. This post carried a special pay of Rs. 100.00 per month. The appellant earned one increment on October 3, 1958 and his
basic pay was raised from Rs. 600.00 to Rs. 640.00 per
month. On July 18, 1958 the appellant was served with
a charge sheet and was called upon to submit a reply in
defence. The appellant submitted a reply which apparently did not satisfy the Government. An enquiry was
ordered, and an officer was appointed to hold the enquiry.
However, before the enquiry started the appellant was
reverted to his substantive rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police by an order dated November 3, 1958.
The post of Assistant Superintendent of Police is a post
in the junior scale and the order dated November 3, 1958
stated that the appellant was reverted to his substantive rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police from the
date he was relieved and on reversion the appellant was
posted as Assistant Superintendent of Police at Amritsar. It is this order dated November 3, 1958 which is
the main subject of attack in the present appeal.
We shall presently state the grounds on which the
appellant attacks the order of reversion; but before we
do so, we may complete the statement of facts. The appellant challenged the order of reversion by means of a
Writ Petition filed in the Punjab High Court. This Writ
Petition was however dismissed as premature, on the
ground that the appellant had filed an appeal, permissible under the rules, to the Government of India against
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1963
the order of reversion and the appeal had not then been
disposed of. Subsequently, the Government of India dismissed the appeal by an order dated May 8, 1959. The P. C. Wadhwa
v.
appellant then filed a second Writ Petition in the Punjab
Union of
High Court out of which the present appeal has arisen.
India and
Anr.
This second Writ Petition was first placed before a single
Judge who referred it to a larger Bench. The Writ PeS. K. Das
tition was ultimately heard by Khosla, C.J. and Dulat, J.
Acg. C. /.
They dismissed the petition. The appellant then moved
this court for special leave and having obtained such leave,
has brought the present appeal to this court from the
order of the High Court dated January 20, 1%1 by which
the High Court dismissed the second Writ Petition.
We proceed now to state the main grounds on which
the appellant has attacked the order of reversion dated
November 3, 1958. The principal contention of the appellant has been that under the relevant rules governing
the Indian Police Service, a member thereof is entitled
as of right to be promoted to a post in the senior scale as
and when a vacancy (except a vacancy in the promotion
quota) arises therein and no one senior to him is available for that post; at the time when the appellant was
reverted, officers junior to him in the I.P.S. cadre of the
Punjab State were officiating in the senior scale ; therefore, the order of reversion made against the appellant on
November 3, 1958 was in effect a reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution for
it operated as a forfeiture of his right, and inasmuch as
the appellant was given no opportunity of showing cause
against the said order of reversion, there was a violation
of the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Alternative! y, the appellant has contended that on the principles
laid down by this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v.
Union of India('), the order of reversion made against
the appellant involved penal consequences and operated
as a punishment against the appellant both in the matter
of his pay and seniority ; it has been contended that the
order entailed loss of pay as well as loss of seniority and
postponement of the appellant's future chances of promotion ; therefore, although in form the Government had
purported to exercise its right to revert the appellant to
( 1 ) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
604
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
his substantive rank, the order of reversion really amounted to a reduction in rank by way of punishment, irrespective of whether the appellant had a right to be appointed to a vacancy in the senior scale. These are the two
main grounds on which the appellant has attacked the order
of reversion. He.has also raised a contention that the order
of reversion was malafide, improper and against the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
On behalf of the respondents, the main contention
has been that under the relevant rules the appellant had
no absolute right to be appointed to a vacancy in the senior scale as and when such vacancy occurred therein
and nobody senior to the appellant was available for it.
The stand taken on behalf of the respondents is that under r. 4(2) of the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954
appointment to a post on the senior time-scale is not
automatic, because such appointment involves a process
of selection ; therefore, there was no forfeiture of any right
of the appellant by the order of reversion made against
him and the provisions of Art. 311 (2) are not attracted to it. As to the alternative contention of the appellant
the reply of the respondents has been that the order of
reversion made against the appellant was not made by way
of punishment. In their written statements, the respondents have stated that the order of reversion was
not made as a measure of punishment or penalty, but
was made because the appellant who was tried as officiating Superintendent of Police was -not found fit and
ripe enough for being entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of a Superintendent of Police. It was further
averred that the departmental enquiry instituted against
the appellant had nothing to do with the order of reversion. The respondents relied on Explanation ( 4) to r. 3
of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1955, which says that the reversion to a lower post of
a member of the service who is officiating in a higher
.post, after a trial in the higher post or ·for administrative reasons (such as the return of the permanent incumbent from leave or deputation, availability of a more suitable officer, and the like) does not amount to reduction
in rank within the meaning of r. 3 which deals with
penalties that may, for good and sufficient reasons, be irn-
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1963
posed on a member of the service. The respondents have
contended that as the order of reversion was not passed
P. C. Wadhw•
by way of punishment, it was unnecessary to ask the apv.
pellant to show cause against the action proposed to be
Union of
India and
taken and there has been no violation of the provisions
Anr.
of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The respondents have
also denied that the order of reversion made against the
S. K. Dar
appellant was malafide or improper or that it violated the
Acg. C. f.
fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.
We may now briefly state the findings which the
High Court has arrived at. The first finding of the High
Court was that the appellant did not hold the officiating
post of a Superintendent of Police as a matter of right
and his case was covered by Explanation (4) referred to
above; therefore, the order of reversion did not amount
to reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 (2)
of the Constitution. Secondly, the High Court found that
the reversion of the appellant to his substantive rank
of Assistant Superintendent of Police was not by way of punishment and the reasons which led to the framing
of a charge sheet against the appellant were not the reasons
which prompted the order of reversion. Therefore, the
order of reversion was not per se an order of punishment
and did not inflict any stigma or stain upon the appellant, nor was the appellant debarred from future promotion to the senior scale. The High Court did not deal
with the question whether the order was malafide nor
with the question whether the order of reversion violated
any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14
and 16 of the Constitution, presumably because these were
not pressed in the High Court.
We proceed now to consider the first point urged on
behalf of the appellant, namely, whether he had a right
to a vacancy in the senior scale as and when such a vacancy occurred, except a vacancy in the promotion quota.
It is perhaps necessary to explain here what the promotion
quota means. Rule 9 of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 says inter alia that the number of
persons recruited by promotion from amongst the members of a State Police Service (usually Deputy Superintendents of Police) shall not exceed 25 per ~ent of the
606
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
number of senior duty posts borne on the cadre of that
State. The manner in which the promotion quota of 25
per cent is filled is laid down in the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955. It
is sufficient to state here that a committee is constituted
to make a selection and a list of suitable officers is prepared. The selection for inclusion in such a list is based
on merit and suitability in all respects with due regard
to seniority. The Select List is considered from time to
time and after approval by the Union Public Service Commission, forms the Select List of the members of the State
Police Service from which the promotion quota is filled.
It is conceded on behalf of the appellant that a vacancy
in the promotion quota is not filled automatically and
that the regulations laid down in the Indian Police
Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955
clearly indicate that there is a process of selection in the
matter of filling up the promotion quota.
The argument of the appellant is that there is no such
selection with regard to vacancies in the senior scale
other than vacancies in the promotion quota ; therefore,
a member of the Indian Police Service who is in the junior scale is entitled as of right to go into the senior
scale in a vacancy other than a promotion quota vacancy,
provided that nobody senior to him in the Indian Police
Service is available for that post. In support of his contention the appellant has relied on the Indian Police
Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954, particularly
r. 6 thereof which says inter alia that there shall be prepared every year for each State Cadre a gradation list consisting of the names of all officers borne on that Cadre
arranged in order of seniority in accordance with the provisions of the said rules.
We are unable to accept this line ·of argument as
correct. Under r. 4 of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 recruitment to the Indian Police
Service is done by two methods: (1) by a competitive
examination ; and (2) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service. Under r. 3 of the Indian
Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 there shall be constituted for each State or. group of States an Indian Poljce Service c;adre. The strength and composition of each
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of the Cadres constituted under r. 3 shall be determined by regulations made by the Central Government.
P. C. Wadhwa
These regulations are known as the Indian Police Service
v.
(Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations, 1955. We
Union of
India and
have already stated that so far as Punjab is concerned,
Anr.
there are 57 senior posts out of which 14 have to be filled by promotion and 43 by direct recruitment. Amongst
S. K. Das
the senior posts are included the posts of the InspecAcg. C. /.
tor General of Police, Deputy Inspectors General of
Police, Assistant Inspectors General of Police, Principal, Police Training School etc. If the argument of the appellant
were to be pushed to its logical extreme, then a member
of the Indian Police Service would be entitled as of right
to all the senior posts including the post of Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspectors General of Police etc.
This, we do not think, can be correct, and indeed the appeilant does not so contend.
Under r. 8 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, save as otherwise provided in the rules, every
cadre post shall be filled by a cadre officer. That does
not however mean that a cadre officer is ei1titled as of
right to go into the senior scale or to hold every post
in the senior scale. The appellant has drawn our attention to r. 9 (b) of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954. That relates to the temporary appointment of
a non-cadre officer to a cadre post and the rule lays down,
inter alia, that a cadre post may be filled by a person who is not a cadre officer if the State Government is
satisfied that there is no suitable cadre officer available
for filling the vacancy. We <lo not think that that rule
shows that an officer in the junior scale has the right to go
automatically into the senior scale. On the contrary, the
rule seems to show that the suitability of a cadre officer
is a relevant consideration even in the matter of a temporary appointment. We think that the matter is governed by the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954.
Every person recruited to the Indian Police Service by
a competitive examination remains on probation for a
period of two years; see r. 3 of the Indian Police Service
(Probation) Rules, 1954. Thereafter, on his confirmation,
he starts on the junior scale. The Indian Police Service
(Pay) Rules, 1954, lay down two independent scales of
608
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P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr..
S. K. Das
Acg. C. f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
pay ; one is the junior scale spread over 19 years and the
other is the senior scale spread over 22 years. These two
independent scales spread over a period of years seems to
indicate that an officer in the junior scale cannot claim
the right of automatically passing into the senior scale
without any selection by the State Government, though
normally we apprehend that an officer in the junior scale
may expect to go into the senior scale if nothing is found
against him. It may be here stated that there is an
efficiency bar in the junior scale at the stage when the
salary of the officer reaches Rs. 590.00 per month which
corresponds to the eleventh year of his service. If every
officer in the junior scale has the right to pass automatically into the senior scale, then it is difficult to understand
the meaning of this efficiency bar -at the eleventh year ot
service. Such a bar would serve no useful purpose in
the majority of cases, because all officers would automatically go into the senior scale long before the eleventh year
unless they were kept back by way of punishment.
Rule 4 of the aforesaid rules lays down that the initial
pay of a direct recruit shall be fixed at the minimum of
the junior time-scale. R. 4(2) is important for our purpose and may be quoted here.
"4. (2) The pay of a member of the Service in the
junior time-scale shall, on appointment to a post on
the senior time-scale, be fixed at the corresponding
stage in the senior time-scale as shown in Schedule
I:
*
*
*
*
*
.,,
The learned Additional Solicitor-General who has argued
the case on behalf of the respondents has rightly drawn·
our attention to the words "on appointment to a post on
the senior time-scale" occurring in r. 4(2). His argument
is that those words indicate that the competent authority
must appoint a member of the Indian Police Service to a
post on the senior time-scale before he can claim the pay
fixed for the senior time-scale as shown in Schedule I ; in
other words, the argument is that the words "appointment to a post on the senior time-scale" show by necessary implication that the appointing authority has the right
either to- appoint or not to appoint a member of the
Indian Police Service to a post on the senior time-scale
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and there is no automatic advance from the junior to the
senior scale. We think that this contention of the learned
P. C. Wadhwa
Additional Solicitor-General is correct. Rule 8 of the
v.
Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954 is also relevant in
Union of
this connection and fortifies the argument of the learned
India and
Anr.
Additional Solicitor-General. That rule says that any
member of the Service appointed to hold a post specified
S. K. Das
in Schedule III, shall, for so long as he holds that post,
Acg. C. /.
be entitled to draw the pay indicated for that post
in the said Schedule. The rule makes it clear that there
must first be an appointment to a post specified in Schedule III and then a member of the Service appointed
to that post is entitled to draw the pay indicated in Schedule III. When we go to Schedule III we find that the
posts mentioned therein are classified under t9ree heads,
A, B and C. Category A relates to posts above the timescale of pay and includes the posts of Inspector General of Police and Deputy Inspectors General of Police.
The appellant concedes that to these posts there is
no automatic right to promotion. Category B relates
to posts in the senior time-scale and includes, so far as
Punjab is concerned, the posts of Assistant Inspectors General of Police, Superintendents of Police, Adju_tant,
Punjab Armed police, Principal, Police Training School
etc. Category C relates again to posts carrying pay above
the time-scale. The argument of the appellant, when proper! y analysed, is that with regard to category B posts
there is an automatic right, but not so to category A and
category C posts. This argument falls to the ground when
the terms of r. 8. are examined. The rule makes no
difference in the matter of the three categories of posts
specified in Schedule III ; on the contrary, the rule in
express terms says that any member of the Service appointed to hold a post specified in Schedule III shall, for
so long as he holds that post, be entitled to draw the
pay indicated for that post in the said Schedule. The
expression "for so long as he holds that post" is important and shows clearly enough that the appointing authority has a right to appoint or not to appoint a member of
the Service to a post in Schedule III. It is conceded that
such a right exists in the matter of category A and category C posts; but the argument is that no such right exists
610
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
in the appointing authority in the matter of category
B posts. \Ve do not see how in view of the express
terms of r. 8 any such distinction between category A
and category C posts on one side and category B posts on
the other can be made. In our view, r. 8 shows beyond
any doubt that the posts of Superintendents of Police
which are mentioned in category B of Schedule Ill
are posts to which an appointment must first be made
by the appointing authority and a member of the Service
cannot claim an automatic right to such a post. This
conclusion inevitably flows from r. 4(2) and r. 8 of the
Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954.
There is another aspect of the question. In exercise
of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 1) of s. 3 of the
All-India Services Act, 1951, the Central Government has
made rules known as the All India Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1955. Rule 3 of the said rules states
the penalties which may, for good and sufficient reasons,
be imposed on a member of the Service. Rule 5 lays
down the procedure to be followed for imposing those
penalties and states that no order shall be passed imposing any of the penalties specified in r. 3 on a member
of the Service unless he has been informed in writing of
the grounds on which it is proposed to take action
and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. In the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 19~7, a distinction is drawn
between penalties which are minor in nature such as censure, withholding of increments or promotion and recovery from the pay of an officer any pecuniary loss caused
to Government by his negligence, and other punishments
of a major character such as reduction in rank, compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service. No
such distinction appears to have been made in the AllIndia Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955
save for certain exceptional cases mentioned in sub-rule
(10) of r. 5. Under r. 3 of the said rules there are seven
kinds of penalties one of which is "reduction in rank including reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to a
lower stage in a time scale". There are certain Explanations tor. 3 of which Explanation (4) is important for our
purpose. This Explanation reads thus :
¥
'
-'
4 S.C.R.
}
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
1963
"The reversion to a lower post of a member of the
Service who is officiating in a higher post, after a
P. C. Wadhw11
trial in the higher post or for administrative reasons
v.
(such as the return of the permanent incumbent from
Union of
leave or deputation, availability of a more suitable
India and
Anr.
officer, and the like) does not amount to reduction in
rank within the meaning of this rule."
S. K. Das
The High Court was of the view that the case of the
Acg. C. f.
appellant was covered by the aforesaid Explanation even
though the reversion of the appellant was not caused by
the return of the permanent incumbent from leave or deputation nor by the availability of a more suitable officer.
The High Court took the view that the instances mentioned in the Explanation were not exhaustive and the
phrase "and the like" was intended to cover other instances
of reversion when reversion was not intended to
be by way of punishment or penalty. Whether the reversion of the appellant in the present case was by way
of punishment or penalty, apart from the alleged forfeiture of his right to go automatically to the senior scale,
is a question which we shall presently consider in relation to his alternative argument. At the present moment,
we are considering the question from the point of view
as to whether there has been any forfeiture of his right
to go automatically into the senior scale. In our view
Explanation ( 4) to r. 3 shows clearly enough that a
member of the Service cannot claim the right of officiating
in a higher post merdy by reason of his seniority and
even when he is officiating in a higher post he may be reverted after a trial in that post or for administrative
reasons and such reversion does not amount to reduction
in rank within the meaning of r. 3. The existence of
such a rule negatives the claim of the appellant that
he has the right to officiate in a post on the senior scale,
and any reversion from that officiating post amounts to
reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 of the
Constitution.
There is a third aspect of the question. We have
stated earlier that r. 3 of the Indian Police Service (Pay)
Rules, 1954 states that there shall be two time-scales of
pay, junior and senior, and also a selection grade. The
first proviso to the rule states that a member of the Ser-
612
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
vice holding a post in the senior time-scale may be appointed to a post in the selection grade and where he is
so appointed, he shall be entitled to draw pay of the post
in the selection grade. Here again the proviso talks of "appointed to a post in the selection grade". The words
show by necessary implication that an officer may or may
not be appointed to a post in the selection grade. Exactly
the same words occur also in r. 4(2) which we have earlier quoted. If the words "appointed to a post" are to be
interpreted in the same way, then there is no escape from
the position that there is no automatic right of appointment to a post on the senior time-scale.
We have therefore come to the conclusion that the
first contention urged on behalf of the appellant that he
has a right to go automatically into the senior scale is not
correct and cannot be upheld.
We turn now to the alternative argument of the appellant that in any view of the matter his reversion involved penal consequences to him within the meaning of
the rule laid down in Parshotam Dal Dhingra's case(').
Dealing with the question of reduction in rank, Das C.J.
speaking for the majority of the court in that case said :
"A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of
'punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the
Government servant has a right to a particular rank,
then the very reduction from that rank will operate as
a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments
and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no
right to the particular rank, his reduction from an
officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank
will not ordinarily be a punishment. llut the mere
fact that the servant has no title to the post or the
rank and the Government has, by contract, express or
implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce
him to a lower post does not mean that an order of
reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot
in any circumstances be a punishment. The real
test for determining whether the reduction in such
cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out
if the order for the reduction also visits the servant
with any penal consequences. Thus if the order en{1) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
1963
tails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his fu- P. C. Wadhrutr
v.
ture chances of promotion, then that circumstance
Union of
may indicate that although in form the Government
India and
Anr.
had purported to exercise its right to terminate the
employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank
S. K. Das
under the terms of the contract of employment
Acg. C. f.
or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by
way of penalty. The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the
use of such innocuous expression, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above namely, (1)
whether the servant has a right to the post or the rank
or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to. If the
case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be
held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal
or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank
and if the requirements of the rules and Art. 311,.
which give protection to Government servant have
not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be
wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right
of the servant."
The appellant has contended that his case comes under the
second test laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's
case('), namely that he has been visited with penal
consequences like loss of pay, loss of seniority and the
stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion.
This is an aspect of the matter which has caused us
great anxiety. The admitted position is that the appellant
was reverted to the post of an Assistant Superintendent
of Police by an order dated November 3, 1958. The reversion was not due to the return of the permanent
incumbent from leave or deputation or for any administrative reason. It is also admitted that officers junior to
·----rr [1958] S.C.R. 828.
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
the appellant continued to officiate in the senior scale
while the appellant was reverted. In its written statement
P. C. Wadhwa
the respondent State took the stand that the appellant
v.
was tried as Superintendent of Police and on trial he was
Union of
found to be immature. It was further stated that his reIndia and
Anr.
version had nothing to do with the departmental proceedings instituted against him on July 18, 1958. It
S. K. Das
appears from the judgment of the High Court that the
Acg. c. ].
personal file of the appellant was produced before the
learned Judges and on examining the personal file the
learned Judges found that the reasons which prompted
the appellant's reversion in the present instance were
not the reasons which led to the framing 0£ a charge sheet
against him. The same personal file has also been produced before us and we have examined it. The following
extracts from that file are relevant:
"As the regular enquiry into Shri Wadhwa's conduct
might take long, probably it will be advisable to shift
him from F erozepore some other place. His personal
file is placed below.''
This was apparently a note of the Senior Superintendent
of Police. It is dated October 6, 1958 and was marked
to the InsJ?ector General. Below that there is a note
of some other officer which begins with the following :
"Can't we revert him and then proceed with further
enquiries on the charge of not carrying out the orders
of his senior officers?"
Then it is stated that Mr. W adhwa is not yet ripe and
fit for the duties of a Superintendent of Police and then
the note says :
"We may, therefore, get the State Government's approval to his reversion on account of his unsatisfactory record. The departmental enquiry could be proceeded with after his reversion."
The extracts quoted above show that the appellant
was really reverted by way of punishment. The departmental proceedings were instituted against him on July 18,
1958. On 6-10-1958 it was noted that as the regular en.quiry into the conduct of the appellant might take a long
time it was advisable to shift him from Ferozepore. The
reversion order was thereafter passed and the ground suggested for reversion was unsatisfactory conduct. No details
~-
4 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
1963
of the unsatisfactory conduct were specified and the appellant was not asked for any explanation. In his writ
P. C. Wadhwa
petition the appellant stated that he has had a brilliant
v.
academic career and that no bad or adverse remarks were
Union of
ever communicated to .him; he further stated that he was
India and
Anr.
recommended for the award of the Indian Police Medal
for gallantry : only a month before the order of reversion
S. K. Das
he was given an increment of pay. The appellant's sugAcg. C. f.
gestion is that if his work was unsatisfactory, his increment would have been withheld. On all these grounds
the contention of the appellant is that he has really been
reverted by way of punishment though the order of reversion is expressed in innocuous terms.
We are inclined to agree with this contention of the
appellant. It should be made clear however that when a
person is reverted to his substantive rank, the question of
penal consequences in the matter of forfeiture of pay
or loss of seniority must be considered in the context of
his substantive rank and not with reference to his officiating rank from which he is reverted, for every reversion must necessarily mean that the pay will. be reduced
to the pay of the substantive rank. In the case before us
the appellant has not merely suffered a loss of pay which
was inevitable on reduction in rank, but he has also suffered loss of seniority as also postponement of future chances of promotion to the senior scale. A matter of this
kind has to be looked at from the point of view of substance rather than of form. It is indeed true, as was
pointed out in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case('), that the
motive operating on the mind of the Government may
be irrelevant; but it must also be remembered that in a
case where Government has by contract or under the rules
the right to reduce an officer in rank, Government may
nevertheless choose to punish the officer by such reduction.
Therefore, what is to be considered in a case of this nature is the effect of all the relevant factors present therein. If on a consideration of those factors the conclusion is that the reduction is by way of punishment involving penal consequences to the officer, even though
Government has a right to pass the order of reduction,
the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution are attrac(') [ 1958] S.C.R. 82 8.
616
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
Mudholkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
ted and the officer must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be
taken against him. Our conclusion is that in the present
case the appellant was reverted by way of punishment,
but he was given no opportunity of. showing cause against
the action proposed to be taken against him. Therefore
the order of reversion dated November 3, 1958 was in violation of the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution.
In view of this finding it is unnecessary to go into
the further question of any violation of the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
We would accordingly allow this. appeal and quash
the order of reversion passed against the appellant on November 3, 1958. The appellant will be entitled to his costs
of this court and the High Court.
MuoHOLKAR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave
from the judgment of the High Court of Punjab dismissing the appellant's writ petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution.
The appellant is a member of the Indian Police Service having been appointed therein on October 3, 1952 as
an Assistant Superintendent of Police on the basis of a
competitive examination held by the Union Public Service
Commission. He was confirmed in his appointment on November 30, 1953. On January 27, 1958 he was appointed to officiate as District Superintendent of Police, which
is a post in the senior scale of pay of the service, and was
posted as Additional Superintendent of Police, Ferozepore.
He was later transferred to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police, Punjab Armed Police, Ferozepore,
which post carries a special pay of Rs. 100.00 p.m. It may
be mentioned that at the date of his appointment as Additional Superintendent of Police he was drawing a salary
of Rs. 440.00 in the junior scale. But on being appointed
to the post of senior scale he drew the minimum salary of
Rs. 600.00 in the senior scale.
On July 18, 1958 a charge-sheet was served upon the
appellant to which he submitted a reply. On October 31,
1958 a departmental enquiry was ordered against him by
the Government under the All India Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and Mr. Bindra, Deputy Inspec-
l__.> ~
•
Jo(
4 S.C.R.
·--
-
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
1963
tor General of Police, Jullunder, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer. On November 3, 1958 the appeilant was re- P. C. Wadhwa
verted to the post of Assistant Superintendent of Police
v.
and posted at Amritsar. The appellant thereupon preferUnion of
India and
red a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab. The
Anr.
first ground on which the writ petition rested was that the
reversion of the petitioner from the post of officiating Mudholkar /.
Superintendent of Police to that of Assistant Superintendent of Police involved an element of punishment and that
as the provisions of the All India Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and those of Art. 311 of the Constitution were not complied with, his reversion was illegal.
The second ground was that the action of the Government in reverting him was mala fide. It is common
ground that persons junior to the appellant in the gradation list were either continued to officiate as Superintendents of Police after the reversion of the appellant or were
appointed to officiate as Superintendents of Police whik
the appellant continued to he Assistant Superintendent of
Police. The main question, therefore, for consideration
is whether the appellant's reversion amounts to a punishment.
The determination of this question would depend upon the answer to he found to another question and that
is whether the appellant, by virtue of his appointment to
the Indian Police Service had a right to be promoted to
and to hold the post of Superintendent of Police, if at
the time his turn came to officiate in that rank there was
a vacancy and he was not barred from stepping in because
of any punishment awarded to him as a result of an enquiry made under the Discipline and Appeal Rules. The
High Court, while negativing the contention of the appellant, observed that this Court held in Parshotam Lal
Dhingra v. Union of India(') that a Government servant
acquires a right to hold a post only in three kinds of cases :
the first is when he is substantively appointed to a permanent post in Government service ; the second is when
he is appointed to a temporary post for a fixed term ; and
the third is when a person having been appointed
temporarily to a post has been in continuous service for
--------- - - - - - --~.
1
( )
[1958] S.C.R. 828.
~0-2 S. C. lndia/64.
618
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
·v~
Union of
lndia' and
Anr.
Mudholkar f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
more than three years or has been certified by the appoi~t::----.,kil
ing authority as fit for appointment in a quasi-permanent capacity. The learned Judges, however, overlooked the fact that there this Court was interpreting the
Fundamental Rules and not rules applicable to an All
India Service, which have their source in the All India
Services Act, 1951 (LXI of 1951). It may be mentioned
that this Act applies only to two All India Services namely
the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police
Service and to no others.
Sub-section ( 1) of s. 3 of this Act empowers the Government to make rules for the regulation of recruitment
and conditions of service of persons appointed to an AllIndia Service. In exercise of this power the Indian Police
Service Recruitment Rules, 1954, were framed by the Government. Rule 3 provides that the service shall con...,. '
sist 0 f three classes of persons : (a) members of the Indian Police ; (b) members recruited to the service before
the commencement of the rules and ( c) persons recruited
to the Service in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules. The method of recruitment prescribed by rule 4
are : (a) by a competitive examination and (b) by proj
motion of substantive members of a State Police Service.
Rule 6 provides that all appointments to the Service shall
be made by the Central Government and no such appointment shall be made except after recruitment by one of the
methods specified in r. 4. Rule 9 provides for recruitment by promotion. Sub-rule (2) of that rule provides that the number of posts available for being filled by
recruitment or promotion would not exceed at any time
25% of the number of senior duty posts borne on the
cadre of a State. Sub-rule ( 1) of that rule empowers the
Central Government, in consultation with the State Gol
vernments and the Union Public Service Commission, to
make regulations governing recruitment and promotion.
In exercise of this power the Indian Police Service ( Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 were made
by the Government. It is sufficient to say that these
rules provide for the preparation of "select lists" in each
State in which persons belonging to state service were
selected by a committee and placed in their order of merit
and appointments to cadre posts i.e., posts in the Indian
l
4 S.C.R.
•
••
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
1963
Police Service were to be made in accordance with these
Lists. It would be relevant here to make a m.ention of the
P. C. Wadhwa
fact that according to the High Court a cadre post means
v.
only a senior post in the service, that is, the post of
Union of
India and
Superintendent of Police or a higher post. In coming to
Anr.
this conclusion the High Court has purported to rely on
the Indian Police Service Cadre Rules, 1954, framed unMudholkar /.
der sub-section (1) of s. 3 of All India Services Act.
Rule 2 (b) defines a cadre post to be one specified as such
in the regulations made under sub-rule (1) of r. 4. Rule
3 provides that there shall be constituted for each State
or group of States an Indian Police Service Cadre. Here
we are not concerned with a cadre for a group of States
but one for a single State. 'Cadre Officer', according to
the definition in r. 2(a) means a member of the Indian
Police Service. Rule 4(1) provides for determining the
strength and composition of each of the cadres constituted under r. 3. Rule 5 provides for the allocation of members to various cadres by the Central Government. From
these rules it is clear that once a person is appointed in
the Indian Police Service it is the Central Government
which allocates such person to the cadre of a State. No
State has more than one cadre and as soon as a person
appointed to the Indian Police Service is allocated to a
State he is borne on the cadre of that State. Consequently the post which he holds would be cadre post. These
rules do not differentiate between posts held in the
junior scale of pay and those in the senior scale of pay.
Rule 8 provides "Save as otherwise provided in these rules,
every cadre post shall be filled by a cadre officer" which
means by an officer of the Indian Police Service. Thus
it is immaterial whether the post is borne on the junior
scale of pay or on the senior scale of pay but so long as
the post is borne on the cadre of the Indian Police service it must be filled by a cadre officer and none else except of course as provided in the cadre rules. The only
other rules which have any bearing on this point in the
Cadre rules are rules 9 and 10. Rule 9 .deals with temporary appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre posts
and rule 10 deals with keeping cadre posts vacant. In pursuance of the power conferred by r. 4(1) the Central
Government has made regulations fixing the cadre
620
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
Mudholkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
streqgth for the State of Punjab at 82. The number of
senior posts is fixed at 57, 43 of which are to be filled by
direct recruitment and 14 by promotion. The total direct
recruitment posts is fixed at 68 and, therefore, 25 of them
must be junior posts. The cadre thus comprises not necessarily 0£ senior post but includes also junior posts. In addirion to these rules, the Central Government framed Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954 in exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section ( 1) of s. 3 of the All India
Services Act, 1951. Rule 2 (a) provides that 'Cadre' and
'Cadre post' shall have the meanings respectively assigned
to them in the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954.
Rule 3 prescribes the time-scale of pay admissible to
members of the service. The rules prescribe two scales
of pay-junior scale and the senior scale, in addition to the
selection grade. The junior scale is Rs. 350-350-380-380-30500-E.B.-30-770-10-850 (19 years). The senior scale is
Rs. 600 (6th year or under)-40-1000-1000-1050-10501100-1100-1150 (22 years). The selection grade is
Rs 1250. It also contains some other provisions which
are not relevant for the present discussion. Sub-rule (1)
of r. 4 provides that the initial pay of a direct recruit
shall be fixed at the minimum of the junior time-scale.
Sub-rule (2) of that rule provides that the pay of a
member of the service in the junior time scale shall, on
appointment to a post on the senior time-scale, be fixed
at the corresponding stage in the senior time-scale as
shown in Schedule I of the rules. Further, the rule deals
with promoted officers but with that part of the rule we
are not concerned. Rule 5 deals with regulation of irn;rements and cl. ( 1) of sub-rule ( 1) of that rule says that in
the case of a member appointed as a result of competitive
examination the increment shall accrue on the expiry
of each year from the date of his appointment to the service. The point to be noted is that where an Assistant
Superintendent of Police is appointed as Superintendent
of Police in the senior scale his annual increment falls
due not on the expiry of one year from the date of his
appointment as Superintendent of Police but by reference
to his initial appointment in the junior scale. Rule 6
deals with withholding of increments and r. 7 with grant
of advance increments. The heading of r. 8 is "Pay of
-..
4 S.C.R.
••
-I
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
1963
officers holding posts enumerated in Schedule III". The
posts in the Schedule are (a) posts carrying pay above the
Wadhwa
time-scale pay of the Indian Police Service under the P. C. v.
State Governments, specified in Section A, (b) posts carUnion of
rying pay in the senior time-scale of the Indian Police
India and
Anr.
Service under the State Governments including posts carrying special pay (in addition to pay in the time-scale)
Mudholkar /.
specified in Section B and ( c) posts carrying pay above
the time-scale or special pay in addition to pay in the
time-scale, under the Central Government held by members of the Service, specified in Section C. In category
(a) so far as the State of Punjab is concerned the posts
are those of Inspector General of Police and Deputy Inspector(s) General of Police; posts in category (b) in that
State are: Assistant lnspector(s) General of Police, Superintendent(s) of Police of District(s), Additional Superintendent( s) of Police and others. The posts in category ( c) are posts held under the Central Government and not under the State Government. It will be
seen that the posts of Superintendents of Police and Additional Superintendents of Police in category (b) are included in Sec. B of Schedule III. It is urged by the learned Additional Solicitor General that by the inclusion of
the posts of Superintendents of Police in sec. B of the
Schedule it is made clear that officers have to be appointed to the posts therein in the same manner as to posts in
Sections A and C. No doubt a formal order of appointment to all posts has to be made, whether an element of
selection is involved therein or not. But if the contention
means that appointments to posts in the senior scale
must be made by selection, we cannot accept it is sound.
The rule in question does not <lea! with the question of
appointment at all. Its heading clearly discloses its
purpose: that of indicatin& the pay of certain classes of
. officers. While the pays of posts in Sections A and C
are specifically set out in those sections, those of posts in
Section B are not. The heading of Section B merely describes the posts dealt with in that section as those carrying
senior scale of pay and provides mainly for two matters concerning such posts namely, calculation of selection posts and competency of the State Government to
grant special pay and allied matters. It will thus be seen
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1963,
that this rule has no relevance to the determination of the
question before us. A consideration of the various rules
P. C. Wadhwp_
would therefore, make it clear beyond doubt that a person in
v.
the
junior time-scale of the Service is as much a cadre offiUnion of
India and
cer as one holding a post in the senior time-scale or a
Anr.
post above the time-scale, such as those in Category (a)
of Schedule III.
Mudholkar /.
As to what is meant by senior post we must go to the
definition contained in the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954, also framed under subsection (1) of s. 3 of the All-India Services Act, 1951.
Senior post is defined thus in r. 2(g) :
" 'senior post' means a post included under item 1
of each Schedule to the Indian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre strength) Regulations, 1955, framed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, or any post declared equivalant thereto by the State Government concerned ;"
The senior posts in the cadre of the State of Punjab are
57 in number and include 18 posts of Superintendents
of Police and 5 posts of Additional Superintendents
of Police. Rule 3 provides that every officer directly recruited to the Indian Police Service shall be assigned a
year of allotment according to the provisions contained in
that rule. Rule 4 provides for determining seniority of
officers. Rule 6 provides that there shall be prepared every
year for each State cadre a gradation list of names of
all officers borne on that cadre arranged in the order of
seniority in accordance with the provisions of rules 4,
5, 5-A and 7.
Even though a large body of rules has been framed
by the Central Government governing the rights, privileges, discipline etc., of the members of the Indian Police Service, there is not a single rule which specifically
deals with the appointment of an Assistant Superintendent of Police to the post of Superintendent of Police. In ·
other words there is no specific rule which prescribes
the condition for transfer or 'promotion' of :i person holding a post carrying a pay in the ju!lior scale to a post
carrying salary in the senior pay scale. Nor again, is there
any rule which specifically provides that in so far as a
member of the Indian Police Service is concerned he
..
4 S.C.R.
1
,,
-
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
1963
has to be freshly appointed to a post carrying a salary
in the senior scale of pay. This may be apparently beP. C. Wadhwa
cause 'appointment' connotes only initial appointment to
v.
the Service.
Union of
India and
In this situation we have got to deduce the precise
Anr.
legal position from the large body of rules to which we
have referred. It seems clear beyond doubt that in so
Mudholkar f.
far as the Indian Police Service is concerned there is only
one cadre. Appointments to posts borne on that cadre are
to be made by direct recruitment except to the extent of
25% of the senior posts which may be filled by promotion
from the State Police Service, leaving aside for the moment appointments made by special recruitment or emergency recruitment. Now, according to the learned
Additional Solicitor General, what is guaranteed to a person who is appointed to the posts of Assistant Superintendent of Police is that he will be allowed to reach the
maximum of .Rs. 850.00 in the 19th year of his service in
the junior scale subject of course to his increment not
being withheld. His contention is that an Assistant Superintendent of Police has no right to hold a post carrying a pay in the senior scale even though according
to his seniority in the gradation list he may be eligible
for such a post. He emphasises that an element of selection is involved in promoting an Assistant Superintendent of Police to the post of a Superintendent of Police.
No doubt the junior time scale goes upto Rs. 850.00 which
would be reached by an Assistant Superintendent of Police in his 19th year of service and thereafter he would
continue to draw only that salary till he retires. But it
would not be right to conclude from this circumstance
that that is all that is guaranteed to him. We must take
into account all the relevant rules bearing on the matter.
There are also good reasons for providing a complete
time scale for the junior posts. Thus it may well happen that the senior posts are unavailable for a long period
because of having been filled by younger persons say as
special or emergency recruits. Or again, the Government may find an officer in the junior scale unsuitable
for holding a post in the senior scale and may either not
appoint him to or revert him from a post in the senior
scale. Thus, if after conforming to the appropriate proce-
624
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
dure the Government withholds the promotion of such
person or reverts him provision for granting increment
P. C, Wadhwa
to him had to be made so that he could expect to draw
v.
a
reasonably fair salary with the passage of time and not
Union of
be left to stagnate at a very low salary for the rest of the
India and
Anr.
period of his service. The argument of the Additional Solicitor General on the point cannot, therefore, be
Mudholkar /.
accepted. It is true that we are not direct! y concerned in
this case with initial appointment of a person to a post in
the senior time-scale but only with that of one who has
been reverted. Apart from grounds of administrative
convenience the guiding factors would be the same, namely, seniority, whether the case is of initial appointment
to a post in the senior scale or reversion therefrom to the
junior scale. No doubt, r. 6(2) of the Pay Rules contemplates provision of an efficiency bar in the junior
scale and a bar has been placed at Rs. 590.00. But the
placing of this bar has no bearing on tqe appointment
of a person whose increment has been barred, to a post
in the senior scale. Indeed, the proviso to r. 6(2) clearly
states that even where the increment of a member has been
witliheld, but he is appointed to a post in the senior
scale his pay in that scale will not be affected but would
be regulated according to his length of service. This
proviso in fact lends further support to the conclusion that
in the Service what counts is the length of service of
a member and not even whether he has or has not passed
the departmental examination. Increments can, under r.
6(1), be withheld but that is only if a member fails to
pass the departmental examination in a prescribed time.
This is a condition of service and when the condition is
not satisfied the member affected can have no legitimate grievance. But the result of this is different from ·
that of not allowing a person to hold a post in the senior time-scale in his turn according to his seniority.
As already indicated very elaborate rules have been
framed for the purpose of determining the inter se seniority
of the officers borne on the cadre of the Indian Police Service. The gradation list has to be prepared with
scrupulous regard to the rights of every member of the
service. All this would have been unnecessary if seniority
were meaningless. In Schedule I framed under rr. 4(2)
....
'
-
4 S.C.R.
•
••
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
and 5(2) of the pay Rules the first column refers to
the year of service, the second to the monthly rate of pay
in the junior scale and the third column to the monthly
rate of pay in the senior scale. No person is directly recruited to the Indian Police Service as a Superintendent
of Police and, therefore, it will be pointless to provide in
cl. 3, against the first year of service the salary of Rs. 600.00
the salary in the junior scale for that year being
Rs. 350.00. The reason why this has been provided for
apparently is that a situation was contemplated that a
person appointed as an Assistant Superintendent of Police
may immediately have to hold the office of a Superintendent of Police, the minimum salary for which was fixed
at Rs. 600.00. If a question of selection were involved,
surely choice could never fall upon a person who has
just been recruited to the service. The circumstance
that the two scales are given in parallel columns clearly
indicates that the transition of a member of the service
from one scale to another was not to depend upon the
consideration of the comparative merits of a group of officers in the junior scale inter se but only upon a consideration of their seniority. We have already indicated that in
so far as promotion of officers to the State Police Service
is concerned, elaborate provisions have been made in the
rules which, among other things, provide for the appointment of a selection committee and preparation of 'select
lists'. Thus where a question of selection was involved the procedure has been laid down in the rules. Had
it been the intention of the Government to bring in the
element of selection in so far as promotion of Assistant
Superintendents of Police to the posts of Superintendents
of Police is concerned we have no doubt that express
provisions relating to the manner in which the selection
has to be made wonld have found place in the rules.
The appellant who argued his case in person asked us to
compare the position of persons belonging to other Central Services and said that in so far as they were concerned the rules provide for a selection at every stage
and in this connection he drew our attention to explanation (iii) to r. 13 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 which
reads thm :
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
Mudholkar /.
626
1963
P. C. Wadhwa
v.
Union of
India and
Anr.
Mudholkar f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
"The following shall not amount to a penalty within
the meaning of this rule :
*
*
*
*
*
*
(iii) non-promotion whether in a substantive or officiating capacity of a Government servant, after
consideration of his case, to a Service, grade or
post for promotion to which he is eligible;"
and sought to support the argument by reference to this
explanation. He also pointed out that there is no corresponding provision in the All India Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules. This argument is not without substance.
The learned Additional Solicitor General, however
referred us to explanation (3) to r. 3 of these Rules which
·run_s thus :
"A refusal to promote a member of the Service, after
due consideration of his case, to a post or grade to
which promotions are made by selection, does not
amount to withholding of promotion within the meaning of this rule."
Clearly, this provision will apply only where appointment
is to be made to a post by selection and the question we
have to decide is whether the post of a Superintendent
of Police is of that nature. The language of this provision is different from that to which we have adverted
earlier.
Then the learned Additional Solicitor General, as
also the High Court, relied upon explanation 4 to r. 3.
Rule 3 provides for penalties including withholding of
increments, promotion, reduction in rank i.e., to a lower
post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale. The
explanation reads thus :
"The reversion to a lower post of a member of the
Service who is officiating in. a higher post, after a
trial in the higher post or for administrative reasons
(such as the return of the permanent incumbent from
leave or deputation, availability of a more suitable
officer, and the like) does not amount to reduction in
rank within the meaning of this rule."
The question, however, is whether it applies to a case
like the present. No doubt, this explanation speaks of
a person who was given a trial in the higher post being
••
•
-
4 S.C.R.
j
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fi27
1963
reverted for administrative reasons including availability
of a more suitable officer. This may be a condition of serP. C. Wadhwa
vice but if it means that a person who has a right to hold
v.
a post in the senior scale would be liable to be demoted
Union of
India and
if an officer junior to him, but more suitable, is available
Anr.
it would run contrary to the provisions _of Art. 311 (2)
and would be ultra vires. But it would be a valid proviMudholkar J.
sion if we consider it to apply only to promotions to
posts to which the incumbent has no right. In our opinion, the whole scheme of the rules indicates that a person
borne on the junior scale of pay has a right to hold
a post on the senior scale of pay depending upon the
availability of a post and his seniority in the junior scale
of pay. We should not be understood as saying that this
right extends to the appointment to a post carrying pay
above time scale of pay or a post carrying a special pay.
The rules governing appointment to such posts were not
placed before us. If a person holding a post in the senior
scale, though in an officiating capacity is found to be unfit to hold that post, action will have to be taken against
him as required by r. 5 of Discipline and Appeal Rules because his reversion to a post in the lower scale would
amount to reduction in rank within the meaning of
Art. 311 of the Constitution as held in Dhingra's case(').
In the case before us Mr. Wadhwa was not reverted for
an administrative reason like the unavailability of posts
but for a different reason which we will indicate while
dealing with the second point raised by him. Despite the
fact that he holds a certain rank in the gradation list persons who also belong to the Indian Police Service and
who were recruited to it subsequent to him have continued to hold or have been appointed to hold posts carrying salary in the senior scale. This would itself indicate
that the action taken against him was by way of penalty
or punishment. For, he has not only been reduced in
rank but his promotion to the senior scale has also been
withheld. This could only be done by holding a departmental enquiry and affording him an opportunity to show
cause against the action proposed to be taken against
him. Nothing of the kind was done and, therefore, on
1
( )
(1958] S.C.R. 828.
628
1963
P. C• .Wadhwa
v.
Union of
lndia and
Anr.
Mudholkar f.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
this ground alone the writ petition ought to have been
granted.
, On the other ground also the writ petition must sue'
ceed. The learned Additional Solicitor General very fairly placed before us the file concerning the reversion of
the appellant which we find from the judgment of the
High Court was also placed before it. The following extracts from that file would be relevant :
"As the regular enquiry into Shri Wadhwa's conduct
might take long, probably it will be advisable to shift
him from Ferozepore to some other place. His personal file is placed below."
This was apparently a note of the Senior Superintendent
of Police. It is dated October 6, 1958 and was marked to
the Inspector General. Below that there is a note of
some other officer which begins with the following query:
"Can't we revert him and then proceed with further
enquiries on the charge of not carrying out the orders
of his senior officers?"
Then it is stated that Mr. Wadhwa is not yet ripe and fit
for the duties of a Superintendent of Police and then
the note says :
"We may, therefore, get the State Government's approval to his reversion on account of his unsatisfactory record. The departmental enquiry could be proceeded with after his reversion."
It will thus be clear that the main object with which his reversion was sought was to facilitate the departmental enquiry. No doubt, a reference is made to the unsuitability
of the appellant for the post of Superintendent of Police.
But that is not what mainly actuated his superior in recommending his reversion. Then, as the next note in the
file would show, actually a show cause notice was prepared
and a recommendation was made to the Inspector General to send it to the Chief Minister for his approval. Thereafter there is a long note of the Inspector General in
which reference is made to Explanation 4 to r. 3 of the
Discipline and Appeal Rules and it is said that in view of
this provision no show cause notice need be issued to the
appellant. This suggestion of the Inspector General was
.,
4 S.C.R.
..
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
accepted by the Chief Minister and that is how the appel1963
lant came to be reverted.
A perusal of the file thus shows that instead of sus- P. C. Wadhwa
v.
pending the appellant during the pendency of the enquiry
Union of
against him which was expected to take considerable time
India and
to finish, resort was had to his reversion on the vague
Anr.
grounds that he was a 'problem child' and an 'immature
Mudholkar f.
person'. We quite appreciate that while a departmental
enquiry is being held against a person in respect of a serious offence it would not be in the public interest to
allow him to hold a responsible position. But in that
case the more straightforward course would be to suspend
him and not to resort to a devious method of the kind
which the Government thought it fit to employ in this
case. If as a result of the departmental enquiry the person arraigned is found not guilty or is awarded a minor
punishment he may well be able to revert to the post
which he was occupying. We are told that in the departmental enquiry held against the appellant, though he has
been found remiss, the only punishment awarded to him
was stoppage of one increment without prejudice to his
future. If that is the correct state of affairs one would
have expected that the appellant, had he been suspended,
would have been restored to his former post in the light
of the actual action taken against him on the basis of the
findings of the Enquiry Officer. But, as a result of
what the Government has done he loses the benefit of
such a result. In the circumstances we have no doubt in
coming to the conclusion that the order of the Government is mala fide.
On both these grounds, therefore, we allow the appeal
:is well as the writ petition and quash the order dated
November 3, 1958 reverting him to the post of Assistant
Superintendent of Police from the post of Superintendent
of Police. Costs of this petition here and in the High
Court will be paid by the respondent State.
Appeal allowd.
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