GURAMMA BHRATAR CHANBASAPPA DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER versus MALAPPA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 August 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 497 | 1963 INSC 174
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 August 1963
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 334/1960
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 497
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 174
Text of the judgment
4 S.C.R.
•
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SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS
497
evidence being given. This case turned on wholly different facts and is of no assistance.
We may also refer to, In re N atesan (1 ) where it was
observed that the decision in Nazir Ahmed's ca.<e(')
might require reconsideration in view of the observations
of this Comt in Willie Slaney v. The State of Madhya
PradeshC). The actual decision in In re Natesan(") does
not affect the question before us and with regard to the
aforesaid observation made in it we think it enough on
the present occasion to say that we are unable to accept
it as correct.
We think that the High Court in the present case
rightly rejected the oral evidence of Mr. Dixit.
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
GURAMMA BHRATAR CHANBASAPPA DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER
v.
MALAPPA
(K. SuBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J. R. MunHOLKAR,
JJ.)
Hindu LatV-foint family-Manager, powers of-Gifts of
property to stranger and to daughter aftC1· marriage, validity ofAdoption-Whether existence of son in embryo £nvalidates adoption-partition-Sudras of Bombay Presidency-Share of adopted
son vis-a-vis natural born son.
'A' died on Jwuary 8, 1944. He left behind him three wives
and t\vo wido\vcd daughters, children of his pre-deceased wife.
The senior most widow filed a civil suit for partition and possession
of l/6th share after setting aside the alienations n1ade by her husband on January 4 and 5, 1944. It was alleged that at the time
of the death of '/\' his youngest \.vife \.Vas pregnant and that she
gave birth to a male child on October 4, 1944. On January 30, 1944,
the senior most widow took her sister's son in adoption. A few days
before his death 'A' executed two deeds of maintenance in favour
of his two wives (defendant Nos. 1 and 2) and also executed deeds
of gift in favour of widowed daughter, a son of an illegitimate
son and a relative. Long before his death he also executed two
deeds viz on,t a deed of maintenance and a deed of gift in favour of
the senior most wido\.\' (the plaintiff). To this suit the two widows
were made defendants 1 and 2; the alleged adopted son, defendant 3,
,,___,
(') A.LR. 1960 Mad. 443.
(2) L. R. 63 !. A. 372.
3
( )
[1955] 2 S.C.R. 1140.
1963
State of l:tt.:r
Pradc:1i
v
ShiS:,·h1<'1·a Singh
and OtlicrJ.
August 19,
1963
498
1963
Deshmukli
v.
Malappa
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the alleged posthumous son, defendant 4; and the alienees defendants 5 to 8. These two appeals arise out of the certificate granted
by the High Court_
Held (1) that the existence of a son in embryo does not invalidate an adoption.
Narayana Reddi v. Varadachala Reddi, S. A. No. 223 of
1859 M.S.D. 1859, p. 97, referred to.
Nagabhushanam v. Seshammagaru, (1878-8i) I.LR. 3 Mad. 18()
Shamvahoo v. Dwarakadas Vasanji, (1888) I.LR. 12 Born. 202,
Dau/at Ram v. Ram Lal, ( 1907) l.L.R. 29 All 310, approved.
(2) that the High Court was right in affirming the alienation•
made in favour of the plaintiff and was equally justified in setting
aside the alienations made in favour of defendents 1 and 2. The
former documents were executed by uA" in 1937 and 1939 'vhen
he 'vas the sole surviving coparcenar whereas the latter documents
were executed when he had ceased to have that power because
the male child i.e., 4th defendant was already conceived.
(3) that a managing member of the family has power to
alienate for value joint family property either for family necessity
or for the benefit of the estate. The sole surviving member of a
Co-parcenary has an absolute power to alienate the family property, as at the time of alienation there is no other me1nber \.vho
has joint interest in the family. If another member 'vas conceived
in the family or inducted therein by adoption the power of the mana·
ger \Vas circumscribed as aforesaid and if the alienations were ma<le
by the manager or father for a purpose not binding on the estate,
they 'vould be voidable at the instance of subsequently born son
or adopted son.
Avdesh Kumar v. Zak_aul Hassain, I.LR. [ 1944 J All 612, Chandramani v. fambeswara, A.LR. 1931 Mad. 550 and Bhagwat Prasad
Bahidar v. Debichaud Bogra, ( 1941) I.LR. 20 Pat. 727, referred to.
( 4) that a gift to a stranger of joint family property by the
manager of the family is void as he has not the absolute po,ver
oi disposal over the joint Hindu family property.
Partha Sarathi Pillai v. Tiruvengada, (1907) I.LR. 30 Mad.
340, referred to.
(5) that the Hindu Law texts conferred a right upon a
daughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share in the
family property at the time of partition. The right was lost by
effiux of time. But it became crystallized into a moral obligation.
The father or his representative can make a valid gift by way of
reasonable provision for the maintenance o£ the daughter, regard
being had to the financial and other relevant circurnstaiices of the
family. By custom or by convenience, such gifts are made at the
time of marriage, but the right of the father or his representative
to n1ake such a gift is not confined to the marriage occasion. It is
a moral obligation and it continues to subsist till it is discharged.
J\1arriage is only a customary occasion for such a gift. But the
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
moral obligation can be discharged at any time, either during the
life time of the father or thereafter. Applying the aforesaid principles, the deed of gift made by father to the daughter, i.e. 8th defen-
-
dant in the present case, was within his right and certainly
reasonable.
finnappa Mahadevappa v. Chimmava, (1935) I.L.R. 59 Born.
459, disapproved.
Vettorammal v. Poochammal, (1912) 22 M.L.J. 321, Kudutamma
v. Narasimhacharyalu, (1907) 17 M.L.J. 528, Sundaramaya v. Sathamma, (1911) 21 M.L.J. 695, Ramaswamy Aiyyar v. Vengidsami
Iyer, (1898) l.L.R. 22 Mad. 113, Bachoo v. Mankorebai (1907) l.L.R.
)I Born. 373, Ramalinga Annavi v. Narayana Annavi, (1922) 49
I.A. 168, Sithamahalakshmamma v. Kotayya, (1936) 71 M.L.J. 259,
Annamalai v. Sundarathammal, (1952) 2 M.L.J. 782 and Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu, (19!0) l.L.R. 37 Cal. I., approved.
(5) that the Hindu Law applicable to Sudras applies to lingayats as \vell.
( 6) that in Bombay Presidency the rule accepted in Dattaka
Chandrika ha' never been followed and the share of an adopted
son in competition with a natural born son among Sudras ha!;
always been I/5th in the family property, i.e. I/4th of the natural
born son's share. The rule in Dattaka Chandrika is that among
Sudras an adopted son and an afterborn natural son take equal
share in the family .property and it is 'followed in Madras and
Bengal provinces.
t
-•
~ -l
Tirkangauda Mallang•uda v. Shivappa Patil, l.L.R. 1943 Born ..
706, Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanumant Ganesh Safray, (1879)
l.L.R. 3 Born. 273, Gopalan v. Venkataraghavulu, (1915) l.L.R.
40 Mad. 632 and Asita v. Nirode, (1916) 20 C.W.N. 901, referred to.
Arumilli Perrazu v. Arumilii Subb~r•yadu, (1921) 48 I.A. 280,
distinguished.
Giriapa v. Ningapa, (1892) I.LR. 17 Born. 100 and Tukaram
M•hadu v. Ramachandra Mahadu, (1925) l.L.R. 49 Born. 672,
approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE Jm1so1cTION :Civil Appeals Nos. 334
and 335 of 1960.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated 16/17th
August 1955 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal
No. 341 of 1950.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, M. Rajagopalan and K. R.
Chaudhri for appellants Nos. 1 and 3 (in C.A. No. 334/60)
and respondents Nos. 1 and 3 (in C.A. No. 335/60).
R. Gopalkrishnan, for ~ppell~nts Nos. 4, 5 and 13 (in
C.A. No. 334/1960) and respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 13 (in
C.A. Nos. 335/(JJ).
-
1963
Deshmukh
v.
M•l•ppo
-
500
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
----·
Su Ma Rao /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Naunit Lal, for appellants Nos. 6, 9 to 11 and 12 (in
C.A. No. 334/60) and respondents Nos. 6, 9 to 11 and 12 (in
C.A. No. 335/60).
N.C. Chatterjee, S. Venkatakrishnan and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 334/60) and the
appellants (in C. A. No. 335/60).
August 19, 1963. The Judgment· of the Court was delivered by
SuBBA RAo J .-These two appeals by certificate arise
out of Special Civil Suit No. 47 of 1946 filed by Nagamma,
wife of Chanbasappa, for partition and possession of onesixth share in the plaint scheduled properties with mesne
profits. Chanbasappa died possessed of a large extent of
immovable property on January 8, 1944. He left behind
him three wives, Nagamma, Guramma and Venkamma
and two widowed daughters, Sivalingamma and Neelamma, children of his pre-deceased wife. It is alleged that
at the time of his death Venkamma was pregnant and th~t
she gave birth to a male child on October 4, 1944. It is
also alleged that on January 30, 1944, Nagainma, the senior
most widow, took her sister's son, Malappa, in adoption.
A few days before his death, Chanbasappa executed gift
and maintenance deeds in favour of his wives, widowed
daughter, a son of an illegitimate son, and a relative. Long
before his death, he also executed two deeds-one a deed
of maintenance and another a gift deed of some property
in favour of Nagamma. We shall deal with these alien~tions in detail in appropriate places.
The plaintiff, one of the three surviving widows of
Chanbasappa, filed the aforesaid suit for recovery of her
share after setting aside the alienations made by her husband on January 4 and 5, 1944. To that suit, Guramma
and Venkamma, the other two widows of Chanbasappa,
were made defendants l and 2; the alleged adopted son,
defendant 3; the alleged posthumous son, defendant 4;
and the alinees, defendants 5 to 8.
Defendant 3 naturally supported the plaintiff, and the
other defendants contested the suit. The contesting defendants denied the factum and validity of the adoption of
defendant 3 by the plaintiff; and~they asserted that defendant 4 was the posthumous son of Chanbasappa by Ven-
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4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
kamma, the second defendant. The alinees sought to sustain the validitv of the alienations in their favour.
As many ~s 12 issues were framed in the case. The
learned Civil Judge found that defendant 3 was taken in
adoption by the plaintiff on January 30, 1\144, but it was
invalid in law; that defendant 4 was born to defendant 2
by the deceased; that the plaintiff had failed to prove that
the deeds executed by Chanbasappa .on January 4, 1944
in favour of defendants 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were vitiated
by fraud; and that the plaintiff was entitled to one-sixth
share in the suit property and for partition and recovery of the same. In the result he passed a decree
for partition and delivery of the plaintiff's' one-sixth share
in the property. He also held that defendants I and 2
would each be entitled to one-sixth share and that defendant 4 would be entitled to three-sixths share therein. He
declared that the deeds executed by the deceased in favour
ot the plaintiff as well as in favour of the defendants were
binding on the parties to the suit. He directed an enquiry
as to the future mesne profits from the date of the suir.
The plaintiff and defendant 3 preferred an appeal to the
High Court, being First Appeal No. 341 of the 1950 against
the decree of the Civil Judge insofar as it went against
them. The High Court agreed with the learned Civil
Judge that defendant A was the posthumous son of the
deceased by the second defendant; it accepted the finding
of the learned Civil Judge that the adoption took place;
but it also held that it was valid in law. It declared that
the deeds executed by the deceased on January 4 and 5,
1944 in favour of defendants 6, 7 and 8 were invalid a!
also the gift over in favour of defendant 5. It held that,
as defendants 1 and 2 were getting a share in the property,
they were not entitled to separate maintenance given to
them under the deed executed by their husband and directed that that property also should be brought into the
hotchpot and divided between the parties. It declared that
the olaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 were each entitled
to 4j27 share in the suit property, that defendant 3 was
entitled to 1/9 share therein, and defendant 4 was entitled
to 4/9 share therein. It also gave further directions in the
matter of partition, costs and mesne profits.
Pl:iintiff and defendant 3 preferred Civil Appeal No.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Ma/appa
Subba Rao /.
502
1963
· /Jt.•shmukh
Malappa
Subba Rao /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
335 of 1960, and defendants 1, 2, 4 and 5, the legal representatives of defendant 7 and defendant 8 preferred Civil
Appeal No. 334 of 1960 to this Court against the decree
of the High Court insofar as it went against them.
At the outset it would be convenient to clear the ground
and focus our attention on the outstanding points of difference between the parties. The factum of adoption of
defendant 3 by the plaintiff is accepted, but its legality is
questioned. The fact that the 4th defendant is the posthumous son of Chanbasappa by the 2nd defendant is also
not disputed. In the result the following questions only
remain to be answered in the present appeals: ( 1) Whether
the adoption of defendant 3 by the plaintiff was void as it
was made at a time when defendant 4 had already been
conceived. (2) Whether the alienations in favour of defendants 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are binding on the members of the
family. And (3) What is the share of an adopted sen
of a sudra in competition with the natural born son?
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, appearing for defendants 1 and
4 (Appellants 1 and 3 in Civil Appeal No. 334 of 1960)
contends that the adoption of defendant 3 was void inas··
much as at the time of the adoption defendant 4 had been
conceived. He presses on us to extend the legal position,
by analogy, of the right of a son in the womb a.t the time
his father made an alienation of a family property to set
aside that alienation, to that of an adopted son in similar
circumstances.
The Hindu law texts do not throw much light on the
subject. Dattaka Chandrika and Dattaka Mimamsa are
the treatises specially composed on the subject of adoption.
Nanda Pandita cites the following texts of Atri and
Cankha in Dattaka Mimasa :
"By a man destitute of son only must a substitute for
the same be adopted". (Atri).
"One to whom no son has been born, or whose son
has died having fasted, etc." ( Cankha).
In section 13, Nanda Pandita explains that the term "destitute of a son" must be understood to include a son's son
and grandson. In Dattaka Chandrika the relevant part of
the text of Cankha is stated thus:
"One destitute of a son"-see s. I, 4.
"One having no male issue"-see s. II. 1.
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4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
1963
These texts ex facie do not equate a son in existence with
a son in the womb. If the authors of the said treatises
Deshmukh
intended to equate the one with the other, they would not
v.
have left it in doubt, for such an extension of the doctrine
Malappa
would introduce an element of uncertainty in the matter
of adoption and defeat, in some cases, the religious object Subba Rao /.
underlying adoption. It is now well settled that the main
object of adoption is to secure spiritual benefit to the adopter, though its secondary object is to secure an heir to
perpetuate the adopter's name. Such being the significance of adoption, its validity shall not be made to depend
upon the contingencies that may or may not happen. It
is suggested that an adoption cannot be made unless there
is certainty of not getting a son and tha_t if the wife is
pregnant, there is a likelihood of the adopter begetting
a son and, therefore, the adoption made is void. The texts
cited do not support the said proposition. Its acceptance
will lead to anomalies. Suppose a husband who is seriously
ii! and who had no knowledge of the pre;;nancy of his wife,
makes an adoption; in such an event, the existence of a
pregnancy, of which he has no knowledge, invalidates the
adoption, whether the pregnancy turns out to be fruitful
or not. If he has knowledge of the pregnancy, he will
not be in a position to take a boy in adoption, though
ultimately the wife may have an abortion, or deliver a stillborn child or the child born may turn out to be a girl.
Further, as it is well settled law that a son includes a
son's son and a grandson of the son, the pregnancy of a
son's widow or a grandson's widow, on the parity of the
said reasoning, will invalidate an adoption. We cannot
introduce such a degree of uncertainty in the bw of adoption unless Hindu law texts or authoritative decisions compel ns to do so. There are no texts of Hindu law imposing
a condition of non-pregnancy of the wife or son's widow
or a grandson's widow for the exercise of a person's power
to adopt. The decisions of the High Courts on the subject discountenance the acceptance of any such condition.
But there is a decision of Sudr Adalut in N arayana Reddi
v. Vamdachala Reddi('), wherein it was observed that it
was of the essence of the power to adopt that the party
adopting should be hopeless of having issue. Mr. Mayne
(1) S.A. No. 223 of 1859, M.S.D. 1859, p. 97.
504
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
1963
commenting upon the said observation drew a distinction
between a husband taking a boy in adoption knowing that
v,.,/,mukh
his wife was pregnant and doing so without the said
v.
knowiedge and stated:
}falappa
"If a wife, known to be pregnant at the time of adopSubba Rao /.
tion, afterwards brought forth a son, it might fairly
be held he was then in existence to the extent of
precluding an adoption .... ".
A division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nagabhushanam v. Seshammagaru( 1 ) criticized the opinion of the
pandits as well as the observation of Mr. Mayne, and came
to the conclusion that an adoption by a Hindu with knowledge of his wife's pregnancy was not invalid. The Bombay High Court in Shamava/zoo v. Dwarkadas Vasanii(2)
accepted the said view. A division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Daulat Ram v. Ram La/( 3 ) followed the
Madras and Bombay decisions. No other decision has been
brought to our notice either taking a different view or
throwing a doubt thereon. All textbooks-Mayne, Mulla,
Sarkar Sastri-accepted the correctness of the said view
without anv comment.
Mr. Vi;wanatha Sastri contends that under the Hindu
law a son conceived or in his mother's womb is equal in
many respects to a son actually in existence in the matter of
inheritance, partition, survivorship and the right to impeach an alienation made by his father and that, therefore,
logically the same equation must hold good in the case of
adoption. When a son in his mother's womb is equated
with a son in existence vis-a-vis his right to set aside an
alienation or to reopen a partition, the argument proceeds,
the father cannot validly adopt, as from the date of conception the son must be deemed to be in existence. But
there is an essential distinction between an alienation, partition and inheritance on the one hand and adoption on the
other: his right to set aside an alienation hinges on his
•ecular right to secure his share in the property belonging
to the family, as he has a right by birth in the joint family
property and transactions effected by the father in excess
of his power when he was in embryo are voidable at
( 1 ) (1878-81) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 180.
(2) (1888) I.L.R. 12 Born. 202.
(') (1907) I.L.R. 29 All. 310.
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4 S.C.R.
505
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
his instance: but, in the case of adoption, it secures mainly
spiritual benefit to the father and the power to adopt is
conferred on him to achieve that object. The doctrine
evolved wholly for a secular purpose would be inappropriate to a case of adoption. We should be very reluctant
to extend it to adoption, as it would lead to many anomalies and in some events defeat the object of the conferment
of the power itself. The scope of the power must be
reasonably construed so as to enable the donee of the power
to discharge his religious duty. We, therefore, hold that
the existence of a son in embryo does not invalidate an
adoption.
The next contention of Mr. Viswanatha Sastri is that
the High Court, having set aside the alienations made by
Chanbasappa, should have brought into hotchpot the property covered by the said alienations for the purpose of
partition. The particulars of the alienations may be noticed at this stage.
>
S. No.
Exhibit
No. Date
- - - - - - - --------
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}
'
Nature of Properties
document comprised of
In favour of
----
--- - - - ·
].
362
4-1-44
D-1 Guramma
Deed of Plt. Sch. A.
main tenanee
2.
372 5-1-44
D-2 Venkamma
Deed of Plt. Sch. A.
maintenanee &
giftover
to D-5
3.
369 4-1-44
D-6 Imam Sahib Deed of Pit. Sch. A.
Gift.
4.
370 4-1-44
D-7 Channappa Deed of
Plt.Sch.A-3.
ii!·
371
D-8 Neelamma
Deed of
main!enance
Plt.Sch.A-3.
346 30-1-37 Plff. Nagamma
Deed of
maintenance
347 14-2-39 Plff. Nagamma
Deed of
Gift.
4-1-44
33-~ S. C. lndh/64
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao /.
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
This argument is based upon a misapprehension. The High
Court, having set aside the alienations, including those
Deshmukh
in favour of defendants 1 and 2 directed the said property
·V,
to be divided in accordance with the shares ddclared by
Malappa
it. This position is also conceded on behalf of the plaintiff
Subba Rao /.
and defendant 3. We need not, therefore, pursue this
matter.
Mr. K. R. Chaudhri, following Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri, further contends that the High Court went wrong in
making a distinction between the documents executed in
favour of the plaintiff in that while it confirmed the documents Exs. 346 and 347 executed in favour of the plaintiff,
it set aside the deeds executed in favour of defendants 1
and 2. There are no merits in this contention. The documents executed in favour of the plaintiff are Exs. 346 dateci
January 30, 1937 and 347 dated February 14, 1939. These
two documents were executed by Chanbasappa at a rime
when he was the sole surviving coparcener, whereas he
executed the documents in favour of defendants 1 and 2
after the 4th defendant was conceived. The former were
executed when he had absolute power of disposal, whereas
the latter were executed when he had ceased to have the
said power. On the basis of this distinction the High
Court rightly set aside the alienations made in favour of
defendants 1 and 2.
Mr. Naunit Lal, appearing for some of the legai representatives of defendant 7 who are appellants 6, 9 to 11
and 12 in Civil Appeal No. 334 of 1960 and respondents
6, 9 to 11 and 12 in Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1960, con. tepds that the gift deeds executed by Chanbasappa in favour
of defendants 7 and 8 were binding on the members or
the family. The High Court held that Chanbasappa could
· not have validly made these gifts of immovable property
. oLthe joint family after the 4th defendant was conceived
and, therefore, they were void. Mr. Naunit Lal broadly
contends that the alienations effected by Chanbasappa were
voidable only at the instance of the 4th defendant, who
was in the womb on the date of the alienations and that
as he has chosen to adopt them, the third defendant, who
was adopted subsequent to the alienations, rnuld not question their validity. Before we advert to the legal aspects
of the argument, it may be stated at once that no question
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
of consent of the 4th defendant can possibly arise in this
case, as he was not born when the alienations were made
and he was a minor at the time the suit was filed. We
must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the alienations
were made by one of the members of the joint family
without the consent of the other members of the family.
If so, at the time the alienations were made Chanbasappa
had not the absolute power to alienate the family property,
but only a limited one to do so for the purpose of necessity
or benefit of the estate. The relevant principles are well
settled. A coparcener, whether he is natural born or
adopted into the family, acquires an interest by birth
or adoption, as the case may be, in the ancestral property of the family. A managing member of the family
has power to alienate for value joint family property
either for family necessity or for the benefit of the
estate. An alienation can also be made by a managing
member with the consent of all the coparceners of the
family. The sole surviving member of a coparcenary
has an absolute power to alienate the family property,
as at the time of alienation there is no other member
who has joint interest in the family. If another member
was in existence or in the womb of his mother at the time
of the alienation, the power of the manager. was circumscribed as aforesaid and his alienation would be voidable
at the instance of the existing member or the memb(;f who
was in the womb but was subsequently born, as the case
may be, unless it was made for purposes binding on the
member of the family or the existing member consented
to it or the subsequently born member ratified it after he
attained majority. If another member was conceived in
the family or inducted therein by adoption before such consent or ratification, his right to avoid the alienation will
not be affected: See Avdesh Kumar v. Zakaul Hassain(')
Chandramani v. fambesw'ara(2) ; and Bhagwat Prasad
Bahidar v. Debichand Bogra('). In the instant case the
impugned alienations were made at a time when the 4th
defendant was in the womb i.e., at a time when Chanabasappa had only a limited right of disposal over the joint
(')LL:R. [l944] AIC612.
(') A.LR. 1931 Mad. 550.
3
( ) (1941) l.L.R. 20 Pat. 727.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
508
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao}.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
family property. The 4th defendant being in the womb,
he could not obviously give his consent, nor ratify the
alienations before the adoption of the 3rd defendant took
place and he was inducted into the family. If the alienations were made by the father for a purpose not binding
on the estate, they would be voidable at the instance of
the 3rd or 4th defendant.
The next question is whether the two gifts were binding on the family. We shall now take the two gift t\eeds
Exs. 370 and 371 executed by Chanbasappa-the former in
favour of the 7th defendant and the latter in favour of the
8th defendant. The High Court, agreeing with the learned
Civil Judge, set aside the gifts on the ground that the donor
had no power to make a gift of the family property.
Learned counsel for the legal representatives of the said
defendants seeks to sustain the validity of the said two gifts.
We shall consider the validity of the two gift deeds separatelv.
Ex. 370 dated January 4, 1944, is a gift deed executed
by Chanbasappa in favour of Channappa, the 7th defeadant, in respect of immovable property valued at Rs. 1,500/-.
The donee was described as the donor's relative. The
gift was made in token of love for the services rendered
by the donee to the donor during the latter's lifetime.
The gift was made, as it was narrated in the document,-out of love and affection for the donee. It is contended that the said gift was for pious purposes and, therefore, valid in law. Can it be said that a gift of this nature
to a relative out of love and affection is a gift for "pious
purposes" within the meaning of that expression in Hindu
law? In Mitakshara, Ch. I, s. 1, v. 28, it is stated:
"Even a single individual may conclude a donation,
. mortgage, or sale of immovable property, during a
season of distress, for the sake of the family and especially for pious purposes."
In support of his contention that pious purposes include
a charitable purpose, learned counsel relies upon certain
passages in Mukherjea's "Hindu Law of Religious and
Charitable Trust'', 2nd Edn. The learned author says
at p. 12:
"In the Hindu system there is no line of demarcation
between religion and charity. On the other hand
•
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-
~ .•
4 S.C.R.
SUPRE:'v!E COURT REPORTS
509
charity is regarded as part of religion.. . . . . . All the
Hindu sages concur in holding that charitable gifts are
pious acts par excellence, which bring appropriate
rewards to the donor ............ ''.
The learned author proceeds to state, at p. 58 :
"Religious and charitable purposes have nowhere been
defined by Hindu lawyers. It was said by Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar f. in Partha Sarathi Pillai v. Tiruvengada(1) that the expression "dhanna" when applied
to gifts means and includes, according to Hindu
text writers, what are known as lstha and Purtta
works. As I have said already in the first lecture,
no exhaustive list of such works has been drawn
up by the Hindu lawgivers, and they include all
acts of piety and benevolence whether sanctioned by
Vedas or by the popular religion, the nature of the acts
differing at different periods of Hindu religious
history."
The learned author defines the words lstha and Purtta
briefly thus, at p. 10:
"By lstha is meant Vedic sacrifices, and rites and gifts
in connection with the same; Punta on the other hand
means and signifies other pious and charitable acts
which are unconnected with anv Srouta or Vedic
sacrifice."
.
It may, therefore, be conceded that the expression "pious
purposes" is wide enough, under certain circumstances, to
take in charitable purposes though the scope of the latter
purposes has nowhere been precisely drawn. But what we
are concerned with in this case is the power of a manager
to make a gift to an outsider of a joint family property.
The scope of the limitations on that power has been fairly
well settled by the decisions interpreting the relevant texts
of Hindu law. The decisions of Hindu law sanctioned
gifts to strangers by a manager of a joint Hindu family
of a small extent of property for pious purposes. But no
authority went so far, and none has been placed before us,
to sustain such a gift to a stranger however much the
donor was beholden to him on the ground that it was made
out of charity. It must be remembered that the manager
has no absolute power of disposal over joint Hindu family
- · - ( 1)-(1907) 1.1..R~.30 Mad. 340.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
510
1963
Deshmuk.h
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
property. The Hindu law permits him to do so only
within strict limits. We cannot extend the scope of the
power on the basis of the wide interpretation given to the
words "pious purposes" in Hindu law in a different context. In the circumstances, we hold that a gift to a stranger of a joint family property by the manager of the
family is void.
The second document is Ex. 371, dated July 4, 1944.
Under that document, Chanbasappa created a life-interest
in a property of the value of about Rs. 5,000/- in favour of
his widowed daughter, the 8th defendant. In the docu·
ment it is recited thus:
"You are my own daughter and your husband is de2d.
After his death you have been living in my house
only. For your well being and maintenance during
your life time I have already given some property to
you. As the income from the said property is not sufficient for your maintenance, you have asked me to give
some more property for your maintenance. I have
therefore gladly agreed (to the same) and passed a
deed of maintenance in your favour regarding the
below mentioned property and delivered it to your possession to-day only."
Under the said deed the daughter should enjoy the property during her lifetime and thereafter it should go to
the 5th defendant. The gift-over would inevitably be invalid. But the question . is whether the provision for the
daughter's maintenance during her lifetime would also be
invalid. The correctness of the recitals are not questioned
before us. It is in evidence that the family possesses a large
extent of property, worth lakhs. The short question is
whether the father could have validly conferred a lifeinterest in a small bit of property on his widowed daughter
in indigent circumstances for her maintenance. It is said
that the Hindu law does not permit such a gift. In Jinnappa Mahadevappa v. Chimmava('), the Bombay High
Court accepted that legal position. Rangnekar J. held that
under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, a father has no
right to make a gift even of a small portion of joint family
immovable property in favour of his daughter, although
it is made on the ground that she looked after him in his
( 1)
(1935) I.L.R. 59 Born. 459, 465.
..
'
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4 S.C.R.
'
• '
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
old age. The learned Judge distinguished all the cases
cited before him on the ground that they were based upon
long standing customs and ended his judgment with
the following observations :
"Undoubtedly, the gift is a small portion of the whole
of the property; but, if one were to ignore the elementary principles of Hindu law out of one's sympathy
with gifts of this nature, it would be difficult to say
where the line could be drawn, an<l it might give rise
to difficulties which no attempt could overcome."
We agree with the learned Judge that sympathy is out of
place in laying down the law. If the Hindu law texts
clearly and expressly prohibit the making of such a gift of
the family property by the father to the widowed
daughter in indigent circumstances, it is no doubt the duty
of the Court to accept the law, leaving it to the Legislature to change the law. We shall, therefore, consider the
relevant Hindu law texts bearing on the subject.
At the outset it would be convenient to clear the
ground. Verses 27, 28 and 29 in Ch. I, Mitakshara, describe the limitations placed on a father in making gifts
of ancestral estate. They do not expressly deal with the
right of a father to make provision for his daughter by
giving her some family property at the time of her marriage or subsequently. That right is defined separately by
Hindu law texts and evolved by a long catena of decisions,
based on the said texts. The relevant texts have been collected and extracted in Vettorammal v. Poochammal(').
Section 7 of the Ch. I, Mitakshara, deals with provision for
widows, unmarried daughters etc. Pla"citum 10 and 11
provide for portions to sisters when a partition is made
between the brothers after the death of the father. The
allotment of a share to daughters in the family is regarded
as obligatory by Vignaneswara. In Ch. I, s. 7 pp. 10 and
11, he says:
"The allotment of such a share appears to be indispensably requisite, since the refusal of it is pronounced
to be a sin."
He relies on the text of Mann to the effect that thev who
refuse to give it shall be degraded: Mann Ch. I, ;. 118.
In Placitum 11, Ch. -I, withholding of such a portion is
---(1) (l<iiz) 22 M:L.J. 321.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
512
1963
DeshmukJ•
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
pronounced to be a sin. In Madhaviya, pp. 41 and 42, a
text of Katyayana is cited authorizing the gift of immovable
property by a father to his daughters beside a gift of movables upto the amount of 2,000 phanams a year. In Vyavahara Mayukha, p. 93, the following text of Brihaspati is
also cited by the .author of the Madhaviya to the same
effect:
"Let him give adequate wealth and a share of land
also if he desires."
Deval a says:
"To maidens should be given a nuptial portion of the
father's estate"-Colebrooke's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 185.
Mann says:
"To the unmarried daughters by the same mother let
their brothers give portions out of their allotments respectively, according to the class of their several mothers.
Let each give one-fourth part of his own distinct share
and those who refuse to give it shall be degraded."
These and similar other texts indicate that Hindu law
texts not only sanction the giving of property to daughters
at the time of partition or at the time of their marriage,
as the case may be, but also condemn the dereliction of the
said duty in unequivocal terms. It is true that these Hindu
law texts Juve become obsolete. The daughter has lost her
right to a share in the family property at the time of its
partition. But though the right has been lost, it has been
crystallized into a moral 'obligation on the part of the
father to provide for the daughter either by way of marriage
provision or subsequently. Courts even recognized making
of such a provision not only by the father but also after
his death by the accredited representative of the family and
even by the widow. The decision in Kudutamma v. Narasimhacharyalu(') is rather instructive. There, it was held
that a Hindu father was entitled to make gifts by way of
m"rriage portions to his daughters out of the famiiy property to a reasonable extent. The first defendant was the
half-brother of the plaintiffs and the father of the 2nci
defendant. After the death of his father and after the
birth of the 2nd defendant he for himself and as
guardian of the 2nd defendant executed a deed of gift
to the plaintiffs jointly, of certain portions of the joint
•
r
...
(') (1907) 17 M.L.J. 528.
..Ii
4 S.C.R.
-
>
)
.'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
family property. The question was whether that gift
was good. It will be seen from the facts that the gift
was made by the brother to his half-sisters not at the
time of their marriage but subsequently. Even so, the
gift was upheld. Wallis J. in his judgment pointed out
that unmarried daughters were formerly entitled to share
on partition and that after marriage they were entitled to
an endowment and that though that right fell into desuetude, a gift made to a daughter was sustained by Courts
as a provision for the married couple. The learned Judge
summarized the position thus, at p. 532:
" ...... although the joint family and its representative,
the father or other managing member, may no longer
be legally bound to provide an endowment for the
bride on the occasion of her marriage, they are still
morally bound to do so, at any rate when the circumstances of the case make it reasonably necessary."
If such a provision was not made at the time of marriage,
the learned Judge indicated that such moral obligation
could be discharged subsequently by a representative of the
family. To quote his observations-"Mere neglect on the
part of the joint family to fulfil a moral obligation at the
time of the marriage, cannot, in my opinion, be regarded
as putting an end to it, and I think it continued until it
was discharged by the deed of gift now sued on and executed after the father's death by his son, the !st defendant who succeeded him as managing member of the
joint family". Another division Bench of the Madras High
Court considered the question in Sundararamaya v.
Seethamma(') and declared the validity of a gift of 8 acres
of ancestral land by a Hindu father to his daughter after
marriage when the family was possessed of 200 acres of
land. The marriage took place about forty years before
the gift. There was no evidence that the father then had
any intention to give any property to the daughter. The
legal position was thus expounded by the learned Judges,
Munro and Sankaran Nair TJ.
"The father or the widow is not bound to give anv
property. There may he no legal but only a moral
obligation. It is also true that in the case before us
the father did not make any gift and discharge that
---(')(!911)21M.L..095, 699.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
514
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
moral obligation at tbe time of the marriage. But it
is difficult to see why the moral obligation does not
sustain a gift because it was not made to the daughter
at the time of marriage, but only some time later.
The moral obligation of the plaintiff's father continued
in force till it was discharged by the gift in 1899."
Another division Bench of the Madras High Court in
Ramaswamy Ayyer v. Vengidusami Ayyer(') held that
a gift of land made by a widow, on the occasion of her
daughter's marriage, to the bridegroom was valid. Sundara
Aiyer and Spencer JJ. held in Vettorammal v. Poochammal (') that a gift made by a father to his own daughter
or by a managing member to the daughter of any of his
coparceners, provided it be of a reasonable amount, is
valid as against the donor's son. After elaborately considering the relevant texts on the subject and the case law
bearing thereon, the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's father was competent to make a
gift of ancestral property to the 1st defendant, his brother's
tiaughter. The learned Judges also held that the validity
of the gift would depend upon its reasonableness. The
legal basis for sustaining such a gift was formulated by the
learned Judges at p. 329 thus:
"No doubt a daughter can no longer claim as of right
a share of the property belonging to her father, but the
moral obligation to provide for her wherever possible
is fully recognized by the Hindu community and will
support in law any disposition for the purpose made
by the father."
•
-
-
In Bachoo v. Mankorebai('), the Judicial Committee held
that a gift by a father, possessed of considerable ancestral
property, of a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to his daughter was
valid. No doubt this was not a gift of immovable property;
but there is no difference in the application of the principles to a gift of immovable property as illustrated by the
decision of the Judicial Committee in Ramalinga Annavi
v. Narayana Annavi('). There, both the Subordinate
Judge and the High Court held that the assignments by
a member of a joint Hindu family to his daughters of a
(1) (1898) l.L.R. 22 Mad. 113.
( 3)
(2) (1912) 22M. L.J. 321.
(1907) l.L.R. 31 Bom. 373. ( 4 ) (1922) 49 IA. 168, 173.
'
I
.
4 S.C.R.
515
sum of money and of a usufructuary mortgage were valid,
as they were reasonable in the circumstances in which they
were made. The Privy Council confirmed the finding of
the High Court. In considering the relevant point, Mr.
Ameer Ali observed at p. 173 thus:
"The father has undoubtedly the power under the
Hindu law of making, within reasonable limits, gifts of
movable property to a daughter. In one case the Board
upheld the gift of a small share of immovable property
on the ground that it was not shown to be unreasonable.'
Venkataramana Rao f. in Sithamahalakshmamma v.
Kotayya(') had to deal with the question of validity of
a gift made by a Hindu father of a reasonable portion of
ancestral immovable property to his daughter without reference to his son. Therein, the learned Judge observed at
p. 262:
"There can be no doubt that the father is under a
moral obligation to make a gift of a reasonable portion of the family property as a marriage portion to
his daughters on the occasion of their marriages. It
has also been held that it is a continuing obligation till
it is discharged by fulfilment thereof. It is on this
principle a gift of a small portion of immovable property by a father has been held to be binding on the
members of the joint family."
Adverting to the question of the extent of property he can
gift, the learned Judge proceeded to state:
'The question whether a particular gift is reasonable
or not will have to be judged according to the state
of the family at the time of the gift, the extent of the
family immovable property, the indebtedness of the
family, and the paramount charges which the family
was under an obligation to provide for,- and after
having regard to these circumstances if the gift can
be held to be reasonable, such a gift will be binding
on the joint family members irrespective of the consent of the members of the family."
This decision was followed by Chandra Reddy J. of the
Madras High Court in Annamalai v. Sundarathcrmma/(2).
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
)
-
)(1936)71 M.L.fl59.
( 1
2
( )
(1952) II M.L.J. 782, 784.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao f.
516
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
A division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Churaman
Sahu v. Gopi Sahu(') held that it was competent to a
Hindu widow governed by the Mitakshara law to make a
valid gift of a reasonable portion of immovable property
of her husband to her daughter on the occasion of the
daughter's gowna ceremony. The learned Judges have followed some of the aforesaid decisions of the Madras High
Court.
It is, therefore, manifest that except the decision of a
single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Jinnappa Mahadevappa v. Chimmava(2) all the decisions on the subject
recognize the validity of a gift of a reasonable extent of
joint family property to a daughter under varying circumstances. The observations of Rangnekar J. that Hindu law
does not sanction the validity of such a gift and that the
said decisions were based only on long standing custom
do not appear to he correct. The Hindu law texts as well
as decided cases support such a gift.
The legal position may he ·summarized thus: The
Hindu law texts conferred a right upon ·a daughter or a
sister, as the case may he, to have a share in the family
property at the time of partition. That right was lost by
efflux of time. But it became crystallized into a moral
obligation. The father or his representative can make a
valid gift, by way of reasonable provision for the maintenance of the daughter, regard being had to the fimncial
and other relevant circumstances of the family. By custom or by convenience, such gifts are made at the time of
marriage, but the right of the father or his representative
to make such a gift is not confined to the marriage occasion.
It is a moral obligation and it continues to subsist till
it is discharged. Marriage is only a customary occasion for such a gift. But the obligation can be discharged at any time, either during the lifetime of the
father or thereafter. It is not possible to lay down
a hard and fast rule, prescribing the quantitative limits
of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each
case and it can only be decided by Courts, regard being
had to the overall picture of the extent of the family estate,
the number of daughters to be provided for and other
paramount charges and other similar circumstances. If the
- - ( l f (T910) [L.R. 37 Cal. !. (") (1935) I.LR. 59 Born. 459.
•
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.,. _..,
4 S.C.R.
y
-
• •
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
father is within his rights to make a gift of a reasonable
extent of the family property for the maintenance of a
daughter, it cannot be said that the 'said gift must be made
only by one document or only at a sing!~· point of time.
The validity or the reasonableness of a gift does not depend
upon the plurality of documents but on the power of the
father to make a gift and the reasonableness of the gift
so made. If once the power is granted and the reasonableness of the gift is not disputed, the fact that two gift deeds
were executed instead of one, cannot make the gift anytheless a valid one.
Applying the aforesaid principles, we have no doubt
that in the present case, the gift made by the father was
within his right and certainly reasonable. The family had
extensive properties. The father gave the daughter only
a life-estate in a small extent of land in addition to what
had already been given for her maintenance. It has not
been stated that the gift made by the father was unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. We, therefore, hold
that the said document is valid to the extent of the right
conferred on the 8th defendant.
Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the respondents in
Civil Appeal No. 334 of 1960 and appellants in Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1960, contended on behalf of the adopted
son that in a competition between an adopted son and a
subsequent born natural son among Sudras, each takes an
equal share in the family property. A controversy wa~
raised before us on the question whether the Lingayats,
to which community the parties belong, are Sudras or
dwijas. The Bombay High Court in Tirkangauda Mallanagauda v. Sfzivappa Patil('), after considering the relevant
authorities on the question, held as follows, at p. 742:
"Whether the Lingayats are Hindus or not, we are
concerned to sec what is the law by which they are
governed, and ever since the ruling in Copa! Narhar
Safray v. Hanumant Ganesh Safray('), they have
been subject to Hindu law as applied to Shudras."
In this case it is not necessary to express our opinion on
the question whether Lingayats are Sudras or not, for we
proceed on the assumption that they are, or at any rate that
(1) I.LR. [ 1943] Bom. 706.
2
) (1879) IL.R. 3 Born. 273.
(
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
518
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Ma/appa
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the Hindu law applicable to Sudras applies to them.
In Arumilli Perrazu v. Arumilli Subbrayadu(') it
was held by the Judicial Committee that among Sudras in
the Madras Presidency an adopted son on partition of the
family property would share equally with a son or sons
born to the adoptive father after the adoption. The Judicial Committee based its conclusion mainly on the following
ground:
" ...... the rule of the Dattaka Chandrika that on a
partition of the joint family property of a Sudra family
an adopted son is entitled to share equally with the
legitimate son born to the adoptive father subsequently
to the adoption had been accepted and acted upon for
at least more than a century in the Presidency of Madras, as the law applicable in such cases to Sudras until
the law on that subject was disturbed in 1915 by the
decision of the High Court at Madras in Copa/am
v. Venkataragkwulu(')."
It will be seen that the decision rested on the fact that
Dattaka Chandrika was the recognized authority in the
Madras Presidency and that the rule that an adopted son
and an afterborn natural son take in equal shares the family
property had been followed for over a century. On this
decision Sarkar Sastri commented in his valuable book on
Hindu Law, 8th Edn., at p. 211, thus:
"Another novel rule enunciated for the first time by
the Dattaka Chandrika is that a Sudra's adopted son
should share equally with his begotten son, on the
ground that a Sudra' s illegitimate son ma¥ by the
father's choice get an equal share with his legitimate
sons. It is difficult to understand the cogency of this
argument. This rule, however, has been followed by
the Calcutta and Madras High Courts, for this book is
said to be of special authority in Bengal and Madras.
But the Madras High Court, after consideration of the
authorities on the subject, came to the conclusion, following an earlier decision of the same Court, that an
adopted son of a Sudra was entitled to only a fifth
share of what a natural born son gets. But in the case
( 1)
( 1921)
( 2)
(1915) !.L.R. 40 Mad. 632.
48 I.A. 280.
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4 S.C.R.
•
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l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
of Arumilli Perrazu(') the above decision has been
overruled and it has been finally settled by the Privy
Council that an adopted son shares equally on partition
with an after-born son of a Sudra."
In Bengal where Dattaka Chandrika is given same importance as in the Madras Presidency, the same rule has
been followed in the matter of partition between an adopted son and an after-born natural son among Sudras: see
Asita v. Nirode("). It is not necessary to pursue that matter. It may be accepted that in Bengal and Madras the
said rule governs the shares between them. But in Bombay, Dattaka Chandrika is not given the place of honour
as in Madras and Calcutta. As early as 1892, a division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Giriapa v. Hingappa(") had to consider the question of shares inter se
between an adopted son and an after-born aurasa son. It
held that in Western India, both in the districts governed
by the Mitakshara and those specially under the authority
of Vyavahara Mayukha, the right of the adopted son, where
there was a legitimate son born after the adoption, extended only to a fifth share of the father's estate. The question therein was whether the adopted son takes onefourth of the estate or one-fourth of the natural born
son's share in the property. After considering all the relevant texts the division bench came to the conclusion that
he takes one-fourth of a natural born son's share. After
the decision of the Judicial Committee in Perrazu v. Subbarayadu(') another division Bench of the Bombay High
Court, in Tukaram Mahadu v. Ramachandn1 Mahadu( 4 )
reviewed the law and came to the same conclusion. Adverting to the Privy Council decision, the learned Judges of
the Bombay High Court observed:
"No doubt this case Perraztt v. Subbarayudu(') is
an authority for holding that in Madras and in Bengal
among Sudras the rule is that for which the appellant's
counsel contends."
Then the learned Judges posed the following question:
"Assuming that the parties here are Sudras ought we
(') (1921) 48 I.A. 280.
(2) (1916) 20 C.W.N. 901.
( 3 ) (1892) I.L.R. 17 Born. 100.
4
( ) (1925) l.L.R. 49 Born. 672, 679, 680, 684.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!964]
1963
to apply to this Presidency the rule which their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down as prevailDeshmukh
ing
in the Madras and Bengal Presidencies?"
v.
Malappa
After citing the relevant extracts from the decision of the
Judicial Committee, the learned Judges proceeded to
Subba Rao J.
answer thus:
"In this Presidency where the rule of Dattaka Chandrika upon the question at issue has never been followed, for no case, and no kind of judicial or other pronouncement is forthcoming, (and as I have said the
leading case is against it), ought we to accept the
rule upon the authority of the Dattaka Chandrika
alone? In my opinion we should err if we did so.
The authority of the Dattaka Chandrika has never been
placed so high in Western India as in Bengal and
Madras ...... The case is one where the principle of
stare decisis should be maintained."
Coyajee J., said much to the same effect:
"We have no reason to believe that the rule propounded in paras. 29 and 32 of section V of the Dattaka
Chandrika has been so accepted and acted upon in this
Presidency; and there is therefore no justification for
holding that the decision in Giriappls case(') is not
applicable to the parties to this suit even if they were
Sudras."
Steele in his valuable book on Hindu Law and Customs,
compiled as far back as 1868, did not find any justification
for excepting the Sudras from the general rule. It is .• therefore, manifest that in Bombay Presidency the rule accepted in Dattaka Chandrika has never been followed and the
share of an adopted son in competition with a natural born
son among Sudras has always been 1/5th in the family
property, i.e., 1/4th of the natural born son's share. Nothing
has been placed before us to compel us to depart from the
long established rule prevalent in the Bombay State. \Ve,
therefore, cannot accept the argument of Mr. Chatterjee in
this regard.
,
In the result, Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1960 filed by
the plaintiff and defendant 3 is dismissed with costs, and
Civil Appeal No. 334 of 1960 filed by defendants 1, 2, 4,
( 1)
(1892) I.LR. 17 Born. 100.
...
I .,
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
5, the legal representative,s ©f defendant 7 and def. 8, except
to the extent of the 8th defendant's right to maintenance
under Ex. 371, is dismissed with costs. So far as the 8th
defendant is concerned, the appeal filed by her is allowed
with costs proportionate to her interest in the property
throughout.
1963
Deshmukh
v.
Malappa
Subba Rao/.
Appeal No. 335 dismissed.
Appeal No. 334 partly allowed.
NOOR KHAN
'
ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN
(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. c. SHAH JJ.)'
Criminal Trial-MurderC-Asquittal by Trial Court-Conviction after setting aside acquittal by the High Court-Validity·-Provisions relating to the record of statements of witnesses by Police and failure to supply copies to the accused!/ and when viti'ates the trial-Prejudice-Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Act ·5 of 1898). ss. 161(3), 162, 173(b),
207A(3).
-'
I
1963
I).
The appellant and nine others were tried before the Sessions
Judge for offences of rioting and being members of an unlawful assembly and causing in furtherance of their common object
death of one person and serious injuries to four others. The appellant was also charged for the substantive offence of causing the
death by gun-shot injuries. All the accused persons were acquitted
at the trial. In appeal against acquittal by the State, the High
Court set aside the acquittal of the appellant and sentenced him
to imprisonment for life under s. 302 Indian Penal Code and confirmed the order in respect-·of the rest. The appellant's main contention in this Court was that under s. 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure it was obligatory upon an investigating officer to record
the statements of witnesses examined by him and if those statements were not made available to the accused at the trial, a valuable right was lost to the' accused, and the trial must on that
account alone be regarded as vitiated.
34-2 S. C. India/64
ANgusl 19
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