R. P. KAPUR versus PRATAP SINGH KAIRON & OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 August 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 204 | 1963 INSC 161
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 August 1963
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 75/1963
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 204
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 161
Text of the judgment
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
R. P. KAPUR
August, 2
I .
[1964}
PRATAP SINGH KAIRON & OTHERS
' )
(
(S. K. DAs, AcTING C.J., A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANcHoo,
. K. c. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Civil Servant-Enquiry under Public Servants (Inquiries) Act,
1850-0rder of enquiry whether competent when First Information Report a!ready filed under Code of Criminal Procedure-Meaning of "misbehaviour" in Inquiries Act-Differences in procedure
between enquiry under Public Servants (Inquiries) Act and All
India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 whether violate
Constitution, Art. 14-Articles 16 and 20(3)-0rder of Government
if malafide-Public Servant Inquiries Act, 1850, s. 2-All India
Services (Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1955-Code of Criminal
Procedure, ss. 5, 154-Constitution of India Arts. 14, 16 and 20(3).
-
The appellant jointed the Indian Civil Service in 1938. He
continued in the service after the independence of India and since
1948 has been serving the Government of Punjab. In July, 1959,
When he was serving as Commissioner, Ambala Division, he was
placed under suspension. A few months before that, two criminal
cases had been instituted against him.
Several other cases were
instituted against the appellant and some of his relations during
the year 1960. The criminal cases which were pending in the courts
of different Magistrates in the Punjab \Vere transferred to Criminal
Courts subordinate to the Allahabad High Court by the orders of
this Court. Two of those cases had to be dropped by the orders
of Additional District Magistrate, Saharanpur.
The cases started
on the complaint of Dhingra arnl report of Daryo Singh were
consigned to record as untraced by the orders of the Magistrate
on May, 25, 1961.
On May 26, 1961, an order was passed in the name of the Governor of Punjab directing an enquiry against the appellant under the
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. Some of the charges were in
respect of the acts alleged against the appellant in the complaint
of Dhingra and the other charges were in respect of the acts- alleged
against him in the report of Daryao Singh. By 3nother order of the
same date, the Governor appointed Mr. Justice D. Falshaw, then
a puisne Judge of Punjab High Court, as Commissioner for holding
the enquiry. Notice was duly served on the appellant and he was
informed that the enquiry would begin on August 28, 1961. On
July 18, 1961, the appellant filed a writ petition under Art. 226
of the Constitution praying for an order striking down the order
of the Government for making the enquiry against him. The
High Court rejected all the contentions raised by the appellant and
dismissed the writ petition. The appellant came to this Court by
special leave.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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The contention of the appellant before this Court was that
no enquiry could be held under the Inquiries Act in as much as
the First Information Reports had already been lodged under the
Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the acts mentioned in the
articles of charge, that Section 2 of the Inquiries Act was bad as
the word "misbehaviour" was too vague and the section gave the
Government uncontrolled and uncanalised power to subject Government Servants to enquiry under the Act, that an enquiry under the
Inquiries Act was more drastic and less ,advantageous to an officer
in the position of appellant than an enquiry that could he held
against an officer in a similar position under the All-India Services
(Discipline and Appeol) Rules, 1955, and thus resulted in infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution, th::i.t the Inquiries Act
violated Articles 16 and 20( 3) of the Constitution and \Vas there·
fore invalid and that the Government had acted ma/a fide in order·
ing the enquiry.
Held, that. in most case:;, it would be proper and reasonable
for Governmer:t to a\vait the result of the police investigation and
where the inYestigation is follovved by an enquiry or trial, the result
of such enquiry or trial, before deciding to take disciplinary action
against any of its servants. It V\.'ould be proper and reasonable also,
generally, for Government not to take action against a Government
servant w·hen on investigation by the police it is found that no prinia
facic case had been made out. Even though this appears to be a
reasonable course which will ordinarily be followed by Government
there is no legal bar to the Government ordering a departmental
enquiry even in a case where a First Information Report under
s. 154 having been lodged, an investigation will follow. The use of
the words "otherwise dealt \vith" in s. 5 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not justify a conclusion that enquiries in connection
with disciplinary proceedings on the basis of offences alleged to
have been comitted by the Government servant must also be held
in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The \Yard "misbehaviour" as used in s. 2 of the Inquiries Act
is not vague. "Misbehaviour" by a Government servant would
certainly mean a lapse by him from the proper standard o.f conduct
in the discharge of his functions as a Government servant. A Government servant is expected and required to act honestly and not
to use his position as a Government servant for enriching himself
or others. Every dishonest act of a Government servant amounts to
"misbehaviour".
It is well settled that where the Government is invested \vith
authority to direct an enquiry in one of the two alternative modes
and one of the modes is more drastic and less advantageous that the
other an order directing an enquiry under the ~ore drastic and less
advantageous mode will amount to an infringement of Article 14 of
the Constitution as the more advantageous and less drastic mode
may be applied against another Government servant similarly circumstanced. However, the procedure and provisions of the In-
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singk
Kairon and
Others
206
1963
R. P. 1<.apur
v.
Prattip Singh
Kairon and
Others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
quiries Act are not in substance less advantageous and more drastic
than the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955
and hence Article 14 is not violated.
Article 16 guarantees to all citizens equality of opportunity in
matters relating to e1nployment or appointment to any office under
the State. I-Iowever, that guarantee is no bar to disciplinary action
being taken against a citizen who holds an office under the State.
The fact· that the result of such disciplinary action inay be that a
citizen is deprived of promotion cannot be held to be a denial of
equality of opportunity relating to employment or appointment.
There is also no violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. It
cannot be said a provision that an accused shall be required to
make his defence amounts to compelling him to be a witness against
himself. Moreover, the accused is not even compelled to make his
defence. If he chooses not to make any defence, he is free to do so.
,
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The Government of the Punjab had not acted ma/a fide in
ordering an enquiry against the appellant. For holding the enquiry
the Government had appointed a Judge of the High Court as the
Com1nissioner and it was reasonable to think that the enquiry
would be fair and impartial. The appellant had also the right to
appeal against the finding of the Inquiry Officer. The concurrence
of the Public Service Commission or the Central Government was
also necessary to impose any penalty on the appellant. If the penalty
\Vas itnposed by the State Government with the concurrence of the
Public service Com1nission, the appellant, had a right of appeal to
the Central Government. Hence, even if the Punjab Chief Minister
was unfriendly to the appellant, he could not expect to harm him
by having recourse to an enquiry under. the Inquiries Act in preference to a trial in a criminal Court.
S'i1rder Kapur Singh v. Union of India. [1960] 2
S.C.R. 569 and State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit,
[1964] 2 S.C.R. I, referred to.
•
CIVIL APPELLATE JumsmcnoN: Civil Appeal No. 75· of
1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 9, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in
Civil Writ No. 954 of 1961.
·
The appellant appeared in person.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, S. M. Sikri,
Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, Mohinder Singh
Punu, Deputy Advocate-General for the State of Puniab,
R.N. Sachthey and P.D. Menon for the re.spondents.
. .
August 2, 1963. The judgment of the Court was delivered by
~
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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DAs GUPTA J.-The appellant, R. P. Kapur, was appointed to the Indian Civil Service almost 25 years ago.
He continued in the service after the independence of
India and since 1948 has been serving the Government of
Punjab. On the 18th July 1959, when the appellant
was serving as Commissioner, Ambala Division, he was
placed under suspension. A few months before this, two
criminal cases had been instituted against him. The first
of these was instituted on December 10, 1958, by one M.L.
·Sethi against Kapur and his mother-in-law, Kaushalya
Devi, on allegations of offences under s. 420 and · s.
120B of the Indian Penal Code. The second was instituted on the complaint of one M.L. Dhingra on allegations of offences under s. 55(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and ss. 167, 168, 406, 420 and 465 of the
Indian Penal Code. This complaint was submitted by
D hingra to Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, the Chief Minister of Punjab, on February 27, 1959. Action in this case
was taken unper the orders of the Chief Minister and a
first information report was recorded on the basis of this
complaint at Chandigarh Police Station on March 4, 1959.
Several other cases were instituted against the appellant
and some of his relations after this, during the year
1960, including one instituted on the .basis of a report
by Daryao Singh, Inspector of Police, C.l.D., Kamal.
This report which bears the date November 1, 1959, alleged that the appellant had committed offences under s. 166,
s. 167 of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 109 of the
Indian Penal Code and also under s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This report was forwarded by
Daryao Singh to the Secretary, Orphanage Advisory Board,
Chandigarh, in connection with the affairs of which
Board the offences were said to have been committed·
it was sent by the latter to the police for registration of
a case and investigation, only on May 25, 1960. The criminal cas,s which were pending in the courts of differe_nt magistrates of the Punjab were on appellant's application transferred by this Court to criminal courts subordinate to the Allahabad High Court for disposal in the State
of Uttar Pradesh.
Two of these cases, one under s. 107 of the Indian
Penal Code in which the appellant's wife was made an
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta f.
208
1963
R. P. Kapu,.
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
accused, and the other under s. 145 of the Indian Penal
Code in which also she figured as an opposite party, were
disposed of in March and April 1961, the proceedings in
both cases being dropped by au order of the Additional
District Magistrate, Saharanpur. Jn the case instituted on
Dhingra's complaint the investigation appears to have been
completed m August-Septemb.er 1959, and in February
1960, the Government of Punjab applied to the Central
Government for sanction to prosecute the appellant under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
as required under s. 6( c) of that Act. The Government
of India was however reluctant to accord sanction and on
June 2, 1960, the Government of India (Home Department) wrote to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab indicating the view of the Central Government that such prosecution was not likely tu succeed and
also that as Kapur was already involved in two criminal
cases and would be facing his trial in those cases, any action to prosecute him in a third case, might look like chasing a man who was already in serious trouble. In this letter the Punjab Government was requested to consider
whether it was necessary to pursue that particular case just
then.
The Governl]1ent of Punjab does not appear to have
pressed its request for sanction and ultimately on the 25th
May 1961 the Police submitted the final report in the case
under s. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying
that the case "should be consigned. to record as untraced". On the same date the Magistrate made' an
order directing the case "to be consigned to record as
untraced". A similar report was on the same date submitted by the Police to the Magistrate in the cases started
on the report of Daryao Singh and the Magistrate made
an order directing the case to be filed as untraced and
to be sent to record. On the next date, the 26th of
May 1961 an order was made in the name of the Governor
of Punjab directing an enquiry against the appellant under
the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. Later in the
judgment we shall refer to this Act as "the Inquiries Act".
The order was in these words :"Whereas the Governor of Punjab is of opinion that
there are good grounds for making a formal and pub-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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lie inquiry into the truth of certain imputations of misbehaviour against Shri R.P. Kapur, I.C.S., Commissioner (under suspension) ;
"Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by
section 2 of the Public Servants' (Inquiries) Act,
1850, the Governor cf. Punjab hereby orders a formal
and public inquiry to be made into the truth of the
imputations of misbehaviour, the substance whereof
has been drawn in articles of charge, against the said
officer.'''
It may be mentioned here that some of these charges
are in respect of acts alleged against the appellant in Dhingra's complaint while the other charges are in respect of
acts alleged against him in Daryao Singh' s report.
Eight articles of charges were drawn up for the purpose of the enquiry. Another order was made by the
Governor on the same date appointing Mr. Justice D.
Falshaw, then a puisne Judge of the High Court of Punjab, as Commissioner for holding the enquiry. Notice was
duly served on the appellant of these orders and also of
the article of charge ; and he was informed that the Inquiry would commence on August 28, 1961. On July 18,
1961, the appellant applied to the Punjab High Court under .Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for an order
striking down the order of the Governor dated the
26th May, 1961, for making the enquiry against him.
Other prayers were that the order appointing Mr. Justice
Falshaw as Commissioner for the Inquiry and the notice
on the petitioner be also struck down ; a writ of quo
warranto be issued against Mr. Justice Falshaw and a writ
of Prohibition against the Commissioner not to proceed
with the inquiry.
It is obvious that the real relief that the appellant
sought by this petition was that the order to hold the inquiry should be struck down. The other reliefs prayed
for are either superfluous or irrelevant.
The averments in the petition cover a large number
of grounds but the principal grounds on which the appellant based his prayer may be summarised thus :(1) ~hat no. inquiry could be held under the Inquines Act masmuch as first information reports had
already been lodged under the Code of Criminal
1963
R. P. Kapur
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Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
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Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Procedure in respect of the acts mentioned in the
articles of charge ;
·
(2) That s. 2 of the Inquiries Act was bad as the word
"misbehaviour" was too vague ; and so, the section gave the Government uncontrolled and uncanalised power to subject Government servants
to inquiries under the Act;
(3) That an inquiry under this Act was more drastic
and less advantageous to an officer in the position
of the appellant than an inquiry that could be
held against an officer in a similar position under
the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1955, hereinafter referred to· as "the 1955
Rules" and thus resulted in infringement of Art.
14 of the Constitution ;
(4) That the Inquiries Act violates Arts. 16, 21 and
20(3) of the Constitution and is therefore invalid;
(5) That the Government has acted mala fide in
ordering the inquiry.
The High Court rejected all the contentions and dismissed the petition. Against that order this appeal has been
filed with special leave of this Court.
In support of the appeal all the grounds raised in the
High Court have been urged again before us. After the
arguments were concluded, we reserved judgment for considering the matters -raised. When we were considering
these it appeared to us that a further question which required consideration, though it had not been raised before
us on behalf of the appellant, was whether under the terms
·of s. 2 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, the
Punjab Government was competent to direct this enquiry
under the Act. On the face of it this question appeared
to be concluded by the decision of this Court in Sardar
Kapur Singh v. Union of India('). As we were of opinion
that some matters involved in the question required• further
consideration by a larger Bench, these were accordingly
referred to a Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court.
That Bench has delivered its judgment today. On the
majority decision of the Bench it is now finally settled that
. ( 1)
[1960] 2 S.C.R. 569.
.;
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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the Punjab Government was competent to direct the inquiry. We shall therefore now proceed to consider the
points originally raised by the appellant in support of his
appeal.
The first and indeed the most important question of
law raised by the appellant, who argued the appeal himself
with considerable ability and restraint, was that no disciplinary proceedings can be commenced against a Government servant for any act in respect of which a first information report has been recorded under s. 154 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
At one stage of his arguments the appellant put his
propositions in an even wider form and submitted that no
inquiry except under the Code of Criminal Procedure can
be held at all in respect of any offence under the Indian
Penal Code or any other law. For this proposition he
relied on s. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That
section lays down in its first sub-section that all offences
under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired
into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained ; and in its second sub-section
that all offences under any other law shall be investigated,
inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to
the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the
time being in force regulating the manner or place
of investigating, enquiring into, trying or otherwise
dealing with such offences. The appellant emphasises
the use of the words "otherwise dealt with" in this
section and contends that the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure have to be followed not only for
investigation, inquiry or trial of offences but also for
dealing with them in any other manner, thus including
an inquiry into the truth of the imputati0ns, for the purpose of disciplinary action. We do not think the words
"otherwise dealt with" has the significance which the appellant attaches to these. "Otherwise dealt with" in the
section refers, in our opinion, to such dealing with offences as is provided for in the provisions of the Code apart
from the provisions for investigation, enquiry or trial. Such
provisions are to be found in the Code, for instance, in
Chapters IV and V. Thus, the provisions in section 54
of the Code for an arrest by a police officer without warrant
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
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R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
in certain cases may come into operation even before any
investigation, enquiry or trial in connection with an offence
has commenced. It is unnecessary to multiply instances,
but it seems to us clear that the use of the words "otherwise dealt with" in s. 5 does not justify a conclusion that
inquiries in connection with disciplinary proceedings on
the basis of offences alleged to have been committed by
the Government servant must also be .held in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In any case, then argues the appellant, at least when
a first information report has been recorded under s. 154
of the Code of Criminal Procedure any enquiry under the
Inquiries Act or any other Rules for a disciplinary action
must be held to be barred.. The argument. may best be
put thus: Once a first information report has been lodged
under s. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an investigation into the correctness of the allegations made in the
report will proceed under Chapter XIV of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Under s. 173 of the Code every such
investigation has to be completed without unnecessary
delay and as soon as it is completed the officer-in-charge ·
of the police station has to forward to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police
report, a report as regards the results of the investigation.
Such a report may either ask the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence which according to the police investigation the accused person appears prima facie to have
committed or it may state that no such prima facie case
has been made out. Cases may occur where though an
offence has, in the opinion of the investigating officer, been
committed, no clue to the identity of the culprit is found
or even if such clue is found the culprit is untraced. It
is urged by the appellant that where on investigation a
prima facie case is made out against a Government servant
the truth or falsity of the allegations can best be ascertained
finally by enquiries or trials in the criminal courts that
·would follow. Where on the other hand, the police officer finds that no prima facie case has been made out it
would be reasonable to think that the truth of the allegations has not been established. In either case, it is said,
there is no scope for the truth of the allegations of the
commission of an offence by a Government servant being
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4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1963
investigated by any departmental inquiry.
At first sight it does seem reasonable that when a
R. P. Kapu•
first information report has been recorded against a Govv.
ernment servant that he has committed a cognizable Pratap Singh
offence the truth of the same should be ascertained only
Kairon and
Others
in an inquiry or trial by the criminal court when a prima
facie case is found by the investigation and a charge-sheet
Das Gupta/.
is submitted. When once that has been done there is
no need for any further inquiry in the .same matter. It
seems no less reasonable that if the police on investigation
finds that no case is made out for submission of a chargesheet the allegations should be held to be untrue, or doubtful and then also there is no need for any further inquiry
in the same matter. We are convinced that in most cases
it would be proper and reasonable for Government to await
the result of the police investigation and where the investigation is followed by an inquiry or trial, the result of
such inquiry or trial, before deciding to take any disciplinary action against any of its servants. It would be proper
and reasonable also, generally, for Government not to take
action against a government servant when on investigation
by the police, it is found that no prima fade case has
been made out. Even though this appears to be a reasonable course which we have no doubt is and will ordinarily
be followed by Government, we are unable to see any
legal bar to the government ordering a departmental enquiry even in a case where a first information report under
s. 154 having been lodged an investigation will follow.
The appellant's next argument is that the word "misbehaviour" in s. 2 of the Inquiries Act is vague and consequently the Act is bad. "Misbehaviour" by a government servant would certainly mean a lapse by him from
the proper standard of conduct in the discharge of his
functions as a government servant; but the appellant argues
that there was at the date of the Act in 1850 no ascertainable standard of conduct and so neither the government
nor its servants could know for certain what would amount
to "misbehaviour". This argument seems to us to be misconceived. Even in the absence of any detailed instructions
or direcc1u1b as to how a government servant should act
and conduct himself there could never be any manner of
doubt that a government servant was expected and required
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R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
to act honestly and not to use his position as a government
servant for enriching himself or others. Every dishonest
act of a government servant, including acts by which he
uses his position for enriching himself or others would
clearly amount to "misbehaviour". We are unable therefore to accept the appellant's argument that the word
"misbehaviour" as used in s. 2 of the Inquiries Act is vague.
It may be pointed out in this connection that even
if the appellant is correct in his argument that at the date
of the Act in 1850 no ascertainable standard of conduct
for government servants had bee.n laid down this argument is not available to him after such standard was clearly
laid down in the numerous Government Servants' Conduct Rules. So far as the appellant himself is concerned
he was at the date of the order made by government in 1961
governed by the All India Services Conduct Rules, 1954.
The attack on the validity of the Inquiries Act on the
ground that the word "misbehaviour" is vague must therefore fail.
The next attack on the validity of the Act is on the
ground that it is discriminatory inasmuch as the procedure and provisions of the Inquiries Act are more drastic
and less advantageous than those of the 1955 Rules. It is
well settled that where the government is invested with
authority to direct an enquiry in one of two alternative modes and one of the modes is more drastic
and less advantageous than the other, an order directing
an enquiry under the more drastic and less advantageous
mode will amount to an infringement of Art. 14 of the
Constitution as the more advantageous and less drastic
mode may be applied against another government servant
similarly circumstanced. We are not satisfied however
that the procedure and provisions of the Inquiries Act are
in substance less advantageous and more drastic than the
1955 Rules as contended for by the appellant. It may be
mentioned that in Sardar Kapur Singh's Case(') when a
somewhat similar argument was raised against the validity
of the Inquiries Act on the allegation that it was more
drastic and less advantageous than an enquiry under
Rule 55 of the Classification Rules, this Court contrasted
and compared the provisions of the Inquiries Act with
(') (1960] 2 S.C.R. 569.
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Rule 55 of the Classification Rules and held that there was
no substantial difference between the two alternative modes
R. P. Kapur
of enquiry. The procedure of enquiry under the 1955
v.
Rule is practically the same as under Rule 55 of the ClassiPratap Singh
Kajron and
fication Rules.
Others
Faced therefore with the decision in Kapur Singh's
Case (Supra) the appellant tried to persuade us that the
Das Gupta/.
procedure and provisions of an enquiry under the 1955
Rules were more advantageous to a government servant
than those of the Inquiries Act in the following respects
which were not considered in Kapur Singh's Case (Supra)
as those advantages were not available under the Classification Rules. These advantages, according to the appellant,
are: (1) Under sub-rule 4 of Rule 5 of the 1955 Rules the
government servant may request for access to official records
for the purpose of preparing his written statement, but
there is no such provision ip the Inquiries Act; (2) Under
sub-rule 7 of the same Rule a Board of Inquiry shall contain at least one member who shall be an officer of the
service to which the government servant belongs. There
is no such provision in the Inquiries Act; (3) Under subrule (9). of the Rule the member of the service charged
shall be supplied with a copy of the report of enquiry,
whereas there is no such provision under the Inquiries Act;
( 4) Under the proviso to sub-rule (9) mentioned above,
if the punishing authority disagrees with any part or
whole of the findings of the Board of Inquiry or the
Inquiry Officer, the point or points of such disagreement
together with a brief statement of the grounds thereof,
shall also be communicated to the member of the service.
There is no similar provision under the Inquiries Act.
We do not think that these provisions under sub-rules
4, 7 and 9 and the provisio to sub-rule 9 of Rule 5 result
in any substantial difference between an enquiry under
the Inquiries Act and an enquiry under the 1955 Rules.
While it is true that there is no express provision in the
Inquiries Act for an access to official records for the purpose of preparing the officer's written statement such as
there is in sub rule 4, we see no reason to think that similar facilities will not be allowed by the authority holding
an enquiry under the Inquiries Act. It has to be noticed
that under sub-rule 4 the access to such records may be
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1963
refused "if in the government's opinion such records are
not strictly relevant to the case or it is not desirable in
,R. P. Kapur
the public interest to allow such access." We have no doubt
v.
that in an enquiry under the Inquiries Act also the auth<>Pratap Singh
Kairon and
rity holding the enquiry will afford the officer proper faciOthers'
lities of access to official records for the purpose of preparing his written statement except where these appear
Das Gupta/,
to be irrelevant, or It is satisfied on an objection made by
the Government that it is not desirable in the public
interest to allow such access. It is reasonable to expect
that in actual practice there will be no difference in the
matter of access to official records as between an enquiry
under the Inquiries Act and an enquiry under the 1955
Rules.
The appellant's contention that in an enquiry under
the 1955 Rules he will have the benefit of having an officer
of the service to which he belongs taking part in the enquiry while he cannot have this benefit in an enquiry
under the Inquiries Act appears to be misconceived. Subrule 5 of Rule 5 leaves it to the discretion of the government to appoint either a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiry
Officer to enquire into the charges. Indeed, under that
sub-rule if the government does not consider it necessary
to appoint a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiry Officer the
enquiry may be held into· the charges "in such manner as
it deems fit". It is only 'when a Board of Inquiry is appointed that sub-rule 7 comes into operation and at least
one of the members of the Board has to be an officer of
the service to which the member of the service belongs.
It is wrong to think therefore that in an enquiry under
the 1955 Rules the officer will necessarily have the advantage-if it is an advantage---0f having an officer of the
service to which he belongs taking part in the enquiry.
There is also nothing to prevent the government to
have the enquiry held by an officer of the service
to which he belongs even in an enquiry under the Inquiries Act. It is clear therefore that the provision of subrule 7 does not mean any real difference between the two
modes of enquiry.
Coming now to sub-rule 9 we find that it provides
for a copy of the report of the enquiry to be supplied
to the member of the service after the punishing
. l
r
...
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4 S.C.R.
>
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y
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
217
authority has arrived at a provisional conclusion that a
penalty of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or
reduction in rank should be imposed. The Inquiries Act
contains no such provision; but the member of the service
will be entitled to get a copy of the report under the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution in all cases of
proposed dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The
only difference is that while under this Rule the officer
will be entitled to get a copy of the report even where a
punishment of compulsory retirement is ·proposed, the·
provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution will have
no application to such a case, so that he will not, if the
enquiry is held under the Inquiries Act, get the benefit
of having a copy of the report under the Inquiries Act if
the penalty of compulsory retirement is proposed. It is
unnecessary however to consider in the present case
whether this difference amounts to a violation of Art. 14
of the Constitution. For it is clear to us that the penalty
of compulsory retirement which can be imposed under
the 1955 Rules (See R. 3) cannot be imposed on an officer
in the position of the present appellant in view of Art. 314
of the Constitution. The appellant did not contest that
this consequence will flow from Art. 314.
It appears to us also that just as under the proviso
to sub-rule 9 the point or points of disagreement with
grounds thereof have to be furnished to the officer concerned where the punishing authority disagrees with any
of the findings of the report, the same result flows from
Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. This was held by this
Court in a recent decision-State of Assam v. Bimal
Kumar Pandit('). There is therefore no substance in the
appellant's contention that the procedure and provisions
of the Inquiries Act are less advantageous and more drastic
than an enquiry under the 1955 Rules. The contention
that the Inquiries Act violates Art. 14 of the Constitution
is therefore rejected.
It is not easy to understand the appellant's further
contention that the Inquiries Act contravenes Art. 16 and
Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. Article 16 guarantees to
all citizens equality of opportunity in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the
1
( )
[1964] 2 S.C.R. 1.
15-2 S. C. India/64
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singft
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta/.
218
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
State. That guarantee is however no bar to disciplinary
action being taken against a citizen who holds an office
under the State. The fact that the result of such disciplinary action may be that a citizen is deprived of promotion cannot possibly be held to be a denial of equality
of opportunity relating to employment or appointment.
The appellant also suggested that the provision in section 15
of the Inquiries Act that a person accused shall be required
to make his defence, infringes Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. Art. 20(3) provides that no person accused of any
offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
It is diflicult to understand how a provision that an accused
shall be required to make his defence amounts to compelling the accused to be a witness against himself. Under
this section the accused is not even compelled to make
his defence. The section merely compels the Inquiring
authority to require the accused to make a defence. If
the accused chooses not to make any defence s. 15 could
not compel him to do so. The argument that the Inquiries Act contravenes Art. 16 or Art. 20(3) of the Constitution is wholly misconceived and is rejected.
This brings us to the question whether the Government
of Punjab acted mala fide in ordering the enquiry.
The appellant's case is that he incurred the severe displeasure and hostility of the Punjab Chief Minister, Sardar
Pratap Singh Kairon and for this the Chief Minister has
been bent upon his ruin. To this ehd, it is said, the Chief
Minister instituted criminal cases against the appellant
and even against his wife, mother and mother-in-law
through his own creatures in the expectation that he would
get them convicted and sent to prison and thereafter have
the appellant dismissed on the basis of his own conviction. As the cases were transferred for trial to courts in
Uttar Pradesh and by May 1961 two of the cases had been
disposed of against the prosecution, the Chief Minister
felt apprehensive that the other criminal cases might also
end in the acquittal or discharge of the appellant. So,
he hit upon the plan of having an enquiry under the Inquiries Act on the basis of allegations made in the t\vo
cases, viz., Dhingra's complaint and Daryao Singh's report,
being apprehensive that even these cases, if charge-sheets '.:
were submitted in court, might be transferred to courts
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4 S.C.R.
•
.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
219
outside Punjab and were likely to end in the acquittal
or discharge of the appellant. The appellant urges that
the statement in the Order that the Governor was of
opinion that there were good grounds for making a formal
and public enquiry into the truth of certain imputations
of misbehaviour against him, was false, and that the real
purpose was not to ascertain the truth of the imputations
but to harass and humiliate him and if possible to impose
penalties on him by way of disciplinary action whether or
not the imputations were true or false.
The appellant has not been able to produce before us
materials to explain why the Punjab Chief Minister should
be personall-y hostile to him. There are several circumstances however which seem to suggest that whatever be
the reason the Punjab Chief Minister is not friendly to
the appellant. The appellant repeatedly drew our attention to the manner in which the Chief Minister took it
upon himself to accept a complaint of serious charges
against a senior officer like the appellant and directed the
Additional Inspector-General "to take immediate action in
taking over papers from Government Departments concerned and the papers with Shri Dhingra", and to the
direction given by him to the Additional Inspector-General
to give "a prima facie report". In a previous decision(')
of this Court observed thus:"We do not know what reasons led the Chief Minister
to make the endorsement on the complaint of Dhingra
as he did and why instead of referring the complaint
to the officer in charge of the police station, a reference
was made to the Additional Inspector-General of the
Criminal Investigation Department. It is not clear
why he ordered the seizure of the papers before even
a prima facie report was given in respect of an offence
said to have been committed five years ago."
The Court then proceeded to point out that these were
matters on which the Chief Minister alone was in a position to enlighten the Court and that "the Chief Minister
owed a duty to this Court to file an affidavit stating what
the correct position was so far as he remembered". Even
though the appellant made a pointed reference to the Chief
1
)
R. P. Kapur v. Sardar
S.C.R. 143.
(
Pratap Singh
Kairon [1961] 2
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta].
zzo
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Othtrs
Das Gupta/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
Minister's endorsement on Dhingra's complaint and also
set out this Court's observations on the ealier occasion,
the Chief Minister did not file any affidavit even on the
present occasion throwing any light on the circumstances
under which he acted in this, to say the least, unusual
manner. There is the further circumstance that even
though after the investigation of Dhingra's case was completed, the Government of Punjab did ask for the Central Government's sanction to prosecute the appellant
under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the
Government of Punjab waited for about a year after the
Government of India expressed its reluctance to give the
sanction, before taking further action in the matter. The
manner in which the police proceeded in the matter after
this long delay also appears to be unusual. For, instead
of submitting a charge-sheet for the offences found to have
been committed by the appellant, the Police Inspector
merely asked the Magistrate to consign the case to record
as untraced. This is a most curious procedure, apparently
unknown to law. The learned Advocate-General, who
appeared for the State of Punjab, was unable to explain
how the case could be treated as "untraced". It may well
happen in some cases that the culprit is untraced. But
we do not understand how the case can be untraced. It
is surprising that the police should make such a request
to the Magistrate in the circumstances of Dhingra's case.
It is even more surprising and indeed it is a matter which
has caused us deep concern, that tbe Magistrate readily
did what the police requested him to do. The papers
produced before us show that in his report to the Magistrate the Inspector, C.I.D., mentions the fact that this
course had been decided upon in consultation with "higher
authorities". Apparently that was what the Magistrate
decided. We were not enlightened as to who these "higher
authorities" were.
On the same date, i.e., May 25, 1961, a similar report
was submitted by the police to the Magistrate in the case
instituted on the basis of Daryao Singh's report and the
Magistrate readily passed a similar order. That report
itself had been made by Daryao Singh on November 1,
1959 stating that he had discovered during the course of
investigation of another case that the several offences men-
(
•
4 S.C.R.
'I
-
.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
221
tioned in the report had been committed by the appellant.
There was a delay of more than six months before this
report was forwarded to the police. It is not possible to
say clearly from the papers on the record when the investigation by the police was completed. That it was completed has not been disputed before us. It is not
known whether the investigation officer found a case
made out for the submission of charge-sheet. All that
we find is that on May 25, 1%1, that is, a year after
the first information report was recorded and a year and
six months after Daryao Singh made the report, the Magistrate granted a request of the police that the case should
be treated as untraced.
Not unnaturally the appellant has laid great stress on
the conduct of the police in connection with these two
cases. Why, asks the appellant, did the "higher authorities" under whose directions the police acted, decide to
treat these cases as untraced and at the same time start an
enquiry under the Inquiries Act in respect of some of the
allegations in these very cases? If the intention of the
Government was to ascertain the truth of these imputations,
he asks, why was it decided to discard the usual and
obvious method of enquiry into these in a court of law
in favour of the unusual method of an enquiry under the
Inquiries Act? The learned Advocate-General did not
attempt to answer these questions; but he argued that when
two alternative methods were open to the Government
for ascertaining the truth of the allegations, the mere fact
that one was adopted in preference to the other is no
reason to suspect mala fides. The appellant, on the other
hand, strenuously contends that when the conduct of the
police in connection with these two cases is considered in
the back-ground of the previous history of the criminal
cases instituted against the appellant, the manner in which
the Chief Minister himself acted in connection with
Dhingra's complaint, the fact that five criminal cases against
the appellant or the persons in whom he was interested
were transferred to courts in Uttar Pradesh and the further fact that at the date when we are considering the
matter all these cases have ended in favour of the appellant, it is reasonable to think that the enquiry under the
Inquiries Act was adopted more as a measure of persecu-
1963
R. P. Kafl"r
v.
Pratap Sinrli
Kairon and
Ollit!rs
Das Gupta/.
222
· 1963
R. P. Kapur
.v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Others
Das Gupta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
tion of the appellant than the ascertainment of the truth
of the imputations against him. Even if we assume that
these facts by themselves might afford some ground for
such a conclusion, we are of opinion that when considered
along with other circumstances to which our attention has
been drawn, this conclusion would not be justified.
For holding the enquiry the Government has appointed a Judge of the High Court of Punjab. It is reasonable
to think therefore that the enquiry would be fair and impartial. It is true, as pointed out by the appellant, that the
Government is not in law, bound to accept the report of
the Inquiring Authority. It has to be noticed however
that the power of the Government to impose any penalty
on the appellant will be limited by the provisions of the
1955 Rules. It is clear also that the appellant will be entitled to the rights of appeal under the 1955 Rules. The
penalties which can be imposed are set out in Rule 3. Of
these penalties, the penalty No. 5, viz., compulsory retirement on proportionate pension, cannot be imposed on the
appellant in view of Art. 314 of the Constitution. The
other two penalties mentioned in els. 6 and 7 of Rule 3,
viz., dismissal or removal from service, cannot be imposed,
except by an order of the Central Government. As regards
penalties which can be imposed by the State Goyernment
Rule 6 provides that no order imposing such penalty shall
be passed by the Government except after consultation with
the Public Service Commission and where there is a difference of opinion between the State Government and the
Public Service Commission the matter shall be referred to
the Central Government whose decision thereon shall be
final. If therefore it does happen that the Inquiring
Authority finds the appellant not guilty as regards some
or all the charges and the Government considers him
guilty of those charges, even so the Government will not
be in a position to impose any penalty on him unless either
the Public Service Commission or the Central Government
takes the same view. If a penalty is imposed by the State
Government with the concurrence of the Public Service
Commission, the member of the service has a right of
appeal to the Central Government. The circumstances in
which an appeal can be withheld by the State Government
are set out in Rule 14. These, in our opinion, do not
,
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
1963
interfere with the proper and reasonable exercise of the
right of appeal.
R. P. Kapu•
A consideration of all these provisions makes it reasonav.
ble to think that even if the Punjab Chief Minister was unPratap Singlr
Kairon and
friendly to the appellant he could not exp.ect to harm
Others
him by having recourse to an enquiry under the Inquiries
Act in preference to a trial in a criminal court. It is
Das Gupta/.
therefore not possible for us to accept as correct the appellant's contention that the Inquiries Act was being used
only as a device to harass and humiliate him or to impose
penalties on him in any case, nor that the statement in
the Order that the Governor was of the opinion that there
were good grounds for making a formal and public inquiry
into the truth of certain imputations of misbehaviour, was
false. We hold that the appellant's case that the Government of Punjab has acted mala fide in ordering the enquiry
against him has not been established.
There remains for consideration the question whether
the enquiry under the Inquiries Act can go on so long as
the appellant's complaint against Dhingra which is pending
in the criminal court has not been disposed of. This complaint was made by the appellant in the court of the
Magistrate, First Class, Chandigarh, alleging that the case
instituted against him by Dhingra was false and that
Dhingra himself had by making this complaint committed
offences under ss. 93, 204, 211 and 385 of the Indian Penal
Code. We are informed that the hearing of this case is
in progress in the court of a Magistrate in U.P. The appellant contends that the holding of the enquiry under
the Inquiries Act ordered against him would amount to
contempt of court. The argument is that the appellant's
case in his complaint being that the allegations made by
Dhingra in his complaint against the appellant are false,
the criminal court is engaged in examining the truth or
otherwise of those allegations of Dhingra, and an enquiry
under the Inquiries Act would involve the examination of
witnesses on the same questions. This, it is said, will tend
to interfere with the proper determination of the question '
by the criminal court and so amount to contempt of the
criminal court. We do not think it necessary to decide
this question for the purpose of the present case. For,
whether or not the holding of such a parallel enquiry under
224
1963
R. P. Kapur
v.
Pratap Singh
Kairon and
Otht:rs
Das Gupta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
the Inquiries Act would amount to contempt of the criminal court, we are clearly of opinion that it is wholly undesirable that the enquiry under the Inquiries Act should
be held at the same time when the trial before the criminal court is going on. No particular reason has been shown
to exist which makes the immediate commencement of the
enquiry essential or otherwise desirable. We think it proper therefore that the enquiry under the Inquiries Act
should not proceed so long as the appellant's complaint
against Dhingra is not finally disposed of.
While therefore, we have come to the conclusion that
the High Court has rightly refused to issue to the appellant
writs prayed for to quash the Government's order for enquiry against him and the other prayers mentioned in the
petition, we direct that the enquiry should not take place
so long as the appellant's complaint against Dhingra is not
finally disposed of. The parties will bear their own costs.
-
Appeal dismissed.
1963
Aug11st, 2
R.P. KAPUR
ti,
PRATAP SINGH KAIRON AND OTHERS
(S.K. DAS, ACTING C.J., P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHoo, M. HmAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS
GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Civil Servant-A member of the Indian Civil Service en1ployed
in the State of Punjab-Enquiry under order of Governor-whether
competent-"Not removable from his appointment without the
sanction of Government"-Meaning of-The Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850, s. 2.
The appellant joined the Indian Civil Service in 1938 and
after serving in other capacities was employed under the Punjab
Government since 1948. On May 26, 1961, an enquiry was started
against him by the Punjab Government under s. 2 of the Public
Servant (Inquiries) Act, 1850. He filed a petition in the Punjab
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the
validity of the order of the Punjab Government but his petition was
dismissed. He came to this Court by special leave.
...
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