BENGAL NAGPUR COTTON MILLS versus BOARD OF REVENUE, MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 July 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 190 | 1963 INSC 158
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 July 1963
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 416/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 190
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 158
Text of the judgment
190
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
or it be a citizen cannot enforce the fundamental rights
against another body which can be regarded also as a State
The- State
Trading Corpo· within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution.
In my view, therefore, the first question should be
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. answered in the affirmative, and the first part of the sev.
cond question in the negative. The answer to the second
The Commer·
part of the second question will be as follows : even if
cial Tax Officer,
the State Trading Corporation be regarded as a departVisakhapatnam
ment
Q[ organ of the Government of India, it will, if it
and Others.
be a citizen competent to enforce fundamental rights unShah /.
der Part III of the Constitution against the State as defined
in Art. 12 of the Constitution.
1963
BENGAL NAGPUR COTTON MILLS
July, 30.
11.
BOARD OF REVENUE, MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
.(A. K. SARKAR, M. HrnAYATULLAH AND J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Octroi duty-Agreement-Exempted by former State-Liabi·
lity to pay Octroi duty-Merger of State-If Municipality can levy
after merger.
The Ruler of the former State of Nandgaon established a mill
called Central Provinces Mills Ltd. A firm purchased the said mill
and changed its name to Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. The
ruler and the appellant
company entered into an
agreement on
March 1, 1943. By this agreement the appellant company was
exempred from liability to pay octroi dury to the State or to the
municipality of the area. The ruler bound himself in consideration of certain advantages promised to him Py the mill. In consequence of the said agreement neither the ruler nor the municipality
collected octroi from _the company. On December 31, 1947, the
State merged with the State of Madhya Pradesh. On September
20, 1952, the Municipal Committee passed a resolution stating
therein that this committee would levy octroi duty on the appel~
!ant company as the Darbar Agreement of 1943 was not binding
on this committee.
The appellant challenged this resolution in a
petition under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the Constitution before
the High Court. The High Court dismissed the application and
hence the appeal has been filed in this Court.
Held (i) that the agreement of 1943 cannot be regarded as
la\v as it is in the shape of a contract between both the parties.
\
I
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
191
1963
Madhaorao Phalke v. State Madhya Pradesh, [1961] 1 S.C.R.
957, explained.
Ben gal Nagpur
Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, [1963]
Cotton Mills
Supp. 2 S. C. R. 515, relied on.
v.
(ii) that the agreements culminating in the agreement of 1943,
Board of
could not be regarded as law but must be regarded only as agreeRevenue,
ments which might have bound the sovereign as a contracting Madhya Pradesh
party and not the Municipal Committee.
& Others
(iii) that an indication of the will of the ruler meant to bind
as a rule of conduct and enacted with some formality either traditional or specially devised for the occasion, resulted in a law, but
not an agreement to which there were two parties, one of which
was the ruler.
(iv) that the Municipal Committee's rules and bye-laws though
they applied to the appellant-company, remained in suspense because
of the ruler's desire not to collect octroi from the appellant-com·
party, but could be invoked when the ruler's \vish ceased to operate.
( v) that the ruler's desire that octroi should not be collected
ceased to operate from the moment he ceased to be the ruler and
therefore the resolution of Municipal Committee was in order and
binding on the appellant.
-·
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 416
of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated April 4, 1959, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Misc. Petition No. 546 of 1956.
S. T. Desai and G. C. Mathur, for the appellant.
H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General of India, and A. G.
Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 2.
July 30, 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HmAYATULLAH J.-This is an appeal by special leave
against an order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
dated April 4, 1959, dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Art. 226 of the Constitution. By that petition,
the appellant asked for a writ of certiorari to quash an
order of the Board of Revenue, dated September 15, 1956,
by which the right of the Municipal Committee, Rajnandgaon, to levy octroi from the appellant was recognised, and
for a mandamus, directing the Committee not to realise
octroi from the appellant, in the following circumstances :
The appellant, Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd.,
Hidayatullah /.
192
[1964]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Rajnandgaon, is a limited company incorporated under
the Indian Companies Act, and carries on business of
Bengal Nagpur manufacturing textiles as Rai·nandgaon with its head office
Cotton Mil/1
• at Calcutta. Rajnandgaon was the capital of the former
v.
State of Nandgaon in the Eastern States Agency Group
Board of
Revenue,
before it merged with the State of Madhya Pradesh. A
Madhya Pradesh mill called the Central Provinces Mills Ltd., was establi& Others
shed in the year 1893 by the then Ruler Raja Bahadur
Hidayatullah f. Bairam Dass, who owned most of the shares. The mill
was in difficulties owing to heavy losses, and in 1896,
the Ruler agreed to sell it to M/ s. Shaw Wallace & Co.
On August 5, 18%, the Ruler wrote a letter to Shaw
Wallace & Co., promising to assist the mill in various ways
if the company purchased it. The mill was liought by
Messrs. Shaw Wallace & Co., on September 13, 1896 and
its name was changed to Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills
Ltd. ln 1897, there was an agreement between the Raja
Bahadur and Shaw Wallace & Co., which contained the
following terms among others :
"2. The Rajah will assist the New Company by the
special privilege of freeing its manufactured goods
from octroi duties and by enhancing the present octroi
of three pies per rupee ad valorem on imported goods
which are the product of other mills outside the said
State to one anna per rupee ad valorem.
3. The Rajah will cause that octroi on goods imported into Nandgaon by the New Company; such as
cotton, fuel, oil, stores and *C ("as in the original)
will be levied at the same scale of rates as that levied
by the Nagpur Municipality on goods imported by the
cotton mills in Nagpur."
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
"6. The Rajah agrees that. his personal claims
against the ol<l company shall as from the date of
sale be considered as discharged by the undertaking
agents as aforesaid that the New Company will pay to
the Rajah a royalty of twenty-five per cent per annum
on all net profits of the New Company after payment
out of such net profits to the proprietors of a dividend
of ten per cent per annum on the share capital of
the New Company including in such capital such
money as may be raised by way of debentures."
'I S.C.R.
i ..
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
193
1963
It appears that the increase of octroi on imported goods
produced by other mills was later found to hamper
the trade and commerce of the State, and the appellant Bengal Nagpur
Cotton Mills
company was persuaded to forego the protection, and the
v.
Municipal Committee, by a special resolution passed on
Board of
April 13, 1901, restored the original rate of three pies
Revenue,
per rupee. On October 29, 1906, another agreement was Madhya Pradesh
. & Others
executed by the Ruler and the appellant-company. This
was necessary because differences had arisen about the Hidayatullah /.
correct interpretation of the agreement, and the Ruler had
a large claim on the appellant-company for royalty. This
agreement again referred to the concessions which the
Ruler had granted to the appellant-company. On March
1, 1943, there was yet another agreement between the
Ruler and the appellant-companv. That agreement c1me
into force from January 1, 1941. It was divided into
three parts and Part III referred to the concessions in the
following words:Agreement of 18%.
"III. Save only as modified in manner aforesaid
the Principal Agreement is confirmed as valid and
subsisting.
And the Darbar in consideration of the relief given
to it by the Company by reason of the modification
in the Principal Agreement as stated above hereby
declares that the Darbar will at all times hereafter
as hitherto use its power and authority in maintaining and protecting the company under its special
favour and hereby confirms the privileges and rights
heretofore enjoyed by the company and. in particular
the Darbar with the intent to bind the Chief for the
time being thereof hereby covenants with the company as follows:1. That the company shall during the currency of
the Principal Agreement continue to enjoy freedom
from all cesses duties (whether excise octroi or otherwise) licences taxes or other impositions leviable
either by the said State or by the Municipality of
Rajnandgaon or other local Authority in the said
State on any goods manufactured by the Company
and on any machinery raw materials or Mill Stores
imported intG the said State by the company for its
194
1963
Bengal Nagpur
Cotton Mills
v.
Board of
Revenue,
Madhya Pradesh
&
Other,
Hidayatullah /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
own use for the working of the Mills."
.
[1964]
.
.
From the time of the execution of the agreement of
1943, the Municipal Committee, Rajnandgaon, did not
collect octroi and other duties contemplated by the agreement as indeed it had not, ever since 1896. On December
31, 1947, Nandgaon State merged with the State of Madhya
Pradesh. It seems that for a few years, the Municipal
Committee did not recover octroi from the appellantcompany. On September 20, 1952, the Municipal Committee at a general meeting passed a resolution in the
following terms:
"This .Committee, therefore, resolves that the so
called Darbar agreement of 1943 is not binding on this
Committee when the State Government has already
started collecting taxes and cases exempted under
Clause 1 'of Chapter III and, therefore, the Committee
shall levy octroi duty (on the imports) and other legitimate dues on Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills from 1st
November, 1952."
On October 19, 1952, the Deputy Commissioner, Durg,
suspended the resolution, but on May 19, 1953, the Government of Madhya Pradesh rescinded the order of suspension. The Municipal Committee on June 14, 1953, informed the appellant-company that octroi would be
collected retrospectively from November 1, 1952, and asked
the appellant-company to furnish full particulars including
cost of imports made by it after that date. The appellantcompany filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner,
Durg, under s. 83(1) of the Central Provinces & Berar
Municipalities Act, challenging the imposition of octroi.
The Deputy Commissioner, by his order dated March 13,
1954, quashed the imposition and the demand made, but
the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, on September 15,
1956, purporting to act under s. 83A of the Municipalities
Act, set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner in
a revision filed by the Municipal Committee. The appllantcompany thereupbn filed a petition under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution for the writs above,mentioned. On
the High Court's dismissing the petition, the present appeal
has been filed.
The appellant•company contends that it was exempted
. \.
-
-
4 S.C.R.
·'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
195
1963
from the operation of the bye-laws of the Municipality
which imposed octroi by the Ruler, and his will however
Bengal Nagpur
expressed, must be regarded as law which continued to
Cotton Mi/11
bind the Municipal Committee unless it was set aside by
v.
other competent anthority. It further contends that a>
Board of
Revenue,
the Municipal Committee was not authorised to grant the
Madhya
Pradesh
exemption, it had no power to rescind the exemption which
& Others
could not be held to be granted by it, and thus take away
an exemption granted by a sovereign ruler, which could Hidayatullah /.
only be taken away by the succeeding sovereign by appropriate legislation. The appellant-company further contends
that if the resolution passed by the Municipal Committee
did not impose the tax and it could not be construed as
rescinding an exemption since no exemption was granted
by the Municipal Committee, then so long as the agreement stood and the appellant-company paid the royalty, the
exemption could not be withdrawn. Lastly, it is contended
that the order passed by the Board of Revenue was barred
by time.
....
-
The main question is whether the agreement of 1943
operated as a law before the merger and it must continue so
to govern the Municipal Committee till it is repealed or
abrogated by suitable legislation. Reliance is placed upon
the observations in Madhaorao Phalke v. the State of
Madhya Bharat('), where this Court observes that in dealing
with the question as to whether the orders issued by an
absolute monarch amount to laws or regulations having
tl1e force of law or whether they constitute mere administrative orders, it is important to bear in mind that the distinction between executive orders and legislative commands,
is likely to be merely academic where the ruler is the
source of all power, and that all the orders of the ruler;
however issued, must be regarded as law. It is contended
that these observations show that the order of the ruler
incorporated in the agreement of 1943 must be read as a
law enjoining upon the Municipal Committee not to recover
octroi from the appellant-company and abrogating the law
imposing the levy in respect of the mill. It is also contended
that in determining whether a particular order bears the
character of law, the name which the orders bear is not
(
1
)
[1961] I S.C.R. 957 at 964.
196
1963
-Bengal Nagpur
Cotton Mills
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
conclusive, and its character, its content and its purpose
must be independently considered.
The above observations were made by this Court in
connection with certain Kalambandis which were issued by
Board of
the Ruler of Gwalior and which created a tenure to which
Revenue,
certain
persons were subject, granting to them at the same
Madhya Pradesh
time military pensions. Those Kalambandis were held by
& Others
this Court to be laws binding upon the subsequent GovernHidayatullah /. ment until repealed or replaced by other laws. In a subsequent case decided by this court between The M alzaraja
· Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. the Union of India and
others('), the earlier case in this Court was considered and
explained. The latter case is more in point. In that case,
an agreement was entered into by the Umaid Mills, and
The Maharaja of fodlzpur relieved the mills of some taxes
and also promised to obtain an exemption fro'm any federal
tax or excise which was likely to be imposed if Jodhpur
joined the Indian Federation when it came into being under
the Government of India Act, 1935. It was contended in
that case that the agreement was in the nature of a law
which bound the succeeding sovereign unless it was repealed or abrogated by suitable legislation, and the mills were,
therefore, entitled to exemption from the Central excise
duty. This contention was not accepted by this Court. This
Court pointed out that where the enforceability of an exemption from tax depends not upon a law but upon consensus,
what results is not a law granting an exemption but only
an agreement which is enforceable as an agreement. Mr.
S. T. Desai, arguing for the mill in the present case,
attempts to distinguish the Umai,d Mills' case on the ground
that in that case the promise was to obtain an exemption from
another sovereign in future and the ratio of the case was that
one sovereign could not bind another sovereign. No doubt,
the decision was also rested on this aspect of the case, but
it was quite clearly laid down in the case, that an agreement
cannot rank as a law enacted by the Ruler. The consensual
aspect of the document there considered was pointed out
in Umaid Mills' case. It is plain that an agreement of the
Ruler expressed in the shape of a contract cannot be
regarded as a law. ·A law must follow the customary
v.
(1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 515.
...
l,
-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
1963
forms of law-making and must be expressed as a binding
rule of conduct. There is generally an estabfohed method Bengal Nagpur
for the enactment of laws, and the laws, when enacted, have
Cotton Mills
also a distinct form. It is not every indication of the will
v.
Board of
of the Ruler, however expressed, which amounts to a law.
Revenue,
An indication of the will meant to bind as a rule of conduct
Madhya
Pradeth
and enacted with some formality either traditional or
& Others
specially devised for the occasion, results in a law but not
an agreement to which there are two parties, one of which Hidayatullah f.
is the Ruler.
Judged from this angle, it is quite obvious that the
document of 1943, was merely intended to bind consensually and not by a dictate of the Ruler. The Ruler bound
himself in consideration of certain advantages promised to
him by the mill. The document is not worded as a law is
ordinarily expected to be. It records a contract and Part
III where the concessions occur is also worded as a contract
and uses language familiar in agreements between two
parties dealing with each other at arm's length. It is not
necessary to refer in detail to Part III, but the words,
"And the Darbar in consideration of the relief given
to it by the Company by reason of the modification
in the Principal Agreement as stated above hereby
declares that tl1e Darbar will at all times hereafter as
hitherto use its power and authority in maintaining
and protecting the company under its special favour
and hereby confirms the privileges and rights heretofore enjoyed by the Company and in particular the
Darbar with the intent to bind the Chief for the time
being thereof hereby covenants with the company as
follows", etc.
indicate that the Darbar was binding itself in consideration
of certain acts done by the appellant-company in the past,
and others, which the appellant-company undertook to
perform in the future. This document, therefore, is of the
same character as the one which was considered in Umaid
Mills' case where the sovereign expressed himself not in a
rule of law but in an agreement. The present document
stands distinguished from the Kalambandis which not only
ordered that the pensions were to be paid but also laid down
the rules of succession to the privileges and the kind of
tenure which the holders for the time being were to enjoy.
198
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
We are, therefore, satisfied that in the present case, the
agreements culminating in the agreement of 1943, cannot
Bengal Nagpur be regarded as law but must be regarded only as agreements
Cotton Mills
which might have . bound the sovereign as a contracting
v.
party but not the Municipal Committee.
Board of
The Municipal Committee had already imposed octroi
Revenue,
Madhya Pradesh in the State but the ruler ordered the Municipal Committee
& Others
not to collect the dues from the appellant-company because
of
the agreement. No doubt, the Dewan, who entered into
Hidayatullah /.
the agreement of 1943, was also the 'local government' and
the Chief Officer of the Municipality, but the capacity of
the Dewan in entering the agreement was different from
his capacity as the head of the Municipality or as the 'local
government' of Nandgaon State. His action as the Dewan
in foregoing the collection of octroi was not anything he
did on behalf of the Municipality but on behalf of the
sovereign. The resulting position, thus, was that the sovereign did not collect octroi from the appellant-company
because of the agreement, and the Municipal Committee's
rules and bye-laws, though they applied to the appellantcompany remained in suspense because of the Ruler's desire.
After the State merged with the State of Madhya Pradesh
and the Municipal Committee was not controlled in any
way by the Ruler or by his agreement, the imposition of
octroi upon the appellant-company which was in suspense,
began to take effect from such date as the Municipal Committee chose to determine. The Municipal Committee
ceased to be subject to the wish of the Ruler after the
merger, and for a time it did not collect octroi from the
appellant-company because the succeeding Government
was accepting the royalty. In 1952, the Municipal Committee resolved to recover octroi from the appellant-company in accordance with the original imposition of the tax
in the State and there was nothing which stood in the way
of the Committee. The resolution was neither a fresh imposition of octroi because it had already been imposed nor the
cancellation of an exemption because the Municipal Committee had not granted an exemption to the appellantcompany. The resolution only indicated that on and
from a particular date, the Municipal Committee would
recover octroi which it had already imposed a long time
ago upon all and sundry and to which the appellant1963
-
..
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
1963
company was also subject and which was no longer affected
by the will of the quondam sovereign. The agreement of Bengal Nagpur
the Ruler bound the Municipal Committee only indirectly,
Cotton Mills
because the Ruler to whom the amount recovered would
v.
Board of
have gone, had agreed to forego it, but the Ruler's desire
Revenue,
that octroi should not be collected ceased to operate from
Madhya Pradesh
the moment he ceased to be the Ruler.
& Others
The Resolution of the Municipal Committee was thus
in order and the demand was rightly made. The point H idayatullah f.
about limitation was properly abandoned because it has no
substance.
-
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
CHERUBIN GREGORY
1963
t!.
fuly, 31
THE STA TE OF BIHAR
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR JJ.)
Criminal trial-Trespasser-Duty of owners towards trespassers Indian Penal Code S. 99, 103, 304A.
The appellant was
charged
under
s. 304-A of Indian
Penal Code for causing the death of a woman.
The deceased was
residing near the house of the accused. The wall of the latrine
of the house of the deceased had fallen down about a week prior
to the day of occurrence and so the deceased along with others
started using the latrine of the accused. The accused protested
a~ainst their coming there. The oral warnings however, proved
ineffective and so he fixed up a naked copper wire across the
passage leading upto his latrine and that wire carried current from
the electrical wiring of his home to which it was connected. On
the day of the occurrence, the deceased went to the latrine of the
appellant and there she touched the aforesaid fixed wire as a result
o~ which she died soon after. The trial and the appellate court
convicted and sentenced the appellant under S. 304A of the Indian
Penal Code. Hence this appeal.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org