THE STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. & OTHERS versus THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, VISAKHA- PATNAM AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 July 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 99 | 1963 INSC 157
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 July 1963
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, S.K. DAS*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 9
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 202/1961
- Disposal
- Directions issued
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 99
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 157
Text of the judgment
4 S.C.R.
99
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THE STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA
LTD. & OTHERS
v.
THE
COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, VISAKHAPATNAM AND OTHERS
(.B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANcHoo, M. HmAYATULLAH, K. C.
DAs GUPTA, J. C. SHAH and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.J
Fundamental Right, Enforcement of-Corporation, if a citizen
entitled to claim fundamental
Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g), 32.
-
rights-Constitution
of
India,
The State Trading Corporation of India is a private lirnited com·
pany registered under the Indian Co1npanies Act, 1956, with its he.ad
Office at Delhi and its entire capital is contributed by the Govern·
ment of India. The Sales-tax Authorities of the States of Andhra
Pradesh and Bihar sought to assess the Corporation to sales tax
under their respective Sales Tax i\cts and issued notices of demand.
Thi'.: Corporation claiming to be an Indian citizen filed petitions
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the said proceedings
on the ground that they infringed its fundamental rights under Art.
19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. Preliminary objections having
been taken by the respondents to the maintainability of the said
petitions, the Constitution Bench hearing the matters referred the
t\vo following questions for decision by the special bench~
"(1) Whether the State Trading Corporation, a companyregistered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, is a citizen
within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution and can ask
for the enforcement of fundamental rights granted to citizens
under the said article; and (2) whether the State Trading Corporation is, not\vithstanding the formality of incorporation under
the Indian Companies Act, 1956, in substance, a department
and organ of the Government of India with the entirety of its
capital contributed by Government; and c.an it claim to
enforce fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution
against the State as defined in Art. 12 thereof.
Held, (DAs GuPTA and SHAH JJ., dissenting) that the answer
to the first question must be in the negative.
Per S1NHA, C. J., S. K. DAs, GAJENDRAGADKAR, SARKAR,
WANCHOO and Ayyangar JJ. There can be no citizens of India not
mentioned in Part II of tho Constitution or by the Citizenship
Act, 1955. These provisions are wholly exhaustive and contemplate only natural persons.
Part III of the Constitution makes a clear distinction betwcc:n
fundamental rights available to "any person" and those guaranteed
1963
/uly, 26.
100
1963
The Stat<
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
to "all citizens", indicating thereby that under the Constitution all
c1t1.zens are persons but all persons are not citizens
Part II of. the Constitution relating to 'citizenship' is clearly
inapplicable to juristic persons and the provisions of the Citizen·
ship Act, 1955, enacted by Parliament under Art. 11 of the Constitution, show that such persons are outside the purview of the
Act.
It cannot therefore, be said that either Part II of the ConSti·
tution or the Citizenship Act, 1955, confers the right of citizen·
ship or recognises as citizen any person other than a natural
person. They do not contemplate a corporation as a citizen.
In none of the relevant decisions this Court gave its considered judgment on the present issues and the question now raised
are open questions.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India [1950] S.C.R. 869,
Dwarkadas Srinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd. [1954] S.C.R. 674 and Bengal Immunity Co.
Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603, considered.
'Nationality' and 'citizenship' are not synonymous. A corporation can claim nationality which is ordinarily determifled by
the plac.e of it.5 incorporation. But while nationality detennines
the civil right.5 of a natural or artificial person, particularly wit.i.
reference to international law, citizenship is intimately connected
with civic rights under municipal law. All citizens are, therefore,
nationals of a particular State and enjoy full political rights but
all nationals arc not citizens and do not have full political rights.
It was not correct to say that the word 'citizen' in Art. 5 was
not as wide as in Art. 19 of the Constitution or that Part II
of the Constitution supplemented by the provisions of the Citizenship Act, which deals \vith citizens, deliberately
left
out of account citizenship in relation to JUnsttc persons.
When the Constitution confers any particular right to be enjoyed
by a citizen it uses the words "any citizen" or "all citizens" in
clear contradistinction to those rights which are to be enjoyed
by all, whether citizens or alien!!, natural or juristic persons.
There i.5 no reason to think that the word 'citizen' in Art. 19
is used in a different sense from that in which it is used in Part II
of the Constitution.
Per HrDYATULLAH J.-Both the questions must be ans\vered
in favour of the respondent!!.
Before inOependence there was no law of citizenship in India.
Under the British Nationality Act, 1948, Indians became Commonwealth citizens or British subjects without citizenship and were
regarded as JX>!ential citizens of India. The Indian Constitution
made provision for citizenship under which certain natural per~
sons alone could be citizens of India and the Citizenship Act,
1955, excluded persons other than natural persons from citizenship.
f
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
101
It is not correct to say that corporations were citizens before
the Constitution. They enjoyed only such privileges under the
municipal law which that law expressly conferred on them.
The nature and personality of an incorporated company have
their origin in a fiction of law. This personality arises from the
moment of incorporation and from that date the persons subscrib~
ing to the memorandum of association or joining as members
becon1e a body corporate. But they cannot be said to pool their
status and even if all of them are citizens of India, the Company
does not become a citizens of India.
G. E. Rly. v. Turner, (1872) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 152, Salomon
v. Salomon & Co. (1897) A. C. 22 and Janson v. Driefontein Con-
solidated Mines Ltd., (1902) A. C. 484, referred to.
The seven freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19(1) are for the
citizens of India. The Constitution in using the \Vord "person",
a \Vord of larger import, in some other places makes its intention
to exclude corporations clear.
-
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, [1950] S.C.R. 869,
explained.
The precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States
\.vhich hold that corporations are citizens of the State of incorporation for purposes of federal jurisdiction cannot be followed in
India. The diversity of citizenship which has led to such rulings
does not exist in India. As a corporation is a separate entity from
its 1nembers, it is not possible to pierce the veil of incorporation
to determine the citizenship of its members in order to give the
corporation the benefit of Art. 19.
'r
The State Trading Corporation is not, therefore, a citizen
either by itself or as the aggregate of Indian citizens. Its Indian
nationality is not to be confused with citizenship of natural per~
sons and the word 'citizen' in Art. 19(1) (£) and (g) can refer
to no other than natural persons. The State Trading Corporation
is really a department of Government behind the corporate veil.
Per DAs GUPTA J.-The first question must be answered in
the affirn1ative.
r
~
It has been repeatedly laid down by this Court that in interpreting the Constitution a broad and a liberal and not merely
the grammatical view should be taken. A syllogistic or mechanical
approach has always to be avoided, more so when interpreting
the Constitution. The attempt should be to reach the intention
of the Constitution makers by examining the substance and give
effect to that intention, if possible.
So judged, it is clear that the Constitution makers when they
used the word 'citizen' in Art. 19 had the intention that at least
a corporation constituted wholly by citizens of India would get
1963
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
102
1963
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer,
Visakflapatnam
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the benefit of the fundamental rights enshrined in that Article.
There is nothing in the Constitution that stands i:i the way of
giving all citizens of India, whether forming a corporation or not,
the benefit of Arts. 19(1) (£) and (g).
State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaughwala, I.L.R. [1955]
Born. 680, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, [1950]
S.C.R. 869, Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, [1959]
S.C.R. 12, Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 S.C.R.
603 and Bombay Dyeing Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1122, referred to.
The first part of the second question should be answered in
the negative and the second part in the affirmative.
Per SHAH J.-In ascertaining the meaning of expressions used
in a vital document like the Constitution of a nation, a mechani·
cal approach is impermissible. The Constitution is the declara·
tion of the will of the people and should be interpreted liberally
and not in a narrow or doctrinaire spirit. Such interpretation
should be in accordance with the true purpose and intent as disclosed by the phraseology understood in its . natural signific.ation
in the light of its setting and its dynamic character which is intended to fulfil the aspirations of the people.
Citizenship means the members of a jural society investing the
holder with all the rights and privileges enjoyed by its nationals
and subjecting him to corresponding duties. Nationality links a
person to a State and ensures his rights in international affairs.
While a citizen is a national, every national is not always a citizen.
Virginia L. Minor v. Reese Happersett, 21 Wal!. 162: 88 U.S.
627, referred to.
Under the English Common Law which formed the foundation of the Indian jurisprudence, a company or a corporation aggregate is a national of the State in which it is incorporated and
is clothed with a personality given by the law of the land, capable
of exercising rights and entitled to protection abroad.
Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd. L. R. (1902)
A.C. 492, Attorney-General v. fewish Colononization Association .
(1901) 1 K.B. 133, Generali v. Salim Cotran, L.R. (1932) A.G.
288, Gasque v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, L.R, (1940)
2 K.B. :30 and Kuenigl v. Donnersmark, L.R. (1955) 1 Q.B. 515,
referred to.
So also in India a juridical person is c.apable of exerc1s1ng
to the fullest extent a large majority of civil rights which natural
persons may exercise as citizens, its inc.apacity to exercise other
rights arises from the nature of its personality and constitution and
not from any special restriction imposed upon it. The Constitution, as is apparent from various other Articles, aff6rded the widest
protection to corporation as it did to natural persons. Unless
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
103
therefore, the language or the scheme of the Constitution is com1963
pulsive, it is impossible to put a limited connotation on the ex~
pression 'citizen' occurring in Art. 19(1).
The State
To say that Arts. 5, 6 and 8 and the law made under Art. 11 Trading Corpoare exhaustive and there can be no citizen except those expressly ration of India
covered thereby is to assume that there were no citizens in India Ltd. & Others.
v.
before the Constitution, an assumption which is not warranted
The
Commereither by the language of the Constitution or the history of our
national evolution. The legislative history shows that British sub- cial Tax Officer,
jects of Indian origin held the status of citizens in British India V isak hapatnam
and Others.
and there was no statute before the Constitution which indicated
even indirectly that a corporation aggregate could not be a citizen.
Although this Court did not make any definite expression
of opinion, it has consistently assumed that corporations aggregate
are entitled to claim pr?tection under Art. 19( 1) as citizens.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India. [1950] S.C.R. 869,
Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1955] 2 S.C.R.
603, State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaughwala, [1957]
S.C.R. 874 and State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964]
1 S.C.R. 371, referred to.
In numerous cases in this Court it was assumed, without
contest, that a company is a citizen of India and competent to
enforce fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the
-
Constitution.
_.
Case law referred to.
In view of the fact that a company is invested with important
fundamental rights under various other Articles of the Constitution and it is recognised as a person capable of holding and disposing of property and carrying on business, commerce and intercourse, it could not be held that the expression 'citizen' in
Art. 19 was intended to be restricted to a natural person.
A corporation is, however, distinct from its £hare"-holders and
even if all the share-holders are Indian Citizens, its claim to citizenship ·cannot be founded on that ground for that would lead to
anomalous results.
Salomon v. Salomon and Co. Ltd. L.R. ( 1897) A.C. 22,
relied on.
State of Bombay, v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, l.L.R. [1955]
Born. 680, disapproved.
The question whether a corporation is an agent or servant
of the State must be decided on the facts of each case. In the
absence of any statutory provision, a commercial corporation acting
on its behalf, even if it is controlled wholly or partially by a
Government department, will be presumed not to be a servant
or an agent of the State. Where, however, the corporation is
performing in substance Governmental, and not commercial, functions, an inference will readily be made that it is an agent of
the Government.
104
1963
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. 6· Others.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
Sinha C. f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
Tamlin v. Hannaford, L.R. (1950) 1 K. B. 18, referred to.
Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart N. V. v. Administrator.
of Hungarian Property, L.R. (1954) A.C. 584, held inapplicable.
There i!I no warrant for the proposition that a department or
an organ of the Union or the State, if it is a citizen, cannot en-
force fundamental rights against the State as defined by Art. 12
of the Con!titution.
ORIGINAL JuR1so1cT10N : \Vrit Petitions Nos. 202-204 of
1%1.
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
M. C. Setalvad, G. S. Pathak, B. Parthasarthy, B. Dutta,
/. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and f?.avinder Narain, for
the Petitioners (in all the petitions).
D. Narasarju, Advocate-General for the State of
Andhra Pradesh and T. V. R. T atachari, for the respondents (in Petitions Nos. 202 and. 203 of 1961 ).
V. K. Krishna Menon, Anil Kumar Gupta, R. K.
Garg, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi and S. C. Agarwala,
for the respondents (in Petition No. 204 of 1961).
A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for Intervener No. 1.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab
and Gopal Singh, for Intervener No. 2.
B. Sen, M. K. Bannerji and P. K. Bose, for Intervener
No. 3.
/. M. T hakore, Advocate-General for the State of
Gujarat and K. L. Hathi, for Intervener No. 4.
G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General for the State of
· Rajasthan, S. K. Kapur and K. K. Jain, for Intervener
No. 5.
· July 26, 1963.-The Judgment of Sinha C. J., S. K. Das,
Gajendragadakar, Sarkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar JJ. was
delivered by Sinha, C. J. Hidayatullah J., delivered a separate opinion. Das Gupta and Shah JJ. delivered separate
dissenting opinions.
SINHA C.J.-The following questions have been referred to the Special Bench by the Constitution Bench before which these cases came up for hearing :
(1) whether the State Trading Corporation, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
105
1963
1956, is a citizen within the meaning of Art. 19
of the Constitution and can ask for the enforceThe State
ment of fundamental rights granted to citizens Trading Corpounder the said article; and
ration of India
(2) whether the State Trading Corporation is, not- Ltd. & Others.
v.
withstanding the formality of incorporation under
The
Commerthe Indian Companies Act, 1956, in substance a
cial Tax Officer,
department and organ of the Government of India Visakhapatnam
with the entirety of its capital contributed by Govand Others.
ernment; and can it claim to enforce fundamental
rights under Part III of the Constitution against Sinha C. /.
the State as defined in Art. 12 thereof.
The questions were raised by way of preliminary objections
to the maintainability of the Writ Petitions under Art. 32
of the Constitution.
As the whole case is not before us, it is necessary to
state only the following facts in order to appreciate how
the controversy arises. The State Trading Corporation of
India Ltd., and K. B. Lal, the then Additional Secretary,
Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Government of India,
moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for
quashing by a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ, direction or order, certain proceedings instituted by
or under the authority of the respondents,-( 1) The Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatnam ; (2) the State of
Andhra Pradesh; and (3) the Deputy Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes, Kakinada. Those proceedings related
to assessments of sales tax under the provisions of the
Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax Act. Writ Petitions 202 and 203
of 1961 are between the parties aforesaid. In Writ Petition
204 of 1%1, the parties are the petitioners aforesaid against
(1) the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes,
I/c Chaibasa Sub-Circle, Bihar State; (2) the Depmy
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, Ranchi; and (3) the
State of Bihar. Thus, the petitioners are the same in all
the three cases, but the respondents are the State of Andhra
Pradesh and its two officers in the first two cases and the
State of Bihar and its two officers in the third case.
The first petitioner is a private limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, with its
h~d office at New Delhi, in May, 1956. The second petitioner is a shareholder in the first petitioner company. The
8-2 S. C. India/64
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106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
two petitioners claim to be Indian citizens as all its shareholders are Indian citizens. Proceedings were taken for
.The State
Trading Corpo- assessment of sales tax, and in due course of those proceed·. ration of India ings demand notices were issued. It is not necessary for
the purposes of deciding the two points referred to us to
Ltd..& Others.
v.
set out the details of the assessments or the grounds of
The Commer- attack raised py the petitioners. It is enough to say that the
cial Tax Officer,
petitioners claim to be Indian citizens and contend that
V isakhapatnam
their fundamental rights under Art. 19 of the Constitution
and Others.
had been infringed as a result of the proceedings taken
Sinha C. /.
and the demands for sales tax made by the appropriate
authorities. When the case was opened on behalf of the
petitioners in this Court, before the Constitution Bench,
counsel for the respondents raised the preliminary objections which have taken the form now indicated in the two
questions, already set out. The Bench rightly pointed out
.that those two questions were of great constitutional importance and should, therefore, be placed before a larger
Bench for determination. Accordingly they referred the
matter to the Chief Justice and this larger Bench has been
constituted to determine those questions.
At the very outset of the arguments, we indicated tl1at
we shall give our decision only on the prelinlinary questions and that die decision of the controversies on their
· merits will be left to the Constitution Bench.
Before dealing with the arguments at the Bar, it is
.convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Part III of die Constitution deals with Fundamental Rights. Some fundamental rights are .available to
"any person", whereas other fundamental rights can be
:available only to "all citizens". "Equality before the law"
or "equal protection of the laws" within the territory of
India is available to any person (Art 14). The protection
.against die enforcement of ex-post-facto laws or against
double-jeopardy or against compulsion of_self-incrimination
is available to all persons (Art. 20); so is the protection of
life and personal liberty under Art. 21 and protection
against arrest and detention in certain cases, under Art. 22.
:Similarly, freedom of conscience and free profession, prac;tice and propagation of religion is guaranteed to all
persons. Under Art. 27, no person shall be compelled to pay
.any taxes for the promotion and maintenance of any
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
107
1963
particular religious denomination. All persons have been
guaranteed the freedom to attend or not to attend religious
The State
instructions or religious worship in certain educational Trading Corpoinstitutions (Art. 28). And, finally, no person shall be rtJtion of India
deprived of his property save by authority of law and no Ltd. & Others.
v.
property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned
The Commer·
except in accordance with law, as contemplated by Art.
Tax Officer,
31. These, in general terms, without going into the details cial
Visakhapatnam
of the limitations and restrictions provided for by the
Mid Others.
Constitution, are the fundamental rights which are available to any person irrespective of whether he is a citizen Sinha C. /.
of India or an alien or whether a natural or an artificial
person. On the other hand, certain other fundamental
rights have been guaranteed by the Constitution only to
citizens and certain disabilities imposed upon the State
with respect to citizens only. Article 15 prohibits the
State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds
on!y of religion, race, caste, etc., or from imposing any
disability in respect of certain matters referred to in the
Article. By Art. 16, equality of opportunity in matters
of public employment has been guaranteed to all citizens,
subject to reservations in favour of backward classes. There
is an absolute prohibition against all citizens of India from
accepting any title from any foreign State, under Art.
18(2), and no person who is not a citizen of India shall
accept any such title without the consent of the President,
while he holds any office of profit or trust under the State
{Art. 18(3)]. And then we come to Art. 19 with which
we are directly concerned in the present controversy.
Under this Article, all citizens have been guaranteed the
right:(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
( e) to reside and settle in any part ·of the territory of
India;
(£) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business.
Each one of these guranteed rights under els. (a) to (g)
is subject to the limitations or restrictions indicated in ck.
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
1963
(2) to ( 6) of the Article. Of the rights guaranteed to all
citizens, those under els. (a) to ( e) aforesaid are partiThe State
Trading Corpo- cularly apposite to natural persons whereas the freedoms
ration of India under els. ( f) and (g) aforesaid may be equally enjoyed
Ltd. & Others. by natural persons or by juristic persons. Art. 29(2) prov.
vides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any
The Commereducational institution maintained by the State or Statecial Tax Officer,
aid
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or
Visak.hapatnam
any
of them. This short resume of the fundamental rights
and Others.
dealt with by Part III of the Constitution and guaranteed
either to 'any person' or to 'all citizens' leaves out of acSinha C. f.
count other rights or prohibitions which concern groups,
classes or associations of persons, with which we are not
immediately concerned. But irrespective of whether a
person is a citizen or a non-citizen or whether he Is a
natural person or a juristic person, the right to move
the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of their respective rights has been guaranteed
by Art. 32.
It is clear on a consideration of the provisions of Part
III of the Constitution that the makers of the Constitution
deliberately and advisedly made a clear distinction between fundamental rights available to 'any person' and
those guaranteed to 'all citizens'. In other words, :di
citizens are persons but all persons are not citizens, under
the Constitution.
The question next arises: What is the legal significance of the term "citizen"? It has not been defined by
the Constitution. Part II of the Constitution deals with
'Citizenship', at the commencement of the Constitution.
Part II, in general terms, lays down that citizenship shall
be by birth, by descent, by migration and by registration.
Every person who has domicile in the . territory
of India shall be a citizen of India, if he was
born in the territory of India or either of whose parents
was so born or who has been ordinarily · resident in
the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution (Art. 5). Secondly, any person who has migrated to
the territory of India from the territory included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India, if he satisfied
the conditions laid down in Art. 6(a) and 6(b) (i). Any
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1963
person who does not come within the purview of Art. 6(a)
and 6(b)(i), but who has migrated to India and has
The State
been registered, as laid down in Art. 6(b}(ii}, shall also Trading Corpobe deemed to be a citizen of India. Similarly, a person of ration of India
Indian origin, residing outside India, shall be deemed to Ltd. & Others.
v.
he a citizen of India if he has been registered as such by
The
Commeran accredited diplomatic or consular representative of
cial Tax Officer,
India in the country where he has been residing (Art. 8). Visakhapatnam
Persons coming within the purview of Arts. 5, 6 & 8, as
and Others.
aforesaid, may still not be citizens of India if they have
migrated from India to Pakistan, as laid down in Art. 7, Sinha C. f.
or if they have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any
foreign State (Art. 9). Those, in short, are the provisions
of the Constitution in Part II relating to 'Citizenship',
and they are clearly inapplicable to juristic persons. By
Art. 11, the Constitution has vested Parliament with the
power to regulate, by legislation, the rights to citizenship.
It was in exercise of the said power that Parliament has
enacted the Citizenship Act (LVII of 1955). It is absolutely clear on a reference to the provisions of this
statute that a juristic person is outside the purview of the
Act. This is an act providing for acquisition and termination of Indian citizenship. The Constitution in Part II,
as already indicated, has determined who are Indian citizens at the commencement of the Constitution. As the
Constitution does not lay down any provisions with respect to acquisition of citizenship or its termination or other
matters relating to citizenship, after the commencement
of the Constitution, this law had to be enacted by way of
legislation supplementary to the provisions of the Constitution as summarised above. The definition of the word
"person" in s. 2(l}(f} of this Act says that the word
"person" in the Act "does not include any company or
association or body of individuals, whether incorporated
or not". Hence, all the subsequent provisions of the Act
relating to citizenship by birth (s. 3}, citizenship by descent (s. 4), citizenship by registration (s. 5), citizenship
by naturalisation ( s. 6) and citizenship by incorporation
of territory ( s. 7) have nothing to do with a juristic person.
It is thus absolutely clear that neither the provisions of
the Constitution, Part II, nor of the Citizenship Act
aforesaid, either confer the right of ·citizenship on, or
110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
recognise as citizen, any person other than a natural person.
That appears to be the legal position, on an examination
The State
of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the CitiTrading Corporation of India zenship Act. But it was contended that this Court had
Ltd. & Others. expressed itself to the contrary in certain decisions,
and some of the High Courts have also taken a conThe Commer- trary view, which we may now proce.ed to consider. In,
cial Tax Officer, what is now known as the first Sholapur case, Chiranjit
Visakhapatnam
Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India('), Mukherjea, J.,
and Others.
speaking for the majority of the Court, made the following
observations at page 898, which seem to countenance the
Sinha C. /.
contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that fundamental rights are available to juristic persons also, as to
citizens :
"The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are available not merely to individual citizens
but to corporate bodies as well except where the
language of the provision or the nature of the right
compels the inference that they are applicable only to
natural persons. An incorporated company, therefore,
can come up to this Court for enforcement of its fundamental rights .... "
Though the observations quoted above would seem to
lend countenance to the contention raised on behalf
of the petitioners, they really do not determine the controversy one way or the other. In that case, a shareholder
of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company made an
application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a declac
ration that the Act impugned in that case was void, as also
for the enforcement of his fundamental rights by a writ
of mandamus against the Government and the directors of
the company, restraining them from exercising any power
under the Act. It is not necessary to refer to the details
of the controversy in that case because it is plain that it
was not the company which was seeking the enforcement
of its fundamental rights, if any, but only a shareholder.
As a matter of fact, the company opposed the petition
under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is manifest that the
observations quoted above were purely obiter and did not
directly arise for decision of the Court.
Then we come to the second Sholapur case, reported
...
( 1)
[1950] S.C.R. 869.
-
4 S.C.R.
-
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
111 '
1963
as Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd.('). In the first Sholapur case,
The State
this Court had been moved under Art. 32 of the Constitu- Trading
Corpotion by an individual shareholder, as aforesaid, for enforce- rtllion of Indio
ment of his alleged fundamental rights. That petition, by Ltd. & Others.
v.
majority judgment, stood dismissed. The second case
arose out of a suit instituted by a preference shareholder, The Commerin a representative capacity on behalf of himself and other cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
preferential shareholders, for a declaration that the law
and Others.
which had been impugned in the previous case was ultm
vires. This Court held that the law impugned had authe>- Sinha C. f.
rised, in effect, the deprivation of the property of the company within the meaning of Art. 31 of the Constitution,
without compensation, and had thus violated the fundamental rights of the company under Art. 31 (2) of the
Constitution. It will thus appear that the decision of this
Court proceeded on an examination of the provisions of
Art. 31, which is not confined to citizens only and has
reference also to the property of "any person". But there
are observations made in the course of the judgment which
would support the view propounded on behalf of the respondents. At page 694, Mahajan J., while discussing the
scope and effect of the provisions of the Constitution in
Part III, with particular reference to Arts. 19 and 31, made
the following observations :"In considering Article 31 it is significant to note
that it deals with private property of persons residing
in the Union of India, while Article 19 only deals with
citizens defined in Article 5 of the Constitution. It is
thus obvious that the scope of these two articles cannot be the same as they cover different fields. It cannot be seriously argued that so far as citizens are concerned, freedoms regarding enjoyment of property
have been granted in two articles of the Constitution, while the protection to property qua all
other persons has been dealt with in Article 31
alone. If both articles covered the same ground,
it was unnecessary to have two articles on the
same subject."
These observations would appear to support the view
that Art. 31 has reference to property of "persons" and
(
1
)
[1954] S.C.R. 674.
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
-
Art. 19 deals with fundamental Fights. of "citizens" as
described in Part II of the Constitution.
The State
Bose J., in the course of his judgment, at page 732 obTrading Corp.a.
served
as follows :
ration of {n.t/il!.
"Article
19(1) (f) confers a certain fundamental
Ltd. lit Others.
v.
freedom on all citizens of India, namely, the freedom
The Commerto acquire, hold and dispose of property. Article 31(1)
rial Tax Officer,
is
a sort of corollary, namely, that after the property
Visal(hapatnam
has
been acquired it cannot be taken away save by
and Others.
authority of law. Article 31 is wider than Article 19
Sinha C. f.
because it applies to everyone and is not restricted to citizens. But what Article 19(1)(£) means is
that whereas a law can be passed to prevent persons who are not citizens of India from acquiring and
holding property in this country no such restriction can be placed on citizens. But in the absence of such a law non-citizens can also acquire
property in ~ndia and if they do then they cannot be
deprived of it any more than citizens, save by authority of law."
But it has got to be said that those observations, though
they may appear to support the contention raised on behalf of the respondents, were not made directly with
reference to the question now before us, namely, whether
a corporation could claim the status of a citizen. That
question did not arise in that case also because the company, as such, was not seeking any relief. Even if the
company were interested in seeking relief under Art. 31
of the Constitution, it could do so without having the
status of a citizen.
·
In the case of The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar,(') the appellant company had
moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for certain reliefs against the provisions of the Bihar
Sales Tax Act, but this Court (per S.R. Das, Acting C.f. at
page 618 and per Venkatarama Ayyar f. at pages 765-766)
left the question open and granted relief to the company
without deciding that question. This case only serves the
purpose of showing that the question now before us was
still an open one and that this Court had not given its
( 1)
[1955] 2 S.C.R, 603.
(
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
113
1963
.considered judgment on the issue now before us.
lt is, therefore, not necessary to refer to certain deciThe State
sions of the Madras, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts Trading Corpoas they cannot be decisive one way or the other in the ab- ration of India
sence of a clear decision of this Court. We have, therefore, Ltd. & Others.
v.
to examine the legal position afresh on the footing that it is
The Commerstill an open question.
cial Tax Officer,
On an examination of the relevant provisions of the Visakhapatnam
and Others.
Constitution and the Citizenship Act aforesaid, we have
as already indicated, reached the conclusion that they do Sinha C. /.
not contemplate a corporation as a citizen. But Mr. Setalvad, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that
Part II of the Constitution relating to citizenship is
not relevant for our purposes because it does not define
"'a citizen" nor does it deal with the totality of "citizenship". It was further submitted that the same is the
position with reference to the provisions of the Citi"Zenship Act. It is common ground, therefore, that the
constitutioml and the statutory provisions discussed
above have no reference to juristic persons. But even so,
it was contended, we have to review the legal position in
the light of the pre-existing law, i.e., the Common Law,
which it was claimed, was preserved by Art. 372 of the
Constitution. In this connection, reference was made to
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 6, 3rd Edition, pages
113-114, para 235, which lays down that, on incorporation, a company is a legal entity the nationality or domicile of which is determined by its place of registration.
Reference was also made to Vol. 9 of Halsbury's Laws of
England, page 19, paragraphs 29-30, which say that
the concept of nationality is applicable to corporations
and it depends upon the country of its incorporation.
A corporation incorporated in England has a British nationality, irrespective of the nationality of its members.
So far as domicile is concerned, the place of incorporation
fixes its domicile, which clings to it throughout its existence. In this connection, reference was made to the case
of fanS'On v. Driefontain Consolidated Mines(') for the
proposition that a company may be regarded as a national
of the country where it was incorporated, notwithstanding
( 1)
[1902] AC. 484, 497, 501, 505.
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4)
1963
the nationality of its shareholders. It is not necessary
to refer to other decisions, because the position is absoThe State
lutely
clear that a corporation may claim a nationality
Trading Corpowhich
ordinarily is determined by the place of its inration of India
Ltd. & Others. corporation. But the question still remains whether
"nationality" and "citizenship" are interchangeable terms.
r. '
The Commer:
"Nationality" has reference to the jural relationship
cial Tax Officer,
which may arise for consideration under international
Visakhapatnam
On the other hand "citizenship" has reference to
law.
and Others.
the jural relationship under municipal law. In other
Sinha C. /.
words, nationality determines the civil rights of a person, natural or artificial, particularly with reference to
international law, whereas citizenship is intimately connected with civic rights under municipal law. Hence,
all .citizens are nationals of a particular State, but all
nationals may not be citizens of the State. In other
words, citizens are those persons who have full political
rights as distinguished from nationals, who may not enjoy full political rights and are still domiciled in that
country ( vide P. Weis-Nationality and Statelessness in
International .Law, pp. 4-6; and Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, pp. 642, 644).
In our opinion, it is not correct to say, as was
contended on behalf of the petitioners, that the expression
"citizen" in Art. 5 is not as wide as the same expression
used in Art. 19 of the Constitution. One could understand
the argument that both the Constitution and the Citizenship Act have not dealt with juristic persons at all, but it
is more difficult to accept the argument that the expression "citizen" in Part II of the Constitution is not conterminous with the same expression in Part III of the
Constitution. Part II of the Constitution, supplemented by the provisions of the Citizenship Act (LVII of
1955) deals with "citizens" and it is not correct to say
that citizenship in relation to juristic persons was deliberately left 'Out of account so far as the Constitution and the Citizenship Act were concerned. On the
other hand, the more reasonable view to take of the provisions of the Constitution is to say that whenever any particular right was to be enjoyed by a citizen of India, the
Constitution takes care to use the expression "any citizen"
or "all citizens", in clear contradistinction to those rights
r
'I
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
115
1963
which were to be enjoyed by all, irrespective of whether
they were citizens or aliens, or whether they were naThe State
tural persons or juristic persons. On the analogy of Trading Corpothe Constitution of the United States of America, the ration of I ndi•
equality clause in Art. 14 was made available to "any Ltd. & Others.
v.
person". On the other hand, the protection against
The
Commer·
discrimination on denominational grounds (Art. 15)
Tax Officer,
and the equality of opportunity m matters of public cial
V isakhapatnam
employment (Art. 16) were deliberately made availand Others.
able only to citizens. In this connection, reference may be
Sinha C. f.
made to the Constitution of the United States of America(')
"Corporations :
Citizens of the United States within the meaning of
this article must be natural and not artificial persons ;
a corporate body is not a citizen of the United States."
-
-
(p. 965)
"Persons" defined
"Notwithstanding the historical controversy that has
been waged as to whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the word, "persons" to
mean only natural persons, or whether the word,
"persons" was substituted for the word "citizen" with
a view to protecting corporations from oppressive
State legislation, the Supreme Court, as early as the
Granger cases, decided in 1877, upheld on the merits
various State laws without raising any question as to
the status of railway corporation-plaintiffs to advance
due process contentions. There 1s no · doubt that
a corporation may not be deprived of its property
without due process of law ; and although pnor
decisions have held that the "liberty" guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment 1s the liberty of
natural, not artificial, persons, nevertheless a newspaper corporation was sustained, in 1936, in its objection that a State law deprived it of lib~rty of press.
As to the natural persons protected by the due process clause, these include all human beings regardless
of race, colour or citizenship." (p. 981)
We have already referred, in general terms, to those·
( 1)
Senate Document No. 170, 82d. Congress, Ed. Edward S. Corwin·
•
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
provmons of the Constitution, Part III, which guarantee
certain rights to "all persons" and the other provisions of
The State
the same part of the Constitution relating to fundamental
Trading Corporation of India rights available to 'citizens' only, and, therefore, it is not
Ltd. & Others. necessary to recount all those provisions. It is enough to
v.
say that the makers of the Constitution were fully alive to
The Commerthe distinction between the expressions "any person" and
cial Tar Officer, "any citizen'', and when the Constitution laid down
Visak hapatnam
the freedoms contained in Art. 19(1)(a)-(g), as availand Others.
able to "all citizens'', it deliberately kept out all noncitizens. In that context, non-citizens would include
Sinha C. ].
aliens and artificial persons. In this connection, the following statement in Private International Law by Martin
Wolff is quite apposite :"It is usual to speak of the nationality of legal persons, and thus to import something tbat we predicate
of natural persons into an area in which it can be applied by analogy only. Most of the effects of being
an 'alien' or a 'citizen' of the State are inapplicable in
the field of corporations ; duties of allegiance or military service, the franchise and other political rights do
not exist." (p. 308)
This apart, it is necessary to refer to another aspect
of the controversy. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the distinction made by the Constitution between "persons" and "citizens" is not the same thing as a
distinction between natural and juristic persons, and that
as "persons" would include all citizens and non-citizens,
natural and artificial persons, the makers of the Constitution deliberately left artificial persons out of consideration because it may be that the pre-existing law
was left untouched. It is very difficult to accept the
contention that when the makers of the Constitution
were at pains to lay down in exact terms the fundamental rights to be enjoyed by "citizens" and those
available to all "persons", they did not think it necessary or advisable clearly to indicate the classes of persons who would be included within the expression
"citizens". On the other hand, there is clear indication in the provisions of Part III of the Constitution
itself that they were fully cognizant of the provisions
· of the Constitution of. the United States · of America,
r
.
.,
,
4 S.C.R.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
117
where the Fourteenth Amendment ( s. 1) clearly brings
out the antithesis between the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States and life, liberty or
property of any person, besides laying down who are
the citizens of the United States. Section 1 aforesaid
is in these terms and brings out the distinction very
clearly:"All persons born or naturalised in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
The question may be looked at from another point
of view. Art. 19 lays down that "all citizens" shall have
the right to freedoms enumerated in els. (a) to (g). Those
freedoms, each and all of them, are available to "all citizens". The Article does not say that those freedoms, or
only such of them as may be appropriate to particular
classes of citizens, shall be available to them. If the Court
were to hold that a corporation is a citizen within the
meaning of Art. 19, then all the rights contained in
els. (a) to (g) should be available to a corporation.
But clearly some of them, particularly those contained
in els. (b), ( d) and ( e) cannot possibly have any application to a corporation. It is thus clear that the
rights of citizenship envisaged in Art. 19 are not
wholly appropriate to a corporate body. In other words,
the rights of citizenship and the rights flowing from
the nationality or domicile of a corporation are not
conterminous. It would thus appear that the makers
of the Constitution had altogether left out of consideration juristic persons when they enacted Part II of
the Constitution .relating to "citizenship'', and made a
clear distinction between "persons" and "citizens" in Part
III of the Constitution. Part III, which proclaims fundamental rights, was very accurately drafted, delimiting those
rights like freedoms of speech and expression, the right to
1963
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer,
V isakhapatnam
and Others.
Sinha C. f.
118
l963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
assemble peaceably, the right to practise any profession,
etc., as belonging to "citizens" only and those more geneThe State
ral rights like the right to equality before the law, as
Trading Corporation of India belonging to "all persons".
In view of what has been said above, it is not necessary
Ltd. & Others.
v.
to refer to the controversy as to whether there were any
The Commercitizens of India before .the advent of the Constitution. It
cial Tax Officer, seems to us, in view of what we have said already as to the
Visakhapatnam
distinction between citizenship and nationality, that corpoand Others.
rations may have nationality in accordance with the country
of their incorporation; but that does not necessarily confer
Sinha C. /.
citizenship on them. There is also no doubt in our mind
that Part II of the Constitution when it deals with citizenship refers to natural persons only. This is further
made absolutely clear by the Citizenship Act which deals
with citizenship after the Constitution came into force
and confines it only to natural persons. We cannot accept
the argument that there can be citizens of this country
who are neither to be found within the four
corners of Part II of the Constitution or within the
four corners of the Citizenship Act. We are of opinion
that these two provisions must be exhaustive of the citizens of this country, Part II dealing with citizens on the
date the Constitution came into force and the Citizenship
Act dealing with citizens thereafter. We must, therefore,
hold that these two provisions are completely exhaustive
of the citizens of this country and these citizens can only
be natural persons. The fact that corporations may be
nationals of the country for purposes of international
law will not make them citizens of this country for
purposes of municipal law or the Constitution. Nor do
·we think that ·the word "citizen" used in Art. 19 of
the Constitution was used in a different sense from that
in which it was used in Part II of the Constitution. The
first question, therefore, must be answered in the negative.
In view of this answer, we do not consider it necessary
to answer the second question as that would have arisen
on! y if the first question had been answered in the affirmative.
Let the cases go back to the Bench for hearing on
merits with this opinion. Costs of the hearing before the
.~pecial Bench will :be dealt with by the Bench which ulti-
'
4 S.C.R.
-1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119
1963
mately hears and determines the controversy.
HmAYATULLAH J.-Two questions have been referred to
The State
this Bench for opinion. They are :
Trading Corpo(1) Whether the State Tracling Corporation, a Com- ration of India
Ltd. & Others.
pany registered under the Indian Companies Act,
v.
1956, is a citizen within the meaning of Article 19
The Commerof the Constitution and can ask for the enforce- cial Tax Officer,
ment of fundamental rights granted to citizens Visakhapatnam
under the said Article ; and
and Others.
(2) Whether the State Trading Corporation is notwithstanding the formality of incorporation under Hidayatul/ah f.
the Indian Companies Act 1956, in substance a
department and organ of the Government of India
with the entirety of its capital contributed by
Government ; and can it claim to enforce fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution
against the State as defined in Article 12 thereof?
The State Trading Corporation has been assessed to
sales tax by the Commercial Tax Officer, Vishakhapatnam
and a demand has been made upon it. By this petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution it challenges the
demand on the ground inter alla that the impugned order
and the demand for the tax infringe its fundamental rights
which are guaranteed to citizens by Art. 19 sub-clauses ( f)
and (g) and these sub-clauses read :
Art. 19(1). All citizens shall have the right :
(f) to acquire, hold and clispose of property;
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
The State Trading Corporation claims to be a citizen
for the application of these sub-clauses, which fact being
disputed on the other side, has given rise to the two questions above set out. As the questions amply indicate, the
share capital of the State Trading Corporation is entirely
contributed by the Central Government. The shares are
held by the President of India and two Secretaries to Government. The State of Andhra Pradesh, therefore, denies
that the State Trading Corporation being :in artificial person is a citizen and consequently contends that Art. 19 is
inapplicable because the word 'citizen' in the article refers
120
1963
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
Hidayatullah /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
to natural persons. Additionally, it contends that being a
department of Government, the State Trading Corporation
cannot claim protection of Arl 19 against an action of the
State.
Mr. Setalvad in formulating the grounds on which he
rests the claim of the State Trading Corporation to citizenship, points out that the Constitution does not define the:
word 'citizen', that Part II of the Constitution which deals
with. citizenship is not material inasmuch as it is concerned'.
with natural persons only and is not exhaustive and that
the Citizenship Act (LVII of 1955) which provides for
certain matters relating to citizenship but defines the word
'person' so as to exclude artificial persons like corporations
aggregate, cannot also be regarded as exhaustive. He thus.
contends that corporations aggregate which, according t<>
him, were citizens before the Constitution and the Citizenship Act, continue to enjoy the privileges of citizens, one
of which is the guarantee in Article 19. In support of
his submission that corporations were and continue to be
citizens, he relies upon the fact that corporations possess
a nationality and claims that in this connection 'nationality'
and 'citizenship' bear the same meaning. He relies upon
the observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), in
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India(') where
the learned Judge observed obiter :
"The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are available not merely to individual citizens
but to corporate bodies as well except where the language of the provision or the nature of the right compels the inference that they are applicable only to
natural persons. An incorporated company, therefore,
can come up to this Court for enforcement of its fundamental rights and so may the individual shareholders
to enforce their own ; but it would not be open to an
. individual shareholder to complain of an Act which
affects the fundamental rights of the company except
to the extent that it constitutes an infraction of his
own rights as well."
Mr. Setalvad also refers to other cases in which, though
the point was not decided, several corporations claimed the
( 1)
[1950] S.C.R. 869, 898.
r
(
-
,
4 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
121
1963
protection of Article 19 and no objection was raised. Lastly,
he contends that the word 'citizen' should be liberally con·The State
strued to include a corporation aggregate which consists of Tradjng CorpoIndian citizens only. On the second question he contends ratjon of India
that a company has an existence which is independent of Ltd. & Others.
·v.
its members and the State Trading Corporation cannot be
The Commerequated with the sh~reholders or the Government since the
corporate veil cannot be allowed to be pierced. He points cial Tax 0 fficer,
Visakhapatnam
out that there are several States in our Republic and there
and Others.
.is a great danger of one Government stilling the trading
activities of another Government either by law or executive Hidayatullah /.
act10n against which Article 19 is the only effective safeguard. He submits that it could not have been intended
that while every individual citizen should be protected, a
.group of citizens, should by mere incorporation, lose the
benefits of the guarantee in Article 19.
We are dealing here with an incorporated company.
The nature of the personality of an incorporated company
which arises from a. fiction of law, must be clearly understood before we proceed .to determine whether the word
'citizen' used in the Constitution generally or in Article 19
specially, covers an incorporated company. Unlike an unincorporated company, which has no separate existence
and which the law does not distinguish from its members
an incorporated company has a separate existence and the
law recognises it as a legal person separate and distinct
from its members. This new legal personality emerges
from the moment of incorporation and from that date the
persons subscribing to the memorandum of association and
other persons joining as members are regarded as a body
corporate or a corporation aggregate and the new person
begins to function as an entity. But the members who
form the incorporated company do not pool their status
or their personality. If all of them are citizens of India
the company does not become a citizen of India any more
than if all are married the company would be a married
person. The personality of the members has little to do
with the persona of the incorporated company. The persona that comes into being is not the aggregate of the
personae either in law or in metaphor. The corporation
really has no physical existence ; it is a mere 'abstraction
of law' as Lord Selborne described it in G. E. Rly. v.
9-2 S. C. India/64
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
Turner('); or as Lord Macnaghten said in the weli-knowri
case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. ( 2 ) it is "at law a
The State
different person altogether from the subscribers to the
Trading Cor('Omemorandum of association." This distinction is brought
fation of f ndia
Ltd. & Otliers. home if one remembers that a company cannot commit
crimes li~e perjury, bigamy or capital murder. This
The Commerpersona ficta being a creature of a fiction, is protected by
.cial Tax Officer, natural limitations as pointed out by Palmer in his ComVisak,l•apatnam
pany Law (20th edn.) p. 130 and which were tersely sumand Others.
med up by counsel in R. v. City of London(') when he
Hidayatullah J.
asked "Can you hang its common seal?". It is true that
sometimes the law permits the corporate veil to be lifted,
but of that later.
There is a rule of English Law that a company or an·
incorporated corporation has a nationality and this nationality is determined by the law of the country in which it
is incorporated. Mr. Setalvad thus begins his contention
by citing certain obiter statement:S. from Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd.(') such as :
"l assume that the corporation ...... was to all intents and purposes in the position of a natural bor~
subject of the late South African Republic."
'(Lord Macnaghten-p. 497)
"I think it must be taken' that the respondent company was technically an alieri and became, on the
breaking out, of hostilities between this country and
South African Republic an alien enemy".
(Lord Davey-p. 498)
"The company must clearly be treated as a subject of
the Republic notwithstanding the nationality of its
shareholders."
(Lord Brampton-p. 501)
He contends that there is no difference between
'nationality' and "citizenship" and the two words are synonymous and relies upon the following passage from Weis
on Nationality and Statelessness in International Law
(1956) pp. 4-5"0ne of the terms frequently used synonymously
with nationality is citizenship. Historically, this is correct for States with the Roman conception of nationa-
"·
(
1
)
( 3)
[1872] L.R, 8 Ch. App. 152.
[1632] 8 St. Tr. 1087, 1138.
( 2 ) [1897] A.C. 22, 51.
(') L.R. [1902] A.C. 492.
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
123
1963
lity, but not for States with the feudal conception of
nationality, where citizenship is used to denote not
The State
political status but membership of a local community. Trading
CorpoIt has, however, become usual to employ the term citi- ration of India
zen instead of subject in republican States-including Ltd. & Others.
v.
common law countries such as the United States; he
who before was a 'subject of the King' is now a 'citizen The Commerof the State' - - and in that sense and in those States cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
the terms 'nationality' and 'citizenship' must be regardand Othert.
ed as synonymous."
It is, therefore, contended somewhat syllogistically Hidayatullah /.
that all incorporated corporations have the nationality of
the State under the laws of which they are incorporated,
that nationality is synonymous with citizenship and therefore incorporated companies are citizens. From this it is
but a mere step, which is also taken, that incorporated companies in India were and still are citizens and that the
Constitution and the Citizenship Act have nowhere deprived them of this citizenship or of the right to protect themselves by invoking Article 19(1) (f) and (g). Alternatively it is contended that if all the members of the Corpo-. ration are Indian citizens then the Corporation as a whole
must be a citizen, for the whole cannot be different from
its parts.
Both the arguments involve fallacies. The first assumes
that 'nationality' of corporations and citizenship of natural
persons are the same concepts and caps it with the fallacy
of ignorantio elenchi which in English is called the fallacy
of irrelevant conclusion because instead of proving that corporations are citizens, it is sought to be shown that they
ought to be citizens for the remedy is so good and effective.
The second involves the fallacy of petitio principii because
it tends to beg the question and founds a conclusion on a
basis that as much needs to be proved as the conclusion
itself. In my opinion, the State Trading Corporation cannot be said to be a citizen either by itself or by taking
it as the aggre~;ate of citizens, that nationalitv of a corpo-ration is a different concept not to be confused. with citizenship of natunl personc.that the word "citizen" in Art. 19(1)
sub-clauses (£) and (g) refers to a natural person, that
State Trading Corporation is really a Department of Government behind the corporate veil and that for all these
124
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
reasons the two questions must be answered in favour of
the objectors. I shall now make good these conclusions
The State
with
reasons.
'Trading CorpoArticle 19 uses the word 'citizen' while the word
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. 'person' is used in some other articles in Part III notably
v.
Art. 14 (creating equality before the law), Art. 21 (protecThe Commertion of life and personal liberty). By Art. 367, (unless
cial Ta:r Officer,
the context otherwise requires) the General Clauses Act,
Visakh,1painam
1897 applies to the interpretation of the Constitution. The
and Others.
word 'citizen' is not defined in the Constitution or the
Hid«yat11ll1h /.
General Clauses, Act but the word 'person' is defined in
the latter to include 'any company or association or body
of individuals whether incorporated or not.' The word
"person" therefore, conceivably bears this extended meaning
at least in some places in Part III of the Constitution. But' it
is not necessary to determine where in the Constitution the
word 'person' includes a company etc. because that word has
not been used in Article 19. The claim of corporations
aggregate, like the petitioner, to the benefits which Art. 19
gives, must depend on whether the word 'citizen' which is
actually used can bear a similar enlarged meaning. Mr.
Setalvad is right in contending that use of the word 'person'
with an enlarged meaning in some places and of the word
'citizen' in other places does not by itself prove that artificial persons are outside the meaning of the word 'citizen'.
The contrast may not be between natural and artificial persons so much as between citizens and non-{'.itizens, and it
is possible that where the benefit is intended to go to noncitizens, a word of wide meaning is used and where the
benefit is meant for citizens only the word 'citizen' is used.
It is true that the word 'citizen' cannot include an enemy
or an alien while the more general word 'person' may but
that does not answer the question whether the word
'citizen' can include a company or association or body of
individuals, to borrow the words of the definition. The
::mswer to that question must depend, as already pointed
out, on the connotation of the word 'citizen' which mus[
be found out.
In attempting to determine whether the word 'citizen'
in Art. 19 denotes only a natural person or includes a company etc., we must turn first to the Constitution to see
if the use of the word 'citizen' or 'citizenship' in any other
-f S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
125
1963
place bears the extended meaning or throws any light on
this problem. The word 'citizen' is used in 29 places and
The State
the word 'citizenship' in 6 places. These words are also
Trading Corpoused in headings to Chapters and marginal notes but these ration of India
may be ignored. It is worth inquiring if there is any place Ltd. & Others.
at all other than Art. 19 where not only a natural person
v.
The Commerbut also an artificial person is meant. The word first
cial Tax Officer,
occurs in the preamble thus :
Visakhapatnam
"We the people of India having solemnly resolved to
and Others.
secure to all it~; citizens
Justice, social, economic and political ;
Liberty of throught, expression, belief, faith and worship:
Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote
among them all
Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and
the Nation," etc.
'Libaty of thought, expression, belief, faith and wor~hip, equality of status' and 'dignity of the individual are
expressions appropriate to natural persons and not companies, associatiops and other corporations aggregate and
the word 'citizen' in the preamble refers to individuals
for whom the Constitution was being made. In this connection, it must he remembered that a Constitution is a
bond between the citizens and the adminstration and regulates their respective actions. It is as Ahrens defined it :
·'
'"L.' ensemh.'e des institutions et des lois fondame11-
tales, destine earg!er /'action de /'administration et de taus
les cityens.
1
(Ahrcn : Caurs·: de Droit Nature/ fr C. iii p. 380)
(The bodv of imtitutions and fundamental law designed to regulate the action of the Administration and all
the citizens).
The preamble in solemn words sums up what is later
provided in the Constitution. 'Citizens' in the preamble
mean those individuals who under the Constitution are
guaranteed civic rights in the body politic that is India
and who can hold public offices and elect their representatives to Parliament and Assemblies of the people.
They are persons who were declared citizens on the inauguration of the Constitution and those on whom the
rights of citizens were conferred and on whom they may
Hidayatullah f.
..126
SUPREME .COURT REPORT~
<
.• -.
'
,
,
,•
'
,.
('
'
''·'
. [19q4J
,_· -.
'
1963
be conferred by law. Of course the Constitution also CO!l·
fers some rights on aliens and assists ·and- protects therti
The State
but the guarantee in the preamble is to the citizens alone
Trading Corpothat is individuals who enjoy full civic rights in the body
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. politic.
Then follows a special chapter entitled "Citizenship".
v.
The Commer~
That part contains seven Articles. Art. 5 spoke at the comcial Tax Otfice1", mencement of this Constitution. That article uses the word
V isak hapatnam
'person' but the context shows that only natural persons
and Othei-s.
were meant. Citizenship was conferred on every person
who had his domicile in the territory of India and
Hidayatullah f.
(a) who was born in the territory of India ; or
(b) either of whose parents was born in the territory
of India or
(c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory
of India for not less than five years immediately
preceding such commencement.
The reference to the birth of the person or of his
parents clearly shows that only natural persons were meant
because corporations though born in a metaphorical sense
do not have parents. By the same token.Art. 6 also refers
to natural persons. Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 so clearly speak
of a natural person as to need no elaboration. That leaves
Art. 11 which gives Parliament the power to make laws
for the acquisition and termination of citizenship, and all
other matters relating to citizenship. That article reaffirms
the power which is given to Parliament by Entry 17 of
List I of Schedule VII of tbe Constitution. As we shall
. see presently, the Citizenship Act of 1955 expressly excludes companies, etc. from its provisions. The power
conferred by Art. 11 or Entry No. 17 may give rise hereafter
to the question whether Parliament can invest corporations,
institutions, trusts, funds, ships or aeroplanes with citizenship but till Parliament does so there is nothing in Part II
to indicate that the words 'citizen' and 'citizenship' were
used to include any of them.
In the fourth part which is entitled 'Directive Principles' the word 'citizen' is used twice. In Art. 39 it is qualified by the words 'men and women' which addition tells
its own story. In Article 44 the State is asked to endeavoljr
to secure a uniform Civil Code for all citizens and the
'_'l'Ord plainly means men and ·women because it is imp~
r
SUPR.~~EC,O\JRT REPORTS
l
sible to think that the Constitution is thinking of a uniform
Civil Code for corporations. In the other parts of the Constitution 'citizenship' is a condition precedent for some
office, post or privilege. The President, the Vice-President,
the Governors, the Members of Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies, the Judges of the Surreme Court and
High Courts must be citizens. Members of Parliament and
Legislatures cease to be members if they cease to be citizens
of India or acquire the citizenship of other countries. The
words 'citizen' and 'citizenship' thus refer to natural persons because these offices cannot be held by corporations
aggregate. Art. 326 says that every citizen 21 years in age
has a vote. This means only a natural person.
There remains only Part III entitled 'Fundamental
Rights'. In Articles 15 and 16, the word clearly means a
natural person. The words religion, race, caste, sex, descent,
place of birth and residence mark out a human being. In
Art. 18, which mentions titles, a natural person is again
meant because titles are ordinarily conferred on- individuals.
In Art. 29(1), where citizens residing in the territory of
India having distinct language, script or culture of their
own have been given a right to preserve the same, the
word definitely refers to natural persons. In Art. 29(2)
entrance to educational institutions is guaranteed to citizens
and the entrant can only be a natural person and not a corporation.
The above analysis shows that in 34 places, the words
'citizen' and 'citizenship' refer to natural and not artificial
persons. The question is whether in the thirty-fifth place
the word is meant to include corpurations aggregate. For
this purpose we must ascertain if there is anything special
which points to a different use of the word. Sub-clauses
(a) to (e) of Art. 19 contemplate natural persons. The
claim is that the word 'citizen' must bear a different meaning in respect of clauses (£) and (g) because corporations
acquire, hold and dispose of property and carry on trade
or business. It is argued that if several citizens carry on
business together as an incorporated company they cannot
lose the guarantee which is given to citizens, and we are
invited to give a meaning to the word which is wide
enough to include companies. It has been shown above
that the way in which the words 'citizen' and 'citizenship'
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
Hidayatullah /.
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
1%3
have been used in the Constitution goes to show that such
was not the intention at least in 34 other places. It may
The State
be conceded that this is not decisive and if corhowever
Trading Corpocan possess citizenship there is no reason for not
porations
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. interpreting the Constitution liberally to give them the
v.
benefits of clauses (f) and (g) of Art. 19(1). For this
The Commerpurpose it is necessary to find out what is meant by 'citizen
cial Tax 0 Ifieer, and citizenship' generally and to trace historically the conVisakhapatnam
cept of citizenship to see if that concept included at any
and Others.
time artificial persons like corporations so that the word
Hidayatullah f.
can be said to be intended to bear such a meaning.
The word 'citizen' which is used in Art. 19 of the
Constitution has not been defined. Its meaning in the
context of Art. 19 must be found out. If it bore the same
meaning as in the other parts of the Constitution, it would
mean a member, born or naturalised, of the State, on which
the Constitution or a law of Parliament confers citizenship.
Is there in law a citizenship of a group of persons who may
be all citizens or some of whom may be non-citizens? The
answer is that the word in its normal meaning does not
admit "bulk citizenship" which is the only way to describe
it. Salmond in an article on "Citizenship and Allegiance"
1901-1902 Law Quartely Review Part I pp. 270-82, says
that the worrl is derived from the Latin 'civitas' and 'civis'.
More directly, of course, the root is in the French words
'citoyen' or 'citeyen'. From the earliest times, the concept
of citizenship concerned natural persons and not groups
of persons. In ancient Greece, according to Aristotle, the
population of Attica was divided into groups which were
brotherhoods (phratriai) and of clans (gene). Groups
of brotherhoo<ls formed tribes (phylai). The entire citizen
body was thus included in the tribes and brotherhoods but
the wealthy formed the clans. When monarchy was abo"
lished through the efforts of the clans, the citizenship of
the members of the brotherhoods was in name only
because they had no civic rights. Draconian reforms created four classes according to wealth and Solon gave to
the four classes the right to act in· a political capacity
( ecclesia) and also in a judicial capacity ( heliaia) and thus
earned the title 'the first champion of the people'. But
even under him, the concept of citizenship was immature.
The first recognition of citizenship came with Cleisthenes
.,
/·
. -
4 S.c.R.
..
-
--- .
. SUPREME COURT REroRTS
129
·-·-~--
>
.-r--~
-
under wh~~ rcfomfs there was a distribution of th~ PoPU· ·.
1963
Iation on a geographical basis and .an enfranchisement of.·_
.. •, persons of pure _or partial Athenian desecnt. ;Resident _.
forcigners had inter-married and though there was ·a partial. rati4rs of Jndill
recognition of foreigners.perman.ently settled (domiciled) -Ltd. & Oth<r1.
....
in
"Athens_ even from the days of Peisisiratus there was· no
,.
recognition of· the offsprings of mixed marriages as. citi- The Comm<rT"" 0 ffic<r•
zens. These were added to the list of citizens· because dal
Visakhapatnam. citizenship no longer depended on membership of. the . ad Oth<r1.
phratriu. This state of ·affairs· continued till Pericles abrogated the enlightened measure. He limited citizenship to Hidayatullah f.
those of Athenian descent on both sides. Had he come
· earlier some famous men ' of Athens like Themistocles
would have been ·barred from not only office but other
civic rights. It is not necessary to follow the history of ·
• Athens further. It -is reasonable to believe that all other
States iri Greece except Sparta followed this kind of citizen- •
ship. The Spartans had their own system of rule with two kings and an elected council (gerusia) elected by the citi- - zens which was· both ·advisory and judicial. There was .
also an assembly of all citizens over twenty called_ the '
appella which elected the magistrates and -met monthly.
The right of vote in the election of the gerusia and membership of the appella was open to those who were selected
at the birth by the spartiate. All children were inspected
at birth by the heads of the tribe arid those who were
sickly were exposed in a ravine of Mt•. Taygetus and of .
the others those· that lived all boys were taken away at the
-" age of seven 'and trained as citizens. · All the Hellenic
..
States followed Athens but Crete perhaps was influenced
by Sparta.
. .
..
- - '. _ .
This is the earliest recognition of citizenship that we
need consider in · Europe. The next to consider is· the
conception of citizenship in Rome. The words 'civitas'
and 'civil were used in Roman Law to describe persons
who had thC freedom of the city and who enjoyed all
" political and civic privileges of Government. In this way
were distinguished a slave (servus), an enemy (hostis)
who had none of these rights on the one hand and a fore- igner (peregrinus) particularly - from a country with
which Rome was on terms of peaceful intercourse on the
other; from citizens. Though by Justinian's time everyonci _
Tr;t:/'t:.Po-
130
Ji
SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
t '. ·,
'. '": . ·.. ' - '.' '
. ' ·. ·-:' ! • :./"'"':
[1%4]
.<
>;
1963
became a citizen, unless he was an unmanumitted slave,
in· the time of Gaius citizenship was i:he·· privilege 'of
The State
Romans and carried with it the right to vote (jus sufjragii)
Trading Corpoand "the right to hold public office (jus honorum) the right
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. to a Roman marriage (jus connubium) and the right
v.
to legal relations (jus commericum). The son of a
The Commer- Roman citizen was also a Roman citizen irrespective of
cial Tax 0 fficer
where he was born. The peregrinus had no civic rights
Visakhapatnam
unless he belonged to a Latin country. There were difand Others.
ferent laws for a long time for the citizens and the latini
H idayatullah f. and the peregrini. The first to be given the status of citizens were the latini. Later all free subjects were to be
cives. The only peregrines who were left were foreigners
and barbarians and they had no civic rights just as members of certain treacherous communities (dediticii) and persons deprived of citizenship (deportati) had none.
Thus both in Greece and Rome the idea of citizenship
was bound up with natural persons in whom certain civic
rights ·were con,sidered to inhere and which marked them
out from others. Sometimes descent, sometimes the wealth,
sometimes the status, military or other, determined the
privilege but at no time was there a concept of citizenship
of any but a natural person. In Roman Law citizenship
was transmitted by birth to an offspring of a Roman
citizen.
So far we have dealt with citizenship namely membership of body politic with full civic rights. In the
middle ages this membership of the State began to carry
a dual status : one status was political and the other civil.
The double status came in Cenrtal Europe in the wake
of Roman Law and was partly due to the growth of
feudal vassalage by which what might have grown into
nations composed of 'clans' became divided into feudal
Chi~ftainships. The feudal lord did not concern himself
with descent as such so long as his follower held land
or rendered service according to his laws. Such laws
did not apply to foreigners but if the foreigners held lands
or chattels or rendered service he was equally bound. But
the main reason was the impact of international relations.
An individual began to be viewed in two capacities.
Firstly, he was regarded as the subject of a certain State
...
'
4 s,q.R
;
l
1
S:tJfREME <;:QURT RJ;.PORTS
'
1.963
(a political status) and secondly as one entitled to certain
rights and privileges in his own State (a civil status).
The State
Both arose from the bond to a particular State or territory Trading Corpobut it would be wrong to say that the word 'nationality' ration of India
describes the civil status. The word 'nationality' whether Ltd. & Others.
v.
denoting an ethnic group or political membership of a
The
CommerState is a word of much later origin. M. Cogordan (La
Nationalite p. 2) has given the origin of the word and cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
in the Dictionnaire de /, Ac.."demi e friwi ais it appeared
and Others.
for the first time in 1835. Even the Code Napoleon dealt
with rules concerning the status of Frenchmen abroad Hidayatullah /.
but did not provide for the status of foreigners in France.
The recognition of nationality as a test of the law applicable to an individual followed the famous lecture by
Mancini at the University of Turin in 1851. The impact
of international relations added to the civic rights possessed by a citizen by investing him with a policial status
which he could claim abroad. The word 'nationality'
itself has now come to acquire two distinct meaningsa political one by which is indicated the membership of
a State and the other an ethnic one denoting membership
of a nation. All this time citizenship has also meant
membership of a State but in a municipal aspect. In
this sense, the words 'national' and 'citizen' are not interchangeable as has been sometimes supposed. In the
United States Public Law 414 (82nd Congress, 2nd ,
session) section 308 is entitled "Nationals but not citizens
of the United States at birth". According to Weis Nationality and Citizenship p. 5:
"That the term American National has a wider
meaning than the United States citizen was recognised
in Administrative Decision No. V of the Mixed Claims
Commission between the United States and Germany
(Decisions and Opinions Vol. 1 pp. 18-i9; Hackworth Digest of International Law, Vol. III p. 5 ;
Annual Digest, 1923-24, Case No. 100)."
Weis has given other examples of the disparate use of
the two words in the Constitution of the Netherlands,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Roumania. Even in the United
States Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, the distinction is preserved. This dual status which has caused all
the trouble in this case was summed up by Lord Westbury
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
132
1963
[1964]
in Udny v. Udny(') by saying that the political status:
"May depend upon different laws in different countries, wheras civil status is governed universally by one
single principle, namely that of domicile, which is the
criterion established by law for purposes of determinV.
ing civil status. For it is on this basis that the perThe Commersonal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which
. cial Tax Officer,
determines
his majority or minority, his marriage, sucVisakhapatnam
cession,
testacy
or intestacy, must depend."
and Others.
Thus, in the Middle ages, it was begun to be realised
Hidayaturlah /.
that the legal personality of persons was composed of a
political status and a civil status. It was possible for a
person to have political status but not civil status, that is
to say, he could be a national but not a citizen but it was
difficult to imagine a citizen without political status. This
political status was determined according to two different
.theories. One was the theory of descent (jus sanguinis) and
the other a theory of domicile (jus soli). The European
countries applied the former and the Common Law countries the latter to determine the status. We have already seen
that according to Roman Law the son of a Roman citizen
was also a Roman citizen and it did not matter where he
was born and this was the theory which was recognised
in Central Europe. In the Common Law countries (and
I inclnde the.United States of America) birth in the terri' tory of the King (jus soli) determined political as well as
civil status. Descent from a citizen or subject outside
the territory was recognised statutorily. Statutes from the
time of Edward III recognised. descent as one of the modes
of acquisition of political as well as civil status in England.
In the D\1ited States the principle of descent also was
recognised statutorily except in the case of children whose
parents though citizens had never resided in the States,
but the governing theory was birth in the territory of the
States.
I have, I think, sufficiently explained that citizenship
and nationality are not entirely similar concepts though
the words are sometimes used interchangeably owing to
the fact that most citizens are also nationals and vice versa.
But strictly speaking citizenship:
The State
Trading Corf'<>ration of India
Ltd. & Others.
1
( )
L.R. I H.L. S.C. 441.
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
1963
"is a term of municipal law, and denotes the possession within the particular State of full civil and political
The State
rights, subject to special disqualification such as min<>- Trading
Corpority or sex. The conditions on which citizenship is ration of India
acquired are regulated by municipal law."
Ltd. & Others.
v.
J. B. Moore (Digest of International Law Vol. III
The
Commer( 1906) p. 273.)
cial Tax Officer,
The disqualifications of citizenship in the past and V isakhapatnam
even today are many and different from country to country.
and Others.
Some of them which operate even today in several countries are: minority, heresy, colour, lack of settled abode, Hidayatullah /.
insolvency, infamy, treason, sex etc.
I have wondered what would have been the argument
in this case to support the claim of citizenship if our
Constitution had thought with Bluntschli (Die Lehri:
Vom modernen Statt, i, p. 246) "die Politik ist Sache ies
Mannes."*
It will thus be seen that the concepts of citizenship and
nationality have been influenced either by descent or by
birth in a particular place. Some countries like the Republics of South America do not recognise descent because,
it is reasoned, to do so enables succeeding generations of
former citizens to claim the privileges of citizenship irrespective of where they are born, while being outside the
territory they do not contribute to the country of which
they are citizens. Some countries recognise both the principles but there are many differences in the approach to
the problem of descent. In some countries, citizenship
is confined to children born from a citizen-father resident
abroad and in others such descent is considered applicable
upto grand-children. Thus certain statutes before the Act
of 1914 conferred British citizenship and nationality upon
grand-children born abroad of natural born subjects, while
the French Naturalization Law (1889) gave recognition
only to children born in France of a father also born in
France and to children born abroad of a Pren.ch father. The
former German law adhered only to the principle of
descent but later recognised marriage, naturalization etc.
In Italy long residence of the father and his domicile in
Italy is considered sufficient. Today nationality has assum*Politics is men's concern.
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
ed enormous importance and the principles of dual nationality and statelessness cut across some of the former theories
The State
and Cogordon's statement "que tout homme doitposseder
Trading Corpoune nationalite*" is no longer true because of many stateration of India
Ltd. & Others. less persons.
v.
It is not my intention to speak exhaustively about citiThe Commer- zenship and nationality. I have, I hope, sufficiently estacial Tax 0 fficer, blished my point that citizenship and nationality from
Visakhapatnam
the earliest times to date have been viewed as the attriand Others.
butes of natural persons. We are not concerned however,
Hidayatullah f. with other peoples or nations or States. We are concerned ·only with our laws on the subject. When the
French Naturalization Law of 1889 differed from the
English law, Sir James Ferguson stated on the advice of
the law officers in Parliament that if the English and the
French laws differed there was no help and each country
was entitled to its own laws. We have thus to see how
our own citizenship has evolved and who are the persons
who are citizens and what further arrangement exists for
investing others with citizenship.
As India was, for centuries, ruled by Britain we have
necessarily to examine the laws on the subject of citizenship and nationality before independence. There was no
.law of citizenship in India. The Indian Naturalization
Att was merely supplemental to the Imperial Act and
hardly needed. I have already pointed out that the English
Common Law recognised the principle of jus soli but
English Statute Law (the Naturalization Act of 1870 in
particular) recognising descent conferred British nationality on persons,
(a) born in Great Britain or the Dominions (jus soli)
( b) up to and including the second generation of descent from natural born British subjects born
abroad; and
(c) by naturalization, denization and resumption.
The statutes on the subject are collected by Clive
Parry in his Natioaaiity and Citizenship Laws and need
not be referred to in detail here as we are really not concerned with them except as the background of our laws.
In 1914, the British Nationalityand Status of Aliens Act,
·*Every person must posses a nationality.
l
4 S.C.R.
)
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
1963
1914 was passed which was later amended in 1943. The
definition of a natural-born British subject in that Act
The State
shows the classes of persons who were regarded as British Trading Corposubjects by birth. The word 'subject' need not be con- ration of India
sidered in a sinister sense. It only meant a citizen though Ltd. & Others.
v.
the feudal concept of subjection seemed to persist in the
The
Commerword. The Act of 1914 as amended in 1943 made one
cial Tax Officer,
significant departure and it was the limitation of British Visak,hapatnam
nationality on birth to the first foreign-born generation.
and Others.
The Act of 1914 as amended in 1943 ruled the field till
the British Nationality Act, 1948 was paseed. By that time Hidayatullah f.
the problem of British-born subjects underwent a cataclysmic change along with the changes in the British
Empire. A new conception namely that of Commonwealth citizenship came to be recognised but it was
obvious that members of the Commonwealth countries
were about to enact their own citizenship and nationality
laws. The Act of 1948 did two things with which we are
concerned. It laid down rules by which the status of
British subjects was conferred on persons who were citizens of certain countries named in the Act. India was one
of such conntries. This new citizenship was Commonwealth citizenship. It also contained transitional provisions and s. 12 ( 4) provided:
S. 12( 4) :-A person who was a British subject immediately before the <late of the commencement of
this Act and does not become a citizen of the United
Kingdom and colonies by virtue of any of the foregoing provisions of this section shall on that date
become such a citizen unless( a) he is then a citizen of any country mentioned in
sub-section (3) of section 1 of this Act under a citizenship law having effect in that country or :i citizen
of Eire ; or
( b) he is then potentially a citizen of any country
mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 1 of this Act.
One of the Commonwealth countries (Canada) had
already such laws, but others followed immediately afterwards. India lagged behind and the citizenship laws came
in the Constitution and in the Act of 1955. During the
period between 1948 and 1950 Indian citizens were only
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
potentially so. They however enjoyed Commonwealth citizenship which term was synonymous with British subject
The State
in effect but 'was more appropriate to certain countries in
Trading Corporation of India view of the attainment by them of full nationhood.' Thus
Ltd. & Others. every Indian in British India by virtue of s. 1 of the English
v.
Act of 1948 and every Indian in the Indian States as a
The Commerprotected person enjoyed Commonwealth citizenship. Of
cial Tax 0 fficer, course this citizenship was to continue till India enacted
V isak hapatnam
its own citizenship laws and thereafter if there was a comand Others.
mon clause preserving this citizenship and was to cease if
Hidayatul/11!i /. there was an express abrogation of Commonwealth citizenship. Under the English Act of 1948, Indians became Commonwealth citizens or British subjects without citizenship
and were regarded as potential citizens of India, The
Indian Constitution made provisions for citizenship on the
inauguration of the Constitution but it was not 4 law for
the purpose of the British Nationality Act, 1948. It only
provided that certain natural persons were to be regarded
as citizens of India from January 26, 1950.
In so far as we are concerned this created a hiatus
because the scheme of Indian citizenship was not completely worked out on 26th January, 1950. The Constitution no doubt declared who were Indian citizens on that
date bnt the status of a British subject without citizenship
which was mellifluously called Commonwealth Citizenship
"could not be liquidated" upless there was a citizenship
law as contemplated by the English Act of 1948. As a
result, in the words of Clive Parry,
"Pending the completion of the the scheme of Indian
citizenship, persons who were potentially citizens of
India but are not citizens thereof remained British subjects without citizenship in the eyes of the United
. don1. "
K 1ng
No doubt in 1955, the Citizenship Act was enacted
by the Indian Parliament. Some writers think that even
that is not the citizenship law contemplated by the English
Act of 1948. Whether or not it fulfils the test, it is not
necessary to decide here because it does not affect the status
of corporations. Its provisions are applicable to 'persons'
and the definition of the word 'person' in the Act expressly
excludes "any company or association or body of indivirluals, ·whether incorporated or not."
(
l.
y
r
4 S.C.R.
)
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
1963
I have attempted to establish that citizenship as viewed
from country to country and from one period of time to
The State
another was concerned with natural persons. The manner Trading Corpoof acquisition of citizenship and/or nationality described ration of India
by me are admirably summed up by Mervyn Jones in Ltd. & Others.
v.
his book "British Nationality Law" at p. 9 in the form
The
Commerof a pedigree which may be seen. It is enough to read
Tax Officer,
the various headings in the pedigree to realize that there · cial
Visakhapatnam
is no room for artificial persons there. From the point
and Others.
of view of Mr. Setalvad's argument this raises an intriguing
situation. If corporations possessed citizenship immediately Hidayatullah f.
before our Constitution they would be citizens under the
English Act of 1948, that is to say, British subjects without citizenship or Commonwealth citizens and only potential citizens of India. The Indian Constitution dealt with
natural persons and not artificial persons in its provisions
dealing with citizenship and the status of corporations
was not disturbed by those provisions. When the Citizenship Act was enacted in 1955, it began to speak from
January 26, 1950, and it might have affected corporations
but for the fact that it excluded them. Thus if there was
any citizenship which the corporations enjoyed, it remained where it was. The corporations, if at all, would
thus be Commonwealth citizens, not Indian citizens
~ecause no law has made them Indian citizens. But I
do not accept the basic argument that corporations enjoyed
citizenship even before, because in the sense in which
I have explained citizenship, there is no room for artificial
persons.
The argument here repelled is sought to be supported
by referring to the rule of law under which corporations
are said to possess nationality. Nationality in this context
is not to be confused with the status of a citizen. What
is meant by that nationality may next be seen. Ordinarily
corporations are given recognition by law as persons who
can sue or be sued. Corporations also own property, carry
on business or trade. But it is not to be thought that
corporations have an access to courts as a matter of course.
The courts are open as a matter of course to natural persons and not to 'intangible concepts' like corporations.
Unless the law gives this right to corporations they cannot sue or be sued. What the law does is to invest corp<>10--2 S. C. India/64
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
rations with a distinct personality and with a right to sue
and
with a disability to be sued. Ordinarily such rights
The State
and
disabilities
attach to 'persons' but that word is given
Trading Corporation of India an extended meaning to include corporations. In this
Ltd. & Others. way the law invests an intangible body with a unity and
v.
individuality and creates a legal person capable of suing
The Commer- or being sued. Foreign corporations enjoy the same privicial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam lege by a comity of nations and also sue and are sued. These
privileges which corporations share with natural persons do
and Others.
not make them 'citizens' entitled to every other privilege
Hidayatullah /. which the municipal law gives to citizens. In other words
corporations enjoy only such privileges under the municipal law which that law expressely confers on them.
It is, of course, undeniable that corporations have an
existence in the eye of law. The law further regards that
corporations have a domicile and a residence. The law
also recognises that corporations have a nationality. What
does the law mean by that? The concept of the nationality
of a corporation is comparatively new and it was really
developed during the First World War. Nationality of
corporations becomes important when it is necessary to
apply the 'nationality of claims' principle before an international tribunal or to give effect to law-making treaties
applying to 'nationals'. See Starke (An Introduction to
International Law 4th edn. p. 256). Starke has pointed
out that there is no unanimity of opinion regarding the
tests to be applied to ascertain the nationality of corporations. Clive Parry does not recognise this nationality and
calls it quasi-nationality. I shall now explain in what
sense the word 'nationality' is used in this connection.
There have been many theories about the nationality
of corporations which were again reconsidered during the
First World War. According to Hilton Young 22 Har-vard Law Review p. 2, there were four main theories at
first. The first theory viewed a corporation as the national
of the State in which its members or the majority of them
or owning the greater part of the capital, were nationals.
This theory considered the word 'corporation' as 'a collective name for the corporators', the corporate veil being
considered to be of such gossamer texture as to hide almost
nothing. This theory of which the chief proponents
Were Sommieres and Morawetz was criticised on all hands
,
'·
.
y
r
4 S.C.R.
)
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
1963
and particularly by Maitland and was abandoned as it
made nationality a matter of accident and liable to change
The State
day in and day out. The second theory regarded nationa- Trading Corpolity as determined by the nationality of the State under ration of India
which it was created. The United States of America has Ltd. & Others.
v.
adhered to it but England may be said to have adopted
The Commerthis theory modified by considerations of domicile. The
Tax Officer,
Germans c_all this theory Griindungstheorie that is the cial
Visakhapatnam
theory of the place of birth. The theory has great names
and Others.
behind it-Calvo, Fiore, Pineau, \Veiss etc. This theory
is inadequate to cover corporations which are not autho- Hidayatullah f.
rised by the State and has been modified in the United
States by evolving a theory of 'implied consent to extraterritorial service'. The third theory considers that a corporation acquires the nationality of the place where its
acts or any of its acts are performed. This theory is
rejected universally by lawyers but it was adopted by businessmen in the Congress of Joint Stock Companies held
at Paris in 1889. Under this theory nationality can be
changed at will. Obviously enough difficulty is likely to
be felt in the event of simultaneous actions in different
countries. The fourth theory considers that corporations
are domiciled where they have a permanent home. This
Theory was influenced by Von Bar who considered that
though juristic persons could not be nationals either iure
sanguinis or iure soli, they could be nationals by domicile.
Chief Justice Taney summed up the thought by saying
that "a corporation must dwell in the place of its creation
and cannot migrate to another sovereignty". The Bank of
Augusta v. Erle (' ). Domicile of a corporation has more
foundations t~an one. It may be fixed by the territory
of the sovereign which created it or by the charter or other
constitutive documents or by the .Place where the corporation discharges its functions or by the bona fide centre of
its administrative business. These different concepts have
led to diverse theories.
English Law regarded nationality as dependent on
domicile and was at first content to regard a corporation
as the national of a State where it was incorporated. But
a glance at the history of the law of corporations shows
(') [1839] 13 Pet. 519, 588-10 L. Ed. 274.
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
that there is a variation in this theme in later. years.
The
conception of domicile was adopted in the English
The State
Common
Law merely for purposes of jurisdiction and law.
Trading CorpoA
corporation's
domicile, it was held, depended upon
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. where it came into being and this domicile was not
v.
changeable though Lord St. Leonards was of a contrary
The Commer- opinion in Carron Iron Co. v. McLaren(').
Similarly
cial Tax Officer,
it
was
held
that
a
corporation
had
a
residence
though
it
V isak hapatnam
could
change
its
residence
and
even
have
more
than
one
and Others.
residence under certain laws. On what then did nationaHidayatullah /. lity depend? According to English Common Law a corporation incorporated under the English Law had British
nationality and it did not matter if its members held a
different nationality. A corporation which was not of
British nationality was an alien corporation. · According
to the laws of many European countries particularly
France, nationality depended upon the siege social by
which is meant the seat or centre of control. Both these
theories suffered during the First World War. As regards
the English Common Law the leading case was Janson
v. Driefontein (2). from which I have already quoted
certain extracts. In that case it was decided that a company possessed the nationality of the country under
the laws of which it was incorporated and that the nationality of the share-holders was not determinative of the
question. Once this nationality was determined then
the corporation received the treatment as a national, as an
alien, or as an enemy as the case was in peace or in war.
This view was revised in the First World War. In Daimler
Co. Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (Great
Britain Ltd. ('), all the shares of the res.Pondent company (except one) were held by a German company and
all directors were Germans though the company was incorporated in Great Britain. If the principle that nationality follows incorporation applied, the respondent company
would have had a British nationality and it could not
change it. But the House of Lords applied the principle
of effective control to determine its nationality. In the
Court of Appeal the case was heard by the full Court and
( 1)
( 3)
[1952] 5 H.L.C. 416.
[1916] 2 A.G. 307.
(2) [1902]
A.G. 484.
(
4 S.C.R.
II
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
1963
the above principle was held applicable (Buckley L. f.
dissenting). The majority view was confirmed by the full
The State
judicial strength of the House of Lords by majority. Trading
CorpoLords Shaw and Parmoor considered that enemy character ration of India
depended on whether it was incorporated in an enemy Ltd. & Others.
v.
country. The majority (Lords Halsbury, Me11Sey, KinThe Commernear, Atkinson, Parker and Sumner) however, considered
that it depended upon where the effective control lay. cial Tax 0 fficer,
Visak hapatnam
Lord Parker summarized the law in six propositions as
and Others.
under:
(1) A company incorporated in the United Kingdom Hidayatullah /.
is a legal entity, a creation of law with the status
and capacity which the law confers. It is not a
natural person with mind or conscience. To use
the language of Buckley L. J., "It can be neither
loyal nor disloyal. It can be neither friend nor
enemy."
(2) Such a company can only act through agents
properly authorized, and so long as it is carrying
on business in this country through agents so
authorized and residing in this or a friendly
country, it is prima facie to he regarded as a
friend, and all His Majesty's lieges may deal with
it as such.
(3) Such a company may, however, assume an enemy
character. This will be the case if its agents or
the persons in de facto control of its affairs,
whether authorized or not, are resident in an
enemy country, or, wherever resident, are adhering
to the enemy or taking instructions from or acting
under the control of enemies. A person knowingly ·dealing with the company in such a case
is trading with the enemy.
( 4) The character of individual shareholders cannot of
itself affect the character of the company. This
is admittedly so in times of peace, during which
every shareholder is at liberty to exercise and enjoy such rights as are by law incident to his status
as shareholder.
(5). In a similar way a company registered in the
United Kingdom, but carrying on business in a
neutral country through agents properly a,uthori-
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
zed and resident here or in the neutral country,
is prima facie to be regarded as a friend, but may,
The State
through its agents or persons in de facto control
Trading Corpoof
its affairs, assume an enemy character.
ration of India
(
6)
A
company
registered in the United Kingdom but
Ltd. & Others.
v.
carrying on business in an enemy country is to
The Commerbe regarded as an enemy.
cial Tax Officer,
The House of Lords case is regarded ·as an instance
Visakhapatnam
of
judicial
legislation on the subject of 'enemy character'
and Others.
and it undoubtedly was so. It is not as if this theory
has been universally accepted. It was criticised by Sir
Hidayatullah /.
Arnold Mcnair in 1923/24 British Year Book of International Law p. 44 and by Mr. Ralph A. Norem: American
fournal of International Law Vol. 24 p. 310.
We have seen that in the United States a corporation
is a domestic corporation of the State which incorporates
it or under the laws of which it is incorporated. Some
of the States have even laws to this effect. While other
countries were revising their attitude in Europe, the United
States adhered to this theory and the Supreme Court
observed that the Congress had definitely adopted the policy
of disregarding stock ownership as a test of enemy character. In other words, in the United States there was no
attempt to look behind the corporate veil. We have also
seen that England drifted from the theory of domicile to
the continental theory of siege social. But France, Germany, Italy and Belgium went a step further than before.
The Gour de Cassation departed from the principle of
siege social in Societe Conserve Lenzburg in which it was
held that the court was entitled "to go to the bottom of
things and ascertain whether a corporation was really
French or not." The French Minister of Justice issued a
circular in 1916 which stated the French ~pproach to the
question thus :
Les fonnes juridique dont la societe est revetue, le
lieu de son principal etablissement, taus les indices
auxquels s' attache le droit prive pour determiner la
nationalite d'une societe, sont inoperants, alors qu'il
s'agit de fixer au point de vue du droit public le caractre
reel de cette soc Mt e. Elle do it etre assimilee aux sujets
de nationalite ennemie des qne notoirement sa direction
ou ses capitaux sont en totalite ou en majeure partic
(
-
r
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
1963
entre !es mains de sujets ennemis, car, en pareil cas,
derriere la fiction du droit prive se dissimule vivante et
The State
agissante la personnalite ennemie elle-meme."
Trading Corpo-
)
-
(The juridical forms in which the society is dressed, ration of India
the place of its principtl office and all the indicia on Ltd. & Others.
v.
which Private Law fastens to determine the nationality
The Commerof :a society, are inoperative when one tries to fix from cial Tax Officer,
the point of view of Public Law the real character of Visakhapatnam
and Ot!ters.
this society. The society must be counted among
enemy nationals if manifestly its direction or its capital wholly or in major part is in enemy hands for in Hidayatullah J.
such a case behind the fiction of the Private Law
lurks the active personality of an enemy.)
The Cour de Cassation justified the change by holding
that the corporation was a personne interposee under the
cover of which an enemy did business. The German attitude also changed to Geschaftssi~z from der Mittelpunkt
des Geschaftes i.e., to the "seat" of real control from the
"centre of its enterprise". The corporation was said to
have its seat where the "brain" was and not where it had
its centre of exploitation. The Italians also adopted the
same test. The Belgians framed a law which sums up the
new theory in crisp legal language (Act 172-Mai 23, 1913) :
"Toute socii!te dont le principal etablissement est en
Belgique est soumise a la loi beige bien que l' acte
constitutif ait ete passe en pays etranger."
(Every society of which the principal establishment
is in Belgium is under the laws of Belgium, notwithstanding tl1at the incorporation took place in a foreign
country.)
In the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals which followed the
First World War there were some cases which were decided on the theory of control but many odiers were decided
on the theory of domicile depending upon die composition
of the Tribunal. There are indeed many other tests which
I have not mentioned such as the test of beneficial interest,
or of substantial ownership or of responsibility which it is
not necessary to describe here.
It would not be wrong to say that die control theory
is also losing ground and there is a great support for the
theory that the juridical life of the corporation must ulti-
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963'
mately fix its nationality. It is also to be noticed that Herr
Marburg and M. Mazeaud two noted thinkers have pointed
The State
Trading Corpo- out that all this law is not so much to fix the nationality
ration of India of a corporation but its enemy character. Many writers
Ltd. & Others. (including Dicey, Cheshire, Foote and Farnsworth) have
v.
also pointed out that the conception of the nationality of a
The Commer- corporation is important only in war and it has significance
cial Tax Officer,
not so much in Municipal Law as in Public International
Visakhapatnam
Law.
During times of peace the domicile of a corporation
and Others.
which, as Lord Westbury pointed out, is an idea of law
Hidayatullah f. creating a relationship between an individual and a particular country is allowed to operate a fiction. A corporation resembles a natural person in the matter of domicile
except that an individual can choose his domicile but a
corporation's domicile is tied to its place of birth. The law
of the country of its birth gives it such rights as it considers practicable and foreign corporations share in those
rights subject to any special provisions. In times of war
these rules and the rule of corporate entity give way and
public policy dictated by the consideration whether the
resources of the corporation are likely to be used for enemy
purposes determines the issue. Thus in the Daimler case
"the fons et origo of the control theory"-"The acts of a company's organs, its directors, managers, secretary and so forth, functioning within the
scope of their authority are regarded as the company's
acts .... ,, (')
The operatives are regarded as the 'brain' of the corporation and where the brain functions the corporation is
held to function. During times of peace a corporation
may own property, do business because the Municipal law
expressly permits that all this can be done and foreign
corporations also obtain the benefit of such laws either
because of provisions of the Municipal law or by a comity
of nations. In times of war all this changes. The law
of nationality is thus a law to determine the enemy character and not a law recognising nationality either in a political or municipal sense. There may be some analogy between an individual and a corporation but as Mr. Vaughan
Williams said ( 49 L.Q.R. 334) in an article which has
been of great assistance to me, it is not necessary 'to ride
( 1)
[1916] 2 A.C. 307, 340.
f
-
r
4 S.C.R.
)
'
,)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
1963
·the analogy to death.' The English Law was summed up
by Mervyn Jones· (British Nationality Law, Revised Edn.) :
The State
"A corporation is a juridical person, but could not be Trading
Corpoa subject at Common Law, because allegiance, being ration of India
essentially a personal bond, was a conception limited Ltd. & Others.
v.
in its application to individuals. Nor have corporations
been recognised as statutory British subjects or as citi- The Commercial Tax 0 fficer,
zens of the United Kingdom and colonies."
Visakhapatnam
·Oppenheim also points out (International Law, Lauterand Others.
pacht Edition) p. 642 n. 3"The nationality of corporations is mainly a matter Hidayatullah f.
of Private International Law, and considerations of
Public policy have a decisive influence upon the attitude of every State with regard to it."
Citizenship depends upon Municipal Law and the
same learned author says (ibid p. 643) :
"It is not for International Law but for Municipal
Law to determine, who is, and who is not, to be considered a subject."
Hyde in his International Law Vol. 2 (2nd Edn.)
. p. 1066 also says:
"Citizenship as distinct from nationality, is a creature
solely of domestic law. It refers to rights which a
State sees fit to confer upon certain individuals who
are also its nationals."
But perhaps the most practical argument against the
recognition of corporations as citizens comes from M.
·Niboyet (who, as Mr. Vaughan Williams points out) observed in his Manual of Private International Law that in
computing the total number of citizens of a country we do
not add to the number of physical persons the number
· of corporations of that nationality. Indeed Lord Atkinson
(and all who formed the majority. except Lord Halsbury)
· was of opinion in the Dai!l'ller case that"The question of the residence of the company apart,
I do not think that the legal entity, the company, can
be so completely identified with its share-holders, or
the majority of them, as to make their nationality
its nationality." ( 1 )
We have only two laws on the subject of citizenship
and none on the subject of the nationality of corporations.
(1) [1916] 2 A.C. 307, 327.
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964}
1963
The fundamental law provides only for natural persons
where it enacts rules for determining citizenship and the
The State
Citizenship
Act excludes corporations. The chapter on funTrading Corporation of India damental rights does not altogether ignore corporations as
Ltd. & Others. did the American Constitution. In places the word 'person'
v.
is used which attracts the definition in the General Clauses
The Comn1er~
Act and in others the word 'citizen'. The word 'citizen"
cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam could have been defined specially for Article 19(1) (f) and
(g) but it is not. There is nothing which can justify us
and Others.
in giving a special meaning to the word "citizen" for purHidayatullah f. poses of clauses (f) and (g). The fact that corporations
are regarded in some circumstances as possessing nationality does not make them citizens. As Mr. Menon rightly
pointed out ships and aircraft also possess nationality in
Internat,jonal Law but it cannot be claimed that they possess
citizenship in Municipal Law.
Which corporations should be regarded as possessing
Indian Nationality is a question to be answered when it
arises. Whether the provisions of the Companies Act
dealing with foreign companies furnish any assistance in
this behalf must also be left unanswered. It is sufficient
to say that even if it be established that a corporation
possesses Indian Nationality this has not the result which
is contended for namely that all or any of the citizenship
rights arise. It may be admitted that the State Trading
Corporation which is incorporated in India is not a foreign
company under the Companies Act. If we were to lift
the veil of incorporation it will be found that the entire
capital is subscribed by the Government of India, that the
share-holders are the President of India and two Secretaries.
to Government, in their official capacities and that its management is a governmental function for the benefit of the
nation. It may be conceded that it possesses Indian
Nationality in an ideal sense and that there is also no·
possibility of its acquiring an enemy character. But even
so it is not a 'national' that is to say an individual who is
a part of our nation. When we count Indian nationals
for purposes of census we do not count the corporations
as nationals. The argument is not one what advanced by
dropping the word 'citizen' and using the word 'natiunal'.
No doubt the existence of corporations as entities is recognised but· the entity obtains only such rights as the law·
(
-
...
r
4 S.C.R.
)
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
147
1963
confers on it. This entity cannot claim other rights as a
matter of course or by standing side by side with citizens.
The State
This entity cannot aspire to hold a public office or to mem- Trading
Corpobership of Parliament or the Legislatures or to franchise ration of India
or to entry into educational institutions. This is because Ltd. & Others.
v.
it is not a citizen in the true sense of the term and because
The
Comrner~
its 'nationality' though of consequence in Public or Private
International Law, in treaties, in conventions and in pro- cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
tocols, is of no comequence in Municipal Law except to
and Others.
the extent that the Municipal Law says so.
This is not to say that corporations have not been Hidayatullah f.
given any protection under our Constitution. Unlike the
Constitution of the United States of America our Constitution does not overlook corporations. The General Clauses
Act is applicable to interpret the Constitution and that Act,
as has been pointed out already, defines 'person' as including corporations. The following articles of the Constitution employ the word 'person' which applies equally to
individuals and to corporations etc.
Art. 14 : Equality before the law.
Art. 20 : Protection in respect of convictions for
offences.
Art. 27 : Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion.
Art. 31 : Compulsory acquisition of property.
The seven freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19(1) are
for 'citizens'. It was easy to say that the word 'citizen' included corporations etc. of Indian Nationality for purposes of
any of the clauses of Art. 19( 1) but it has not been so said.
It is to be noticed that in the third part the Constitution
defines 'the State', 'the law', 'laws in force', 'estate' and
'rights'. The expression 'law in force' is defined twice and
differently. Can it be said that the word 'citizen' was purposely left vague so that a broad and liberal spirit could
enter the interpretation? What a chance to take! It
must have been well-known that an attempt by the
Supreme Court of the United States to give an artificial
meaning to the word 'citizen' has been regarded on all
hands as Constitution making. It is easy to see that our
Constitution was circumspect enough to use a word of
larger import (person) in some places but not in others.
The intention may well have been that the seven freedoms
148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
shall guarantee the rights of individuals whom the body
politic
recognised as 'citizens' and not the rights of
The State
abstractions
like corporations. The observations of Chief
Trading CorpoJustice
Mukherjea
quoted earlier mean that a corporation
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. is protected only where the language admits the inclusion
v.
of corporations otherwise only individuals are meant.
The ConimerIt is however argued that in the United States the
cial Tax Officer,
Supreme
Court has held that the word 'citizen' includes
Visakhapatnam
corporations. Reference was also made to the Constitutions
and Others.
of some minor countries where corporations are expressly
Hidayatullah f.
mentioned. It is not necessary to refer to these Constitutions because no inspiration can be drawn from them to
rewrite our Constitution. As Willis said (and he is not
alone in this) of the position in the United States that the
rights and liabilities of corporations "have been worked
out under and through the judge-made United States Constitution". Perhaps this was forced upon the Supreme
Court by the diversity of citizenship existing in the United
States but it may be noted that the word 'citizen' has not
been held to include corporations in other articles. Since
this precedent was strongly relied upon I shall briefly refer
to it.
The Constitution of the United States of America overlooked corporations and this has made the language intractable in places. The Supreme Court has supplied this want
by 'judicial legislation'. How this was done may be explained. I have already referred to the dictum of Chief
Justice Taney and to the attitude of the Congress and the
Supreme Court on the subject of nationality of corporations.
There is a fixed view that nationality follows incorporation and is unalterable. This geographical theory coupled
with dual citizenship of the State and United States has
led to some difficulties. Corporations were always regarded
as the citizens of the State of incorporation but not of the
United States. The citizenship of the State has been accepted for purpose of exercise of the judicial power of the
United States.
The following provisions of the Constitution of the
United States may be read at this stage :
Art. I Sec. 8. "Congress shall have power ........ to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."
Art. Ill Sec. 1. "The judicial Power of the United States,
-
i-
4 S.C.R.
-.
I
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
1963
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
The State
ordain and establish .... "
Trading CorpoArt. III Sec. 2. "The judicial Power shall extend ...... to ration of India
controversies . . . . . . between a State and Citizens of Ltd. & Others.
v.
another State ; between Citizens of different States ;
The
Commerbetween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a cial Tax Officer,
V isak hapatnam
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citiand Others.
zens or Subjects."
·
Art. IV Sec. 2 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled Hidayatullah f.
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."
Amendment XIV Sec. 1 "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
::itate wherein they resi<le. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 0£ the United States ; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
The Supreme Court has held that a corporation is
the citizen of the State of incorporation for purposes of
federal jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Though Art. I sec. 8 and Amendment XIV refer
to natural persons the word 'citizen' was given a larger
meaning for purposes of controversies between citizens of
different States over which federal courts alone have
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the national courts could
not be invoked if the defendant was a corporation but the
Supreme Court has by slow stages created a fictional jurisdiction. The development of the law has had an interesting course. Rather than describe it in my own
words I quote a small passage from Willis, Constitutional
Law of the United States (p. 850) :"At first a corporation was not regarded as a citizen for any purpose and it could not get into or be
taken into the federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Then a case arose where all of the
stockholders of the corporation were citizens of the
150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
same State where the corporation was incorporated
and the plaintiff was a citizen of another State, and it
The State
was held that the Court would look behind the corTrading Corpoporate veil to the stockholders and give the federal
ration of India
courts jurisdiction because of the diversity of citizenLtd. & Others.
v.
ship thus found. In a later case some of the stockThe Commerholders were not citizens of the State where the
cial Tax Officer,
corporation was incorporated but of the state in
Visakhapatnam
which
the opposing litigant was a citizen. To
and Others.
avoid robbing the federal courts of their jurisdiction,
H idayatullah J.
the Court held that for purposes of diversity of citizenship all of the stockholders of a corporation would
be conclusively presumed to be citizens of the chartering state. This rule, however, had to be modified
later so as to make an exception in the case of
a stockholder plaintiff. Now it is believed that the
courts have come to the position that the corporation is itself a citizen of the state of its incorporation for the purposes of diversity of citizenship."
The following extract from St. Louis & San Francisco Railawy Co. v. James(') sums up the position so far
as the Supreme Court is concerned :
"There is an indisputable legal presumption that a
State corporation, when sued or suing in a circuit
court of the United States, is composed of citizens
of the State which created it. . . . . . . That doctrine
began, as we have seen, in the assumption that
State corporations were composed of citizens of the
State which created them ; but such assumption
was one of fact, and was the subject of allegation
and traverse, and thus the jurisdiction of the Federal courts might be defeated. Then after a long
contest in this co1,1rt, it was settled that the presumption
of citizenship is one of law, not to be defeated by
allegation or evidence to the contrary. There we
are content to leave it."
States have, however, begun to destroy the presumption
which is thus erected by requiring a corporation as a
condition to doing business there to incorporate in the
State. This can be done because the Supreme Court
( 1)
[1896] 161 U.S. 545, 562, 563.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
1963
has rejected the claim of corporations to citizenship
for purposes of the privileges and immunities clauses
The State
quoted above. As Corwin pointed out in The Constitu- Trading Corpotion and what it means today 11th edn. p. 166 :
ration of India
"Nor does the term 'citizens' include corporations. Ltd. & Others.
v.
Thus a corporation chartered elsewhere may enter
The Commera State to engage in local business only on such terms
Tax Officer
as the State chooses to lay down, provided these cial
Visakhapatnam'
do not deprive the corporation of its rights under the
and Others.
Constitution-of its right, for instance, to engage in
interstate commerce, or to appeal to the national courts Hidayatullah f.
or, once it has been admitted into a State, to receive equal treatment with corporations chartered
by the latter."
It remains to point out that corporations have been
held to be 'persons' within the Fourteenth Amendment and
are entitled to equal protection of the laws. But a foreign
corporation as Corwin points out (at p. 268) is entitled to equal treatment with the corporations chartered by a State if there is submission to the jurisdiction
·
of the State.
The Nationality Act of 1940 declared that for the purpose of that Act a 'national' meant a person owing
personal allegiance to a State in the United States.
Corporations were thus not included because in the
words of Buckley L.J. a corporation cannot be loyal or disloyal. For international purposes a corporation is treated
as a national if subjected to illegal treatment in an
international aspect by a foreign power. The position
of corporations is protected in treaties as for example
the treaties between Great Britain and the United States
of 1783 and 1794 and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
between the United States and Mexico. Other examples are found in Hyde and international documents.
Similarly treaties of commerce are construed to include
corporations within expressions denoting natural persom.
But even in international sphere corporations are
not on a par with natural persons or nationals. As
' Hyde points out :
" ...... at least in a technical sense, a corporation is
not, for many purposes to be deemed a national of the
State to which its life is due, and lacks many privileges
;
'
-. ---- ,-~-,.; '/--::' ~"": ''
',_ ~ _->.....~
152
- 1963
·;,..
..
', ' '
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
that enure to a natural person ... ; .. "
The-question is· whether the precedent of the United ·"'
The State
Trading
Corpr/c ·states Supreme Court should be f ollowed . Apart f ram the
ration of India fact that this involves a conscious effort at judicial legislaLtd. & Other.<. 1 tion, I ·am of opiniqri th'at such a spirit of libre recherche
v. ·
. scientifique is hardly justified in India in view of the folThe Commer- lowing considerations :cial Tar Officer, · ... (a) We. have a single citizenship and there is no citiVisakhapatnam - .
,
and Others. _
zenship--of the States to create diversity ;
(b) We have only- one set of courts and not two with
Hidayatullah ].
separate jurisdiction ;
. ( c) -Our· Constitution has not completely overlooked 'r7
corporations' and some of the fundamental rights
are prima facie ,guaranteed to corporations as
well •
·
· --- -- '
.
.
- .. (d) Members .of a _corporation who are citizens can··
. . enforce the rights under Art. 19(1) (f) and (g).
Even if corporations may not be - able to do so
directly, the members who are citizens by enfor- ,.-,
' cing their personal rights can effectively benefit r
the corporation. The only persons who are not able . :to . do so are non,citizens whether as individuals
· · or as members of a corporation ;
. ·
( e) There has never been a recognition of a corporation· as· a citizen ; and
- (0 Unless a presumption juris et de jure is raised
· that corporations whether composed of citizens
only or of non-citizens only or of citizens anci-0on-':ocitizens ·are citizens of India, ·every time an
inquiry_ will have to be made into· their com-_
po-<ition and there is 110 discernihle principle
. on which the - citizenship can be based when
there is diversity of citizenship in the composition
of the corporation.
_I arn, therefore, of opinion that the. State Trading
Corporation cannot be regarded as citizeµ for the purpose _
of enforcing rights under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g).
.~
_ :The next question is whether the State Trading Corporation is a uepartment or organ of Government · not- withstanding the formality of incorporation. On behalf
·of the ·Corp0ration it is contended that if the corporate
.-eil is pierced one sees that ·the right to invoke Art.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
153
19(1) (f) and (g) is being claimed by three persons
.
I
....
'
1963
who are admittedly citizens of India namely the
The State
President of India and the two secretaries. The Trading Corpocontention on the other side is that the corporate veil ration of Indi1J
cannot be pierced at all and that if it is, then behind Ltd. & Others.
v.
that veil there is the Government of India.
The CommerIt is quite clear that none of the shareholders holds cial Tax Officer,
his share or shares for his personal beneficial enjoy- Visakhapatnam
ment. None of them has paid for the shares held in
and Others.
his name. The administration of the affaill! of the corporation though technically a company, is a concern of Hidayatullah /.
the Government of India. The legal and beneficial ownership of the corporation vests in the Government of India. Now there are not two veils so to speak, so that
by lifting the first one sees the shareholders and by lifting the other the Government of India. There is
but one veil and if it is at all to be lifted, it must be lifted right off. What one would see on lifting the veil may
be described in the words of Martin Wolff (Private International Law, 1945 p. 56) as follows :"It occurs frequently that a state creates e.g., for a
commercial purpose, a separate legal entity, in law
distinct from the state, but in fact, if the veil of
personality is pierced, identical with it. Examples
are . . . . . . . . notably many companies under state
control, the state possessing all or practically all the
shares in that corn pan y."
If the corporation is to be regarded as a separate
entity from its members and not merely as an association of individuals, it is not permissible to tear the veil
aside. Corporations in which the State owns the stock do
not, in the United States, benefit from the immunity of the
State. It is because of these difliculties that the Supreme Court of the United States settled the question of
federal jurisdiction in the face of diversity of citizenship by making an irrebuttable presumption of law
that the stockholders of a corporation incorporated in
a State are citizens of that State and the corporation
's thus also a citizen of that State. There is a fiction
.1pon a fiction. I do not think that it is permissible
mder our laws to raise such an irrebuttable presump11-2 S. C. India/64
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1%3
tion of Indian citizenship in, respect of every member
of a corporation in India and it is obvious that if no
The State
T."ading, Corpo- such presumption can be raised the citizenship of cor. ~ation of India porations raises an issue of fact. Can we say that if
l;J. & Others. all the corporators are found to be Indian citizens then we
v.
must hold that the corporation is an Indian citizen?
The, Commer- Such a view was held in an early case by the Supreme
cial Tax Officer,
Court of the United States-see Bank. of the United States
Visakhapatnam
v. Deveau¥('). In that case Chief Justice Marshal, while
and Others.
recognising that a corporation aggregate was certainly not
Hidayatullah /.
a citizen because it was an 'invisible', 'intangible' and
'artificial' being, held that since the Constitution dealt
with matters generally and not in detail, and the general
purpose and object of the law of incorporation show ..
ed that such an artificial person was to have corporeal
qualities, a corporation had the character of a citizen if
those that composed it had that character. In the Daimler
case (op. cit. sup.) Lord Parker seemed to be of the opinion
that this was the established law in the United States
but Farnsworth (The Residence and Domicile of Corporations p. 311) supports Dr. Schuster (The Nationality of Trading Corporations 2 Grotius Society (1916)
at p. 195) in the view that Lord Parker's statement
was inaccurate. Farnsworth ha! also quoted from Garner's International Law in the World War Vol. I p.
227 where the opinion of the Federal Judge in FritzSchultz fr. Co. v. Raines & Co. ( 2 ) is quoted with approval:"In upholding the right to bring the action the Court
expressed the opinion that the authority in the case
of United States v. Deveaux has been much limited,
if not overruled, by subsequent cases and that 'at
the present time the courts of this country are entirely wedded to the doctrine that the corporators
of a corporation are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the same State as the corporation'. The statements of Lord Reading and Lord Parker in the
Daimler case, that the SuP.reme Court had laid down
the principle that a court may look behind the corporate name to ascertain the character of the indivi(1) (1809) 5 Cranch 61 : 3 L. Ed. 38.
e) (1917) 166 N.Y. S. 567.
•
4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
155
1963
duals comprising it, was, said Justice Lehman, obviously not accurate."
The State
I have earlier quoted from St. Louis & San Francisco Trading Corpo·
Railway Co., v. fames (cit. sup.) which also supports ration of India
Ltd. & Others.
Dr. Schuster's view.
v.
[n my judgment it is not possible to pierce the veil
The Commerof incorporation in our country to determine the citi- cial Tax Officer,
zenship of the members and then to give the corpoVisakhapatnam
ration the benefit of Art. 19. If we did pierce the
and Others.
veil and saw that the corporation was identical with Government there would be difficulty in giving relief unless Hidayatullah f,
we held that the State can be its own citizen. Nor is it
possible to raise an irrebuttable presumption about the
citizenship of the members. I have given detailed reasons
already in answer to the first question posed for our decision. If we go by the corporate entity then we must hold
that A.rt. 19 applies to natural persons. On that subject I
have said a great deal but what I have said sums up to
the following passage from Ducat v. Chicago ( 1 ) quoted
by Farnsworth (op. cit.) at p. 310 and approved by the
United States Supreme Court:"The term citizen can be correctly understood in no
other sense than that in which it was understood in
common acceptation when the Constitution was adopted, and as it is universally explained by writers
on government, without exception. A citizen is
of the genus homo, inhabiting, and having certain
rights in some State or district . . . . . . . . these privileges attach to him in every State into which he may
enter, as to a human being-as a person with faculties to appreciate them, and enjoy them, and not to an
intangibility, a mere legal entity, an invisible artificial
being, but to a man, made in God's image."
It is not necessary to refer to the earlier cases of this
court. The point was not raised in this form before and
even the observations of Mukherjea J. (as he then was)
were obiter. In most cases an individual member also
joined the corporation in the petition for the enforcemem
of fundamental rights (as is the case here also) and this
Court was content to leave the matter there. Joseph Kur(') (1868) 48 Ill. 172.
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
villa Vellukunnel v. Reserve Bank of India(') was heard
by this Court in which the Palai Bank Ltd. was a
The Stat<:
Trading Corpo- party along with others. No objection was raised
ration of India about the competency of the Palai Bank to claim the bem:Ltd. & Others. fit of Art. 19. The main case (there were two heard
v.
together) was an appeal from a decision of Raman Nayar
The Commer- J. in proceedings for the winding up of the Palai Bank
cial Tar Officer,
(I.L.R. (1961) Kerala 166]. It was an action properly
Visakhapatnam
brought against the Palai Bank under the Banking Comand Others.
panies Act. The main question in this Court was whether
Hidayatullah /. a section of the Banking Companies Act which enabled
the Reserve Bank to decide whether a banking company
deserved to be wound up was ultra vzres m as much as
it took away the right of the court to decide this matter. It was held by majority that there was no flaw
in the law and that it was for Parliament to say ar
what stage m a particular case, the judicial process
should begin and not ' for the courts who come mro
the picture from the stage the judicial process commences under the law. This point could be decided
in an appeal in which beside the corporation there were
other interested parties.
Lastly, I have no cause for anxiety about Corporations in general and companies in which the States own
all or the majority of the shares in particular. They are
amply protected under our Constitution. There can be
no discrimination, no taxation without authority of law,
no curbs involving freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse and no compulsory acquisition of property.
There is sufficient guarantee there and if more is needed
then any member (if citizen) is free to invoke Art. 19(1)
(f) and (g) and there is no doubt that the corporation in most cases will share the benefit. We need not
be apprehensive that corporations are at the mercy of
State Governments.
For these reasons my answers to the question posed
are against the State Trading Corporation.
Das Gupta/.
DAs GUPTA J.-I think the State Trading Corporation
of India is entitled to fundamental rights under Art.
( 1)
[1962] Supp, 3 S.C.R. 632.
-
•
'I S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
1963
19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution as citizen of India.
The petitioner bases its claim to these fundamental
The State
rights on the fact that all its members are citizens. That Trading Corpothis is so is not disputed by the respondent. But the resration of India
pondent resists the claim on the legal basis that the Corpo- Ltd. & Others.
v.
ration is not a natural person but only an artificial person
The
Commerforming a distinct entity from the natural persons who are
cial Tar Officer,
its members. According to the respondent no artificial
Visakhapatnam
person is a citizen of India either under the Constitution
and Others.
or under the Citizenship Act which was passed in 1955 in
Das Gupta J,
accordance with the Constitution. The respondent also
contends that it would be a mistake to confuse nationality
with citizenship and while it is correct that the present
petitioner having been incorporated in India under the
Indian Companies Act is a national of India it would be
wholly erroneous to think that it also became on such incorporation a citizen of India. The fact that it is a national of India puts it in no better position that any othe1
person, natural or artificial, which is not a citizen of India
in the matter of fundamental rights.
While creating fundamental rights "the people of India"
created some which they conferred on all persons (Arts.
14, 20. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30); but some were
created that were conferred only on citizens and were denied
to others. Among those conferred on citizens only are the
fundamental rights created by Arts. 15, 16, 19 and 29. The
word "citizen" was not, however defined in the Constitution ang so we have not got a key that is provided by a clear
definition, to the minds of those who framed the Constitution, on the question whether they intended to exclude corporations as such from the fundamental rights conferred on
citizens. The respondent points out that immediately before
dealing with the question of fundamental rights, the Constitution deals with question of citizenship in seven Articles,
viz., Arts. 5 to 11. There is force in the respondent's contention that these articles do not appear to contemplate any
artificial person, like a corporation, being in its capacity of
corporation, a citizen of India. Article 5, the first and the
main article dealing with the question makes persons, (I)
born in the territory of India, or (2) born of parents one or
both of whom were born in the territory of India, or (3) persons who have been ordinarily residents in the territory of
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964}
1963
for not less than 5 years preceding the commencement of the
the Constitution, citizens of India. Article 6 and 7 deal
The State
with
the cases of certain persons who have migrated to India
Trading Corpofrom
Pakistan, while Art. 8 deals with the question of
ration of India
rights
of citizenship of persons of Indian origin residing
I.td. & Others.
v.
outside India. Article 9 lays down that inspire of Arts. 5,
The Commer6 or 8 a person who has voluntarily acquired the citizenship
cial Tax Officer,
of any foreign State shall not be a citizen of India. Article
Visakhapatnam
10 embodies the provisions of continuity of citizenship
and Others.
"subject to the provisions of any law that may be made by
Das Gupta /.
Parliament"; Article 11 makes an express provision that
Parliament would be competent to make any provision
with respect to acquisition and termination of citizenship
and all other matters relating to citizenship.
I agree with the contention raised on behalf of the respopdent that it is not reasonably possible to read into these
articles of the Constitution any intention that an artificial
person might also be a citizen. We also find that the Citizenship Act, 1955, which was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the powers preserved to it by Art. 11 of the Constitution, expressly excludes from its benefit "any company
or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated
or not." A Corporation is not a citizen under the Citizenship Act, 1955, nor is a corporation as such a citizen under
the constitutional provisions on the question of citizenship.
From this it seems an easy step to say : Arts. 5 to 11 do not
make the corporation a citizen; the Citizenship Act does
not make the corporation a citizen; there is no other Indian
law that makes the corporation a citizen; and so the problem is solved : corporation is not a citizen for the purpose
of fundamental rights.
That, according to the respondent, should end the
search for light. I am unable to agree. After all it is a
constitution that we are interpreting and it has again and
again been laid down that those on whom falls this task
have to take a broad and liberal view' of what has been
provided and should not rest content with the mere grammarians' role. If, as is undoubtedly true, a syllogistic or
mechanical approach of construction and interpretation of
statutes should always be avoided, it is even more important when we construe a Constitution that we should not
proceed mechanically but try to reach the intention of the
-
...
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
own right citizens of India form themselves into a private
company, or seven or more persons, each of whom is a
The State
Trading Corpo- citizen in his own right, form a public incorporated comration of India pany, they are faced with the proposition that the company
Ltd. & Others.
not being a citizen, it is excluded from the right which
v.
they could have claimed.
The CommerIt is well known that many years before 1950 when the
cial Tax Officer,
Constitution
came into force much of the trade and industry
Visakhapatnam
was being carried on.by corporations. Most
of
this
country
and Others.
of these corporations were and are composed of persons
Das Gupta /.
who are clearly citizens of India under the provisions of the
Constitution. The obvious effect of the strictly legalistic
approach that a corporation being an artificial person cannot
be a citizen for the purpose of any of the fundamental
rights even when all its members are citizens of India
would thus be to deny a considerable part-if not the major part of Indian industry and commerce (using the word
"Indian" to mean 'carried on by Indian citizens') the valuable protection of the fundamental rights under Art.
19(l)(f) and (g). No doubt the mere fact that the effect
is inconvenient or even regrettable can be no justification
for a forced construction of a constitutional provision. But
it is permissible, nay proper, often to consider the effect of
proposed construction to find an answer to the question :
was that the intention of the Constitution makers?
What do we find here? In Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) the
Constitution-makers are creating a right intended to be of
great benefit to industry and trade. They decide to restrict
this benefit to only citizens of India. They are aware tllat
much if not most-of the trade and industry carried on
by Indian citizens are carried on by them, after forming
themselves into corporations. They know equally well that
corporations are in law distinct entities from their members
and so the 'State' naturally anxious to extend the domain
where ilie restriction of fundamental right on its powers
does not operate, may well argue iliat corporations even
iliough composed entirely of citizens are not entitled to
fundamental rights. The concern of the Constitutionmakers to imporve the economic condition of the country
is writ large over the Constitution's many provisions. The
question has reasonably been asked .: . why then did not
the Constitution-makers distinctly provide iliat corpora-
-
4 S.C.R.
+·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
tions composed of Indian citizens will be deemed to be
citizens for at least the fundamental rights under Art.
19(1) (£) and (g)? The mystery disappears, however,
if we credit the Constitution-makers with the further
knowledge that in the United States of America when
somewhat similar questions had arisen regarding the
character of corporations composed of citizens of a particular State the courts had not hesitated to apply the
process of what has been called "tearing the veil" and
granted to a corporation composed of citizens of a State
some of the rights of a citizen of that State, inspite of the
fact that the corporation as such is an artificial person distinct from its members. Is it not reasonable to th.ink that
the makers of our Constitution trusted that courts in India
would also not hesitate to apply a similar process of going
under the surface and looking at the composition of the
corporation, in deciding whether the corporation is entitled
to fundamental rights? In my judgment the answer to the
question must be in the affirmative. Indeed I would go
further and say that to take another view is an insult to the
intelligence and understanding of those who drafted the
Constitution.
l am thus clearly of opinion that the Constitutionmakers when they used the word "citizen" in Art. 19
intended that at least a corporation of which all the members were citizens of India would get the benefit of the
fundamental rights enshrined in that Article. The legal
position that the corporation is a distinct entity from its
members does not appear to me to create any real difficulty in the way of giving effect to this intention. The
proposition, viz., that the corporation is a distinct legal
entity from its members is too well established to require
discusion. I see no reason however why the charm of this
legal learning should so hold us captives as to blind us to
the great rule of interpretation of giving effect to the
intention of those who made the law unless the words
make that impossible. I can find nothing in the words
of the Constitution that stand in the way of giving effect
to the intention of the Constitution-makers of giving all
citizens of India, whether forming into a corporation or
not, the benefit of the fundamental rights under Art.
19(1) (f) and (g). Whether the Constitution-makers also
1963
Tlie State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Othm.
v.
The Commercial Tax 0 fficer,
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
Das Gupta /.
162 .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
1963
intended that a corporation of which the major portion
of the interest was held by citizens of India would also
The State
Trading Corpo- get the benefits of the rights, it is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to investigate.
ration of India
Ltd. & Others.
This view of the law was taken, and in my opinion
v.
rightly, by the Bombay High Court in The State.of BomThe Commercial Tar Officer, bay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaughwala('). It is of interest also
Visak hapatnam to mention that in this view of the law it is possible to
and Others.
appreciate what was said by way ol dicta by Mr. Justice
Mukherjea (as he then was) in Chiraniit Lal Choudhuri
Das Gupta /.
v. The Union of India & ors.(") :
"The fundamental rights guaranteed by tlie Constitution are available not merely to individual citizens but to
corporate bodies as well except where the language of the
provision or the nature of the right compels the inference
that they are applicable only to natural persons. An incorporated company, therefore, can come up to this Court
for enforcement of its fundamental rights ...........
In that case the Court had to consider an allegation of
infringement of the fundamental rights not only under Arts.
31and14 but also under Art. 19(1) (£). While the observa·
tions of Mr. Justice Mukherjea may riot perhaps be regarded as a considered decision on the question now before ns,
it is not unreasonable to think that his Lordship felt no
difficulty about extending the fundamental rights under
Art. 19(1)(f) to the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving
Company, the share-holders of which were Indian citizens.
It is proper to mention in this connection that in the
13 years that have rolled by since the Constitution came
into force there have been many cases in which this Court
as also the High Courts have given companies of which the
members were Indian citizens the benefit of fundamental
rights, special to citizens. In some of these cases the question
was sometimes raised whether or not a corporation was a
citizen for the purpose of the fundamental rights hut that
was left unanswered. Among the cases in which relief·
claimed on fundamental rights, specially conferred on
citizens has been granted to corporations may be mentioned:
The Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., v. Union of
( 1)
I.L.R. [1955] Born. 680.
( 2 ) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
•
4 S.C.R.
SCPREME COURT REPORTS
163
1963
India('); The Bengal Immunity Co., v. St:ite of Bihar( );
The Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co., Ltd., v. State of
The State
Bombay(').
Trading CorpoIn my judgment, therefore, the first question referred ration of India
to this Special Bench should be answered in the affirmative. Ltd. & Others.
v.
On the other question that has been referred, I agree
The Commerwith the conclusion of my learned brother Shah J. that the cial Ta:c Officer,
State Trading Corporation is not in substance a department Visakhapatnam
and organ of the Government of India. As I entirely agree
and Others.
with the reasoning on which he has based this conclusion,
Das G11pta J.
I do not propose to discuss the matter further.
For the reasons mentioned above I. would answer the
two questions referred to this Special Bench thus:( 1) The State Trading Corporation, so long as it consists wholly of citizens of India, can ask for enforcement of
the fundamental rights granted to citizens under Art.
19( 1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution;
(2) The State Trading Corporation is not a department
or organ of the Government of India and can claim to
enforce the fundame•1tal rights under Part III of the
Constitution against the State as defined in Art. 12 thereof.
2
.
SHAH J.-On May 18, 1956, the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Company' was
incorporated as a Private Limited Company under the
Indian Companies Act, 1956, with an authorised capital of Rs. 5 crores divided into five hundred thousand
shares of Rs. 100 each. Ninety eight per cent of the
subscribed capital which was contributed out of the
funds of the Government of India stood registered in
the name of the President of India and the remaining
two per cent in the names of two Joint Secretaries in
the Ministry of Commerce & Industries. On February
12, 1961, the Commercial Tax Officer, Vishakhapatnam
assessed the Company in the sum of Rs. 5,79,198.17 nP.
to sales tax in respect of certain transactions and issued
a notice demanding payment of the amount. The Company
and Mr. K. B. Lall, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce
& Industries then petitioned this Court for a writ quashing
the order of the Commercial Tax Officer and the notice
(') [19591 S.C.R. 12.
(S) [1958] S.C.R. 1122.
( 2)
[1955] (2) S.C.R. 603.
Shah /.
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1%3
of demand on the plea that the assessment order and the
notice of demand infringed the fundamental rights of the
The State
Tradint Corpo- petitioners, amongst others, under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g).
At the hearing of the petition; counsel for the Commercial
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. Tax Officer and the State of Andhra Pradesh submitted
v.
that the petition was not maintainable because the Company
The Commer- was not a 'citizen' within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Concial Tax 0 fficer,
V isakhapatnam stitution, and in any event the Company being "an organ,
department or instrumentality" of the Government of
and Others.
India was incompetent to enforce any fundamental right
Shah /.
against the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Coun thereupon
referred the followipg questions to a larger Bench :
"(1) Whether the State Trading Corporation a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act 1956
is a citizen within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution and can ask for the enforcement of fundamental
rights granted to citizens under the said article; and
(2) Whether the State Trading Corporation is notwithstanding the formality of incorporation under the
Indian Companies Act 1956 in substance a department
and organ of the Government of India with the entirety
of its capital contributed by Government and can it
claim to enforce fundamental rights under Part III of
the Constitution against the State as defined in Art.
12 thereof?"
We are not at this stage concerned to deal with any right
which the second petitioner K. B. Lall may have, to maintain the petition, for the questions deal only with the right
of the Company to set up the protection of Art. 19(1)(f)
& (g) of the Constitution.
Article 19 guarantees certain basic freedoms in favour
of citizens : it provides that "(1) All citizens shall have the right( a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
( c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
( e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of
India;
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business."
....
4 S.C.R.
,)
-i--
-
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
165
1963
The fundamental freedoms (exercise whereof is by els. (2)
to ( 6) subject to certain restrictions) being expressly guaThe State
ranteed to citizens, the question which presents itself at the Trading Corpothreshold is whether the Company can claim to be t citizen ration of India
and on that basis claim protection of the freedoms to acquire, Ltd. & Others.
v.
hold and dispose of property, and to carry on any trade,
The
Commeroccupation or business. The plea that a Company incorporacial Tar Officer,
ted under the Indian Companies Act is not a 'citizen' within Visak hapatnam
the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution is advanced
and Others.
principally on two grounds:
Shah ].
(1) That prior to January 26, 1950, there was no law
relating to citizenship in force in India and by Arts. 5
to 10 of the Constitution only natural persons were for
the first time declared citizens. Under the provisions
of the Citizenship Act, 1955, only natural persons may
claim rights of citizenship since the commencement of
the Constitution. The Company which came into existance after the promulgation of the Constitution not
being a citizen under the Citizenship Act, 1955, is therefore incompetent to enforce the rights claimed by it,
for Arts. 5 to 11 constitute an exhaustive code relating
to citizenship in India, and an artificial person not
being of the classes enumerated in Arts. 5, 6 & 8, nor
under the Citizenship Act, 1955 (enacted in exercise of
powers under Art. 11), the claim of the Company to
citizenship must stand rejected; and
(2) Citizenship postulates allegiance to the State of
which a person claims to be a citizen and involves a
duty to serve when called upon in the Civil Administration, and in the defence forces in the maintenance of
peace or defence of the State in an emergency, and an
artificial person being incapable of owing allegiance and
of rendering these services cannot be regarded
as citizen. This argument is based on what is called
the traditional concept of citizenship.
Counsel for the Company submits that citizenship i£
the status which a person endowed wicli full civil and political rights in a State possesses under its municipal law, and
such rights inhere the status of natural and artificial persons alike.
In determining the content of the expression 'citizen'
used in Art. 19, which is defined neither in the Constitution
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
nor in the General Clauses Act, it may, in the first instance,
be useful to consider the scheme under which the diverse
The State
fundamental
rights are declared and guaranteed by Part III
Trading Corpoof the Constitution and the extent of protection afforded
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. against infringement of those fundamental rights. The
v.
Constitution in declaring the fundamental rights uses difThe Commer- ferent expressions to denote the beneficiaries of different
cial Tax Officer,
rights. By Arts. 14, 20(1), (2) & (3), 21, 22(1), (2) & (4),
Visak hapatnam
25(1), 27, 28(3) and 31 certain fundamental rights are
and Others.
declared in favour of persons. By Arts. 16(1) & (2), 26(1)
Shah ].
& (2), 19( 1) and 29(2) citizens are the recipients of fundamental rights guaranteed thereby. Certain fundamental
rights are declared in favour of groups such as denominations, sections, minorities or institutions e.g. Arts. 26, 29(1),
30(1) and 30(2): these would in the very nature of things
be groups of individuals. By certain other Articles prohibitions are declared e.g. 17, 23(1), and 24 and 28(1) for removal of evils, such as untouchability, traffic in human beings,
forced labour, employment of children in hazardous employment, and against imparting of religious instructions in educational institutions. The expression 'citizen' used in Ch.
III has undoubtedly narrower connotation than 'person'.
By Art. 367 of the Constitution read with s. 3( 42) of the
General Clauses Act a "person" includes any company or
association or body of individuals whether incorporated
or not. By declaring rights in favour of persons, it may at
first sight appear that it was intended to confer those rights
upon persons artificial as well as natural. But this presumption is not in fact uniformly true. In Arts. 25(1), 28(3)
and probably Art. 20(3) by the use of the expression "person" having regard to the character of the right conferred
natural persons only could be the beneficiaries of the rights
declared thereby. By Art. 15(1) & (2) prohibitions are imposed against the State in making discrimination between
citizens on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex or place
of birth; els. (I) & (2) of Art. 16 declare equality of opportunity to citizens in matters of public employment, and Art.
18(2) imposes restrictions on citizens against acceptance of
titles from any foreign State. In these Articles, the expression citizen may refer only to a natural persori. But that
cannot be decisive of the meaning of the expression
"citizen" in Art. 19. In ascertaining the meaning of expn:s-
·~
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
1963
sions used in a vital document like the Constitution of a
nation, a mechanical approach would be impermissible. The
The State
Constitution is but the declaration of the will of the people, Trading Corpoand must be interpreted liberally, and not in any narrow ration of India
or doctrinaire spirit. It must be interpreted according to its Ltd. & Others.
v.
true purpose and intent as disclosed by the phraseology in
The
Commerits natural signification in the light of its setting and its dyTax Officer,
namic character which is intended to fulfil the aspirations of cial
Visakhapatnam
the people. There can be little doubt that an artificial person
and Others.
like a Corporation is capable of exercising rights conferred
Shah /.
by els. (a), (c), (f) and (g) of Art. 19(1) and the right to
hold property and the right to carry on trade or business
are two rights of vital importance vested in artificial persons
and a substantial segment of trade and business in India
and abroad is carried on through corporate activity. On
the view that only a natural person having certain attributes under the municipal law may be a citizen, the rights
conf.~rred by Art. 14 (equality before the law and equal
protection of the laws), Art. 27 (freedom from payment
·of taxes for promotion of any particular religion or religious
denomination), Art. 20(1) & (2) (bar against retrospective
operati0n of penal statutes, and rule against double jeopardy)
and Art. 31 (bar against deprivation of property otherwise
than by authority of law) are guaranteed even in the case of
artificial persons, but some of the most cherished rights i.e.
right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to carry
on trade or business of artificial persons may not be protected against executive or legislative action. Was it intended
by the Constituent Assembly when declaring the freedoms
under Art. 19 to make a deliberate departure, and in respect
of rights declared under Art. 19 to restrict the enforcement
thereof against action of the law makers or the executive
only in favour of natural persons and not in favour of
artificial persons r'
It is in this background we may turn to the question
whether, the declaration of citizenship under Arts. 5, G &
8 of the Constitution, and the Citizenship Act, 1955, was
to be exhaustive; or merely to deal with the rights of natural
persons. It may be necessary first to have a true concept of
citizenship and to ascertain whether the common law of
England which formed the foundation of the Indian jurisprudence, attributed to artificial persons prior to the Cons-
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
titution the status of citizens or 'subjects' as it was usual to
call them in a monarchical form of Government.
The Staie
Waite C. J., in Virginia L. Miner v. Reese HapperTrading Corposett(') observed :
ration of lndU.
"There cannot be a nation without a people. The verY'
Lui. l!r Others.
v.
idea of a political community, such as a nation is,.
The Commerimplies an association of persons for the promotion of
dal Ta:r Officer,
their
general welfare. Each one of the persons associaV isakhapatnam
ted
becomes
a member of the nation formed by the
and Others.
association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to i~s
Shah /.
protection. Allegiance, and protect10n are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance.
For convenience it has been found necessary to
give a name to this membership. The object is to
designate by a title the person and the relation he bears
to the nation. For this purpose the words "subject",
"inhabitant" and "citizen" have been used, and the
choice between them is sometimes made to depend
upon the form of the government. Citizen is now more
commonly employed, however, and as it has been considered better suited to the description of one living
under a republican government, it was adopted by
nearly all of the States upon their separation from
Great Britain, and was afterwards adopted in the Articles of Confederation and in the Constitution of the
United States. When used in this sense it is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a.
nation, and nothing more."
In the Digest of lnternatiortal Law (J. B. Moore) Vol. III,.
1906 Edn. at p. 273, it is stated:
"Citizenship, strictly speaking, is a term of municipal
law, and denotes the possession within the particular
state of full civil and political rights, subject to special'
disqualification, such as minority or sex. The condi-tions on which citizenship is acquired are regulated by·
municipal law."
In Oppenheim's International Law (Lauterpacht) Vol. I:
p. 644 it is stated:
( 1)
21 Wall. 162 : 88 U.S. 627.
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
"In the United States of America, while the expressions 'citizenship' and 'nationality' are often used
interchangeably, the term 'citizen' is, as a rule, employed to designate persons endowed with full political and personal rights within the United States,
while some persons-such as those belonging to territories and possessions which are not among the States
forming the Union-are described as 'nationals'. They
owe allegiance to the United States and are United States nationals in the contemplation of International Law; they do not possess full rights of
citizenship in the United States
In the British Commonewealth of Nations it is the
citizenship of the individual States of the Commonwealth which is primarily of importance for International Law, while the quality of a 'British subject' or
'Commonwealth citizen' is probably relevant only as
a matter of the Municipal Law of the countries concerned."
Citizenship and nationality emphasize different facets
of a single concept of association with or membership of a
political community. The form and content of the association have varied in their historical evolution with the
complexion of the governmental machinery, but in essence
they denote the relation which a person bears to the sovereign authority. Citizenship is the relation that a person
bears to the State in its national or municipal aspect; nationality appertains to the domain of International Law, and represents the political status of a person, by virtue of which
he owes allegiance to a particular sovereign authority.
'Citizen' and 'national' are frequently used as interchangeable terms, but the two terms are not synonymous.
Citizenship in most societies is the highest political status
in the State, it is employed to denote persons endowed with
full political and civil rights. There are in some States
nationals who though owing allegiance, lack citizenship
such as those belong to colonial possessions which are not
included within the metropolitan territory, and do not
participate in the Government. Even in States where association of nationals in the governmental machinery does
not exist or is too tenuous to be effective, the national endowed with capacity to exercise personal and political
12-2 S. C. India/64
1963
The Sta~
Trading Corporation of lntlia
Ltd. & Otflers.
v.
The Commercial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
Shah /.
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
1963
rights may be called a citizen. Again there may be citizens
even in States having a form of government, which permits
The State
Trading Corpo- an effective association of its citizens with the administraration of India tion, who do not participate in the government, or who by
reason of sex, minority or personal disqualification
Ltd. & Others.
v.
are incompetent or are unable to participate. Citizenship
The Commer- is therefore membership of a jural society investing the
cial Tax Officer, holder with all the rights and privileges which are
V isakhapatnam
normally enjoyed by its nationals, and subjecting him to
and Others.
corresponding duties; nationality is the link between a
Shah ].
person and a State, ensuring that effect be given to his
rights in international affairs. Every citizen is a national,
but every national is not always a citizen. The tie which
binds the national and the citizen is the tie of allegiance
to the State; it arises by birth, naturalisation or otherwise
in a political society which is called a State, Kingdom or
Empire.
Under the English common law, a company or a
corporation aggregate is regarded as possessing attributes
which would make it a national of the State in which it
was incorporated and the incapacity of a corporation aggregate to discharge obligations such as performance of military
or civil service, or to exercise franchise, has not been held to
be a bar to the recognition of its status as a national of the
State of its incorporation. This is reflected in the judicial
decisions that public corporations aggregate are nationals
of the country of incorporation, irrespective of the nationality of the share-holders. The English Statute Law did not
regulate the nationality of Corporations, but the decisions of
the highest tribunals regarded them for certain purposes
as capable of possessing all the attributes of nationality. In Janson v. Driefontain Consolidated Mines Ltd.(')
the House of Lords regarded a company registered under
the laws of the South African Republic as a national of
that State. The observations of Lord Macnaghten at p.
497, of Lord Davey at p. 498, of Lord Barmpton p. 501 and
of Lord Lindley at p. 505 proceed on the view that the Company concerned in that case was a national of the Republic
of South Africa and the question as to the validity of the
contract of insurance by British underwriters against cap(') L.R. (1902) A.C. 494.
-
.
4 S.C.R.
.J
f
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
1963
ture during transit to the United Kingdom by the foreign
State before declaration of war was valid. Similarly
The State
Attorney General v. Jewish Colonization Association(') Trading Corpowas decided on the footing that a public Corporation is ration of India
capable of nationality, and in Generali v. Selim Cotrap( 2 ) Ltd. & Others.
v.
it was accepted that a public Corporation has the attributes
The
Commer·
of nationality. In Gasque v. Commissioners of Inland
cial Tax Officer,
Revenue(') Macnaughten J., observed :
Visak hapatnam
"But by analogy with a natural person the attributes
and Others.
of residence, domicile and nationality can be given,
Shah /.
and are, I think, given by the law of England to a
body corporate. It is not disputed that a company
formed under the compaines Acts, has British nationality, though, unlike a natural person, it cannot change
its nationality."
In Kuenigi v. Donnersmarck(') it was held that a company
incorporated under the laws of England and registered in
England and so having an English domicile, and by analogy, British nationality, did not cease by English law to be
an English company subject to English law merely because
iL was under enemy control. Mc. Nair J. observed at
p. 535:
'I think that it is also clear that, in so far as nationality can by analogy be supplied to a juristic person, its
nationality is d!;termined in an inalienable manner
by the laws of the country from which it derives its
personality."
The personality of a Corporation aggregate therefore
springs from the laws of the country in which it is incorporated, and upon that personality is impressed the nationality of that country, for the Corporation is by virtue of the
law i°:cor~orating it capable of exercising rights, is subject
to obligations and by common acceptance is entitled to
claim protection in international affairs of the State of its
incorporation.
If a Corporation aggregate is a national, can it be regarded as a citizen? According to our law a juridical person. may normally exercise all civil rights except those
which from the _nature of its constitution or of the rights,
cannot be exercised or enforced by the Corporation. A
1
( )
3
( )
[1901] 1 K.B. 123.
L.R. [1940] 2 K.B. 80.
( 2 ) L.R. (1932) A.C. 288.
(') L.R. (1955] 1 Q.B. 515.
172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
juridical person may acquire, hold and dispose of property,
carry on trade or business, take up residence within the terriThe State
tory
and form associations. It is also liable to discharge obliTrading Corpogations
which the nature of its incorporation permits. There
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. are no special restrictions placed upo!1 its activity and upon
v.
exercise of its rights in its corporate character. It is capable
The Commer- of exercising to the fullest extent a large majority of civil
cial Tax Officer,
rights which natural persons may exercise as citizens, its
Visakhapatnam
incapacity to exercise others arises from the nature of its
and Others.
personality and constitution and not from any special resShah /.
triction imposed upon it. Undoubtedly franchise cannot be
exercised by the Corporations but the capacity to exercise
franchise is not a sine qua non of citizenship. The State
normally affords to Corporations protection as to its nationals abroad and recognises i.ts corporate character with capacity to exercise rights within the realm. In the matter of
protection, the law makes no distinction between natural
persons and artificial persons like corporations. Was it then
intended by the Constitution which afforded protection of
the widest amplitude in favour of Corporations as well as
'
natural persons against discrimination under Art. 14, against
deprivation of property under Art. 31(1), against compulsory acquisition or, requisition of property for purposes not
public and without payment of compensation under Art.
31(2), against imposition of taxes the proceeds of which
are specifically appropriated for payment of expenses for
maintenance of a particular religion or religious denomination under Art. 27, against being subjected to taxation without authority of law under Art. 265, and to the freedom
of trade, commerce and intercourse, subject only to the
provisions of Part XIII, still did not guarantee the right to
carry on business of trade, to acquire, hold, and dispose of
property and the right to form associations, or the right
to take up residence of its choice within the territory?
Unless the language or the scheme of the Constitution is
so compulsive, it would be difficult to reach that conclusion, on any predilection as to a limited connotation of
the expression citizen occurring in Art. 19(1). It may be
remembered that Constitutional practice is not inconsistent with the recognition of artificial persons a~ c!tizens. The Constitution of the United States of Max1co
1917, of El Salvador 1950, and of the Spanish People
r
4 S.C.R.
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
17.3
1963
do recognise the status of Corporations as citizens. It
was also not disputed at the Bar and could not reasonThe State
ably be disputed that it was open to the Constitution- Trading Corpomakers, and the Parliament of India to make express provi- ration of India
sions declaring artificial persons as citizens of India.
Ltd. 1!1 Others.
v.
But it is urged that the intention of the ConstitutionThe
Commermakers was not to recognise the corporate character of a
Company as a citizen. It is said that the provisions of Arts. cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
5, 6 and 8 and the law made under Art. 11 in matters
and Others.
post-constitutional, are exhaustive of the conferral of the
right of citizenship and there can be no citizen who does
Shah /.
not satisfy the prescribed requirements. A necessary corollary of that thesis is that there were no citizens in India
before the Constitution-natural or artificial-and it was by
the Constitution and the Citizenship Act, 1955, that only
natural persons are made citizens and no one else.
To examine the validity of this assumption, it is necessary to examine carefully the relevant provisions of the
Constitution and the material provisions which preceded
the Constitution. It must be conceded that persons mentioned in Arts. 5 ( 1), 5 (b), 6 and 8 are natural persons and
the expression 'person' in the context of those provisions
does not include artificial persons. Clause ( c) of Art. 5
refers to persons resident within the territory of India for
not less than five years, and it may be presumed that this
clause was also intended to apply to natural persons. Similarly by the definition contained in s. 2(f) of the Citizenship
Act, 1955, the Act is made applicable only to natural persons. But the assumption that there were in India prior
to January 26, 1950, no citizens, and citizenship rights were
conferred for the first time by the Constitution is not warranted either by the language used in the Constitution, or
the history of our national evolution. The status of British
Indians prior to 1947 was governed by the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914. They were regarded as
British subjects, and entitled in British India to such rights
and privileges as were ,accorded to British nationals in India. Their status as British subjects was analogous to the
status of citizens of a republic. They exercised civil rights,
and such political rights as the form of Government permitted. If a citizen is a national who under the law of the
state is entitled to enforce full civil and political rights,
·174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
British Indian subjects prior to the Constitution had within
the territory of British India that quality of rights which
The State
Trading Corpo- would go to make them citizens. Similarly the subjects of
the Indian States had the rights of citizenship within their
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. own States, and those rights were not 'affected by the standv.
still and merger agreements of their rulers with the DomiThe Commer- nion of India. The thesis being merely to establish the
cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam existence of rights which were analogous to rights of citizenship prior to the enactment of the Constitution, it is
and Others.
unnecessary to enter upon a detailed examination of the conShah /.
stitutional developments which took place between August
1947, and the 26th of November, 1949, which culminated
in the setting up of the Republic of India by the erstwhile
British Indian subjects and the subjects of the Indian States.
It may be sufficient to observe that before the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Legislature was invested with the
power to confer upon foreigners rights as British Indians
by naturalization, and had also sought to invest the Government of the day with power to deny entry into India to
foreigners or even of nationals of British possessions. Part
II of the British Nationality & Status of Aliens Act, 1914,
relating to the naturalization of aliens was not extended to
British India, though Parts I & III were intended to apply
to all territories which formed part of the British empire
subject to the provisions of s. 26 of the Act which preserved
the power of Colonial or Dominion Governments and Legislatures to legislate on the subject of nationality and to
safeguard .the validity of laws passed by them relative to
the treatment of different classes of British subjects. Under
the Act of 1914 the place of birth within the British empire
was determinative of British nationality, but power was reserved to the Dominions and the Colonies by legislation to
make provision for naturalization restricted to their territory. The British Indian legislature in 1926 enacted the Indian Naturalization Act, 1926, which enabled the local Governments to grant certificates of naturalization to persons
applying in that behalf and satisfying the local Government on matters specified therein. Power was also reserved
to revoke the certificates of naturalization. The Legislature
also enacted the Immigration into India Act, III of 1924,
which authorised the Central Government to make rules for
the purpose of securing that persons not being of Indian ori-
. ...
,.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
175
1963
gin, domiciled in any British Possession, shall have no
greater rights and privileges, as regards entry into and resiThe State
dence in British India than are accorded by the law and ad- Trading Corpaministration of such possession to persons of Indian domicile. ration of India
The effect of these statutory provisions was-subject to cer- Ltd. & Others.
v.
tain exceptions to recognize the right of British subjects in
The
CommerIndia and to approximate them to the rights of citizenship,
to grant such rights by naturalization and to restrict immi- cial Tax Officer,
Visak hapatnam
gration into India. The British Nationality Act, 1948, was
and Others.
enacted after the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and wa!
not incorporated in the stream of the statute law in India.
Shah /.
The effect of that Act was to create a new statutory concept
of citizenship of the various constituent units of the British
Commonwealth and to provide for a dual citizenship, citizenship of the country in which the local community resided
within the units and of the Commonwealth. The concept of
allegiance which was the foundation of the status of a subject, was excluded from the rules governing local citizenship. The Act contemplated the passing of Citizenship
Acts by various Dominions and till the enactment of such
Acts accorded to the citizens potential or actual of any Dominion (which expression included India) the status of
Commonwealth citizen. In relation to this citizenship, allegiance to the British Crown was not a condition.
This brief review of the legislative history is sufficient
to destroy the assumption that the status of citizenship
was not recognized under the common law operative in
India prior to January 26, 1950, for, in my judgment, British
subjects of Indian origin held for all purposes the status
in British India of citizens. That status arose by birth and
could also be conferred by naturalization.
If a natural person could be a citizen prior to November
26, 1949 (the day on which by Art. 394, Arts. 5 to 9 came
into force), there is no reason to suppose that artificial
persons who were nationals of the British Empire and who
could claim the protection abroad could not claim rights
of citizenship within the territory of India, when they were
in fact exercising all the rights and privileges which natural
persons who were citizens exercised, except those which
by their incorporation they could not exercise. There was
before the Constitution no statute which indicated even indirectly that a Corporation aggregate could not be a citizen.
176
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
[1964]
At the time when the Constitution of the United States
of America was proclaimed, no citizenship laws were enThe State
Trading Corpo- acted, but rights of citizenship were recognized under diverse provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. The American Constitution recognised even without any
v.
express statute law, citizenship of States, and also of the
The CommerUnion. Under the Constitution of the United States of
cial Tax Officer,
America,
the expression "citizen" has been given different
V isak hapatnam
meanings
under diverse Articles. In some clauses the expresand Others.
sion "citizen" meant only natural persons, in others it inShah f.
cluded artificial persons like Corporations. Though Constitution as originally proclaimed was silent upon the
subject, corporations were regarded as citizens of the
State of their incorporation for the purpose of federal
jurisdiction. Initially no corporation was regarded according to the decisions of the Court in the United
States as a citizen within the meaning of Art. 3 s. 2 :
The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux et(').
But this view was modified in a later case : The
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Company
y. Thomas W. Letson('). This case arose on the interpretation of the "diversity clause" in Art. 3 s. 2. In neither of
these cases was the capacity of corporations to be citizens of
the State in which they were incorporated, denied. For
the purpose of the 14th Amendment which prohibits a
State from making or enforcing any law which abridged
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,
an individual alone was regarded as a citizen : Orient lnsu:rance Company v. Robert E. Daggs(') and Bankers Trust
.Company v. Texas & Pacific Railway( 4 ). In cases arising
under Art. 4 s. 2 it was also held that a corporation could
not be regarded as a citizen of a State other than the State
of its incorporation. In Paul v. Virginia(') Field J. delivering the opinion of the Court observed at p. 359. :
"But in no case which has come under our observation,
either in the State or Federal Courts, has a corporation been considered a citizen within the meaning of
that provision of the Constitution which declares that
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
( 1)
3 L.Ed. 38.
172 U.S. 552.
(5) 75 U.S. 357.
( 3)
( 2 ) 11 L.Ed. 353.
( 4 ) 241 U.S. 295.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
States."
J
1963
The State
The learned judge however made it clear that he was res- Trading Corpotricting the observations only to the claim of citizenship ration of India
Ltd. & Others.
made. by a Corporation in a State other than the State which
v.
incCt'"porated it. On p. 360 he observed :
The Commer"
. a grant of corporate existence is a grant cial Tax Officer,
of special privileges to the corporators, enabling them V isakhapatnam
and Others.
to act for certain designated purposes as a single individual, and exempting them (unless otherwise specially
Shah f.
provided) from individual liability. The corporation
being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal
existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where
created.
Having no absolute right of recognition in other States,
but depending for such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts upon their assent, it follows, as a
matter of course, that such assent may be granted upon
such terms and conditions as those States may think
proper to impose."
It may be noticed that corporations have been regarded as
persons within the meaning of the 14th Amendment and
therefore they cannot be deprived of their property or rights
without due process of law : Smyth v. Ames(') and Kentucky Finance Corporation v. Paramount Auto Exchange
Corporation ( 2 ). Our Constitution has not accepted the
doctrine of due process as a test for protection of fundamental freedoms, but has sought to effectuate protection
of those freedoms by the 19th Article.
In this Court there has been no definite expression of
opinion about the rights of corporations aggregate to enforce the fundamental freedoms under Art. 19 of the Constitution, though it seems to have been consistently assumed
that corporations aggregate are entitled to claim protection of the Courts against violation of fundamental freedoms enumerated in Art. 19(1). In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India('), Mukherjea J., observed :
"The fundamenal rights guaranteed by the Cons(1) 169 U.S. 466.
( 2 ) 262 U.S. 544.
3
( ) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 893.
178
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
- 1963
titution are available not merely to individual citizens
but to corJ;Jorate bodies as well except where the lanThe State
guage
of the provision or the nature of the right comTrading Corpo'
pels
the
inference that they are applicable only to naturation of India
Ltd. & Others.
ral persons. An incorporated company, therefore, can
v.
come up to this court for enforcement of its fundamenThe Commertal rights and so may the individual shareholders to encial Tax Officer,
force
their own, but it would not be open to an indiviVisakhapatnam
to complain of an Act which affects.
dual
shareholder
and Others.
the fundamental rights of the company except to the
Shah /.
extent that it constitutes an infraction of his own rights
as well."
In that case an individual shareholder petitioned this Court
for the issue of a writ declaring that the Sholapur Spinning
and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act
(XXVIII of 1950) which enacted that the managing agents
of the Company stood dismissed and the Directors automatically vacated their office, and which authorised the Government to appoint new Directors and restricted the rights
of shareholders in the matter of voting and appointment of
Directors, passing resolutions and applying for winding
up and which further authorised the Government to mo-dify the Indian Companies Act was ultra vires the legislative authority of Parliament, in that it infringed the funda-mental rights of the shareholders and the action taken there-under infringed the shareholders' fundamental rights under
Arts. 19(1)(f), 31 and 14 of the Constitution. The Court
in that case dismissed the petition holding that the funda-·
mental rights of the petitioner under Art. 31(1) & (2),
19(l)(f) and 14 were not infringed. The observations of
Mukherjea J., cannot be regarded as an expression of a
considered opinion of the Court holding that all fund:imental rights are enforceable by individual citizens as well
as corporate bodies. The question was mooted in two later
cases: The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd v. The State of
Bihar(') and The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala('). It may be pointed out that the High Court
of Bombay in The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalia(') held that an application at the instance of a·
corporation alleging infringement of a fundamental right·
(') [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603.
( 2 ) [1957] S.C.R. 874.
(') l.L.R. [1955] Born. 680.
r
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
1963
to carry on business was maintainable . Again in The State
of West Bengal v. The Union of India(') Sinha C.J., in
The State
delivering the judgment of the majority observed :
Trading Corpo"The fundamental rights are primarily for the protec- ration of India
tion of rights of individuals and Corporations enfor- Ltd. & Others.
v.
ceable against executive and legislative action of a govn
The
Commerernmenta! agency.
.
.
.
.
.
cial Tax Officer,
It may be pointed out that there have been scores of cases in V isakhapatnam
this Court in which it has been assumed without contest
and Others.
that a company is a citizen, and competent to enforce funShah f.
damental rights under Art. 19(1) (f) & (g) of the Constitution, I propose only to set out a short illustrative list of
cases picked up at random
(1) [1955] 1. S. C.R. 752
(2) [1959] S. C.R. l
Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v.
State of Ajmer.
Messrs Kasturi and Sons (Private) Ltd. v. Shri N. Salivateesy.,raran.
(3) [1959] S. C.R. 12
(4) [1960] 2 S. C.R. 408
(5) [1960] 3 S. C.R. 528
(6) [1961] 1 S. C.R. 379
(7) A. I. R. 1963 S.C. 548
Express Newspapers (Private)
Ltd. v. Union of India.
Messrs Fedco (P) Ltd. & Another v. S. M. Bilgrami.
M/S Hathisingh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.
Union of India.
Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v.
S. R. Sarkar.
State Trading Corporation of
India Ltd. v. The State of
Mysore.
There have arisen a number of cases in the High Courts
in which conflicting views have been expressed. In the
Narasaraopeta Electric Corporation Ltd. v. The State of
Madras( 2 ) the Madras High Court held that Art. 19(1)(£)
applies only to citizens and a company incorporated under
the Indian Companies Act does not satisfy the requirements
of the definition of citizen in Art. 5. This case reached the
Supreme Court in Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. A Nageswara Rao('), but the question whether
the fundamental right could be enforced by a company was,
it appears, not raised. In fupiter General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajgojalan(4), it was held by the Punjab
[1964] I S.C.R. 371.
(') [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1066.
( 1)
( 2 ) A.LR. 1951 Mad. 979.
(') I.LR. [1952] Punjab I.
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
1963
High Court that a company cannot raise the question that
an impugned legislation takes away or abridges the rights
The State
Trading Corpo- conferred by Art. 19(1) (f) & (g) of the Constitution,
ration of India because a company is not a citizen. In A mrita Bazar PatriLtd. & Others. ka Ltd. v. Board of High School and Intermediate Educav••
tion U.P.(') a single judge of the Allahabad High Court
The Commer- held that Art. 5 applied to natural-born persons and not to
cial Tax Officer,
J!isakhapatnam artificial persons and hence a corporation is not a citizen
within the meaning of Art. 19. But the Rajasthan High
.and Others.
Court in Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd. v. State of
Shah ].
Rajasthan(') assumed that the question whether a corporation was a citizen for the purpose of Art. 19 was generally decided in Chairanjitlal Chowdhuri's case(") and held
that a corporation was entitled to raise by a petition under
Art. 226 a plea of a breach of a fundamental right
under Art. 19. Authorities in the Calcutta High Court
appear to be somewhat conflicting. In Everett Orient
Line Incorporated v. fasjit Singh( 4 ) it was held that the
rights conferred by Art. 19 being granted only to citizens,
non-citizens could not enforce such rights and the
Company incorporated in India not being a citizen could
not challenge the validity of ss. 52"A and 167(12-A) of
the Sea Customs Act on the ground that those provisions
infringed Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The same
view was affirmed in Cherry Hoisery Mills Ltd. v. S. K.
Chose('). It was held in that case that a company
was not entitled to enforce the fundamental rights
granted under Art. 19, which are available only to citizens. But it was held in M / s T. D. Kumar l!lnd Brothers
Private Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Controller(") that a corporation ordinarily resident in India for a period exceeding
five years prior to the commencement of the Constitution
being a person was a citizen within the provisions of Art.
5 ( c) of the Constitution and entitled to enforce fundamental rights under Art. 19(1), but a company incorporated after J;muary 26, 1950, will not be regarded as a citizen, for the Citizenship Act expressly excludes artificial
persons from the benefit of citizenship rights. In recording this conclusion the earlier judgment of the Calcutta
( 1)
( 3)
A.LR. 1955 All. 595.
[1950] S.C.R. 869, 893.
(') A.LR. 1959 Cal. 397.
2
LL.R. [1953] Raj. 363.
A.LR. 1959 Cal. 237.
(') A.LR. 1961 Cal. 258.
(
)
( 4)
r
4 S.C.R.
..... -
/
l
.,.,j
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
181
1963
High Court in Liberty Cinema v. The Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta(') was referred to, and it was
The State
pointed out that in the group of cases which were Trading Corpothen heard relief was granted to petitioners some of ration of India
whom were corporations claiming that their fundamen- Ltd. & Others.
v.
tal rights were infringed.
The CommerIn The State of Bombay v. RM.D. Chamarbaug- cial Tax 0 fficer,
wala(2) in considering whether a company incorporated Visakhapatnam
and Others.
under the Indian Companies Act prior to the Constitution
could claim protection of its fundamental rights under
Shah f.
Art. 19(l)(g), Chagla C.J., speaking for the Court observed:
"
. can it be said in the first
place that a corporation can ever be under any circumstances a citizen, and if it can be so said,
what must be the constitution of the corporation
before it could be said that it is a citizen? "Citizen"
has not been defined by the Constitution and the only
provision which is relevant is the provision contained
in Art. 5. But that article only deals with the citizenship at. the commencement of the Constitution and it
lays down who was a citizen at the commencement
of the Constitution.
. although domicile is a question of
private international law, rights and acquisition of
citizenship is a creation of municipal law and it
is only Parliament by municipal law that can determine who is a citizen. It would be perfectly
competent to Parliament by legislation to provide that
a corporation satisfying certain conditions should be
deemed to be a citizen for the purpose of Art. 19(1)
but Parliament has not done so. But the very curious
anomaly that arises is that when we turn to some of
the provisions of Art. 19(1) it is impossible to contend that it could ever have been the intention of the
Constituent Assembly that the rights guaranteed by
those provisions were not to apply to corporations
but on! y to individual citizens. Take two of the
rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(£) and (g). Can
it be suggested that a corporation which, let us
1
( )
A.LR. 1959 Cal. 45.
(2) I.L.R. [ 1955] Born. 680.
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
1963
assume, is Indian in every sense of its term-its
shareholders are Indians, its directors are Indians,
The State
its
capital is Indian-that such a corporation should
Trading Corponot
have the right under cl. (f) to acquire, hole\
ration of India
and dispose of property, or under cl. (g) to pracLtd. & Others.
v.
tise any occupation, trade or business?"
The CommerIn The Assam Company Ltd. v. The State of As..
cial Tax Officer,
sam
(')
the High Court of Assam proceeded to consider
Visakhapatnam
claim
for protection of fundamental rights under Art.
the
and Others.
19(1)(f) on the assumption that a corporation could seek
Shah T.
to enforce those rights.
In Reserve Bank of India v. Palai Central Bank
Ltd.(2) Raman Nayar J. observed:
"Many of the rights in Art. 19( 1) and, in particular those in clauses (f) and (g) thereof, are capable of
enjoyment by companies. Our Constitution-makers
could not have been unaware of the existence of legal
persons. By Article 19(1) ( c) they gave all "citizens
the right to form associations and unions, and it
could not have been their intention that the corporate bodies so formed by citizens, should be denied the rights guaranteed to the individual citizens, in particular that the agencies through which
a substantial portion of their business is conducted
by the citizens of this country and a considerable
portion of their property held, ·should not have the
protection of clauses (f) and (g).
That would mean a denial of the fundamental
rights to property and occupation not merely to
companies but to all corporate bodies even though
they may be Indian in every sense of the term, their
members Indian, directors Indian, and capital Indian, a
denial which virtually amounts to a denial of those
fundamental rights to the citizens who (though, of
course, different persons) really constitute those
bodies."
The Palai Central Bank's case(') was carried to this
Court in appeal, and the Court entered upon an exhaustive discussion of the complicated questions raised
(') A.LR. 1953 Assam 177.
( 2 ) I.L.R. [1961] Kerala 166.
I
,
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
therein, instead of disposing of the appeal on the limited ground that the Palai Bank was not a citizen and
could not claim any fundamental rights under Art.
19(1)(f) and (g): foseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel v.
Reserve Bank of India(').
1963
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
It was submitted that he alone can be a citizen who T lte Commercan take an oath of allegiance to the State because the cial Tax Officer,
bond of citizenship arises by virtue of the allegiance which Virakhapatnam
and Othert.
the citizen bears to the State. Municipal laws of various
States do insist upon an oath of allegiance being taken on
Shah /.
naturalisation, but the actual swearing of an oath of
allegiance is not one of the conditions which go to
make or constitute the right of citizenship. Children
of Indian citizens become citizens by their birth and taking
of oath or even capacity to swear an oath of alleggiance is not predicated as a condition of citizenship. If
allegiance may be presumed from birth and the requirement of taking a formal oath of allegiance is not a condition of citizenship the law proceeding upon a presumption
of allegiance in respect of natural persons, I see no reason
why such a presumption of allegiance may not be made in
respect of artificial persons like corporations.
It was also submitted that corporations are incapable
of rendering military service, or to assist in the maintenance of peace when called upon to serve the State. But that
again, in my view, is not a ground on which the rights
of citizenship could be denied. Incapacity to render service may arise on account of diverse causes such as infancy,
physical or mental incapacity, and such incapacity in the
case of a natural person will not deprive him of the rights
of citizenship. By reason of their constitution, artificial persons are incapable of rendering service-military or civilbut that may not by itself be a ground for holding that
they cannot be citizens. If the corporations or artificial
persons can be regarded as nationals of the State where they
are incorporated and if they are permitted to exercise the
various functions for which they are constituted and no prohibition is imposed upon them in the enforcement of the
rights similar to those which are enforceable by natural per(1) A.LR. 1962 S.C. 1371.
184
1963
The State
Trading Corporation of India
Ltd. & Others.
v.
The Commer·
cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
and Others.
Shah ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
sons who are citizens, notwithstanding the special character
of the corporations and their incapacity to perform duties
or to exercise such other rights which natural persons may
possess, it will not be a ground for depriving them of the
rights of citizenship for enforcing the fundamental rights
under Art. 19.
Two views are presented before us as to the meaning
of the expression "citizen" used in Art. 19(1). On the one
hand it is said that a citizen is a person natural or artificial
who is entitled to all the rights which are capable of being
enjoyed by the citizens under the municipal law as distinguished from persons who are aliens or persons who are not
competent to exercise such rights. The distinction, according to this view, springs from the capacity to exercise the
rights-whether the body which exercises the rights is
a natural person or an artificial person. The other view is
that citizens are only natural persons who being national
and not aliens are under the municipal law competent to
exercise all the rights which the State permits. This view
proceeds on the assumption that an artificial person can
never be a citizen and it is only the natural persons who
can be citizens. But having regard to the privileges and
duties of nationals competent by the municipal law to exercise full political and civil rights, and also having regard
to the fact that companies invested with important fundamental rights like equality before law, protection
against taking of property without authority of law, pro-tection against acquisition of property without payment of
compensation or without public purpose, protection from
imposition of taxes for sectional purposes, and also having
regard to the fact that the compaines are persons by their
constitution and by the recognition afforded to them are
competent to hold property and to dispose of property and
to carry on trade, business, vocation or occupation and are
Jirotected from levy of taxes without authority of law anrl
aie guaranteed the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse it would be difficult to hold that the expression
"citizen" used in Art. 19 was intended to have a restricted
meaning of one who is a natural person.
The alternative argument submitted by Mr. Setalvad
based upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in The
4 S.C.R.
.
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
18'5
1963
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chramarbaugwala(') need not
then be considered in any detail. Chagla, C.J., in deliverThe State
ing the judgment of the Court relying upon a number of Trading Corpocases which arose under Art. 3 s. 2 of the Constitution of ration of India
the United States of America expressed the view that it wa8 Ltd. & Others.
v.
open to the Court "to tear the corporate veil" and to look
The
Commerbehind it and if all the shareholders of the corporation are
cial Tax Officer,
found to be citizens, the corporation should not be denied Visakhapatnam
the fundamental rights which each of the shareholders ha8
and Others.
under Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. In reaching that
Shah f.
conclusion the learned Chief Justice relied upon the observation made by Mukherjea J., in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury's case(') which have already been set out. I am however unable to agree with the principle enunciated by the
learned Chief Justice. A corporation is distinct from the
shareholders who constitute it. The theory of corporate
existence independent of shareholders, and its capacity to
exercise rights has been built on Salomon v. Saloman and.
Company Ltd.( 3 ). The rights and obligations of the company are different from the rights and obligations of the
shareholders. By action taken against the company, the
shareholders may be indirectly affected because their interest in the capital of the company is reduced. But action taken against the company does not directly affect the
shareholders. The company in holding its property and
carrying on its business is not the agent of the shareholders.
Mukherjea J. in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury's case (') pointed out the difference in the passage already quoted between the rights of the company and the shareholders. Even
if a company consists of shareholders who are all Indian
citizens, the company has still a distinct personality and an
infringement of the rights of the company alone will not
furnish a cause of action to the share holders. The doctrine
of w~at is called ripping open the Corporate veil was evolved by American jurists in dealing with cases under the
"diversity of jurisdiction" clause to enable companies constituted within one State to have recourse to the Federal
Courts in respect of disputes arising in other States as citizens. If the company is not a citizen it would be difficult to
found a claim upon this doctrine attributing the status <Ji
1
( )
3
( )
l.L.R. [1955] Born. 680. ( 2 ) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 893.
L.R. (1897) A.C. 22.
13'-2 S. C. India/64
•
186
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
citizenship to the company relying upon the status of its
shareholders and thereby to enforce rights of the shareThe State
Trading Corpo- holders as if they were the fundamental rights of the Comration of India pany. In enforcing the rights of the shareholders, as if they
Ltd. & Others. were the rights of the company as envisaged by Chagla C.J.,
v.
numerous practical difficulties may arise. Suppose in the
The Commer·
case of a company a substantial number of shareholders
cial Tax Officer,
though not the majority are aliens, would it be possible
Visakhapatnam
for the Court to attribute right of citizenship to the comand Others.
pany relying upon the citizenship of some of its memShah /.
bers so as to enable it to enforce fundamental rights under Art. 19? Similarly in a case where a company incorporated in India may have a majority of its shareholders
aliens. Would it be possible for the Court to enter upon
an enquiry and to deny the rights of citizenship notwithstanding the place of its incorporation, because a majority
of its members are aliens? The shareholding may vary
from time to time : to-day the shareholding of aliens may
exceed the shareholding of citizens and the next day
the position may be revised. Can it be said that the company
goes on changing its citizenship, according as the shareholding fluctuates between nationals and aliens? If the
place of incorporation and the centre of management of
its affairs do not confer right of citizenship upon the
company, it would be impossible to project the citizenship of the shareholders upon the company so as to enable
it to claim this reflected right and on that basis to claim
relief for breach of fundamental rights.
The first part of the second question raises what is
essentially a question of fact. The State Trading Corporation was, on the date of the petition, functioning under the
direct supervision of the Government of India, the shareholding was in the names of the President and two Secretaries to the Government and its entire subscribed capital was
contributed by the Government of India. But it is a commercial body, incorporated as the Memorandum of Association indicates to organise and undertake trade generally
with State Trading countries as well as other countires in
commodities entrusted to it for such purpose by the Union
Government from time to time and to undertake purchase,
sale and transport of such commodities in India or any
where else in the world and to do various acts for that pur-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
1963
pose. The Articles of Association make minute provisions
for sale and transfer of shares, calling of general meetings,
The State
procedure for the general meetings, voting by members, Trading
CorpoBoard of Directors and their powers, the issue of dividend, ration of India
maintenance of accounts and capitalisation of profits. The Ltd. & Others.
v.
State Trading Corporation has been constituted not by any
special statute or charter but under the Indian Companies The CommerAct as a Private Limited Company. It may be. wound up cial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam
by order of a competent Court. Though it functions under
and Others.
the supervision of the Government of India and its Directors; it is not concerned with performance of any governShah ].
mental functions. Its functions being commercial, it cannot be regarded as either a department or an organ of the
Government of India. It is a circumstance of accident that
on the date of its incorporation and thereafter its entire
share-holding was held by the President and the two Secretaries to the Government of India.
.+
-
Strong reliance was sought to be placed upon the
decision of the House of Lords in Bank Voor Handel En
Scheepvasrt N.V. v. Administration of Hungarian Property(') in support of the contention that the State Trading Corporation, which is the first petitioner in this case,
was merely an agent of the Government of India. That ,
was a case in which after the invasion of Holland in 1940,
certain stocks of gold belonging to a Dutch banking corporation in London were transferred to the Custodian of
Enemy Property, who sold the same and invested and reinvested the proceeds. These investments were subsequent! y
transferred to the Administrator of Enemy Property in the
erroneous belief that they were the property of a Hungarian
national. After the termination of hostilities the Bank obtain~d i;idgment for recovery of the proceeds of sale, together
with mterest or other profits earned thereon. During the
management of the Custodian, tax was paid to the British
Treasury on the income received by him by the sale of the
stocks of gold but the Bank claimed that it was entitled to •
recover a sum equivalent to an amount assessed on the
Custodian as tax in respect of the income of the invested
proceeds of sale and paid by him. The House of Lords
by a majority held that if the Custodian had asserted Crown
1
( )
LR. (1954) 584.
188
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
[1964)
immunity, he would not have been obliged to pay tax on
the income, for the Custodian was a servant or agent of the
The State
Crown
and under the 'trading with the enemy legislation'
Trading Corpothe
Crown
had sufficient interest to enable it to invoke imration of India
Ltd. & Others. munity from tax if it chose to do so even if the Crown had
v.
no beneficial interest in the income. The principle of that
The Commercase, in my judgment, has no application in the present
cial Tax Officer,
case. The Custodian who was constituted a Corporation
Visakhapatnam
sole
was regarded by the House of Lords as entitled in the
and Others.
circumstances of the case to Crown immunity from payShah /.
ment of income-tax.
The question whether the corporation either sole or
aggregate is an agent or. servant of the State must depend
upon the facts of each case. In the absence of any statutory
provision a commercial corporation acting on its own behalf, even if it is controlled wholly or partially by a Government Department, will be presumed not to be a servant or
an agent of the State. The fact that a Minister appoints the
members of the Corporation and is entitled to call for information and to supervise the conduct of the business, does
not make the Corporation an agent of the Government.
Where, however, the Corporation is performing in substance
governmental, and not commercial functions an inference
that it is an agent of the Government may readily be made.
In Tamlin v. Hannaford(') a house had vested by the
operation of the Transport Act, 1947, in the British Transport Commission and the question arose whether the house
could be regarded as owned by the Crown and administered
by the British Transport Commission as Crown's agent.
Denning L.J., pointed out that the Minister of Transport
had extensive powers over the British Transport Commission. The Minister had powers as great as those of a man
who holding all the shares in a private company possesses.
He appointed the Directors i.e. the Members of the Commission and fixed their remuneration. They were bound to
·give him the information he wanted, he was entrusted with
power to give directions of a general nature, in matters
which appeared to him to affect the national interest, as
to which he was the sole judge and the Commissioners were
bound to obey him. Notwithstanding these great powers
( 1)
L.R. (1950) 1 K.B. 18.
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
189
1963
the Corporation could not be regarded as an agent of the
Minister any more than the Company is the agent of the
The State
share-holders or even of the sole shareholder. Denning Trading Corpo·
L. J., observed :
ration of India
"In the eye of the law, the corporation is its own master Ltd. & Others.
v.
and is answerable as fully as any other person or corpoThe
Commer·
ration. It is not the Crown and has none of the immuTax Officer,
nities or privileges of the Crown. Its servants are not cial
Visakhapatnam
civil servants, and its property is not Crown property.
and Others.
It is as much bound by Acts of Parliament as any other
Shah f.
subject of the King. It is, of course, a public authority
and its purposes, no doubt, are public purposes, but it is
not a government department nor do its powers fall
within the province of government."
The assumption underlying the second question that
a department and organ of the Union or the State even if
it is entitled to be called a citizen cannot claim to enforce
fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution against
the "State" as defined in Art. 12 thereof needs to be examined. Assuming that the State Trading Corporation is a department or organ of the Government of India, it is not still
seeking to enforce any fundamental rights against the Union
of India; it is seeking to enforce its rights against the State
of Andhra Pradesh. By Art. 12 of the Constitution the
Union as well as the State of Andhra Pradesh are States.
Assuming that the State Trading Corporation be regarded
as 'the State' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, if it be regarded as a citizen there is nothing in Art. 19
which prohibits enforcement by the citizen of the fundamental rights vested in it. For the apllication of Art. 19, two conditions are necessary-( 1) that the claimant to the protection
of the right must be a citizen and (2) that the right infringed must be one of the fundamental freedoms mentioned
in Art. 19. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the citizen
would, in my judgment, be entitled subject to the restrictions
imposed by the Article to enforce the rights against their
infringement by action executive or legislative by any Government or the Legislature of the Union or the State and
all local or other authorities within the territory of India or
under the control of the Government of India. There is no
warrant for restricting the enforcement of these rights on
some implication that an agent or servant of the State if he
190
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
or it be a citizen cannot enforce the fundamental rights
against another body which can be regarded also as a State
The- State
Trading Corpo· within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution.
In my view, therefore, the first question should be
ration of India
Ltd. & Others. answered in the affirmative, and the first part of the sev.
cond question in the negative. The answer to the second
The Commer·
part of the second question will be as follows : even if
cial Tax Officer,
the State Trading Corporation be regarded as a departVisakhapatnam
ment
Q[ organ of the Government of India, it will, if it
and Others.
be a citizen competent to enforce fundamental rights unShah /.
der Part III of the Constitution against the State as defined
in Art. 12 of the Constitution.
1963
BENGAL NAGPUR COTTON MILLS
July, 30.
11.
BOARD OF REVENUE, MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
.(A. K. SARKAR, M. HrnAYATULLAH AND J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Octroi duty-Agreement-Exempted by former State-Liabi·
lity to pay Octroi duty-Merger of State-If Municipality can levy
after merger.
The Ruler of the former State of Nandgaon established a mill
called Central Provinces Mills Ltd. A firm purchased the said mill
and changed its name to Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. The
ruler and the appellant
company entered into an
agreement on
March 1, 1943. By this agreement the appellant company was
exempred from liability to pay octroi dury to the State or to the
municipality of the area. The ruler bound himself in consideration of certain advantages promised to him Py the mill. In consequence of the said agreement neither the ruler nor the municipality
collected octroi from _the company. On December 31, 1947, the
State merged with the State of Madhya Pradesh. On September
20, 1952, the Municipal Committee passed a resolution stating
therein that this committee would levy octroi duty on the appel~
!ant company as the Darbar Agreement of 1943 was not binding
on this committee.
The appellant challenged this resolution in a
petition under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the Constitution before
the High Court. The High Court dismissed the application and
hence the appeal has been filed in this Court.
Held (i) that the agreement of 1943 cannot be regarded as
la\v as it is in the shape of a contract between both the parties.
\
I
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