PRATIVA BOSE versus KUMAR RUPENDRA DEB RAIKAT & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 May 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 69 | 1963 INSC 148
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 May 1963
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 539/1960
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 69
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 148
Text of the judgment
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
PRATIVA BOSE
1963
I!.
May, JO.
KUMAR RUPENDRA DEB RAIKAT & ORS.
(S.
K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR
DAYAL AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Succession to Estate-Prof>rietor dying intestate leaving a single
heir-Dispute between several claimants-Suit by person out of
possession-Application for taking of security from person in possession-Power of District Judge-Bengal Wills and Intestacy
Regulation V of 1799 ss. 3, 4.
The respondent had brought a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Jalpaiguri for declaration of his title as the sole
heir and successor to his father's impartible estate, which was taken
possession of by his step-mother. That suit was on transfer pending in the High Court. Two other title suits were also pending
in the High Court in which certain agnates were claiming as
successors. The respondent moved an application before the District Judge, Jalpaiguri for the taking of security from the appellant
under s. IV of the Bengal Wills and Intestacy Regulation V of
1799. The District Judge held that the application was barred
under Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act and that s. IV of the
Regulation had no application since it applied only where the
deceased had left several heirs and not one. . The High · Court
found in favour of the respondent on both the points and directed
the District Judge to take security under s. IV. Section IV of the
Regulation is as follows~
"If there be more heirs than one to the estate of a person
dying intestate, and they can agree amongst themselves in the
appointment of a common manager, they are at liberty to take
possession, and the Courts of Justice are restricted from interference, without a regular complaint, as in the case of a single
heir; but if the right of succession to the estate be disputed
between several claimants, one or more of whom may have
taken possession, the Judge, on a regular suit being preferred
by the party out of possession, shall take good and sufficient
security from the party or parties in possession for his or their
compliance with the judgment that may be passed in the suit;
or, in default of such security being given within a reasonable
period, may give possession, until the suit may be determined,
to the other claimant or claimants who may be able to give
such security, declaring at the same time that such possession
is not in any degree to affect the right of property at issue
between the parties; but to be considered merely as an administration to the estate for the benefit of the heirs who may on
investigation be found entitled to succeed thereto."
He/J (Per Hidayatullah, Dayal and Ayyangar JJ.) that the
70
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
£1964]
Regulation was a piece of restrictive legislation and its provisions
should be strictly construed.
Each of the ss. II, III and IV of the Regulation, properly read
and construed, was a complete code by itself and dealt with the
different situations. Section II applied when the deceased died
leaving a will and naming an executor to manage the property, s. III
applied when the deceased died intestate leaving a single heir and
s. IV applied when the deceased died intestate leaving more than
one heir. The provisions of ss. 111 and IV were in no way inconsistent and it was not necessary to construe them together.
r
Cohen v. S. E. Railway, (1877) 2 E. & D. 253, held inapplic-
(
able.
-
The second part of s. IV which provided for taking of security
did not apply to a case such as the present where the deceased
died intestate leaving only one heir entitled to the entire .estate.
It fell within the ambit of s. III of the Regulation.
,
Since the courts have now ample powers under the Indian
Succession Act, 1925, and the Code of Civil Procedure, these pro-.
visions of the Regulation are out of date and should be repealed.
Per S. K. Das and Sarkar J).-Section IV of the Regulation
does not require an application for taking security and the court
can act suo motu. Art. 181 is confined to applications under the
Code of Civil Procedure and it can have no application to the
present application as it is under s. IV of the Regulation and not
under the Code. An application is not under the Code because
the procedure there laid down has to be followed.
Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills, Ltd. [ 1953] S.C.R.
351, applied.
·
The Court of the District Judge is the
proper forum where
In the --absence of an
order under s. 23 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts
Act, 1887, the order contemplated by s. IV can be made only, by a
District Judge and it is not necessary that the suit mentioned in
the section n1ust be pending before him.
the application under s. IV can be made.
Kumar Punyendra Dev v. Kumar Bhairnbendra Deb. (1946)
50 C. W. N. 776, approved.
There is no reason why the Resolution should provide differently for cases of a single heir and cases of more than one heir
and it does not do so. The words "if the right of succession to
the estate is disputed between several claimants" in s. IV includes
a case where a person dies leaving a single heir and several persons
dispute each claiming to be that heir.
There is no rule that if the two parts of a sentence are separated by a semi-colon they cannot deal .with two different states
of affairs and that the latter part must be controlled by the former.
k
4 S.C.R.
71
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Neither does the word "but" between the two parts lead to that
1963
conclusion.
The word 'heirs' in the second part of s. IV n1ust include one
heir.
Section IV of the Regulation, therefore, applied to the case
and the appellant could be called upon to furnish security.
It was not correct to say that s.
IV of the
Prativa Bos~
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Regulation was
impliedly repealed by ss. 192 to 195 of the Succession Act, 1925.
The I Iigh Court had jurisdiction in revision to set aside the
order of the District Judge since he had failed to exercise his
jurisdiction on a n1isinterpretation of the statute and erroneous
view of limitation.
Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Choudhury.
(1949) 76
I. A. 131, applied.
But the power to take the security under s. IV of the Regulation is a discretionary power vested in the District Judge and the
High Court was in error in directing him to do so.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 539 of
1960.
r
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated June 6, 1956, of the Calcutta High Court in Civil
Rule No. 499 of 1955.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. Sen,
S. N. M ukerji and P. K. Bose, for the appellant.
K. B. Bagchi and Sukumar Chose, for the respondents.
May 10, 1%3. The Judgment of M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar
Dayal and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ., was delivered by
Raghubar Dayal J. The separate opinion of S. K. Das
and A. K. Sarkar JJ., was delivered by A. K., Sarkar J.
SARKAR J. Raja Prosanna Deb Raikat, the proprietor of the Baikunthapur Raj Estate, in the district of Jalpaiguri in West Bengal, died intestate on December 4, 1946.
The Raja left behind him a widow, Rani Asrumati Debi,
now deceased and the appellant Prativa Bose, the daughter
by her. Rani Asrumati took possession of the estate on
the Raja's death.
On August 7, 1947, the respondent Rupendra instituted
a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Jalpaiguri,
against Rani Asrumati and certain other agnatic relations
of the Raja for a decl~tion that as the Raja's eldest son
Sarkar /.
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
by. another wife Rani Renchi, he was the sole lawful heir
and entitled to the exclusive possession of the estate which
Prativa Bose'
was
an impartible estate and governed by the rule of priv.
mogeniture,
and for possession and other consequential
Kumar
reliefs. Rani Renchi was a lady belonging to the Lepcha
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
tribe and the respondent Rupendra alleged that the Raja
Others.
had married her according to the Gandharba form. The
suit was contested by Rani Asrumati and the agnatic rela_sa,.kar f.
tions who denied that there had been any marriage between
the Raja and the mother of the respondent Rupendra. The
suit was transferred to the High Court at Calcutta by an
order made on April 12, 1949 under cl. 13 of its Letters
Patent. The respondent Rupendra made an application to
the High Court in that suit for appointment of a receiver
but it was dismissed on July 29, 1952. There was an appeal
from this order but the records do not show that it succeeded. It appears that two agnatic relations, namely, Kumar
Guru Charan and Kumar Jitendra filed suits in the High
Court at Calcutta each claiming title to the estate as the
sole heir of the deceased Raja. All these suits are still
pending.
On January 5, 1954, Rani Asrumati died and thereupon
the appellent Prativa Bose took possession of the estate
claiming
title
to it. Since then she has been and still is
.
.
m possession.
On March 31, 1954, the respondent Rupendra filed
an application under s. 4 of the Bengal Regulation V of
1799 in the Court of the District Judge of Jalpaiguri for
an order calling upon the appellant Prativa Bose to furnish
security for compliance with the judgment that may be
passed in the suit filed by him. The learned District
Judge dismissed the application on two grounds. He first
held that s. 4 of the Regulation did not apply to a case
where a person died intestate leaving a single heir and the
dispute was between several persons claiming to be that
heir. Then he held that the application by the respondent
Rupendra was barred under Art. 181 of the First Schedule
to the Limitation Act.
The Respondent Rupendra moved the High Court
at Calcutta in revision against the order of the learned
District Judge. The High Court disagreed with" the learned
District Judge on both the points and set aside his order
(
4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
and directed him to "exercise his special jurisdiction under
s. 4 of the Regulation and take sufficient security from the
opposite party Prativa Bose." The present appeal is by
Prativa Bose agaimt the order of the High Court.
The object of the Bengal Regulation V of 1799 appears
to have been "to limit the intcrierence of the Zila ..... .
Courts of Diwani Adalat in the execution of wills and
admi;iistration to the estate or pe"ons dying intestate."
The first section is in the nature of a preamble, and so far
as relevant, sets out the object of the Regulation as earlier
stated. Section 2 deals with the case of the death of a
person leaving a will and appointing an executor where
the heir of the deceased is not a disqualified landholder
subject to the superintendence of the Court of Wards. It
states that the executor is to take charge of the estate
without any application to the Judge of the Diwani Ada lat
or any other officer of the Government and it prohibits
the courts of justice from interfering in such cases except
l)n a regular complaint against the executor. Sections 3,
4 and 5 (the last so far as material only) are in the·se
terms:
S. 3 In case of a Hindu, Mussalman or other person
subject to the jurisdiction of the Zila Courts dying
iutestate, but leaving a son or other heir, who, by the
laws of the country, may be entitled to succeed to the
wl10le estate of the deceased, such heir, if of age and
competent to take the possession and management of
the estate, or, if under age or incompetent and not
under the superintendence of the Court of Wards,
his guardian or nearest of kin who, by special appointment or by the law and usage of the country, may be
authorised to act for him, is not required to apply to
the Courts of Justice for permission to take possession
of the estate of the deceased as far as the same can be
done without violence; and the Courts of Justice are
restricted from interference in such cases, except a
regular complaint be preferred.
S. 4 If there be more heirs than one to the estate of
a person dying intestate, and they can agree amongst
themselves in the appointment of a common manager,
they are at liberty to take possession, and the Courts
of Justice are restricted from interference, without a
fi-2 S. C. India/64
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Sarkar /.
_,_
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikl1' 6-
0thers.
Sarkar /.
74
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
=~
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regular complaint, as in the case of a single heir; but
if the· right of· succession · to the estate be disputed
between several claimants, one or more of whom may
have taken possession, the Judge, on a regular suit
being preferred by the party out of possession; shall
take good and sufficient security from the party or
parties in possession for his or their compliance with
the judgment that may be passed in the suit; or, ·in
default of such. security being given within a reasonable period, may give possession, until the suit
may be determined, to the other claimant or claimants who may be able to give such security, declaring at the same time that such possession is not
in any degree to affect the right of property at issue
between the parties ; but to be considered merely as
an administration to the estate for the benefit of the
heirs who may on investigation be found entitled to
succeed thereto.
S. 5 In the event of none of the claimants of the
estate of a person dying intestate being able to give the
security required by the preceding section, and in all
cases wherein there may be no person authorised and
willing to take charge of the landed estate of a person
deceased, the Judge within whose jurisdiction such
estate may be situated (or in which the deceased may
have resided, or the principal part of the estate may
lie, in the event of its being situated within· two or
more jurisdiction) is authorised to appoint an administrator for the due care and management of such
estate, .................... .
Section 6 provides for taking of security from the
administrator appointed under s. 5 and for granting of
allowance to him. Section 7 states that the Judges of the
Zila Court on receiving information that any person within
their respective jurisdiction has died intestate leaving personal property of which there is no claimant are to adpot
measures for the temporary care of the property as mentioned in the section. Section 8, which is the last section
of the Regulation, provides that nothing in the Regulation
is to limit or alter the jurisdiction of the Court of Wards
in certain matters.
~· Sen appearing for the appellant canvassed a numbe1
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4 S.C.It.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
75
''
of points including the two which were decided in favour of
his client by the trial Court. We shall first take up the
question of limitation. It does not seem to us that the
question really arises. Article 181 of the Limitation Act,
1908, prescribes the time within which certain applications
can be made. Section 4, however, does not require any
application before an order calling upon a person to furnish
security can be made under it. The section does not mention any application and it seems to us that it was intended
that the Court should act suo motu. Indeed the Regulation no where requires an application for making any of the
orders for which it provides. Article 181 would have no
operation where no application is required to enable a
court to make an order: see Tlze Oriental Bank Corporation v. f. A. Clzarrio/(1) and Solzan v. Klzalak Singh(').
The present case cannot, therefore, be decided on the
ground that the application by the respondent Rupendra
had been made beyond the time prescribed by Art. 181.
?'
It also seems to us that Art. 181 of the Limitation Act
is inapplicable to the present case for another reason. We
will now assume that s. 4 of the Regulation requires an
application to the Judge before the order mentioned in it
can be made. Now Art. 181 deals with "applications for
which no period of limitation is provided" either in the
Limitation Act or s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The pre-ponderating view adopted by the High Courts in
regard to this article and its corresponding provision in the
earlier Limitation Act of 1877 is that applications mentioned in them are applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only. The reason for this view is that as the article
is in general terms, it must be construed ejusdem generis
and so construed it must be applicable only to applications
under the Code for all the other articles in the Act providing periods of limitation for applications deal with application under the Code. It is however said that the Act was
amended in 1948 and now there are two articles, namely,
Arts. 158 and 178 which deal with applications under the
Arbitration Act and hence, since the amendment, it cannot
be said that all other articles in the Act deal with applications under the Code. It is, therefore, contended that Art.
1
( )
(1886) I.LR. 12 Cal. 642, 650.
( 2 ) (1891) I.LR. 13 All. 78.
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
llupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
'
76
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
181 can no more be construed ejusdem generis and con-
fined to applications under the Code.
We are unable to accept this contention and tliink
v.
that
the view expressed by Das J., in Sha Mulchand &
Kumar
Co.
Ltd.
v. Jawa!tar Mills Ltd. (') puts the matter correctly.
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
The learned Judge said, "It does not appear to us quite
Others.
convincing, without further argument, tl1at the mere
amendment of articles 158 and 178 can ipso facto alter the
Sarkat f.
meaning which, as a result of a long series of judicial
decisions of the differept High Courts in India, came to be
attached to the language used in article 181. This long
catena of decisions may well be said to have, as it were,
added the words 'under tile Code' in the first column of
that article. If tllose words had actually been used articles
158 and 178 certainly would not have affected tile meaning
of that article. If, however, as a result of judicial construction, those words have come to be read into tile first
column as if those words actually occurred therein, we are
not of opinion, as at present advised, that tile subsequent
amendment of articles 158 and 178 must necessarily and
automatically have the effect of altering the long acquired
meaning of article 181 on tile sole and simple ground that
after the amendment the reason on which the old construction was founded is no longer available." We respectfully
agree with these observations and feel no doubt that even
now Art. 181 has to be read as confined to applications
under the Code.
It was then said that the application which the respondent Rupendra made was under the Code because in view
of s. 141 of the Code the procedure prescribed by the Code
has to be followed in dealing with an application made
under s. 4 of the Regulation. This is obviously fallacious.
The question is not whether the procedure for an applicauon is that prescribed by the Code but whether the application was under Code. The application by the respondent
Rupendra was not under the Code in any sense. The
Regulation had been in existence before the Civil Procedure Codes had been enacted. We, therefore. think that
even if s. 4 of the Regulation required an application, Art.
181 of the Limitation Act would not apply to such application.
Prativa Bose
( 1)
[1953] S.C.R. 351, 371.
(
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4 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
1963
The next question is whether the order could only be
made by the court where the suit mentioned in s. 4 of the
Regulation was pending. The High Court at Calcutta held Prativav. Bose
in Kumar Punyendra Narayan Deb v. Kumar Bhairabendra
Kumar
Narayan Deb() that the order could be made by a District J?.upendra Deb
Raikat &
Judge even though the suit mentioned was not pending
Others.
before him. We think that this is the correct view. All
that s. 4 savs is that "the Judge on a regular suit king
Sarkar f.
preferred .......... shal\ take good and sullicient security".
There is nothing to show that the "Judge" referred to is
the Judge before whom the suit is pen,ling though no
doubt there will be no power to make an order requiring
security under the section before the suit mentioned in it
h:is been filed. From the summary of the Regulation that
we have earlier given we are inclined to think that the
Judge referred to is the Judge of the Zila Court whose
powers of interference in the administration of the
estate of a deceased person are intended to be restrictetl by the Regulation. The Zila Courts have no doubt
been long abolished. Their place was taken up by
Courts of District Judges constituted by the Bengal
Civil Courts Act, 1871, section 12 of which provided that
"the present Judges of the Zillah Courts, Additional Judges,
Subordinate Judges and Munsifs shall be deemed to have
been duly appointed to the office the duties of which they
have respectively discharged and shall be the first District
Judges, Additional Judges, Subordinate Judges and Munsifs
named under this Act." The Act of 1871 was replaced in
its turn by the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act,
1887 which provided that "All Courts constituted, appointments ........ made ...... under the Bengal Civil Courts
Act, 1871 or any enactment thereby repealed .... shall be
deemed to have been respectively constituted, made,. .....
under this Act." It would appear, therefore, that the words
"Judge" and "Zila Courts" in the Regulation have now to
be understood as referring respectively to District Judges
au.cl District Courts appointed and constimted under the
Act of 1887. Section 23 of the Act of 1887 provides that
the High Court may by order authorise any Subordinate
Judge to take cognizance of a proceeding under the Bengal
(
1
)
(1946) 50 C.W.N. 776.
78
1963
~.·r1:. ~ . '.;·'.
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SUPllEME COURT REPORTS
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Regulation V of 1799. It would thus appear that :i Subordinate Judge woold have jurisdiction to take cognizance
Pratt'v11 Bose
of proceedings under Regulation V of_ 1799 only if the
v.
High Court conferred sµch jurisdiction on him by an order
Kumar
Rupendra Deb made for the purpose and no Subordinate Judge would
Rtdfr../IJ "- . have such jurisdiction without such order even though the
Others.
suit might be yending before him. It is, therefore, clear
that in the absence of an order under s. 23 of the Act of
Sark_ar f.
1887, the order contemplated by s. 4 of the Regulation can
be made only by a District Judge. It cannot hence be said
that the District Judge of Jalpaiguri had no jurisdiction
to act under s. 4 of the Regulation in the present case at all.
We turn now to the question concerning the correct
interpretation of s. 4 of the Regulation. It is said on behalf
of the appellant that s. 4 applies to a case where "there be
more heirs than one". In such a case only the Court has
the power to demand security. A case like the present,
where a person dies leaving a single heir is governed by
s. 3 only and as that section does not provide for any security being demanded, the appellant cannot be called upon
to furnish security.
We are unable to accept this contention. We find
no reason why the Regulation should have provided differently for cases of a single heir and cases of more than one
heir and we do not think it did so. It is no doubt true
that s. 4 commences with the words "if there be more heirs
than one" and provides that in such a case the heirs, if
they agree, can take possession and Courts are not tt>
interfere except upon a complaint being preferred. It is
not clear what the complaint contemplated is. It may be
said that that complaint is not one arising out of a dispute
between the heirs, for this part of the section directs the
Courts not to interfere except upon a complaint, when
the heirs are agreed among themselves ; if the heirs are
agreed, then the complaint is not likely to be out of_ a dispute between them. However this may be, the section goes
on to say after a semi-colon, "but if the right of succession
to the estate be disputed between several claimants" and
one or more take possession and the party out of posses.ion
files a suit, then. the Court shall call upon the party in
possession to furnish security. It seems to us that the words
"if the right of succession to the estate be disputed between
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SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
79
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'T }t'
sev~ clailIWJ.tS'', u.k.en by tharudve£, clearly include
a case where a person dies leaving a single heir and several
personi dispute each claiming to be that heir. This seems
to us to be beyond :ill dispute. That being so, it would
follow that in such a case also, the Court may demand
security from the party in possession. The learned District
Judge thought that as the opening words of the section
dealt with a case of more heirs than one, the words "the
right of succession to the estate be disputed between several
claimants" which are separated from the opening words
by a semi-colon must be read as governed by the opening
words, and therefore, as confined to a dispute between
several claimants in a case where there are more than one
heir. We are not aware of any rule which says that two
parts of a sentence separated by a semi-colon cannot deal
with two different states of affairs. We find no justification
in such a case for refusing to give to the words used their
plain meaning and to read them as controlled by the
preceding words because they are separated by a semicolon. Neither do we think that the word "but" after the
semi-colon shows that what follows it must contemplate
the case dcilt by the words preceding it. We think that
word "but" was used to distinguish between two cases, in
one of which the Omrt was directed not to interfere and
in the other to interfere in one way, namely, by demanding
a security. The use of the word "but" does not lead to
the conclusion that the cases so distinguished must otherwi.e be the same. The word may be appropriately used
to indicate that in one set of facts the Cour:t is not to
interfere without a complaint and in another it may do so.
The learned District Judge also thought that the use of
the word "heirs" in plural in the expression "for the benefit
of the heirs who may on investigation be found entitled to
succeed" occurring at the end of the section showed that
security could be demanded only where a person had died
kaving two or more heirs. We think the learned District
Judge was clearly wrong in this. As the High Court
pointed out, the plural must include a singular.
It was also said that s. 3 deals with a case where a
person dies leaving a single heir and covers the dispute
between several persons each claiming to be the sole heir.
It was contended that as this section does not provide for
1'63
Prativa BQs~
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Sarkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
1963
demanding of security when one of the disputing
claimants has peacefully got possession and the other or
Prativa Bost·
others
have filed a suit, s. 4 cannot be applied to this. case
v.
for the purpose of demanding security. Assuming that the
Kurnar
Rupendra Deb interpretation put upon s. 3 is right, as to which we do not
Raikat _&
think it necessary to express any view, we are unable to
· Others.
see why if s. 4 also deals with a case of a dispute between
several persons each claiming to be the sole heir-which if
Sarkar /.
what we have said before is right, it does - its operation
should be excluded in a case covered by s. 3. Of course,
if on its own words it can be said that s. 4 does not apply
to the case of a person leaving a single heir, no further
question arises. On the other hand, if it applies to such
a case then there is no reason to say that it does not so
apply simply because s. 3 also applies to such a case. We
find no difficulty in applying both the sections to the case
of a single heir. If there is no dispute, s. 4 has no operation
in so far as demand of security is concerned. If there is
·dispute, the Courts can interfere under s. 3 on a complaint
being filed and they can also demand security when one is
in possession and the other or others are out of possession
and have filed a suit or suits. We agree with the High
Court that s. 4 applied to this case and the appellant could
be called upon to furnish security. We have some doubt
if s. 3 is intended to apply to the case of several persons
each claiming to be the single heir of an intestate but we
have assumed it to apply to such a case.
Then it was said that ss. 192-195 of the Succession Act,
1925 impliedly repeaied s. 4 of the Regulation. These
sections of the Succession Act no doubt deal with a summary decision of a· disputed right to possession on succession.
But they are not identical with s. 4 of Regulation. Section
4 does not apply unless there is a suit. The provisions of
the Succession Act apply when there is no suit. Under
the later Act a party in possession may he dispossessed if
the Judge thinks he has no right while under the Regulation he cannot be dispossessed if he furnishes the security
required of him. There are other differences between the
two. They are further in no sense in conflict with each
other. We do not think, therefore, that the later Act can
be said to have repealed the earlier impliedly.
Lastly it is said that the High Court should not have
-
4.S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81
interfered in revision as the trial Court had neither exceeded nor refused to exercise its jurisdiction. It seems to us
that this contention is ill founded. It is beyond dispute
that "if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate
court exercising a juridiction not vested in it by law or
failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision
arises": fay Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury(' ). This principle fully applies to the present case.
The trial Court erroneously held-that is erroneously in the
view of the High Court a view with which we agree-that
properly interpreted s. 4 did not apply to the present case,
and also that the application by respondent Rupendra was
barred by limitation and on these grounds refused to exer~ise jurisdiction under s. 4 of the Regulation. The High
Court was, therefore, fully justified in setting aside the
order of the learned District Judge in exercise of its rev1sional jurisdiction.
We have now dealt with all the objections to the applicability of s. 4 of the Regulation to the present case raised
by learned counsel for the appellant. We have not been
able to accept any of them. The question however whether
it is obligatory upon the District Judge in a ·case to which
s. 4 applies to take security from the party in possession,
haS caused us some anxiety. The High Court thought
that it was and so did the trial Court. Having given the
matter our best thought we are inclined to take the opposite
view. Vve think the section leaves it to the District Jndge
to ask for security if in all the circumstances of the case
he thinks that that is the proper order to make. He has a
discretion in the matter and is not obliged as soon as a
case comes under the section, to demand the security.
No doubt the section says "the Judge .......... shall
take .... security." Prima facie the words appear to
impose an obligatory duty on the Judge. But the context
may indicate a different intention: see State of U.P. v.
Manbodhan Lal Srivastava('). We think the context in
the present case does so. It certainly does seem to us very
strange that a person in possession of property claiming to
be an heir should be required by a statute to give security
simply because some other person claims to be entitled to
( 1)
(1949)
76
I.A. 131.
(') I 1958] S.C.R. 533.
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Rtdkat &
Others.
Sarkar /.
.. _._,.~tf'. .:-r.
SUPREME COUl.T ltEPOl.TS
,,, "'·T.~1':'.·.
82
•
Prativa lJfJse
v.
Kum•r
Ruproilra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Sarkar /.
'
'
. .- . .J
, .'1··r~-
t
.
[~
t
.....
it as the hcir, no matter whether or not tli.e latter's claim
has the slightest foundation. An intention lading to such
a situation should not be =ily ascribed to a legi_,laturc. It
docs not seem to us that such could have been the intention of the present statute. There are several considerations, apart from the absurdity of the situation, which lead
us to that view.
The first consideration which we wish to notice ii>
the fact which we have earlier noticed, that under the
section, the Judge is to call for security suo motu.
Of course, the Judge cannot call for security unless the
facts entitling him to do so exist. It is obvious that in
most cases the Judge would have no knowledge of these
facts. He would thus be unable to act suo matu in a very
large number of cases. It seems to us that it could not
have been intended to cast an obligatory duty on the Judge
when in a large number of cases it would be impossible
for him to discharge that duty for want of knowledge of
the necessary facts.
Next, we wish to point out that the whole object of the
Regulation is .to restrict the interference of Courts in the
matter of succession. Section 4 in so far as it enables a Court
to demand security is an instance where the restriction. i.t
relaxed and a Court is permitted to interfere in the manner
provided, that is, by demanding security from the party in
possession as an heir. There can be no doubt that the
interference by the Court which the Regulation was intended to restrict was discretionary with the Court. It would
seem to follow that the interference whicb s. 4 permitted should also be discretionary.
Then we wish to observe that· ss. 4 and 5 read together
lay down three successive stages in connection with the
demand of security. In the first stage s. 4 provides that the
Judge shall take security from the party in possession
of property. That section also provides that if that party
fails to give the security, the Judge may give possession of
the property to the other claimant or claimants who m&y
be able to give such security. This is the .'!Ccond stage. The
third stage is provided for in s. 5. That stage is where none·
of the claimants to the property, that is, neither the one
in possession nor those out of possession, is able to give
the security.
In such a case the Judge is authorised,
(
'i S.C.R.
)
)
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
1963
to ~p~int an administrator of the property for its care
and management until the suit mentioned in s. 4 is deter- ?rativa Bose
mined. Quite clearly the power which is given to the Judge
in the second and third stages is a discretionary power.
Kumar
The words used are in one case "may" and in the other Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
"is authorised", both of which confer a discretionary power.
Others.
It cannot be said that these words notwithstanding their
form impose an obligatory duty for they confer power to
Sarkar /.
protect the right of a party. We say this because the
section does not proceed on the basis that the party out
of possession has any right but only on the basis of the
existence of a dispute no matter however unmeritorious.
It seems that if the power that the Judge has in the second
and third stages, is only discretionary it can hardly be
that the power given to him in the first stage is obligatory.
It could not be that the section obliged the Judge to take
security from the claimant in possession, while if he did
not furnish the security it was optional for the Judge
to put the rival claimant in possession or to appoint an
administrator to take possession. It seems to us that since
the power exercisable in the second and third stages is a
discretionary power, the power exercisable in the first stage
must also be of the same nature.
In our view, therefore, the High Court was in error
in directing the District Judge to "take sufficient security
from the opposite party Prativa Bose", the appellant before
us. We think the proper course would be to send the
case back to the District Judge to decide in his discretion
whether he com~ders it a fit case for calling upon the
appellant to furnish security and if he thinks it is, to take
the security. It was contended on behalf of the appellant
that in view of the order of the High Court refusing tl:te
application of the respondent Rupendra for the appointment
of a receiver, the District Judge cannot in the exercise of
his discretion call upon the appellant to furnish security.
We do nCJt think that the decision in the application
for the receiver concludes the matter finally, for that decision proceeds on findings which were in their nature only
prima facie. The learned District Judge in deciding whether to demand security or not will no doubt give due
consideration tlo everything properly placed before him
including the findings in the application for appointment
...
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
1963
of receiver and make his own order after such consideration.
Prativa Bost!
We, therefore, direct that the case be sent back to
v.
the District Judge of Jalpaiguri to decide whether he
Kumar
Rupendra Deb would in the circumstances of this case call upon the
Raikat &·
appellant to furnish security and make an order accordOthers.
iingly. The costs in this matter in all the Courts so far
incurred
and to be incurred before the District Judge under
Sarkar /.
this order, will be costs in the suit.
Raghubar
RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-This Appeal, by special leave, is
Dayal/.
directed against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta, and rises in the following circumstances.
Raja Prasanna Deb Rajkot, the Raja of the impartible
estate known as 'the Baikunthapur Raj Estate', died intestate on December 4, 1946, leaving considerable properties, immovable and movable. Ashrumati, the widow,
claiming as the sole heir, took possession of the property,
except the southern block of the palace at Jalpaiguri and
a small quantity of land attached to the palace. On October 31, 1947, she got mutation of her name over the property despite applications for mutation by three other persons. Kumar Rupendra Narayan instituted a title suit,
Suit No. 40 of 1947, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge;
Jalpaiguri, on August 7, 1947, against Ashrumati and
other claimants for the declaration of his title as the sole
heir of and successor to his father Raja Prasanna Deb
Raikat and for the recovery of possession of the estate left
by the Raja. According to him, the Raja left three sons
Kumar Ruprendra Deb Rajkot and his younger brothers
Kumar Shiba Prasad Deb and Kumar Deba Prasad Deb,
a daughter Prativa Bose and two widows Ashrumati, mother of Prativa Bose and Renchi Devi, mother of the three
sons. The suit was transferred to the High Court under
cl. 13 of the Letters Patent, 1865, and was numbered as
Extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1948. Two other title suits No.
2347 of 1950 and 3619 of 1951 were also filed in the High
Court in its Original Civil Jurisdiction by Guru Charan
Deb and Jitendra Deb. In July 1952, applications for the
appointment of a receiver and injunction order were rejected by the High Court. On Ashrumati' s death on January 5, 1954, Prativa Bose was substituted in her place in
these suits.
•
•
4 S.C.R.
-
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85
On March 31, 1954, Kumar Rupel)dra Deb applied
to the District Judge of Jalpaiguri, praying that good and
sufficient security be taken from Prativa Bose under the
provisions of s. IV of the Bengal Wills & Intestacy Regulation V of 1799, hereinafter called the Regulation. This
app1ication was opposed on grounds that it was presented ai ter the expiry of the period of limitation, that the
provisions of s. IV or the Regulation did not apply to a
case where a single heir had been left by the deceased,
that the application was barred by the principle of waiver
and that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain it as the suit was at the time pending in the High
Court. The District Judge held that the application was
barred by time in view of the provisions of Art. 181 of
the I Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act and that the
provisions of s. IV of the Regulation applied only to
cases where the deceased had left several heirs and therefore dismissed the application.
Kumar Rupendra Deb went in revision to the High
Court. The High Court found in his favour on both the
questions regarding limitation and regarding the applicability of the provisions of s. IV of the Regulation to the
facts of the case, and accordingly, allowed the revision
application and ordered that the District Judge should
ex<crcise his special jurisdiction under s. IV of the Regular.on and take sufficient security from the opposite party
viz., Prativa Bose. It is against this order that this appeal
has been presented by Prativa Bose after obtaining special
leave from this Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant has urged the following points:
1. Section III and not s. IV of the Regulation applies
to the facts of the case.
2. The application for the taking of security from the
party in possession is made in the suit and, consequently it is the Court where the suit is pending which has
the jurisdiction to entertain that application.
3. The application is barred by the principles analogous to res judicata on the ground that the High
Court has already gone into the question of the interim protection of the estate.
4. If such an application be considered to be an inde-
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Ku1nar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Raghubar
Dayal f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
• t
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kum•r
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Raghubsr
Dayal f.
J 1 .f .
•
I
' l
·;
[1964]
. "
pendent application and not an application in the suit,
it is barred by limitation under the provisions of Art.
181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act.
5. The Regulation is impliedly repealed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian
Succession Act, 1925.
6. The High Court had no jurisdiction to enterain
a revision against the order of the District Judge rejecting the application praying for the demand of
security from Ashrumati Devi and therefore could
not interfere with that order.
Before dealing with these points, we would like to
refer to the relevant provisions of the Regulation. Its sections III and IV, as they stood originally, are set out below:
"III. In case of a Hindoo, Mussulman, or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Zillah or City
Courts, dying intestate, but leaving a son or other
heir, who by the laws· of the country may be entitled
to succeed to the whole •'state of the deceased such
heir, if of age and competent to take the possession
and management of the estate, or if under age or incompetent, and not under the superintendence of the
Court of Wards, his guardian, or nearest of kin, who
by special appointment or by the law and usage of
the country may be authorised to act for him, is not
required to apply to the Courts of justice for permission to take possession of the estate of the deceased
as far as the same can be done without violence ; and
the courts of justice are restricted from interference
in such cases, except a regular complaint be preferred,
when they are to proceed thereupon according to the
general Regulations.
IV. If there be more heirs than one to the estate of
a person dying intestate, and they can agree amongst
themselves in the appointment of a common manager,
they are at liberty to take possession, and the courts
of justice are restricted from interference, without a
regular complaint, as in the case of a single heir ;
but if the right of succession to the estate be disputed
between several claimants, one or more of whom
may have taken possession, the judge, on a regular
..
.
r. .
.
{
•
t
4 S.C.lt
-
SUPitEME COURT R.EPOltTS
87
1963
suit being preferred by the party out of possession,
shall take good and sufficient security from the party
Prativa Base
or parties in possession for his or their compliance
v.
with the judgment that may be passed in the suit ; or
Ku mu
in default of such security being given within a reaRupendra Deb
Raikat &
sonable period, may give possession, until the suit may
Others.
be determined, to the other claimant or claimants
who may be able to give such security, declaring at
the same time, that such possession is not in any degree to affect the right of property at issue between
the parties, but to be considered merely as an administration to the estate for the benefit of the heirs,
who may, on investigation, be found entitled to succeed thereto."
Certain portions of s. III were repealed by Act XL
of 1858 and Act XVI of 1874 in matters which do not
affect the qtiestion before us. In 1903, the expression
'when they are to proceed thereupon according to the
general Regulations' was repealed. This does not make
much difference as thereafter the complaint was to be proceeded with according to the procedure laid down in the
Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of suits.
Ashrumati claims title to the estate as the sole heir
of the deceased Raja. Kumar Rupendra Narayan, the
plaintiff in the title suit, also claims title to the property
as the sole heir of the Raja. Each other claimant to the
title, claims as sole heir. In the circumstances, the contention for the appellant is that it is s. III which is applicable to the facts of this case and not s. IV. There is no
dispute that the former deals with a case where a single .
heir is entitled to succeed to the whole estate of the deceased and the latter deals with a case when there be more
heirs than one to the estate of the person dying intestate.
It is the later part of s. IV which provides for the judge, on
a regular suit being preferred by the party out of possession, to take security from the party or parties in possession of the estate. The real contention therefore is that
the Judge can exercise this power only when there be more
heirs than one to the estate and there be a dispute about
the right of succession and that this provision cannot apply to the case falling under s. III where the dispute, if
any, is be'Ween the rival claimants to the entire property
88
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
.1963
[1964]
on the ground that each of them is entitled to the entire
estate as. the sole heir. The High Court considered the
·Prativa Bose
contention aud did not accept it, as it did not see any
v.
good
reason why the legislating authority should have
Kumar
made
any distinction between cases of disputes arising
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
where a person had· died intestate leaving a single heir
Others.
and where the person died intestate leaving,several heirs,
as the words used in the two sections did not indicate
Raghuba1·
any
such intention, as ss. III and IV (first part) do not
Dayal /.
contemplate cases of dispute about succession and as the
fact that the provision about taking of security appears
in the later part of s. IV, was no reason to limit the applicability of that provision to what had gone before in that
very section. In support of the last_ view, reliance was
placed on the observations of Mellish L. J., in Cohen v.
S.E. Railway.(').
To appreciate the contention for the appellant, it is
necessary to consider the entire object of making the Regulation. The title of the Regulation states :
"A Regulation to limit the interference of the Zillah and City Courts of Dewanny Adawlut in the execution of wills and administration to the estates of
persons dying intestate."
The reason for limiting such interference is given in s.
I which indicates that the Regulation was passed to remove doubts which were entertained with respect to the
extent up to which and the manner in which the judges
of the Zillah and City Courts of Dewanny Adawlut in the
provinces of Bengal, Behar, Orissa and Benares, were authorised to i'nterfere in cases where the inhabitants of those
provinces had left wills at their decease and appointed
executors to carry the same into effect or who died intestate leaving an estate, real or personal, and also to apply to those cases as far as possible the principle prescribed in section XV of Regulation IV of 1793 to the effect
that in suits regarding succession and inheritance the
Mahomedan laws with respect to Mahomendans and the
Hindoo laws with regard to Hindoos be the general
rules for the guidance of the judges. It appears therefore
that prior to the passing of this regulation, these Courts
( 1)
(1877) 2 E & D. 253, 260.
4 S.C.R.
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
did interfere with such cases and it was to limit and define those powers of interference that the Regulation was
passed. The Regulation, therefore, should be construed
strictly a~ a piece of restrictive legislation.
It also appears necessary to have an idea of what sort
of interference was being made by these Courts. We have
not been referred to anything in particular in this connection. Section II provides that executors appointed under the will of the deceased can take charge of the estate
and proceed in the execution of their trust without any
application to the judge of the Dewanny Adawlut or' any
other officer of Government for his sanction. This gives
some idea about the part used to be played by executive
officers in this regard. Some rcf~rence to the procedure
adopted in the time of the Indian rulers for investing the
successor of a landholder is found in Mr. Shore's Minute
on the rights of zamindars and talookdars, recorded in
the proceedings of Government in the Revenue Department dated April 2, 1788, printed at p. 228 of Elementary Analysis of the Laws and Regulations (enacted by
the Governor-General in Council)' by Harington, Volume III. The actual procedure on investing the landholder is given in appendix No. 9 to this note, printed at
p. 275 of the same volume. An extract from the first paragraph quoted below, indicates that the heir of the deceased zamindar had to get the permission of the State authorities before assuming the management of the affairs
of the zamindary :
'Upon the demise of a zamindar, his heir or heiress
transmitted an account of the event, in a petition to
the dewan of the soobah, and the roy-royan ; or if
landholders of the first rank, to the soobahdar himself ; with letters to all the principal men of the court,
soliciting their protection. To an heir, or heiress who
paid a large revenue to the state, the soobahdar returned answers of condolence ; accompanied with an
honorary dress to the former ; and with a present of
shawls to the latter. Letters to a similar purport were
transmitted by the dewan and the roy-royan. After
performing the funeral rites of the deceased, the heir,
if of age, was presented to the soobahdar by the dewan and the roy-royan; and after receiving the beetcl
7-2 S C lndia/64
•
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Raghubar
Dayal/.
90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
1963
leaf, and an honorary qress, was permitted to assume
the management of the affairs of his zamindary."
Prativa Bose
.
!
Harington
described the zamindar to be a landholder.
v.
of
a
peculiar
description,
not definable by any single term
Kumar
Rupendra Deb and said that he was allowed to succeed to the zaminRaikat &
dary by inheritance and yet, in general, required to take
Others.
out a renewal of his title from the sovereign or his representative
on payment of a peshkush, or fine of investiture
Raghubar
to
the
emperor,
and a nuzranah or present to his pn:>vinDayal/.
cial delegate, the Nazim. This is said in the remarks submitt~d by him to Lord Cornwallis in 1799 on Mr. Law's
plan of settlement, and has been quoted at p. 400.
At p. 287 is given the form of the munchalka which
the heir accepted by the State had to execute.. Appendix
10 at p. 289 gives a sanad which used to be issued to the
zamindar. These various steps appear to be taken in the
Mughal period in view of the theory that the sovereign
ruler was the sole virtual proprietor of the soil.
It might have been that when the East India Company got sovereignty over these provinces or parts thereof,
heirs of zamindars and possibly of other men of property, might have approached courts as well either for obtaining such permission or for interference with the person who had taken possession on the basis of such permission from some officer of the company. Regulation V of
1799 was passed to provide that the Courts were not to interfere in these matters on considerations of general adminstrative convenience, but could interfere only judicially
when they were moved for adjudicating the title of the
disputants to succession to the estate.
Section II, as already mted, provided for the executors to take charge of the estate of the deceased who had
left a will and thereby appointed executors to carry it into
effect and further provided :
"and the courts of justice are prohibited to interfere
in such cases, except on a regular complaint against
the executors for a breach of trust or otherwise. when
they are to take cognizance of such complaint in common with all others of a civil nature, under the general rule contained in Section VIII, of Regulation III,
1793 and proceed thereupon according to the Regulatioru, taking the opiillon of their law officers upon
•
'
-
4 S.C.R.
.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
1963
any legal exception to the executors, as well as upon
the provision to be made for the administration of
Prativa Bose
the estate in the event of the appointed executor bev.
ing set aside, and generally upon all points of law
Kumar
that may occur; with respect to which the judge is Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
to be guided by the law of the parties as expounded
Others.
by his law officers, subject to any modifications enacted by the Governor-General in Council, in the form
Raghuhar
prescribed by Regulation XLI, 1793."
Dayal f.
Similarly, s. III provided that when the deceased died
intestate, leaving a son or other heir, who by the laws of
the country be entitled to succeed to the whole estate of
the deceased, such heir, if of age and competent to take
the possession and management of the estate, was not
required to apply to the courts of justice for permission,
and could take possession without obtaining the permission from the Courts of justice, if it could be done without
violence. It enjoined upon the courts of justice not to
interfere in such cases except when a regular complaint
be preferred and then too they were to proceed according
to the general Regulations till 1903. Thereafter the proceedings were governed by the Civil Procedure Code.
This meant that the person who claimed to be so entitled,
could take possession without obtaining any permission,
if he could ·do so without violence and that his rival
claimant, if any, had to move the courts by means of a
regular complaint and that it was then that the courts of
justice would consider the dispute between the person
who had taken possession and the other claimants. It laid
down the entire procedure which the courts of justice
were to follow in dealing with the disputes between
claimants, each claiming succession to the entire estate.
It is a complete code of procedure in that regard.
Similarly, s. IV is a complete code with respect to the
case in which the deceased died intestate and left more
heirs than one. If those heirs agreed amongst themselves
in the appointment of a common manager,_ that is to say,
agreed to the common management of the estate which
remained undivided and to one person managing the entire estate, they were at liberty, in view of the first part
of the sectioo, to take possession of the estate and the
courts of justice were prohibited from any interference
92
1963
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
ilitghubar
D•yal /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
without a regular complaint as in the case of a single
heir.
The provisions of Regulation XI of 1793 also throw
some light with respect to the provisions of the first part
of s. IV of Regulation V of 1799. This Regulation was
made for removing certain restrictions on the operation
of Hindu and Mahomadan Law with reference to inheritance of landed property subject to the payment of revenue to Government. Section II provides that if any
zamindar, independent talukdar or other actual proprietor
of land shall die without a will or without having declared by a writing or verbally to whom and in what manner
his or her landed property is to devolv€ after his or her
demise, and shall leave two or more heirs, who, by the
Mahomadan or Hindu law may be respectively entitled
to succeed to a portion of the landed property of the deceased, such persons shall succeed to the shares to which
they may be so entitled. The Regulation does not deal
with the case of a deceased dying intestate leaving a single
heir as there was nothing to provide with respect to the
extent of the estate he is to succeed. He succeeded to the
entire estate. Section III provides that in the cases referred to in s. II, the several persons succeeding to the estate
would be at liberty, if they so preferred, to hold the property as a joint undivided estate and that if some
or all of them desired to have separate possession of
their respective shares, a division of the estate was to
be made m the maner laid down m Regulation
XXV of 1793, and that if there be more than
two sharers and any two or more of them be demous of holding their shares as a joint undivided
estate, they would be permitted to get their shares united. Thus, it would be seen that this section covers
the case of persons who would like to have their shares
continue as a joint undivided estate and also of those who
would like to have their shares separate. Section IV then
provides that in the case of those who would like to
hold the property as a joint undivided estate, a manager for their joint estate was to be appointed under
the rules contained in ss. XXIII to XXVI of Regulalation VIII of 1793. Thus the provisions for a common
manager of persons holding their estate as a joint undivi-
(
<
-
4 S.C.R.
)
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
93
1963
ded estate is made in this Regulation XI of 1793. The
first part of s. IV of Regulation V of 1799 is in consonance
Prativa Bose
with this provision as it provides that if the heirs who are
v.
more than one, in principle agree to have a common manaKumar
ger, they require no permission for taking possession of Rup<ndra D<b
Raikat &
the property.
Others.
When a complaint is made by any one of the heirs or
persons claiming to be heirs on account of the disRaghubar
agreement among them to act unitedly through a comDayal /.
mon manager, the Court has to deal with the dispute according to the general Regulations prescribing the procedure to be followed by Courts, just as the Courts had to
do in the case coming under s. III, when the deceased had
left a single heir. In addition to the procedure so provided under the general Regulations, one special provision
was further made for the Courts to follow when the Court
was moved for settling the disputes between several
claimants to the estate and that special procedure is that
on a regular suit being preferred, the Court is to take
good and sufficient security from the party in possession
for his complying with the judgment that be passed in the
suit.
It may appear rather extraordinary that on the mere
institution of a regular suit, the court should invariably
call upon the defendant in possession of the property to
furnish sufficient security for his complying with the
eventual judgment in the suit. It might have been necessary in those days, as we find that it was considered
necessary then for the defendant to furnish security for
his appearance in court if he did not accompany the officer serving the summons for his appearing in person before the court. Section V of Regulation IV of 1793 provided that the Court was to issue a summons to the defendent requiring him either to accompany the officer deputed to serve the summons to appear in person before the
Court or to deliver to such officer gcxXl and sufficient
security to appear and answer upon complaint on the
day appointed either in person or by vakil. Order
XXXVIII of the present Code of Civil Procedure provides for demanding security for appearance in court and
for the purpose of securing compliance with the judgment
in certain specified circumstances only.
94
1963
Prativa Bose
y.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Raghubar
Dayal /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
Sections III and IV, thus cover the entire possibilities
about the heirs of the deceased. The former deals when
there be only one heir and the latter when there be
more heirs than one. The reason for the special provision in the second part of s. IV and for a distinction being made in the procedure to be followed in the two cases,
lies in the fact that when there be more heirs than
one and they are not in agreement about common
management of the entire estate, they are not permitted
by the provisions of s. IV to take possession of the estate
singly or by some of them jointly. An agreement about all
the claimants being heirs and about their respective shares,
in the absence of an agreement about common management, does not entitle them to take possession of the estate.
In case of di5ilgreement about common management, the
original procedure, whatever it might have been under the
law prevalent prior to the passing of this Regulation, applied. They had to take permission, be it of some executive
officer or of the court of justice. For such cases, this
Regulation V of 1799 made no provision. It is only
when such a dispute between the various claimants
is brought before the court that it gets seized of the matter and, on a regular suit being preferred, the first step
it had to take suo motu was to take good and sufficient
security from the party in possession who had obviously
taken possession in defiance of the provisions of the first
part of s. IV. On the other hand, in the case of the deceased leaving a single .heir, s. III permits the heir to
take possession of the estate peacefully and he takes
possession lawfully. Any rival claimant, challenging
his title to the · property has therefore to establish his
case in the court of law according to the procedure
laid down. The reason for the special provision in the
latter pait of s. IV is therefore that one or more claimants to the estate take possession not in accordance
with law but against the provision of law. It would have
been unreasonable for the legislature to provide in s. III
that the person claiming to be the single heir of the deceased, dying intestate, and taking possession of the estate in
accordance with the provisions of that section, be called
upon to furnish security and in case of default to run the
risk of making over possession to another dairnarit disput-
(
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
95
ing his title to the entire estate. It would be equally unreasonable if the second part of s. IV be so construed as to
make the peaceful possession of a person claiming title
to the entire estate as a single heir in jeopardy merely
because another person disputes his right.
We make it clear here that the word 'complaint' used
in tliis Regulation really refers to what we at present call
a plaint in a civil suit. Regulation III of 1793 defined the
jurisdiction of courts of Dewanny Adawlut established in
the zillahs and the cities specified in s. II of that Regulation for the trial of civil suits in the first instance.
This is clear from s. I. Section III provides that each
zillah and city court was to be superintended by one
judge alone. These courts were empowered by s. VIII
tD take cognizance of all suits and complaints respecting, inter alia, the succession or right to real or personal
property. Section XVIII prohibits t11ese courts from taking cognizance of any matter of a criminal nature except
proceedings for contempt and perjuries committed in court.
Section XIV uses the word 'complaint' with reference
to one whom we now call a 'plaintiff'. These provisions indicate that 'complaint' in the Regulations refers to a plaint and not to what we now call a complaint in a criminal case. This is further made clear
by the provisions of s. 2 of Regulation IV of 1793
which deals with the procedure to be followed in regard
to the receipt, trial and decision of suits or complaints
cognizable in the courts of Dewanny Adawlut established in the various zillahs. Section II provides that no complaint is to be received but from the plaintiff nor any answer to a complaint but from a defendant or their respective vakils duly empowered.
We are therefore of opinion that each of the sections
II, III and IV of Regulation V of 1799 is a complete code
for dealing with different · situations. Section II deals
with the case when the deceased dies leaving a will under
which an executor is appointed to manage the property.
Section III deals with the case when the deceased dies intestate leaving a single heir and s. IV to cases when the deceased dies intestate leaving more than one heir.
This view finds support from the fact that when
extending the provisions of this Regulation to other
1%3
Prativa Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Raghubar
Daytd f.
96
SUPllEME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
Provinces. all the three sections viz., II, III and IV have
not been invariably extended. Only ss. IV, V, VI and_ VII
Prativa Bose
and not ss. II and III were extended to the Central Prov:
vinces by the Central Provinces Laws Act XX of 1876.
Kumar
It is not correct as observed by the High Court, that
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
s. III and first part of s. IV of the Regulation do not cover
Others.
the cases where each of several persons claims to be the single
heir and where out of several persons some claim to be
Raghubar
the
heirs while some others also claim to be the heirs.
Dayal/.
These sections contemplate those cases when they provide for the interference of courts on complaints by
other persons against the person in possession. Such
complaints can be only when they are by such claimants
to the estate or part of it whose claims are not accepted
by the others claiming title to the estate. The effect of the
expression 'as in the case of a single heir' at the end
of the first part of s. IV is that the restriction on the
interference of a court of justice in the case where the deceased leaves more heirs than one extends upto the same
stage as has been described in s. III which deals with the
case of a single heir, that is to say, the interference is restricted up to the stage a complaint is filed and that the
interference subsequent to it would be that in accordance
with the procedure laid down in the General Regulations.
This expression cannot be interpreted to make the second
part of s. IV operative in the case coming under s. III.
The observations of Mellish L.J., in Cohen v.
S.E. Railway(') are not of much help in order to conshue the scope of the second part of s. IV in regard to
its applicability to cases coming under s. III. Those observations were made in a different context about the
provisions of the Acts there under consideration. These
observations are :
"Then the next question is whether 31 and 32 Viet.
C. 119, s. 16, includes that provision of the Railway
and Canal Traffic Act, so as to apply it not only to
the carriage by railway, but to carriage by steamer.
It seems to me that this is a still plainer question, except for the doubt thrown upon it by the Irish case.
But the words are so clear that there can be no doubt
about it : 'The provisions of the Railway and Canal
( 1)
(1877) 2 E & D 253.
i
--
4 S.C.R.
,
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
97
Traffic Act, 1854, so far as the mne are applicable,
shall extend to the steam vessels and to the traffic
carried on thereby'. Those words in their plain natural meaning incorporate s. 7 .as well as every other
section of the Act. Then why should it be excepted?
The only reason is that this clause is not contained in
a separate section by itself, but is contained at the
end of section 16 ; and therefore it is said that it is
to be confined to the subject matter to which the
previous parts of section 16 relate. I am not
aware that there is any such rule of construction of
an Act of Parliament. If some absurdity or inconvenience followed from holding it to apply to the whole
Act, it might be reasonable to confine the incorporation to clauses relating to some particular subjectmatter, but if there is no inconvenience from holding
that the incorporation includes section 7 as well as the
other sections, we ought to hold that it does."
The expressions to be construed in that case were not
as a proviso or exception to what had gone before but
formed an independent enactment. They were not separately numbered as a section. In s. IV of the Regulation, the second part commences with the word 'but'
and thereby indicating that it is by way of an exception to
what is enacted in the first part-and that it is open to the
courts to interfere in the manner prescribed in the second
part where the deceased had left more heirs than one to
the estate.
Section XIX of Regulation XL of 1793 enacted for
forming into a regular code all regulations, provided that
one part of a regulation has to be construed by another
so that the whole might stand. This provision simply
means that the provisions of a Regulation should be so
construed that they be harmonized in case there be some
apparent inconsistency between the different provisions
of the Regulation. This implies that in .the absence of
such necessity for harmonizing the provisions of different provisions of the Regulation, each provision has to
be taken as complete by itself and to mean what it
states. This directly goes against the applicability of the
observations of Mellish L.J. in Cohen'J Cag( 1 ) to the con(
1
)
(
1877) 2 E. a. D. 253, 260.
1963
Prativa Bote
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Raghubar
Dayal f.
98
1963
Prat£va Bose
v.
Kumar
Rupendra Deb
Raikat &
Others.
Raghubar
Dayal/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
struction of the second part of s. IV with respect to
its applicability to s. III. We do not find the provisions of s. III and s. IV to be inconsistent in any manner and to necessitate their being construed together. In
fact, we have already indicated that there had been good
reason for providing a special procedure in addition to the
procedure to be followed in the trial of suits on regular
complaints in cases in which the deceased died intestate
and left more than one heir.
We are therefore of opinion that the second part of
s. IV does not apply to the case where the deceased dies
intestate leaving only one heir entitled to succeed to the
entire estate, a case which is covered by s. III of this Regulation.
In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to decide
the other contentions raised in this case. We, therefore
allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court below
and dismiss the application of the respondents presented
to the District Judge under s. IV of Regulation V of 1799.
We order that the respondents will pay the costs of the appellant throughout.
Before parting with the case we would like to draw attention of Government to these provisions which appear
to be somewhat out of date and which need to be repealed. Ample power is to be found in the Indian Succession
Act and the Code of Civil Procedure to safeguard such
rights and there is hardly any need for a provision which
was passed to remove certain doubts created by the Regulation of 1793.
ORDER OF· COURT
In view of the opinion of the majority the appeal is
allowed with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
y
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