BADAT AND CO. versus EAST INDIA TRADING CO.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 May 1963 | [1964] 4 S.C.R. 19 | 1963 INSC 150
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 May 1963
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 39/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 4 S.C.R. 19
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 150
Text of the judgment
4 s.c.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
into two parts, hearing on a broader view and later, if
necessary, on facts, does not go to make a hearing as perfect as it would be desirable for a proper adjudication of
the appeal. If parties know that once they obtain special
leave without limitations they will be free to argue on
facts, they will come prepared and will present the case as
best a~ possible for their clients, and the Court too would
be in a better position to decide.
Of course, after hearing the appeal fully, this Court
is in the best position as to how to dispose of the appeal.
It can surely dispose of it by merely stating that it sees no
reason to consider the findings of fact to be incorrect or it
may consider those findings and express a different opimon.
I would, however, as stated earlier, not like to express
anything with respect to how such an appeal be heard by
this Court, when it is not doubted that this Court has full
discretion to hear an appeal on facts and law and has, for
similar reason laid down that the High Court has full
power to review evidence when hearing an appeal against
acquittal under s. 423 Cr. P.C.
!963
Nihal Singh
and Others
v.
State of
Punjab
Raghubar
Dayal /.
Appeal dismissed.
BADAT AND
CO.
v.
EAST INDIA TRADING CO.
(K. SuBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J. R. MuoHOLKAR,
JJ.)
Foreign Award and /udgment-Suit filed in Romhay High
Court-Jurisdiction of Court to entertain the suit based on such
documents.
The respondent company, which was incorporated in New
York and carried on business in spices, brought a suit in the
original side of the Bombay High Court against the appellant for
recovery of a sum of Rs. 92,884-4-10 on the basis of a judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State of New York affirming two
awards obtained by it and also on the awards in the alternative.
1963
May, HJ
20
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
The respondent was a partnership firn1 carrying on import and
export business in Bombay. By t\vo letters exchanged between
them, the appellant and the respondent agreed to do business in
turmeric fingers on the terms and conditions of the American
Spice Trade Association, one of which was an arbitration clause
which ran as follows :"All questions and controversies and all claims arising
under this contract shall be submitted to and settled by Arbitration under the Rules of the Ameri~an Spice Trade Association printed on the reverse side thereof. This contract is
made as of in l'few York."
The appellant failed to supply turmeric in terms of the t\vo con:tracts it entered into with the respondent. The respondent put the
matter into arbitration in pursuance of the arbitration clause. The
appellant took no part in it. The arbitrators gave the two awards
in favour of the respondent for damages. The appellant did not
pay. The respondent then took appropriate proceedings and got
the awards confirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York. The single ) udge of the Bombay High
Court \vho tried the suit held that it was not maintainable either
()fl the foreign judgment or on the a\vards and dismissed the suit.
The Division Bench on appeal held that the suit \Vas maintainable on the awards, though not on the judgment, as part of the
cause of action had arisen in Bombay and the rele,·ant facts had
been proved by the Public documents produced by the respondent
.and the admissions made by the appellant and decreed the suit.
Held, (per Dayal and Mudholkar )J.) The decision of the
Single Judge of the High Court that the suit was not maintainable
on the foreign judgment must be affirn1ed but on other grounds.
Apart from the provisions of the Arbitration Protocol and
Conventions Act, 1937, foreign awards and foreign judg1nents
based upon a-Ward are enforceable in India on the sa1ne grounds
and in the same circumstances in which they are enforceable in
England under the Common. Law on grounds of justice, equity
and good conscience. On the original side of the Bombay High
Court English Co1nmon Law is also applicable under cl. 19 of the
Letters Patent read with cl. XLI of the Charter of that Court.
If the award is followed by a judgment which is rendered in a
proceeding in which the person again.st whom judgn1ent is sought
can take objections as to the validity of the award, the judgement
will be enforceable in England. Even then the plaintiff will have
the right to sue on the original course of action. Secondly, even
a foreign award will be enforced only if it satisfies mutatis mutandis
the tests applicable to the enforcement of foreign judgments on
the ground that it creates a contract~a~ oblig~tion arising o':1t. of
submission · to arbitration. But there is a difference of op1n1on
in this connection· on two matters, (1) whether an award which
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
is followed by a judgment can be enforced as an award or whether
the judgment "lone can be enforced, and (2) whether an award
which is not enforceable in the country in which it was made
without an enforcement order or a judgment, can be enforced
or in such a case the Ot1ly reri:iedy is to sue on the original cause
of action. Thirdly, both a foreign judgment and a foreign award
n1ay be sued upon provided certain conditions are fulfilled one of
\vhich is that it has become final.
•
Although, therefore, the respondent could sue on the original
cause of action in the Bombay High Court that cause of action
1uust be distinguished from the one furnished by the judgment
of the New York Supreme Court \vhich n1u£t be held to have
arisen in Ne\\' York and not in Bombay and was a cause of actioa.
independent of the one afforded by the contracts and the Bombay High Court would, consequently, have no jurisdiction to try
the suit based on that judg1nent.
-
East India 1'rading Co. v. Carmel Exporters & In1porters Ltd.~
(1952) 2 Q. B. 439, Schibsby v. Westenholz., (1870) 6 Q. B. 155
and Re Davidson's Settlement Trust, (1873) L. R. 15 Eq. 383,
referred to.
In a suit based on a foreign award the plaintiff has to prove,
( 1) that the contract between the parties provided for arbitration
by a tribunal in a foreign country, (2) that the award is in accordance with the agreement, (3) that the award is valid according
to the la\V of that country ( 4) that it wa~ final according to that
law and, (5) that it was subsisting award at the date of the suit.
The essential difference between a foreign judgment and a
foreign award is that \vhile the former is a com1nand of the foreign
sovereign and the comity of nationS accords international recognition to it if it fulfils certain basic requirements, the latter is
founded on the contract bet\veen the parties and is not given the
status of a judgment in the country in which it is nlade and cannot claim the same international status as the act of a foreign
sovereign.
-"'
Even though an award may not have obtained the status of
judgment in the country in which it is made, if it possesses the
essential attribute of a judgment, that is finality, it can be sued
upon in another country.
Union l\Tationaledes Cooperatives Agricoles de Careales v.
Robert Cattmll & Co. Ltd., (1959) 2 Q. B. 44, referred to.
But the finality that r. 15, cl. (E) of the American Spice Trade
Association gives to the awards in question is no more than a
matter of contract between the parties and must be subject to the
law of the State.
7'
A reference to the laws of the State of New York makes it
abundantly clear that the. relevant provisions of the laws of the
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
22
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
State under which alone the awards could become final had not
been complied with and they could not, therefore, provide a cause
of at:tion for the suit.
For an award to furnish a fresh cause of action, it n1ust be
finaL If the law of the country in which it was made gives
finality to the judgment based on an award and not to the award
itself, the award cannot furnish a cause of action in India. Although
the High Court of Bombay. has jurisdiction to enforce a final
award made in a foreign· country in pursuance of a submission
made within the limits of its original jurisdiction, the awards in
question not being final the suit must fail.
Per Subba Rao J.-The doctrine of non-merger of the original
cause of action with the foreign judgment pronounced upon it is a
well established doctrine.
Popat v. Damodar, (1934) 36 B.L.R. 844, Oppenbeim and Co.
v. Mohmed Haneef, (1922) l.L.R. 45 Mad. 496 and Nil Ratan
Mukhopadhya v_ Cooch Behar Loan Office, Ltd. l.L.R. (1941) 1
Cal. 171, referred to.
-
If the contract does not merge in the judgment, by a parity of
reasoning an award on which a foreign judgment is passed cannot also 1nerge in the judgment.
There is no distinction bet\veen a foreign award which would
-require an enforcement order to be enforceable in law and an
award which cannot be enforced except by a judgment.
An enforcement order as well as a judgment on an award serves the
same purpose and they are two different procedures for enforcing
-an award.
Meerifield Ziegler & Co."v. Liverpool Cotton Association Ltd.,
{1911) 105 L.T.R. 97, referred to.
A suit would, therefore, lie on a foreign award completed
.according to the law of that country and before a decree can be
passed on it three things must be proved, ( 1) arbitration agreement, (2) that the arbitration was conducted in accordance with
"the agreement, and ( 3) that the award was valid according to the
law of the country when it \Vas made.
Norske Atlas Insurance Co. Ltd. v. London General Insurance
.Company Limited.. (1927) 43 T.L.R. 541, referred to.
It was not correct to say that the High Court had gone wrong
"in holding that the three necessary conditions had been proved by
-the admission of the appellants in their pleadings.
Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Order VIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure form an integrated code dealing with the manner in
·which the allegations of fact made in a plaint has to be traversed
:and the legal consequences that follow from its non-compliance.
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
Badat and
Company
The discretion under the proviso to r. 5 has to be exercised
by the court as justice demands and particularly according to the
East India
Trading
Company
nature of the parties, standard of drafting prevailing in the loca-
lity and the practice of the court.
There can ~ no doubt that pleadings on the original side
of the Boll:ibay High Court have to be strictly construed in the
light of the said provisions unless the court thinks fit to exercise
it discretion under the proviso.
Tildesley v. Harper, (1878) L.R. 7 Ch. D. 403 and Laxminarayan v. Chimniram Girdharilal, (1917) IL.R. 41 Bom.-89,
referred to.
-
The said three conditions were also proved by the exhibited
record of the proceedings of the Supreme Court of New York
containing the certificate of the Consul General of India in Ne\.v
York and certified copies of the order and judgment of the
Supreme Court.
While under s. 78(6) of the Indian Evidence Act, proof of the
character of the document according to the law of the foreign
country, is condition precedent to its admission, such admission
is not a condition precedent for drawing the requisite presumption
under s. 86 of the Act. That presun1ption can be drawn before
the document is admitted. The judgment of the Supreme Court
of New York, therefore, which satisfied the first two conditions
laid down by s. 78(6), could be legitimately admitted into evidence.
-
-t
The contracts between the parties having been concluded
within the local limits of the original jurisdiction of the Bombay
High Court, a part of the cause of action must have arisen there.
and that court had jurisdiction to try the suit on the awards.
·
C1v1L APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 39
of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September, 1958 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 13 of
1958.
~
1963
The written statement must deal specifically with each allegation
of fact made in the plaint and if th~ defendant denies any such
fact, such denial must not be evasive, he must answer the point
of substance and if he fails to do so the said fact must be taken
to be admitted.
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, P.L. Vohra and/. B. Dadachanji, for
the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Atul Setalvad, V.J. Merchant and G.
Gopalkrishnan, for the respondent.
v.
24
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
May 10, 1%3.-Subba Rao J., delivered a · dissenting
Opinion. The judgment of Dayal and Mudholkar JJ.,
was delivered by Mudholkar J.
SuBBA RAO J.-I regret my inability to agree with the
judgment prepared by my learned brother Mudholkar J.
Company
This appeal by certificate raises the question of jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain a suit
Subba Rao f.
on an award in respect whereof a judgment was made
in a foreign court and other incidental questions.
The facts that have given rise to the present appeal
may be briefly stated. I shall only narrate such facts which
are relevant to the question raised, for in the pleadings a
wider field was covered, but it has gradually been narrowed down when the proceedings reached the present
stage. The appellants are Badat & Co., a firm formerly
carrying on business at Bombay. The respondents, East
India Trading Co., are a private limited company incorporated under the laws of the State of New Yark in
the United States of America and having their registered
office in the State of New York. The respondents instituted Suit No. 71 of 1954 against the appellants in the High
Court ·of Judicature at Bombay, in its Ordinary Original
Civil Jurisdiction, for the recovery of a sum of
Rs. 92,884/4/10 with interest thereon. It was alleged in
the plain that by correspondence, the details whereof were
given in the plaint, the appellants agreed to do business
with the respondents on the terms of the American Spice
Trade Association contract. Thereafter, by subsequent
correspondence the parties entered into two different contracts whereunder the appellants agreed to sell to the respondents different quantities of Allepey Turm~ric Fingers
on agreed terms. Though the respondents forwarded
to the appellants in respect of the said transactions
two contracts in duplicate on the standard form issued
by the said Trade Association with a request to the
appellants to send them after having duly signed, the appellants failed to do so. Under the terms and conditions of
the said Trade Association Contract, all claims ansmg
· under the contract should be submitted to, and settled
by, arbitration under the rules of the said Association.
It was stated that pursuant to a relevant rule of the
East Indis
Trading
-
4 S.C.R.
I
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
said Association, the dispute was referred to arbitration
and two awards were made in due course i.e., on July
12, 1949. Following the procedure prescribed for the
enforcement of such awards in New York, the respondents initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the:
State of New York to have the said awards confirmed and
a judgment entered thereon in the said Court. In due
course, the said Court pronounced judgment confirming
the said awards. On those allegations a suit was filed
m the High Court of Bombay for recovery of the
amounts payable under the said two awards by the
appellants to the respondents. The suit was tried, in the
first instance, by Mody J. The learned Judge, inter alia,
held that the suit on the foreign judgment would. not lie
in the Bombay High Court, as there was no obligation
under the said judgment for the appellants to pay any
amount to the respondents at any place within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. Adverting to the claim
ba~d on the agreement resulting m the awards, the
learned Judge observed that there was no proof of such
agreement and that there were no admissions m the
written-statement in regard to the facts sustaining such
an agreement. On those findings he held that the respondents had failed to prove that the Bombay High
Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. As the suit
w:ts heard on merits also, he considered other issues
and held that there was neither proof nor admissions
m the written-statement in regard to the alleged contracts. He found that the arbitrators and the umpire
h:td jurisdiction to make the awards, but the said awards
merged m the judgment and that the suit was not
maintainable on the said two awards. It is not necessary
to give the other findings of the learned Judge, as nothing
turns on them in the present appeal. In the result. the
~uit was dismi~ed with costs. On appeal, a division
Bench of the said High Court, consisting of Chagla
C.J. and S. T. Des;ii J., disagreed with Mody J., on the
material questions decided by him and allowed the appeal
with costs. The learned Judges held that the awards did
not merge in the judgment, that the suit on the awardi;
was maintainable and that the Bombay High Court had
jurisdiction to entertain the suit as part of the came of
3-2 S. C. India/i~
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao/.
26
1963
Badat aad
Company
v.
East ladia
Trading
Company
Subba Rao /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964 J
action arose within its limits. The learned Judges further held that all the facts necessary to sustain the respondents' suit on the awards had been proved either by public documents produced in the case or by the admissions
made by the appellants in the written-statement. The present appeal, as aforesaid, has been preferred by certificate
against the judgment of the division Bench.
The learned Solicitor General, appearing for the appellants, raised before us the following points : ( l) The
awards merged in the judgment made by the Supreme
Court of the State of New York and, therefore, no suit
would lie on the awards. (2) Even if the suit could be
filed on the awards, it was not proved that any part of the
cause •of action accrued within the jurisdiction of the
Bombay High Court. To state it differently, the respondents have not proved that the agreements resulting
in the awards were entered into or concluded within
the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. And (3)
the respondents failed to prove the three necessary conditions for the enforcement of the awards namely, (i)
that there was an arbitration agreement, (ii) that the
arbitration was conducted in accordance with the agreement, and (iii) that the awards were made pursuant
to the provisions of the agreement and, therefore, valid
according to the lex fori of the place where the arbitration was carried out and where the awards were
made.
Mr. Setalvad appearing for the respondents, sought
to sustain the findings of the Division Bench of the High
Court given in favour of the respondents on the said questions raised by the appellants.
The first question is whether the awards merged in
the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New
Yark for all purposes; if so, the awards would lose their
individuality or separate existence and no suit could, therefore, be filed to enforce them. In Halsbury's Laws
of England, Vol. 7, 3rd Edn., at p. 141, the relevant
principle is stated under the heading "Foreign Judgments" thus :
"Since the foreign judgment constitutes a simpie
contract debt only, there is no merger of the original
cause of action, and it is therefore open to the plain-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
1963
tiff to sue either on the foreign judgment or on the
original cause of action on which it is based, unless the
Badat and
foreign judgment has been satisfied."
Company
The same idea is expressed in Dicey's "Conflict of
v.
East India
Laws", 7th edn., at p. 1059:
Trading
"For historical and procedural reasons, a foreign
Company
judgment is treated in England as a contractual debt,
and the fact that, in certain instances, it can be en- Subba Rao/.
forced by registration does not appear to alter the traditional view."
Though the learned author in the course of his commentary criticizes this view, the passage represents the
accepted view on the subject. An interesting discussion of the evolution of the rule of non-merger of the
cause of action in the foreign judgment is found in
Piggott's "Foreign fudgment", Part I at p. 17. The various
steps in its evolution may be stated thus: (1) Action
brought on a foreign judgment was an action brought
to recover the judgment debt : . . . . . . necessarily then,
the judgment must be evidence of the debt. (2) It
was not made clear which. debt it evidenced, whether
it was the judgment debt or the original debt. (3)
As it was an action on a debt, an action on the judgment debt soon came to be confused with, and perhaps
looked upon as, an action on the original debt. (4) Having come to that stage, the courts declared that the original debt or cause of action had not merged in the foreign
judgment pronounced upon it. Whatever may he the origin, the doctrine of non-merger of the original cause of
action with the foreign judgment has now been well established in spite of the fact that some text-book writers are
not able to discover a logical basis for the doctrine. In
"Smith's Leading Cases", the learned author says:
"Foreign judgments certainly do not occasion a merger of the original ground of action."
In Cheshire's Private International Law, 5th Edn., the
learned author says in Ch. XVII under the heading
"Foreign Judgments", thus, at p. 598 :
"It is a rule of domestic English law that a plaintiff who has obtained judgment in England against a
defendant is barred from suing again on the original
cause of action. The original cause of action is mer-
28
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964 J
ged in the judgment-transit in rem judicatum-and it
would be vaxatious to subject the defendant to
another action for the purpose of obtaining the same
result. It has been held, however, in a series of authorities, that this is not so in the case of foreign judgments. Such a judgment does not, in the view of
English law, occasion a merger of the original cause
of action, and therefore the plaintiff has his option,
either to resort to the original ground of action
or to sue on the judgment recovered, provided, of
course, that the judgment has not been satisfied."
The learned author gives the following different reason
for this distinction between a foreign and a domesticjudgment, at p. 599 :
"The most plausible justification for non-merger,
perhaps, is that a plaintiff suing in England on a
foreign judgment, as contrasted with one who sues on
an English, judgment possesses no higher remedy than
he possessed before the foreign action. The effect
of judgment in English proceedings is that "the
cause of action is changed into matter of record,
which is of a higher nature, and the inferior remedy
is merged in the higher" ; but the view which
English law takes of a. foreign, judgment is that it
creates merely a simple contract debt between the parties. The doctrine of non-merger has, however, been
too often repeated by judges to justify any prospect
of its abandonment."
This doctrine has been accepted and followed by Indian
Courts: see Popat.. v. Damodar('), Oppenheim and Company v. Mahomed Haneef( 2 ) and Nil Ratan Mukliopadhyaya v. Cooch Behar Loan Office, Ltd.(3).
If the contract doe• not merge in a judgment, by
parity of reasoning, the award on which a foreign judgment
is made cannot also merge in the judgment. While
conceding the said legal position, the learned counsel for
the appellant contends that the award to ,furnish a valid
cause of action shall be one which is legally enforceable
in the country in which it is made. An award made in
(') (1934) 36 B.L.R. 844, 853. (') (1922) l.L.R. ~5 Mad.~%.
l.L.R. (1941) 1 Cal. 171, 175.
(1)
t
4 S.C.R.
,.
r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29
1963
New York, the argument proceeds, by its own force does
not create rights or impose liabilities thereunder and thereBadat and
fore, such an inchoate document cannot afford a cause
Company
of action. This contention has not been raised for the
v.
East India
first time, but has been noticed in "Russel On ArbiTrading
tration", 16th Edn. and answered at p. 282.
The
Company
learned author places the following two propositions in
juxtaposition: (1) "An award made by foreign arbi- Subba Rao J.
trators, which requires an enforcemei!t order to render
it enforceable by the local law, is not a judgment of
a foreign tribunal which can be enforced by action in
English courts". (2) "But an award which is complete
and could be enforced in the country where it was
made is enforceable in England at Common Law, quite
apart from any rights given by Part II of the Act."
In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II 3rd edn., the following note is given at p. 52 :
"A foreign arbitration award which is complete
and enforceable in the country in which it was made
is enforceable in England at Common Law."
The learned Solicitor-General seeks to draw a subtle
distinction between an award made by foreign arbitrators
which require an enforcement order to render it enforceable by the local law and an award which could not be
enforced except by obtaining a judgment on its basis. On
this distinction an argument is advanced, namely, that in
the case of the former award, the award has been vitalized
by the enforcement order, while in the case of the latter
the award qua the judgment has not become enforceable,
but it is the judgment that becomes enforceable. In
support of this contention reliance is placed upon the
following observations found in Dicey's Conflict of Law>,
17th edn., at p. 1059 :
"If the foreign award is followed by judicial proceedings in the foreign country resulting in a judgment of the foreign court which it not merely a formal
order giving leave to enforce the award, enforcement proceedings in England must be brought on
the foreign judgment (or possibly on the original
cause of action), but probably not on the award."·
These observations are not supported by any direct decision; they represent only the author's doubts on the
30
1963
Badal and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
question. On principle I cannot see why a distinction
should be made between the two categories of cases. An enforcement order as well as a judgment on an award
serves the same- purpose : they are two different procedures prescribed for enforcing an award. In the case of
an enforcement order a party applies to a court for
leave to enforce the award ; and on the granting of such
leave, the award can be enforced as if it were a decree of
a court. .In the alternative procedure, an action either in
the shape of a suit or a petition will have to be filed on
an award and a judgment obtained thereon. In that event,
the award, vis-a-vis the country in which it is made,
merges in the judgment and thereafter the judgment
only becomes enforceable. But, as explained earlier,
there is no merger in the context of its enforcement in another country. In both the cases the award in the
country of its origin is complete and enforceable. If an
award. gets vitality by a mere enforcement order, it gets
a higher sanctity by the court of its origin making a judgment on it. Both of them afford a guarantee of its vitality
and enforceability in the country of its origin and,
therefore, a different country can safely act upon it.
In both the cases the award is complete in the country
of its origin and if the doctrine of merger cannot be invoked in the case of foreign judgment, as I have held
it cannot, there is no principle on which the distinction sought to be made can be sustained. To sanction the
distinction in the context of a foreign judgment is to
prefer the form to substance and to accept a lesser guarantee and reject a higher one. The decision in Merrifield, Ziegler, and Co., v. Liverpool Cotton Association
Limited (1) does not lay down any different proposition.
There, t!Ie plaintiff brought an action in England against
Liverpool Cotton Association for restraining tl1e said Association from expelling them from membership of the
Association. The Association filed a counter claim demanding a large amount from the plaintiffs payable
by tl1em under an award made in Germany. The claim
was based on the award and in effect it was a claim to
"enforce the award. By German Law an enforcement order
( 1)
(1911). 105 L.T.lt. 97, 106.
-
4 S.C.R.
-
!
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
was necessary before an award can be enforced. But no
such order was made there. The High Court rejected
the counter claim. In doing so, it made the following observations :
"The sole point, therefore, remains whether the
award is a decision which the court here ought to recognize as a foreign judgment. In my opinion it is
not, although as between the parties it is conclusive
upon all matters thereby adjudicated upon, and is
therefore in a different category to the "remate"
judgment dealt with by the House of Lords in
Nouvin v. Framan(') ; it has no further force or
effect unless and until the court determines that
it is an adjudication made in proceedings regularly conducted upon matters really submitted to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal. It is nor even as
though the award were enforceable unless the court
stays its operation ; the contrary is really the case,
and for all practical purposes it is still born until
vitality is infused into it by the court. It is then,
for the first time, endowed with one, at least, of
the essential characteristics of a judgment-the right
to enforce obedience to it."
This passage in clear terms brings out the principle
underlying the proposition that an award cannot afford
a cause of action till it is complete in the country of its
origin. The reason of the rule is that unless and until
the appropriate court determines its regularity, it is inchoate and it becomes enforceable only when an enforcement order or judgment puts its seal of approval on it.
For the application of this principle the distinction between
an enforcement order and a judgment ·on the award
is not material. In either case, the Court approves it.
Indeed, the Judicial Committee in Oppenheim & Co.
v. Mahomed Hanef( 2 ) sanctioned the maintainability
of a suit to enforce an award which ended in a judgment. There, in respect of a mercantile dispute that
arose between merchants carrying on business in London and a merchant at Madras, an award was obtained in England. The merchants in England filed a suit on
( 1)
(1889) 15 App. Cas. 1.
(') (1922) LLR. 45 Mad. 496.
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
S_ubba Rao /.
32
1963
~adat and
Company
v.
East India·
Trading
(;on1pany
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the award on the King's Bench Division of the High Court
in England for the amounts payable thereunder and
obtained an ex-parte judgment against the metchant at
Madras. Thereafter, they brought a suit against the
Madras merchant in the High Court of Judicature at
Madras claiming the sum due under the said judgment, or in the alternative, for the amount due under the
award. Coutts Trotter J., who heard the case in the fir.st
instance, held that the suit was not maintainable on the
judgment that was an ex-parte one, and gave a decree on
the award. But on appeal, a Division .Bench of that Court
took a dilfetent view. On further appeal, the Privy
Council restored the decree made by Coutts Trotter J. :
but they concluded their judgment with the following
caution:
"In order to prevent misconception, it appears
desirable to add that it was not pleaded or contemled
at any stage of the proceedings that the award had
merged in the English judgment, and accordingly
their Lordships do not deal with that point."
This decision is certainly an authority for the position
that on the assumption that an award does not merge
in a foreign judgment, it affords a cause of action in
another country. I have already indicated earlier on the
same reasoning applicable to the doctrine of non-merger
of a contract in a foreign judgment that an award also will
not merge. For the reasons given by me, I hold that a
suit would lie on the basis of an award in a foreign country, provided it is completed in the manner prescribed by
the law of that country.
I shall now take the third question, for the discussion
thereon would also solve the problem raised by the second
question. The learned Solicitor-General contends that
there is no proof of the facts to satisfy the afore53id
three conditions and the Division Bench of the High Court
went wrong in holding to the contrary on the basis of tl1e
alleged admissions found in the pleadings. Mr. Setalvad,
learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
while conceding that the said three conditions must be
satisfied before a foreign award can be enforced, argues
that the relevant facts were proved not only by the admissions made by the appellants in the written-statem;nt, ex-
-
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
pressed or implied, but also by the production of the certified copy of the judgment of the foreign court.
In Norake Atlas Insurance Co. Ltd. v. London
General Insurance Company Limited('), an award made
in Norway was sought to be enforced in England. Action
was brought not on the contract but on the award. MacKinnon J., laid down in that case that three things had
to be proved for obtaining a decree thereon, namely, (1)
the submission ; (2) the conduct of the arbitration in
accordance with the submission ; and (3) the fact that the
award was valid according to the law of the country where
it was made. So too, in Halsbury' s Laws of En gland,
3rd edn., Vol. II, in para 116, at p. 53, the said conditions of enforcement are given with further elaboration.
I need not pursue this matter, as there is no dispute on
this aspect of the question.
Have the conditions been proved in the present case?
I shall first take the arguments based on the pleadings. Before doing so, it would be convenient to read the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the
subject, as the arguments turn upon the application of
those provisions to the pleadings.
Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes, among others, that the plaintiff shall give in the
plaint the facts constituting the cause of action and when
it arose, and the facts showing that the court has jurisdiction. The object is to enable the defendant to ascertain from the plaint the necessary facts so that he may
admit or deny them. Order VIII provides for the filing
of a written-statement, the particulars to be contained
therein and the manner of doing so ; rules 3, 4 and 5
thereof are relevant to the present enquiry and they read :
Order VIII Rule 3. It shall not be sufficient for
a defendant in his written statement to deny generally
the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact
of which he does not admit the truth, except damages.
r. 4 Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in
the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the
point of substance. Thus if it is alleged that he
( 1)
(1927) 43 T.L.R. 541.
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao J.
34
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount,
but he must deny that he received that sum or any
part thereof, or else set out how much he received.
And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those
circmrutances.
Rule 5. Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not
denied specifically, or by necessary implication, or
stat.ed to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a
person under disability.
Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than
by such admission.
These three rules form an integrated code dealing with
the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should
be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its
non-compliance. The written-statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when
a defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. If his denial of
a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken
to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself
being proof, no other proof is necessary. The first paragraph of r. 5 is a re-production of O.XIX, r. 13, of the English rules made under the Judicature Acts. But in mofussil
Courts in India, where pleadings were not precisely drawn,
it was found in practice that if they were strictly construed
in terms of the said provisions, grave injustice would be
done to parties with genuine claims. To do justice between
those parties, for which Courts are intended, the rigor of
r. 5 has been modified by the introduction of the proviso
thereto. Under that proviso the Court may, in its discretion, require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise
than by such admission. In the matter of mofussil pleadings, Courts, presumably relying upon the said proviso, tolerated more laxity in the pleadings in the interest of justice.
But on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court, we are
told, the pleadings are drafted by trained lawyers bestowing
serious thought and with precision. In construing such
pleadings the proviso can be invoked only in exceptional
.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
1963
circumstances to prevent obvious injustice to a party or
to relieve him from the results of an accidental slip or
Badat and
omission, but not to help a party who designedly made
Company
vague denials and thereafter sought to rely upon them
v.
East India
for non-suiting the plaintiff. The discretion under the
Trading
proviso must be exercised by a Court having regard to the
Comp•ny
justice of a cause with particular reference to the nature
of the parties, the standard of drafting obtaining in a Su~ba Rao {.
locality, and the traditions and conventions of a Court
wherein such pleadings are filed. In this context the decision in Tildesley v. Harper(') will be useful. There, in an ·
action against a lessee to set aside the lease granted under
a power the statement of claim stated that the donee of the
power had received from the lessee a certain sum as a
bribe, and stated the circumstances; the statement of
defence denied that that sum had been given, and denied
each circumstance, but contained no general denial of a
bribe having been given. The Court held, under rules
corresponding to the af<,resaid rules of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that the giving of the bribe was not sufficiently
denied and therefore it must be deemed to have been admitted. Fry J. posed the question thus : What is the point
of substance in the allegations in the statement of claim?
and answered it as follows :
"The point of substance is undoubtedly that a
bribe was given by Anderson to Tildesley, and that
point of substance is nowhere met. ........... no fair
and substantial answer is, in my opinion, given to the
allegation of substance, namely that there was a bribe.
In my opinion it is of the highest importance that this
rule of pleading should be adhered to strictly, and that
the Court should require the Defendant, when putting in his statement of defence, and the Plaintiff,
when replying to the allegations of the Defendant, to
state the point of substance, and not to give formal
denials of the allegations contained in the previous
pleadings without stating the circumstances. As far
as I am concerned, I mean to give the fullest effect
to that rule. I am convinced that it is one of the
highest benefit to suitors in the Court."
1
(1) ( 1878) L.R. 7 Ch. D. 403.
36
1963
Badat and
Company
V.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
It is true that in England the concerned rule is inflexible and that there is no proviso to it as is found in
the Code of Civil Procedure. But there is no reason why
in Bombay on the original side of the High Court the same
precision in pleadings shall not be insisted upon except in
exceptional circumstances. The Bombay High Court, in
Laxmi11arayall v. Clzimniram Girdlzari Lal('), construed
the said provisions and applied them to the pleadings in a
suit filed in the court of the Joint Subordinate Judge of
Ahmednagar. There the plaintiffs sued to recover a sum
of money on an account stated. · For the purpose of saving
limitation they relied in their plaint upon a letter sent by
the defendant-firm. The defendants in their written statement stated that the plaintiffs's suit was not in time and
that "the suit is not saved by the letter put in from the
bar of limitation". The question was raised whether in that
state of pleadings, the letter could be taken as admitted
between the parties and, therefore, unnecessary to be
proved. Batchelor, Ag. C. J., after noticing the said provisions, observed :
"It appears to us that on a fair reading of paragraph 6, its meaning is that though the letter put in
by the plaintiff is not denied the defendants contend
that for one reason or another its effect is not to save
the suit from the bar of limitation. We think, therefore, that ...... the letter, Exhibit 33, must be accepted
as admitted between the parties, and therefore, unnecessary to be proved."
The written statement before the High Court in that
case was one filed in a court in the mofussil ; yet, the Bombay High Court applied the rule and held that the letter
need not be proved aliunde as it must be deemed to have
been admitted in spite of the vague denial in the written
statement. I, therefore, hold that the pleadings on the
original side of the Bombay High Court should also be
strictly construed, having regard to the provisions of rr. 3,
4 and 5 of Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless
there are circumstances wherein a Court thinks fit to
exercise its discretion under the proviso to r. 5 of O.VIII.
The first condition for the enforceability of an award
(1) (1917) I.L.R. 41 Born. 89, 93.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
37
is the proof of submission to arbitration. A claim based on
an award is in effect a claim to enforce the award on the
footing that the submission implied a contract to give
effect to the award. In the plaint the details of the preliminary contract between the parties containing an arbitration clause has been specifically and precisely stated in
paras 2 and 3. As much of the argument turns upon the
sai(l allegations, it may conveniently be read here.
"2. By their letter d·ated 7th September 1948 the
plaintiffs intimated to the defendants that they were
prepared to do business with them on the terms of
the American Spices Trade Association contract, net
landed weights, less 11 per cent. discount, letter of credit to be opened for 95 per cent. of the amount of the
transaction and the balance to be settled immediate! y
after the goods were weighed and delivered and if
there was any difference in the plaintiffs' favour the
same was to be remitted to them by the defendants by
telegraph. By their letter dated 13th September, 1948
the defendants agreed to the said terms. Thereafter
by their cable dated 3rd March, 1949 the defendants
offered to sell to the plaintiffs 30 tons of Alleppey
Turmeric Fingers at 22} cents per lb. C. & F. New
York less 2 per cent March/April shipment. On the
same day the plaintiffs cabled to the defendants their
acceptance of the said offer. By their cable dated
7th March, 1949 the defendants offered to sell to the
plaintiffs further 30 tons of Alleppey Turmeric Fingers at 22 cents per lb. C. & F. New York less 2 per
cent March/ April shipment. On the same day the
plaintiffs cabled to the defendants their acceptance of
the said offer. By their letter dated 8th March 1949
the defendants confirmed the >aid contract arrived at
between the parties on 3rd March, 1949. By their letter
'dated 9th March, 1949 the plaintiffs confirmed both
the said contracts ~nd further intimated to the defendants th~t they had opened the necessary letters of
credit. The plaintiff> forwarded to the defendants in
respect of the said transactions two contracts in duplicate on the standard form issued by the said American
Spice Trade Association with a request to the defendants to return to the plaintiffs a copy of each of them
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao f.
38
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
. Subba Rao /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
after signing the same. The defendants, however,
failed and neglected to do so. The plaintiffs crave
leave to refer to and rely upon the cables and letters
above referred to and standard form of contract issued
by the said American Spice Trade Association, when
produced."
"3. The plaintiff say that the standard form of
contract issued by the said American Spice Trade Association is known in the spice and herb market as
"The American Spice Trade Association Contract" and
contains terms and conditions on which the defendants had agreed to do business with the plaintiff as
aforesaid. The plaintiff further say that the said standard form of contract is in common use with firms
dealing in spices and herbs both in the New York market apd elsewhere. The plaintiff further say that the
defendants have been dealing in spices and herbs with
American firms in the United States and also on the
United States market and had previously entered into
several American Spice Trade Association Contracts
and were well aware of and knew what the terms and
conditions of the said American Spice Trade Association Contract were. One of the said terms was as
follows:"All questions and controversies and all claims
arising under this contract shall be submitted to
and settled by Arbitration under the Rules of the
American Spice Trade Association printed on the
reverse side hereof. This contract is made as of
in New York."
Then the plaint proceeds to give how the dispute should
be referred to arbitration and how arbitrators and umpire
should be appointed by the parties. From the said allegations in the plaint it is clear that the plaintiffs have precisely
and definitely given the particulars of the correspondence
that passed between the parties on the basis of which they
claimed the preliminary contract containing an agreement
to submit their dispute to arbitration and the subsequent
contracts in respect of the goods made and concluded between the parties.
The defendants, adverting to the said allegations dealt
with them in paragraphs 7 and 8 of their written state-
4 S.C.R.
•
-
•
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
39
ment. The said paragraphs read :
"7. With reference to paragraph 2 of the plaint
the defendants deny that they at any time entered into any contract with the plaintiff as alleged in the said
paragraph or otherwise. The defendants deny that
they at any time signed or were bound to sign a standard form of contract issued by the American Spice
Trad(; Association."
8. With reference to paragraph 3 of the plaint, the
defendants deny that they at any time agreed to do
any business or enter into any contract with the
plaintiffs as alleged therein or otherwise. The defendants say that they did not at any time sign nor were
they bound to sign the said American Spice Trade
Association Contract and that they are not therefore
bound by or concerned with the terms and/or conditions of the said contract. The defendants deny the
rest of the statements contained in the said paragraph."
It will be seen from the said paragraphs that though
the defendants denied that at any time they entered into a
contract with the plaintiffs as alleged in the plaint or otherwise, they have not denied that the letters particularized
in the plaint passed between the parties. Learned SolicitorGeneral relied upon the expression "as alleged" in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the written statement and contended
that the said words implied necessarily that the defendants
denied the passing of the correspondence. No such necessary implication can arise from the use of the said expression. That expression is consistent with the admission by
the defendants of the passing of the letters mentioned in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint, coupled with a denial that
wch correspondence does not constitute a binding contract between them. Indeed, rr. 3 and 4 of 0. VIII are
aimed at such general allegations in written statements. Rule
3 demands that each allegation of fact made in the plaint
must specifically be denied and r. 4 emphasizes that such
a denial shall be of the point of substance and shall not
be vague. Here, in the plaint the contents of the letters
dated September 7, 1948, September 13, 1948, March 8,
1949 and March 9, 1949 are given and it is specifically
stated that they passed between the parties. Nowhere in
the written statement there is a denial as regards the
1963
Badat and
Company
V.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao f.
40
1963
Badat and
Comp~ny
v
East Indi•
Trading
Compµny
Subba R•• /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
passing of the letters or the contents of those letters. The
general and vague allegations in the written statement
cannot possibly be construed, expressly or by necessary
implication, as a denial of the specific allegations in the
plaint in regard to the said correspondence. On this
aspect of the case, to some extent, there is unanimity between Mody J., and the learned Judges of the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court. Adverting to para 7 of
the written statement, Mody, J., says :
"In my opinion, paragraph 7 of the written statement does not at all, directly or indirectly, specifically
or by implication, deal with any of the said three statements of facts. A denial of a contract is not a denial
of the receipt or of the contents of the said letter dated
7th September 1948 or the writing of the letter dated
13th September 1948. The defendants can conceivably
admit the said three statements of fact but still deny
that any contract resulted thereby. Therefore the said
three statements of facts must be deemed to have been
admitted."
Dealing with para 8 of the written statement, the learned
Judge says that these two statements of facts have not been
pleaded to in the written statement and must, therefore,
be deemed to have been admitted. But having gone so far,
the learned Judge rules against their admissibility on the
ground that there are no allegations that the defendants
wrote the letters attributed to them and that there is no
description of the contents of the letters. This, if I may
say so, is rather hypercritical. The allegations in para 2 of
the plaint in express terms say that the letters emanated
from the defendants and also give their gist. The Division
Bench of the High Court in the context of the said denials
said:
"Therefore, there is no denial of this corresp.,ndence. Indeed there could not be, because before
the Written Statement was filed inspection was giTen
by the plaintiffs of this correspondence and again the
conscientious draftsman of the written statement could
not possibly have controverted the statement that these
letters passed between the parties. Therefore, in Olli"
opinion, these two letters of the 7th September, 194~
and 13th September, 1948 are admissible in evidence,
•
-
;,
I\
4 S.C.R.
r
';
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
1963
and we will formally admit them in evidence."
Then they proceeded to state :
Badat and
"Now, we read this denial to mean not a denial
Company
of the exchange of letters and telegrams, not a denial
v.
East India
of the correctness of the copies of the documents of
Trading
which the Defendants have taken inspection, but a
Company
submission in law that no contract emerges from the
exchange of these letters and telegrams.
Subba Rao f.
For the reasons already given by me, I entirely agree with
the view expressed by the Division Bench on the interpretation of the pleadings and hold that the said letters have been
rightly admitted in evidence. If the said letters can go in
as evidence, the first condition, namely, the factum of submission has been proved in this case.
As regards the question whether the arbitration was
conducted in accordance with the submission, the pleadings
again afford the answer. In paras 3, 4 and 5 of the plaint
it is specifically stated that the parties agreed to the arbitration clause and to the procedure prescribed for carrying out
the arbitration. It is stated therein that pursuant to r. 5
and clauses B, C and E of r. 15 of the Rules of tl1e said
American Spice Trade Association, arbitrators and umpire
were appointed, that the arbitrators and the umpire subscribed to their oaths of office and proceeded to hear the
matter on 27th June, 1949, and 12th July, 1949, that the
defendants, though duly notified of the hearings, did not
attend the same, that on 12th July, 1949, the said arbitrators and umpire duly made, signed, acknowledged and
published their awards and thereby they unanimously held
that the defendants had committed a breach of the said
two contracts and awarded that the defendants should pay
to the plaintiffs specific amounts in respect of the said contracts as and by way of damages. Paragraph 7 of the
plaint describes how the defendants did not meet the
demand, how proceedings were taken before the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, how notice of the said
proceedings was duly served on the defendants and how
the said Court pronounced its judgment confirming the
said awards. Paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the written
statement deal with the said allegations. In the said
paragraphs the defendants do not deny the factum of the
appointment of arbitrators and the procedure followed by
4-2 S C India/64
42
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
them in making the awards. They are content to say
that they are not bound by or concerned with the appointment of the arbitrators by the plaintiffs as alleged therein
or otherwise, that they are not bound by or concerned
with any of the statements contained in para 7 of the
plaint and that the awards passed by the arbitrators and the
umpire are not binding on them. As regards the allegations in pa~a 7 they only say that the arbitrators act.;:d
without jurisdiction and that the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York made thereon is not
binding on them. It will be seen from the said denials
that neither the appointment of the arbitrators nor the
steps taken by them are denied. If so it must be held,
on the same reasoning.which I have adopted in the context of the allegations pertaining to submission, that in the
absence of specific denials it must be held that it is admitted that the awards were made in strict compliance with
the terms of submission.
Now coming to the third condition, namely, the proof
of the fact that the awards are valid according to the law
of the country where they were made, the same equivocal
attitude is adopted by the defendants in their written statement. In para 8 of the plaint there is the following
specific allegation in that regard :
" ...... the said arbitration having been duly held
and the said awards having been duly made, signed,
acknowledged and pµblished according to the said rules
and the 'laws of the State of New York, and the defendants not having taken steps to have the said awards
or either of them set aside or modified, as provided
in the said rules and by the laws of the State of New
York, the said awards are binding on the defendants
and the defendants are now precluded and estopped
from disputing the same."
Here there is a definite averment that the awards were
made according to the laws of the State of New York. In the
written statement of the defendants, though they generally
deny that the awards are binding on them, there is no
specific denial that the awards are not in accordance with
the laws of the State of New York. Applying the same
rules of construction which I invoked in the case of the
other averments in the plaint, I must also hold that the
;·
(
f-
4 S.C.R.
-
-·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
43
1963
defendants must be held to have admitted the fact that
the awards were made in accordance with the laws of the
Badal and
State of New York.
Company
There is one important circumstance which must be
v.
East India
borne in mind in construing the terms of the written stateTrading
ment. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs have filed affiCompany
davits disclosing the copies of the documents mentioned in
the plaint. The defendants' Advocate had inspection of Subba Rao /.
the said documents before he filed his written statement.
It is not disputed that the defendants received a copy
of the petition filed by the plaintiffs in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, along with a copy of
the awards and the order of the Court to show cause.
With the knowledge of the contents of the copies of the
letters and the contents of the awards, the Advocate for
the defendants rightly and properly was not in a position to deny the factual aspect of the passing of the letters
and the making of the awards and the delivery of the
judgment by the Supreme Court of the State of New York
confirming the said awards. That is why the written
statement contained vague and general denials only specifically raising disputes on legal questions, and designedly
giving equivocal answers to factual aspects. It is said that
no inference of tacit acceptance on the part of the defendants or their counsel can be drawn, for the defendants'
Advocate, after inspection of the documents, asked the
plaintiffs' Advocate to produce the originals, but the plaintiffs failed and neglected to do so. But this circumstance
does not detract from the knowledge of the defendants
and their Advocate of the existence of the said documents
and their contents before the written statement was drafted.
This circumstance gives a satisfactory explanation for the
vagueness of the allegations in the written statement of
the defendants. They were designedly made vague as
the Advocate presumably could not bring himself to go
the whole length of denying the facts. I, therefore, hold,
on a fair and reasonable construction of the pleadings and
written statement that the existence of the three conditions for enforcing the awards have been admitted by the
defendants in their pleadings and that, therefore, they need
not be independently proved.
I would go further and hold that the said three con-
44
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964}
ditions are also proved by Ex. X-9. The said exhibit is
the record of proceedings of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York relating to the arbitration between the
plaintiffs and the respondents. That record contains the
certificate issued by the Consul-General, and other papers
relating to the proceedings including the order and judgment of the said Supreme Court. The Certificate reads
thus:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY (a) that the annexed proceedings have been duly had in accordance with
the laws of the State of New York.
( b) that the annexed proceedings are duly certified
by tlie officer having the legal custody of the originals thereof at the time such annexed proceedings
were issued by the Supreme Court of New York.
(c) that the several persons named in the annexed
proceedings as holding the respective offices stated
therein in respect of each of them did in fact hold
such respective office at the time the same took
place.
The Consulate-General of India assumes no
responsibility for the contents of this document.
Sd./- M. Gopalcharan
Dated: New York, N.Y.
June 18th, 1957.
CONSUL-GENERAL
Seal of CONSULATE
GENERAL OF INDIA,
New York, N.Y.
The order and judgment of the Supreme Court of New
York dated March 21, 1950, give in detail the filing of
the application by the respondents for an order confirming
the two awards ; the consideration given to the said application by the Court ; the Court's satisfaction, after perusing the awards and the connected papers, that the said
proceedings wert'. in all respects regular ; and the terms of
the order made on the said application. The decretal
portion of the order confirms the awards. The judgment is
signed by Archibald R. Watgon, Clerk, and certified both
by the said Clerk and the Clerk of the. Supreme Court of
New York County. If the Judgment goes into evidence,
the three conditions are satisfied, namely, that there was
''
,_
4 S.C.R.
45
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
a submission, that the arbitrators gave the awards in terms
of the submission and that a judgment was made on those
awards on the ground that the awards were made in
accordance with law.
But it is argued by the learned Solicitor-General that
the said judgment has not been proved in the manner prescribed by the Indian Evidence Act. The relevant sections
of the Evidence Act may now be read :
Section 74 : The following documents are public
documents :( 1) documents forming the acts, or records of
acts-
.
-
.
.
.
.
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive of any part of India or of the Commonwealth or of a foreign country.
Section 78 : The following public documents may
be proved as follows :
-,
.
(6) Public documents of any other class in a foreign
country,
By the original, or by a copy certified by the legal
keeper, thereof with a certificate under the seal of a
notary public, or of an Indian Consul or diplomatic
agent, that the copy is duly certified by the officer
having the legal custody of the original, and upon proof
of the character of the document according to the law
of the foreign country."
Section 86 : The Court may presume that any
document purporting to be a certified copy of any
judicial record of any country not forming part of
India or Qf Her Majesty's Dominions is genuine and
accurate, if the document purports to be certified in any
manner which is certified by any representative of the
Centr.al Government in or for such country to be the
manner commonly in use in that country for the certification qf copies of judicial records ............. "
It is not disputed that the copy of the judgment is certified by the legal keeper of the original within the meaning
of s. 78(6) of the Evidence Act; nor is it contended that
there is no certificate under the seal of an Indian Consul
certifying that the copy is certified by the officer having
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao/.
46
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Subba Rao/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the legal custody of the original. But what is contended
is that under s. 78 (6) of the Evidence Act three conditions
must be complied with before. the judgment can be admitted in evidence and the third condition, namely, proof of
character of the document according to the law of the
foreign country, is not forthcoming in this case. A perusal of s. 78(6) of the Evidence Act makes it clear that apart
from the two certificates-one by the legal keeper of the
original documents and the other by the Consul-Generalthere shall also be proof of the character of the document
according to the law of the foreign country before the
document is admitted. It is a condition precedent. The
short question, therefore, is whether there is such proof in
this case. Proof can be by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Proof can also be given by placing before the Court facts
giving rise to presumptions, rebuttable or irrebuttable. Section 86 of the Evidence Act lays down that a Court may
presume the genuineness and accuracy of any document
purporting to be a certified copy of any judicial record of
any foreign country, if such a copy is duly certified in the
manner and according to the rules in use in the country
for certification of copies of judicial records. To give rise
to this presumption it is not necessary that the judgment
of the foreign country should have already been admitted
in evidence. While s. 78(6) of the Evidence Act lays down
three conditions for admitting the judgment in evidence,
the admission of the judicial record is not a condition
precedent for drawing the requisite presumption under
s. 86 of the Evidence Act. That presumption may be drawn
before the said record is admitted. The document may be
looked into for the purpose of ascertaining whether there
is the requisite certificate, viz., a certificate issued by any
representative of the Central Government in the concerned
country to the effect that the said document was certified
in the manner commonly in use in that country for the
certification of copies of judicial record. If the distinction
between the certificate and the judgment is borne in mind,
the fallacy of the argument becomes apparent. The requisite certificate makes the document admissible and not
vice versa. If there was such a certificate forthcoming-in,
this case there is such a certificate-the document may be.
presumed to be genuine and accurate. If it is presumed
-
·-
4 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
1263
to be genuine and accutate, it shows its character, viz., that
it is a genuine judgment made by the Supreme Court of
Badat and
New York. This is a fit case for raising the said presumpCompany
tion and with the aid of this presumption the third conv•.
East India
dition is also complied with i.e., it is a judgment of the
Trading
Supreme Court of the State of New York made in
Company
accordance with law. As the thrte conditions laid down in
s. 78(6) of the Evidence Act are fulfilled, the document can Subba Rao J.
legitimately be admitted in evidence, and if it is admitted, the document, by its own force, establishes that the
aforesaid three conditions for the enforceability of the
awards have been fulfilled.
Now I come to the second contention. This deals
with the jutisdiction of the Bombay High Court on its
original side to entertain the suit. Clause 12 of the Letters
Patent for Bombay enables a party to file a suit with the
leave of the Court, if the cause of action arises in part
within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction
of the said High Coutt. The cause of action in the plaint
is given as follows :
" ...... the terms of business were accepted by the
defendants in Bombay and the proposal or acceptance
of the said contracts by the defendants took place in
Bombay. The defendants' refusal to pay the said sum
also took place in Bombay."
On those allegations the leave of the High Coutt of Bombay was obt~ned and the suit was filed in the said Court.
I have alre:idy pointed out that in the case of a claim
based on an award, it is in effect a claim to enforce the
award on the footing that the submission implied a contract to give effect to the award. I have also held that
all the necessary documents relating to the preliminary as
well as subsequent contracts are admitted in the written
statement. The said documents clearly establish that the
parties agreed that their disputes under the contracts should
be submitted to arbitration in the manner prescribed by
the rules of the American Spices Trade Association. Those
contracts were concluded within the local limits of the
original jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. It follows
that a part of the cause of action accrued within the said
limits and that as the leave of the High Coutt was obtained,.
the said High Court had jutisdiction to entertain the
48
1963
Badat and
Compa"y
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
claim. No other point is argued before us.
In the result, I agree with the conclusions arrived at
by the High Court. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
MuoHOLKAR J.-This is an appeal by a certificate
granted by the High Court of Bombay from its judgment
dated September 12, 1958 reversing that of Mody J., who,
by his judgment had dismissed a suit instituted by the
East India Trading Co., respondents before us, against
the defendants Badat & Co., on the original side of
the High Court for a sum of Rs. 92,884-4-10 with interest and costs on the basis of a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York affirming awards given by a
domestic tribunal or alternatively on the awards themselves.
The plaintiff-company was incorporated in the State
of New York and among other things, engages in the import of spices. The defendant-company, was a partnership
firm and at the relevant time was carrying on import and
export business in Bombay. According to the plaintiffs, by two letters dated September 7, 1948, and September 13, 1948, the first written by the plaintiffs and
the second by the defendants, the parties agreed to do
business upon the terms of the American Spice Trade
Association. One of the terms agreed between the parties was that the plaintiffs at the time of placing an
order for the supply of spices with the defendants were
to open a letter of credit to the extent of 95 per cent
of the value of the commodity ordered to be supplied
and the balance to be settled immediately after the goods
were weighed and delivered. By their cable dated
March 3, 1949, the defendants offered to sell to the plaintiffs 30 tons of Alleppey Turmeric Fingers at a certain rate, to be shipped in March/April. This offer
was immediately accepted by the· plaintiffs. A somewhat similar offer was again made by the defendants
to the plaintiffs on March 7, 1949, which offer also was
accepted by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim to have
forwarded to the defendants in respect of the said transactions two contracts in duplicate on the standard forms
issued by the American Spice Trade Association with a
request to the defendants to return to them a duly signed
4 S.C.R.
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
from in respect of each of the transactions and their
grievance is that the defendants failed to comply with
the request. The plaintiffs further aver that though
they opened letters of credit, the defendants committed
a breach in respect of both the contracts by failing to
supply turmeric.
The plaintiffs have alleged in para 3 of the plaint
that the defendants were well aware of and knew what
the terms and conditions of the American Spice Trade
Association were. One of the terms of the Association
which they have set out is as follows:
"All questions and controversies and all claims
arising under this contract shall be submitted to and
settled by Arbitration under the Rules of the American Spice Trade Association printed on the reverse
side thereof. This contract is made as of in New
York."
In pursuance of this term, the plaintiffs who had declared the defendants in default appointed one Edward B.
Polak as their Arbitrator and on May 24, 1949, called
upon the defendants to appoint an arbitrator on their
behalf. They also informed the defendants that if they
failed to do so, they, the plaintiffs, would request the Association to appoint an arbitrator on the defendants'
behalf. The defendants not having appointed any arbitrator on their behalf, the Association at the plaintiffs' request
appointed one Michael F. Corio to act as an arbitrator on the defendants' behalf. This person informed the
defendants of his appointment as Arbitrator and requested them to furnish him with all documents and information which might be necessary or useful in the matter of arbitration and further informed them that in the
absence of such documents and information the Arbitrators
will have to proceed with the arbitration upon the documents and information made available by the plaintiffs.
The defendants did not reply to this communic~tion.
The Arbitrators before entering upon arbitration, selected
one James F. Knight as Umpire and Chairman as required
by the rules of the Association. Thereafter the Arbitrators
and the Umpire entered upon arbitration and gne two
awards, in the ·sum of $9,538.6'4 in respect of the first contract and in the sum of $9,209.36 in respect of the second
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudhollr.ar /.
50
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964J
contract by way of damages. The plaintiffs thereupon
drew a bill of exchange on the defendants at Bombay for
$18,748 being the aggregate sum awarded by the two
awards. According to them, though it was presented to the
defendants several times in Bombay they "failed and neglected to accept or to pay the same."
Then, according to the plaintiffs, they adopted prcr
ceedings in the Supreme Court of the State of New York
to have the said awards confirmed and judgment entered
thereon. Notices of the proceedings were said to have
been served on the defendants and judgment confirming
the said awards and ordering the defendants to pay
$19,554.17, including interest and costs, was pronounced on
April 13, 1950. The plaintiffs eventually instituted the suit
out of which this appeal arises in the High Court of Bombay on January 14, 1954.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants have, by
the terms of the contract voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New
York and have agreed to the said Court, which was a
Court having jurisdiction in that behalf, confirming the said
awards and entering judgment thereon. Further, according to them, the parties had expressly agreed that judgment might be entered on any award that might be made
in respect of any question, controversy or claim between
the parties arising under or out of the said contracts in
accordance with the practice of any Court having jurisdiction. Alternatively they have contended that if the
Court held that the judgment was not a judgment of
a foreign Court on which action would lie in the High
Court the defendants having by the terms of the said
contracts expressly agreed to have any dispute arising un-,
der the contracts settled by arbitration in New York.
under the rules of the Spice Trade Association and the
arbitration upon which 'the awards are founded having
been duly made and published according to the rules and
laws of the State of New York and further having become
final are binding on the defendants, the defendants are
bound to carry out the terms of the said awards and to pay
to the plaintiffs the sums awarded under them. Thus the
suit is substantially based on a foreign judgment and in
the alternative on the two awards given by a domestic
-
{
-
4 S.C.R.
-
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
tribunal functioning in New York.
The defendants raised a number of pleas in defence.
In the first place they said that they did not reside within the limits of the original jurisdiction of the High
Court or carry on business therein and the High Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. They further contended that no part of the cause of action had arisen
in Bombay. It may be mentioned that the plaintiffs had
sought for and obtained ex parte leave of the court under
cl. 12 of the Letters Patent and the defendants submitted
that the leave should be revoked. The next important
contention of the defendants was that the Supreme Court
of New York had no jurisdiction to pass the judgment
and the order sought to be enforced. Further, according
to them, the Arbitrators and the Umpire who gave the
alleged awards on which the judgment of the Supreme
Court was founded had no jurisdiction to make those
awards. They raised a number of other pleas also and
elaborate judgments have been delivered by Mody J. as well
as by the appeal court consisting of Chagla C. J., and S.
T. Desai J., dealing with those contentions. Upon the
view we take on the question of the enforceability of
the awards in question in the manner sought in this case
it is not necessary to advert to those pleadings.
It was not disputed before us that the defendants had,
at the date of suit, ceased to reside or carry on business
within the limits of the original civil jurisdiction of the
High Court of Bombay. The appeal court, while holding
that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York
cannot be enforced against the defendants in a suit
brought on the original side of the High Court took the
view that the awards upon which the judgment is based
can be enforced because they give rise to a cause of action
and a part of that cause of action had arisen in Bombay.
The reason why the judgment of the Supreme Court of
New York could not be the foundation of the suit is, in
the words of the karned Chief Justice, as follows :
"The foreign judgment was passed in New York
and the defendants did not reside and carry on business within jurisdiction at the relevant date. The only
way that jurisdiction could possibly have been attracted was by an averment that there was an obligation
1963
Badat and
Company
...
Ea1t India
Trading
Company
52
!963
Badat and
Company
v.
Ea!t lndja
Trading
Company
Mu_dholkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
under the judgment on' the part of the defendants to
pay the amount in Bombay or that the defendants
had undertaken the obligation to pay the judgment
amount in Bombay. There is no such averment in
the Plaint and in the absence of any such averment
if the Plaint had been based only on the foreign
judgment then we might have agreed with the
learned Judge and held that the Court had no jurisdiction."
No doubt, the learned Chief Justice has further said
that it was unnecessary to decide the matter finally because in his view the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief
claimed on the basis of the awards. We may point out
that Mr. Setalvad, who appeared before us for the plaintiffs, did not challenge the finding of the appeal court on
this point and did not seek to argue that the judgment of
the Supreme Court could furnish a cause of action to the
plaintiffs in respect of the present suit.
We entertain no doubt as to the correctness of the
view that the plaintiffs are. not entitled to enforce the
judgment of the Supreme Court against the defendants by
a suit instituted on the original side of the High Court
and therefore, we should ordinarily have let the matter
rest there. Our reasons for agreeing with the High Court's
conclusion on the point are, however, different and,
therefore, it is necessary for us to state them. Before
we do so, it would be desirable to examine the position
regarding the enforcement of foreign awards and foreign
judgments based upon awards. Under the Arbitration
Protocol and Convention Act, 1937 (VI of 1937), certain
commercial awards made in foreign countries are enforceable in India as if they were made on reference to
arbitration in India. The provisions of this Act, however,
apply only to countries which are parties to the Protocol
set forth in the First Schedule to the Act or to awards
between persons of whom one is subject to the jurisdiction
of some one of such powers as the Central Government
being satisfied that the reciprocal provisions have been
made, may, by notification declare to be parties to the Convention, setfbrth in the Second Schedule to the Act. It
is common ground that these provisions are not applicable to the awards in question. Apart from the provisions
4 S.C.R.
53
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of the aforesaid statute, foreign awards and foreign judgments based upon awards are enforceable in India on the
same grounds and in the same circumstances in which
they are enforceable in England under the common law on
grounds of justice, equity and good conscience. We
may add that in cases arising on the original side of the
High Court of Bombay, English common law is applicable
"as nearly as the circumstances of the place and the
inhabitants admit" by virtue of cl. 19 of the Letters
Patent read with cl. XU of the Charter of the Bombay High Court.
The common law on the subject is crystallised thus
as rule 198 in Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 7th edn. at p. 1056.
"Rule 198(1) : A foreign arbitration award which
has been rendered enforceable by a judgment in the
country where it was given may be enforced by an
action as a foreign judgment.
(2) A foreign arbitration award which has not
been rendered enforceable by a judgment in the
country where it was given may be enforced by an action at the discretion of the court if the award is,( a) in accordance with the terms of the submission agreement; and
(b) valid according to the law governing the arbitration proceedings; and
( c) (semble) final according to the law governing the submission agreement."
The position as summarised in Russel On Arbitration,
16th edn. is set out thus at p. 282 :
"An award made by foreign arbitrators, which requires an enforcement order to render it enforceable
by the local law, is not a judgment of a foreign tribunal which can be enforced by action in English courts.
-
'
.
.
.
.
.
But an award which is complete and could be enforced in the country where it was made is enforceable in England at common law, quite apart from
any rights given by Part II of the Act. (Arbitration
Act, 1950-14 Geo. 6, c. 27) ."
Dealing with actions upon foreign awards at common
law, it is stated further at p. 283 thus :
"To succeed in such an action the plaintiff must
1963
Badat a~d
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar /.
54
1963
·Badat and
Company
v.
·East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
prove:(1) That there was an arbitration agreement ;
(2) That the arbitration was conducted in accordance
with that agreement ; and
(3) That the award was made pursuant to the provisions of the agreement and is valid according to
the lex fori of the place where the arbitration was
carried out and where the ward was made.
If the award is validly made in consequence of a
valid arbitration agreement, a sum found due by the
award and unpaid may be sued for in an action upon
the agreement,"
Thus commercial arbitration awards, though based on a
contract to arbitrate are not contracts and although they
are decisions they are not judgments. Even though that
is so, it has been held in several cases in England that
even where an award has not been reduced to a judgment in a foreign country it can be enforced in England
provided, of course, the award answers mutatis mutandis
the tests for determining the enforceability of foreign
judgments. Thus, the foreign arbitration tribunal must
have acted upon a valid submission within the limits
of jurisdiction conferred by the submission, and the award
must be valid and final. (see Dicey's Private International Law, p. 1057). Then it is stated there :
"Others believe that enforcement in England must
depend upon the nature of the award in the country
where it was given. Thus, if the award must be, and
has been, reduced to a judgment abroad, the judgment and not the award must be enforced in England. If the award gives rise to a claim in contract
abroad, it must be enforced as a contract in England.
However, as will be shown, this is not the view generally adopted by the courts, for the award is treated
as a contract in England, no matter whether foreign
law so regards it or not. Still others assert that the
enforcement of an award in England is based not
on the award, but on the contractual agreement to
submit to arbitration all differences arising out of
the original contract, on the ground that the submission to arbitration itself implies a contractual
-
4 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
1963
agreement to abide by the award, thereby extinguishing the original cause of action."
Badat and
After stating this, the learned author proceeds to say :
Company
v.
"It is submitted that no one short formula is
East India
saisfactory and that the enforcement of a foreign
Trading
award involves a complex of questions which must be
Company
treated separately."
He has then dealt with various decisions in England and Mudholkar /.
also the opinions of certain writers. The conclusions
stated in so far as they are relevant to this case are :1. In all enforcement proceedings in England the
plaintiff must first obtain an enforceable title in
England i.e., he must either apply for leave to enforce the award or must bring an action on the
award.
2. In an enforcement proceeding in England the
action on the award must take the form of a claim
in contract. This rule is based upon the assumption that the agreement to perform the award is
implied in the submission and that the submission
is the contract on which the action is based.
3. In order to be enforceable in England, the foreign
award need not first be pronounced enforceable
in the country of its origin. (see Union Nationale
des Cooperatives Agricoles de Cereales v.
Robert Catterall & Co. Ltd.(') though there the
award was being enforced under the Arbitration
Act, 1950). If, however, the foreign award is followed by judicial proceedings in the foreign country resulting in a judgment of the foreign court
which is not merely a formal order giving leave
to enforce the award, enforcement proceedings
in England must be brought on the foreign
judgment or possibly on the original cause of action but probably not on the award. If the foreign
judgment has the character of a formal order
giving leave to enforce the award it is doubtful
whether the foreign award or the foreign order is
to be enforced in England. If the distinction between foreign judgments on the award and foreign
( 1)
(1959) 2 Q.B. 44.
56
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
formal enforcement orders can be maintained in
practice, then, it is believed that the foreign award
and not the foreign order, will be enforced in
England, if the enforcement order is purely formal.
4. For the purpose of enforcing a foreign award
plaintiff must prove only (I) submission, (2)
compliance with the submission in the conduct of
an arbitration and (3) the validity of the award
according to the law of the country where it was
made. This is also laid down in Norske Atlas
Insurance Co. Ltd., v. London General Insurance
Co., Ltd.,(1) and according to the learned author
this decision correctly indicates the conditions
which must be fulfilled if a foreign award is to be
enforced in England.
We may, however, mention that relying upon Merrifield, Ziegler & Co., v. Liverpool Cotton Association
Ltd.,(2) the learned Solicitor-General contended that an
award should also be one which is enforceable in the country in which it was rendered without the aid of an enforcement order or a judgment. There, a German award
was sought to be executed in England. Eve J., who decided the case, found that under the German law the award
had the effect of a final judgment pronounced by a
court of law. But it could not be enforced by execution unless an enforcement order was made by the Court
and further no enforcement order will be made if any
grounds exist for setting the award aside. In the course of
his judgment the learned Judge observed :
"It is not even as though the award were enforceable unless the court stays its operation ; the contrary is
really the case, and for all practical purposes it is stillborn until vitality is infused into it by the court.. It is
then, for the first time, endowed with one, at least, of
the essential characteristics of a judgment-the right
to enforce obedience to it."
Dicey has pointed out that this is the only case· where
such a view has been taken and that it was not even referred to in the Norske's case(1). Nor was it referred to
1
( )
(1927) 43 T.L.R. 541.
2
( )
(1911) 105 L.T:R. 97.
·'
.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
57
in the Union Nationale case('). There, a Danish award,
though not enforceable in Denmark in the absence of an
enforcement order was held by the court of Appeal to be
enforceable under the Arbitration Act of 1950 on the
ground that it had become final and that under the Danish
law only formal objections could be taken to such an
award in the proceedings for obtaining an enforcement
order.
It will thus be seen that there is a conflict of opinion
on a number of points concerning the enforcement of
foreign awards or judgments, based upon foreign awards.
However, certain propositions appear to be clear. One is
that where the award is followed by a judgment in a
proceeding which is not merely formal but which permits
of objections being taken to the validity of the award
by the party against whom judgment is sought, the
judgment will be enforceable in England. Even in that
case, however, the plaintiff will have the right to sue
on the original cause of action. The second principle is
that even a foreign award will be enforced in England
provided it satisfies mutatis mutandis the tests applicable
for the enforcement of foreign judgments on the ground
that it creates a contractual obligation arising out of
submission to arbitration. On two matters connected
with this there is difference of opinion. One is whether an award which is followed by a judgment can
be enforced as an award in, England or whether the
judgment alone can be enforced. The other is whether
an award which it not enforceable in the country in which
it was made without obtaining an enforcement order or
a judgment can be enforced in England or whether in
such a case the only remedy is to sue on the original
cause of action. The third principle is that a foreign
judgment or a foreign award may be sued upon in England as giving good cause of action provided certain conditions are fulfilled one of which is that it has become
final.
Bearing in mind these principles let us consider
whether the judgment of the Supreme Court could be
enforced against the defendants by instituting a suit on
(1) (1959) 2 Q. B. 44.
5-2 S. c. lndia/64
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar /.
{1964]
the original side of the High Court. The appeal court
has, as already stated taken the view tliat the original
cause of action having arisen wholly or in part within
the limits of the original jurisdiction of the High Court,
the suit was maintainable. If the plaintiffs were suing
upon the original cause of action, there would have been
no difficulty and the High Court could have granted leave
under cl. 12 to the plaintiffs to institute the suit. But
here, we are concerned not with the original cause of
action but with the judgment of the New York Supreme Court and the award. The judgment furnishes
an independent cause of action. The question would be
whether the cause of action furnished by it arose within
the limits of the original jurisdiction of the High Court.
The judgment was rendered in New York and, therefore, the cause of action furnished by it arose at that place
and not anywhere else. This cause oL action is really
independent of the cause of action afforded by the contract and, therefore, if advantage was sought to be
taken of it, the suit would not lie at Bombay. This point
?oes not appear to have come up for a direct decision
m any case.
We may, however, refer to the decision in East India
Trading Co., v. Carmel Exporters & Importers Ltd.(')
There, an action was brought in England to enforce
a foreign judgment awarding damages for breach of contract and the question for' consideration was the relevant
date for converting the amount of damages into sterling.
After considering the relevant decisions on the point Sellers J., held that the relevant date would be the date
of the foreign judgment. The ground given by him
was that the plaintiff's cause of action was the foreign
judgment and it is that judgment which creates the debt
which was enforceable by action in England. The principle underlying this case should also apply to the present
one because in both cases the cause of action is founded on
foreign judgments, though in the case before us it is
founded alternatively, upon foreign awards also. The
only difference is that while in our case the question
is where it arose, in the case cited the question was as tO
(') (1952) 2 Q.B. 439.
-
v
.k
-
4 S.C.R.
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
when it arose.
The reason why a foreign judgment should be deemed to create a new obligation has not been stated in this
case. But it is to be found in the judgment of Blackburn
J. in Schibsby v. Westenholz(') where at p. 159 he has
stated :
"The true principle on which the judgments of
foreign tribunals are enforced in England is that stated
by Parke B. in Russel v. Smyth( 2 ), and again repeated
by him in Williams v. fones(') that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the defendant to pay the sum for which judgment is given,
which the courts in this country are bound to enforce ;
,,
As James L. J., has said in Re Davidson's Settlement Trusts(') "It would be impossible to carry on
the business of the world if courts refused to act upon
what has been done by other courts of competent
jurisdiction."
Schmitthoff in The English Conflict of Laws, 3rd edn. has
stated at p. 459 :
"The English courts recognise that a foreign judgment gives rise to private rights which, on principle,
should be protected by them. Consequently, when
referring to the recognition of a foreign judgment,
what is actually meant is the recognition of the private right that is created by the judgment and not
the enforcement of a foreign judicial act of State. In
the words of Professor Read(')-'The true basis upon
which the Anglo-Dominion authorities ........ place
the recognition of a foreign judgment is that it
proves the fact that a vested right has been created through the judicial process by the law of a
foreign law district.' .......... The view that the recognition of a foreign judgment in the English juris---
(') (1870) 6 Q.B. 155.
(') (1842) 9 M & W 810.
(') (1845) 13 M & W 628. ( 4 ) (1873) L.R./E. & 383, 386,
( 5 ) "Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (1938)"
by Prof. Read. Quoted by Schmitthofl in "The English Conflict of
Laws" p. 459.
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar J.
60
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Tradinf(
Company
Mudholkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
diction is based on the assumption that the foreign
judgment creates a new legal obligation is firmly established by numerous decisions."
No divergent views have been expressed upon this question. No doubt, the English doctrine of merger has been
consistently held in England not to apply to a foreign
judgment with the result that despite tl1e fact that a plaintiff has obtained a foreign judgment he may nevertheless sue in an English court upon the original cause of
action instead upon the judgment. When he sues upon
the original cause of action, no doubt, the court within
whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose would be entitled to entertain the suit. But, if on the other hand,
he chooses to sue upon the judgment, he cannot found
jurisdiction for the institution of the suit on the basis of
the original cause of action because once he chooses to
rest himself on the judgment obtained by him in a foreign
court, the original cause of action will have no relevance whatsoever even though it may not have merged in
that judgment.
Since the judgment with which we are concerned was
pronounced in New York the cause of action for a suit
based thereon must be said to have arisen at that place.
Since that is so, it follows that the cause of action in so
far as it rests on the judgment, did not arise within
the limits of the original jurisdiction of the High Court
of Bombay and the suit based upon that judgment must
be held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
The alternative claini of the plaintiffs is for the enforcement of the awards themselves and it is this which t.he
Appeal Court has held to be one which can validly form
the basis of the present suit. The learned Solicitor-General contended that the awards having merged in the judgment cannot afford a basis to the present suit. It is true
that it is pointed out in Dicey's Conflict of Laws that some
writers have qpressed the view that where a foreign award
must be, and has been, reduced to a judgment the
judgment and not the award must be enforced in England. But it has also been pointed out that this is not the
view generally adopted by the courts in the United States
of America as would appear from the following passage
frCllll Lorcnzcn's "Cases on Conflict of Ulwl' 4th edn.
4 S.C.R.
p. 1090:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
1963
"As a judgment of a foreign country is held not
Badat and
to merge the original cause of action, it would folCompany
low that an action might be brought upon the award,
&st India
notwithstanding the fact that it has been converted
Trading
into a judgment abroad."
Company
This question was left open by the Privy Council in
L. Oppenheim & Co., v. Mahomed Haneef(') as it had Mudholkar T.
not been raised in that case. fhe reco~mtion ;iwen to a
foreign judgment by the English Courts is, as pointed out
by Schmitthoff at p. 459 of the English Conflict of Laws,
not based upon the doctrine of merger. For, this doctrine
does not apply to judgments of courts which are not courts
of record in the English sense. It may be that founded as the American legal system is on the common law
of England the New York Supreme Court would be a
court of record in the English sense and, therefore, the
doctrine of merger could be said to apply to a judgment
recorded by it. However, as no contention was raised before us that the Supreme Court of New York was a court
of record, we would leave the matter there.
Just as a foreign judgment affords a fresh cause of
action upon which a suit can be brought in an English
court, so is the case with regard to a foreign award. Thus,
in Bremer Ge/transport GMBH v. Drewry(2) it was held
that a foreign award furnishes a new cause of action based on the agreements between the parties to perform the
award. This view has been accepted in H alsbury' s Laws of
England Vol. II, p. 45. In that case it was contended for
the respondents that in so far as the submission is a contract whereby the parties to it impliedly undertake to abide
by and carry out the award of the arbitrators, the enforcement of the award would be the enforcement of a contract made within jurisdiction (the contract having been
entered into in London while the award thereunder made
at Hamburg in Germany). On the other hand it was
contended for the appellant that the award having been
made in Hamburg the action for its enforcement in England would not be an action for the enforcement of a contract made in England. Rejecting this contention Slesser
(1) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 496.
( 2) (1933] 1 K.B. 753.
...
r
JI
62
1963
Badat aod
c'ompany
...
Ea.rt India
Trilding
Company
Mudholkar f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
LJ., after considering the authorities on the subject observed at p. 760 :
"So far it would appear clear that in the opinion
both o£ common law and equity judges the award is
to be regarded as merely the working out of a term
of the original agreement of submission ........ "
and then referred to the following observations of
James L.J., in Uanelly Ry. and Dock Co., v. London and
North Western Ry. Co.,('):
"It would be difficult to say that the real question
between the parties could be determined by the arbitrator under that clause ; because, "if the plaintiffs are
right in their contention, they have determined that
part of the agreement as well as everything else."
Now, when a plaintiff sues upon a foreign award what
he in fact does is to ask the court to pass a judgment in
his favour for the amount stated in the award only after
proving five facts :
(1) that there was a contract between the parties
whereunder disputes between them could be referred to arbitration to a tribunal in a foreign country;
(2) that the award is in accordance with the terms of
the agreements;
·
(3) that the award is valid according to the law governing arbitration proceedings obtaining in the ·
country where the award was made ;
( 4) that it was final according to the law of that
country; and
(5) that it was a subsisting award at the date of suit.
A view has been expressed in some English cases that
an award must also be enforceable in the country in which
is was made before a suit can be brought in England on
its basis. But upon the view we are taking it is not necessary to decide this point. Now, when a suit is brought by a
plaintiff on the basis of an award it is not necessary for him
to prove that the amount claimed was actually payable to him
in respect of the dispute nor is it open to the defendants to
challenge the validity of such an award on grounds like
those which are available iri India under s. 30 of the Arbitration Act. A very limited challenge to the claim based
( 1)
(1873) L.R. 8 Ch. 942, 948. ·
- <"-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
on the award is permissible to the defendants and that is
one of the reasons why it is important to ascertain whether
the award has in fact attained finality in the country in
which it was made. We will assume that the plaintiffs
have satisfactorily established the first three of the five conditions which we have set out above. The question then is whether the fourth and the fifth conditions have been satisfied.
As to when an award can be regarded as final has been
considered recently in the Union Nationale case('). The
facts of that case are succinctly summarised in the head-note
and we can do no better than reproduce its relevant portion:
"By an agreement in French made in Paris, dated
August 31, 1956, the appellants agreed to sell to the
respondents a quantity of wheat seed. The agreement
contained an arbitration clause, the English translation of which was: 'All differences arising out of the
present contract will be judged by the Arbitration
Chamber of Copenhagen which will settle without
appeal with the powers of an amicable arbitrator.' Differences having arisen between the parties
they were referred pursuant to the arbitration clause
to the Copenhagen Chamber of Arbitration. Under
the rules regulating the procedure of the arbitration
chamber, awards are made by a committee of the
chamber. Regulation 14 of the rules provides that:
'awards made by the Committee . . . . shall be final. An
award can only be appealed against to the appeal court
attached to the committee .... If the presidency decides
that the appeal cannot be made . . . . the award made
by the judgment and arbitration committee shall be
final. ... ' By an order of October 6, 1958, the committee awarded to the respondents the sum of £ 183,000.
The presidency of the arbitration committee on November 25, 1958 refused the appellants' application for
leave to appeal and notified them that the award of
October 6, 1958, was final. The award could not be enforced in Denmark without an order of a Danish court.
The respondents, by summons under section 36 and 26
. of the Arbitration Act, 1950, which applies to arbitration awards made in Denmark, applied for leave to en-
-
.,. .
( 1)
44 .
. '(1959) 2. Q.B.
. .
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar f.
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1%3
force that award. The appellant claimed that the
award was a foreign award and had not become final
Badat and
in the country in which it was made."
·Company
The
contention raised on behalf of the appellants was
v.
East India
that the award had not become final in the country in which
Trading
it was made because it was not enforceable in that country.
Company
· The Court of Appeal referred to regulation 14 which gives
finality to an award made in accordance with the rules reMudholkar f.
gulating the procedure of the arbitration chamber and accepted the opinion of a qualified Danish lawyer that according to the Danish law the award had become final, though
it could not be enforced in Denmark without obtaining a
judgment from a Danish Court and that during the proceedings befor~ such court it would be open to the defendant
to complain that the award suffered from formal defects
but nothing else. Thus, in this case the Court of Appeal
has drawn a distinction between 'finality' and 'enforceability' of an award and held that where under the laws of the
country in which an award has been made, it is no longer
open to challenge it on merits it must be regarded as final
even though in the form in which it stands it may not be
enforceable there. Rule 15, cl. (E) of the American Spice
Trade Association whereunder the awards in the plaintiff's favour were made runs thus :
"The award of such arbitrators and umpire or sole
arbitrator shall be final and binding on both parties
unless within three business days after receipt of the
award, an appeal with a fee $75 be lodged with the
Secretary of the Association by either disputant. Settlements under an arbitration award or awards of the
Arbitration Committee shall be made within 10 days
from the date of such award, and if not so settled,
judgment may be entered therein in accordance with
the practice of any Court having jurisdiction."
One point of distinction between the Danish rule and rule
15E of the American Rules is that the latter requires the
obtaining of a judgment for enforcing it in case the claim
arising out of the award is not settled. No doubt, the
American rule also says that the award shall become final
and binding on the parties but whether it takes away the
jurisdiction of the courts to go behind its finality will have
· to be ascertained by reference to the laws of New York
•
4 S.C.R.
-
r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
State. For, that rule is no more than a term of the contract between the parties and must be subject to the laws
of the State.
It would be desirable at this stage to compare foreign
judgment with foreign awards and bear in mind the difference between them. No doubt, both of them create new
obligations. The judgment of a foreign sovereign is a command of that sovereign which has to be obeyed within the
territorial limits of that sovereign's jurisdiction. On the
principles of comity it is, therefore, accorded international
recognition provided it fulfills certain basic requirements.
A foreign award, on the other hand, which is founded on
a contract of the parties and is not given the status of a
judgment in the country in which it is made, cannot claim
the same international status as the act of a foreign
sovereign. As pointed out by Schmitthoff on the English
Conflict of laws, at p. 489 :
"It follows that unless the plaintiff can satisfy the
English court that the award is treated, in the country
where it was made, like a judgment of the court he
should sue on the original cause of action, but even in
that case he should plead the award because it might
in appropriate cases, be regarded by the English courts
as conclusive between the parties."
These observations would perhaps now stand slightly modified by the view taken by the Court of Appeal in the
Union Nationale case(') in the sense that even an award
which has not obtained the status of a judgment in the
country in which it was rendered but which possesses an
essential attribute of a judgment, that is, finality, it could
be sued upon in another counrry.
Bearing in mind these principles we must consider what
are the requirements of the laws of New York State for
giving an award finality. In Appendix I to Sturges' Cases
on Arbitmtion Law, the New York Arbitration Law, Art.
84 of the New York Civil Practice Act, as in force on September I, 1952, has been set out. Section 1461 which deals
with confirmation of an award runs thus:
"Motion to confirm award : At any time within
one year after the award is made, as prescribed in the
1
( )
(1959) 2 Q.B. +I.
1963
Badat ""d
Company
'f.
East India
Trading
Company
MuJholkar /.
66
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
last s~ction, any party to the controversy which was
arbitrated may apply to the court having jurisdiction
as provided in section fourteen hundred fifty-nine for
an order confirming the award; and thereupon the
court must grant such an order unless the award is
vacated, modified or corrected, as prescribed in the next
two sections or unless the award is unenforceable under
the provisions of section fourteen hundred fifty-eight.
Notice of the motion must be served upon the adverse
party or his attorney, as prescribed by law for service
of notice of a motion upon an attorney in an action
in the same court. In the Supreme Court, the motion
must be made within the judicial district embracing
the country where the judgment is to be entered."
Then follows s. 1462 which deals with a motion to vacate
award; s. 1462-a which deals with a motion to modify or
correct an award; s. 1463 which deals with 'notice of motion
and stay'; s. 1464 which deals with 'entry of judgment on
award and costs'; s. 1465 which deals with the judgmentroll and s. 1466 which deals with effect of a judgment and
its enforcement. It is clear from s. 1462 that in the motion
to vacate an award a party to the arbitration can challenge
the award on the following five grounds :
"l. Whether the award was p,rocured by corruption,
fraud or other undue means.
2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators or either of them.
3. Where arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehaviour by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final
and definite award upon the subject-matter submitted was not made.
5. If there was no valid submission or contract, and
the objection has been raised under the conditions set forth in section fourteen hundred fiftyeight:'
It will thus be seen that despite the tinality. spo~en of by
'
.
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
Rule 15E, this section enables the defendants to apply for
vacating the award on certain grounds and thus imperil
the finality accorded to the award by his contract. It is
only after the objections under s. 1462 are disposed of that
a judgment putting an end to all controversy, can be entered under s. 1464 which reads thus:
"Entry of judgment on award and costs: Upon
the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment may be entered in conformity therewith, as upon a referee's report in an action,
except as is otherwise prescribed in this article. Costs
of the application and of the proceedings subsequent
thereto ; not exceeding twenty-five dollars and disbursements, may be awarded by the court in its discretion. If awarded, the amount thereof must be included in the judgment."
After the judgment is pronounced a judgment roll is prepared and the judgment docketed as if it was rendered in an
action. The effect of the judgment as enunciated in s. 1466
is as follows:
"Effect of judgment and enforcement: The judgment so entered has the same force and effect, in all
respects as and is subject to all the provisions of law
relating to, a judgment in an action ; and it may be
enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the
court in which it is entered."
From all these provisions it would be abundantly clear that
the award has no finality till the entire procedure is gone
through and that the award as such can never be enforced.
What is enforceable is the judgment. There is no provision in the law providing for taking proceedings for the
confirmation of an award in which all objections to the
award could be made except, s. 1461. The proceedings taken
thereunder must, however, culminate in a judgment. In
this respect the procedure under the law of the New York
State is quite different from that under the. Arbitration law
of Denmark. Apparently, that is why the plaintiffs, after obtaining the awards, went up to the Supreme Court of New
York for obtaining a judgment confirming the awards.
No doubt, as a result of the judgment the decision of the
arbitrators became unchallengable in the New York State
and for all practical purposes in India as well but in the pro-
1963
Badat and
Company
v.
East India
Trading
Company
Mudholkar /.
68
1963
Badat a~d
Company
T.
East India
Trading
Company
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
[1964]
cess the award made by them has given way to the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York. It is this judgment which can now furnish a cause of action to the plaintiffs and not the awards.
No doubt, an award can furnish a fresh cause of action.
But the award must be final. If the law of the country in
which it was made gives finality to judgment based upon
an award and not to the award itself, the award can furnish no cause of action for a suit in India. In these circumstances we hold that though the High Court of Bombay
·has jurisdiction to enforce a final award made in a foreign
country in pursuance of a submission made within the
limits of its original jurisdiction, the awards in question
being not final, cannot furnish a valid cause of action for
the suit. Upon this view we allow the appeal and dismiss
the suit with costs throughout. The normal rule as to costs
must apply because the choice of forum made by the plaintiffs was deliberate and with the knowledge that they were
taking a risk in not seeking out the defendants at the place
where they reside or carry on business.
By Court-Following the opinion of the majority, the
appeal is allowed with costs.
,Appeal allowed.
(
-
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