IN RE. THE BILL TO AMEND S. 20 OF THB SEA CUSTOMS ACT, 1878, AND S. 3 OF THE CENTRAL EXCISES AND SALT ACT, 1944 versus VS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 May 1963 | [1964] 3 S.C.R. 787 | 1963 INSC 147
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 May 1963
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, S.K. DAS, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 9
- Case number
- SPECIAL REFERENCE CASE No. 1/1962
- Citation
- [1964] 3 S.C.R. 787
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 147
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
We are of opinion that the order of the High
Court is correct and therefore dismiss the appeal
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
IN RE. THE BILL TO AMEND S. 20 OF THB
SEA CUSTOMS ACT, 1878, AND S. 3 OF THE
CENTRAL EXCISES AND SALT
ACT, 1944
c. J., s.
(B. P. SINHA
K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDIU.·
G.olDKAR,
A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAJI,
and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
JJ.)
Pre6ident'• Reference-Ouatom., dutiea and dutiea of e11:ci1tParliamenl'• power to levy such dutiea on the property of Btolt•Direct and indirect taxes-Distinction, if valid under 00111titution-·Ouatoms duties and duties of exciBe, if ta:u1 Oii
properly-"Taxation", Definition-Bea Oustoma Act, 1878
(8 of 1878), s 20-0entral Excises and Bait Act, 1944 (1 of
1944). •· 3 (11-Go•vernment of India Act, 1935 (25 It 25
Geo. Ii, Oh. 42), as. 154, llili-Oon•titution of India, .frll. 246,
246, 285, 289, 366 \28).
As a result of a proposal to introduce in Parliament a
Bill to amend s. 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, ands. 3 of
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, with a view to apply·
ing the provisions of the ·said two Acts to goods belonging to
the State Governments, in regard to which certain doubts arose
as to whether the provisions of the Bill were inconsistent with
Art. 289 of the Constitution of India, the President of India
referred under Art. 143 of the Constitution certain questio111
for the opinion of the Supreme C mrt to ascertain if the proposed amendment• would be constitutional. The question
was whether the provisions of Art. 289 of the Constitution
precluded the Union from imposing, or authorising the impo1i•
tion of (a) custom• duties on the import or export, or (b)
excise duties on the production or manufacture in India, of 1he
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M "'41• T.lal.llc.\
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788
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
property of a State used for purposes other than those specified
ha,, s,a· Cwtonil · In cl. (2) of that Article.
-'
..let.
..· \
Held (S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, Hidayatullah and K. C.
Das Gupta,JJ, dissmting), that the provisions of Art. 289 (1)
of the Constitution of India were in the nature of an exception
to the exclusive field of legislation reserved to Par hament and
were limited to taxes on property and on income of a State ;
that the immunity granted in favour of States had to be
restricted to taxes levied directly on property and .income ;
and, that even though import and export duty or duties of
excise had refeience to goods and commodities, they were not
taxes on property directly and were not within the exemption
In Art. 289 (1).
Per Sinha C. J., Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Shah and
Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.-(1} Though the expression
"taxation", as defined in Art. 366 (28), "includes the Imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or special",
the amplitude of that definition has to be cut down if the
context otherwise so requfres.
(2) Whereas the Union Parliament has been vested with
the exclusive pnwer to regulate trade and commerce and with ,
the sole responsibility of imposing export and import duties
and duties of excise, with a view to regulating trade and
commerce and raising revenue. an exception has been engrafted
In Art. 289 (1) in favour of States granting them immunity
from certain kinds of Union taxation and it is necessary that
the general words of the exemption in that Article should be
limited in their scope so as not to come in conflict with the
power of the Union to regulate trade and commerce.
(3) Though the Constitution of India does not make a
clear distinction between direct and indirect taxes, the exemption provided in Art., 289 (I) from Union taxation to property
must refer to what arc known to economists as direct taxes on
property and not to indirect taxe< like duties of customs and
excise which are in their essence trading taxes and not tax on
property.
Per Das, Sarkar and Das GuptaJJ.-(1} The exemption
clause under Art. 289 (I) ha• to be interpreted with the key
furnished by Art. 366 (28) Under the Constit11tion the
word "taxation" has been defined by the Constituiion itflelf,
and the Court is not free to give a different meaning to the
word so as to make a diotinction between direct and indirect
a s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
taxation, nor is the Court free to make a distinction between a
tax on property and a tax in respect of it.
'·f·· ,., s., Galtem.t
A.it. ~
(2) The problem is not the nature of the impost, but
rather the extent of the immunity granted by Art. ·289 and
the extent of the immunity really depends on the true scope
and effect of Arts. 245, 285, 289, and 366 (28).
(3) The Union's power to legislate to regulate foreign
trade contained in the legislative list is subject to the provisions
of the Constitution, and the Union cannot, in view of Att.
289 (I), impose a customs duty on things imported by the
State and seek to justify it as an exercise of its power to regulate
foreign trade.
(4) The exemption given to State proporty from _Union
taxation by Art. 289 does not conflict in any way with the
power of control whicti the Union ha• over foreign trade
or inter-State trade.
(5) In the Constitution of India the "taxing power"
is treated as different from the "regulatory power" and the
classification between "direct" and ''indirect'~ taxes hasot
been adopted in the Constitution,
Ptr Hidayatullah J.-(1) The
fact that
the word
otaxation" is used in one place only in the Constitution saves
us from tbe task ol examining the context, because the definition would become a dead letter if it were not used in Art.
289 in the sense defined.
(2) Taking the language of Art. 289 (I) by itself or
even as modified by that of els. (2) and (3) the conclusion is
inescapable that properties ot all kmds belongiug to the States
aavc those used or occupied for trade or business, were meant
to be exrmpted from taxation. The •Cherne of Art. 289 does
not admit that the word "property" at.ould be read in ·any
specialized sense and goods imported and goods manufactured
or produced by the States are included in the word "property."
(3) The provisions of Art, 289 preclude the Union
from imposing, or authorising the imposition, of customs duties
on the import or export of the property of a State used for
purposes other than those specified in cl. (2) of that Article
if the imposition is to raise revenue but not to regula1e externai
trade,
(4) The intention being to raise revenue the amendment
,
if mad1 would be hit by Art. 289,
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
1963
u '' Se• Customs
.Ad
Ptr Rajagopala Ayyangar ].-Though no express distinc..
tion has been made in the Uonstitution between direct and
indirect taxes, taxes in the shape of duties of customs including·
export duties, and excise, particularly when imposed with a
view to regulatjng trade and commerce in so far as such matters
arc within the competence of Parliament being covered by
various entries in List I, cannot be called taxes on property ;.
for they are imposts with reference to the movement of property
by way of import or export or with reference to the production
or manufacture of goods.
American, Australian and Candian cases reviewed.
ADVISORY JURISDICTION:
Special
Reference
No. 1 of 1962.
Reference by the President of India under
Art. 143 (1) of the Constitution regarding the propo·
aed amendments to sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the
Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act 8 of 1878) and sub·
section 1 (a) of Section 3 of the Central Excise and
Salt Act, 1944 (Act l of 1944).
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor .General of India,
G.N. Joshi and R.H. Dhebar, for the Union of India.
D. Narsa Raju, Advocate-General for the State
of Andhra Pradesh and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the
State of Andhra Pradesh.
.
B. 0. Baru,a, Advocate-General for the State of
Aaaam and Naunit Lal, for the State of Assam.
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate·General for the State
of Bihar and S. p, Va.rma, for the State of Bihar.
.A. V. Viswanatha Saatri, J. B. Dadachanji,
0. 0. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the State of
Maharashtra.
J. M. Thakore, Advocate-General for the State
of Gujarat and H.L. Hathi, for the State of Gujarat.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79!
D. Sahu, Advocate-General for the St.ate of
Ori&sa and K. L. Hathi, for the State of Orissa.
. 196J
la '' Sia C&isJMnl
J.d.
V. P. Gopalan Nflmbyar, Advocate-General for
the State of Kerala and Sardar Bahadur, for the
State of Kerala.
A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam,
for the State of Madras.
G. R. Ethirajulu Naidu, Advocate-General for
the State of Mysore and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the
State of Mysore.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of
Punjab, S. K. Kapur and Gopal Singh, for the State
of Punjab.
G. 0. Kasliwal. Advocate-General for the Stat~
of Rajasthan, S. K. Kapur, V. N. Sethi and K. K.
Jain, for the State of Rajasthan.
B. Ben, M. K. Banerjee and P. K. Bose. for the
State of West Bengal.
M. Adhikari, Advocate-General for the State of
Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for the State of
Madhya Pradesh.
K. B. Hajela and G. P. Lal, for the State of
Uttar Pradesh.
. 1963. May 10. The opinion of B. P. Sinha,
C.J., P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo and
J.C. ShahJJ. was delivered by Sinha, C.J. The
· opinion of S. K, Das, A. K. Sarkar and K. C. Das
Gupta JJ., was delivered by Das, J M. Hidayatullah, J., and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., delivered
separate opinions.
SINHA C. J.-The main question, on this reference by the President of India under Art. 143 (1) of
s.-..u c.1.
792 SUPREJHE COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
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)$63
. :;i/a '' St• Gtu,_1
.dd.
the Constitution, depends upon the true scope and
interpretation of Art. 289 of the Constitution relating
to the immunity of States from Union taxation. On
receipt of the reference notices were issued to the
tiAttorney-General of India and to the AdvocatesGeneral of the States. In pursuance of that the case
of the Union Government has been placed before us
by the learned Solicitor-General and that of the States
of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala,
Madhya Pr;adesh, Madras, Maharashtra, Mysore,
Orissa, Punjab and West Bengal was presented to us
by their respective counsel. On the date the hearing
of this case started, an application was made on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh also to be heard,
but no statement of case had been put in on behalf
of that State, and as no grounds were made out for
condoning the delay, we refused the application.
The reference is in these terms :
"Whereas sub-section {l) of section 20 of the
Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act 8 of 1878), provides for
the levy of customs duties on goods imported or ex·
ported by sea to the extent and in the manner specified in the said sub.section ;
And whereas sub.section (2) of section 20 of the
said Act applies the provisions of sub-section (I) of
that section in respect of all goods belonging to tbe
Government of a State and used for the purposes of a
trade or business of any kind carried on by, or on
behalf of, that Government, or of any operations
connected with such trade or business as they apply
i11 respect of goods not belonging to any Govern·
ment;
And whereas it is proposed to amend sub-section
(2) of section 20 o~ the said Act so as. to '.1PPIY the
provisions of sub-section (1) of that sect10n m respect
of all goods belonging to the Government of a State;
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
irrespective of whether such goods are used or not for
the purposes set out in the said sub-section (2) as at
present in force;
And whereas sub-section (1) of section 3 of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 19!4 (Act l of 1944),
provides for the levy of duties of excise on all excisable goods other than salt which are produced or
manufactured in India and a duty on salt manufactured in, or imported by land into any part of
India in the manner specified in the said sub-section;
And whereas sub-section ( 1A)of section 3 of the
said Act applies the provisions of sub-section (1) of
that section in respect of all excisable goods other
than salt which arc produced or manufactured in
India by, or on behalf of, the Government of a State
and used for the purposes of a trade or business of
any kind carried on by, or on behalf of, that Government, or of any operations connected with such trade
or business as they apply in respect of goods which
are not produced or manufactured by any Government;
And whereas it is proposed to amend sub-section
( 1A) of section 3 of the said Act so as to apply the
provisions of sub section ( l) of that section in respect
of all excisable goods other than salt which are produced or manufactured in India by, or on behalf of
the Government of a State, irrespective of whether
such goods are used or not for the purposes set out in
the said sub-section (lA) as at present in force;
And whereas it is proposed to introduce in
Parliament a Bill, the draft of which is annexed here
to and marked 'Annexure', to amend for the purpose
aforesaid sub-section (2) of section 20 of the Sea
Customs A~t, 1878 (Act 8 of 1878) and sub-section
(lA) of scct10n 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944 (Act 1 of 19!4);
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111 r1 S1~ ,Cf#,_,
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794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
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c:. 1•
And whereas Governments of certain States
have expressed the view that the amendments as proposed in the said draft of the Bill may not be constitutionally valid as the provisions of article 289 read
with the definitions of 'taxation' and 'tax' in clause
. (28) of article 366 of the Constitution of India preclude the Union from imposing or authorising the
imposition of any tax, including customs duties and
excise duties; or in relation to any property of a
State except to the extent permitted by clause (2)
. read with clause (3) of the said article 289;
And whereas the Government of India is on the
other hand inclined to the view(i)
that the exemption from Union ti.xation
granted by clause (1) of article 289 is restricted to Union taxes on the property of a
State and does not extend to Union taxes
in relation to the property of a State and
that clauses (2) and (3) of that article have
also to be construed accordingly;
that customs duties are taxes on the import
or export of property and not taxes on
property as such and further that excise
duties are taxes on the production or
manufacture of property and not taxes on
property as such; and
(iii) that the union is not precluded by the provisions of article 289 of the Constitution
of India from imposing or auchorising the
imposition of customs duties on the import
or export of the property of a State and
other Union taxes on the property of a
State which are not taxes on property as
such;
And whereas doubts have arisen as to the true
interpretation and scope of article 289 of the Consti. tution of India and, in particular, as to the constitutional validity of the amendments to the Sea Customs
(ii)
-·
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOKTS
791i
Act. 18i8 (Act 8 of 18i8) and the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 (Act 1 of 1944) as proposed in the
aforesaid draft Bill;
And wherea~ in view of what has been hereinbefore stated, it appears to me that the questions of
Jaw hereinafter set out have arisen and are of such a
nature and are of such public importance that it is
expedient to obtain the opinion of the ::iupreme
Court of India thereon;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause ( l) of article 143 of the
Constitution of India, I, Rajendra Prasad, President
ef India, hereby refer the following question to the
Supreme Court of India for consideration and report
of its opinion thereon;
''(I ) Do the provisions of article 289 of the
Constitution preclude the Union from imposing,
or authorising the imposition of, customs duties
on the import or export of the property of a
State used for purposes other than those specified in clause (1) of that article ?
(2) Do the provisions of article 289 of the
Constitution of India preclude the Union from
imposing, or authorising the imposition of,
excise duties on the production or manufacture
in India of the property of a State used for
purposes other than those specified in clause
(~) of that article ?
(3) Will sub section (2) of section 20 of the Sea
Customs Act, 18i8 (Act 8 of 1878) and subsection (IA) of section 3 of the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 (Act 1 of 1944) as amended
by the Bill set out in the Annexure be inconsistent with the prel".risions of article 289 of the
Constitution of India ?"
t\ew Delhi:
Dated the 19-4-1962.
Sd/-Rajendra Prasad,
President of India.
/11 " Sia Ctui"""
· Act.
Sln/llo
c. '.
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL .
. 196'
Annexure
,,. ,, ~.C';. c.,,,...,
· Att
DRAFT BILL
SU:M CJ,
A
BILL
Further to amend the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
,
Be it enacted by Parliament in the the year of
the Republic of India as follows :1.
Short title-This Act may be called the
Sea Customs and Central Excises (Amendment) Act, 19.
2.
Amendment of section 20, Act 8 of 1878, In section 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878
for sub· section (2) the following sub-section
shall be substituted, namely :"(2) The provisions of sub-section (l) shall
apply in respect of all goods belongin~
to the Government as they apply in
respect of goods not belonging to the
Government."
3.
Amendment of section 3, Act 1 of 1944.In section 3 of the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944, for sub-section (IA) the
following sub.sectbn shall be substituted,
namely:"(lA) The provisions of sub-section (I) shall
apply in respect of all excisable goods
other than salt which are produced or
manufactured in India by, or on behalf of, the Government as they apply
in respect of goods which are not pro•
duced or manufactured by the Govem·
.meut."
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
.
It has been argued on behalf of the Union of
India that cl. (1) of Art. 289 properly interpreted
would mean that the immunity from taxation granted by the Constitution to the States is only in respect
of tax on property and on income, and that the
immunity does not extend to all taxes; the clause
should not be interpreted so as to include taxation
in relation to property; a tax by way of import or
export duty is not a tax on property but is on the
fact of importing or exporting goods into or out of
the country; similarly, an excise duty is not a tax
on property but is a tax on production or manufacture of goods; though the measure of the tax may
have reference to the value, weight or quantity of
the goods, according to the relevant provisions of
the statute imposing excise duty, in essence and truly
speaking import or export duties or excise duty are
not taxes on property, including goods, as such, but
on the happening of a certain event in relation to
goods. namely, import or export of goods or production or manufacture of goods; the true meaning of
Art. 289 is to be derived not only from its language
but also from the scheme of the Indian Constitution
distributing powers of taxation between the Union
and the States in and the context of those provisionq;
Arts. 285 and 289 of the Constitution are complementary and the true construction of the one has a
direct bearing on that of the other; those articles have
to be construed in the back5round of the corresponding provisions of the Government of India Act 1935,
ss. 1!54 an:! 155; cl. (2) of Art. 289 is only explana·
tory and not an exception to cl. (I) in the sense that
the entire field of taxation covered by cl. (1) is also
covered by the terms of cl. (2); as Parliament has
exclusive power to make laws with respect to trade
and commerce with foreign countries :md with respect
to duties of customq, including export duties and
duties of excise on certain goods manufactured or
produced in India, the Union is competent to impose
or to authorise the impD'lition of cust~ duties on
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Sinlul C. F.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
the import or export of goods by a State which may
be its property or excise duty on the production or
manufacture of goods by a State; if cl. (1) of Art. 289
were to be interprrted as including the exemption of
a State in respect of customs duties or excise duty,
it will amount to a restriction on the exclusive
competence of Parliament to make Jaws with respect
to trade and commerce-a restriction which is not
warranted in view of the scheme of the Constitution;
that the term "taxation" has been used in a very
wide sense, as per Art. 366 (28); the wide sweep of
that expression has to be limited with respect to the
words "property" or "income"; the juxtaposition of
the words "property" and "income" in cl. (1) of
Art. 289 would show that the exemption of the States
from Union taxation was only in respect of tax on property and tax on income; in other words, the exemp·
tion granted by Art. ?89 (1) is in respect of property
taxes properly so called in the sense of taxes directly .
on property; a tax on property means a tax in respect
of ownership, possession or enjoymrnt of property,
in contradistinction to customs duties and duties of
excise, which in their true meaning are not taxes on
property but only in relation to property, on a parti·
cular occasion; Cl. (2) of Art. 28fl of the Constutition
shows clearly that trade or business carried on by
States will. be liable to taxation; by cl. (3) of Art. 289
Parliament has been authorised to legislate a1 to
what trade or businrs3 would be incidental to the
ordinary functions of government and which, there·
fore would not be subject to taxation by the Union;
any trade or busine~s not so declared by parliament
will be within the operation of cl. (c), i.e., liable to
Union taxation.
On the other hand. it is argued on behalf of
the States that in interpreting Art. 289 of the Constitution, on which the answer to the question referred
by the President depends, it has to. be borne in mind
that our 9,s1nstitution does not make a distinction
-
3 S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
799
between direct and indirect taxation; that trade and
commerce and industry have been distributed
between the Union and the States; that the power of
taxation is different from the power to regulate trade
and commerce; that the narrower construction of rhe
Article, contended for and on behalf of the Union, will
seri·ously and adversely affect the activities of the
States and their powers under the Constitution; that
a comparison and contrast between the terms of s. 155
of the Government of India Act and those of
Art. 289 of the Constitution would clearly emphasize
that the wider meaning contended for on behalf
of the States should be preferred; that the legislative
practice iu respect of excise and customs duties is a
permissible guide to the interpretation of the Article
in question and would support the wider construction,
and that even on a narrower construction, insisted
upon by the Union, customs duties and duties of
excise affect property and are, therefore, within the
imm'unity granted by Art. ~89 (1); properly construed
Art. :!89 (1) grants complete immunity from all
taxation on any kind of property; and any kind of
tax on property or in relation to property is within
the immunity; therefore, the distinction sought to be
made on behalf of the Union between tax on property
and tax in relation to property is wholly irrelevant;
cl. (2) of Art. 289 is not explanatory, as contended
on behalf of the Union, but is an exception or in th.:
nature of a proviso to cl. (1) of the Article; cl. (t)
really carves out something which is included in
cl. (I) and similarly cl. (3) is an exception to cl. (2)
and carves out something which is included in
cl. (2).
It should be noted that all the States which
were represented before us were agreed in their
contention, as set out above, except the State of
l\faharashtra. The learned Counsel for the State of
Maharashtra agreed with the contention on behalf of
the Union that there was a clear distinction between
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Si,,Jui C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196+] VOL.
tax on property and excise duties. In other words,
excise duty is not within the immunity granted by
cl. ( l) of Art. 289, which is in the nature of an exception to the general power of a State to regulate
trade and commerce and its right to tax, and as
such it should be very strictly construed. But he
supported the other States in so far as they contended
that duties of import and export were within the
exemption granted by cl. (1) of Art. 289.
It will thus be seen that whereas the Union is
for interpreting cl. (I) of Art, 289 in the restricted
sense of the immunity being limited to a direct tax
on property and on the income of a State, the
States contend for an all-embracing exemption
from Union taxes which have any relation to or
impact on State property and income. In spite of
this wide gulf between the two view points. both
are agreed that the terms "property", "income' and
"tax" have been used in their widest sense. 'They
are also agreed that the immunity granted to the
Union in respect of its property by Art. 285 corresponds to the immunity granted to the States by
Art. 289, and that, therefore, the term "property"
"taxation" and "tax'' hwe to be interpreted in the
same comprehensive sense in both the Articles. It
will be noticed that whereas not only the term
"property" but also "income" occurs in Art. 289, in
Art. 285 the term ''income' is not ust>d apparently
because the Constitution makers were aware of the
legal position that tax on "income" (as distinct
from agricultural income) is exclusively in the
Union List and wa~ so even before the advent of
the Constitution. It was agreed, and it is manifest
that the terms of Art. 285 and 289 are very closely
parallel to those of ss. 154 and L5.5, respectively,
of the Government of India Act, 1935 (2.) & 26 Geo.
VC. 42), except for the differences in expression
occasioned by the change in the constitutional position and the integration of the Indian States after
$.C.R.
stJPREM:E COURT REPORTS
801
1947. The language of the two parellel provisions
may lie set out below in order to bring out the points
of similarity aRd contrast.
l 1 ' ' s,. Customr
Act
. Sinhc C J.
•
Government of India Act.
Constitution of India.
S. 154 : Property vested
in His Majesty for
purposes of the Go·
vernment
of the
Federation shall, save
in so far as any Fede·
ral -law may other·
wise provide, be exempt from all taxes
imposed by, or by
any authority within,
a Province or Federa'
ted State;
Art. 285. (1) The pro·
perty of the Unien
shall, save in so far
as Parliament may lily
law otherwise provide,
be exempt from all
taxes imposed by a
State or by any
Authority within a
State.
Provided that, until
any
Federal law
otherwise
provides,
any property so ves·
ted which was im·
mediately before the
commencement
of
Part Ill of this Act
liable, or treated as
liable, to any such
tax, shall, so long as
that tax continues,
continue to be liable,
or to be treated as
liable, thereto .
S. 155-(1) Subject
as
hereinafter provided,
the Government of a
Province and the
(2) Nothing in clause
( 1) shall, until Par·
liament bv law other·
wise pro~ides, pre·
vent any authority
within a State from
levying any tax on
any property of the
Union to which such
property was imme·
diately before the
commencement of this
Constitution liable or
treated as - lial;>le, so
long as that tax con·
tinues to be levied in
that State.
Art. 289. (1) The pro·
perty and -income of
a State shall be ex·
empt - from ' U'nion
802
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I•" Se• Cust•ms
A"
Sik•• c. 1.
Ruler of a Federated
State shall not be
liable to Federal taxa·
tion in respect of
lands or buildings
situate
in British
India, or mcome
accruing, arising or
received in British
India:
Provided that(a) where a trade or
buaincn of any kind
ii carried on by. or on
behalf of the Gevern ·
ment of a Province in
any part of British
India outside that
Province or by a
Ruler in any part of
British India, nothing
in thi1 1ub-1ection
1hall ellempt that
Government or Ruler
from
any Federal
taxation in respect of
that trade or business,
or any operations con·
ncctcd therewith, or
any income ariaing in
connection therewith,
or any property occupied for the purpo1e1
thereof;
(b) nothing in this 1uh·
aection shall ellcmpt
Oona#itutfon of btdia.
taxation.
(2) Nothin1 ia cla111e
(l) shall prevent the
Union from imp01in1.
or authorising tll.e
imposition of any tall
to such extent, if any
aa Parliament may by
I aw provide in respect
of a trade or bu1ine11
of any kind carried on
by, Or OD behalf of
the Government of a
State, or any operations connected there·
with, or any property
used or occupied for
the purposes of auch
trade or business, or
any income accuring
or arising in conncc·
tion therewith.
Nothing in clause
shall apply to
any trade or business,
or to any clau of
trade
or bu1ineu
which
Parliament
may by law declare
to be incidental to the
ordinary !unctiona or
government.
(3)
(2)
3 S.C.R.
SUPlt~M'.! OOUllT REPORTS
Government of India Act.
soa
0on&tit1'1ton of In&ia.
a Ruler frqm any Federal taxation in raspect
of any lands, buildings
or income being .hi1
penonal property or
personal income.
(2) Nothing in this Act
affects any exemption
from taxation enjoyed aa of right at the
passing of this Act
by the Ruler of an
Indian State in respect of any Indian
Government seci.trities
issued before that
'
date.
It will thus appear that both 1. IM and
Art. 285 set out above speak only of "property" and
lay down that property vested in the Union shall be
exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any
authority within a St'!lte, subject to one exception of
saving the pre-existing taxes on such property until
Parliament may by law otherwise provide. Similarly,
whereas s. 155 of the Government of India Act
exempts from federal taxes the Government of a
Province in respect of lands or building• situate in
British India or income accruing, arising or received
in British India, Art. 289( l) says "the property and
income of a State shall be exempt from Union taxation". Section 156 aforesaid has two provisos {a) &.
(b); (a) relating to trade or business of any kind
carried on by or on behalf of the Government or a
Province, and (b) which is not relevant, relating to a
Ruler. It will be seen that "income" is repeated in
both the provisions, but what was "lands" or "buildings" has brcome simply "property" in Art. 289(1).
1118
be re Sn Cust~J
Act
804. 'SUPREME COURf ttEi>tiR:t1S[l96!j \lot ·
l!iJ
Jn ,. &• Cui!.,,,,
Art ·
Sinha
c. 1.
' The question, naturally• arises°'i•why "income"
was at all mentioned when it is common ground that
"income" would be included in ·the ··generic term
''property". It was suggested on 'bWalf of the• U12ien
that the juxta ·position of the termi "property" alild
"income" of a State which have' b'een declared to be
exempt from Union taxation would ·indicate that the
tax from which they were to be immune was tax en
"property" and on "Income", i.e., in both cases a
direct tax, and not an indirect tax, which may be
levied in rtlation to the property o! a State, namely,
excise duty, which is a tax on the manufacture er
production of goods and customs duty which is"a tax
on the event of importation or j,exportation
of goods.
•
Before dealing with the' argument on either
side, whether the restricted meaning attributed to the
words of Art. 289(1) on behalf of the Union, or.the
wider significance claimed for those words on behalf
of the States, was intended by the Constitution
makers, it is necessary to bear in mind certain general
considerations and the scheme .Gf the' 'con>titutional
provisions bearing on the powh 'of the Union to
impose the taxes contemplated by the proposed legislation. Neither the Union nor W.e States. can claim
unlimited right as regard> the are area of taxation.
The right has been hedged i:n by considerations
of respective powers and responsibilities of the Union
in relation to the States, and those of the States in
relation to citizens or inter se or in relation to the
Union. Part XII of the Constitution relates· to
"Finances etc." At the very outset Art. 265 lays
down that no tax shall be levied or collected except
by authority of law. That authority has' to be found
in the three fats in the Seventh Schedule, subject to
the provisions of Part XI which deals with the relations between the Union and the''States, particularly
Chapter I relating to legislative re_la~ions and distribution of legislative powers, with .. sp~Cial reference· to
Art. 246. Under that Article' tile legislature of a
State has exclusive powers to make 'laws with 'respect
I
3 S.C.·R. SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
805
to th.e matters enumerated in List II and Parliament
and the Legislature of a State have powers to make
laws with respect to the matters enumerated in List
III (the Concurrent List), and notwithstanding those
two lists, Parliament has the exclusive power to make
laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in List I (the Union List). Parliament also has
power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in the State List with respect to any part
of the territory of India which is not included in a
State. By Art. 248 Parliament has been vested with
exclusive power to make laws with respect to any
matters not enumerated in the State list or the
Concurrent list,. including the power of making a law
imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those lists.
It is not nece~sary to refer to the extended power of
legislation vested in Parliament in abnormal circumstances, as contemplated by Arts. 249, 250 and 252.
In short, though the States have been vested with
exclusive powel's of legislation with respect to "the
matters enumerated in List II, the authority of
Parliament to legislate in respect of taxation in List I
is equally exclusive. The scheme of distribution of
powers of legislation, with particular reference to
taxation, is that Parliament has the exclusive power
to legislate imposing taxes on income other than
agricultural income (Entry 82); duties of customs
· including export duties <Entry 83); duties of excise
1m tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India, except alcoholic liquors for human consu111ptiori and opium, Indian hemp and other
narcatic drugs and narcotics, which by entry 51 of
List II is vested in the State legislature (Entry gt).
It is not necessary to refer to the other taxes which
Parliament may impose because they have no direct
bearing on the questions in controversy in this case.
Similarly, the State legislatures have the power to
impose taxes on agricultural income (Entry ·16), ta:i;;es
on l~nds and buildings (Entry 49) and duties of e:i;;cise
911 alcoholic liquors and opium etc., manufactured
or
1963
I•
,,.s.. Cust•ms
&<1
s;••• c 1.
•
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
in rr
S'•
Custnm1
Acl
Si11th•C. J.
produced in the State and countervailing duties at
the same or low"r rates on similar goods manufactured
or produced elsewhere in Indi.a (Entry 51). It is also
not necessary to reft:r to other heads of taxes which
arc contained in the State. List. It would, thus
appear that whereu all taxes on income other than
agricultural income are within the exclusive power
of the Union, taxes on agricultural income only are
reserved for the States. All customs duties, including
export duties, relating as they do to transactions of
import into or export out of the country are within
the powers of Parliament. The States are not
concerned with those. They ·are only concerned with
taxes on the entry of goods in lo<;al areas for consumption, use ot sale therein, covered . by entry 52
in the State List. Except for duties of excise on
alcoholic liquors and opium and other narcotic
drugs, all duties of excise are leviable by Parliament.
Hence, it can be said that by and large, taxes on
income, duties of customs and duties of excise are
within the exclusive power 'of legislation by
Parliament.
Those exclusive powers of taxation, as aforesaid veated in Parliament, have to be correlated with
the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with
respect to trade and commerce with foreign countries;
import and export duties across customs frontiers;.
definition of customs frontiers (Entry 41); inter-State
trade and commerce (Entry 42). As the regulation
of trade and commerce with foreign countries, as also
inter-State, is the exclusive responsibility of the
Union, Parliament has the power to legislate with
respect to those matters, alongwith the power to
legislate by way of imposition of duties of customs
in respect of import and export of goods as aho to
impo1e duties of exci&e on the manufacture or production in any part of India in respect uf goods other
than alcoholic liquors and opium, etc , referred t0
above. Further, the irnposition of customs du.' ies
. I
.,
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREllB COURT RBJOllTS
80'7
or e:sciae duties may be either (1) with a view to
raise revenue or (2) to regulate trade and commerce,
both in land and foreign, or (3} both to regulate
trade and commerce and to raise revenue. If there·
fore Art. 289 (1) completely exempts all property of
the States from all taxes the power of Parliament to
regulate foreign trade by the use of its power of
taxation would be seriously impaired and this con·
sideration will have to be kept in mind when interpreting Art. 289( 1).
There is another general consideration which
has also to be borne in mind in view or the provisions
contained in Part XII of the Constitution. Though
various taxes have been separately included in Litt I or
List II and there is no overlapping in the matter of
taxation between the two I:ists and there is no tax
provided in the Concurrent List except stamp duties
(Item 44), the constitution embodies an elaborate
scheme for the distribution of revenue between the
Union and the States in Part XII, with respect to
taxes imposed in List I. The scheme of the Constitution with respect to financial relations between
the Union and the States, devised by the Constitu·
tion makers, is such as to ensure an equitable distribution of the revenue between the Centre and the
States. All revenues received by the Government of
India normally form part of the Consolidated Fund
of India, and all revenues received by the Govern·
ment of a State shall form part of the Contolidatrd
Fund of the State. This general rule is subject to
the provision of the Chapter I of Part XII in which
occur Arts. 266 to 277. Though stamp duties and
duties of excise on medicinal aud toilet preparations
which are covered by the Union List are to be levied
by the Government of India, they have to be collected
by the States within which such duties are leviable
and are not to form part of the Consolidated Fund
of India, but stands assigned to the State which has
(:91)ected them (Art. 268). Similarly, dutie1 and ta~e~
1963
Itt re SetJ CustflmJ
Act
Si11h~ C. J.
',·,
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
11 11 S~_ Cust1m1
Ad
Siitb c. J.
.
levied and collected by the Union in respect of Succession Duty, Estate Duty, Terminal Taxes on go()ds
al'ld passengers carried by Railway, sea or air, taxes
on rail fares and freights, etc. as detailed in Art. 269
shall be assigned to the States and distributed
amongst them in accordance with the principles of
distribution as may be formulated by Parliamentary
legislation, as laid down in cl, (:?) of Art. 269. Art.
270 provides that taxes on income, other than
agricultural income shall be levied and collected by
the Government of India and distributed between the
Union and the States. The taxes and duties levied
by the Union and collected by the Union or by the
States as contemplated by Arts. 268, 269 and 270 and
distributed amongst the States shall not form part
of the Consolidated Fund of India. Further Excise
duties which are levied and collected by the Govern·
ment of India and which form part of the Consoli·
dated Fund of India may also be distributed amongst
the States, in accordance with the principles laid
down by Parliament in accordance with the provisions
of Art. 272. Express provision has been made
by / Article 273 in respect of grants· in-aid. of the
revenue of the States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and
West Bengal in lieu of assignment of any share of the
net proceeds of export duty on jute and jute products.
Further a safeguard has been laid down in Art. 274
that no bill or amendment which imposes . or varies
any tax or duty in which States are interes•ed or
which affects the principles of distribution of duties
or taxes amongst the States as laid down in
Arts. ~68...,..273 shall be introduced or moved in either
House of Parliament except on the recommendation
of the President. Parliament has· also been authoris·
ed to lay down that certain sums may be charged
on the Consolidated Fund of India in each year by
way of grants-in-aid of the revenues of suc.h States
as it may determine to be in need of assistance. This
aid may be different for different States, according
to their need~, with particular reference to ~chemes of
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREMB COURT RBPOl.TS
devel&pment for
Art. 275 (1 ).
the
purposes
indicated
SOQ
m
Provision has also been made by Art. 280 for
the appointment by the President of a Finance
Commission to make recommendations to the Presi·
dent as to the distribution amongst the Union and
the States of the net proceeds of taxes and duties
as aforesaid, and as to the principles which should
govern the grants-in-aid of the revenue of the States
out of the Consolid;?,ted Fund of India.
It will thus appear that Part XII of the Con·
stitution has made elaborate provisions as to the
revenues of the Union and of the States, and as to
how the Union will share the proceeds of duties and
taxes imposed by it and collected either by the
Union or by the States. Sources of revenue which
have been allocated to the Union are not meant
entirely for the purposes of the Union but have to
be distributed according to the principles laid down
by Parliamentary legislation as contemplated by the
Articles aforesaid. Thus all the taxes and duties
levied by the Union and collected either by the
Union or by the States do not form part of the
Consolidated Fund of India but many of those taxes
and duties are distributed amongst the States and
form part of the Consolidated Fund of the States.
Even those taxes and duties which constitute the
Consolidated Fund of India may be used for the
purposes of supplementing the revenues of the States
in accordance with their.needs. The question of the
distribution of the aforesaid taxes and duties amongst
the States and the principles goyeming them, as also
the principles governing grants-in-aid of revenues
of the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India,
are matters which have to be decided by a highpowered Finance Commission, which is a responsible
body designated to determine those matters in an
objective way. It cannot, therefore, be justly
1919
111 rt s~c Cust1ms
Act
(i1fhl
c. J.
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
196'
I• r1 s~ CustM'lts
Jct
Si•kl C. J.
contended that the construction of Art. 289 suggested
on behalf of the Union will have the effect of seriously and adversely affecting the revenues of the
States. The financial arrangement and adjustment
suggested in Part XII of the Constitution has been
designed by the Constitution-makers in such a way
. as to ensure an equitable distribution of the revenues
between the Umon and the States, even though
those revenues may be derived from taxes and duties
imposed by the Union and collected by it or through
the agency of the States. On the; other hand, there
may be more serious difficulties in the way of the
Union if we were to adopt the very wide interpreta·
tion suggested on behalf of the States. It will thus
be seen that the powers of taxation assigned to the
Union are based mostly on considerations of con·
venience of imposition and collection and not with
a view to allocate them solely to the Union ; that is
to say, it was not intended that all taxes and duties
imposed by the Union Parliament should be expended on the activities of the Centre and not on
the activities of the States. Sources of re\ltnue
allocated to the States, like taxes on land and other
kinds of immovable property, have been allocated
to the States alone. The Constitution maker•
realised the fact that those sources of revenue allocated to the States may not be sufficient for their
purposes and that the Government of India would
have to subsidise their welfare activities out of the
revenues levied and collected by the Union Government. Realising the limitations on the financial
resources of the States and the growing needs of the
community in a welfare "State, the Constitution has
made, as already indicated, specific provisions
empowering Parliament to set aside a portion of its
revenues, whether forming part of the Consolidated
Fund of India or not, for the benefit of the State1,
not in stated proportions but according to their needs.
It is clear, therefore, that consideration• which may
apply to those Constitutions which recognise
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 811
water· tight compartments between the revenues of the
federating States and those of the federation do not
apply to our Constitution which does not postulate
any conflict of interest between the Union on the
one hand and the States on the other. The resources
of the Union Government are not meant exclusively
for the benefit of the Union activities ; they are also
meant for subsidi1ing the activities of the States in
accordance with their respective needs, irrespective
of the amounts collected by or through them. In
other words, the Union and the States together
form one organic whole for the purposes of utilisation
of the resources of the territories of India as a
whole.
•
Bearing the scheme of our Constitution in mind
let us now tum to the words of Art. 289 and also
its complementary article, namely, Art. 285. The
contention on behalf of the Union is that when
Art. 289 provides for exemption of the property
and income of a State from Union taxation, it
only provides for exemption from such tax as may
be levied directly on property and income and not
from all Union taxes, which may have some relation
to the property or income of a State. On the other
hand, the contention on behalf of the States is that
when Art. 289 {l) provides for exemption of the
property and income of a State from Union taxation,
it completely exempts the property and income of a
State from all Union taxation of whatsoever nature
it may be. So far as exemption of income is ,
concerned, there is no serious dispute that the
exemption there is with respect to taxes on income
other than agricultural income (item 82, List I),
for the simple reason that the only tax provided in
List I with respect to incomr is in item 82 of List I.
The ditpute ,is mainly with respect to taxes on "pro·
perty". Now this fact in our opinion has an impor·
tant bearing on the nature of taxation of "property"
which is exempt under Art. 289 ~(l). If the income
1963
be re Se6 CustMltJ
Act
Si<ii• C. J
IL
·~-
Sl2
/~S
Tr. re .s,. Cust•ms
J.ct
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOl..
"fa State is exempt only from taxes on income, the
juxtaposition of the words "property arid income"
in Art. 289 (I) must lead to the inference that
property is also exempt only from direct taxes on
property. ~ut it is said that there is no specific tax
on property in List I and it is therefore contended
on behalf of the States that when property of a State
was exempted from Unfon taxation, the intention
of the Constitution makers must have been to exempt
it from all such taxes which are in any way related
to property. Therefore, it is urged that the exemption is not merely from taxes directly on property
as such but from all taxes which impinge on property
of a State even indirectly, like customs duties, or
export duties or excise duties. It is true that List I
contains no tax directly on property like List II, but
it does not follow from that that the Union has no
power to impose a tax directly on property under
any circumstances. Article 246 (4) gives power to
Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter
for any part of the territory of India not ineluded
in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a
matter enumerated in the State List. This means
that so far as Union territories are concerned Parlia·
ment has power to legislate not only with respect to
items in List I but also with respect to items in
List II. Therefore, so far as Union territories are
ecncemed, Parliament has power to impose a tax
directly on property as such. It cannot therefore be
said that the exemption of States' property from.
Union taxation directly on property under Art. 289 (1)
would be meaningless as Parliament has no power
to impose any tax directly on property. If a
State has any property in any Union territory
that property would be exempt from Union taxatien
on property under Art. 289 (I).· The argument
therefore that Art. 289 (l) can no( be confined to tax
directly on property because ·there is no such tax
provided in List I cannot be accepted.
3 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
Now the words in Art. 289, confining ourselves
to "property", are tha' "the property of a State shall
be exempt from Unio taxation''. It is remarkable
that the word "all" d0es not govern the wo -.J;
"Unien taxation" in Art. 289 (1). It does not provide tllat the property of a State shall be exempt from
all Uaion taxation. The question therefore is whether
when Art. 289 provides for the exemption of S~ate
property from Union taxation, it only provides fer
exemption from that kind of Union taxation which
is a tax directly on property. lt is true that Art.
2S9( l) does not specifically say that the property of a
State shall be exempt from Union taxation on property. It may however be properly inferred that
that was the intention if one looks to the languace
of Art. 289 (2). That clause mainly deals with
income accruing or arising to a State from trade or
business carried on by it. At the same time it pro·
vides that where the State is carrying on a trade or
business nothing in cl. (1) shall prevent the Union
from imposing any tax to such extent as Parliament
may by law provide in respect of any property used
or occupied for the purposes of such trade or business,
and the authority thus giveo to Parliament to tax
property used or occupied in connection with trade
or bminess can only refer to a tax directly on property as such, which is used or occupied for business,
the tax being related to the use or occupation of the
property. The meaning will be clearer if we look
to Art. 285. Clause ( l) of that Article provides that
the property of the Union shall be exempt from all
taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within
a State. Prima facie the use of the words "all
taxes" in cl. (1) would suggest that the property of
the Union would be exempt from all taxes of whatsoever nature, which a State can impose. But if one
looks to cl: (2) of Art. 285 the nature of taxes from
which the property of the Union wo1.1ld be exempt
is clearly indicated as a tax on property. Clause ( ~)
provides that "nothing · in clause ( 1) shall, until
IJ6'
In,,
s., cu, 1.,,,,
A;t
-'-C
Si·v~ • 1 •
SI• SUl>MMECOUllT REPORTS [l964]VOL.
J9IS
In re Sea Customs
Act
Parliament by law otherwise provides, prevent any
authority within a State from levying any tax on any
property of the Union to which such property was
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so long as that
tax continues to be levied in that State". It will in
our opinion be permissible in view of cl. (2) to read
cl. (l) of Art. 285 when it speaks of all taxes as
relating to taxes of the nature of taxes directly on
property. We have already pointed out, when
dealing with the general considerations which sheuld
govern the interpretation of Art. 289 (1) that the
Power of the Union would be crippled if Art. 289 i1
mterpreted a1 exempting the property of a State from
all Union taxes. We have also pointed out that even
though the taxes may be collected and levied by the
Union, there are provisions in Part XII for the
assignment or distribution of many Union taxes to
the States. There are also provisions for grants-in·
aid by the Union from the Consolidated Fund of
India to a State. In these circumstances it would in
our opinion be in consonance with the scheme of the
Constitution relating to taxation to read Art. 289 (l)
as laying down that the property and income of a
State shall be exempt from Union taxation on
property and income. There is in our opinion better
warrant for reading these words "on property and
income" after the words "Union taxation" in
Art. 289(1) in view of the scheme of our Constitu·
tion relating to taxation and also the provisions of
Part XII thereof than to read the word "all" before
the words "Union taxation" in that clause. The
effect of reading the word "all" before the words
"Union taxation" would in our opinion be so serious,
and so crippling to the resources, which the Constitu·
tion intended the Union to have, as to make it
impossible to give that intention to the words of
cl. (1) of Article 289. On the other hand, the States
would not be 10 seriously affected if we read the
words "on property and income" after the words
3 s.O.R.
SUPREME COURt REPORTs
815
"Union taxation" in Art. 289 ( 1), for unlike other
Constitutions there is provision in Part XII of our
Constitution for assignment or distribution of taxes
levied and collected by the Union to the States and
also for grants-in-aid from the Union to the States,
so that the burden which aay fall on the States by
giving a restrictive meaning to the words used in
cl. ( l) of Art. 289 would be alleviated to a 1argc
extent in view of the provisions in Part XII of the
Constitution for assignment and distribution of taxe1
levied by the Union to the States and also for grantsin-aid from the Union to the States.
Further it must not be forgot ton that Arta. 285
and 289 arc successors of ss. 154 and 155 of the
Government of India Act, though there arc diiferencea
in detail between them, in particular cl. (2) of Art.
289, which corresponds to the proviso to s. 154 seems
in our opinion to make it clear by the change in the
language, that cl. (1) of Art. 285 when it speaks of
all taxes is referring to taxes on property of which
cl. (2) definitely permits continuance provided such
property of the Union immediately before the
commencement of the Comtitution was liable or was
treated as liable to such ta•. As to Art. 289 (1), a
change has been made in the words, for s. 155(1),
which corresponded thereto, provided that the
Government of a Province shall not be liable to
Federal taxation in respect of lands or buildings.
Art. 289 on the other hand refen not only to lands
and buildings but to all property of a State, whether
movable or immovable and exempts it from Union
taxation. Even so, we find no warrant for interpre·
ting cl. ( 1) of Art. 289 as if it exempts all property
of a State from all Union taxation. We arc there·
fore of opinion reading Art. 289 and its complementary Art. 285 together that the intention of the
Constitution makers was that Art. 285 would exempt
all property of the Union from all taxes on property
levied by a State or by any authority within the
1963
In r1 Sea Ctlst91t1s
A<I
SinliA C. /,
8iiF SUPREME cot..JJ:, REP(JRts [1964) \lot.
-
]JiJ
ln''re Se• CUstlms
Act
SinM. C J
State while Art. 289 contemplates that all property
of the States would be exempt from all taxes on
property which may be leviable by the Union. Both
the Articles in our opinion are concerned with taxes
directly either on income or on property and not
with taxes which may indirectly affect income or
property. The contention. therefore on behalf of
the Union that these two Articles should be read
in the restricted sense of exempting the property or
income of a State in one case and the property of
the Union in the other from taxes directly either on
property or on income as the case may be, is
correct.
In this connection, it is pertitient to refer
to certain decision of the High Court of
Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the
Privy Council bearing on the construction of similar,
though not identical, provisions in the Constitutions
of Australia and Canada.
The corresponding provisions of the Canadian
Constitution are contained in ss. 91, 92 and 125 of
the British North America Act, · 1867 (30-31 Viet.
Ch. 3). The relevant portion of s. 91 is as follows :. "It shall be lawful for the Qµeen ...... to make
laws for the peace, order and good Government of Canada, in relation to all matters not
coming within the classes . of subjects by this
Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures· of
the Provinces; and for greater certainty, but
· not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms of this Section, it is hereby declared
that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the
exclusive legislative authority of thi: Parliament
of Canada extends to all matters coming within
the classes of subjects next · hereh1after enumerated; that is to say :
~·
,
...
3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS
817 .
(2) The regulation of Trade and Commerce;
(3) The raising of money by any mode or
system of taxation."
S. 92 provides for exclusive powers of the province including direct taxation within the Province
in order to the raising <Jf revenue for Provincial
purposes.
Section 125 is in these terms :"No lands or property belonging to Canada or
any Province shall be liable to taxation."
~
It will thus be seen that the above-quoted section
runs very parallel to the provisions of Art. 289 (I) or
our Constitution. These provisions of the Canadian
constitution have come up for consideration before
the Supreme Court of Canada, as also before the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on a number
of occasions. In the case of the Attorney-General o(
The Province of British Columbia v. The Attorney.
General of the Dominion of Canada (64 Can. S.C.R.
377) the question arose whether the Province of
British Columbia could import liquors into Canada
for the purposes of sale, pursuant to the provisions
of the Government Liquor Act (ll Geo. V, c. 30)
without payment of custoffiJ duties imposed by the
Dominion of Canada. It was argued, as haa been
argued before us, that the word "tax" wa1 wide
enough to include the imposition of customs duties,
and that the word "property" in 1. 125 included
property of all kinds. The answer given by the
Dominion was that customs duties did not con·
stitute taxes within the meaning or the exprcuion
used in s. 125 but were merely in the nature or
regulation of trade and commerce, and secondly,
assuming that cuaroms duties were included in the
expression "taxation", tlli!y tfti net comthut'I ~xatioa
.. ,,y,.c.,,.,,,
.ilct
sw..c.1.
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
)9/iS
on property. It was also contended on behalf
of the Dominion that the word "taxation" ins. 125
In '' $111, C11sttm1
. "·
ii.cl. ..
was not intended to comprehend customs duties
inasmuch as the prohibition indicated by the section
~i~.c.1.
was intended to be reciprocal prohibition and did not
. extend as regards the Dominion to indirect taxation.
The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority judg- _ment, upheld the decision of the Exchequer Court of
Canada, which had held that the import by the Province was liable to pay import duty to the Dominion.
Thus the contention raised on behalf of the Dominion
was accepted that customs duties were not taxes
imposed on property as such but were levied on the
importation of certain goods into Canada as a
condition of their importation.
This decision of the Supreme Court was cha!·
lenged before the Privy Council, by special leave.
The juqgment of the Privy Council is reported in
Attorney-General of British Columbia v. AttorneyGeneral of Canada (1924 A. C. 222). The Privy
· Council upheld the decision appealed from and held
that import duties imposed by the Dominion upon
_alcohoHc liquors imported into Canada by the
Government of British Columbia for the purposes of
trade was valid. The Privy Council based its decision on a ·consideration of the whole scheme of the
_Canadian Constitution under which the Dominion
had the power to regulate trade and commerce
_throughout the Dominion, and held that "s. 125
must therefore be so considered as to prevent the
paramount purpose thm declared being defeated".
, The Privy Council further observed that "the true
_solution is to be found in the adaptation of s. 125 to
the whole scheme of Government which the statute
defines". The ratio decidendi in the case just mentioned fully supports the contention raised on behalf
of the Union in the present case and the intcrpreta·
tion cf Art. 289 (1) must also be adapted to the whole
scheme of the Constitution.
'-
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
1116$
Turning now to the Comtitution of Australia
and the relevant cases decided by the High Court . r..,, s,. eusi...:..
of Australia, it is necessary to set out the relevant
Acl
part of s. 51 of the Commonwealth of Australia
;;m. c.1.
Constitution Act, 1900 (63 and 64 Viet. c. 12) : - •
"The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace,
order and good Government of Commonwealth
with respect to( i ) Trade and Commerce with other countries,
and among the States;
(ii) Taxation; but so as not to discriminate
between the States or parts of States."
This closely follows that part of s. 91 of the British
North America Act, which has ve~ted the Federal
Parliament with the exclusive power to legislate in
respect of such trade and commerce and taxation in
respect thereof. Section 114 of the Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution grants immunity from
taxation in the following terms :"A State shall not, without the consent of the
Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or
maintain any naval or military force, or im·
pose any tax on property of any kind belong·
ing to the Commonwealth nor shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on property of any
kind belonging to a State."
This corresponds to the provision of s. 125 of the
Canadian Constitution and Arts. 285 and 289 of our
Constitution, which have laid down the provisions
as to t>xemption from taxation. The question of
the interpretation of those provisions of the Australian
Constitution came before the High Court of Australia
·in the case of the Attorney-General of New South
820
1!16J
lit· r• 810 Cu11atn1
.tl11
SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l964] VOL.
,
Wales v. The Oollector. of Oustomt1 for New Swth
Wales (1907-8) 5 C.L.R. 818. In this case an action
was brought by the State of New South Wales to
recover the amount of customs duties realised by the
Collector of Customs in respect of certain steel rails
imported by the plaintiff from England for use in the
construction of the railways of the State. The State
claimed that those rails were not liable to customs
duties on the ground that they were the property of
the Government and as such exempt from customs
duties by virtue of s. 114 of the Constitution. The
majority of the Court decided that the imposition of
customs duties being. a mode of regulating trade
andcommerce with other countries as well as of
exercising the taxing power, the goods imported by
a State Government were aubject to the customs
laws of the Commonwealth. They also laid it down
that the levying of the duties of custom, is not an
imposition of a tax on property within the meaning
of s. 114 aforesaid. The Court added that even if
the words of the section were capable of bearing that
comprehensive meaning, that was not the only or
necessary meaning atid should be rejected as inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution conferring upon the Commonwealth exclusive power to
impose duties of customs and to regulate trade and
commerce. Isaacs J. came to the same conclusion thou~h on somewhat different grounds. In the result, the
Court unanimously held, though not for the aame reasons, that the goods imported by the State were liable
to import duty. The High Court held that the words
"impose any tax" might be capable of application to
duties of customs. But it pointed out that the levying
of customs duties was not within the comprehension
of the expression "imposition of a tax on property."
It also pointed out that customs duties were imposed
in respect of goods and in a sense "upon" goods, even
as the expression Stamp duties, Succession Duties and
other forms of indirect taxes are aaid to be taxes on
deeds and other real or p<:rsonal property. The
I
•.,
3 S.C.I{.
SUPREME COURT REPORTs
821
Court recognised the legal position that customs
duties arc not really taxation upon property but upon
operations or movements of property,
These authorities based on the interpretation of
analogous provisions in the Canadian and Australian
Constitutions fully support the contention raised on
behalf of the Union that customs duties are not taxes
on property but are imposts by way of conditions or
restrictions on the import and export of goods, in
exercise of the Union's exclusive power of regulation
of trade and commerce read along with the power of
taxation aod that the general words of the exemption
have to be limited in their scope so as not to come
into conflict with the power of the Union to regulate
trade and commerce and to impose duties of customs.
It is next urged on behalf of the States that
even if Art. 289 (1) only exempts the property of the
States from tax directly on property, the levy of excise
on goods under item 84 of List I is a tax on property
and therefore no excise can be levied on goods belonging to States and manufactured by them. It is
further urged that duties of customs including export
duties under item b3 of List I are equally duties on
the goods imported or exported and therefore the
property of the State must be exempt under Art.,289
(1), both from excise duties aod ·from duties of
customs including export duties. This raises the
question of the nature of duties of excise and customs.
This question with respect to excise duties was
considered by this Court in the case of Amalgamated
Ooalfields Ltd. v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1962
S.C. 1281). After considering the previous decisions
of the Federal Court In re. The Oentral Provinces
2nd Berar Salu of Moror and Lubricant Taxation
.A.ct (1939 F.C.R. 18); The Province of Madras v.
M/a. Budhu Paidanns (1942 F. C. R. 90) and of the
Judicial Oommiltee of ihe Privy Oouncial in Governor
General in Oounoil v. Province of Madras (1945
,..,
l• ,, .Su C"'""'5
~C.J.
822
1963
tn '~ Sea Custnu
iA<t
Sin/lo C. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
F. C. R. 179). this Court observed as follows at
p. 1287 :"With great respect, we accept the principles
laid down by the said three decisions in the
matter of levy of an excise duty and the machinery for collection thereof. Excise ·duty
is primarily a duty on the production or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured
within the couritry. lt is an indirect duty.
which the manufactu•er or producer passes on
to the ultimate consumer, that is, ultimate
incidence will always be on the consumer. ·
Therefore, subject always to the legislative
competence of the taxing authority, the ·said
tax can be levied at a convenient stage so Jong
as the character of the impost, that is. it is a
duty on the manufacture or production. is not
lost. The method of collection does not affect
the essence of the duty, but only relates to the·
machinery of collection for administrative
convenience."
This will show that the taxable event in the .
case of duties of excise is the manufacture of goods
an.:1 the duty is not directly on the goods but on the
manufacture thereof. We may in this connection
contrast sales tax which is also imposed with reference
to goods sold, where the taxable event is the act of
sale. Therefore, though both excise duty and salestax are levied with reference to goods, the two are
very different imposts ; in one case the imposition is
on the act of manufac.ture or production while in
the other it is on the act of sale. In neither case
therefore can it be said that the e::::cise duty or sales
tax is a tax directly on the goods for in that event.
they will really become the same tax. It would thus
appear that duties of excise partake of the nature of
indirect taxes as known to standard works on econo.
mies and are to be distinguished from direct taxes.
like taxes on property and income.
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
823
Similarly in the case of duties of customs in·
eluding export duties though they are levied with
reference to goods, the taxable event is either the
import of goods within the customs barriers or their
export outside the customs barriers. They are also
indirect taxes like excise and cannot in our opinion
be equated with direct taxes on goods themselves.
Now, what is the true na•ure of an iniport or export
duty ? Truly speaking, the impos'tion of an import
duty, by and large, results in a condition which
must be fulfilled before the goJds can be brought
inside the customs barriers, i.e., before they form part
of the mass of goods within the country. Such a
condition is imposed by way of the exercise of the
power of the Union to regulate the manner and terms
on which goods may be brought into the country
from a foreign land. Similarly an export duty is a
condition precedent to sending goods out of the
country to other lands .. It is not a duty on property
in the sense of Art. 289 (1). Though the expression
"taxation", as defioed in Art. :166 (28), "includes the
imposition of any tax or impost, whtther gen.:ral or
local or special", the amplitude of that definition
has to be cut down if the context otherwise so
requires. The position is that whereas the Union
Parliament has been vested with exclusive power to
regulate trade and commerce, both foreign and inter·
State (Entries 41 and 42) and with the sole respon·
sibility of imposing export and import duties and
duties of excise, with a view to regulating trade and
commerce and raising· revenue, an exception has
been engrafted in Art. 289 (I) in favour of the
States, granting them immunity from certain kinds
of Union taxation. It, therefore, becomes necessary
so to construe the provisions of the Consti tu ti on as to
give full effect to both, as far as may be. If it is
held that the States are exempt from all taxation in
respect of their export or imports, it is not difficult
to imagine a situation where a State might import
or export all varieties of things and thus nullify to
-.-
J,. ,,-s,~·cuitcnu ·
.A.cf
·>inlui C. 1: · ·
824
196!1
... ,, 8,. c.,1.,,.,
.A.ti
s;.r.. c. 1.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
a large extent the exclusive power of Parliament to
legislate in respect of those matters. The provisions
of Art. 289 (1) being in the nature of an exception
to the exclusive field of legislation reserved to
Parliament, the exception has to be strictly construed,
and therefore, limited to taxes on property and on
income of a State. In other words, the immunity
granted in favour of States has to be restricted to
taxes levied directly on property and income. Therefore, even though import and export duty or duties
of excise have reference to goods and commodities,
they are not taxes on property directly and are "lot
within the exemption in Art. 289 (1).
We may in this connection refer to the
Attorne11-General for British Columbia v. Ki.ngcome
Navigation Co. Ltd. (19:J4 A. C. 45), to bring out
the essence of duties of customs and excise which
were held by the Privy Council to be in their essence
trading taxes as distinguished from direct taxes.
But it is contended on behalf of the States
that in the scheme of our Constitution no distinction
has been made between direct and indirect tax and
therefore this distinction is not relevant to the present
controversy. It is true that no such express distinction has been made under our Constitution; even so
taxes in the shape of duties of customs (including
export duties) and excise, particularly with a view
to regulating trade and commerce in so far as such
matters are within the competence of Parliament
and are covered by various entries in List I to which
reference has already been made, cannot be called
taxes on property; they are imposts with reference
to the movement of property by way or import or
export or with reference to production or manu·
facture of goods. Therefore even though our Constitution does not make a clear distinction between
direct and indirect taxu, there is no doubt that the
exemption provided in Art, 2t!9 (I) from ·Union
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
825
taxation to property must refer to what are known
to economists as direct taxes on property and not to
indirect taxes like duties of customs and excise which
are in their essence trading taxes and not taxes on
property.
It is also contended on behalf of the States that
the narrower construction suggested on behalf of the
Union would very seiiously and adversely affect
activities of the States. This arg11ment does not
take into account the more serious consequences that
would follow if the wider interpretation suggested
on behalf of the States were to be adopted. For
example, a State may decide to embark upon trade
and commerce with foreign countries on a large scale
in respect of different commodities. On the interpretation put forward by the States, the Union
Parliament would be powerless to regulate such trade
and commerce by the use of the power of taxation
conferred on it by entry 83 of List I, thus largely
nullifying the exclusive power of Parliament to
legislate in respect of international trade and commerce, including the power to tax such trade. Trade
and commerce with foreign countries, export and
import across the customs frontriers and inter-State
trade and commerce are all within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Union Parliament. This Court
naturally will not adopt a constructiov. of Art. 289(1)
which will lead to such a startling result as to
nullify the exclusive power of Parliament in these
matters.
•
Lastly, it is urged on behalf of the States that
s. 20 of the Sea Customs Act was recast and amended
by Act. XLV of 1951 and that sub·s. (2) thereof
has borrowed most of its words from the provisions
of cl. (2) of Art. 289, and therefore, Parliament itself
had understood cl. (2) of Art. 289 in the sense in
~hich the States are contending that it should be
interpreted. But that in our opinion does not
1961
/a r1 S• Custems
""
SW C. J,
826
I• ,, SH l'uslMns
.dct
Shrlr4 C. J • .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
conclude the matter, for we have to construe the pro· ·
visions of the Constitution in their proper setting and
we are entitled to come to the conclusion that
Parliament may not have been correct in so interpreting the words of cl. (2) of Art. 289.
For the reasons given above, it must be held
that the immunity granted to the States in respect of
Union taxation does not extend to duties of customs
including export duties or duties of excise. The
answer to the three questions referred to us must,
therefore, be in the negative. Let the opinion of
this Court be reported to the President accordingly.
D•• J.
S. K. DAS J.-In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by cl. (I) of Art. 143 of the Constitu·
tion, the President of India has referred three
questions of law to this court for consideration and
a report of its opinion thereon. These questions are :
(1) Do the provisions of article 289 of the
Constitution preclude the Union from
imposing, or authorising the imposition
of, customs du ties on the import or export
of the property of a State used for purposes·
other than those specified in clause (2) of
that article ?
(2) Do the provisions of article 289 of the
Constitution of Tndia preclude the Union
from imposing, or authorising the imposition of, excise duties on the production or ·
manufacture in India of the property of
a State used for purposes other than those
specified in clause (2) of that article? ·
(3) Will sub-section (2) of section 20 of the
Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act 8of1878),
and sub·section (IA) of section 3 of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (Act I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR1 KEPORTS
827
of 1944) as amended by the Bill set out in
the annexure be inconsisteut with the
provisions of article 289 of the Consitution
of India?
·
We have had the advanta~e of very full arguments on these questions. The learned SolicitorGeneral of India has put forward the point of view
on behalf of the Union of India. Several States
were represented before us by their Advocates-General or other counsel. Except for _the State
of Maharashtra which has taken a stand somewhat akin to that of the Union of India,
there is a sharp conflict between the States and the
Union as to the answers to be given to the three
questions. We shall presently refer in greater detail
to the points of conflict but it may be generally
stated that except for the State of Maharashtra, the
States have taken the stand that under Art. 289 of
the Constitution the property of a State is exempt
from the imposition of customs duties and excise
duties except to the extent permitted under clause (2)
of the said article. The Union of India has taken
the stand that the amplitude of power given to the
Union Legislature to impose duties of customs (entry
83 of List I of the Seventh Schedule) and duties of
excise (entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule)
can be cut down only by a very strict interpretation
of article 289 and that strict interpretation is that
cl. (1) of Art. 289 i~ confined to a property tax only,
namely, a tax on the goods as such and not on their
importation or exportation or on their production
a~d manufacture, and look~d ~t from that point of
view A_rt. 289 of the. Constitution does not give any
protection to a State m the matter of customs duties
and excise duties.
It is necessary perhaps to say something at this
sta~e about the constitutional background -against
which the questions fall for consideration. The Si:a
r
I
l96S
In" s,. C..I,,,;,
All
Dos J.
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964) VOL.
lD6J
I•·" S•• c.,,...,
Aci
Du 1.
Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878) was enacted in March
1878 in order to consolidate and amend the law rela·
ting to the levy of sea customs-duties. The Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1of1944) was enacted.
in February 1944 to consolidate and amend the law
relating to central duties of excise and to salt, The
Government of India Act, 1915 {5 and 6 Geo. 5,
' c. 61) was a consolidating measure repealing and reenacting the numerous Parliamentary Statutes relat·
ing to the administration of British India which had
been passed between the years 1770 and I 912. This
Act was amended in certain minor respects by the
Government of India Amendment Act, 1916 {6 and
7 Geo. 5, c. 37) which also contained certain substantive provisions not incorporated in the principal Act.
In 1919 the Act again underwent amandment by the
passing of the Government of India Act, 1919 (9 and
10 Geo. 5, c. 101) which was enacted for the purpose
of bringing into effect the Indian constitutional re·
forms based on what is commonly known as the
Montagu·Chelmsford Report. Section 45 of the
Act of 1919 provided that the amendments made by
that Act and the Act of 1916 be incorporated in the
text of the Government of India Act, 1915, and
that that Act as so amended 'be known as the
Government of India Act. This Government of
India Act constituted an Indian Legislature consis·
ting of two Chambers, namely, the Council of States
and the Legislative Assembly. This Legislature had
the power to make laws for all persons, for all courts
and for all places and things within British India
and had also the power to repeal or alter any laws
which were in force in any part of British India.
Prior to the Government of India Act, 1935
(26 Geo. V, c. 2) the dominion and authority of the
Crown, which extended over the whole of British
India, was derived from many sources, in part statutory and in part prerogative, the former having their
origin in Acts of the British Parliament and the
latter in rights based upon conquest, cession or usage
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
8211
some of which were directly acquired while others
were enjoyed by the Crown as successor to the rights
of the East India Company. The Secretary of State
for India was the Crown's responsible agent
for the exercise of all authority vested in the Crown
in relation to the affairs of India. But the superintendence, direction and control of the civil and
military government of India was declared by the
Government of India Act to be vested in the
Governor-General-in-Council; while the government
or administration of the ·Governers' and Chief
Commissioners' Provinces vested respectively in the
local governments.
•
The Government of India Act, 1935 introdu·
ced a dual system of government in the shape of
autonomous Provinces and a Federation; two sets of
Legislatures were set up, one Federal Legislature
and the other Provincial Legislature. In the Seventh
Schedule were given three Lists, Federal Legislative
List called List I, Provincial Legislative List called
List II and the Concurrent legislative list called
List III. Legislative power was distributed amongst
the legislatures in accordance with those lists. Duties
of custom, including export duties came within item
44 of List I and duties of excise on tobacco and
other iroods manufactured or produced in India
except alcoholic liquors, opium etc., came within
item 45. The Indian Legislature amended the Sea
Customs Act, 1878 as also the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944 from time to time in exercise of the
powers which it had either under the Government
of India Act, or the Government of India Act, ! 935.
The Indian Independence Act, 194 7 created the
Dominion of India as from August 15, 194 7 and the
Secretary of State for India as the Crown's responsi ·
ble agent for Indian affairs disappeared from the
Indian constitutional scene. The Constitution of
Iodia came into force on January 26, 1950. This
Constitution envisaged India as a Sovereign
'""'
In ,., Sit Ciutctms
Jlcl
830
I•"
•·
· 190!!
sea Ciutoms
.!ti .·
Das 1.
SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
Democratic Republic, viz., a Union of States but
the scheme of the Government of India Act,
Hl35 with regard to distribution of legislative
powers between Parliament,· which is the Union
Legislature, and the State Legislatures was continued.
The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution contains
called List I, State
three lists, Union List
List called List II, and
Concurrent
List
called. List III. Entry 83 of List I relates to
duties of customs including export duties and entry
84 relates to duties of excise on tobacco and other
goods manufactured or produced in India except
alcoholic liquors, opium etc. The distribution of
legislative powers and 1he legislative relations
between the Union and the States are controlled by
various articles, namely, Arts. 245 to 258,. in Chapter
I of Part XI of the Constitution. We may indicate
here briefly the constitutional position that in normal
circumstances Parliament has exclusive power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters enume·
rated in List I, and the Legislature of any State has
exclusive power to make laws for any such State
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in
List II; both Parliament and the Legislature of a
State have power to make laws with respect to any
· of the matters enumerated in List Ill.
Under Art. 245 of the Constitution, the power
of Parliament as al'o of the Legislature of a Stale
to make laws is subj~ct to the provisions -of the Con·
stitution. Some of these provisions are contained
in Art. 285 and Art. 289 which occur in Chapter
I of Part XII of the Constitution. This Part deals
with several subjects, such as Finance (Chapter I),
Borrowing (Chapter II) and Property, Contracts etc.
(Chapter TII). We may now read Art. 289:
'·289 (I) The properly and income of a State
shall be exempt from Union taxation.
.
"
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
(2) Nothing in clause (I) shall prevent
. 1963
the Union from imposing, or authorising the . 1... ,,. Craloms
imposition of, any tax to such exteot, if any, as
A<1
Parliament may by law provide in respect of a
Dn 1.
trade or business of any kind carried on by, or
on behalf of, the Government of a State, or any
operations connected therewith, or any property used or occupied for the purposes of such
trade or business, or any income accruing or
arising in connection therewith.
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall apply to
any trade or business, or to any class of trade
or business, which Parliament may by law
declare to be incidental to the ordinary functions of government."
The interpretation of this article is the main subject
for consideration in this reference.
....
Soon after the coming into force of the Constitution, s. 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 which
stated what goods would be dutiable under the Act,
was, amended by the Union Legislature by Act XLV
of 1951. The amendment took the shape of inserting a sub-section in s. 20, suh·s. (2), which said that
the provisions of sub·s. (I) shall apply in respect of
goods belonging to the Government of a State and
used for the purpose of a trade or bminess of any
kind carried on by, or on behalf of,. that Government
or of any operations connected with such trade or
business as they apply in respect of goods not belonging to any Government. A similar amendment
was made in s. 3 of the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944 by inserting sub-s. (I· A) in that section.
That su b·section said that the provisions of sub-s. ( l)
shall apply to all excisable goods other than salt
\\ hich are produced or manufactured in India by,
or on behalf of a Government of a State (other
than a Union territory) and used for the purpases
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
bt t• &'J Car toms
Act
IillS i/.
of a trade or business of any kind carried on by or
on behalf of that Government, or of any operations
connected with such trade or business as they apply
in respect of goods which are not · produced or
manufactured by any Government. It is obvious
that these two amendments were intented to bring
the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 into harmony with Art. 289 of
the Constitution. In 1962 the Union Government
introduced a draft Bill in Parliament further to
amend the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 19!4. We may quote two
clauses of this draft Bill in order to appreciate how
this reference has come to be made to this court. /
These two clauses are clauses 2 and 3 of the draft
Bill which run :
2. Amendment of section 20, Act 8 of
1878,-In section 20 of the Sea Customs Act,
1878, for sub-section (2) the following sub·
section shall be substituted, namely :"(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall
apply in respect of all goods belonging to
the Government as they apply in respect
of goods not belonging to the Govern·
ment."
3. Amendment of section 3, Act I of 1944,In section ::l of the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944, for sub-section (IA) the following
sub-section shall be substituted, namely:"(lA) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall
apply in respect of all excisable goods
othrr than salt which are produced or
manllfactured in India by, or on behalf
of, the Government as they apply in respect of goods which are not produced or
manufactured by the Government."
3 s.G.R.
•·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
saa
This draft :Bill gave rise to a controversy and the
Ggvernments of certain States expressed the view
that the amendments proposed in the draft Bill would
not be constitutionally valid as the provisions of
Art. 289 read with the definitions of 'taxation' and
'tax' in cl. (2.S) of Art. 366 of the Comtitution preclude the Union from imposing or authorising the
imposition of any tax, including cmtoms duties and
excise duties, on or in relation to any property of a
State, except to the extent permitted by cl.(:!) read
with cl. (3) of the said Art. ~89. The Union Government was, however, of the view that the exemption
from Union taxation granted by cL (1) of Art. 289 was
restricted to Union taxes on the property of a State
and did not extend to Union taxes in relation to the
property of a State; therefore, customs duties being
taxes on the import or export of goods and not on
goods as such and excise duties being taxes on the
protiuction or manufacture of goods and not on goods
as such did not come within the protection of cl. (1)
of Art. 289. This conflict of views gave rise to
doubts as to the true interpretation and scope of
Art. 289 of the Constitution and in particular, as to
the constitutional validity of the amendments proposed in the draft Bill. This led the President to
refer the three questions stated above to this court
for consideration and a report of its opinion
thereon.
In one of the very earliest references made to
the Federal Court (In re The Central Provinces and
Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation
Act, 1938 (Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV
of 1938) (1), under s. 213 of the Government of India
Act, 1935 (which corresponded to Art. 143 of the
Constitution), Gwyer C. J. observed that the rules
which would apply to the interpretation of other
statutes would apply equally to the interpretation of
a constitutional enactment, but their application must be conditioned of necessity by the
(I) ( 19S9] i'.C,R, 18.
/911
,,., J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
__,,..,
subject matter of the enactment itself, namely, the
nature and scope of the Act itself which is a Constitution, "a mechanism under which laws are to be made
and not a mere Act which declares what the law nught
to be". He said that this was especially true of a
Federal Constitution, with its nice balance of jurisdictions. We recognise that a broad and liberal spirit
must inspire those whose duty it is to interpret an
organic instrument which sets up a constitutional
machinery, a machinery meant to control the life of
a nation, to embody its ideals, and facilitate the
realisation of such ideals for the present and
the future; this does not however imply that those
whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution are free
to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment
in the interests of any legal or constitutional theory
or even for the purpose of supplying omissions or of
correcting supposed errors.
••
834
1965
In re sea Cust>ms
Art
Das /,
Keeping these principles in mind let us consider
the problem before us by an examination of the
relevant articles of the Constitution bearing on that
problem. The crux of the problem is the true scope
and effect of Art. 289 of the Constitution which we
have quoted earlier. Cl. (1) of Art. 289 states that
the property and income of a State shall be exempt
from Union taxation. Now, Art. 366 (28) says in
clear terms that, unless the context otherwise requires,
the expression "taxation" includes the imposition of
any tax or impost whether general or local or special
and the word "tax" shall be construed accordingly.
We shall presently consider the question whether the
context of Art. 289. requires a different meaning to
be given to the word "taxation". But let us first see
what happens if we read Art. 289 (1) by substituting
for the expression "taxation" the words which
Art. 366 (28) says the expression "taxation" includes.
Cl. (1) of Art. 289 will then read as follows :
"The property and income of a State shall be
exempt from the imposition of any tax or
,.
<.~
~....
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
impost, whethct general or local or special, by
the Union."
There can be no manner of doubt that customs duty
or excise duty is an impost within the meaning of
Art. 366 (28), an~ this the learned Solicitor-General
has n'Jt contested. If therefore Art. 28\J (1) is interpreted with the key furnished by Art 36li (28), then
it seems to us that however broad and liberal a spirit
may inspire those whose duty it is to interpret the
article, it would be imp:issible to stretch or pervert
the language of the article which in the clearest of
terms says that the property and income of a State
shall be exempt from any impost, whether general or
local or special, by the Union.
So far as the property of the Union is concerned
the counter-part of Art. 289 is An. 285 which reads :
"(1) The property of the Union shall, save
in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise
provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by
a State or by any authority within a State.
(2) Nothing in clause (I) shall, until
Parliament by law otherwise provides, prevent
any authority within a State from levying any
tax on any property of the Union to which such
property was immediately before · the commencement of this Constitution liable or treated
as liable, so long as that tax continues to be
levied in that State."
Now, the words of Art. 285 (1) are still more clear
an~ emphatic. !t says that the property of the
Umon .shall, Sft:Ve m so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed
by a State or by any authority within a State. The
expression "all taxes" must mean all taxes whether
they be on property or in relation to property.
1963
In re Seri Customs
Act
Das. J.
836
IHJ
Du 1.
SUPRElt'IE COURTREPORTS[l964]VOL.
Neither in Art. 289 ( l) nor in Art. 285 ( l) do we
see any restricting words which would cut down the
full meaning of the expression "taxation" in
Art. 289 or "all taxes" in Art. 285. The distribution
of legislative powers under Art. 245 is in express
terms subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
The result therefore is that Parliament cannot legislate to take away the exemption given by Art.
289 (1), nor can a State Legislature Legislate to take
away the exemption given by Art. 285 (1). If one
follows the principles of interpretation to which we
have earlier referred, the plain effect of Arts. 245,
285 (1), 289 (1) and 366 (28) appears to be this:
' under Art. 285 (l) the property of the Union shall
be exempt from all taxes imposed by the State or
by any authority within a State, save in so far as
Parliament may by law otherwise provide ; the
property and income of a State shall be exempt
from Union taxation save in so far as cl. (2) of
Art. 289 allows or authorises the imposition of any
tall: on the property of a State.
Let us now C011sider whether the context of
Art. 289 or any of the other articles in the Constitu·
tion requires that a different meaning should be
given to the expression "taxation" or "taxes" in
Art, 289 (1) or Art. 285 (1).
The learned Solicitor-General has emphasised
the use of the words 'property' and 'income' iri
Art. 289 and has further submitted that the word
'income' was not necessary in Art. 285 (1) and has
not been mentioned there, because "taxes on income
other than agricultural income" is an item in List I
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and a
State, or an authority within a State, has no legislative competence to impose a tax on income.
From the use of the two words 'property' and
'income' in cl. (1) of Art. 289, the learned Solicitor·
General has argwed that the intentiQn of the makers
..JJ"
"'--·
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
of the Constitution must have been to rC!trict cl. (1)
to a direct tax on property or income, that is, a tax
on property as such or a tax on income as such. He
has elaborated this argument in this way: as 'income
shall be exempt from tax' mnnq that income shall
be exempt from income-tax, in the 1ame way the
expression 'property shall be exempt from tax' means
that property shall be exempt from property tax.
lu other words, he contends, that the word 'property'
must control the word 'taxation' and must be interpreted as modifying the comprehensive connotation
of the word 'taxation'.
We are wholly unable to accept this line of
argument as correct. The learned Solicitor-Gi:neral
has indeed conceded that the word 'property' in
cl. (1) of Art. 289 has a comprehensive connotation
and refers to all property and assets of a State.
Article 294 which occurs in the same Part of the
Constitution states that as from the commencement of
the Constitution all property and assets which immediately before such commencement were vested in His
Majesty for the purposes of the Government of the
Dominion of India and all property and assets which
immediately before such commencement were vested
in His Majesty for the purposes of the Government
of each Governor's Province shall vest respectively
in the Union and the corresponding State. It is
clear therefore that in the Constitution the word
'property' is used in a comprehensive sense to include all assets, movable or immovable. Apart from
those assets which vested in the Union or a State at
the commencement of the Constitution, the Union or
a. State m~y acquire new assets. This is also provided for m Arts. 29t> to W8 of the C'..onstitution.
Therefore, in both Arts. 285 and 289 the word
'property' means all property and assets which
vested in the Union or a Srate at the commencement
of the Constitution and all property and assets which
may thereafter be acquired
by the Union or a State.
.
.
,,,,
D111 /,
838
1969
In re Ser,. Custom1
Ai.:t
DaJ '·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
In cl. (1) of Art. 289 the subject of the sentence is
'property and income' and the predicate is 'shall be
exempt from Union taxation'. Grammatically, the
clause can only mean this: all property and income
of a State shall be exempt from all taxation by the
Union, giving the word •taxation' its comprehensive
meaning, as required by Art. 366 (2K). It is necessary to emphasise here that the word 'property'
used in the sentence is not used as a word qualifying
the word 'taxation'; rather it is used as a subject
which gets the benefit of exemption from Union
taxation. One can understand that when one says
that State income shall be free from Union tax he
means that such income shall be free from Union
income-tax, particularly when there is only one
legislative item with regard to a tax on income
(0ther than agricultural income) which is entry 82
in List I. But we fail to appreciate how the word
'property' can be used as qualifying the word 'taxation' and thereby restricting the ambit of its comprehensive connotation. The Union power of taxation
on or in relation to property of various kinds ranges
over a wide field; see entries 82 to 92A of the
Constitution. Why then should the use of the word
'property' in Arts. 285 and 289 refer only to those
items which enable the imposition of a direct tax on
property and not to other>? We find no leiritimate
ground for such a restriction in the context of Art. 289.
Such a restriction would, in our opinion, be clearly
against the plain language of the article.
The learned Solicitor-General has conceded
that Art. 285 (1) and 289 (1) are analogous and
complementary articles and bear the same meaning.
In Art. 285 (1) the word 'incom~' does not occur,
but the word 'property' occurs. It states that the
property of the Union shall be exempt from all taxes
imposed by a State etc. We fail to see how in
Art. 285 (1) the· word 'property' can be taken to
qualify and cut down the expression "all taxes"
~
3 Sl.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
occurring therein. It should be obvious that the
expression 'all taxes' means all taxes, and the clear
intention as expressed in Art. 285 (I) is that the
property of the Union shall be exempt from all taxes
imposed by a State or by any authority within a
State, including even a tax on agricultural income
derived from Union property. It is worthy of note
here that the items in List II which deal with taxes
or duties which can be imposed by a State Legislature are those contained in items 46 to 62 thereof·
Some of these items are indeed taxes on property as
such, e. g., item 49, "taxes on lands and buildings";
item 5U, "taxes on goods and passengers carried by
road or on inland waterways"; item 57, "taxes on
vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not,
suitable for use on roads etc"; and item 58, "tf\xes
on animals and boats''. Some other items are in
relation to property, but are not on property as such;
e.g., item 51, "duties of excise on the manufacture or production of alcoholic liquors for human
consumption manufactured in the State and countervailing duties at the same or lower rates on similar
goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India";
item 52, "taxes on the entry of goods into a local
area for consumption. use or sale therein"; item 54,
"taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than
newspapers"; and item 55, "taxes on advertisements
other than advertisements published in the newspapers". If the argument of the learned SolicitorGeneral is correct, then the property of the Union
will be exempt from such taxes imposed by a State, or
by ai;i authority within a State, as are property taxes,
that 1s, ta:ccs on property as such, but not exempt from
taxes which are on the manufacture or production
of goods. entry of goods, sale or purchase of goods
etc. !hi~ would mean that the expression 'all taxes'
occurmg m Art. 285(1) would lose its hlcaning, and
we must read the articl~ as though when the Consti·
tution makers used the expession 'all taxes'. they
meant some taxes only and not all taxes. It is to be
1963
In re Se.a CuslomJ
ht
Das J.
840
/96J
b1 r1 Sell Customs
Act
D.s J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
noticed that under Art. 366(28) the word 'tax' has
also to be construed in the same comprehensive way
as the word 'taxation'. It is necessary to state here
that fortunately for us, neither under the Government
of India Act, 1935 nor under our present Constitution, it is necessary to examine the niceties. of disdinction between direct and indirect taxation, as no
such division exists in the Government of India Act,
1935 or in the Constitution. There are several taxes
like taxes on luxuries or trade which can be indirect;
and some taxes like succession duties (and even
excise) have in part been assigned to both.
In A-/. P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State
of Andhra PradeBh ('), this court observed that our
Constitution was not written on a tabula rasa; and
that a Federal Constitution had been established
under the Government of India Act, 1935, and
though that has undergone considerable change by
way of repeal, modification and addition, it still
remains the framework on which the present Constitution is built. On an analysis of the subjects in
List I and List II of the Seventh :ichedule of the
Constitution, this court observed :
"The above analysis- and it is not exhaustive of the En tries in the Lists-leads to the
inference that taxation is not intended to be
comprised in the main subject in which it
might on an extended construction be regarded
as included, but is treated as a distinct matter
for purposes of legislative competence. And
this distinction is also manifest in the language
of Art. t48, Cls. ( 1) and (2), and of Entry 97
in List I of the Constitution."
The dis1iuctii:'.m is between the main subject of
legislation and a tax in relation thereto; the main
subject of legislation figures in one group and a tax
in relation thereto ·is separately mentioned in a
(I) l l 9SB) S, 0. R. 142:!,
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 841
second group, but no distinction is drawn between
direct and indirect taxation. There are several
taxing items in List I and List II which will take in
both direct and indirect taxation. In re The Oentral
Provinces and Berar Sales of Mo!or Spirit and
Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 (Central Provinces
and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938 (1)), Sulaiman J.,
after referring to the Canadian Constitution as
embodied in the British North America Act, 1867,
and the Australian Constitution as embodied in
the Commonwealth of Australia ·Constitution Act,
1900, ob~erved that unlike those Constitutions the
Government of India Act, 1935, did not make any
distiction between direct and indirect taxation and
in the matter of legislative competence the ultimate
incidence of the tax was not necessarily a crucial !est
and there was no justification for adopting any such
principle as that certain classes of duties which were
to be regarded as direct had been assigned to the
Provinces, and other classes regarded as indirect had
been reserved for the Federation (see the observations
at page 73). As in the Government of India Act,
1935, so also in our Constitution the distinction
for purposes of legislative competence is between
the main subject of legislation and a tax in relation
thereto.
If this be the correct position, then it is
impossible to accept the argument advanced on
behalf of the Union that the word 'property' in
cl. (l) of Art. 289 or cl. (1) of Art. 285 makes a
distinction between direct and indirect taxation
n.amely, a tax on property as such and a tax in reta'.
t10n to property.
If we examine els. \2) and (3) of Art. 289 and
cl. (2) of Art. 285, the position becomes still more
clear. [t seems clear to us that cl. (2) of Art. 289
?arves out an exception to cl. (1) in the sense that
It states that uothirrg in cl. (1) shall prevent the
(l) {IS~] y;c.a. Ul;
/, ",,.~
-
bl
842
· 1963
In rt Sea CuJlo•ns
Ai;t
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
Union from imposing or authorising the imposition
of any tax to such extent, if any, as Parliament may
by law provid c in respect of a trade or business of
any kind carried on, by or on behalf of a Government of a State, or any operations connected therewith, or any property used or occupied for the purposes of such trade or business, or any income
accruing or arising in connection therewith. Cl. (3)
says that nothing in cl. 2 shall apply to any trade
or business or to any class of trade or business
which Parliament may by law declare to
be incidental to the ordinary functions of Government. CJ. (2) creates an exception to cl. (1) and
cl. (3) creates an exception upon an exception. The
broad distinction drawn in these two clauses is between trading or business activities of the Government
of a State and its governmental functions. In respect to its trading or business activities a tax may be
imposed and if any property is used or occupied for
the purpose of trade or business, it is liable to tax.
If however the trade or business is declared by
Parliament to be incidental to the ordinary functions
of a Government, the exemption given by cl. (I)
will operate and cl. (2) will not defeat that operation. The combined effect of els. (1), (2) and (3)
appears to be this: under cl. (1) the property and
income of a State is exempt from Union taxation;
cl. (2) however says that the income of a State derived
from commercial activities or the property of a
State in respect' of a trade or business of any
kind carried on by or on behalf of a Government
of a State or any operations connected therewith
or any property used or occupied for the purpose of
such trade or business shall not be immune from
Union taxation; under cl. (3) however Parliament
may by law declare any trade or business or any
class of trade or business of a State to be incidental
to the ordinary functions of Government and if
Parliament so declares, cl. (2) will not apply and
the operation of cl. ( 1) will not be arrested. What
_,,~
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843.
is a governmental function or what is a trading or
business function is not always eas)' to determine?
Thus, in Australia, activities of the Government
have beer.. held to be 'industrial' even though noth·
ing is charged for the services, e.g. municipal road
co11struction, harbour dredging. piloting and ferries.
Our C::onstitution, avoids this difficulty by empower·
ing Parliament to declare by law that any trade or
business carried on by a State shall not come within
the scope of cl. (2) of the article but shall be deemed
to be 'incidental to the ordinary functions of government'. Upon such declaration no taxation by the
Union of such trade or busine•s or property or income
connected therewith will be possible. This seems to
us to be the true effect of the three dames of
Art. 289.
-')
If cl. (1) of Art. 289 has a restricted meanin~
as is contended for by the learned Solicitor-General
on behalf of the Union, then the distinction drawn
between trading or business activities on one hand
and governmental functions on the other in cl. (2)
and cl. (3) of Art. 289 loses its full significance; for
els. (1) and (2) distinguish between tradmg and other
functions and els. (2) and (3) distinguish between
ordinary trading and trading which is really governmental function. If all that the Union is prevented
from doing is to put a tax on property as such, what
was the purpose of drawing a distinction between
the trading or business activities of Government and
its governmental functions ? If the tax is to be
levied on property as such, then obviously there
cannot be any impost on a trading or business
activity, as for example. on the production or manufacture of goods etc. Why was it necessary then to
make a reference to trading or business activities or
operations in els. (2) and (3) of Art. 289? It would
have bee? en.ough merel.Y to .say that property used
or occupied m connect10n with a trade or business
will be liable to a tax, but not other property. But
•
J96J
Ir. n SM Customl
Act
844
--
SUPRB.l\1B COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
the ambit of cl. (2) is much wider than the mere
use or occupation of property in connection with
trade or business. It has reference to trading or
business activities, such as, the production and
manufacture of goods, transportation of goods etc.
Why was it necessary for the Constitution-makers to
refer to such trading or business activities in cl. (2)
if all that they had in mind in cl. ( l) was a direct
tax on property ? In our opinion, the learned
Solicitor-General has given no satisfactory explanation with regard to this aspect of the case. He
suggested at first that cl. (2) was not an exception,
but merely explanatory of cl. (I). It is difficult to
understand why there should be a reference to .business or trading ac1ivities in cl. (2) if the entire
lntendment was to confine the exemption to a direct
tax on property. The learned Solicitor-General then
said that even if cl. ( 2) was an exception, it was an
exception only in the matter of property tax. That
would mean that only the last portion of cl. (2)
which refers to property used or occupied for the
purpose of trading or business activities of a State
Government has any significance and not the other
parts which relate to trading or business activities,
such as, production or manufacture of goods etc.
We have noticed earlier that the amendments
which Parliament itself made in 1951 in s. 20 of
Sea Customs Act, 1878 and s, 3 of the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 by inserting two subsections thereto showed that Parliament understood
cl. (2) of Art. 289 as creating an exception to cl. (1).
Those two amendments, sub-s. (3) of s. 20 of the
Sea Customs Act, 1878 and sub-s. (I-A) of s. 3 of
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, draw a
distinction between the. trading activities of the
Government of a State and its governmental
functions; no exemption is given in respect of goods
belonging to a State Government and used for .the
purpose of a trade or business of any kind carried an
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
by or on behalf of that Government or of any
operations connected with such trade or busine1s,
but exemption is granted in respect of other goods
belonging to Government.
If, therefore, we look to the context of Art. 289,
particularly els. (2) and (3) thereof, it becomes
manifest that ·there is nothing in Art. 289 which
restricts the ·comprehensive meaning to be given to
the word 'taxation' in Art. 289. Similar is the
position with regard to cl. (2) of Art. 285. That
again creates an exception to cl. (1) of Art. 285 and
saves any tax on any property of the Union to which
such property was immediately before the commence·
ment of the Constitution liable or treated as liable
to tax, so long as that tax continues to be levied in
that State.
-~
One very serious objection to the contention
of the learned Solicitor-General, an objection which
appears to us to be almost fatal, is that in the taxing
entries in List I (from entry 82 to entry 92A) there is
no entry which would enable the Union to impose
a tax on property as such, that is, a direct tax on
property as property in the sense suggested
by the learned Solicitor-General for his incerpretation
of Art. 289 (1). There are, however, entries in
List II to some of which we have referred earlier,
which would enable the State Legislature to impose
a direct tax on property, such as, 'lanf!s and buildings'
and 'animals and boats' etc. If the learned SolicitorGeneral is right in his contention, then the only tax
from which the property of a State can claim exemption under cl. ( 1) of Art. 289 is 'property tax' to be
imposed by the Union, and yet under the legislative
entries in List I the Union cannot impose a 'property
tax' on State property at all. To this aspect of the
case the reply of the learned Solicitor-General has
been two-fold ; he has first referred us to entry 89
(termi?al taxes on ioods and passcnicrs carried lty
'"'
""'"'"
r. " ,,. aui.u
/.
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
I96J
in rt.Sea·· Cu.rtom.r
.Ad
·v.;·J:
railway, sea or air), entry 86 (taxes on the capital
value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of
individuals and companies) and entry 97, the residuary entry; secondly, he has referred us to
Art. 246 ( 4) under which Parliament has power to
make laws with respect to any matter for any part of
the territory of India nol included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in
the State List. His argument is that·the Union can
impose a property tax. under any of the aforesaid
three entries; secondly, under Art. 246 (4) the Union
can impose a property tax on State property if that
property is situate in a territory not included in a
State. It appears to us that the argument does not
really meet the objection raised on behalf of the
States. Entry 86 relates tu capital value of the
assets of individuals and companies and has nothing
to do with State property, for the State is neither an
individual nor a company. Entry 89 relates to a
terminal tax which is essentiallv different from a
property tax in the sense contended for by the learned
Solicitor-General. We find it difficult to believe that
the exemption given by cl. (I) of Art. 289 was meant
as a safeguard against the exercise of power under
the residuary entry. Apart from that, we have qmsiderable doubt if the residuary entry will take in a
'property tax' when there are entries relating to such
tax in List II. /It would be a case of much ado
about nothing if the Constitution solemnly provided
for an exemption against 'property tax' on Stea
property only for such rare cases as are contemplated
in Art. 246 (4), the situation of State property in
territory not included in a State. Such situation
would be very rare, and could have hardly necessi
tated a solemn safeguard at the inception of thConstitution when the States were classed und~e
Part A or Part B of the First Schedule. If the widsr
interpretation of cl. (I) of Art. 289 is accepted, sue
property would also be exempt from Union taxatioch
except m cases covered by cl. (2) of the articl~. Wne
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
find it difficult to accept the contention that cl. (1)
of Art. 289 was meant only for cases covered by
Art. 246 (4); for that would be the result of the
interpretation canvassed for on behalf of the Union.
We proceed now to consider the problem from
three other aspects : (1) against the background of
similar provisions in the Government of India Act,
1935; (2) in the light of the scheme under the Con·
stitution of the financial relations between the States
and the Union; and (3) the distribution of taxing
powers between the States and the Union.
As to the Government of India Act, 193.5 the
relevant provisions are contained in ss. 154 and 155.
They read as follows (so far as relevant for our
purpose) :
"S. 15!. Property vested in His Majesty for purposes of the government of the Federation shall,
save in so far as any Federal law may otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed
by, or by any authority within, a Province or
Federated State :
Provided that, until any Federal law
otherwise provides, any property so vested
which was immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act Jiable, or treated
as liable, to any such tax, shall, so long as that
tax continues, continue to be liable, or to be
treated as liable, thereto.
•
S. 155. (1) Subject as hereinafter provided, the Government of a Province and the
Ruler of a Federated State shall not be liable
to Federal taxation in respect of lands or
buildings situate in British India or income
1953
In re Sea·Customs
Act
Das J.
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
,~,,
la ri Su tlultms
""
accruing, arising or received in British India :
Provided that(a) where a trade or business of any kind
is carried on by or on behalf of the
Government of a Province in any part of
British India, outside that Province or by
a Ruler in any part of British India,
nothing in this sub-section shall exempt
that Government or Ruler from any
Federal taxation in respect of that trade
or business, or any operations , connected
therewith, or any income arising in connection therewith, or any property occu·
pied for the purposes thereof;
(b)
x
x
x
(2)
x
x
x"
Before the Government of India Act, 1935 the
scheme of government was essentially unitary though
there were local legislatures with limited powers.
For the purpose of distinguishing the functions of the
local governments and local legislatures of Governor's
Provinces from the functions of the Governor-General
in Council and the Indian Legislature, subjects were
classified in relation to the functions of Government
as Central and Provincial subjects in accordance with
the Lists set out in Schedule I of the Devolution
Rules made under ss ..45-A and 129-A of the Government of India Act, 1919. All Government property
then vested in His Majesty for the purpose of the
Government of India and there was no necessity for
any special provision granting immunity to that property from taxation. The Government of India Act,
1935 introduced a dual system of Government. Part
III of the Government of India Act, 1!!35 came into
force on April 1, 1937. Properties belonging to the
Crown and in existence prior tc;> that date were
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
governed by the general law enunciated by the courts.
Judicial opinion was however not uniform. In some
cases it was held that statutes imposing duties of
taxes bind Government unless the very nature of the
duty or tax is such as to be inapplicable to Government. On the other hand, in some cases it was held
that the law was the same in India as in England,
where the principle of immunity of Crown property
from taxation followed from· the prerogative that the
Crown was not bound by any statutes unless expressly
named. When the dual system of G.wernment was
first introduced by the Government of India Act, 1935
the question of immunity of taxation of property of
one Government by the other arose.
The doctrine of Immunity of Instrumentalities
was propounded by the Supreme Court of the United
:States in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland (8), to
mean that when two separate Governments are established as in a Federal Constitution, each with a limited jurisdiction, the power of each Government shall
be construed as being under an implied limitation
that it shall be so exercised as not to impair the functions allotted to the other Government. Hence, any
incidental or indirect interference with the functions
of the Federal Government would make a State
legislation bad even th•;mgh the legislation might
relate to a subject allotted to the State Legislature
and conversely. It was held that a State could not
tax the agencies or instrumentalities of the Federal
Government and a similar limitation would apply as
regards the Federal Legislature. This doctrine has
had many vicissitudes of fortune in the decisions of
the courts in America. We do not think that it is
necessary to deal with the history of those vicissitu·
des.
•...,.
'.fh~ Gove.rnment of India Act, l 935 as also the
Constitution of . 1950 contained provisions which
accepted the pm:ci~le with a limited application as
regards the exempuon from mutual taication, in
(I 1 (ISl9j 4 Wb. 316.
l!MJ
Das /.
850
1963
J~'·";;;· Sea. CtJmU
A.ci
v... 1;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
ss. 154 and 155 of the Act of 1935 and Arts. 285 and
289 of the Constitution. In the words of the JudiCial Committee in Webb v. Outrim (1 ), it may be
stated that the very inclusion of the aforesaid provisions shows that the question of interference on the
part of the Federal and State powers as against each
other was not left to an 'implied prohibition or limi'
tation' but the provisions themselvrs define the extent
of the immunity. Outside those provisions the State
and Union Legislatures have the full power to legis·
late on the matters included within their respective
Lists, subject always to the other provisions of the
Constitution.
Like Arts. 285 and 289 of the Constitution, the
aforesaid ss. 154 and 155 are complementary to each
other and provide for the mutual exemption of the
property of the Federation and the Provinces from
taxation imposed by the other: this is consistent with
the general practice of federal constitutions to exempt
the governments of the units from Federal taxation,
that being part of a reciprocal arrangement under
which the Federal Government also is exempt from
taxation by the several units (see Parliamentary
Debates, Vol. 302, Cols. 523 and 524). One notice·
able feature of the two sections is that whereas s. 154
speaks of the "property vested in His Majesty for
. the purpose of the Federation" so' as to include
movable property also (see Bell v. Jlfunicipal
Commissioner of Madras ('), s. 155 which confers
exemption on the property of the '"units" is confined
to lands and buildings. The result would be that
movable property belonging to the Federation would
be exempt from duties like octroi which might be
levied under the Provincial law, while, goods of the
Provincial Governments and "units" would be sub. ject to the customs and excise duties levied by the
Federal Government. Income from commercial
undertakings and operations in the nature of trade
'carried on by the units, so long as ~bey are confined
(ll [1907] A.G. 81.
(21 25 M•<!r•s 457.
•
~
..
I
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
within the territory of that unit is not liable to
Federal income-tax. This, in short, was the scheme
of ss. 154 and 155 of the Government ol India Act,
11135. Now, if ss. 154 and 155 of the Government
of India Act, 1935 are contrasted with Arts. 285 and
289 of the Constitution, one noticeable difference
strikes one at once. The expression 'lan~s and
buildings' in s. 155 is changed to 'property' in Art.
289; in other words, the Union and the States are
practically put on the same footing so far as exemp·
tion from taxation of one by the other is concerned.
Both Arts. 285 and 289 mention 'property' in a
comprehensive sense, and the distinction between
movable property and immovable property drawn
in ss. 154 and 155 is done away with. The inevita·
hie conclusion is that the Constitution makers
consciously made the departure. They must have
been aware of the distinction made in ss. 154 and 155
and also of the interpretation of courts that 'property'
ins. 154 was used in a comprehensive sense so as to
i;(et exemption for the property of the Federation
from all Provincial taxation. With that knowledge
they used the word 'property' in Art. 289 and put
State 'property' on a par with Union 'property'. It
is impossible to accept in these circumstances the
contention that the word 'property' or the juxtaposition of the words 'property and income' in Art. 289
was intended to qualify the word 'taxation' and
thereby the plain meaning of the language used.
Now, as to the financial relations between the
U?ion an~ ~he Sta~es. Chapter I of Part XII cont~ms prov1s1on.s which control and govern these reJa.
t1<;ms.. Put bnefly the scheme is that there is a dis.
tnbutton of revenues between. the Union and the
States, even though the collect1on may be made in
son_ie cases by the State and in other cases by the
Umon ; some taxes collected by the Union are assig-.
ned to the StatfS (Art. 269); some taxes lc:vied and
collected by the Union are distributed between the
/HJ
,. ,, s.. eu.i..' '
dtf
D•1 J •.
852
196J
Du J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Union and the States (Arts. 270 and 272); there are
provisions for grants in aid of the revenues of some
States, in which jute is extensively grown, in lieu of
assignment of any share of the net proceeds in each
year of export duty on jute and jute products (Art.
273); there are also provisions for grants in aid of the
revenues of such States as Parliament may determine
to be in need of assistance (Art. 275), etc. These
provisions indicate clearly that there is an attempt at
adjustment on a financial integration so that neither
the Union nor the States may be starved for want of
financial resources to carry on the essential and ex·
panding activities of a welfare State. We do not
see in these provisions any determ ·ning consideration
which would bear upon the exemption granted to
Union property by Art. 285 and that granted to State
property by Art. 289. We fail to see how a restricted
meaning given to the aforesaid two articles will facilitate the financial adjustment referred to in the
earlier articles in the same chapter or how it will
retard the said adjustment if a wider meaning is
given to them. We repeat that Arts. 285 and 289
must be construed ori their own terms, and it is not
open to us to pervert or change the language used
therein unless there are compelling reasons to be
gathered from other relevant articles of the Constitution. We find no such compelling reasons in the
other articles of Part XII which deal with the financial relations between the States and the Union.
We have earlier referred briefly to the distribution of legislative power between the States and the
Union. We have also pointed out that rn far as the
taxing powers are concerned, the legislative entries
in the Seventh Schedule make a distinction, for
purposes of legislative competence, between the
main subject of legislation and a tax in relation thereto. Taxes on income other than agricultural income (entry '82), duties of customs including
export duties (entry 83), and duties of excise on
r-
•
J
-~
..
1
I
a S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced
in India except alcoholic liquors for human con·
sumption, opium, hemp and other narcotic drugs
(entry 84) are in List I. Therefore, under Art. 246
Parliament alone has power to make laws imposing
the aforesaid taxes. This power, it has been argued
on behalf of the Union, will be seriously curtailed
if a wider meaning is given to Art. 289. We do not
think·that this argument is any answer to the pro·
blem posed before us. The power to make laws
given to Parliament is subject to the provisions of
the Constitution. Art, 289 is one of such provisions.
Therefore, it is no answer to the problem to say that
if a wider meaning is given to Art. ~89, it will
curtail the powers of Parliament. If Art .. t89 in its
true scope and effect is capable of healing only the
wider meaning, then it must control the power of
Parliament. Art, 24'"> says so in express terms.
Another argument on this aspect of the case
is that the Union has exclusive power to regulate
trade and commerce with foreign countries, import
and export across customs frontiers, and definition of
customs frontiers (entry 41 of List I) and inter-State
trade and commerce (entry 42 of the same List), and
the power to regulate trade and commerce with
foreign countries or inter State trade includes the
power to regulate by imposing cust::>ms duties or
duties of excise. This power, it is contended, will
be very seriously affected if the exemption from
"taxation given by Art. 289 is held to extend to cus·
~oms duties and excise· duties in respect of goods
imported or exported by a State or goods produced
or manufactured by a State. We are not impressed
by the argument. The power to control trade and
comm~rce . with foreign countries and inter- State
trade 1s with the Union, and in exercise of that
power the. ~?ion can impose regulatory measures
ol? the act1v1t1es of a State. We are familiar now
with control measures
like the Import Control OrderI
.
-
196J
.f),.n·S111. CtalOffl.I
Act.
Dos /.
854
1963
, <'•,. s,. c....,,.,
An
Dos ;.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Essential Supplies Act, etc. Through these regulatory measures the Union can carry: into effect its
power of control, and under Art. ;{02 Parliament
may by law impose such restrictions on the freedom
of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State
and another or within any part of the territory of
India as may be required in the public interest.
Under Art. 256 the executixe power of every State
shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with
the laws made by Parliament, and the excutive power
of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Union Government to be necessary for that purposes, Under
Art. 257 the executive power of every State shall be
so exercised as not to impede or projudice the exercise of the executive power of the L: nion, and the
Union Government can give necessary directions in
the matter to the State Government. So far as trade
and commerce within the State is concerned, the
State has power to make laws (entry :.::6 of List II).
We think, therefore, that nothing serious is likely to
happen, either with regard to foreign trade or inter
State trade, if we hold on the terms of Art. 289 that
State property is exempt from Union taxation
including customs duties or excise duties. Such an
interpretation is not likely to result in any interference with the power of control which the Union
undoubtedly has over foreign trade or inter-State
trade.
The contention that the Union has the powei
to regulate trade by imposition of customs duties and
that power would be annulled if the State has
immunity from them in respect of things imported
or exported by it seems to us to be fallacious. The
Union's power to legislate to regulate foreign trade
contained in the legislative list is subject to the
provisions of the Constitution one of which is contained in Art. 289(1 ). Therefore in the ca,e of a
_conflict between Art. 289(1) and the legislative
r_,._
.
J
3 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
power to regulate foreign trade, the former must
prevail. The Union, therefore, cannot in view of
Art. 289(1) impose a customs duty on things imported
by the State and seek to justify it as an exercise of
its power to regulate foreign trade. Then, again it
seems to us that as stated in JW.P.V. Sundararamier
& Oo'B case(') an item in the legislative list not
giving expressly the power of taxation does not confer
such a power. It would follow that the power in
List I to regulate foreign trade cannot be exercised
by imposition of a tax. That has to be done other·
wise and without the imposition of a tax .
.It is to be remembered that a striking feature
of our Constitution, which perhaps distinguishes it
from some other Constitutions, is its attempt to
harmonise the interests of the indi victual with those
of the community and the interests of a State with
those of the Union. Our Constitution does not set
up the States as rivals to one another or tu the Union.
Each is intended to work harmoniously in its own
sphere without impediment by the other, with an
over-riding power to the Union where it is necessary
in the public interest. It is a nice balance of jurisdictions which has worked satisfactorily so far and,
it is to be hoped will continue to so work in times
to come with good sense prevailing on all sides. We
a_re not prepared to say that the exemption given to
State property from Union taxation by Art. 289
conflicts in any way with the power of control which
the ynion has over foreign trade or inter-State trade
or disturbs the balance of jurisdictions referred to
above. It is to be remembered in this context that
under cl (2) of Art. 289 the trading activities of a
State and _Property used ~or such trading activities
cannot claim any exemption from Union taxation
unl~s~. Parlia~e~t declares by law that the trading
act1v1tles are 10c1dental to the ordinary functions of
. government.
~ '-""
(11 [1958] s.c.a. 1422.
I!i6J
Jn,, se;cic~""f"
n.. 1.
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1963
1." S•• customs
Ae1
v., 1.
~
We have so far <le.ilt with the problem on
the relevant articles of our Constitution. It may
be helpful now to consider how a similar problem
under other Federal Constitutions has been dealt
with by the courts.
It is necessary here to strike a note of warning.
Each Constitution must be interpreted on
its own terms and in its own setting of history,
geography and social conditions of the country
, and nation for which the Constitution is made;
a decision on a constitutional problem having
an apparent similarity with a problem arising under
a different Coo~titution may not be sure guide as a
solution of the problem. Basically, the problem
must be solved on the terms of the Constitution
under which it arises. Remcmberin'( this warning,
we tum first to certain Canadian decisions on which
the learned Solicitor-General has relied. The vital
core of a federal constitution, it is said, is the division of legislative powers between the central autho·
rity and the component states or provinces. In
Sections 91 to 95 of the British North America
Act, 1867 the main lines of this division in Canada
were set forth. In section 9 i certain classes of
subjects were enumerated and the provinces were
given exclusive power to make laws in relation to
matters coming within these classes of subjects. The
opening paragraph of s. 91 gave the Dominion power
"to make laws for the peace, order and good goverotnent of Canada in relation to all matters not coming
within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces."
That is to say, the residue of pov.~·• not expressly
given to the Provinces was reserved to the Dominion.
The section then proceeded with a speci fie enumeration of twenty nine classes of subjects, illustrating
but not restricting the scope of the general words
used earlier in the section. Section 125 said, "No lands
or property belonging to Canada or any province
•
'<' ~'
3 S.C.R.
(
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 857
shall be liable to taxation." In The Attorney.
General of British Columbia v. The Attorney-General
for Canada('), the facts were these. The Govern·
ment of the province of British Columbia in the
exercise of its powers of control al!d sale of alcoholic
liquors embarked on the business of dealing in alcoholic liquors and found itself under the nece~sity of
importing 'Johnnie Walker Black Label" whiskey;
it claimed it was exempt from payment of the usual
cust_oms duties imposed by the Dominion Parliament
and rested its claim on s. 12.5. The Supreme Court
of Canada held by a majority decision that the levying of customs duties on the goods in question was
not "taxation" on "property" belonging to a province
within the purview of s. 125. The ratio of the
decision, as expressed by Duff, J .. was that customs
duties as an instrument for regulation of external
trade came within the second enumerated head under
s. 91; and customs duties when levied for the purpose
of raising a revenue were, speaking broadly and in
the general view of them, taxes on consumable
commodities, taxes on consumption; while the taxation of capital, of assets, of property was a very
different matter. Duff, J. then said :
"Our first duty in construing the section is,
of course, to ascertain the ordinary and
grammatical meaning of the words tut it is
with the ordinary and grammatical meaning
of the words in the setting in which they are
found and as applied to the subject matter
that we are concerned. What the section is
dealing with is not taxation in general but the
liability of "property" to "taxation" and the
word "taxation" whrn used in this association
has, I think prima fi1cie a much less comprehensive import than that which would be
ascribed to it standing by itself or in some
other connections."
(I) H Canada Supreu.e Court Reportt 377.
1963
-Vu J,
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
193 3
,,. ,.,.s..c.,,.,,,,
Ac1
. Das 1.
It is pertinent to note here that the Canadian Constitution did not contain a key to the word 'taxation'
as is contained in Art. 366 (28) of our Constitution .
It was permissible, therefore, in the setting of the
Canadian Constitution to draw a distinction
between "taxation of property" ancl the "levying of
customs duties" for purposes of raising revenue.
Our Constitution says in express terms that 'taxation'
includes the imposition of any tax or impost, whether
general, local or special. It is reasona hie to think
that the makers of our Constitution were aware of
the distinction between the more comprehensive
. and less comprehensive
meaning that can .be
·attached to the word 'taxation', and deliberately
chose to mention expressly the more comprehensive
meaning in the interpretation article, instead of leaving it to judicial determination. One may well
speculate if the decision in Canada would have been
the same if there were such a provision in the
Canadian Constitution and if, as Duff, J. said, our
first duty in construing a provision is to ascertain the
ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words used.
The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was
approved by the l'rivy Council in Attorney.General
of Briti8h Columbia v. Attorney-General of
Canada('). Referring to s. 125 of the British North
· America Act, Lord Buckmaster said :
"Taken alone and read without consideration
of the scheme of the statute, this section
undoubtedly creates a formidable argument in
support of the appellant's case. It is plain,
however, that the section cannot be regarded
in this isolated and disjunctive way. It is only a
part of the general scheme established by the
statute with its different allocations of powers
and authorities to the Provincial and Dominion
Governments. Sect. 91, which assigns powen
to the Dominion, provides, among other things,
that it shall enjoy exclusive legislative
[I) (192f] A.O. 222.
'
.._.,
3 S.C.R.
MJPREME COURT REPORTS
859
'
authority over all matters enumerated in the
Schedule, included among .which are the regulation of trade and commerce and raising of
money by any mode or system of taxation.
The imposition of customs duties upon goods
imported into any country may have
many objects; it may be designed to raise
revenue or to regulate trade and commerce
by protecting native industries, or it may have
the two-fold purpose of attempting to secure
both ends; in either case it is a power reserved
to the Dominion. It has not indeed been
denied that such a general power does exist,
but it is said that a breach is created in the
tariff wall, which the Dominion has the power
to erect, by s. 125, which enables goods of the
Province or the Dominion to pass through,
unaffected by the duties. But s. 125 cannot,
in their Lordships' opinion, be so regarded.
It is to be found in a series of sections which,
beginning with s. 102, distribute as between
the Dominion and the Province certain distinct
classes of property, and confer control upon the
Province with regard to the part allocated to
them. But this does not exdude the operation
of dominion laws made in exercise of the
authority conferred by s. 91. The Dominion
have the power to regulate trade and commerce
throughout the Dominion, and, to the extent
to which this power applies, there is no
partiality in its operation. Sect. 125 must,
therefore, be so considered as to prevent the
paramount purpose thus declared from being
defeated."
9' •
It is obvious that the observations made by Lord
Buckmaster have reference to the special characte·
ristics of the Canadian Constitution, particularly the
, paramountcy of Dominion Power to regulate trade
and commerce throughout the Dominion to which
1963
·In '' Sis C111tO..u:
Ad
<D4,J.
860
1>6J
·'" ,. s,. Customs
;d;t
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
s. 125 was made to yield. The scheme of our Constitution is different : ( 1) the legislative power of
Parliament is expressly subject to other provisions of
the Constitution; (2) the power to regulate trade and
commerce is assigned both to the Union and the
Stat es; and (3) there is a distinction between the
main subject of legislation and a tax in relation
thereto. We are not emphasising the fact that in
s. 91 of the Brithh North America Act, 1867 occurs
the expression "notwithstanding anything in this
Act", because that expression may be said to relate
to the enumeration of subjects rather than to s. 125.
In our view the decision turned upon the peculiar
characteristics of the Constitution under which the
problem arose and is no safe guide for the interpretation of our Constitution. It may perhaps be added
that if the Canadian case fell tg be decided under
our Constitution. cl. (2) of Art. 289 would have
been given an adequate answer to the problem,
for a State can claim no exemption in respect of its
business activities and when British Columbia imported whiskey to embark on a business of alcoholic
liquors, it could not claim any exemption under
cl. (1) of Art. 289.
We now turn to certain Australian decisions.
Speaking generally, the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, 1900 creates a federation which
resembles the United States in a manner in which
powers are assigned to tlle Federal Government with
a residue in the States or the people. It resembles
the Canadian Constitution in the attempt to adapt
the machinery of responsible government to a federal
system, but differs from the Canadian and our Constitution in the division of powers. As regards the
Commonwealth, s. 51 contains a list of thirty-nine
enumerated powers with which it is vested. It says
inter alia that, subject to the Constitution, the Parliament shall have power to make laws for the .peace,
3 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
order and good government of the Commonwealth
with respect to(i)
Trade and commerce with other countries,
and among the States; and
(ii)
Taxation, but so as not to discriminate
between the States or parts of States.
/96J
1,., 1.
Section 52 defines the cases in which the power of
the Commonwealth is to be exclusive. As regards
the State, the broad principle of the division is found
in s. 107 which in effect says that the powers of the
States are left unaffected by the Constitution except
in so far as the contrary is expressly provided; subject
to that each State remains sovereign within its own
sphere. Now, s. 114 of the Commonwealth of
Australia Act, 1900 says :
''A State shall not, without the consent of the
Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or
maintain any naval or military force, or impose
any tax on property of any kind belonging to
the Commonwealth, nor shall the Common·
wealth impose any tax on property of any kind
belonging to a State."
The decision on which the learned Solicitor.General
has placed the greatest reliance is Attorney-General
of New South Wales v. Collector of Custom.~ for
N.S.W. ('). That was a case in which an action
was brought by the Attorney·General of New South
Wales to recover from the Collector of Customs for
New South Wales a particular sum being the amount
of duties of customs demanded by the defendant .upon
the importation into the Commonwealth of certain
steel tails, and paid under protest by the Government
of the State of New South Wales
The rails in
question were purchased in England by the State
for use in the construction of t!ie railways of
'I)
5 C.l..R. 818.
•
862. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
JH3
ln'ilS.• Ctu1oms
.A.ti
Das J.
the State.
On their arrival at the port of
Sydney the
defendant. claimed that
they
were liable to Customs duties. The State disputed
its liability to pay duty and deposited the amount
claimed under protest. A case was. stated for the
opinion of the High Court of Australia on two main
questions: (1) whether the provisions of the Customs
Act 1901 and the Customs Tariff 1922, affected the
Crown as representing the community of New South
Wales; and (2) whether the steel rails were exempt
from duty by virtue of s. 114 of the Constitution.
So far as the first question was concerned Griffith
C. J. said that it was concluded by the decision in
The King v. Sutton ('). So far as the second question
was concerned, the majority of. Judges held that
customs duties whether capable or not of being
included in the word "tax", are not a tax upon property in the sense in which that expression is used in
s. 114. Isaacs J. held that duties of customs, as
ordinarily understood and as enacted in the Customs
Act, were imposed on the goods themselves, and,
therefore, "on properly" within the meaning of
s. 11 ~. but they did not come within the meaning
of the word "tax'' as used in that section and tbe
Constitution generally. Griffith C. J. not only drew
a distinction between direct and indirect taxation but
also held thats. l 14 applied only to property within
the limits of the Commonwealth and did not apply to
goods in process of coming within those limits. He
further held that the power to impose taxation con
ferred by s. 51 (ii; as well as the power 10 regulate
importation conferred by s. 51 (i) were paramount
and unlimited and a construction which would make
the words of s. 114 consistent with giving full effect
to the plain intention of s. 51 should be preferred.
He proceeded on the footing that the words of s. l 14
were capable of two constructions. Then· he
observed :
"There is no doubt that in some contexts the
words "impose any tax" might be capable of
<I) 5C.L.R. '89.
,....
'
( .•
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
863
application to duties of Customs. Nor is there
any doubt that the word "taxation" in
sec. 51 {ii) includes the levying of duties of
Customs. But these duties are nowhere in the
Constitution described as a "tax", unless the
use of the word "taxation" in sec. 51 (ii) is
such a description of them; nor is the levying
of them ever spoken of as the imposition of a
tax on property. Sec. 86 speaks of "the col·
lection and control of duties of Customs and
of Excise". Ss. 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 9-t, 95,
all speak of the "imposition'' of duties of
Customs. Such duties are imposed in respect
of "goods" and in one sense, no doubt, "upon"
goods, which is only another way of saying that
the word "upon" is sometimes used as synonymous with "in respect of." In the same way
the word "upon" or "on" is used colloquially
in speaking of stamp duties, succession duties,
and other forms of indirect taxation, as taxes
on deeds, etc., or on real and personal property·
Yet it is recognised that these forms of taxation
are not really taxation upon property but upon
operations or movements of property."
Higgins J. based his decision on a somewhat
different ground. He said that he could not con fi
dently take the ground that a customs duty could not
be a tax within the meaning of the word "tax" in
s. 114. He said thats. 114did not me the expression
"tax of any kind", but spoke of "any tax on property
of any kind belonging to a State". He derived the
. idea of ownership as the crucial test by r~ason of the
use of the expression "property of any kind b longing etc." The learned Judge observed :
''The prohibition as to State taxation was, no
doubt, suggested by the Briti~h North America
Act, sec. 125. But by substituting the word
"property" for "lands or property", the
11161
In " 914 · Cuttrtil
. ~Att
D•1 J~
864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
intention-if it was the intention - to confine
the prohibition to what are known as "property
taxes" has been somewhat obscured. Property
is, by the Constitution, subject to be taxed at
the instance of the State as .well as of the
Commonwealth; Customs taxation is solely a
matter for the Commonwealth (sec. 90). Taxes
of retaliation, as between the States and the
Commonwealth, are possible as to property
taxes; but are impossible as to Customs taxes.
But whatever may have been the motive which
led to this express prohibition, in addition to
the prohibition which this Court has held to be
implied from the nature of the Constitution as
to the taxation of State or Commonwealth
agents, the phraseology is such as to point to
taxation of property as property as being the
subject of this express prohibition. "A State
shall not, without the consent of the Parliament or the Commonwealth, ........ impose any
tax on property of any kind belonging to the
Commonwealth, nor shall the Commonwealth
impose any tax on property of any kind
belonging to a State"."
We are of the view that the considerations
which led the learned Judges to the conclusion at
which they arrived are not considerations which
are available 10 us under our Constitution. We
are dealing with an exemption clause under
Art. 28U (I); that exemption clause has to be
interpreted with the key furnished by Art. 366 (21')
Under our Comtitution the word 'taxation' has been
defined by the Constitution itself and we are not
free to give a different .meaning to the word so as
to make a di•tinction between direct and indirect
on property
taxation. or between taxation
within the limits of the Commonwealth and
property in the process of coming within those limits;
nor are we free to make a distinction between a ta.x
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
on property and a tax in respect of property. I tis
further significant that s. 114 of the Commonwealth
of Australia Act, 1900 uses the expression "tax on
property". Our exemption clause in Art. 289 uses
a different phraseology, a phraseology which does
not qualify the word 'tax' in any way, but says that
the property and income of a State shall be exempt
from any tax or impost whether general, local or
special, to be imposed by the Union. Even in the
matter of s. 114 of the Commonwealth of Australia
Act, 1900 there was a difficulty in drawing the dis·
tinction between propeny, and the imporation of pro·
perty, because of the use of the expression "of any
kind" ins. ll4. This difficulty is pointed out by
Nicholas in The Austmlian Constitution (second
edition, page 143). He says 1
"The solution was found in distinguishing
between property and the importation of property, and between duties and taxation as those
terms are used in the Constitution. Both
distinctious involved some difficulties, for
s. 114 uses the words "of any kind" and the
· only express authority to impose duties is to be
found in s. 51 (ii). l'he policy thus sanctioned
has not been approved in all States alike.
States have been compelled to pay duties on
imported materials, including locomotives of
a type not made in Australia, so that the proceeds of their loans have been reduced for the
benefit of the Commonwealth revenue and the
power of exemption has not been used where
it might have been (Report of the Royal
Commission, p. 361)."
.
)
Apropos of the Australian case it may perhaps
be pointed out that under our Constitution the 'taxing
power' is treated as different from the 'regulatory
power'. Again, as we have stated earlier, the
classification between 'direct' and 'indirect' taxes has
i96J
In '' S1• Cudoms
Act.
Dtu /.
S66
1969
In re Sia Cwtoms
Act
Das J.
SUPREME COURT RBPORfS(1964]VOL.
~
not been adopted by our Constitution. Moreover
the problem which falls for our consideration under
Art. 289 is not one which has to be examined from
the p0int of view of legislative power. The problem
before us is really the extent of the immunity or
exemption granted by Art. 289. In AttorneyGeneral for Saskatchewan v. Canadian Pacific
Railway Company (1), the question arose of construing an exemption granted to the Canadian
Pacific Railway Company by clausi- 16 of a contract
between the Canadian Government and the said
company. The exemption clause provided inter
alia that "the Canadian Pacific Railway, and all
stations and station grounds, workshops, buildings,
yards and other property etc., shall be forever free
from taxation by the Dominion, or by any province
hereafter to be established, or by any municipal corporation therein." The Province of Saskatchewan was
constituted in 1905 and in purported compliance
with its obligations under the aforesaid exemption
clause, the Dominion Parliament provided in
section 24 of the Saskatchewan Act of 1905 that "the
powers hereby granted to the said Province shall be
exercised subject to the provisions of clause 16 of the
contract". The Canadian Pacific Railway Company
raised the question that it was free from business tax
imposed by the City Act, 1947, of Saskatchewan by
reason of the exemption clause. Before the J udicia 1
Committee of the Privy Council it was argued on
behalf of the Province of Saskatchewan that the
exemption was limited to taxes imposed upon the
owner in respect of the ownership of the property
liable to taxation, but the exemption did not extend
to taxes levied upon the company in respect of its
business of operating it. Dealing with this argument the Judicial Committee said :
"While the language of clause 16 is that the
propert}' shall be 'forever free from taxation'
by any Province thereafter to be established,
(I) [1953) A.C. 594.
( <
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
it is said that to tax the company in respect
to the use of the property (itself a term of the
exemption), is not to tax the property and that
that alone is prohibited."
Their Lordships construed the exemption on its own
terms and held that a tax upon the owner in respect
of the use of the property was as much within the
exemption as a tax on the property itse If. In our
view the exemption clause in Art. 289 must similarly
be construed on its own terms. We further consider
that no question of paramountcy of legislative power
arises in that connection. ·
••
On behalf of the Statfi!, except the State of
Maharashtra which has supported the stand of the
Union in the matter of excise duties only, it has been
very strongly contended before us that for the purpose
of the exemption clause in Art. 289 nothing turns
upon the distinction between a tax on· property as
such and a tax in relation to property. Both affect
property and if property is to be free from Union
taxatfon, it makes no difference whether the tax is
on the ownership or possession of property or is on
its prodcution or manufacture or its importation or
exportation. A large number of decisions were
cited before us as to the true nature of customs duties
and excise duties. There are a number of decisions
of this court where it has been held that a duty of
excise is a tax on goods produced or manufactured
in the taidng country; similarly customs or export
duty is a duty imposed on goods which are the subject of importation or exportation. This is also clear
from the provisions relating to "draw back" in the
matter of customs duties and refund rules in the
matter of excise duty. We consider it unnecessary
to examine these decisions in detail for the purpose
of the problem before us. It is enough to point out
that in order to determine whether an impost, be it
a tax, duty or fee, falls under one item or the other
t96S
In" s,. Cl/llllllS
A<1
Das J.
868
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOt.
(
/963
ln it Sea Customs
Act
Das J.
of the Legislative Lists in the Seventh Schedule, it
may be necessary to examine the· nature of the tax,
duty or fee. As the Judicial Committee pointed out
in Governor-General in Council v. Province of
Madras (' ), a duty of excise is primarily a duty levied
on a, manufacturer or producer io respect of the
commodity manufactured or produced; it is however
a tax on goods, to be distinguished from tax on sales
or the proceeds of sales of goods; the two taxes, the
one levied on the manufacturer in respect of his goods,
the other on a vendor in respect of his sales may in
one sense overlap. But in law there is no overlap·
ping, the taxes being separate and distinct imposts.
But as we have said earlier, the problem before us is
not the nature of the impost but rather the extent of
the immunity granted by Art. 289 of the Constitution.
The extent of that immunity, as we have indicated
earlier, really depends on the true scope and effect of
Arts. 245, 285, 289 and 366(28) of the Constitution.
In the matter of the extent of the immunity the distinction between a tax on property as such or in
relation to property is really of no materiality. A tax
on property as such and a tax in relation to property
-both affect property-and if the true scope and
effect of the articles which we have mentioned is that
State property must be exempt from imposition of
any tax or impost, whether general or local or spe·
cial, by the Union, then the distinction drawn bet·
ween a tax on peoperty as such and a tax in relation
to property loses its significance.
For the reasons given above our opinion is that
the answers to the three questions referred to this
court must be in the affirmative and against the stand
taken by the Union.
Hid•yalu//ah /.
J.--As a result of a proposal
to introduce in Parliament a Bill to amend s. 20 of
the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act 8 of 1878) ands. 3
of the Central Excises and Salt Act,) 944 (Act I of
HrDAYATULLAH
(I) 72 I.A. 91, 103.
J'
1
•
.• .
3 ~.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS, 869
1944) with a view to applyin~ the provisions of these
two Acts to goods belonging to the State Governments, the President of India has been pleased to
refer under Art. 143 of the Constitution, three questions for the opinion of this Court to ascertain if the
proposed amendments would be constitutional. These
questions are :
"( 1) Do the provisions of article 289 of the
Constitution preclude the Union from
imposing, or authorising the imposition of,
customs dutiei on the import or export of
the property of a State used for purposes
other than those specified in clause (2) of
that article ?
..
I
-.
(2) Do the provisions of article 289 of the
Constitution of India preclude the Union
from imposing, or authorising the imposition of, excise duties on the production or
manufacture in India of the property of a
State used for purposes other than those
specified in clause (2) of that article ?
(3) Will sub-section (<!) of section 20 of the
Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act 8 of 1878),
and sub-section (IA) of section 3 of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, l 94il (Act 1
of 1944) as amended by the Bill set out in
the Annexure be inconsistent with the provisions of article 289 of the Constitution of
India ?"
The sections of the two Acts as they stand today
provide for the levy of customs duties and duties of
excise on all goods belonging to a State but only if
used for purposes of trade or business of any kind
carried on by or on behalf of that Government, or of
any operations connected with such trade or business
as they apply in respect of goods not belonging
1963
In,, s.a C.stoms
[Act
Hid4J0tvllo1t 1.
870
1963
In re Sea CustomJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
to any Government.
read :
These two sections as at present
All
. Hidf!Y•tullah J.
"20. (1) Except as hereinafter provided,
customs-dutie.s shall be levied at such rates as
may be prescribed by or under any law for the
time being in force, on(a) goods imported or exported by sea
into or from any customs·pOrt from or
to any foreign port;
..
(b) opium, salt or salted fish imported by
sea from any customs-port into any
other customs-port;
(c) goods brought from any foreign port
to any customs-port, and, without
payment of duty, there transhipped
for, or thence carried to, and imported at, any other customs-port; and
(d) goods brought in bond from one
customs·port to another.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall
apply in respect of all goods belonging to the
Government of a State and used for the
purposes ·of a trade or business of any kiud
carried on by, or on behalf of, that Government, or of any operations connected with
such trade or business as they apply in
respect of goods not belonging to any
Government.
I
Explanation ... -In this sub-section 'State'
does not include a Union territory".
"3. ( l) There shall be levied and collected
in such manner as may be prescribed dutie$
·-
""-,
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
of excise on all excisable goods other than
salt which · are produced or manufactured
in India and a duty on salt manufactured
in, or imported by land into, any part of
India as, and at the rates, set forth in the
First Schedule.
(IA) The provisions of sub-section (1)
shall apply in respect of all excisable goods
other than salt which are produced or
manufactured in India by, or on behalf
of, the Government of a State other than
a Union territory and used for the purposes of a trade or business of any kind
carried on by, or on behalf of, that Government, or of any operations connected
with such trade or business as they apply
in respect of goods which are not produced
or manufactured by any Government".
x
x
x
x
The proposal is to amend the two sections as
follows :
"AMENDMENT OF SECTION 20, ACT 8
OF 1878.-In section 20 ~f the Sea Customs
Act, 1878, for sub-section (2) the following
sub-sections shall be substituted, namely :'(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply
in respect of all good~ belonging to the
Government as they apply in respect of
goods not belonging to the Government.'
AMENDMENT OF SECTION 3, Act 1 OF
1944.-In section 3 of the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944, for sub-section (1 A) the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely :'(lA) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall
apply in respect of all excisable goods
1969
In re Sia Grutom.s
Act
HidayoM'ah J,
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1969
In rd Sea Cuslom1
A.ct
Hidq,•lullah J,
other than salt which are produced or
manufactured in India by, or on behalf
of, the Government as they apply in res·
pect of goods which are not produced or
manufantured by the Government'."
The question is one of great importance not
only to the States but also to the Union. What the
Union wishes to do is to put the State Governments
on its tax-payers' list, not only in respect of their
trading activities but also in respect of their governmental functions. If the Constitution does not prohibit it their can be no doubt about the power. The
sole question thus is whether the Constitution has not
prohibited this by Art. 289 to which reference will be
made presently.
Our Republic is composed of States with their
own Governments. These Governments possess and
exercise their own powers like any other Government.
Then there is the Union Government which withitl
its own sphere is supreme but its supremacy is not a
general or unrlefined supremacy. It is in certain
respects curtailed to give supremacy to the State
Governments. One such curtailment is to be found
in Art. 289(1) and the only question that can really
arise is to what extent does that restriction go ?
We are concerned here with the taxing power
of Parliament which admittedly extends-to the levy·
ing of duties of customs including export duties (entry
83, List I, 7th Schedule) and duties of excise on
tobacco and other goods manufactured in India
except those expressly mentioned in the entry (entry
84, ibid). In addition to the powers of taxation,
Parliament has exclusive regulatory power over
"trade and comm~rce with foreign countries; import
and export across customs frontiers" (entry 41, ibid)
and also ove~ "inter-State trade and commerce"
(entry 42, ibid). The power derivecl · from thest;
.
-
z
r
I
3 S.C.R.
'
>
'
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
873
entries is plenary and can only be the subject of
restraint if the Constitution so provides Under
Art. 245, this power is expressly stated to be subject
to the provisions of the Constitution. By Art. 246,
which divides the subject matter oflaws to be made by
Parliament and by the Legislatures of the States,
exclusive power is given to Parliament in respect of
matters enumerated in the Union List. Similarly,
exclusive power is conferred on State Legislatures
in respect of matters enumerated in the State List.
There is a third list called the "Concurrent List" and
it contains matters over which Parliament and the
Legislatures of the States have power to make laws.
Inconsistency between the laws is avoided by
Art. 254 which makes the law made bv Parliament,
whether before or after the law made by the State
Legislature, to prevail over the latter. In addition
to these provisions, Parliament has power to make
laws for the territory of India not included in a State
even on matters enumerated in the State List and
also exclusive power to make any law with respect
to any matter not enumerated in the concurrent or
the State Lists. This, in brief, is the scheme
of legislative relations and the distribution of legislative power under our Constitution. The three
Lists contain entries which enable the raising of
money by way of ta:::es, duties and fees. The
taxation entries are to be found in the Union and
State Lists only. There arc only two entries in the
Concurrent List which deal with (a) stamp duties
other than duties or fees collected by means of
judicial stamps, but not including rates of stamp
duties (entry 44, Concurrent List,) and (b) fees in
respect of any of the matters in that List but not
including fees taken in any court (entry 47, ibid).
The other two lists contain entries which enable the
Union and the States to impose taxes, duties and
fees to raise revenue for their respective purposes.
These entries, as far as human ingenuity could
achieve, attempt to make a clear-cut and f~r
In r1 S1a CustMlU
Act
HW.yatull•h J.
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1964] VOL.
1969
In re Sea Customs
Act
Hidayalu/lah J.
division. There is an elaborate procedure for
distribution of the proceeds of some of the taxes
raised by the Union among the States to finance their
activities but we are not presently concerned with it.
The powers of taxation being plenary except
in so far as the exercise of the power could be said to
trench upon the exclusive domain outlined and
·demarcated in a rival list, there was a danger in the
dual form of government, which has been adopted
in our Republic, of one Government taxing another
whether to Rtart with or as a retaliatory measure.
Such a possibility had earlier been envisaged by other
Federal Constitmions either expressly or as an
implication of the dual form and immunity of some
kind had been conferred in respect of property, etc.,
between the respective Governments .. Our Constitution has also made provision in that. behalf.
Those provisions are to be found in Parts Xll and
XIII. The Jatter part has been the subject of much
anxious thought recently in this Court, and it provides for freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India. Articles 285-289
of Part XII provide for immunity from tax in
certain other circumstances. Of these, Art. 286,
which involves restriction:~ on the imposition of tax
on the sale and purchase of goods, has been before
this Court on many occasions and need not be con·
sidered. Article 285 provides for exemption of the property of the Union from State taxes, and Article 289,
for exemption of property and income of a State from
Union taxation. We are primarily concerned with
Art. 289 in this Reference. Articles 287 and 288
provide for special exemption from taxes on electri-.
city in certain cases and are not relevant to the
present purpose.
Putting aside Articles 286, :?87 and 288, I set
out below Articles 285 and 289 :
"285. (1) The property of the Union shall,
'
...
3 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 875
save in so far as Parliament may by
law otherwise provide, be exempt from
all taxes imposed by a State or by any
authority within a State.
•
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall, until
Parliament by law otherwise provides,
.prevent any authority within a State from
levying any tax on any property of the
Union to which such property was immediately before the commencement of
this Constitution liable or treated as
liable, so long as that tax continues to be
levied in that State."
"289. (1) The property and income of a
State shall be exempt from Union taxation.
'
,
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent
the Union from imposing, or authorising
the imposition of, any tax to such extent,
if any, as Parliament may by law provide in respect of a trade or business of
any kind carried on by, or on behalf of,
the Government of a State, or any operations connected therewith, or any property
used or occupied for the purposes of such
trade or business, or any income accuring
or arising in connection therewith.
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall apply
to any trade or business, or to any class
of trade or business, which Parliament
may by law declare to be incidental to the
ordinary functions of government."
• •
These are the provisions of the Constitution which
the President of India has in mind in making this
r~ferencc; to detennine whether the proposed extension
J96J
In r1 Sia Cu1tom1
A.cl
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
--.In re Sea Customs
Act
. ....,_--;-
Hiday<tu/lak J.
of customs and excise duties to all goods belonging to the State Governments, imported or exported
in the one case and manufact11red or produced in
the other, would not offend Art. 289.
It may be mentioned at this stage that under
the Government of India Act, l 935, sections 154 and
155 also provided for similar immunity, but these
sections were slightly differently w0,rded. I quote
these sections for future comparison :
"154. Exemption of certain public property from taxation.-Property vested in His
Majesty for purposes of the Government of the
Federation shall, save in so far as any Federal
law may otherwise provide, be exempt from
all taxes imposed by, or by any authority within, a Province or Federated State :
Provided that, until any Federal law otherwise provides, any property so vested which
was immediately before the commencement of
Part III of this Act liable, or treated as liable,
to any such tax, shall, so long as that tax continues, continue to be liable, or to be treated as
liable, thereto."
"155. Exemption of Provincial ·Govern•
ments and Rulers of Federated States in respect
of Federal taxation.-(!) Subject as hereinafter
provi.ded, the Government of a Province and
the Ruler of a Federated State shall not be
liable to Federal taxation in respect of lands
or buildings situate in British India or income
accruing, arising or received , in British India :
Provided that(a)
Where a trade or business of any kind
is carried on by or on behalf of the
Government of a Province in any
.....
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87,
)
part of British India outside that
province or by a Ruler in any part of
British India, nothing in this sub-section shall exempt that Government or
huler from any Federal taxation in
respect of that trade or busiuess, or
any operations connected therewith,
or any income arising in connection
therewith, or any property occupied
for the purposes thereof ;
(b) nothing in this sub-section shall
exempt a Ruler from any Federal
taxation in respect of any lands,
buildings or income being his personal
property or personal income.
(2) Nothing in this Act affects any exemption
from taxation enjoyed as of right at the passing
of this Act by the Ruler of an Indian State in
respect of any Indian Government securities
issued before that date."
As I have said already, dual government in a
Federation requires the protection of one government
from taxation by the other. la the United States of
America, there is no specific provision but such an
immunity is held to be implied in the nature of dual
government. In Canada, s. 125 of the British North
America Act, 1867, provides :
"No lands or property belonging to Canada or
any province shall be liable to taxation.''
In the Australian Constitution, which, one of its
framers (Mr. Justice Higgins) described as a "pedantic imitation" of the American Constitution, s. 114
provides :
"A State shall not without the consent of
the Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or
196J
In re 8111 Cwtoms
Act
Hidayal•llah I·
S78
194S
/" ,, Sta Custtnns
Ael
Hidayatu/lah J.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) vot.
maintain any naval or military Force, or impose
any tax on prop_erty of auy kind belonging to the
commonwealth, nor shall the commonwealth
impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to a State."
Even in Constitutions which are comparatively
recent, like those of Argentina and Brazil, we find
similar provisions. Article 32 of the Constitution of
Brazil provides:
"The Union, the States and the Municipalities
are forbidden-
•
(c)
•
•
•
to tax goods, mcome or services of
each other."
In the arguments before us at which the Solicitor-General of India - for the Union and AdvocatesGeneral of some of the States and other learned
counsel assisted, two distinct lines of thought were discernible. One line was to rely upon certain American,
Canadian and Australian decisions where restrictions
under the respective Constitutions were either upheld
or negatived, and then to reason from anology. The
other line was to take the words of the Constitution and to see what the Constitution has meant to
say. These two lines represent the classic approach
to the interpretation and construction of a written
Constitution. Cooley explained the difference between them ('Constitutional Limitations', p. 97) by
saying that interpretation "is the art of finding out
the true sense of any form of words; that is, the
sense which their author intended to convey", while
construction is "the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie· beyond the direct expression of
the text, from elements known from and given in the
text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not
'
3 S.C.R.
879
within the letter of the text". With a written Constitution, such as we have, the task in most cases must
be one of interpretation, but where the language of
the Constitution suggests that what was previously
passed upon by the Superior Courts of other countries
in parallel matters has obviously been taken as a
guide, one may have to go a little further than the
text to find out what was being sought to be achieved
and what was being avoided. I am aware that in
Webb v. Outtrim (1 ), Lord Halsbury observed that it
was impossible to say of the framers of the Australian
Constitution what their supposed preferences were.
I am also conscious of the fact that the Indian
Constitution is a document framed by the Indian
people for the Indian pe.ople. In interpreting the
Constitution, one must not completely cast off the
moorings to the text of the Constitution and drift
into alien seas. I may say, however, that there are
indications in the Constitution itself of compelling
force which show that the framers were desiring to
avoid some of the implications of these rulings of
the Superior Courts of the United States, Canada
and Australia. The observations of these learned
Courts have been pressed into service by counsel
before us, as they form the historical background
of the provisions of our Constitution. I also find it
convenient to deal with them first as they prepare
us to understand our own Constitution. Perhaps by
seeing the problem in other settings and environments, one is able to see it better in one's own;
-
. '
SUPREME CObRT REPORTS
•
I shall begin with the United States of America,
because the doctrine had its first beginnings there.
In the United States, the immunity of one Government from taxation by the other arose as an ind~s
pensible implication of the dual system. It had its
roots in what Mr. Justice ~rankfur~er described as. a
'·seductive cliche" of Chief Jusuce M1rshall m
McCulloch v. Maryland ('), that the power to tax
involves the power to destroy by the tax. But the
•
(I) [ 1907) A.G. 81.
(2) 4 Wheaton Sl6,
I96J
1. re Se• Cus111111 ·
Act
Hidayatull.t. J;
880
1969
I• '' SH Customs
.
Act
fflli'!f•"'ll•h J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] V6i.
doctrine was more than a mere cliche; it was stated
by Chief Justice Marshall to be fundamental to dual
government. Let me recall his words :
·
"If .we measure the power of taxation residing
in a State, by the extent of sovereignty which
the people of a single State possess, and can
confer on its government, we have an intelligi·
ble standard, applicable to every case to which
the power may be applied. We have a princi·
ple ''lhich leaves the power of taxing the people
and property of a State unimpaired, which
leaves to a State the command of all its resources, and which places beyond its reach, all those
which are conferred by the people of the United
States on the Government of the Union, and
all those means which are given for the purpose
of carrying those powers into execution, We
have a principle which is safe for the States,
and safe for the Union. We are relieved, as
we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from
interfering powers; from a repugnancy between
a right in one Government to pull down what
there is an acknowledged right in another to
build up; from the incompatibility of a right
in one government to destroy what there is a
right in another ~o preserve. We are not driven
to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judi•
cial department, what degree of taxation is the
legitimate use and what degree may amount to
the abuse of the power".
Th<: Chief Justice, therefore, concluded in these
famous words :
"The Court has bestowed on this subject
its most deliberate consideration. The result
is a conviction that, the States have no power,
by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden or in any manner control, the operations
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
881
of the Constitution laws
enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers
vested in the general government. This is we
think, the unavoidable consequence of that
supremacy which the
Constitution has
declared".
This doctrine had early dissenters and chief
among them was Mr.Justice Bradley who described
it as founded on a fallacy which would lead to
mischievous consequences. Collector v. Day (1).
McCulloch's case involved a State tax which was re·
ally discriminatory against the operations of a national
bank and could have been decided without laying
down any such proposition. But the doctrine was
accepted and it grew and grew. It took in not only
the property and activities of a Government within
its protection but also all means, agencies and
instrumentalities by which
Government acts.
It was only after many years that the reach of the
doctrine began to be curtailed. In the Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Missippi ('), Mr. Justice Holmes did
away with the cliche by the trenchant observation
"the power to tax is not the power to destory while
this Court sits". But it was only the increasing
dissents which led to the overthrow of a good dozen
cases in Graves v. New York (8 ).
•
I need not enter into the history of the process
by which the doctrine was curtailed. I shall refer to
that part only which has withstood the attrition to
to which the doctrine was subjected. In the State
of South Carolina v. U. S. ('), (a case relied upon by
the States to explain Art. 289), the State had taken
over the business of selling intoxicating liquors in
the exercise of its sovereign powers. T.he dispensing
and selling agents of the State were charged, under
a Federal Revenue Statute, an excise licence tax
which was imposed on all sellers of intoxicating
liquors. It was held that the agents were not
" ,
(lJ 11 Wall. 113: 26 L. Edo122.
12J 277 U.S 218, 223:72 L, Ed 857, 859.
l'l 306 U.S, 466: 83 L.Ed, 927. (4J 199 U.S, 437: 50 L. I'd, 261.
1963
In fl sta Customs
Act
Hidayctullah J.
88~
1963
In re Sea Customs
Act
Hldaystulloh J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
protected by the doctrine because they were doing
business and not rnrrying on functions of Government. Mr. Justice Brewer gave the reason in these
words:
4
r
"Mingling the thought of profit with the
necessity of regulation may induce the State
to take possession, in like manner, of tobacco,
oleomargarine and all other objects of internal
revenue tax. If one State finds it thus profitable other States may follow, and the whole
body of internal revenue tax be thus stricken
down".
l'v1r. Justice Brewer pointed out that in this way
control of all public utilities, of gas. of water and of
the rail-road systems would pass to the States and
the States would become owner of all property and
business and then what would the States contribute
to the revenues of the nation ? He held that the
· tax was not imposed on any property belonging to
the State, but was a charge on a business before any
profits were realized therefrom, or in other words,
upon the means by which that property, was acquired
but before it was acquired. In that case, the distinction between State as a trader and State as
Government was made. This distinction was emphasized later in Ohio Helvering(1), where it was
observed :
"When- a State enters the market place seeking
customers it divests itself of its quasi
sovereignty pro tanto and takes on the
character of a ,trader, so far at least, as the
taxing power of the federal government is
concerned".
In subsequent cases this distinction between governmental functions and functions as a trader was preserved. The term . 'governmen ta! functions' was
\I J 292 U.8. 360: 78 L. Ed. qo7,
-
'.
3 S.C.R.
-
I
.'
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
883
further qualified by the words 'strictly', 'essential' or
'usual'. It was even said that these functions must
be those in which State Governments must
be 'traditionally engaged', otherwise they would
not be able to withdraw from the taxing power of the
general government. A certain amount of strictness
in the application of the doctrine was noticeable in
the University oj Illinois v. U.S.A. (1 ). In that
case, the University imported scientific apparatus
for use in one of its departments. Customs duties
were exacted which were paid under protest, the
University claiming to be an instrumentality of the
State of Illinois, discharging a governmental function.
The Tariff Act of 1922, under which the impost was
made, was au Act to provide revenue, to regulate
commerce with foreign countries, and to encourage
the industries of the U.S.A. Relying on Gibbons v.
Ogden\'), it was pointed out in the case that the
power to regulate was plenary and exclusive and
its exercise could not be limited, qualified or impeded
to any extent by State action and that there was a
denial to the States to lay imposts or duties on
imports and exports without the concent of the
Congress (Articles I, 10, 2). It was, therefore, laid
down that the principle of duality did not touch
regulation of commerce with foreign countries. It
was argued that the Tariff Act laid a tax and the
tax fell upon an instrumentality. It was conceded
that it might be so, but it was pointed out that the
imposition of customs duties could be for purposes of
regulation and that the provisions took into account
foreign trade and regulated it a11d revenue was inci·
dental and the protection did not go beyond
governmental functions. Chief Justice Hughes
then observed :
"The fact that the State in the performance·
of State functions may u~e imported articles
does not mean that the imporation is a function
(!) 289 U.S. 48: 77 L. Ed. 1025.
12) 9 Wheaton l.
1963
In re S'ea Customs
Act
Hido1atuiloh /,
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
In re Sea Customs
of the State Government independent
federal power."
Act.
Hidayatull•h J.
•
•
•
•
*
*
of
•
"To permit the States or their instrumentalities
to import commodities for their own use, regardless of the requirements imposed by the
Congress, would undermine, if not destroy, the
single control which it was one of the dominant
purposes of the Constitution to create. It is
for the Congress to decide to what extent if at
all, the States and their instrumentalities shall
be relieved of the payment of duties on imported articles."
,
-
The regulatory aspect of taxes on commerce
was again recently the subject of discussion in the
United States Supreme Court in what is popularly
called the 'Soft drink case', Natural mineral waters
in the State were bottled and sold and it was held by
majority that a non-discriminatory tax on all persons
was payable by the Government of the State because
in selling mineral waters, even though a part of the
natural resources of the State, it was not carrying on
a governmental function and the tax did not affect
its sovereignty. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said :
"Surely the power of Congress to lay taxes has
impliedly no less a reach than the power of the
Congress to regulate commerce. There are of
course State activities and State owned property
that partake of uniqueness from the point of view
of inter-governmental relations. These inherently
constitute a class by themselves. Only a State
can own a State house; only a State can get
income by taxing. These could not be included
for purposes of federal taxation in any
abstract category of tax payers without taxing
the State as a State, But so Ion~ as Con~ress
I
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
885
generally taps a source of revenue by whomso·
ever earned and not uniquely capable of being
earned only by a State, the Constitution of the
United States does not forbid it merely because
its incidence falls also on a State. If Congress
desires, it may of course leave untaxed enter·
prises pursued by States for the public good
while it taxes such enterprises organised for
private ends".
Mr. Justice Frankfurter rejected as untenable
such criteria as 'proprietary' against 'governmental'
activities of the State~ or 'historically sanctioned
activities of Government' or 'activities conducted
mostly for profit', and found "no restriction upon
Congress to include the States in levying a tax
exacted casually from private persons upon the same
subject-matter". Mr.Justice Rutledge did not agree
with the last ex ten ti on but chose not to differ. Chief
Justice Stone, with whom Justices Read, Murphy and
Burton agreed, pointed out that in the United States
the cases were di visible into two parts-those in which
there was taxing of property, income or activities
of the State, and those in which the tax was laid on
agents and instrumentalities of the State, which tax
was said to impede or cripple indirectly the State.
They held that the distinction between governmental
and proprietary interests was untenable, and agreed
that a non-discriminatory tax could sometimes be
laid on the State, provided it did not affect its
sovereignty, but the essence of the matter was not
that the tax was non-discriminatory but because it
unduly interfered with the performance of the State's
functions of Government. Holding,
therefore,
that the t:tx in question there did not curtail the State
Government in its fuPctions, it was pointei out that
the Constitution could not be read tq give "immunity
to the State's mineral water business from federal
taxation" or to deny to the federal government
power to levy the tax. Mr. Justice Jackson took no
1969
In re Sefl Customs
Act
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1969
In re Sea Cusfomr
Aet
Hidayatullah /.
part but Justices Douglas and Black entered a powerful dissent. ·The opinion was based on the theory
that the taxing power of either Government if exercised against the other was likely to affect the cost
of its operation and "if the federal Goverpment can
place the local Governments on its tax collectors'
list, tben, capacity to serve the needs of their citizens
is at once hampered or curtailed."
From the above analy5is of the American cases
(and all of them were within the ken of our Constituent Assembly), we gather that the immunity now
does not extend to agents, means or instrumentalities
as it did previously, and that it does not extend to
any trading or business activity of the State even
though the. trading involves natural resources {though
it is conceded that the Congress may excuse trading
in a suitable case). It extends to the property of the
State owned as State but not in the course of trading.
The marginal cases are those where the tax which is
laid, interferes unduly with the State as a State,
and it is held by narrow majority that except for
such marginal cases, the States are not immune. The
contention on behalf of some of the States is that the
distinction made by Brewer, J., in the South Carolina
case (') has been preserved in the scheme of
Art. 289, and if import and export are in the discharge of essential governmental functions, there
must be exemption from customs duty but not if there
is trading. Similarly, it is contended that there is
exemption from excise duty based on the same or
similar considerations. In other words, the claim is
that our Constitution reproduces in its broad features
the doctrine as understood in the United States till
the time of the framing of our Constitution.
There can be no doubt that the broad features
of Art. 289 correspond to the American doctrine as
understood before our own Constitution was framed.
Article 289 grants an exemption from taxation to
(I)
199 U.S. 437: 50 L.Ed. 261.
.-
3 S.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
887
the property and income of the States. What that
comprehends I am leaving over for discussion till
after I have touched upon the Canadian and
Australian Constitutions and referred to cases decided
in connection therewith.
Article 289, however,
quite clearly limits the exemption against taxation
in such a way as to make the trading activities of
the States and the property used or occupied for the
purposes of such trade or business liable to taxation.
This follows indubitably from cl. (2). Without
attempting to expound exegetically the words of that
clause and its relation to clauses (1) and (3), I find
it sufficient to say that cl. (2) puts outside the exemption granted by cl. (1) al! trading activities of the
State and property used in that connection. The
force of the opening words "Nothing in clause (l)"
does not make cl. (2) an exception to cl. (I). Those
words emphasize that the existence of the power
declared by cl. (2) is really unaffected by cl. (1).
This is the trend of opinion in the U.S.A., as I have
pointed out. The same opening words are repeated
in cl. (3) and the final words "incidental to the
ordinary functions of government" show that even
trading can be regarded, if Parliament so declares
by law, as "incidental to the ordinary functions of
Government." This is again recognized in the
U.S.A., where statutes sometimes include special
exemptions in favour of the trading activities of the
States.
It follows, therefore, that the general outline
of Art. 289 is based upon the American pattern that
the property and income of the States are not to be
taxed, that trading is not an ordinary function of
Government though Parliament may by law declare
that any trade or business or any class of trade or
business is incidental to functions of Government.
only
So far I have dealt with the general pattern
and traced its similarity to the American
1963
In r1 Sea Customs
Act.
HidayatuJ/f'h J.
888
1963
In re Sea Customs
Act
Hidayalu/lah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
doctrine. It may be pointed out even at this stage
that there is no immunity in respect of the agents or
instrumentalities of Government in our Constitution.
The exemption is in respect of the "property and
income of a State". The force of these words appears
from other cases under the Canadian and Australian
Constitutions. I shall deal with Australia first be.
'
cause the leading case under that Constitution was
decided before the leading case under the Canadian
Constitution.
I have already quoted s. 114 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. The material
portion of it may be reproduced here :
"A State shall not .................... .impose any
tax on t;>roperty of any kind belonging to the
Commonwea\th, nor shall the Commonwealth
impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the State".
The doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities as an
implied prohibition in the Constitution was held inapplicable to Australian Constitution by the Supreme
Court of Victoria before the High Court was constituted but the High Court in the first case applied
the doctrine. See D'Emden v. Pedder ('). It is
hardly necessary to trace the history of the doctrine
as it was rejected in what is called the Engineers'
case ('). It was, however, held in D' Emden v.
Pedder('), thats. 114 only referred to "tax on property"
as such and was a prohibition different from that
contained in the American Doctrine. The matter
came to a head in two cases in 1908~ In King v.
Sutton('), a quantity of wire netting purchased in
England and imported into the Commonwealth by
the Government of New South Wales was landed at
the port of Sydney. Without any entry having been
made or passed and without the permission of the
customs officers, it was removed under the executive
(!,
(1904) I C.L.R. 91t2) (1'201 28 C.L.R.129.
(3) (1908) 5 C.L.R. 786.
,-•
3 S.d,R.
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
889
authority of the State. The customs authorities proceeded against the defendant under ss. 36 and ~36
of the Customs Act of 1901. It was held that the
Customs Act, 1901, was a valid exercise of the exclusive power of the Commonwealth conferred by
ss. 52(ii), 86 and 90 of the Constitution Act, to
impose, collect and control duties of customs and
excise, and the Act applied to goods imported by
the Government of a State just as it applied to
private persons and the goods which were subject to
the control of the Customs authorities under s. 30
could not be removed contrary to the provisions of
the Act. On the following day, the High Court
delivered judgment in the Attorney-General of New
South Wales v. The Oollecto¥ of Customs('), in which
s. 114 was considered. That was an action brought
to recover from the defendant the amout of customs
duties demanded and paid under protest in respect
of the importation into the Commonwealth of certain
steel rails by the Government of the State of New
South Wales. The rails were purchased in England
and were shipped to the Secretary for Public Works
of the State. At that time the current of authority
in Austtalia was in favour of applying the American
doctrine of immunity of instrumeJJtalities as laid
down by the High Court in D'Emden v. Pedder('),
though in that case, it was already held that s. 114
dealt with "tax on property", and it was a very
different matter. The State sought the protection
of s. 114. It was held that the doctrine had no
application to powers expressly granted to the
Commonwealth which by their very nature involved
control of some operations of the State Government
and one such grant was the power to make laws with
respect to external trade. It was further held that
the imposition of customs duties being a mode of
regulating trade and commerce with other coutries
as well as an exercise of the taxing power, the right
of the States to import goods must be subject to the
(1)
\19081SC.! •. R.818.
l21
(1904) 1 C.l.R. 91.
1963
In re Se,1 CustomJ
Act.
Hidayatullah J.
S?O
1963
In re Sea Custom1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) Vdi,
Commonwealth power. The Commonwealth power
was said to flow from s. 51 [(i) and (ii)] which read :
Act
Hi1~vatulloh J.
"51. The Parliament shall, subject to the
Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of the
Commonwealth with respect to.: (i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States,
(ii)
{
Taxation; but so as not to discriminate
between States or parts of States".
la this connection, one other section may be quoted :
"55. Tax Bill.- Laws imposing taxation
shall deal only with the imposition of taxation,
and any provision therein dealing with any
other matter shall be of no effect.
Laws imposing taxation, except laws
imposing duties of customs or of excise, shall
deal with one subject of taxation only; but
laws imposing duties of customs shall deal with
dutJes of c~stoms only, a~d la~s imposing
duties of excise shall deal with duties of excise
only".
In deciding that the State· Government was
required to pay customs duties on. import by it, the
provisions of s. ll4 notwithstanding, the learned
Judges gave widely different reasons. Those reasons
were pressed into service in the arguments before us,
and I shall briefly notice them. Chief Justice
Griffith found entinomy in the power of taxation and
regulation conferred by s. 51 on the one hand and
the exemption granted by s. 114. on the other, and
held that if a construction was possible which would
harmonise the two, it was to be preferred. The
,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
891
learned Chief Justice, therefore, examined the scheme
of the Constitution Act and found that though the
word 'taxation' ins. 51 (ii) iucluded custom3 duties,
the latter were not described as 'tax' in the Consti·
tution or as 'tax on property'. He held that customs
duties were a tax on the movement of goods and the
word 'tax' in s. 114 could not be held to include
customs duties because the section mentioned a tax
'on property' 'belonging to a State'. He was of
opinion that such property must be within the
geoiraphical boundaries of the State and customs
duties being collected at the confines of the State
were collected before the goods became the property
of the State. He concluded, therefore, that the
levying of duties of customs on importation was not
an imposition of the tax upon property within the
literal meaning of s. 114, and even if it was, the
section must be differently construed in the light of
the general provisions of the Constitution Act. Barton
and O'Connor, JJ., in separate judgments followed
the same line of thought. Higgim, J., pointed out
that before the prohibition applied, taxation of
property must be 'as property'. His conclusion
may be stated in his own words :
'
.
"I prefer to base my judgment on the ground
which I have stated. I cannot confidently, take
the ground that customs duty cannot be a tax
within the meaning of the word 'tax' in section
114. It is true that 'duties of customs' and
'duties of excise' are the usual expressions; but
phraseology, such as is used in s. 55, shows
that the Constitution treats the im1>osing of
such duties as being the imposing of taxes.
'Laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing
duties of customs or excise, shall deal with
one subject of taxation only'. However the
fact that section 114 uses the mere word 'tax' not 'tax of any kind' although it speaks of
'property of any kind' -strengthens the view
196S
In re Sea Custmns
Act
HidrJvafu lah J.
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i964J
1963
In rt Sea Customs
.Act.
Hid<J.Y'Ilttllah J.
voi..
that the framers of the section could not have
had customs duties in their minds at the time.
They Jay the emphasis on the thought on
ownership-'property of any kind belonging'
etc." (p. 855).
Isaacs, J., on the other hand, held that duties of
customs as ordinarily understood or in the Customs
Act, were imposed on the goods themselves and were
therefore, 'on property' within the meaning of s. 114,
but did not come within the meaning of 'tax' as
used in that section and the Constitution genarally.
He cited certain authorities to show that though the
word 'taxation', when used to confer on Government
a power, might carry the amplest meaning, being
a generic word, the word tax might or might not be
as wide in meaning when used in rome other context.
The learned Judge found that the word 'tax' was
used only in s. 114 and did, not carry the wide
meaning, and coupled with the word 'property' could
not be read to include customs duties.
This decision of the Australian High Court
was strongly relied upon by the learned SolicitorGeneral. It will, however, be seen that the construction of the words used ins. 114 is so intimately
connected with the scheme and language of the
other parts of the Constitution Act as to be of little ·
assistance to us. The words 'tax' and 'taxation'
were not defined in the Australian Constitution,
whereas they are, in our own. Further, the distinctimn between 'tax' and 'taxation' with all due respects
is somewhat difficult to apprehand. I can only say
in the words of Cassels, J., in a Canadian case to
which I shall refer presently that :
"I agree with the Attorney-General for British
Columbia in his Statement before me as to the
difference between taxation and a tax. As the
Attorney.General states 'I am not relying very
,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 893
strongly upon that phase of the argument'. He
thinks the distinction is rather subtle and thin,
so do I."
196S
It• re 810 Custom1
Act.
Hidoyatulloh /,
We shall soon that the Privy Council ,lid not rely
upon this distinction when this case was cited before
it.
The decision in the Australian case lays down
certain general propositions which may be stated.
It recognizes that customs duties have the dual aspect of raising revenue and of regulating external
trade. This proposition, of course, is valid. It was
also accepted in the American cases to which I have
already referred and also in the Privy Council case
from Canada to which I shall make reference. It
also decided that the word 'taxation' is sufficiently
wide to take in customs duties. This was laid down
by Isaacs, J .. and cannot be said to be dissented from
by the other learned Judges. This proposition is
hardly necessary as an aid to construction of our
Constitution which uses the word 'taxation', as I
pointed out during the course of arguments only, in
Art. 289, and defines the term :
"Art. 366 (28). 'Taxation' includes the
imopsition of any tax or impost, whether
general or local or special, and 'tax' shall be
construed accordingly".
This gets over the difficulty felt in Australian case
generally and particularly by Higgins J., in the
extract I have made from his judgment. The fact
that the word 'taxati · n' is med in one place only in
our Constitution saves us from the task of examining
the context, because the definition would become a
dead letter if it were not used in that place in the
sense defined. As regards the scheme of the Austra·
lian Constitution, there is some similarity in that the
powers of ta~ation copferred by s. 51 (>f the Australia11
894
/963
In re Sea Customs
Act.
Hidayotullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
cf
Constitution Act on Parliament are subject to
the provisions of that Constitution just as they are in
our Constitution but unlike those conferred by the
Constitution of Canada. I shall refer to these points
which were used in arguments when I deal with our
Constitution. I shall now refer to the Canadian
case relied upon by the learned Solicitor-General.
Before dealing with the Canadian precedent or
the decision on appeal by the Judicial Committee,
I find it necessary to refer to a few cases in which the
Privy Council explained the general scheme of the
British North America Act and the principles on
which that Act is to be construed, particularly
ss. 91 -95 of the Act, which deal with the powers
of legislation in the Dominion and their distribution between the ,Dominion Parliament and the
Legislatures of the Provinces. Without having
those principles before one, there is a danger of
misapprehending the implications of the cases relied
upon by the learned Solicitor-General. It is not
necessary to reproduce sections 91 and 92 in their
entirety beyond the opening words which have a
direct bearing upon the problem decided in the
Privy Council case. Section 91, in so far as material
to our purpose, reads :
Section 91"lt shall be lawful for the Q:1een, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate and
House of Commons, to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of Canada,
in relation to all matters not coming within
the classes of subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces;
and for greater certainty but not so as to
restrict the terms of this section, it is hereby
declared that (notwithstanding anything in this
Act) the exclusive legislative authority of the
Parliament 9f C~nada ex(ends to all matter~
'
'......
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
895
coming within the classes of subjects next here·ma rter enumerate d
, th
at '1s to say,-"
1963
In re sea Cus1oms
Ar.I
"Then follows an enumeration of twenty
nine classes of subjects".
•
•
•
•
•
•
"And any matter coming within any of
the classes of subjects enumerated in this section
shall not be deemed to come within the class
of matters of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects
by this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces."
Section 92 is as follows :"In each province the le~islature may
exclusively make laws in relation to matters
coming within the classes of subjects next hereinafter enumerated, that is to say,-"
"Then follows an enumeration of sixteen
classes of subjects."
In dealing wi.th the general scheme of the
Act, the Board in The Citizens Insurance Company
of Oan-i la v. William Parsons and The Queen
Insurance Company v. Williams Parsons('), pointed
out that the scheme was to give primacy to the
Dominion Parliament in cases of conflict of power
notwithstanding anything in the Act and explained
how the exclusiveness of the spheres of the two legislatutes was intended to work. The position was
again summed up the next year in R·ussel v. Queen,
the report of which is to be found in the same volume
at p. 8:!9. Again, in Tennant v Union Bank of
Oanad(i ('),it was held thats. 91 (No. 15) of the
British North America Act gave the Dominion
'
111 (1881-82) 7 App. Cas. 96.
12J (1894J A.a, 31attl.
Hidoyotulloh J.
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
196S
In rt s~a Custom1
Act
Hidayatullala J,
r'
Parliament power to legislate over every transaction
within the legitimate business of a banker, notwithstanding tliat the exercise of such power interfered
with property and civil rights in the province (ss. 92,
20, 13) and conferred upon the bank privileges as a
lender which the provincial law did not recognise.
The decision was rested once again on the doctrine
of paramountcy of Dominion Parliament notwithstanding anything in the Act so long as it did not fall
within the exclusive power of the Provincial Legislature under section 91. Lord Watson observed:
" ........ But sect. 91 expressly declares
that, 'notwithstanding anything in this Act,'
the exclusive legislative authority of the
Parliament of Canada shall extend to all
matters coming within the enumerated classes;
which plainly indicates that the legislation of
that Parliament, so long as it strictly relates to
these matters, is to be of paramount authority.
To refuse effect to the declaration would render
nugatory some of the legislative powers specially assigned to the Canadian Parliament."
This primacy of Dominion.Parliament was in
all matters legislative, subject, of course, to what was
assigned exclusively to the Provincial Legislatures.
But the primacy of Parliament of Canada was untrammelled by anything elsewhere to be found in the
same Act.
From the above citations, it is obvious that the
general scheme of the British North America Act
assigns certain subjects to the exclusive and plenary
power of the Dominion Parliament, and certain
other subjects exclusively to the Provincial Legislatures. Bys. 91, the Imperial Parliament has unequivocally placed everything nm assigned to the
local legislatures within the jurisdiction of the Domi•
qion Parli<1ment 11otwithstanding anything in the
~·
.
"',
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
Act. The British North America Act thus has to be
construed.as a "'hole and with reference first to the
exclusive domain of the Provincial Legislatures, next,
with reference to the Paramountcy of the Dominion
Parliament and the general scheme of the Act.
Unless a matter falls within s. 92 and does not fall
within s. 91, the action of the Dominion Parliament
is subject to no restraint by anything elsewhere to
be found in the Act .
•
We are now in a position to consider the case
so strongly relied upon by the learned SolicitorGeneral. To Understand that case, the facts must
be seen first. It was a test case by way of an action
by the Crown in the right of the Province to have
it declared that it could import liquor into Canada
for purposes of sale without paying castoms duties
imposed by the Crown in the right of the Dominion
of Canada by virtue of the Customs Act of Canada.
The action of the Province of British Columbia was
based on the provisions of Government Liquor Act
which was declared intra vires by the Privy Council in
Canadian Pacific Wine Company Limited v. Tuley(').
Before the Exchequer Court, the following admission
of facts was filed by the Attorney-General of
Columbia:"It is hereby admitted, for all purposes of this
action, that the case of 'Johnnie Walker'
'Black label' whiskey, which was purchased and
consigned to B.M. King George Vin the right
of the province of British Columbia care of
Liquor Control Board, Victoria B. C. as alleged in para 1 of the Statement of the claim
filed herein, was so purchased and consigned to
meet the requirements of the Government
Liquor Stores established in British Columbia
under the Government Liquor Act Ch. 30 of
the States of British Columbia, 1921 and for
the purpose of sale at the said Government
_
(I) l192l] 2 A.C, 417.
. 190S
Cwtqm,,
. I• " ,Sea
Act,
. ·f
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
116!
la '' s,. Cust~tJU
Act
'
-
l
Liquor Stores pursuant to the provisions of the
·
.
said Act".
The contention on the side of the Province was that
a. 125 of the British North America Act which provides "No lands or property belonging to Canada or
any Province shall be liable to taxation", gave protection against the customs duty. The contention
on the side of the Dominion was that the whi!lkey
was· not imported for purposes 'of Government but
for trade. It was pointed out that under s. 118,
large sums were payable by the Dominion to the
Provinces and reference was also made to ss. 122,
123 and 124, under whir:h customs and excise laws
as also certain other dues were to continue until
altered ·by the Parliament of Canada. British
Columbia was not a part of the Dominion to start
with. It was admitted into the Dominion under
s. 146 of the British North America Act on May 16,
1871, by an order of Her Majesty in Council.
Section 7 of the Order provided that the existing
customs tariff and excise duties would continue in
force in British Columbia for sometime. The
Dominion Act under which the customs duty was
sought to be levied provided as follows :"The rates and duties of customs imposed
by this Act, or the customs tariff or any other
law relating to the customs, as well as the rates
and duties of customs heretofore imposed by
any Customs Act or Customs Tariff or any law
relating to the Customs enacted and in force
at any time since the first day of July 1867,
shall be binding, and are declared and shall be
deemed to have been always binding upon and
payable by his Majesty, in respect of any
goods, which may be hereafter or have been
heretofore imported by or for His Majesty
whether in thll rigl:lt of His Majesty's Government of Canad11 or His Majesty's Government
,
i
'
.
,
... 3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899.
of any Province of Canada, and whether or
not the goods so imported belongfd at the time
of importation to His Majesty; and any and
all such Acts as aforesaid shall be construed
and interpreted as if the rates and duties of
customs aforesaid were and are by express
words charged upon and made payable by His
Majesty.
Provided, however, that nothing herein
contained is intended to impose or to declare
the imposition of any tax upon, or to make or
to declare liable to taxation, any property belonging to His Majesty either in the right of
Canada or of a Province".
In the Exchequer Court, Cassells, J., based his decision on the fact that the whiskey was imported not
, for any governmental purpose but for trade. He,
1
therefore, rejected the claim of the Province following Mr. Justice Brewer's dictum in the South Carolina ca8e, and referred to two cases of the Privy
Council, Farnell v. Bowman (1 ) anci Attorney-General
of the Strait Settlement v. Wemyss ('), in which it
was stated that "if a State chooses to embark upon
private business in competition with other trades,
they should be liable just as other persons engaging
in trade". The Australian case of Attorney General
' of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs ("), was
referred to but was not followed.
An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
Canada. The report of the decision is found in
The Attorney-General of the Province of British
Columbia v. The Attorney-General of the Dominion
of Canada ('). It was argued on behalf of British
Columbia that in s. 125, British North America Act,
the word 'taxati0n' included the imposition of
customs duties and the word 'property' included
• movable property of all kinds and not merely
(I) (1887) 12 App C". 643.
(3) (1908) 5 C.L,R. 818.
(2) (1888) 13 App. Cas 192.
{4) 64 Canoda s.r.R. 377.
196J.
In rt Sea Customf
Att
Eiidajatullali ''i:·
900
116J
I• ,, s,. Casl1t111
Ad
HiilrJoJulll/i J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
property as may be incidental to the administration of
the provincial government. On behalf of the
Dominion, it was contended that customs duties did
not come within 'taxation' but were merely in the
nature of regulations of trade and commerce, and
further this was not 'taxation on property', and
Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Collector of
Customa (1), was relied upon.
The Court consisted of five learned Judges and
they delivered separate judgments. Iddington J.,
declined to go into the question whether the word
'taxation' would or would not include customs duties.
He held that s. 125 was in a· chapter which dealt
with lands and property and thus was confined to
property as was mentioned there or in the 3rd and
4th Schedules, and concluded that in view of this
context and the nature of the powers given by Nos. 2
and 3 of s. 91, the power to demand customs duties
must be upheld. Anglin J., held on the authority
of Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Collector
of Customs('), that s. 125 could not have been in·
tended to give exemptions of this kind, and that
customs duties were not only taxes but were also regulatory and were imposed rather on movement
across the border than on the goods themselves and
were thus not a tax 'on property' in Canada.
Mignault J., followed a similar line. Duff J.,
entered into a more detailed discussion of the sheme
of the British North America Act. He observed
that it was a fundamental part of the scheme of
Confederation to give amplest authority in relation
to external trade exclusively to the Dominion, and
customs duties were an instrument of regulation.
He, therefore, held that the theory of Dominion
primacy must on such a construction of s. 125
postulate a power of disallowance of anything which
would weaken that control and primacy. He also
held that 'taxation' in relation to property was less
comprehensive in significance than 'taxation'
(I) (1908) 5 C.L.R. 818.
•
··""
'
"· 3 S.C.R.
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS
901
simpliciter, and though customs duties were taxes
on commodities in one sense, they were not 'taxes on
property' as used in s. 125 where the word 'property'
was used in the sense of distribution of 'lands' and
'property' between the Dominion and the Provinces.
Brodeur J., held that customs duties in Canada both
regulated and raised revenue and the Act under
which they were levied laid them 'on or upon goods'
and this attracted s. 125.
All thrse reasons were of course pressed into
service in the arguments before us. I shall now
address myself to the Privy Council judgment on
appeal from the Supreme Court. The Privy Council
did not express any opinion on these reasons.
Lord Buckmaster referred to the width of s. 125
but pointed out that it could not be read in an iso'
lated and disjunctive way. It was to be read as a
part of the general scheme of the Constitution Act
by which the Dominion was to enjoy exclusive legis·
lative authority over matters enumerated in s. 91
which included regulation of trade and commerce
aud raising of money by any mode or system of
taxation. He pointed out that customs duties had
these dual functions and whether it was the one function or the other or both, the Dominion alone had
, the power. The claim of the Provinces that though
the Dominion had the power to erect a tariff wall,
the provinces could make a breach in it by virtue
of s. 125 through which the goods could pass un·
affected by the Custo111s duties, was not accepted,
because s. 125 was a part of a group of sections
which distributed property between the Dominion
and the Provinces and gave control to the Provinces
over properties allocated to them. This did not
affect authority conferred by s. 91, which power
extended to regulation of trade and commerce
throughout the Dominion and irrespective of the
' area of its operation. Lord Buckmaster, therefore,
-
1963
902
/R63
In r1 Sia Customs
. . "Act
H,idayatull•A ./•
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
. ,,f '
held that this purpose was paramount and s. 125
must not be read to defeat it. In other words, the
primacy of Dominion Parliament in the matter of
regulation of external trade and commerce and taxation of this type was held to be unaffected bys. 125.
Lord Buckmaster referred to Attorney-General of
New South Wales v. Collector of Customs('), but
did not apply it and observed that "the true solution
is to be found in the adaptation of s. 125 to the
whole scheme of Government" which the British
North America Act defined.
I
•
The Canadian decisions are based upon the
scheme of the British North America Act which
gives paramountcy to the Dominion Parliament
which was unaffected by s. 125 which found place ·
in a group of sections dealing with the distribution
of property between the Dominion and the Provinces.
(
Now, the arguments in the present case follow . i
the lines taken in the cases I have reviewed. It is
contended for the Union that the exclusive power to
levy duties of customs and regulation of exte:nal
trade belongs to Parliament, that customs duties. both
raise revenue and regulate, that they are not 'taxes'
much less 'taxes on property', and Art. 289 must be
interpreted to preserve the exclusive and plenary
power of Parliament. On the other side, it is contended that clauses (2) and (3) ir.dicate that the '
right of Parliament is to tax the trading activities of •
State Governments but to leave free their ordinary
functions as the Governments of the States, and the
prohibition in cl. (l) of Art. 289 is absolute subject
only to what is expressly excluded by cl. (2). To
understand the arguments and to see how the precedents of other countries serve us to understand our
Constitution, I shall first analyse the scheme of taxation under our Constitution.
'
To begin with, it is a matter for reflection
whether the word 'property' in Art. 289 excludes '
(!)
(19C8; 5 C.L.R. 818.
I
'""
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 903
property imported from foreign countries which has
to bear a tax before it can enter the territory of
India. The Article bans taxation of property belonging to the Government of a State. If by property is meant only that property which is within
the geographical limits of a State, the~ property
outside those limits and seeking to enter the State
across customs frontiers may have to bear customs
duty. Similarly, if customs duties do not come within the word 'taxation', the Article is again ineffective
to save the property of the Slate Governments. The
Union claims that customs duty is neither 'taxation'
nor a 'tax on property'. It is a tax on the movement of goods across the customs frontier and the
protection given by Article 289(1) does not apply.
The scheme of the Constitution clearly shows that
neither claim of the Union can be upheld.
...
'
..
The Union List does not include any tax which
in the technical or popular sense can be said to be
'property tax' or a tax laid on property as property.
These tax entries begin at No. 82 which is "taxes
on income other than agricultural income". Then
follow Nos. 83 and 8! which deal with duties of
customs and duties of excise. It is these entries
which are the subject of controversy. If these are
not to be regarded as taxes on 'property', then, no
other tax can be remotely connected with the property of the State in the sense suggested by the
learned Solicitor-General, Nos. 85 and 86 deal with
companies, and Nos. 87 and 88, with death duties.
In extremely rare cases. a State might be the legatee
as in U. S. v. Perkins(') and Snyder v. Bettm'An ('),
but it is difficult to imagine that such a case was in
contemplation. Terminal taxes and taxes on railway
fares and freights of No. 89 may fall upon the States,
but under Art. 269, the proceeds have to be assigned
to the States. No. 90 deals with taxes other than
stamp duties on transactions in stock exchanges and
future markets. They are seldom, if at all, likely to
(I) 163 U.S. 615: 41 L.Ed, 287,
(2) 190 U,~. 249: 47 L.Ed. 1035,
li6J
I• " s,. Cuslonu
Ad
Hia,.1r1w. 1.
bo4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vot.
,..,' '
.,.,,,
\ ' ...
/Y6J
In re Sea Cudoms
Acl
Hid~atullah J.
'
fall on the States and the proceeds are also assigna·
ble to the States. No. 91 is Rates of stamp rJuties,
and No. 92, taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published therein, and
No. 92-A, taxes on the sale and purchase of goods
other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase
takes place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce, are again not taxes such as may be con·
sidered to be 'on property'. The net proceeds of
these taxes are again to be given to the States. When
the question was put to the learned Solicitor-General
as to which tax on property was in contemplation,
he could only point to the residuary power of Parliament. This shows that unle8s Art. 289(1) took in
entries relating to customs duties and excise duties,
the protection granted by the clause would be large·
ly superflnous or nugatory.
The Government of India Act, 1935, granted
exemption in respect of lands and buildings only.
The present Article changed the words to 'property and income'. The pharse is exhaustive of all
the assets and income of the States. Clause (2) o(
the Article indicates that the exemption is not to
apply to the trade or business carried on by the
State and any tax can be imposed in respect of such
trade or business of any kind or any operations
connected therewith and any property used or
occupied for the purpose of such trade or business
and any income accuring or arising in connection
therewith. The repeated use of the word 'any'
shows that the distinction sought to be made in
Australia from the use of the word in one place and
its omission in another is not admissible. The
words 'used or occupied' show that movable and
immovable properties are included. Clause (3) shows
that power is reserved to Parliament to declare by
law which trade or business or class of trade or
business is incidental to the ordinary functions of
Government, thus, taking the matter out or the
..
(
.'
•
,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
905
jurisdictioa of courts. Till Parliament so declares,
all trade and business of any kind must remain subject to taxation.
From the above, it follows that the three
clauses of Art. 289 must be read together and
harmoniously together their correct import. It is
•
not possible to read cl. (1) with the assistance of
rulings of other Courts. The problem to be faced
is : What is included in the expression 'property of
a State' ? It must obviously include all property to
which the State can lay claim. The word 'property'
is wi:le enough to include immovable as well
as movable varieties.
Art. 289 departed from
the language of the Government of India
Act, 1935 by discarding 'lands or buildings' and
using the more comprehensive expres.~ion 'property', and in cl. (2) qualified that word by 'any'
and by 'used or occupied'. The collocation of these
•• expressions clearly indicates that the property of the
State in whatever circumstances situated, was meant
and was exempt from taxation and the only property
which was made subject to taxation was any property
used or occupied for business. Property, which is
brought into ownership and possession abroad, or
property, which is produced or manufactured by the
State, is property of the State. If not, the question
may be asked, "Whose property is it then ?", and
no answer to such a question can be given. I am,
therefore, of the opinion that takin!i the language
of Art. 289 (1) by itself or even as modified by that
of clauses (2) and (3), the conclusion is inescapable
that properties of all kinds belonging to the States
save those used or occupied for trade or business,
were meant to be exempted from 'taxation'. Such
property may be immovable or movable and need
not be within the geographical limits. This Article
is in the part dealing with "Finance" and is included
in a sub·chapter entitled "Miscellaneous Financial
• l
Provisions". Its significance is tbus not made less
!
••
196S
In '' Sia Custom1
Act.
Hiiayatul/ah I.
906
1963
In 'e Sea Custams
Act
Hidayatul 1ah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
/
by any special considerations as was the case with
s. 125 of the British North America Act. The
powers of legislation, which Parliament enjoys by
virtue of the taxation entries in List I, are expressly
8ubject to the provisions of th:e Constitution, and
Art. 289 must, therefore, override unless it be in·
applicable. The Scheme of Art. 289 does not admit that the word 'property' should be read in any
specialized sense. I am, therefore, of opinion that
goods imported and goods manufactured or produced
by the States are included in the word 'property'.
It is next contended that neither customs duties
nor excise duties can be said to be "taxation", and
even if they can be described as "taxation" or "tax",
they are not tax on property. They are said to be
taxes on movement of goods in the one case, and
taxes on production or manufacture, in the other.
Many rulings were cited to show that this is the way
in which Judges have described these levies. I shall
deal with customs duties first, because, in my opinion,
excise duties are simpler to deal with. Some Judges
have described excise duties as "on goods produced",
and some, as "on production and manufacture", and
it is easy to cite an equal number of cases on either
side.
The definition of the word 'taxation' in our
Constitution is the most significant fact. It serves to
distinguish the Australian cases and it tells us what
kind of levy would be hit by Art. 289 (I). This. is
what it states :
-
••
>
" 'Taxation' includes the imposition of any
tax or impost, whether general or local or
special, and 'tax' shall be construed accordingly".
Though it is not an exhaustive definition and only
shows what is included in the word, one is struck
,
, •
~-
\
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
907
immediately by its width of language. Though it
speaks of any tax or impost, it goes a step further and
adds "whether general, or local or special" indicating
thereby that no special or local considerations are
relevant and even a general non-discriminatory levy
must be regarded as taxation. I have already stated
that the word "taxation" is used only in Art. 2~9 ( 1)
and it must be read with all its wealth of meaning
into the first clause of the Article. Not to do so
would be to make the definition entirely redundant.
When the clause is expanded in the light of the definition, it reads :
"The property and income of a State shall be
exempt from any Union tax or impost, whether
general or local or special".
The underlined portion represents the definition.
The question thus arises why use the word and
define it in this comprehensive way if there was no
tax in the legislative entries in List 1 which could be
said to fall on the property of the States unless one
thought in teTms of customs duties and excises ?
According to Wells('),
"Scientifically considered taxation is the taking
or appropriating such portions of the product or
property of a country or community as is necessary for the support of its Government by
methods that are not in the nature of extortions,
punishments or confiscations".
.
'
Viewed in this broad way and having in mind that
the term 'taxation' as used in the Article was specially defined with great width, the answu to the question posed by me is obvious. But that is not all.
The definition speaks of "impost". The word
"impost" in its general sense means a tax or tribute
or duty and may be on persons or on goods. In a
(I) Theory and Practice of Taxaoion, p. 204.
1961
In rt Sea Customs
Act
Hidayatu/lah J.
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1963
In ra Sea CustomJ
Act
special sense it means a duty on imported goods and
on merchandise. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. Sonle('). In
Ward v. Maryland ('), it is stated ;
Hidq'JGIUl/ah J.
"An .impost, or a duty on imports, is a custom
or tax levied on articles brought into a country".
The 0 xford Dictionary does say that this special
meaning is after Cowell and that there is no evidance
of the origin. But every dictionary of legal terms
will bear out the special meaning. Indeed, the
American Constitution classifies "impost" with
"duties" and "excises"· as indirect taxes in contradistinction to taxes on property or capitation. The
word "duties" is sometimes used as synonymous with
tax, but in a special sense, it means an indirect tax
impO!ed on the importation or consumption of goods.
See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &: Trust Co (').
(
In Art. 289(1), property of the States is exempted from Union taxation. One cannot go by the
word "property" alone but must take into consideration the ambit of the word "taxation" also. I have
read the definition into the first clause of Art. 289.
Reading further into the definition the meaning of
the word "impost" not as a "tax" (which is unnecessary as the word "tax" has already been used and
there is a presumption against tautology) but as a
"duty on importation or consumption", one gets this
result :
'
"The property and income of a State shall be
exempt from any Union tax or duty on imported goods or merchandise of all kinds''.
•
In other words, property of the States shall be free
from direct taxes and indirect taxes.
It will thus be seen that both from the angle of
the word "property" as also from the angle of the
71\'all. (U.S.) 433: 19 L.Ed. 95.
12) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 418 : 20 L.Ed. 449.
l3) 158 U.S. 601, 622 : 39 L. Ed. 1108.
(I)
'
'
.
•
3 s.c.R.
'
SUPRElvlE COURT REPORTS
909
word "taxation" we reach the two kinds of taxes
which are the subject matter of controversy here.
On the other hand, all this width of language is lost
completely if these taxes are left out and one goes
in search of other possible taxes. The definition may
conceivably cover some of them in very special
circumstances but the proceeds of those taxes are
assignable to the States, and it seems pointless to
include them for taxation and then to hand over the
proceeds to the States. The distinction between the
trading activity of the State Governments and their
ordinary functions of government, which is worked
out with such elaborate care on the American
pattern, also loses its point. Clause (i) would scar·
cely be necessary and cl. (3), even less.
The next que~tion is whether customs duties
and excises are m their true nature taxes on the
occasion of importation in the one case and produc·
tion in the other, and cannot be described as "taxes
on property". To begin with, the expression "taxes
on property" is not used; nor is the expression "taxes
in respect of property", with which the former expression was compared. The former expression was used
in the Australian Constitution Act and the distinction was made by the High Court of that country.
We are only concerned to see whether the imports
of the States would be free from Union taxation. If
by the nature of customs duties as a tax on movement of goods, it cannot be said that the exemption
has been earned, there should be an answer in favour
of the validity of the amendment. If customs duties
can be said to be "tax on property", the answer must
be the other way.
•
,
.
In this connection, there is the High authority
of Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryli;md ('),
where he observed :
"l\n impost, or duty on imports, is a custom or a tax levied on articles brought into a
11)
12 Wheaton 419, 437: 6 L,Ed. 678, 6851
1963
In re Sea Customs
Act
Hidayatullah J.
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
I
r"
1963
In,. Sea Customs
Act
Hidayatullah 1.
country, and is most usually secured before the
importer is allowed to exercise his rights of
ownership over them, because evasions of the
law can be prevented more certainly by executing it while the articles are in its custody. It
would not, however, be less an impost or duty
on the articles, if it were to be levied on them
after they were landed .. The policy and consequent practice of levying or securing the
duty before or on entering the port, does not
limit the power to that state of things, nor,
consequently, the prohibition, unless the true
meaning of the clause so confines it. What,
then, are 'imports'? The lexicons inform us,
they are 'things imported'. If we appeal to
usage for the meaning of the word, we shall
receive the same answer. They are the articles
themselves which are brought into the country.
'A duty on imports', then, i~ not merely a duty
on the act of importation, but is a duty on the
thing imported."
•
..
In Marriot v. Brune (1 ), later approved in Lawder v.
Stone (2 ), it was laid down that customs are duties
charged upon commodities on their being imported
into or exported from a country. It follows, therefore;, that it is not right to say that customs duties
are on movement of goods and not upon the goods
themselves. A glance at the Sea Customs Act, 1878,
which is sought to be amended, shows that the legislative practice in our country has been to describe
customs duties as laid on the goods or commodities.
Section 20 itself, which is sought to be amended,
says:
,,•
" ............... customs duties shall be levied ..... .
qn
(a) goods imported or exported, etc.
(b) opium, salt or salted fish imported,
etc.
{!) 9 Haward tU.<.) 619 •I 632: 13 L. Ed. 282.
t2) 187 \U.S.) 211 : 47 L,Ed, 178.
-.. 1...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3 S.C.R.
911
(c) goods brought from any foreign port
to ............ etc.
(d) goods brought in bond from one cus·
toms port to another".
Similarly, ss. ~'5, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29A, 31, 32 and
several others mentioned goods as being the subject of
the tax. Section 43, which deals with drawbacks,
may be seen in this connection :
•
"43. When any goods, having been
charged with import duty at one customs-port
and thence exported to another, are re-exported
by Sea as aforesaid, drawback shall be allowed
on such goods as if they had been so re-exported from the former port."
•
•
•
•
•
• The duty is laid on goods and it is the goods which
earn the drawback. It would be not wrong to say
that the whole of the Sea Customs Act speaks of
gooiB all the time.
If then the goods be the property of the States
and those goods have to bear the tax before rights of
ownership can be exercised in respect of them, is it
an error to say that the exemption of Art. 28~ (1)
will be available to them, regard being had to the
language of the clauie read with the definition of
''taxation"-
,
"The property ......of a State shall be
exempt from any Union tax or impost, whether
general or local or special"?
Indeed, Parliament in 1951, soon after the
Constituent Assembly had adopted the Constitution,
amended s. 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, by
' • inserting sub-s. (2) whieb read:
•
1963
In re Sea Gus toms
Act
Hid•ya u/lah J.
912
1963
In re Sea Customs
Act
Hid yalullah I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.·
-4
''! '
"The provisions of sub-section (1) shall
apply in respect of all goods belonging to the
Government of a State and used for the purpose
of a trade or business of any kind carried on
by, or on behalf of, that Government, or of any
operathm connected with such trade or business as they apply in respect of goods not
belonging to any Government."
-
This sub-section reproduces cl. (2) of Art. 289. It
views the goods imported as property, customs duties
as "taxation", and declares that such goods though
belonging to a State Government would bear the tax
under the circumstances mentioned in the said clause,
If there ever was a perfect instance of contemporanea
expositio, this must be it. It is not a case of a modern
statute being interpreted with reference to an old
one. Nor is their any judicial interpretation
involved. This is a case of the same body of men
enacting a provision in an Act to carry out the intent
and meaning of a provision of the Constitution
adopted earlier by them. In their understanding
of the Constitution, customs duties as levied under
the Sea Customs Act, 1878, were affected by the
change from "lands and buildings" of s. 154 of the
Government of India Act, 19::!5, to "property" and
the grant of exemption to such property from Union
taxation. If I had any doubts about the construction of Art. 289, this would have served me to show
the way. I, however, think that the matter hardly
admits of any doubt.
The learned Solicitor-General again and again
referred to the dual purpose achieved by the imposition of customs duties, namely, the raising of revenue
and the regulation of foreign trade. He associated
excise duties with customs in the same breath and
cited the Privy Council case from Canada to argue
that if the proposed amendment is declared in either
case to be unconstitutional, then, the regulatory part
"'
•
~
F
'
•'
"
L
(
1'
J;
""\.,_,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
913
of the same law would fail without being in any
way imperilled by Art. 289 or anything elsewhere
to be found in the Constitution. This argument
needs serious consideration.
.
.
There can be no doubt that the power of
Parliament to regulate foreign trade is plenary and
is untrammelled by anything contained in Art. 289.
A similar aswmption may also be made in favour of
duties of excise, though the element of regulation
may be somewhat weaker there than in the duties
of customs. The question, however, is what purpose
is the proposed amendment intended to serve ? It
is a little difficult to dissociate the regulatory aspect
from taxation. Even in Australia, where tax laws
must deal only with taxation and no other subject,
the regulatory aspect of customs duties was adverted
to. In the United States of America also, this regulatory aspect of customs duties did play a prominent part. Can we, therefore, say that the
combined effect of entries 83 and 41 of List 1 would
austain the proposed amendment ? If it were
a question of regulation being inextricably woven
into the tax, I would have paused to consider the
matter. I am not expounding a law already made
but am giving an opinion on certain questions. These
questions definitely refer to the revenue aspect of
customs duties. If the law were framed to regulate
and even to prohibit the importation, by the State
Government in common with others, of certain goods
or classes of goods, I would have no hesitation in
saying that such a law would not offend the exemption in Art. 289. Even if the Jaw was intended to
achieve 'both ends' there would be an argument in
favour of the Union. But if the advice is sought
on the plain question whether the goods of the
States can be taxed to raise revenue, the answer is
e51ually plain that it is not permissible except in the
circumstances already mentioned respectively in
the two sub-sections which are sought to be amended .
1963
IR r1 Sia GustomJ
A.::t
Hid1yalullt.h J,
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
bi r1 Se• Customs
Act.
Hidayatu/iah /,
Section 20 of the Sea Customs Act, and s. 3 of the
Central Excises & Salt Act, do not pretend to
regulate external trade in the one case and production
and manufacture, in the other. They are provisions
for raising revenue in much the traditional English
way. Whatever little prete.oce there might be is
shed completely by the proposed amendment which,
to borrow once again from Mr. Justice Douglas,
is a "measure designed to put the States on the tax
collectors' list". In these circumstances, I answer
the question in respect of customs duties without
adverting to entry 41 of the Union list. It is argued
that the States would import goods not only free but
also freely and, thus, lose valuable exchange. But
the question can only be answered as posed and not
on the basis of horrible imaginings. It can be
argued with equal force that the State Governments
may be expected to evince a sane attitude towards
our finances.
..
•
In so far as excise duties are concerned, no
question of regulation of trade or of production or
of manufacture can really arise except in certain
rare circumstances. Much of this power of regulation of production and manufacture (except in respect
of certain essential commodities mentioned in No. 33
of List III and those specially mentioned in List I) belongs to the States. In entry No. 84, we are concerned
with tobacco and other goods except alcoholic liquors
for human consumption, opium, Indian hemp and
other narcotic drugs and narcotics. If regulation
can serve the purpose, power will have first to be
found either in List I or List Ill. But if it were a
C'ISe of pure taxation, then, the excise duty is laid
on goods in much the same way as customs. We
cannot treat the observations of Judges, where they
speak of excises as "on production and manufacture",
to be as binding as statutes. Other Judges have
used other language, like "on goods produced or
manufactured". The Central Excise & Salt Act
'
)
t,
,.
-.
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
915
uses the latter, and so do the lists in the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no difference in this respect
between excises and customs. The case of excises is
simpler and a fortiori, because the goods produced iu
the States by the States for their ordinary functions
of Government and not for trade or business, are
property of the States and directly within their
ownership. If such property is taxed, it is directly
hit by Art. 289 (l), and the arguments on the
analogy of customs have little place. It follows,
therefore, that neither customs duties nor excise
duties can be levied on goods properly belonging to
a State if the goods are imported or produced not
for the purpose of trade or business but for purposes
incidental to the ordinary functions of Government.
It also follows that the sections of the two Acts as
they stand today reflect the true position under the
Comtitution. I may add that if the Union Government desires to put a curb on the excessive importation of goods by the States, the power to regulate
external trade is available and it is unaffected by
Art. 289. A measure designed to achieve regulation
by a system of controls, licensing and all such devices,
would not be affected by the exemption contained
in the Article, but a pW'e taxing measure, which
seeks to tax property used for State or governmental
purposes, is within the exemption.
My answers to the questions are:
(1) The provisions of Art. 289 of the
Constitution preclude the Union from
imposing, or authorizing the imposition of, customs duties on the import
or export of the property of a State
used for purposes other than those
specified in cl. (2) of that Article, if
the imposition is to raise revenue but
not to regulate external tr<;1q~,
1969
1.,,,,. cu,1am'
Ac1
H;d•y•tu:tah 1.
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1953
In r1 Sul C11st1ms
..I"
HidavatUllah J.
,.1
·(2) The provisions
of Art. 289 of the
Constitution of India preclude the
Union from imposing, or authorizing
the imposition of, excise duties on the
production or manufacture in India
of the property of a State used for
purposes other than those specified in
cl. (2) of that Article.
(3) The answer is in the affirmative.
•
•
RAJAClOPALA AYYANGAR J.-1 entirely agree
with the opinion expressed by my Lord the Chief
Justice both as regards the answers to the questions
referred to this Court as well as the reasoning on
which the same is based. My only justification
for venturing to add a few words of my own, is
because of my feeling that certain matters on which
great stress was laid by learned Counsel appearing
for the States, might be dealt with a little more
fully.
When the learned Solicitor-General submitted
that on a proper construction of Art. 289 (1), the
immunity from Union taxation in its relation to
property was confined tO'" a direct tax on propertyand did not extend to indirect taxes-which were
not on property but on an incident or an
event in relation to property, it was urged by learned
Counsel for the States that this was introducing a
distinction between direct and indirect taxes which
formed no part of our constitutional structure. It
is true that no such express distinction has been
made by our Constitution, even so, taxes in the shape
of duties of customs (including export duties) and
excise, particularly when imposed with a view to
regulating trade and commerce in so far as such
matters are within the competence of Parliament
being covered by various entries in List I, these
cannot b~ called taxes on property; for they are
'
-
3 S.C.R.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
917
imposts with reference to the movement of property
by way of import or export or with reference to the
production or manufacture of goods. Therefore,
even though our Constitution does not confer or
distribute legislative power to tax based on any
diiitinetion between direct and indirect taxes, it is
wrong to suggest that for construing the exemption
in Art. 289 (1), the distinction would necessarily be
irrelevant. Learned Counsel for the States are perfectly correct in their submission that the Constitution does not distribute legislative power in regard
to taxation between the Union and the States or any
distinction between direct and ind ire ct taxes as in
Canada. In passing I might observe that even in
Australia, there is no distribution of taxing power
on such a basis, for while the Commonwealth
Parliament has an exclusive power to levy duties of
customs and excise (subject to the same having to
be uniform) it has power, generally speaking, to
impose direct taxes also, provided they do not
discriminate, and the States have alio a similar
power to levy such direct taxes. This however does
not by itself eliminate the relevance of the distinction
for any particular purpose. That there is a distinction between direct and indirect taxes cannot be
disputed and I heard no submission to the contrary.
The question is whether that distinction has any
materiality for interpreting the meaning of the words
'the property of a State not being subject to Union
taxation'. The question at once arises whether
when reference is made to "property" and "its taxation" what is meant is merely a tax on property as
such, i. e. on the beneficial ownership by the
State of the property or whether it is intended to
include a tax which bears merely some relationship
to or has some impact on such property. For in
ultimate analysis the distinction between a direct
and an indirect tax is a distinction based upon the
difference in impact which is also expressed as a
distinction based upon its being one not on property
1961
In re Seo Customs
Att
918
1963
In re Se.1 Custom1
Act.
Ay;angar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
but on a taxable event in relation to property. If
the taxable event is merely the ownership of th1
pr<i>perty and on the beneficial interest therein, it
would be a direct tax, whereas if the conoecti on
between the property and the tax-payer is not merely
ownership but something else such as a transaction
in relation to it, then it would be an indirect tax.
The argument therefore that under the Constitution
legislative power in relation to taxation is not dis·
tributed between the Union and the States on any
distinction between direct and indirect taxes as in
Canada is not very material and of course not
decisive on the question under consideration by us.
It was strenuously urged on behalf of the States
that if Art. 289 (1) were construed in the manner
suggested by the Union, i. e., confining the immunity to direct taxes· on property as distinct from
taxes on property which merely impinged on or had
an impact on property, the States could derive no
benefit at all from the provision, because the Union
Parliament had no legislative competence under the
entries in the Union list to impose any direct taxes
on property and that if some meaning and content
has to be given to the exemption it would only be
if its scope were to be held to extend to indirect
taxes on property such as excise duty and duties of
customs. The learned Solicitor-General submitted
that even on the construction which he desired us to
adopt there would be scope for the operation of the
immunity because the exemption might very well
have been framed in view of the possible direct
taxation on certain forms of property under entry 97
of the Union List, read with Art. 248, though such
taxes had not yet been imposed. His further argument was that the exemption might be capable of
being invoked in cases where any State owned property in the Union territories, for in such a situation
the Union
Government
would have under
i
.
-
~-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
919
Art. 246 (4) power to legislate on the items enumera·
ted in the State List and thus levy direct taxes on
property. On the other side, it was urged that it
would not be reasonable to construe the words as
having some meaning by reference to such unlikely
eventualities, but that it would be proper to attri ·
bute to the Constitution makers an intention to make
provision for the usual and the normal.
I must say that the ·submissions of the learned
Solicitor-General are not without force. That apart,
I consider that the history of this clause should be
sufficient to preclude an argument of the type urged
for the States having any great or decisive validity.
It is common ground that Art. 289 (I) was taken over
from s. 155 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935,
with however a variation to which I shall advert.
In that earlier statute, that section ran :
"Subject as hereinafter provided, the Government of a Province shall not be liable to
Federal taxation in respect of lands or buildings situate in British India or income accuring
or arising or received in British India."
l
•
The only change which is material which this section
has undergone is the substitution of the word 'property' for the words "lands and buildings", thus
extending the immunity not only to immovable
property of the type specified but to other forms of
property, including movable property as well.
The distribution of legislative power in regard to
taxation under the Government of India Act in the
field relevant to the present context was identical
with that which is found in the Constitution. Then
as now, there was no power in the Central Legislature
to levy anv direct taxes on lands and buildings,
besides ther~ being no entry like 97 in the Union
list, the residuary power remaining after the distribu·
tion in the three lists being vested in the Governor
J96J
In r1 Se~ Custom1
Act
Ayyar.gar J.
'"
920
/96J
In '' Sea CustOTTll
Act.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
General for allocation under s. 104. It would have
been impossible to find any scope for the operation
of this exemption under the scheme of distribution
of taxing power under the Government of India Act
except possibly on some such line as suggested by
the learned Solicitor-General. The fact therefore
that if one had regard merely to the distribution of
taxing power between the Centre and the Provinces
there was no scope for imparting a wider meaning to
the expression "taxes on lands and buildings"
appears to me to support the view that the circumstance that direct taxes on property are not within
Union Legislative power is not by itself a ground
for reading the exemption from taxation as
necessarily having any particular or a wider connotation.
The next question is whether the inclusion of
property other than "lands and buildings" in the
Article by itself brings within the immunity taxation
not merely of the property itself but on some incident
or event in relation to property such as production
or manufacture, import or export (to refer to the
incidents which are relevant to the context) or does
the Article contemplate the same type of taxe1 in
relation to movable property as were within the
exemption under the Government of India Act in
regard to "lands and buildings"? In other words,
just in the case of "lands and buildings" under the
·Government of India Act, 1935, is the type of taxation of other species of property now brought in one
which is direct and which arises from the mere
ownership of such property or does it. include a tax
levied not on the property itself but on an incident
or event in relation to it ? The analogy of the
immunity from direct taxes on "lands and buildings"
which formed the feature of the exemption in regard
to "property" under the Government of India Act,
1!135, would appear to favour the view that it is
also a direct taxation in relation to the other forms
,,
' \
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
921
of property that was intended to be brought within
Art. 289 (1). Of course, this view could be over·
borne by sufficient reason pointing the other way.
1963
In re S'ea Custom1
Act
Ayy>ngor /.
It was in this context that a reference was
made to the use of the expression "taxation" in Art.
289, a terin which has been defined in Art. 366 {28)
thus:"366. In this Constitution, unless the context
otherwise requires, the following expressions
have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, th~,t is to say(28) "Taxation" includes the imposition of
any tax or impost, whether general or local or
special, and "tax" shall be construed accordingly."
There is no doubt that if this definition were
applied and every "tax, duty or impost" were within
the scope of the exemption, the submissions made on
behalf of the States would be formidable. A subsidiary and related point was also made that the ex·
pression "taxation" occurs only in Art. 289 and
that if the width of the definition in Art. 366(28) is
not held to be applicable to understand the content
of that word in Art. 289, the definition itself would
be rendered wholly unmeaning. Before considering
these arguments it is necessary to advert to some
matters. It is true that the expression "taxation"
occurs only in Art. 289( 1) but it is also to be noted
that the definition of the term "taxation" in Art.
366 has been bodily taken from s. 311(2) of the
Government of India Act, 1935. Just as under the
Constitution the word "taxation" also occurs only
once in the Government of India Act, 1935, viz., in
s. 155(1) corresponding to Art. 289(1). The defini·
tion, it would be seen, applies to define not merely
the word "taxation" but also to the "rammatical
922
1963
In re Self Custom1
Acl
SUPREME C~URT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
~
variations of that expression-for instance "taxes".
In the circumstances the only question is whather
in the context in which the word occurs having
regard to the antecedent history and the form of the
provision and to the other provisions of the Constitution there is justification for the word being understood as meaning something less than the full width
of which it is capable under the definition.
In this connection it would be pertinent to
refer to the terms of Article 285 in which the
corresponding immunity of the Union from State
taxation is provided. That Article runs :-
"285. (.1) The property of the Union shall,
save in so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes
imposed by a State or by any authority within
·
a State.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall, until
Parliament by law otherwise provides,
prevent any authority within a State from
levying any tax on any property of the Union
to which such property was immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution
liable or treated as liable, so long as that tax
continues to be levied in that State."
•
In regard to this provision there arc two matters ta
which attention might be directed. The first of them
is the use of the expression "all" in clause(!)(taken from the corresponding s. 154 (I) of the
Government of India Act 1935)-which is absent
from Art. 289 (I). It is manifest that some significance has to be attached to this variation. If the
definition of the word "taxes" in Art. 366 (28) were
applied to that word in Art. 285 (I), it would be
apparent that the word "all" would be wholly superfluous and otiose, as the definition itself-and that
;
\_
•
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
923
is the contention urged before us on behalf of the
States-embraces all and every tax. This would
suggest that it would not be wrong to take the view
that the Constitution makers felt that notwithstanding
the definition of "taxes" in Art. 366 (28), it might
not always have that width of connotation. so that
it was necessary to affirm and if need be supplement
its width by the addition of the word "all". The
other matter is this. If the definition of "taxes"
were
read into Art. 285 and the Article
read literally, it would be seen that property of
which the Union was the owner would be entitled
to the exemption, whether or not the beneficial
occupation and use of the property was in the Union.
In other words, the literal reading of the Article
would bring within the exemption a tax on a
private occupier of Union land-even when imposed
on the beneficial interest of such occupier. S. 125 of
of the British North America Act 1867 ran :
"No lands or property belonging to Canada ...
shall be liable to taxation (Provincial)".
•
A lessee of Dominion Crown lands taken on lease
for grazing purposes was astessed to land tax under
an enactment of Saskatchewan in respect of the
lessee's interest in the lands. The dominion
challenged the validity of the. imposition on the
. ground of the land itself being within the immunity
conferred by s. 125. Rejecting this contention
Viscount Haldane speaking for the Judicial
Committee said :
" ......... although the appellant is sought to be
taxed in respect of his occupation of land, the
fee of which is in the Crown, the operation
of the Statute imposing the tax is limited to
the appellants' own interest." (1).
My object in referring to these observations is that
provisions of this sortxcannot always be read literally
(1) Smith v. Vermillion Hills. {1916) 2 A.C, 569, 574.
1963
In re sea Custom;
Art
Ayrong!lr J.
924 SUPREME COURT .REPORTS (1964] VOL.
196!1
In r1 Sea Cust~m•
Act.
,(
and that the object of the framers as disclosed by the
general scheme of distribution of powers has to be
borne in mind to arrive at their proper construction.
It is in this context that the intimate correlation
between the exclusive legislative power of the Union
in regard to "trade and commerce with foreign
countries", and related to it, "import and export
across customs frontiers" and the duties with which
we are now concerned and particularly import and
export duties on movements across the customs
frontier assume crucial importance; and pose the
question whether this power confided to the Union
was intended to be broke1 into by every component
State imparting its requirements free of duty.
There was one other further submission made
to us by learned Counsel for the States which re·
quires some detailed examination and this was ba1ed
upon the impact of cl. (2) of Art. 289 on the import
of cl. (I). The argument was this : The non-obstante clause with which cl. (2) opens should be
taken to indicate that but for that clause, the
exemption would be operative so as to deprive the
Union of the power to levy tax in the con verse
·circumstance, in other words that but for clause (2)
even where the State was engaged in a trading
activity it would be entitled to claim exemption
from Union taxes. It was therefore su.bmitted that.
light could be gathered from the content of cl. (2) on
the types of taxation from which exemption was
granted under cl. (I) or in other words for determin·
ing the ambit of the immunity covered by cl. (1).
The argument proceeded. Cl. (2) permits the
Union to impose the following taxes notwithstanding
the blanket exemption granted by cl. (I}. These
taxes are : (I) A tax in respect of a trade or business
of any kind carried on by or on behalf of the State.
The taxes leviable in respect of a trade or business
would be, having regard to the entries in the Union
..
#
•
'
'
\.
•
...
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
925
List-(a) income tax (item 82), (b) possibly corporation tax (item 85) where the State carries on business
through a State owned or State controlled corporation, (c) taxes on the capital value of assests of
companies (item 86) in cases where the State carries
on business through a State owned corporation;
(2) Taxes in respect of operations connected with
a trade or business. These might include a tax on
freights, sales tax, and it was added duties of
customs and duties of excise; (3) Taxes in respect
of property used or occupied in connection with
such a trade or business or any income accuring or
arising in connection therewith. It was strongly
pressed
upon us that not merely direct
taxes on property and direct taxes on income,
but other types of taxes which were incidental
to the "operations connected" with a trade or business
(and it wa, suggested that customs and excise duties
were such) could be imposed by the Union upon the
States in cases where the latter was carrying on a
trade or business. It necessarily followed, it was
urged, that if these were not used for a trade or
business, the taxes would fall within the scope of the
exemption under Art. 289 (1 ). In other words,
the argument was that as there was a limited power
in Parliament to impose taxation on States or on
those acting on behalf of the States it necessarily
connoted that in cases not covered by cl. (2), that
is in cases where it was not connected with a trade
or business the exemption under cl. (1) would
operate.
The precise relationship between clauses (2) and
(1) and the question whether the former was a proviso
properly so called which had been carved out of the
main provision of cl. (1) and which but for such
carving out would be within cl. (1) was the subject
of considerable debate before us but I consider that
it is not necessary to deal with this rather technical
point for in my view the history of cl. (2) throws
'
Ir. re Sic Custom ~
Act
---~
926
1969
,;i; re Sea CustomJ
Act
Ay;1angor J.
SUPREMECOURTREPORTS[l964]VOL.
'
considerable light on its significance and place ·in the
scheme of tax exemption. At the Imperial Economic
Conference of 1923 a resolution was adopted to the
effect that the Parliaments of Great Britain, the
Dominions and India should be invited to enact a
declaration that the general and particular provisions
of their respective Acts imposing taxation might be
made to apply to any commercial or industrial
enterprises carried on by any other such Government
in all respects as if it were carried on by or on behalf
of a subject of the British Crown.
This resolution drew a distinction between the
trading and business activities of the several constituent units owing allegiance to the Crown of England
and their governmental activities. In pursuanee of
this resolution the Imperial Parliament enacted s. 25
in the Finance Act of 1925 (15 and 16 George V,
Ch. 36) which read to quote the material words :
"25. (1) Where a trade or business of any
kind is carried on by or on behalf of the
Government of any part of His Majesty's
Dominions which is outside Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, that Government shall, in
respect of the trade or business and of all
operations in connection therewith, all property
occupied in Great Britain or Northern Ireland
and all goods owned in Great Britain or
Northern Ireland for the purposes thereof, and
all income arising in connection therewith,
be liable, in the same manner as in the like
case any other person would be, to all taxation
for the time being in force in Great Britain
or Northern Ireland.
(2)
(3)
Nothing in this section shall(a)
affect the immunity of any such
Government as aforesaid from
' .
, '·
3 S.C.R.
SUPREl\lB COURT REPORTS
927
taxation in respect of any
income or property to which
sub-section ( 1) of this section
does not apply ; or
(b)
.•
•
••
"
A similar provision was enacted in India in the
Government Trading Taxation Act, 1926 (Act 3 of
1926). Its preamble recited :
"WHEREAS it is expedient to determine the
liability to taxation for the time being in force
in British India of the Government of any part
of His Majesty's Dominions, exclusive of
British India, in respect of any trade or
business carried on by or on behalf of such
enacted as
Government. It is hereby
follows :-"
The operative provision was s. 2 and it
ran:"2. (1) Where a trade or business of
any kind is carried on by or on behalf of
the Government of any part of his
Majesty's Dominions, exclusive of British
India, that Government
shall, in
respect of the trade or business and of all
operations connected therewith, all property occupied in British India and all
goods owned in British India for the
purposes thereof, and all income arising
in connection therewith, be liable-
,""'
(a) to taxation under the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, ·in the
same manner and to the same
extent as in the like case a com·
pany would be liable;
1961
In 11 Se• CuJtomJ
ht
Ayyang:..r J.
_J_
928
/Y63
la re Sea Custgms
Act
A.yy_angar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l964] VOL.
'•
(bl to all other taxation for the time
being in force in British India
in the same manner as in the
like case any other person would
be liable.
(2) For the purposes of the levy and
collection of income-tax under the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, in accordance with
the provisions of sub-section (1) any
Government to which that sub-section
applies shall be deemed to be a company
within the meaning of that Act, and the
of that Act shall apply
provisions
accordingly.
(3) In this section the expression "His
Majesty's Dominions"
includes any
territory which is under His Majesty's
protection or in respect of which a mandate is being exercised by the Government
of any part of His Majesty's Dominions."
This, it would be seen, applied to a foreign Govern·
ment carrying on a trade or business or owning pro·
perty or using property within British India. The
Act has been adapted subsequently to bring it into
line wiith the constitutional changes that have taken
place since 1926, but it is unnecessary to refer to them.
Proviso (a) to sub·s. (1) of s. 155 enacted the exemp·
tion in the same terms as in the Act of 1926 in favour
of the Provinces under the Government of India Act,
1935. This bodily incorporation was done without
any reference to the distribution of legislative powers
effected by Sch. 7 of the Government of India Act.
This being the historical origin of this provision, it is not easy to relate it to the exemption
in Art. 289. (1) or to construe the exemption with
its aid. Bearing in mind this antecedent history it
•
•
•
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
appears to me that it would not be proper to read
the scope of the saving in favour of the Union in
cl. (2) as reflecting on the scope of Art. 289 ( l).
•
There is also another angle from which the
relevance of clause (2) to the construction of
clause (1) of Art. 289 might be tested. One of the
more serious arguments put forward on behalf of the
States to which I have adverted was that if the
expression 'taxes' in relation to the exemption of
property from tax were confined to direct taxes on
property the exemption would be unmeamng, as
such taxes could not be imposed by the Union.
Now, let me take the taxes specified in Art. 289 (2).
They include, for instance, taxes on "property used
or occupied for the purpose of such trade or
business". A tax on the use of property or on the
property itself which is occupied for the purpose of
trade would obviously be a direct tax on property
which ex-concessis the Central legislature under the
GQvernment of India Act and Parliament under the
Constitution are incompetent to impose. It is not the
contention of the States that the Centre has such a
power to levy a tax on occupation or use of property
where it is in connection with a trade or business.
This would at least show that it is not justifiable to
imply from clause (2) that but for that provision
Parliament would be entitled to impose such a tax.
The other points urged have been dealt with in the
opinion of my Lord the Chief Ju~tice and I do not
propose to cover the same ground. I concur in the
view that the questions referred to this Court for
its opinion should be answered as they have been
by the Chief Justice.
BY COURT : In view of the opinion of the
majority the answer to the three questions referred
to is in the negative.
Questions answered accordingly•
...
•
196S
I• re S.a C1<Stom1
""
.d»..,., J.
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