STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH versus CHEEMALAPATI GANESWARA RAO & ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 April 1963 | [1964] 3 S.C.R. 297 | 1963 INSC 115
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 April 1963
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 39/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 3 S.C.R. 297
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 115
Text of the judgment
..
3 S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT R.EPOR.TS
297
locked. The appellant also knew the whereabouts
of the property inside the house of his maternal
grandfather. He attempted to sell a few muffiers a
day before the recoveries were made. He was seen
arriving at the house, during the night, in a car with
some persons and then removing property which
looked like bales from the car to the house. All
these circumst.mces go to support the finding that
he had a~sisted in the concealment of the stolen property and had thus committed the offence under
s.414 I.P.C.
We therefore ·see no force in this appeal and,
accordingly, dismiss it.
Appeal dismissed.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
v.
CHEEMALAPATI GANESWARA RAO & ANR.
(K. SuBBA Ri1.o, RAGHUBA.R DAYAL and
j. R. MUDHOLKAR jj.)
Criminal Trial-'-Joind.er nf charg" and pers<»U- Oon•·
pirac71, charge of-If illegal after conspiracy fructifieaExamination of accmed-Right of accv•ed to examine him.ielf aa
witneM-lf duty of Oovrt to inform acc""ed of right-Pardota,
legality of-Approver-Refreshing memory by reference to document•-lf Pormiasible-AamiMibility of evidence-Account Boo"8
-Ab1enee of entrie. •f payment. aUeged -Gode of Criminal
ProceJure, 1898 (5 Bf 1~98), 81. 233 to 339,342,337,529,537Indian Evidence Act. 1872(1of1872), 81.ti,ll,34,lli9,1~~.
A and B were tried together at one trial, A of offences
under ss. 120-B, 409,477-A and 471 read with •· 476 Indian
Penal Code and B of offences under ss. 120-B,409 read with 109
1963
J.jm,ra Nath
••
Stal• •! '-fa1hJ•
Prad!1h
Raghubar Dayal /,
..
298
Jj63
Stat1 of AndAr•
Prad1sh
y,
Cluemolapati
Ganer!riar!J {(flO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
and HI read with 467 Indian Penal Code. The Senions Judge
who tried them convicted A of all the offence• char11cd and B
of the first two charges. On app•al the High Court acquitted
both of them. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The
respondents contended: (i) that there was a misjoinder of
charges and persons on account ,,f the cumulative uae of the
various clauses of s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which wa• not permissible, (ii) that no charge of conspiracy
could be framed after the conspiracy had fructifi•d, (iii) that
the Sessions Judge had failed to inform the accused of their
right under s. 342 (+) of the Code to examine themselves as
witnesS<s, (iv) that the pardon had been granted to the approve!'
illrgally, (v) that the approver had been allowed ilkgally to
refresh his memory by reference to documents at the time when
he was examined before the Court, and (vi) that the accouut
books of ce1tain firms which contained ..., entries regarding
payments alleged to have been made to them were inadmissible
in evidence.
Held that there was no misjoinder of charges and of
accused persons. It is open to the Court to avail itself cumulatively of the provisions of the different clauses of s. 239 of the
Code for the purpose of framing charges. Sections 233 to 236
do not override the provisions of 1. 239. But the provisions of
ss. 234 to 231> can also be resorted to in the case of a joint trial
of several persons permissible under s. 239. Even if there was
a misjoinder the High Court was incompetent to set aside the
convictions without coming to the definite conclusion that the
misjoinder had occasioned failure of justice.
Re: Jlanka11alapati Gopala Rao, A.I.R. 1956 Andhra 21 and
T.B . Mukherji v. State, A.I.R. 1954 All. 501, not approved.
State of Andhra Prad"8h v. KandimaUa Subbaiah, [1962]
2 $.C.R. 194, K.V. Kri8'tna Murthy Iyer v. State of M<Jdra•,
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 406, Willi• (William) Slaney v. State of
Madhya Pru.duh. (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1140, Birichh Bhuta'll v. TM
State of Bihar. (1964) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 328.
Held further that where offences have been committed in
pursuance of a conspiracy, it ·is legally permissible to charge the
accused with these offences as well as with the conspiracy to
· commit those offences. Conspiracy is an entirely independent
offence and though other offence• are committed in pursuance of
the conspiracy, the liability of the conspirators for the con1pi•
racy iuclf caunot disappear,
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
Stale of Andhra Prade•h v. Kanclimalla Sabbaiah. ( 1902)
2 S.C.R. 194, relied on.
S. Swamirathnam v. State of Jlaclra1, A.LR. 1957 S.C.
340 and Natwarlal Sakarlal Mudy v. Slate of Bomba11, Cr. A.
No. 111of1959, dt. 19.1.1961, referred to.
Hold further, that there was no violation of the provisions
of s. 342 of the Code. The Sessions Judge had erred on the
side of overcautiousness by putting every circumstance appearing in the evidence to the accused. L:opies of the questions
put to the accused were given to them before hand. Any point
left over in the questions was covered in the written statements
filed by the accused. In such circumstance the length of the
questions or of the examin.tion could not perjudice the accused.
Further, there was no duty cast on the Court to inform the
accused of their right under s. 342 (4) to examine themselves
as witnesses. They were represented by counsel who must hdve
been aware of this provision.
Held further, that the pardon was legally granted to the
approver under s. 337 of the Code and was a valid pardon.
The offences with which the accused were charged were all
such in respect of which a pardon c:ould be granted under
s. 337 (I). The offences under s. 467 read withs. 471 which
was exclusively triable by a court of sessions and the offence
under s. 477-A which was mentioned in s. 337 (l) itself and
thus both fell within the ambit of s. 3J7 (1). The offence
under s. 409. and consequently the offence under s. 120-B
also, was punishable with imprisonment for life or with
imprisonment not excee<.iing ten years and was an "offence
punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years"
within the meaning of s. 337 (1). Further, under G.O. No.
3106 dated September 9, 1949, of the Madras Government, the
power of a District l\Iagistrate to grant pardon was specifically
conferred on Additional District Magistrates, and the
Additional District Magistrate, (Independent) who granted the
pardon in the present case was competent to do so.
Held further, that the Sessions Judge acted legally and
properly in allowing the approver to refresh his memory,
while deposing, by referring to the account books and other
documents produced in the case. Where a witness has to
depose to a large number of transact.ions and those transactions
are referred to or mentioned either in the account books or
in other documents there is nothing wrong in allowing
~e witncst to refer to
the account boolla and the docu:me1111
196!
St<ll •f And/Jr•
l'r•ush
v.
Ch11maJup.iti
G•n1swar• Rn
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
Stat1 of A.na7irc
Pradesh
••
Cluemdopali
Garuswara RtJo
while questions are put to him. Such a course is specifically
permitted by ss. 159 and 160 ofthe Evidence Act.
Held further, that the account books of the firms which
contained no entries wtih respect to payments , alleged to have
been made were not relevant under '· 34 of the Evidence Act,
as that section is applicable O'l!y to entries in account books
regularly kept and says nothing about non-existence of entries.
But they were relevant under s. 11 of the Act as the absence
of the entries would be inconsistent with the receipt of the
2mounts which was a fact in issue. They were also relevant
under s. 5 to prove the facts alleged by the prosecution that
payments were never made to these firms and that those firms
maintained their accounts in the regular cc>urse of business,
and both these were relevant facts.
Qu-.n Empre8' v. Grees Ohander Banerjee (1884) I.L.R. 10
Cal, 1024, and Ram Pershad Singh v. Lakhpati Koor, (1902)
I.L.R. 30 Cal. 231, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 39 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated January 30, 1960 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court (in Criminal Appeals Nos. 277
and 278 of 1957 and Criminal Revision Case
No. 810 of 1957.
A.S..R. Chari, K.R. Ohoudhry and P.D. Menon,
for the appellant.
Bhimasankaram and R. Thiagarajan for respon·
dent No. 1. R. Mahalingier, for respondent No. 2.
1963. April 23. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Muiholkor J.
MuDHOLKAR J.-The respondent No. I wa1
tried before the Court of Sessions, Visakhapatnam
for offences under s. 120-B, Indian Penal Code,
s. 409, s. 477-A ands. 471 read with s. 467, I.P.C.
while respondent No. 2 was tried for an offence under
-
3 s.a.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 301
s. 120-B and for offences under ss. 409 read with
s. 109, 477-A and 471 read withs. 467, I.P.C. Each
of the respondents was convicted of the first two
offences, but the respondent No. 1 alone was convicted of the other two offences. Various sentences
were passed against them by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Visakhapamam, who presided over the court.
The respondents preferrP.d appeals before the High
Court challenging their convictions and sentences.
The State on the other hand preferred an application
for revision under s. 439, Cr. P.C. for the enhance·
ment of the sentences passed on the respondents.
The High Court allowed the two appeals, acquitted
the respondents and dismissed the application for
revision preferred by the State. The State of Andhra
Pradesh has come up before this Court in appeal by
obtaining special leave under Art. 136 of the Con·
stitution.
The prosecution case in so far as it is material
for the decision of this appeal is as follows :
In the year 1929 the Andhra Engineering Co.,
which was originally a partnership firm formed by
one D.L.N. Raju was converted into a private
limited company with its headquarters at Visakh·
apatnam. (We shall refer to this company throughout as the AECO). It obtained licences from the
Government under the Electricity Act for supply of
electrical energy to Visakhapatnam, Anakapalli and
some other places. As the AECO did n0t have the
necessary capital to undertake the work Raju floated
in the year 1913 a public limited company called
Visakhanatnam Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.,
(referred hereafter as VESCO) and another in the
year 1936 called the Anakao.alli Electric Supply
Corporation Ltd. The AECO transferred its
licences for the supply of electrical energy to the
consumers of Visakhapatoam to VESCO and
similarly transferred to AECO the licence to supply
19/iJ
Stat1 of Andhra
Pradtsh
v.
Cli1emalapati
Gan1swar" Rao
Mudho/kar /.
I
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964JVOL.
196S
Slt1t1 of Aadhr11
P1ad11h
••
CheemalajJati
Garuswara Rao
Mudho/kar J.
electrical energy to consumers at Anakapalli. The
AECO was appointed Managing Agent for each of
these Corporations under separate agreements. Some
time later other industrial concerns, the Andhra
Cements Ltd., Vijayawada and the East Coast
Ceremics, Rajahmundry were started apparently by
Raju himself and the AECO was appointed the
Managing Agent of each of these concerns. The
original managing agency agreement in favour of
AECO with resprct to VESCO was for a period of
15 years i.e., from 1933 to 1948 and was later
renewed for the remaining term of the currency of
the licence granted by the Government under the
Electricity Act. A mention may be made o( the
fact that in June, 1952 the VESCO undertaking was
acquired by the Government under the provisions of
the "Electricity Undertaking Acquisition Act" but
nothing turns on it.
The VESCO had its own Board of Directors
while the AECO had also its own separate Board of
Directors. The VESCO had no Managing Director
but at each meeting of its Board of Directors one of
the Directors used to be elected Chairman. The
same practice was followed at the meeting of the
general body of the shareholders. The AECO on the
other hand always had a Managing Director, first of
whom was D.L.N. Raju. He died in the year
1939 and was succeeded by R.K.N.G. Raju, an
Advocate of Ra.iahmundry. This person, .however,
did not shift to Visakhapatnam on his becoming the
Managing Director but continued to stay most of
the time at Rajahmundry. According to the pro·
secution both these concerns were running smoothly
and efficiently during the lifetime of D.L.N. Raju
because· he was personally attending to their affairs.
His successor, however, opart from the fact that he
continued to be staying mostly at Rajahmundry, was
also interested in several other ventures, including a sugar factory at Dewas in Central India.
.
t
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
303
Eventually many or those ventures failed. Accord·
ing to the prosecution the second Raju was not
bestowing sufficient care and attention on the affairs
of VESCO.
The AECO as Managing Agents of VESCO
had appointed in the year 1939 one D.V. Appala
Raju, a trusted employee, as its representative and as
the secretary of VESCO. In 1944 this person resigned
from his appointments and started his own
business in radio and electrical goods in the name
Jf D. Brothers. He was succeeded by T. Visweswara Rao, P.W. 6, an employee of the AECO.
The respondent No. 1, Ganeswara Rao was
also an old employee of AECO, having been
appointed a stenotyp1st in the year 1 J23 on an initial
salary of Rs. 40/- p.m. Eventually he became the
Head Clerk therein. He pressed his claim for
appointment as Secretary of VESCO and rep1esentative of the Managiug Agents at Visakhapatnam and
R K.H.G. Raju appointed him to that post. All
this is not disputed. The respondent No. 1, even
after his appointment on two posts connected with
VESCO, continued to work with the AECO also
whose business had by then been confined only
to that of Managing Agents of the four companies
floated by D.L.N. Raju.
It is the prosecution case that as Secretary of
VESCO and the resident representative of the
Managing Agents, the respondent No. I was attending to the day to day affairs of VESCO, which
included the receiving of aU sums of money due to
VESCO, spending money for the purpose of VESCO,
attending to the appointment, supervision and
control of the staff of VESCO. purchasing materials
required for the purpose of VESCO and supervising
over the accounts of VESCO. He was thus all
important with respect to the every day affairs of
196S
State of A11d.. ra
Pradesh
••
Ch1emc{ojJ11ti
Gunerwara Rae
304
1961
ltate of Andhra
Fradesh
••
Ch1mialtJf11ti
Gane1wara Rao
Mu,Jho/kar J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
VESCO. His dual capacity enabled the respondent
No. I to earn the confidence not only of the Directors
of AECO but also of those of VESCO. The accounts
maintained by the VESCO used to be explained by
him not only to the Directors but also to the shareholders. The knowledge of the Financial position of
VESCO obtained by them used to be derived
essentially from the re1pondent No. I. As Secretary
of VESCO it was his duty to convene the meetings
of the Board of Directors, to present before them the
periodical statement of receipts and expenditure of
VESCO, to convt>ne meetings of the General Body,
to prepare the Managing Agents' report and the
Directors' report as also to see to the presentation of
auditors' report and the statement of accounts. The
explanations of the Managing Agents and the
Directors of VESCO with respect to the items
mentioned in the orders of the Board used also to be
placed by him before the shareholders. It was also
his duty to have the accounts of VESCO audited by
the auditors elected by the general body and to
produce before the auditors the relevant accounts,
vouchers, bank statements and so on.
There were no complaints about the management of the affairs of VESCO or the AECO till .the
end of 1946 or the beginning of 1947. One significant fact, however, which occurred prior to 1946 is
referred to by the prosecution. Till the year 1945
Messrs C. P. Rao & Co., a firm of Chartered Accountants were the auditors of VESCO but after the
respondent No. I became Secretary. one B. Rajan
was elected Auditor not only for VESCO but for all
the other four concerns, including AECO. This
person was Auditor for Green lands Hotel at Visakhapatnam, of which the respondent No. 1 was a
Director.
R,K.N.G. Raju took tiU towards the end of
1947 and died at Madras in April, 1948. According
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
305
to the prosecution the respondent No. I wanted to
take advantage of this fact and conceived of a scheme
for misappropriating as much money belonging to
VESCO as possible before the managing agency
agreement of AECO came to an end in October, 1948.
The respondent No. 1 secured the promotion of the
approver K.V. Ramana, who was originally Accounts
Clerk, to the post of Senior Accountant. Similarly
K. V. Gopala Raju was transferred from the post
of Stores Clerk to the general department and
K.S.N. Murty, the discharged accused, was appoint·
ed Stores Clerk in his place. Later, however, Murty
was also got transferred to the general section and
replaced by P. W. 18, Srinivasa Rao originally a
stores boy.
The approver who was originally an Accounts
clerk with the AECO was, it may be mentioned,
appointed a cashier in VESCO in 1946 at the instance
of the respondent No. l and was thus beholden to
him. He was later promoted as Senior Accountant
and in his place the respondent No. 2 Lakshminarayana Rao was appointed the Cashier. According to the prosecution the resp9ndent No. 1 took
both the approver and Lakshminarayana Rao in his
confidence as also some other persons "known and
unknown" for carrying out his nefarious purpose,
namely, the misappropriation of the funds of VESCO
during the subsistence of AECO's managing agency of
VESCO. The conspiracy is said to have been hatch·
ed in the year 194 7 and falsification of accounts and
misappropriation of funds of VESCO went on till the
end of the accounting year. The term of the·manag·
i !lg agency was renewed in 1943 and AECO continued to be managing agents until the VESCO was
taken over by the Government in 1952. The res•
pondent No. 1 continued to, be the Secretary of
VESCO and resident representative of the Managing
Agents throughout the period of conspiracy.
1963
Stat1 of -Anihra
Pfad.sh
v.
Cheomalapatl
Gan1swara Rao
Mudiw/kar /,
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOi:..
1963
Stat1 of A,,-fhra
Prad1sll
••
C~ennalapati
Ganeswara Rae
Mudlwlkar J,
After the death of R.K.N.G. Raju, it was
discovered that the AECO was indebted to many
concerns which were under its managing agency, the
liability being shown either as that of AECO or that
of R.K.N.G. Raju personally. Again, the VESCO
was shown as indebted to the Andhra Cements to
the extent of Rs. 42,000/-. This amount was, however, paid by the AECO from the funds of VESCO.
The respondent No. 1 and wme of his friends were
in search of a rich and substantial man who would
be amenable to them to fill the post of Managing
Director of AECO. Eventually their choice
fell on G. V. Subba Raju, P. W. 25, a resident
of . Manchili, who held a large. number of
shares in the AECO and who was, besides,
related to R.K.N.G. Raju by marriage. It is said
that this person has not received much education
and knows only how to sign his name in English.
He was assured that by consenting to become the
Managing Director he would not be required to
discharge onerous duties and that the respondent
No. l woi:ld look to all the affairs of VESCO. He
was also told that apart from signing important
papers which may be sent to him by the respondent
No. 1 from time to time to Manchili or wherever
he might be, he would have no work to do. He
agreed and was elected Managing Director of AECO
in the middle of 1948. Upon this understanding he
accepted the position offered to him.
The VESCO used to receive large ;imounts of
money from hi(\'h ten~ion power consumers such as
the railways, K. G. Hospital, the Port Administration, the Andhra University etc., by cheques. But
domestic consumers usually· paid their bills in cash
to the bill collector_s who used to hand over their
collections to the respondent No. 2. The respondent
No. 2 was asked by the respondent No. I to main·
tain a private note book. In that book payments
which used to be made by respondent No. 2 on the
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
basis of slips issued by the respondent No. I (which
included payments to his relatives or to business
firms in which he was personally interested) used to
be noted and the amount totalled up at the end of
the day. This amount was posterl in VESCO's Cash
Handover Book as "by safe" indicating that this
amount was kept in the safe, though in fact it was
not. On the basis of the entries in the Handover
Book the final accounts were written up. The
respondent No. I opened four personal accounts in
different banks, including the Imperial Bank of
India (as the State Bank thr.n was). When the
respondent No. I had to issue a personal cheque on
any of these Banks hr. used to ask the second respondent to send an equivalent amount to the Bank
concerned for being credited to his account. These
amounts also used to be noted in the private note
book and entered 'by safe' in the Handover Book.
Another thing which the respondent No. I initiated was opening a heading in the ledger called "advance purcha~e of materials." Amounts which had
been misappropriated used to be posted therein though
in fact no orders were placed for any material. It may
be mentioned that Subba Raju used to visit Visakhapatnam twice a month and check up the account
books. At that time it used to be represented to him
that the amounts which were shown to be in the safe
and not found therein (hut which were actually mis•
appropriated) had been sent to the Bank for being
deposited. Apparently Subba Raju was fully
satisfied with this and other explanations and, therefore, he appointed one C. S. Raju, who was the
Manager of Andhra Cements to supervise over the
affairs of VESCO. Apparently because of this a
new method of misappropriation was adopted by the
respondents by startinf{ in the VESCO account books,
an account called "suspense account". A lakh of
rupees passed through that account. Amounts which
were misappropriated used to find their way in this
196J
Stal• qf And/Ir•
Prat4th
v.
Ch11malapati
Gan1sw.;,. Rao
Mudho/ka< I.
308
1969
Sltd1 ~f Andhra
Ptarksh
v.
ci......tap•ti
Gaul,WdTa Ra•
Mrdhalluu J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
account. A new cash book was also said to have
been prepared by the conspirators with the object of
covering up the misappropriations which had been
made.
Subba Raju was not satisfied with the nature
of supervision exercised by C. S. Raju over the
affairs of VESCO because he user! to look only at
the cash book entries of the days on which he paid
visits to VESCO's office, to which he used to go
with previous intimation. Besides · that, C. S.
Raju's management of Andhra Cements had landed
it into a loss of Rs. 30,000-. Because of all these
things he had C. S. R"ju replaced towards the end .
of the year 19.51 by one Subbaramayya, a retired
Finance Officer from the Madras Electricity Board
both as a Director of Andhra Cements and as a
Supervisor over the accounts
of VESCO.
Subbaramayya took his work seriously and called for
information on a number of points from the respondent No. 1. He, however, was unable to obtain any
information. lnJanuary, 1952 he therefore brought
one S. G. Krishna Aiyar who had vast experience in
the maintenance of accounts of electrical undertaking's having been Chief Account<1nt of the South
Madras Electric Supply Corporation; to undertake
an investigation and then to act as Financial
Adviser.
In the meantime on November 29, 1951 there
was a. meeting of the General Body at which the
accounts were, among other things, to be considered.
There was a considerable uproar at that meeting
because the respondent No. 1 said that the Auditor's ·
·report had not been received. The shareholders
felt that the report had been received but was being
suppressed or deliberately withheld.
However,
the meeting was postponed and eventually held on
December 9, 1951. On that date the respondent
No. I produced the auditor's report (Ex. p. 234 of
which Ex. P. 235 is a printed copy). According to
•
•
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
the prosecution the report is a forged document.
That was also the feelin~ of a number of shareholders
who wanted to see the original but one Dutt who
was Chairman of the meeting after seeing Ex. P. 234.
said that the report seemed to be a genuine one.
S. G. Krishna Aiyar after his appointment in
January, 1952, made close enquiry and submitted an
mterim report. That report showed that during the
period 1948-49 Rs. 33,271-10-0 shown as paid to the
Andhra Power System were in fact not paid. The
respondent No. 1 on being asked to explain said that
he would give his explanation to the Managing
Director. The Interim Report showed that there
was a shortage of about Rs. 90,000/- for this period.
On February 12, 1952 the respondent No. 1 wrote
to the Managing Director admitting his responsibility and agreed to make good the amounts found
short or such other amounts as would be found short
up to the end of March, 1952. Further scrutiny of
the accounts was being carried out by Krishna
Aiyar and in his subsequent report he pointed out
that Rs. 2,38,000/- which were shown as having been
paid to the Andhra Power System had actually not
been paid. In fact in April, 1952. the Collector
attached VESCO properties for realising this amount.
On April 30, 1952 the respondent No. 1, by selling
some of his property, himself paid Rs. 50,000/- to
the Andhra Power System towards the sum due to it
from VESCO and had promised to pay the balance
shortly thereafter. He was given time for doing so
but he failed to pay it.
The Directors of VESCO thereafter authorised
K.. S. Dutt, one of the Directors to lodge a complaint
with the police which he accordingly lodged on May
19, 1952. On the next day the police placed an armed guard around the office of the respondent No. 1 and
seized a number of papers. As a result of investigation
they found that there was a total misappropriation
1963
Mat1 •f Andlara
p,.,,,,,
v.
Chmnalap.tl
Can1swua Ra•
Muih•lk"' I.
310
1963
Stal1 of Arnihra
Pradesh
y,
Ch1emalajJati
01J111swa1a R11'1
ludkolkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
of Rs. 3,40,000/·. On May 13, 1954 a charge·
sheet was filed against the two respondents as well as
Murti and the approver Ramana. On September 13,
1954 Ramana offered to make a full confession to the
Additional District Magistrate (Independent). who
was empowered to grant pardon under s. 337 of 1he
Code of Criminal Procedure. He, however, directed
Ramana to make his confession before a SubMag~strate. The latter accordingly made a con·
fession on November 15, 1954 and on November 17,
1954 the Additional District !\.1agistrate (Independent)
granted him pardon and that 1s how he came to be
examined as a witness in this case.
As already stated, the Additional Sessions Judge
convicted both the respondents, the respondent No. l
in respect of each head of the offences with which he
was charged and the respondent No. 2 in respect only
of the offences of conspiracy and misappropriation.
The High Court set aside the conviction of the
respondents on a number of grounds. In the first
place according to the High Court, joint trial of two
or more persons in respect of different offences com·
mitted by each of them is illegal and that here as
they were charged with having committed offences
under s. 120-B, s. 409, s. 477-A and s, 476/467,
I.P.C. they could not be tried jointly. According to
it the provisions of s. 239 were of no avail. Next
according to the High Court even ifs. 239 is applicable its provisions are subject to those of s. 234 and as
such the trial being for more than three offences wali
impermissible. Then according to the High Court
offences under. s. 409 and s. 4 71/467 are of, different
kinds and are not capable of joint commission.
·Therefore, they could not be jointly tried. Further,
according to the High Court where a conspiracy has
yielded its fruits the conspirators can be charged with
the actual offences committed and not with conspiracy
to commit those offences. Charge of conspiracy,
according to the High Court, can be validly made
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
only when the prosecution establishes that every
conspirator expected to receive a personal benefit
from it and that the prosecution has not been able to
establish that the respondent No. 2 or the approver
evidently had any such expectations since they did
not in fact receive any corresponding benefit. In so
far as the respondent No. 2 is concerned the High
Court has held that since he was charged with a
specific offence under s.409, l.P.C. he could not be
convicted of mere abetment of an offence. The
approver's evidence was held by the High Court to
be inadmissible because the pardon granted to him
was illegal. The High Court has also held that his
evidence is unreliable and further that the Additional
Sessions Judge was in error in allowing him to refresh
his memory by referring to various documents in a
manner not permitted by s. 159 of the Evidence Act.
The High Court has further stated that inadmissible
evidence was taken on record by the Additional Sessions Jujge, namely, account books of Billimoria
Brothers, maintained in Gujrati and further that the
Additional Sessions Judge was in error in allowing
the prosecution to use those account books for establishing absence of entries with regard to certain payments alleged in the VESCO books to have been
made to them. Finally, the High Court held that
the examination of the respondent under s. 342 of the
Code was unfair for a number of reasons and that
the Additional Sessions Judge had failed to perform
an important duty in that he did not call the attention of the respondents to the provisions of s. 342
which enable an accused person to give evidence in
his own behalf.
Mr. Bhimasankaram, appearing for the two
respondents, however, has not sought to support the
judgment of the High Court on all these points. The
pointa which he urged are briefly these:
(1) That there was a misjoinder of charges
and persons in that the various provisions
1963
Stalt of Andhra
Pr..Ush
••
Che1malapa!i
Gan1swa'a Rao
Mudholkar .I.
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
1969
ofs. 239 were clubbed together and an
omnibus charge of conspiracy was framed
which on its face was one likely to
embarrass the respondents and make their
task of defending themselves difficult .
State of Andhro
Eradash
"·
Cheemalapati
.G4ntswara R(N)
Mudho/kor /, .
(2)
The procedure adopted in the investigation and committal stages was irregular.
(3) Irrelevant evidence was introduced and
some evidence was introduced in a manner
not authorised by the Evidence Act.
(4) That the Court abused its powers under
s. 342, Cr. P.C. while conducting the
examination of the respondents.
(5) The evidence of the approver was inadmissible because the pardon granted to him
was illegal, that, in any case, it is
unreliable, was so found even bv the Ses. sions Judge and must, ther~fore, be
rejected. If the evidence of the approver
is left out the remaining evidence would
be inadequate to sustain the prosecution
case.
We shall deal with Mr. Bhima~ankaram's
contentions in the order in which we have set them
out. The first question for consideration is whether
there was a misjoinder of parties and of persons. The
first charge is in respect of the col'spiracy alleged
to have been entered into by the two respondents,
K. V. Ramana, the approver, and others "known
and unknown" to commit criminal breach of trust
of the funds of VESCO and, in order to screen its
detection, to falsify the accounts of VESCO and to
use forged documents as genuine. On the face of
it this is a valid charge. But certain objections have
been taken to it with which we will deal at th
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
appropriate place. The second charge is for an
offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under
s. 409 and the accusation therein is that the two
respondents along with Ramana, misappropriated
69 items ag~regati:ag to a little over Rs. 3,20,UOO/-.
It is clear from the charge that some of the amounts
were misappropriated between April, 194T and
March, 1950, some between April, 1947 and March,
1949, some between April, 1947 and March, 1951
and quite a large number between September, 1947
and March, 1950 and a still large number between
April, 11J51 and March, 1952. It is thus apparent
that offences committed within a space of 12 months
were tried along with offences committed beyond
that period. lJnless, therefore, the provisions of
s. 239 are applicable it would follow that there was
a misjoiuder of charges. The third charge· is that
the two respondents, along with the approver
Ramana made false entries on seven different dates
in the account books between September 19, 1947 and
March 18, 1952 and thus committed an offence under
s. 477-A, l.P.C. The fourth charge is that the two
respondents, along with the approver Ramana forged
six documents on different dates between March 28,
1949 and November 12, 1951 and thus committed
an offence under s. 4 71 read with s. 467, I.P.C. As
we have pointed out earlier the respondent No. I
alone was convicted by the Additional Sessions
Judge in respect of the third and fourth charges.
Mr. Bhimasankaram supports the reason given
by the High Court for coming to the conclusion
that there was a misjoinder of charges. The main
reasons upon which the conclusion of the High
Court is based are firstly that there could be no
clubbing together of the provisions of the various
clauses of s. 239 and secondly that the respondents
were charged with more than three offences of the
same kind and that this was in contravention of
1. 239 (c). In coming to the conclusion that the
'
1961
Stat. ef A""1r<
Prad.sh
v.
Cheema[a/Jafi
Gtlnlsw•rs Rn
Muiholkar J.
314
1963
Stale of Andhr•
Pradesh
v.
Cheemalopati
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
provisions of various clauses of s. 239 cannot be
applied cumulatively the High Court has relied
upon the decision in Re: Vankaval,a,pati Gopala
Rao('). There the learned Judges have held thus:
(;Q.neswara f<.ao
M udh~Htir . J
"These clauses are mutually exclusive and thev
cannot be simultaneously applied and to
construe them as supplementing each other
would be enlarging the scope of the exceptions.
Each clause is an exception to the general
rule enacted in s. 233, Cr. P.C. If such
a combination is permissible, all persorn1
accused of offences described in els. (a) to (g)
can be tried together in one case which
certainly involves a bewildering multiplicity
of charges and which would obviously set at
naught the salutary principle contained in
s. 233." (p. 24)
.
In support of this view the High Court in that case
has relied upon the decision in T. B. Mukherji v.
State (') and referred to the decision in Singarachariar v. Emperor (') and D. K. Chandra v. The
State(').
Before considering these decisions it will be
useful to look at the scheme. of Chapter XIX of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the
charge. The chapter is split up into two sub-heads,
'·Form of charges" and "Joinder of charges."
Sections 221 to 232 are comprised under the first
sub-head and ss. 233 to 240 in the second. Sections
221 to 223 deal with the framing and content of
charge. s. 224 deals with the interpretation of the
language of the charge and s. 225 with the effect of
errors in the charge. Sections 226 to 231 deal with
the power of the court with regard to framing and
altering charges and the procedure to be adopted
at the trial where a charge is found to be defective
or there is no charge or where a new charge is to be
(I) A.I.R. 19S6 Andhra 21,
(.I) A,I,ll, UIH Mad. 17••
(2) A,J,R, 1954 All. 601,
l•l A,J,R, 1952 11... 177, r,81
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
framed. Section 232 deals with the power of the
appellate court or the High Court when it discovers
that there is material error in the charge. Then we
come to the other sub·head of this chapter. Section
233 provides that for every distinct offence of which
any person is accused there shall be a separate
charge. It thus lays down the normal rule to be
followed in every case. But it also provides that
this will be subject to the exceptions contained in
ss. ~34, 235, 230 and 239. The first three provisions
relate to the framing of charges against a single
accused person. Section 234 (1) deals with the trial
of a person for offences of the same kind not
exceeding three committed within the space
of 12· months from the first to the last of such
offences ands. ::!34 (i) what is meant by the
expression 'offences· of the same kind'. This
provision lifts partially the ban on the trial of a
person for more than one offence at the same trial.
Section 235(1), however, goes a step further and
permits the trial of a person for more offences than
one if they are so connected together as to form the
same transaction. 1 hus under this provision if the
connection between the various offences is established
the limitations placed by s. 234( 1) both as regards
the number and the period during which the offences
are allegt>d to have been committed will not apply.
Full effect cannot possibly be given to this provision if we hold that it is subject to the limitation of
s.234(1). Sub-section (2) of s. 235 deals with a case
where an offence falls within two definitions and
sub·s.(3) deals with a case in which a number of acta
are alleged against an accused person, different combinations of which may constitute different offences.
Then we come to s. 236 which provides that if a
single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it
is doubtful which of several offences the facts which
can be proved will constitute, the accused may be
charged with having committed all or any of such
ofi'euces and further provides that any number of 1uch
1963
S111t1 of Andhr11
Praduh
y.
Cheemalapati
G11n1Jwa•a ttaa
Muihtlkar J.
316
/96J
Stat1 of Arulhrtt
Pradesh
••
Cheema(apati
Ga~swara RH
Mudholkor I•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
charges may be tried together. It also permits that
charges could be framed against an accused person
in the alternative if the court thinks fit. Thus, this
is a special provision available in case of doubt and
is neither subject to the limitations prescribed by
s. 233 nor those of the other preceding provisions.
Now, if the respondent No. 1 were alone tried
upon the second, third and the fourtli charges the
provisions of s. 235(1) could have been pressed in aid
if the allegations were that the offe111ces were so con·
nected together as to form one and the same transaction and the validity of the trial would not have
been open to any attack. Similarly if the second
respondent were alone tried on the second charge
his trial would not have been open to any objection
if the allegation were that the offences were so connected together as to form the same transaction.
Here, however, we have a case where the prosecution
alleges that there was additionally a conspiracy to
which apart from the two respondents the approver
and some other persons were parties and where in
both the respondents were tried together. A conspiracy must be regarded as one transaction and, therefore, a single individual charged with it could be
tried with the aid of s. 235(1) for all the acts committed by him in furtherance or in pursuance of the
conspiracy without the limitations imposed by
s.234(1). For, where all the acts are referable to the
same conspiracy their connection with one another
is obvious.
The only provision in the Code which permits
the joint trial of more than one person is s. 239 and
what we have to see is whether under that provision
the two respondents could have been jointly tried
for the offences with which they were charged. Let
us, therefore, examine closely the provision1 of
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
1. 239.
It will be useful to set out the provisiom of
that section which run thus :
1963
..':.tat1
•f Andlir•
Prad1sh
"The following persons may be charged and
tried together, namely:(a) persons accused of the same offence
committed in the course of the same
transaction;
(b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment, or of an
attempt to commit such offence;
(e) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind within the meaning of section 234 committed by
them jointly within the period of
twelve months;
(d)
per~ons
accused of different offences
committed in the course of the same
transaction;
(c) persons accused of an offence which
include.~ theft, extortion, or criminal
misappropriation, and persons accused
of receiving or retaining, or assisting
in the disposal or concealment of,
property possession of which is alleged
to have been transferred by any such
offence committed by the first-named
persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last-named
offence;
(f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal
Code or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession
v.
Cheemalapati
(;aneswara Ro•
Mudholkar I •
318 SuPREME COURT REPORTS. [1964] VOL.
J96J
Stot1 of Andlrro
P1.Uesh
••
Ch111no/opoti
Ganeswara Raa
Mudhollu J,
of which has been transferred by one
offence; and
·
(g) persons accused of any offence under
Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code
relating to counterfeit coin, and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the
same coin, or of abetment of or
attempting to commit any such
offence;
and the provisions contained in the former part
ef this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply
to all such charges."
This first thing to be noticed is that s. 239 does
not read as if its various clauses can be applied only
alternatively. On the other hand at the end of cl.
(f) there is a conjunction 'and'. If the intention of
the Legislature was that the provisions of these clauses should be available only alternatively it would
havB used the word "or" and not "and" which has the
opposite effect. Grammatically, therefore, it would
appear that the provisions of the various clauses are
capable of being applied cumulatively. The opening words of the section show that it is an enabling
provision and, therefore, the Court has a discretion
to avail itself cumulatively of two or more clauses.
Of course a Court has the power to depart from the
grammatical construction if it finds that strict adhere~
nee to the grammatical construction will defeat the ob,
ject the Legislature had in view. The concluding portion of s. 239 shows that the provisions contained in
the former part of Chapter XIX shall, as far as may
be, apply to the charges framed with the aid of
s. 239. Does this mean that the provisions of s.
233, 234, 235, and 236 must also be complied with?
Obviously, s. 233 does not override the prQYisions of
s. 239. Section 234 cannot also be regarded as an
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
overriding provision because reading it that way will
lead to the clear result that whereas several accused
persons can be charged at the same trial with any
number of different offences committed by them in the
course of the same transaction they cannot be tried
also for offences of the same kind exceeding three in
number and committed beyond a space or 12 months
from the first to the last. It could not have been
the intention of the Legislature to create such a situation. Again, as already stated, s. 234(1) does not
override the provisions of s. 235(1) which premits
trial of a person for more offences than one committfd during any period provided they are so connected
togeth~r as to form one transaction. Unless we read
s. 234(1) as not enacting a fetter on s. 235(1), it may
not be possible to give full effect to the latter. Now,
since s. 234( 1) cannot be properly read as overriding
s. 235(1) there is no valid reason for construing it as
overriding the provisions of s. 239 either. There
are also other reasons which point to this conclusion
which we will set out while considering the argument advanced by Mr. Bhimasankaram.
Mr. Bhimasankaram contended that s 239
mmt be read at least subject toss. 234(1) and 235( I)
on the ground that if there are certain restrictions
with respect to the trial of a single accused there is
no reason why those restrictions will disappear if an
accused person is tried along with several other persons. Thus he points out that where several persons
are accused of more offences than one of the same
kind committed by them jointly within a period of
12 months, the number of offences for which they
could be tried cannot exceed three. In this connection he relied upon the words "within the meaning of
s. 224" occurring in cl. (c) of s. 239. These words, he
contended, clearly show that cl. (c) ofs. 239 is subject
to the provisions of s. 234. In our opinion the words
"within the meaning of s. 234" indicate that what
was meant by the words offence of the same kind"
1963
State of Andlira
Prad1Jh
v.
Che~malapati
Gu.neHtara Rao
Mudhollar J.
320
196J
Stat10f Andh,.
Prodish
v.
Ch1ema(api1.ti
Gousw!lra Ra1
Mudholkar J,
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOl..
in cl. (c) of s. 239 is the same thing as was meant by
the identical expression used in s. 234(1) and defined in s. 234(2) and nothing more. If it was the intention of the Legislature to provide that the number
of offences for which several accused persons
could be tried under cl. (c) of s. 239 should be limited to three as provided in s. 234(1 ), the Legislature
would either have said "persons accused of more
ol!ences than one of the same kind not exceeding three in number" or may have used the words
"persons accused of more than one offence of
the same kind to the extent permissible under s.. 234".
Language of this kind would have made perfectly
clear that cl. (c) of s. 23!l was subject to s. 234(1).
As already stated, if s. 239(c) is construed as being
subject to s. 234(1 ), there would be this anomaly
that whereas the same accused.person could be charged with and tried jointly for any number of offences
of different kinds committed by them, for more than
three offences of the same kind committed by them
jointly there will have to be a separate trial with
respect to such offences. Surely such could not have
been the intention of the legislature. The object
of enacting s. 239 was to avoid multiplicity of trials
and the only limitation which could properly be
placed on the trial of several persons for the same
kind of or different offences would be that which
considerations of justice and fairness would require.
No doubt, such a construction would also give rise to
the result that whereas so far as the trial of a single
accused person is concerned the charges must be limited to three offences committed by him within the
space of 12 months from the first to the last of such
offences, there would be no such limitation when
along with that accused person there are one or more
persons who have jointly committed those offences.
The reason for this possibly is that the Legislature
did not want to differentiate between cases where any
number of different offences were committed jointly
by a group of persons from cases where any number
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
o( offences
of the same kind were committed by a
group of persons.
According to Mr. Chari s. 235(1) cannot be
construed as having an overriding effect on s. 239
because whereas it contemplates acts so connected
together as to form the same transaction resulting in
more offences than one, s. 239(d) contemplate• offen·
ces committed in the course or the same transaction
and nothing more. The question is whether for the
purposes of s. 239( d) it is necessary to ascertain any·
thing more than this that the different offences were
committed in the course of the same transaction or
whether it must further be ascertained whether the
acts are intrin~ically connected with one another.
Under s. 235(1) what has to be ascertained is whether
the offences arise out of acts so connected to11:ether
as to form the same transaction, but the words "so
connected together as to form" are not repeated after
the words "same transaction" in s. 239. What has
to be ascertained then is whether these wor<ls are
also to be read in all the clauses of s. 239 which refer
to the same transaction. Section 235(1 ), while pro- ·
viding for the joint trial for more than one offence,
indicates that there must be connection between the
acts and the transaction. According to this provision
there must thus be a connection between a series of
acts before they could be regarded as forming the
same transaction. What is meant by "same transaction" is not defined anvwhere in the Code. Indeed,
it would always be difficult to define precisely what
the expression means. Whether a transaction can be
regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon
the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to
be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that
which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined.
We have not come across a single decision of any
Court which has embarked upon the difficult task or
defininll' the expression. But it is generally thought
that where there is proximity of time or place or
196J
Stol1 of A•ihra
Prai1J/a
v.
Cl11111alapall
Ganeswara Ru
Mudh.lkar /,
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VO~.
1963
unity of purpose and design or continuity-of action
in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to
infer that they form part of the same transaction.
It
is, however, not necessary that every one of these
C"6emalapoti
Ganeswara Rao
elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by
Mudholk01 J.
a person show a unity of purpose or design that would
be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts
form part of the same transaction. The connection
between a series of acts seems to us to be an essential
·ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction and, therefore, the mere absence of the
words "so connected together as to from" in cl. (a),
(c) and (d) ofs. 239 would make little difference.
Now, a transaction may consist of an isolated act or
may consist of a series of acts. The series of acts
which constitute a transaction must of necessity be
connected with one another and if some of them
stands out independently, they would not form part
of the same transaction but would constitute a different transaction or .transactions. Therefore, even
if the expression "same transaction" alone had been
used in s. 235(1) it would have meant a transaction
consisting either of a single act or of a series of connected acts.
The expression ''.same transaction"
occurring in els. (a); (c) and (d) of s. 239 as well as
that occurring in s. 235( 1) ought to be given the same
meaning according to the normal rule of construction
of statutes. Looking at the matter in that way, it
is pointless to inquire further whether the provisions
of s. 239 are subject to those of s. 236(1). The provisions of sub-s. (2) and (3) of s. 235 are enabling
. provisions and quite plainly can have no overriding
effect. But it would be open to the court to resort
to those provisions even in the case of a joint trial of
several persons permissible under s. 239.
Stat1 of Andhro
Produli
v.
Section 236 is also an enabling provision to
be availed of in case of doubt and it is meaningless
to say that s. 239 is subject to s. 236. Bearing in
/
•
·t
'
3 S.C.R.
~UPREME COURT REPORTS
313
mind the fact that the provisions in the "former
part" of Chapter XIX are applicable to charges made
with the aid of s. 239 only "so far as may be'' it
would not be right to construe s. 239 as being subject
to the provisions of ss. 233 to 236. It was contended
by Mr. Chari that the expression "former part"
would apply to the first sub.division of chapter XIX
which deals with the form and content of the charies
and the powers of the court with regard to the ab·
sence of charge and alteration of charge. We cannot,
however, give the expression such a restricted mean·
ing. For, even in the absence of those words, the
earlier provisions could not have been ignored. For,
it is a rule of construction that all the provisions of
a statute are to be read together and given effect
to and that it is, therefore, the duty of the Court to
construe a statute harmoniously. Thus, while it is
clear that the sections preceding s. 239 have no overriding effect on that section, the courts are not to
ignore them but apply such of them as can be applied
without detracting from the provisions of s, 239.
Indeed, the very expression 'so far as may be' emphasises the fact that while the earlier provisions have to
be borne in mind by the Court while applying
s. 239 it is not those provisions but the latter which
is to have an averriding effect.
Apart from this, the question whether the
provisions of ss. 233 to 236 have or have no overriding effect on s. 239 is not strictly germane to the
question considered by the High Court that is, clubbing together all the provisions of the various clauses
of s. 239. ,Whether they can or cannot be read
cumulatively must be determined by consideration of
the language used in those clauses. We have already
indicated how those clauses may be grammatically
read. On a plain constructiQn of the provisions of
s. 239, therefore, it is open to the Court to avail
itself cumulatively of the provisions of the different
claL1ses of s, 239 for the purpo1e of framing charies
IUJ
St•up,..,,
'1 Anillr•
y,
Clu...topoii
O.n11W111• R•
Mllilltlw /.
3%4
1969
Sta" ef A•ahra
P1•dt14
v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
and charges so framed by it will not be in violation
of the law, the provisions of ss. 233, 234 and 235
notwithstanding.
C~1emalopati
·Ganeswara Rao
Mudholkar J,
The decisi<ln of the Allahabad High Court in
T. R. Mukherji's rose (1), is directly in p<lint and
is clearly to the effect that the 'different clauses of
1. 239 are mutually exclusive in the sense that it is
not possible to combine the provisions of two or more
clauses in any one case and to try jointly several
persons partly bv applyir.g the provisions or one
clause and partly by applying those of another or
other clauses. A large number of decisions or the
different High Courts and one of the Privy Council
have been considered in this case. No doubt, a1 has
been rightly pointed out in this case, separate trial is
the normal rule and joint trial is an e:1ception. But
while this principle is easy to appreciate and follow
where one person alone is the accused and the interaction or . intervention or the acts or more persons
than one does not come iri, it would, where the same
act is committed by several persons, be not onlv
inconvenient but injudicious to trv all the several
persons separately. This would lead to unnecessary
multiplicitv of trials involving avoidable inconvenience to the witnesses and avoidable expenditure of
public time and money. No corresponding advantage
can be ll'ained by the accused persons by following the
procedure of separate trials. Where, however,
several offences are alleged to have been committed
by several accused persons it may be more reason.able
to follow the normal rule of separate trials. But here,
again, if those offences are alleged not to be wholly
unoonnected but as forming part or the same transaction the only consideration that will justify separate
trials would be the embarrassment or difficulty
caused to the accused persons in defending them1elves. We entirely agree with the High Court that
joint trial should be founded on some 'principle'.
But we find it difficult to appreciate what seems to
(I) A. l. R, 19~ All. 501,
3 S.C.R.
.
-
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
\-
.'~be the view of tli'e
325
.
• 1963
High · Courf that becaiise each
Lclause of s." 239 enunciates a separate principle those S1at1 of Andhr• Pradesli
~principles are, so to speak, mutually exclusive and
v;:
Lcannot be cumulatively resorted to for trying several
Cluemaldpati
Ganuwara· H.aa
tpersons jointly· in· respect of several . offences even
l though they form part of the same transaction;- The
Mudholur I'
. 1 High Court has propounded . that : the connection
~described in each of the various clauses is mutually
exclusive, that no two of them can exist simultaneously in any· case and that one cannot, therefore,
have in any case. persons connected with one another
in two Jr more ways. In other words,- as the High
Court puts.it, persons included in two or: more of the
groups cannot ·all be tried together and that since
there is absolutely nothing•to connect one group with
any other, the· persons of one. group cannot be tried
with those of any other. No reason has been stated
·in 11upport of this view. Lei- us consider whether
there is anything intrinsically - incompatible in
combining two clauses ofs. 239. Take els. (a) and
(b). Clause (a) says that persons accused of the same·
offence committed in the course of the same transac.'
tion may be charge~ and tried. together; Clause
(b) 1ays that persons accused of an offence ·and
persons accused of abetment, or, of an attempt to .
commit such offence may also be charged and tried
together. Now, if persons A, B and C are tried for
an offence of murder what intrinsic difficulty would
there be in trying X, Y and Z of abetment of the
same offence ? The transaction in which all of them
have _participated is the same and the abetment by
X, Y and Z of the offence committed by A, B and C
· would .. itself establish the connection of their acts
with those of X, Y and z. Next, let us take els. (a)
and (c). Clause (c) provides that. persons accused of
more than one · offence of the ·same kind within. the
meaning of s. 234 committed. by them jointly within··
the period of twelve months could also be charged
and tried together. Let us · consider these clauses
along with another illustration. • Two persons A and·
,,
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTStI964] VOL.
,.,..,.~··
Slol1 "
••
Cl111••ol•Joli
Q,,,,,..,,
Ra
MUlofU., J,
B enter a house at night and first together commit
the murder of a man sleeping there and then also Joi.is
wife. Each of them has committed two offences and
each of them participated in the same offence. Why
can they not be tried 'jointly for both murders and
why should there be two trials for the two murders ?
The offences are of the same kind and must be
deemed to have been committed in the course of the
same transaction because of association and mutual
connection. Now, supposing in the illustration given
A killed the man and B killed his wife. Under cl. (c)
they could be tried together because the offences are
of the same kind. It would be ridiculous to say that they
cannot be tried together for jointly committing the
murder of the man and the wife because cl. (a) and
(c) cannot be combined. For, without combining these
two clauses their joint trial for the two offences in each
of which both have participated would be impermissible. Then take els. (a) and (d). Under cl. (d)
persons accused of different offences committed in
the course of the same transaction can be tried toge·
ther. Let us suppose that a group of persons are
accused of having been members of an unlawful
assembly the common object of which was to overawe by sheer force another group of persons and take
forcible possession of a piece of land. Some of the
members of the unlawful assembly carried axes with
them while some others carried lathis and attacked
the other group. During the course of the attack
one person from the second group was killed, as a
result of blows with an axe inflicted by the aggressors A, B and C. Two persons of the second group
sustained grievous hurt as a result of lathi blows and
one person sustained simple hurt. . Let us say that
the grievous hurt was caused as a result of lathi
blows given by X and Y, simple hurt was caused by
lathi blows given by Z. Here, the offences committed were those underss. 147, 302, 325 and 323, I.P.C. The offences being different and the persons cwmmiting the_offences being different, they could not
'
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
327
be tried jointly only with the help of cl. (a) of s. 239.
Nor again, could they be tried jointly only with the
help of cl. (d). Yet the transaction in which the
offences were committed is the same and there is a
close association amongst the persons who have com mitted the different offences. What intrinsic difficulty is there in trying them all together simultaneously availing of els. (a) and (d) of s. 239? These
are enabling provisions which circumstance implies
that the court may avail itself of one or more of
these provisions unless doing so would amount to an
infringement of any of the provisions of the Code.
All these persons can be jointly tried for offences under
s. 147 by recourse to cl. (a). So also A, B and C
could be jointly tried together for an offences under
s. 302. x and y can be charged not only with
offences under ss. 147 and 325, I.P.C. but also under
s. 302 read with s. 149. Similarly Z can be charged
with offences under ss. 14 7, 323 and offences under
s. 302 read withs. 149 and s. 325 read with s. 14'9.
The same offence committed by all of them is that
under s. 147 and all of them can be tried jointly in
respect of that offence under cl. (a). Similarly, if
we take cl. (d) by itself all of them can be tried
jointly for the different offences committed by each
of them in the course.of the same transaction and if
cl. (a) is unavailable they could not be tried for the
offence under s. 14 7 at the same trial. This means
that the trial for an offence under s. 147 will have
to be separated from the trial for the different offences committed by them. It is difficult to appreciate
what purpose would be served by separating the
trial for the same offence from the trial for different
offences. To repeat, the object of the legislature
in enacting s. 239, Cr.P.C. clearly was to prevent
multiplicity of trials and not only would that object
be defeated but an extraordinary result will ensue if
the various clauses of s. 239 are read disjunctively.
The reasons given by the Allahabad High Court,
therefore, do not merit acceptance.
1969
ltct1 of And!iTo
Prai1sh
v.
Clt1111t•laft•ti
Ganuw•ro Rt11
Mwdholkar /,
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
.Stat1 of Andhro
Pradesh
v.
Chrtma!apati
Gan1swara Rao
Mudb~lk•r
J,
The decision in Singarachariar' s case ('), has
really no bearing upon the point before us. What
was held there was that ss. 235 (1) and s. 236 are
mutually exclusive and if a case is covered by one
of them it cannot be covered by the other. In that
case the question was whether a person who was
first tried for an offence under s. 380, I.P.C. for
stealing a blank second class railway ticket from the
booking office, tried, for it and acquitted, could not
be tried subsequently for the offence of forgery by
making entries in that ticket and using it. The
acquittal in the previous case was urged as a bar
under s. 403(1) of the Code to the trial for an offence
under s. 467, I.P.C. The contention apparently
was that this was a case which fell under s. 236,
Cr. P.C. and that if he had been tried alternatively
for both the offences at the same trial the Court
could have dealt with him under s. 2:37, Cr. P.C.
The High Court, however, held that to be a kind of
case which fell under s. 235(1) of the Code and that
since that was so, the provisions of s. 236 were exclu·
ded. It is difficult to appreciate how this case assists
the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.
In D.K. Chandra's case (2 ), it was held that the
provisions of ss. 234, 235 and 236 being exceptions
to s. 233 must be strictly construed and that ifjoinder
of charges did not fall under any of them it would
be illegal and contrary to law. The precise point
which we have to consider here did not fall for consideration in that case i.e., whether the provisions
of the various clauses of s. 239 could be used toge·
ther or not. This decision is, therefore, of little
assistance. On the other hand there is the decision
of this Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh
v. Kandimalla
Subbaiah (1), which is to the
effect that where several persons had committed
offences in the course of the same transactions,
they could jointly be tried in respect of all those
offences under s. 239 of the Code of Criminal
\I) ,\.l.R. 19M Mad. 673.
(2)A.I.R.1952 Bem. 177, r.1,
.
(I) (19&2] 2 8. 0. R, lilt.
•
•
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS 329
Procedure and the limitatioo placed by s. 234 of
the Code could not come into operation. There,
nine persons were jointly tried for an offence under
s. 5 (1) (cl and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947,· and s. 109, I. P. C. read with s. 4i0,
s. 466 and s. 467, I. l'. C. and all except one for
offences under ss. 420, 467/471, l.P.C. Some of
them were also charged with separate offences under
some of these provisions. Two of the accused person11
preferred a revision application before the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in which they challenged
the charges framed against them. The High Court
allowed the revision application. But on appeal
by the State of Andhr;; Pradesh to this Court, this
Court held that there was no misjoinder of charges,
that the introduction of a large number of charges,
spread over a long period was a question of propriety
and that it should be left to the Judge or the Magistrate trying the case to adopt the course which he
thought to be appropriate in the facts and circums·
tances of the case. In so far as some of the charges
were co•cerned this Court pointed out that the
Special Judge who was to try the case should
consider splitting them up so that the accused persons
would not be prejudiced in answering the charges
and defending themselves. It is true that the
question of reading the various clauses cumulatively
did not specifically arise for decision in that case
but the High Court had held that the first charge
was an omnibus charge containing as many as 203
offences and that it was in direct violation of ss. 234,
235 and 2a9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Dealing with this matter this Court held at p. ~00 :
"No doubt, sub·s. (1) of s. 234 provides that
not more than three offences of the same kind
committed by an accused person within the
space of 12 months can be. tried at the same
trial. But then s. 235 (1) provides that if in
any one aeries of acts 110 connected torcther
1969
Stall of Andhrti
PraJesll
••
CheemtJJapati
Ganeswara Roe
Mudholkor J,
.
,.
830 StJPRENm COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
llfS
Siolf
•f A1dhro
Proi1sh
••
Ch•unoloµJi
GtJt11swmR••
Alutlli•/ll, I •
as to form the same transaction more offences
than one are committed by the same person,
he may be charged with and tried at one trial
for every such offence. Therefore, where the
alleged offences have been committed in the
course of the same transaction the limitation
placed bys. 234 (1) cannot operate .. No doubt,
the offence mentioned in charge No. 1 is
alleged to have been committed not by just
one person but by all the accused and the
question is whether all these persons can be
jointly tried in respect of all these offences.
To this kind of charge s. 239 would apply.
This section provides that the following persons
may be charged and tried together, namely :
(1) persons accl!sed of the same offence
committed in the lloursc of the same
transaction;
(2) persons accused of abetment or an attempt
to commit such an cffence;
(3) persons accused of different offemies
committed in the course of the same
transaction.
Clearly, therefore, all the accused persons
could be tried to~ether in respect of all the
offences now comprised in charge No. 1."
This Court has thus clearly read the provisions of
the various clauses cumulatively and we see no
reason to read them differently.
There remains the decision of this Court in
K.V. KriBhna Murthy Iyer v. The State of Madras('),
on which Mr. Bhimasankaram strongly relied. In
that case this Court upheld the order of the High Court
of Madras in quashing the charges in the exercise
( lj A. I. It, 1»5+ S, 0, f06,
3 s.c.R.
SOPREME COORT REPORtS
33i
of its inherent powers even before the conclusion of
the trial. It is true that there the charges were 67
in number and spread over a long period of time.
That again was a matter which came before the
High Court before conviction and not after the
trial was over. When an objection is taken at an
early stage, there is time enough to rectify an error.
But in the case before us no objection was taken to
multiplicity or misjoinder of charges before the
learned Additional Sessions Judge and it was only
in the High Court that the point was raised. In
such circumstances what the Court has to consider
is whether prejudice has in fact been caused to the
accused by reason of the multiplicity of charges
or misjoinder, if any, of the charges. This is quite
clear from the provisions of s. 537 of the Code as
amended by Act 26 of 1955. In Willie (William)
Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ('), all the
learned Judges were in agreement on the point that
this section and s. 535 cover every case in which
there is departure from the rules set out in Ch. XIX
ranging from error, omissions and irregularities in
charges that are framed, down to charges that might
have been framed and were not and include a total
omission to frame a charge at all at any stage of the
trial. The whole question has again been examined
by this Court recently in Birichh Bhuian v. The
State of Bihar (2 ). Subba Rao J., who delivered the
judgment of the Court has stated the position thus :
"To summarise: a charge is a precise formulation of a specific accusation made against a
person of an offence alleged to have been committed by him. Sections 234 to 239 permit the
joinder of such charges under specified conditions for the purpose of a single trial. Such a
joinder may be of charges in respect of different offences committed by a single person or
several persons. If the joinder of charges was
contrary to the provisions of the Code it would
(1) [19111 aS.C. R; lHO,
(2) [196Sillupp; 28.C.R112B1
1969
oi.11 ef Aniltr•
PrU.Sh
v.
Cheem•l</J4ti
Gan1sw•r• R1111
Muihtlkor /,
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
l96S
St•l1 of Andhr•
Prad1sh
v.
Cheimalapoti
Gaauwara &•
Mudliolkar J.
· be a misjoinder of charges. Section 537 prohibits the revisional or the appellate court from
setting· aside a finding, sentence or order passed
by a court of competent jurisdiction on the
ground of sucli. a misjoinder unless it has occasioned a failure of justice." ·
Even if we were to assume that there has been a misjoinder of charges in violation of the provisions of ss.
:l33 to 239 of the Code, the High Court was incompetent to set aside the conviction of the respondents
without coming to the definite conclusion that misjoinder had occasioned failure of justice. This decision completely meets the argument based upon
Dawson's case('} • . Merely because the accused persons are charged with a large number of offences and
convicted at the trial the conviction cannot be set aside
by the appellate court unless it in fact came to the
conclusion that the accused persons were embarrassed
in their defence with the result that there was a failure of justice. For all these reasons we cannot accept the argument of learned counsel on the ground
of misjoinder of charges and multiplicity of charges.
Mr. Bhimasankaram, supporting the view taken
by the High Court then contends that it is not permissible to frame a charge of conspiracy when the
matter has proceeded beyond the stage of conspiracy
and that in pursuance of it offences have actually
been committed. A similar view was expressed by
the same High Court in the case which was reversed
by this Court in The 8tate of Andhra Pradesl v.
Kandimalla Subbaiah ('), and it was held that conspiracy to commit an offence being itself an offence
a person can be separately charged with respect to
such a conspiracy. Then this Court has observed:
"Where a number of offences are committed
by several persona in pursuance of a conspiracy it i1 uaual to charie them with tkOlt
(l> (ljtiO) 1 AU, 1.a, 658.
(2) U962J 2 a.c,a, '"·
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
333
offences as
well as with the offence
of· conspiracy to commit those offences. As
an instance of this we may refer to the case
in S. 8wamirathnam v. State of Madraa (').
Though the point was not argued before this
Court in the way it appears to have been
argued .................. before the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, this Court did not see anything wrong in the trial of several persons accused of offences under s. 120-B and s.~20. I.P.C.
We cannot, therefore, accept the view taken
by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh that the
charge of conspiracy was bad. If the alleged
offences are said to have flown out of the conspiracy the appropriate form of charge would
be a specific charge in respect of each of those
offences along with the charge of conspiracy."
(pp. 201-202).
This decision is sufficient to dispose of the point under consideration;
In Stl)(Jmirathnam'a caae ('), which is a decision of this Court certain persons were tried for the
offence of the conspiracy to cheat the members of
the public and for specific offences of cheating in
pursuance of that conspiracy. It was urged before
this Court that there was misjoinder of charges and persons. Negativing the contention this Court held that
the charge as framed disclosed a single conspiracy
although spread over several years, that there was one
object of the conspiracy and that was to cheat the
m~mbers of the public, that the fact that in the course
of years other joined the conspiracy or that several
incidents of cheating took place in pursuance of the
conspiracy did not have the effect of splitting the
conspiracy into several conspiracies, that the several
instances of cheating being alleged to be in pursuance of that conspiracy were parts of the same transaction and, therefore, the joint trial of the accused
(11 11. I. R. 1957 S. C. 3.0, 543, H4.
Strit1 of Andh''
frad1Jh
v.
Che1ma/aflali
Ut1n1swa'a Rao
Mudliolkar /,
334
196J
St•tl ef .4.ndhra
Pradesh
v.
Cbermalapatl
Gan1sw•ra Ra'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
persons for the different offences was not vitiated.
No doubt, there is no discussion there as to the question whether the various clauses of s. 239 could be
combined or as to the impact of the provisions of s.
233 to 236 on those of s. 239. The actual decision
of the case is, however, directly opposed to the contention now put forward before us. This decision
has been followed in Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v.
The State of Bombay (' ). In that case the impact
of s. 120-B, I.P.C. on ss. 233 and 239 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was considered bv this Court
·
and this Court observed:
"The combined effect of the three provisions
(ss. 235, 236 and 239) is that if there is a
criminal conspiracy to commit different
offences, the persons who are members of that
conspiracy may be charged and tried together
but the necessary condition for invoking the
provisions of s. 239 (d) is that the offence
should have been committed in the course of
one transaction i.e., in the present case one and
the same conspiracy."
Here again, the question of clubbing together of the
various provisions of els. (a) to (d) ofs. 239 was not
raised expressly in the argument before the Court.
But the ultimate decision of the case would negative
such argument.
Mr. Bhimasankaram then relying upon the
decision in R. v. Dawson (2 ), contended that in any
event it was not desirable' to try the respondents at
the same trial for as many as 83 offences and pointed
out that these observations had received the approval
of this Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Kandimalla Subbaiah ('). In the first place there the
trial had not actually begun. Again, what was said
by this Court was that it is undesirable to complicate
a trial by introducing a large number of charges
jl) Crl. A. No. Ill of 1959decidedonjanuary 19, 19.61,
(S) [1902) 2 8,C,R, lut.
(2) (1960) I All, E.R. 5iB.
-
3 s.c.R.
SUPRENIB COURT REPORTS
335
spread over a long period but even so this was a
question or propriety which should be left to the
discretion of the Judge or Magistrate trying the
case.
Objection was taken very seriously by Mr.
Bhimasankaram to the charge of conspiracy framed
in this case. That charge reads thus :
"That both of you along with K.V. Ramana,
Ex.-Senior Accountant of the Vizagapatam
Electric Supply Corporation Ltd., Visakhapatnam (approver) and others, known or unknown,
in or about April, 194 7, at Visakhapatnam,
agreed to do illegal acts, to wit, commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the funds
belonging to the Vizagapatam Electric Supply
Corporation Ltd., Vizagapatnam ; and to
screen yourselves from detection of the same,
to wilfully, and with intent to defraud, falsify
the accounts of the said Vizagapatam Electric
Supply Corporation Ltd., Visakhapatnam and
that pursuant .to the said agreement, [you
committed criminal breach of trust in respect
of funds of the said Vizagapatam Electric
Supply Corporation Ltd., Visakhapatnam to
the extent of over Rs 3,20,000 and falsified
the said accounts between April, 1947 and
March, 1952, and also used forged documents
as genuine], offences punishable under Sections
409, Indian Penal Code and 477-A, Indian
Penal Code and 471 read with section 467,
Indian Penal Code ; and thereby committed
an offence of criminal conspiracy punishable
under Section 120· B of the Indian Penal Code
and within my cognizance."
Adverting to the portion which we have bracketed,
his first objection was that the charge comprises
within it not merely the conspiracy but al$o what
""
Sl11t1 of .4o.t.lr•
Pr-"sh
••
CA11mal•i•li
Ga1swaa Rco
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
!96J
Stat1 •f Andliro
Prat/1sh
v.
Ch11molapoti
G Mswara Rao
Mudholkar J.
·-
was in fact done in pursuance of the conspiracy.
His next objection was that it brought within its
purview all the various offences which were alleged
to have been committed by the respondents. The
third objection was that no charge of conspiracy
could have been framed after the conspiracy had
borne its fruits. The last objection was that the
charge of conspiracy was added to the ch;trge sheet
very late,
We shall first deal with the third point. The
of conspiracy is an entirely independent
offence and though other offences are committed in
pursuance of the conspiracy the liability of the
conspirators for the conspiracy itself cannot dis·
appear. In the Indian Penal Code, as originally
enacted, conspiracy was not an offence. Section 120·B
which makes criminal conspiracy punishable was
added by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1913 (8of1913) along withs. 120·A. Section 120-A
defines conspiracy and s. 120-B provides for the
punishment for the offence of conspiracy. Criminal
conspiracy as defined in s. 120-A and consists of an
agreement to do an illegal act or an agreement to do
an act which is not illegal by illegal means.
Section 120 B provides that whoever is a party to a
criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable
with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous im·
prisonment for a term of two years or upwards shall
be punishable in the same manner as if he has
abetted such offence unless there was an express
provision in the Code for the punishment of such
conspiracy. Criminal conspiracy was, however, not
an unknown thing before the amendment of the
Indian Penal Code in 1913. But what the amendment did was to make that compiracy itself
punishable. The idea was to prevent the commission of
crimes by, so to speak, nipping them in the bud. But
it does not follow that where crimes have been committed the liability to punishment already incurred
off~nce
·~ -
~ S.C.R.
SUPRED COURT REPORTS
337
under s. 120-lS by having entered into a criminal
conspiracy is thereby wiped away. No doubt, as
already stated, where offences for committing which
a conspiracy was entered into have actually been
committed it may not, in the particular circumstances
of a case, be desirable to charge the offender both
with the conspiracy and the offences committed in
punuance of that conspiracy. But that woald be
a matter ultimately within the discretion of the court
before which the trial takes place. In so far as the
fourth point is concerned, that would have a bearing not on the Conn of the charge but on the credibility of the evidence bearing on the point of conspi·
racy. As we are remanding the appeal to the High
Court for a fresh decision after full consideration of
the evidence adduced in the case it would be open to·
it to consider this matter particularly while judging
the credibility of the·evidence of the approver.
In so far as the portion included in the bracket
is concerned we agree with the learned counsel that
it should not have found place there. The ideas,
however, of the committing magistrate in stating all
that is said there appears to have been merely to
describe the conspiracy and do nothing more. We
do not think that either that or the other objection
raised, that is, that the charge embraces within it
all the offences said to have been committed by the
r~pondents can properly be said to vitiate the
charge. The object in saying what has been set out
in the first charge was only to give notice to the
respondents as to the ambit of the conspiracy to
which they will have to answer and nothing more.
Even assuming for a moment that this charge is
cumbersome in the absence of any objection by the
respondents at the proper time and in the; absence
of any material from which we could infer prejudice,
they are precluded by the provisions of s. 225 from
complaining about it at any rate after their conviction by the trial court.
1963
St•'4 of An4hr•
Pr•i1sh
v.
c•~~malojtlli
GtJt11SUHU• Ru
Muiholkar /.
33S SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19Ml vo:t..
IHI
SW. e/ A•ili••
"''*"'
T,
C6nll•f¥Mi
GM11•t1N Rao
MldM/11111 J.
Coming to the next point of Mr. Bhimasanka·
ram regarding the abuse of powers under s. 3'2
his first contention was that long and involved
questions were put to the respondents. His second
contention was that reference was made to a n11mber
of documents in some of these questions and those
documents were not made available to the respon·
dents for answering those questions. The third
contention was that the questions were involved,
confusing and bordered on cross-examination. Finally
he said that the ·court did not perform its duty
under s. 342 (4) of the Code as amended as it failed
to bring to the notice of the respondents that they
may, if they chose, give evidenGe in their defence.
In support of his first contention he referred to
questions Nos. 4, 8, 9, 10 and 20 put to the respondent No. 1 and question No. 12 put to the respondent
No. 2 and tried to show that those questions rolled
up a large number of separate questions and that
it could not have been possible for the respondents
to give any rational answers to those questions. We
have read the questions and so also the answers.
While we are disposed to agree with learned counsel
that the questions embrace a number of matters and
that it would have been better if those matters
had been made the subjects of separate questiong,
the answers given by the respendents clearly
show that they understood the questions and
wherever possible they have given complete answers
·to those questions. That is to say, they have given
their explantion regarding the circumstances appearing in the evidence set out in the questions and
wherever that was not feasible they have.said that
they would do so in their written statements. In fact
written statements have been filed by each of them in
which every point left over has been fully answered.
We are informed that the questions had been
prepared before hand by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, copies thereof were made available to
~ S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
each of the respondents and it was with reference to
those copies that they gave their answers· in the court.
A pointed reference was made to question No. 20 put
to respondent No. 1 which contains as many as 22
sub-heads and it is said that it was an extremely
unfair and embarrassing question. What the learned
Additional Sessions Judge has done is to err on the
side of over-cautiousness by putting every circumstance appearing in the evidence to the respondents
for elici.tiog their explanations. His object was to
obviate the possibility of a complaint before the
appellate court that they were denied the opportunity
of explaining the circumstances
appearing in
evidence against them because of defective questions.
Nor again, do we think that there is any substance
in the complaint made that the respondents had no
opportunity of referring to the documents to which
reference has been made in certain questions. No
objection was taken on their behalf before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and from the manner
in wliich they have answered the questions there is
no doubt that they must have had opportunity to look
at the relevant documents and answer the questions.
We are also satisfied that there is no substance in the
complaint that the questioning bordered on crouexamination. Undoubtedly the learned Additional
Sessions Judge has questioned the respondents very
fully and elaborately but to say that this bordered on
cross-examination is wholly unjustifiable. The
object of the learned Additional Sessions Judge quite
clearly was, as already stated, to leave no loophole
for a complaint to be made before the appellate court
of incomplete or insufficient examination under
s. 342.
Finally we are clear that it was not the duty of
the court to draw the pointed attention of the respondents to the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 342 and tell
them that they may, if they chose, enter the witness
box. It is true that by introducing this provision
].ffJ
St.ii •f _.llllhr•
htuluA
v.
c1ttot.i.;.1;
G11111slM'• It•
MIUiltdMr /,
340
'"'
y,
. a.--..ii
. ,.
•, C..U-•llM
~
stJ1>1UiME cotJR t 'REPORts [HIM] vot.
the disability placed on an accused person in rc11pect
of giving evidence on oath iri his own defence has
been removed and to that extent such person is
placed on par with an accused person under the
English law. The new provision, however, does no
more than lift the ban and does not impose a duty on
the court to draw the attention of an accused person
to its contents. Apart from that, the respondena
were represented by counsel at the trial who knew
very well what the law was. No complaint was
made by the respondents even in appeal that they
were ignorant of their right, that had they known
about it they would have given evidence on oath in
their defence and that because of this they have
been prejudiced. In the circumstances this
point must also be rejected as being without
substance.
The irrelevant evidence to which Mr.
Bhimasankaram referred was certain accoun'\ books.
The entries in the account books of VESCO show
that certain sums of money were paid to various
parties, Crompton Engineering Co., Lumin Electric
Co., D. Brothers, Radio and Electricals, Madras,
Vizagapatam Municipality, P. V. Ramanayya Bros.,
and Andhra Power System. They also show payment
of electricity duty to Government. The prosecution
case was that the payments which were entered in the
account of VESCO do not find a place in the account
books of the corresponding firms or authorities
because they were never made by VESCO. The
High Court has pointed out that the main evidence
on which the prosecution rests its case that the
amount represented by the entries against these
various firms were in fact misappropriated by the
respondents in the circumstance that there are no
corresponding entries in the account books of those
firms. The argument before the High Court was
and before us is that the absence of an entry cannot
3 S.C.R.
SUPRENIB COURT REPORTS
34J
ac c:stabli1hed by reference to s. 34 of the lndia11
Evidence Act which reads thus:
"Entries in books of account, regularly kept in
the course of business, are relevant whenever
they refer to a matter into which the Court
has to inquire, but such statements shall. not
alone be sufficient evidence to charge any
person with liability."
This section appears in a group of sections headed
"Statements made under special circumstances".
What it does is to make entries in books of account
regularly kept in the course of business relevant in
all proceedings in a court of law. These entries are,
however, not by themselves sufficient to charge any
person with liability. Therefore, when A sues B for
a sum of money. it is open to him to put his account
books in evidence provided they are regularly kept
in the course of business and show by reference to
them that the amount claimed by him is debited
against B. The entry though made by A in his own
account books, and though it is in his own favour is
a piece of evidence which the court may take into
consideration for the purpose of determining whether
the amount referred to therein was in fact paid by
A to B. The entry by itself is of no help to A in
his claim against B but it can be considered by the
court along with the evidence of A for drawing the
conclusion that the amqunt was paid by A to B. To
this limited extent entries in the account books are
relevant and can be proved. Section 34 does not go
beyond that. It says nothing about non-existence
of entries in account books. We, therefore agree
with the High Court that the account book; of the
various concerns to whom payments are said to have
been made by the respondents are not by themsel.
ves evidence of the fact that no payments were
received by them. The decision in Queen Empress
v. Gree.! Ohunder Banerjee (1), upon which rclianc~
\IJ (IBM) I, L. R. 10 Cal. UIZ~.
,,,.
s,.,.,.,..,,,
" b""'•
c,._..,.li
Gaa••aRdO
v.
M"'1WW J,
,_
342 SUPRENIE COUR1:° REPORTS [1964] VOL.
lffS
••
Clwni•l<i•ti
(JtfMSDUlr• Ru
MuiluilkM I;
is placed by the High Court in support of its view is
also to that effect. Similarly in Ram Pershad Singh .
v. Lakhpati Koer .('). Lord Robertson during the
course of the hearing has observed that no inference
can be drawn from the absence of any entry relating
to any particular matter which observation supports
the view taken in Queen Empre8s v. Girish Ohander
Banerjee ('). That, however, is not the only provision to be considered. There is s. 11 of the Evidence
Act which provides that facts not otherwise relevant
are relevant if they are inconsistent with any fact in
issue or relevant fact. Some of the facts in issue in
this case are whether payments of certain sums of
money were made to Crompton Engineering Co., and
other firms or authorities. These are relevant facts.
Absence of entries in their account books would be inconsistant with the receipt of the accounts and would
thus be a relevant fact which can be .proved under
s. 11. The fact that no payments were received
by those firms has been deposed to by persons connected with those firms and whose duty it was to
receive and acknowledge amounts received by the
firms or. who were in charge of the accounts of these
firms. For the purpose of showing that no amounts
were received by the firms, their account books would
thus be as relevant as the VESCO account books for
the purpose of showing the contrary. Similarly
there is s. 5 of the Evidence Act which reads thus:
"Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or noo-existence of every
fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafteL declared to be relevant, and of no
others."
It is the case of the prosecution that the alleged payments were never made by VESCO to the various
firms. It is also their case,that these firms maintain
their accounts in the regular course of business and
it is their practice to enter in those accounts all payments received by them. Both the sets of facts are
\I/ (1902) I. L. R. 30 Cal. 251, 247.
(2) (188i) J.L.R. Ill Cal. I02t.
-
a s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
relevant, that is, non-receipt of the amounts by the
firms and non-existence of entries in their account
books pertaining to those amounts. It is permissible,
therefore, for the prosec;ution to leacl ,vidence to
prove both these facts. The best evi ,iJce to prove
the latter set of facts consists of the acc,ount books of
the firms themselves. It is under these provisions
that the account books of the firms must be held to
be relevant. What value to attach to them is another matter and would be for the Court of fact to
consider.
It may further be mentioned that the account
books of VESCO show certain payments made to
Billimoria & Co., of Kharagpur. Papers seized by
the police include receipts purporting to have been
signed by one J. J. Billimoria on behalf of the firm.
The prosecution case is that these receipts are forged
documents and the entries in the account books of
VESCO are false. One of the partners of the firm
was examined by the prosecution as a witness in the
case and he produced the account books of the firm.
Those account books are in Gujrati and he stated in
his evidence that the accounts were regularly kept
and that there were no entries in them corresponding
to the entries in the VESCO accounts. The High
Court held that since the account books were not
translated they are not admissible in evidence. The
High Court was clearly wrong in so holding. In
coming to this conclusion it has relied upon the provisions of s. 356 (2A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section reads thus:
"When the evidence of such witness is given in
any other language, not being English, than the
language of the Court, the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may take it down in that lan~age
with his own hand, or cause it to be taken down
in that language in his presence and hearing
and under his personal direction and superinte11dence, and an authenticated translation of
St.u of ........
PraUsll
••
°""'"""l<Jli8G..,,.,.,,
344
1969
''•'' •f ..tnilu•
'rati~slt
v.
Cl.e1wi,t,,p1Jti
CtS11eswfl.1a Rao
Mwtlkolur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [11>114] VOL;
such evidence in the :language of the CGurt or
in English shall form part of the record."
This provision relates only to the oral evidence
adduced in a case and not to documentary evidence.
Mr. Bhimasankaram, therefore, very rightly did not
support the view of the High Court. In the circumstences we wish to say nothing further on the point.
We may, however, point out that Billimoria h11n1elf
gave his evidence in English.
Another point urged by Mr. Bhimasankaram
was that as many as 2,000 documents were "dumped"
by the prosecution in this case out of which 1600
documents were not sought to be proved by it. Further, 64 documents were missing from the records
when they came to the High Court and that this has
caused serious prejudice to the responden.t. No objection, however, was taken in the courts below on this
score and in the absence of any prejudice to the respondents we do not think that we should take notice
of the complaint made by Mr. Bhimasankaram.
The third point stressed by him was that the
approver was allowed to refresh his memory, while
deposing in the case, by referring extensively to the
account books and various documents produced in
the case. This, according to him, was an ·
absue of the provisions of s. 159 of the Evidence Act.
Now, s. 159 expressly enables a witness while under
examination to refresh his memory by referring to
any writing made by himself at the time of the
transaction concerning which he is being questioned
or soon afterwards, or to a writing made similarly
by another person and read by the witness immediately or soon after the writing was made. Section
160 provides that a witness may also testify to the
facts mentioned in any such document as is mentioned
in s. 159. The complaint of Mr. Bhimasankaram
is that the approver should have been questioned
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
about the various facts which were sought to be
established through his evidence and it was only if
and when he was in a difficulty that he should have
been allowed to refer to the account books. Instead
of doing that what he was permitted to do was just
to prove the various documents or read those
documents and then depose with reference to them.
In our opinion, where a witness has to depose
to a large number of transactions and those
transactions
referred to are or mentioned
either in the account books or in other documents
there is nothing wrong in allowing the witness
to refer to the account books and the documents
while answering the questions put to hini
in his examination. He cannot be expected to
remember every transaction in all its details and
s. 160 specifically permits a witness to testify the
facts mentioned in the documents referred to in
s. 159 although he has no recollection of the facts
themselves if he is sure that the facts were correctly
recorded in the document. That is precisely what
happened in this case and we do not think that the
Additional Sessions Judge adopted a procedure which
was either a violation of law or was an abuse of the
power of the Court.
The next point is a formidable one. According
to Mr. Bhimasankaram, the pardon tendered to the
approver was illegal and if the pardon is illegal his
evidence is wholly inadmissible. Further, according
to him, the evidence of the approver was found by
the Additional Sessions Judge to be unreliable and
therefore, the first condition referred to in Sarwan
Singh v. Tke State of Punjab ('), was not satisfied.
For all these reasons the evidence of the approver
must be left out of account. If it is left out of
account, he contends, there is nothing left in the prosecution case, because, as pointed out by the Additional
Sessions Judge himself the evidence of the approver
is the pivot of the prosecution case.
(I) 119571 S, C. R. 953.
St•t1 •I .A.Mhta
Prai1Jla
•·
Ch1•al.;.tl
Gt11te1WtU• Rao
Mwilulm J.
346
l9~J
Stlf1 of A.lllihr•
PrU.sk
••
Ch-.iqlfi
G1111uw111• R"°
Muillwlkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196(] VOL.
The pardon is stated to be illegal for two
reasons. The first reason is that none of the offences
alleged to have been committed falls within s. 337
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the second
reason is that the pardon was granted by an authority
not empowered to grant it. Section 337 (1) as it
stood before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955
read thus:
"In the case of any offence triable exclusively
by the High Court or Court of Session, or any
offence punishable with imprisonment which
may extend to ten years, or any offence
punishable under section 211 of the Indian
Penal Code with imprisonment which may
extend to seven years, or any offence under
any of the following sections of the Indian
Penal Code namely, sections 161, 165, 165A,
216A, 369, 401, 431, 435 and 477-A, the
District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a
sub-divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate
of the first class may, at any stage of the
investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of
the offence, with a view to obtaining the
evidence of any person supposed to have been
directly or indirectly concerned in or privy
to the offence, tender a pardon to such person
on condition of his making a full and true
disclosure of the whole of the circumstances
within his knowlege relative to the offence and
to every other person concerned, whether as
principal or abettor, in the commission thereof :
Provided that, where the offence is under
inquiry or trial, no Magistrate of the first class
other than the District Magistrate shall
exercise the power hereby conferred unless he
is the Magistrate making the inquiry or
holdini; the trial, and, where the offence is
under mvestigation, no such Magistrate shall
3 S.C.R.
SUPREl\1'.E COURT REPORTS 347
exercise the said power unless he is a Magistrate
having jurisdiction in a place where the
offence might be inquired into or tried and
the sanction of the District Magistrate has
been obtained to the exercise thereof."
His contention is that where none of the offences is
exclusively triable by the High Court or the Court
of Sessions pardon could be granted only if the
offences are punishable· with imprisonment which
could extend to ten years but not if a higher punishment were provided for them. Here, one of the
offences alleged against the respondents is criminal
breach of trust ·punishable under s. 409, I.P.C.
It is not exclusively triable by a Court of
Sessions and the punishment as set oui in the 7th column of Schedule II, Cr. P. C. was transportation
for life or imprisonment of either description
for ten years and fine. He contends that since the
offence is punishable with transportation for life,
s. 337 (1) could not be availed of for granting pardon
to the approver. It seems to us that it would not be
correct to read s. 337 (1) in the way sought by
learned counsel. The very object of this provision
is to allow pardon to be tendered in cases where a
grave offence is alleged to have been committed by
several persons so that with the aid of the evidence
of the person pardoned the offence could be brought
home to the rest. The gravity is of course to be
determined with reference to the sentence awardable
with respect to that offence. On the strength of
these considerations Mr. Chari for the State contends
that if the words "any offence punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to 10 years" were
interpreted to mean offences which were punishable
with imprinsonment of less than 10 years grave
offences which are not exclusively triable by a court
of Sessions will be completely out of s. 337 (1 ).
He suggests that this provision can also be reasonably
I96J
State Bf Antlhr,
Frad1Sh
••
CheemalajMti
Gt1n1sw.r• RM
Mudho/k., J.
348
1963
Slal1 of Anilara
Praduli
••
CJu.aalq.ti
G11111SU1-"• Rao
M•'holiar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
interpreted to mean that where the offences arc punishable with imprisonment exceeding 10 years pardon
may be granted to the approver. No doubt, if this
interpretation is accepted the object of the section,
that is, to embrace within it the graver offences,
would be fulfilled, but we wish to express no opinion
on it. For, the pardon granted in this case can be
regarded as being within· the ambit of s. 337 (1) for
another reason. It will be noticed that transportation for life was not the only punishment provided
for an offence under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code
even before the amendment made to the Indian
Penal Code by s. 117 of the Act 26 of 1955, the
other alternative being imprisonment up to IO years.
Therefore, since the offence under s. 409 was not
merely punishable with transportation for life but
alternatively also punishable with imprisonment
which could extend to 10 years, s. 337 (I) would
. apply. This section does not expressly say that the
only punishment provided for the offence should be
imprisonment not 1~xceeding 10 years. The reason
why two alternative maximum sentences are given
in col. 7, that is, transportation for life (now imprisonment for life) and imprisonment not exceeding
10 years appears to be that the offence is not exclusively triable by a court of session and could also be
tried by a Magistrate, who, except when empowered
under s. 30 would be incompet~nt to try offences
punishable with transportation for life (now imprisonment for life) and the further reason that it should
be open to the court of Session, instead of a warding
the sentence of transportation for life to a convicted
person to award him imprisonment in a jail in India
itself for a period ·not exPceeding IO years. Now,
of course, by the amendment made by s. II 7 of
Act 26 of l 955 for the words "transportation for
life" the words "imprisonment for life" have been
substituted, but the original structure of all the
sections now amended continues. That is why they
read rather queer but even so they serve the purpose
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS
349
of allowing certain offences triable by a court of
Se<:Sio12, to be triable also by Magistrates of the First
Class. Be that as it may, there is no substance in
the first ground.
·
What we have said about pardon in respect ef
an offence under s. 409 would apply equally to that
for one under s. 120-B because the punishment for
it is the same as that for the offence under s. 409.
The offence under s. 467 read withs. 471 is
punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a period of 10 years
but it is exclusively triable by a court of Session and,
therefore, in so far as such offence is concerned the
argument of Mr. Bhimasankaram would not even
have been available. As regards the offence under
s. 477-A, it is one of those sections which are specifically enumerated iu s. 337 (1) and the argument
advanced before us-and which we have rejectedwoul,d
not even be available with regard to the
pardon in respect of that offence. It is true that
the respondent No. 1 alone was convicted by the
Additional Sessions Judge of this offence and the
offence under s. 467 read with s. 4 71 but the validity
of a pardon is to be determined with reference to the
offence alleged against the approver alone and not
with reference to the offence or offences for which
his associates were ultimately convicted.
Coming to the next ground of attack on the
validity of pardon, the argument of Mr. Bhimasankaram is that whereas s. 337 (1) speaks of pardon being
granted by a District Magistrate, or Presidency
Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any
Magistrate of First Cla~s. except in casea where an
enquiry or trial was pending before another Magistrate, the pardon here was granted by the Additional
District :Magistrate in a case where an enquiry was
pending before the District Magistrate and is,
therefore, illegal and of no avail. He contend& that
U6J
St1J11 of ..lndhra
Pru"h
v.
Clw......,.,i
GunUHWt1Ru
M.JJ./Mr /.
350
1§69
State •f dnilwa
Prad1sh
v.
Che,.•lapati
Ga11esroora Rao
Mudulk•• J.
SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS [1964] VOi..
s. 337 (1) speaks of the District Magistrate which
expression does not include an Additional District
Magistrate.
Mr. Bhimasankaram's argument on
the point may be summarised thus : Such a . power
cannot be conferred upon an Additional District
Magistrate because s. 337 (1) does not contemplate
grant of pardon by an Additional District Magistrate and that the Additional District Magistrate
would have no status other than that of a Magistrate,
First Class. No doubt, under entry (9-a) in Part
III of Sch. III to the Code a Magistrate, First
Class, has the power to grant pardon under s. 337
but it is limited by the proviso thereto to certain
classes of cases. A case under enq.uiry or trial
before another magistrate does not fall in any of
these classes. Therefore, a pardon granted by him
in such a case would be illegal. The Magistrate
before whom the enquiry or trial is proceeding or
the District Magistrate would be the only authorities competent to grant a pardon in such a case.
Alternatively, the St:.te Government has not made
any directions under sub-s. (2) of s. 10 specifying
the powers of the District Magistrate which would
1'e exercisable by the Additionai District Magistrate
·
concerned.
In order to appreciate and consider the argu ment it is desirable to bear in mind the changes in
the magisterial set up in the former province of
Madras which comprised within it the district of
Visakhapatnam. By Government Order No. 3106
dated September 9, 1949 the Government of the Province of Madras issued certain instructions to the Magistrates in pursuance of the separation of the judiciary
from the executive. It divided the magistrates into two
groups, judicial magistrates and executive magistrates.
The latter category comprises of the executive officers
of the Revenue Department, on whom the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order was to
continue to rest. Para 4 of the instructions provides
_,
3s.c.R.
.
SUPREMB COURT REPORTS 351
.
" ............... To enable them to discharge this responsibility, these officers will continue to be magistrates.
The Collector, by virtue of office, will retain some of
the powers of a Distri_ct Magistrate and will be called
the 'Additional District Magistrate'. To distinguish
him from his Personal Assistant, he may be called
'Additional District Magistrate (Independent)'. He
will continue to be the Head of the Police. Similarly, the Revenue Divisional Officers will be ex. officio First Class Magistrates, and the Tahsildars and
the Deputy Tahsildars will be ex-officio Second
Class Magistrates. The extent of their magisterial
powers will be as indicated in the Schedule of allocation of powers. They will exercise these powers
within their respective revenue jurisdictions." Para
5 provides that as officers of the Revenue Department, those magistrates would be under the control
of the Government through the Board of Revenue.
The Additional District Magistrates (Independent)
would also be under the control of the Government
through the Board of Revenue. The category of
Judicial Magistrates was constituted of the following:
(1) District Magi~trate; (2) Sub.divisional Magistrates; (3) Additional First Class Magistrates and (4)
Second Class Magistrates (Sub-magistrates). The
District Magistrate was constituted as the principal
magistrate of the District and as such was entrusted
with the duty of general administration and superintendence and control over the other judicial magistrates in the district. In addition to his general
supervisory functions and the special powers under
the Code of hearing revision petitions, transfer petitions, appeals from Second Class Magistrates and
the like, the District Magistrate was also to be assigned a specific area, the cases arising from which
would be disposed of normally by himself. This
body of magistrates was made subordinate to the
High Court. Till the separation between the judiciary and the executive was effected the Collector as
the head of the Revenue Department was also the
196~
S1«11ef ..!Uliro
l'r<ilth
Y.
a.....111.;.11
G1'/VIW«'O Ra
MuJM/Ur J.
l-
352
190
Stllf# of Andht•
Pru1m
v.
CMunol.;.ti
G.n4swa• Rs1
Muth1/hr J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOt.
District Magistrate. Consequent on the separatign
he became only an Additional District Magistrate.
Part IV of the Government order deals with the
allocation of powers between the judicial and executive magistrates. Para 19(3) occurring in this part
deals with allocation of powers under the provisions
of the Code otherwise than these referred to in the
earlier paragraphs. It specifically provides that the
power to tender pardon under s. 337 shall be exercised
by executive magistrates except in cases referred to
in the proviso to sub-s. (1) of that section, in which
case a judicial magistrate may exercise that power.
In spite of the Government order all Magistrates
wbo have, under Sch. III to the Code of Criminal
procedure, the power to grant pardon will continue
to have that power and, therefore, a pardon granted
by a judicial Magistrate in contravention of the
Government order will not be rendered invalid. However, that is not the point which is relevant while
considering the argume11t of Mr. Bhimasankaram. His
point is that the proviso to s. 337(1) confers the power
on "the District Magistrate" to grant pardon in a case
pending before another Magistrate and not on "a
District Magistrate" and, therefore, his power to
grant pardon in such cases cannot be conferred under
sub-s.(2) of s. 10 on an Additional District Magistrate.
According to him, under that section . only the
powers of "a District Magistrate" meaning thereby
only the powers under Entry 7 (a) in Part V of
Sch. III as distinguished from the power under the
proviso to s. 337 (1) can be conferred upon an
Additional District Magistrate. Secondly, according to him, no direction has in fact been shown to
have been made by the State Government conferring
upon an Additional District Magistrate the power of
the District Magistrate to grant pardon. In our
opinion, there is no subtance in the contention. The
power conferred by sub-s. (1) of s. 337 on the different clauses of Magistrates is of the same character.
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
The power to grant pardon in a case pending
before another Magistrate is no doubt conferred by
the proviso only on the District Magistrate. But
Entry 7 (a) in Part V of Sch. III when it refers to
the power of a District Magistrate under s. 337 (1)
does not exclude the power under the proviso. There
is, therefore,' no warrant for drawing a distinction
between the powers of "the District Magistrate"
and the powers of '~a District Magistrate." The
power of a District Magistrate to grant pardon has
been specifically conferred on Additional District
Magistrates as would appear from s. no. 37 of
Sch. III of the Government Order, which reads
thus:
"SI. Judi. Exec. Concurrent
no. magis- magis- jurisdictrate trate tion
37
-- -
Remarks
337(1), 2nd Reference to the Disparagraph trict Magistrate in the
(proviso)
proviso should be construed as reference to
the Executive District
Magistrate. Reference
to the
Magistrate
making the enquiry or
holding the trial etc.,
should be construed
as a reference to the
judicial Magistrate."
No doubt, here the reference is to the Execu ive
District Magistrate. But it is clear from the other
part of the Government Order that what is meant by
that is the Additional District Magistrate (Independent). This was, and, we are told, is being regarded
as a direction of the Government falling under subs. (2) of s. 10 of the Code. Whether the interpretation is correct or not, we feel little doubt that the
Stat1 •f Anihr•
Prtdesl
••
Clielf'Jlal•i•li
Ga111swar• a••
.....
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
JtoJ1 •! A.;h,.
Prad1sh
v.
Cluanalapati
Gdfllswara Rao
Muiirolltai J,
action of the Additional District Magistrate "(Independent) Visakhapatnam in granting a plrdon to the
approver in this case though it was pending enquiry
before the District Magistrate (Judicial), was bona
fide. A pardon granted bona fide is fully protected
by the provisions of s. 529, Cr. P. C.
The High Court has not considered any of the
provisions to which we· have referred but held that as
the offence was being enquired into by the District
Magistrate, the Additional District Magistrate
could not usurp the functions of the former
and grant a pardon. Had it done so, it would
not have come to this conclusion. We are, therefore,
unable to accept it.
Mr. Chari for the State advanced a further
argument before us in case his main ar~ument that
the pardon was valid failed and said that the approver, even if we ignore the pardon, was a competent witness. In support of his contention he strongly
relied upon the decision in Kandaswamy Gounder In
re : the appellant (' ), and the cases referred to therein, in particular the decision in Winson v. Queen(').
What has been held in all these cases is that where
the trial of a person who was charged with having
committed an offence or offences jointly with
several persons is separated from the trial of those
persons, he would be a competent witness against
them though of course there will always be the
question as to what weight should be attached to
his evidence. Mr. Chari then referred to s. 133 of
the Evidence Act and pointed out that this section
clearly makes an accomplice evidence admissible in
a case and that an approver whose pardon is found
to be invalid does not cease to be an accomplice and
contends that he is, therefore, as competent a witness
as he would have been if he had not been granted
pardon at all and not been put on trial. Learned
counsel further pointed out that the decisions show
(I) J,L,J.1., 1957 Mod, 711,
{2) ( 1161) b,&; 1 Q.; •• 281;
'
<
3
s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
that however undesirable it may be to adduce the
evidence of a person jointly accused of having
committed an offence along with others, his evidence
is comp~tent and admissible except when it is given
in a case in which he is being actually tried. This
legal position does not, according to him, offend the
guarantee against testimonial compulsion and he
points out that that is the reason why an accused
person is not to be administered an oath when the
court examines him under s. 342 (1) for enabling
him to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. If pardon is tendered to an
accused person and eventually it is found that the
pardon is illegal such person is pushed back into the
rank of an accused person and being no more than
an accomplice would be a competent witness. The
question raised is an important one and requires
a serious consideration. Mr. Chari in support of
his contention has cited a large number of cases,
Indian as well as English, and certain passages from
Halsbury's Laws of England. But in the view we
take about the legal validity of the pardon tendered,
we do not wish to pronounce one way or the other
on this very interesting questio11.
-1
Now, as regards the reliability of the approver.
It is no doubt true that an approver has always been
regarded as an infamous witness, who, on his own
showing has participated in a crime or crimes and
later to save his own skin, turned against his former
associates and agreed to give evidence against them
in the hope that he will be pardoned for the offence
committed by him. The High Court seems to think
that before reliance could be placed upon the evidence of the approver it must appear that he is a
penitent witness. That, in our opinion, is not the
correct legal position. The section itself shows that
the motivating factor for an approver to turn, what
in England is called "King's evidence" is the hope
of pardon and not any noble sentiment like contrition
1961
Stat< •f Anihr•
PraJ,,A
v.
Clteema/apati
Garuswara Ru
Mudholk•r I.
'
356
196~
!lllU •f .4•dhra
Prodtsh
v.
Ch#Nlop•li
G_,,,.,oRaa
MoJUlur 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
at the evil in which he has participated. Whe·
ther the evidence of the approver should in any
given case be accepted or not will have to be determined by applying the usual tests such as the probability of the truth of what he has deposed to the
circumstances in which he has come to give evidence
whether he has made a full and complete disclosure,
whether his evidence is merely self-exculpatory and
so on and so forth. The court has, in addition, to
ascertain whether his evidence has been corroborated
sufficiently in material particulars. What is necessary to consider is whether applying all these tests
we should act upon the evidence of the approver
should be acted upon.
We however, find that certain documents upon
which Mr. Chari wants to rely are not included in
the paper book. It would take considerable time if
we were to adjourn this matter now and give an
opportunity to the parties to i1lclude those documents
ori record. The better course would be for us to
set aside the acquittal of the respondents and send
back the appeal to the High Court for being decided
on merits. The High Court will of course be bound
by the finding which we have given on the questions
of law agitated before us. What it must now do is to
consider the entire evidence and decide for itself
whether it is sufficient to bring home all or any of
the offences to the respondents. We may mention
that the High Court's observation that the approver's
evidence was treated as unreliable by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge is not correct. Of coum,
the view taken by the Additional Sessions Judge is
not binding on the High Court. But it should remove
from its mind the misconception that the Additional
Sessions Judge has not believed him. There is another thing which we would like to make clear. The
decision in Sarwan Singh v. The Stau of Punjab ('),
on which reliance has been placed by the High Court
has been explained by this Court in the case of
(I) 111571 II. 0. R. t5S,
>-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREl\Ul COURT REPORTS
3i7
Jlaj. E. G. Bar8ay v. The State of Bambay ('). This
Court has pointed out in the latter decision that while
it must be shown that the approver is a witness of
truth, the evidence adduced in a case cannot be con1idered in compartments· and that even for judging
the credibility of the approver the evidence led to
corroborate him in material particulars would be
relevant for consideration. The High Court should
bear this in mind for deciding whether the evidence
of the approver should be acted upon or not. Then
again it would not be sufficient for the High Court to
deal with the evidence in a general way. It would be
necessary for it to consider for itself the evidence addu·
ced by the prosecution on the specific charges and then
to conclude whether those charges have been establi ·
.shed or not. The prosecution would be well advised
if, instead of placing the evidence on each and every
one of those large number of charges against the
respondents, it chooses to select a few charges uuder
each head other than the head of conspiracy and
concentrates on establishing those charges, this would
1ave public time and also serve the purpose of the
prosecution. With these observations we set aside the
acquittal of the respondents and remit the appeal to
the High Court for decision on merits in the light of
our observations.
0
)
t1Jt1
'1 ~,.,..
Pradlsfl
••
C%1mal1¥ali
Gan11wara Rru
Mad"-liM J.
Appeal allowed.
Gase remanded.
II) (1962] 2 S. C.R. 195,
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