THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD. versus P. S. RAJAGOPALAN ETC.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 April 1963 | [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140 | 1963 INSC 106
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 April 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 823/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 106
Text of the judgment
140
1963
Sociltt de Traciion
et D' El1ctricit1
So~iett
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
benefit of the view of the High Court on those
questions ..
Anonyme
The appeal will therefore be allowed, and tne
••
Kamani Engineering proceeding remanded to the Court of First Instance
Company 1 Jd.
Sh•h J,
to be heard and disposed of according to Jaw. Costs
in this Court and before the Di vision Bench of the
High Court will abide the result of the proceedin~
taken pursuant to this order in the Trial Court.
Appeal allowed.
Gase remanded.
1963
THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD.
April 19
v.
P. S. RAJAGOPALAN ETC.
•
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
K. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGARjj.)
Industrial Disputes-Application claiming •pecial allowance for operating the adding machine-Power of Labo1tr Court
-Limitation-l'lastry Award-Industrial Dispute• Act, 1947
( 14 of 1947), s. 33C(2).
Applications were made by four respondents under s.33C(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, I!H7, contending that besides attending to their routine duty as clerks, they had been operating the adding machine provided for use in the clearing depart·
ment of the appellant Bank during- the period mentioned in the.
list annexed to the petitions and hence each of them was entitled to the payment of Rs. IO/· pm, as special allowan.ce for
operating the adding machine as provided for in para 164(b)(l)
of the Sastry Award. The appellant Bank raised certain
objections but these Were rejected by the Labour Court which
held that the respondents were entitled to the amounts claimed
....
3 S;C.R..
SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS 141
by them and the oame were ordered to be
appellants came to this Court by special leave.
paid.
The
The contentions raised in this court were that s. 33C(2)
did not apply in the present case and the Labour C'urt had
exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the applications made
by respondents as claims made by them were outside the scope
of s. 33C(2) which postulated the existence of an admitted
right in a workman and did not cover cases where the said right
was disputed. Moreover, special allowance could be claimed
only by comptists and as the respondents had not even claimed
that they were comptists, their applications should have been
rejected.
Htld that s. 33C(2) takes within its purview ca~es of
workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled
should be computed in term of money, even though the right
to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by
their employers. For the purpose of making the necessary
determination under s. 33C(2), it is open to the Labour Court
to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's
right rests.
There is a diotinction between s. 33C(2) and a. 36A.
Whereas s. 33C(2) deals with cases of implementation of indi·
vidual rights of workmen falling under its provisions, s, 36A
deals merely with a question of interpretation of the award
where a dispute arises in that behalf between the workmen and
the employor and the appropriate Government is satisfied that
the dis1mte deserves to be r~solved by reference under s. 36A.
The scope of s. 33C(2) is wider than that of s. 33C(I).
Claims made under s. 33C( 1) can be only those claims which
are referrable to oettlement, award or the relevant provuions
of Chapter V-A, but those limitations are not to be found
ins. 33C(2). Three categories of claims mentioned ins. 33C(l)
fall under s. 33C(2) and in that sense s. 33C(2) can Itself
be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding, but it is pos·
sible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made
under the provisions of Chapter V-A may also be competent
under s. 33C (2).
Hold that respondents' claim for special allowance ""
co111ptists solely on the ground that they could be described aa
,.dding machine operators could not be sustained.
.. ~
No period of limitation is provided for an application
under s. 33C(2).
196J
C1 nlral Bank of
Indio Ltd.
••
I'. S, Rojt1gopaJan
142 SUPREME COUllt REPORTS [1964] vor..
1963
Central Bank of
Tndia Lid.
v.
P. S.' Rajagopalan
Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Klmrbarula, (1962) I
L.L.J. 234, M/8. Kasturi and Sons (P) L!d. v. Shri N. Salita·
teesu·aran [1959] S.C.R. I, Shri,Ambic;1 Mill< Go. Lid. '"
Shri S 11. B!w.it, [1961] 3 S. C.R. WO and M/«. Sawalrain
Ramprasad Mills Go. Ltd. Akola v. Baliram, (1962) 65 !lorn.
L.R. 91, referred to.
·
CIVIL APPELLATE juRISDIOTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 823-826 of 1962.
Appeals by special leave from the order dated
March 7, 1962, of the Central Government Labour
Court at Delhi in L.C.A. Nos. 246 to 249 of 1962.
M. 0. Setalvad, N. V. Phadke, J.P. Thacker,
0.0. Mathur, Ravinder Narain and J.B. Dadachanji,
for the appellants.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, M. K. R:.1mamurthi,
R.K. Garg, D. P. Singh and S. U. Agarwal, for the
respondents.
1963. April 19.
was delivered by
Gojendrogadka.- I.
The Judgment of the Court
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.- This group of several
appeals has been plac~d togeth~r for final disp?sal,
because the appeals mcluded ID the group raise a
common question of law in regard to the construction
of s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(No."14 of 194 7) (hereinafter called the Act). We
propose to deal with this point in Civil Appeals
Nos. 823 to 826 of 1962 which have been preferred
by the appellant, the Ce~tral Bank of Ind.ia Ltd.,
against the respondents, Its employees and ID accordance with our decision on the said point the other
appeals in~luded in this group would be dealt with
·
·
on the merits.
Civil Appeals 823 to 826 of 1962 arise out of
applications made by four · respondents under
3 S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURt REPORTS
143
s. 33C(2) of the Act. The case for each one of the
respondents was that besides attending .to his routine
duties as clerk, he had been operating the adding
machine provided for use in the cleating department
of the Branch during the period mentioned in the list
annexed to the petition and it was alleged that as
such, he was entitled to the payment of Ks. 10/-per
month as special allowance for operating the adding
machine as provided for under paragraph l64(b)(l)
of the Sastry Award. On thi< basis, each one of the
respondents made his respective claim for the amount
covered by the said allowance payable to him during
the period specified in the calculations.
1 he appellant disputed the respondent's claims.
It urged three preliminary objections against the
competence of the applications. According to it, the
respondents could claim only non-monetary benefits
under the Award that were capable of computation
and so, s. 33C(2) was inapplicable to their claim.
It was also contended that without a reference made
by the Central Government, the applications were not
maintainable, and it was pleaded that since the
applications involved a question of the interpretation
of the. Sas try Award, they were outside the purview
of s. 33C(2). On the merits, the appellant's case
was that the special allowance claimed by the respondents was payable only to the Comptists and could
not be daimed by the respondents on the ground
that they were operating adding machines. In
support of this contention, the appellant alleged that
a certaiu amount of manipulative skill is required for
the handling of a Comptometer since the operater
has to execute a series of somewhat complex opera·
tions in quick succession before he can arrive at a
result. The art of operating a comptometer has to
be learnt over several months, but the work of operat·
ing the adding machine needs no special training
and does not require even the skill which a typist has
to show. That is why, according to the appellant,
1969
Centrol BIUllc of
/"""LU.
v.
P. S. ll8i•1.paian
Gt1j1ndragadkar J.
144·
196J
Central Banko,
Int!ia Ltn.
~. S.
••
R•jagapalan
Gojendragflikar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
no special allowance could be claimed by the respon·
dents under paragraph 164(b)(l) of the Sastry.
Award .
The Central Government Labour Court before
which these applications were made by the respon·
dents over-ruled the preliminary objectio11s raised by
the appellant and on the merits, found that the res·
pondents were entitled to claim the special allowance
under the relevent clause of the Sastry Award. That
is how the applications made by the respondents were
allowed and the respective amounts claimed by them
were ordered to be paid by the appellant. It is
against this order that the appellant has come to this
Court by special leave.
The principal contention which has been urged
before us by tht: appellant is one of jurisdiction. It
is argued that the Labour Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction in entertaining the applications made by
the respondents because the claims made by respondents in their respective applications are outside the
scope of s. 330(2) of the Act. In dealing with this
point, it is necessary to read section 33C :
"( l )
Where any money is due to a workman
from an employer under a settlement or an
award or under the provisions of Chapter
VA, the workman may without prejudice
to any other mode of recovery, make an
application to the appropriate Government
for ilie recovery of the money due to him,
and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue
a certificate for that amount to ilie Collec·
tor who shall proceed to recover the same
in the same manner as an arrear of land
revenue.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive
from the employer any benefit which is
f"
-
S S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
capable of being computed in terms of
money, the amount at which such benefit
should be computed may, subject to any
rules that may be made under this Act,
be determined by such Labour Court as
may be specified in this behalf by the
appropriate Government, and the amount
so determined may be recovered as provi·
ded for in sub-section (1).
..
1949
C1ntral Ba ti: of
India Ltd.
v.
P. S, Rajagopala.
Gaj1ntfra1adk"' /,
(3) For the purposes of computing the money
value of a benefit, the Labour Court may,
if. it so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner
who shall, after taking such evidence as
may be necessary, submit a report to the
Labour Court and the Labour Court shall
determine the amount after considering
the report of the Commissioner and other
circumstances of the case."
-
It is common· ground that s. 33C(l) provides for a
kind of execution, proceedings and it contemplates
that if money is due to a workman under a settlement or an. award, or under the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman is not compelled to take resort
to the ordinary course of execution in the Civil Court,
but may adopt a summary procedure prescribed by
this sub-section. This sub-section postulates that
a specific amount is .due to the workmzn and the •
same has not been paid to him. If the appropriate
Government is satisfied that the money i& so due,
then it is required to issue a certificate for the said
amount to the Collector and that leads to the recovery of the said amount in the same manner as an
arrear of land revenue. The scope and effect of
s. 33C(l) are not in dispute before us.
l
There is. also no dispute that the word "benefit"
used in s. 33C(2) is not confined merely to nonmonetary benefit which could be converted in terms of
•
H6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.'
.
.
money, but that it takes in all kinds of benefits which
may be monetary as well as non-monetary if the
Ce.nlrol Bank •f
111iia Lid .
' workman is entitled to them, and in such a case, the
••
workman is given the remedy of moving the appro·
P. S, RajttoP~lan
priate Labour Court with a request that the said
G~jtndrat~dkar J,
benefits be computed or calculated in terms of
money. Once such computation or calculation is
made under s. 33C(2) the amount so determined
has to be recovered as provided for.in sub-s.(l). In
other words, having provided for the determination
of the amount due to the workman in cases falling
under sub.s. (2), the legislature has clearly prescribed
that for recovering the said amount, the workman
has to revert to his remedy under sub-s. (1).
/96J
Sub-section (3) empowers the Labour Court to
appoint a Commissioner for the purposes of computing the money value of the benefit, and it lays down
that if so appointed, the Commissioner shall take
such evidence as may be necessary and submit his
report to the Labour Court. The Labour Court is
thep required to proceed to determine the amount
in the light of the report submitted by the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case. This
means that proceedings taken under sub-s. (2)·may be
determined by the Labour Court itself or, in a suitable case, may be determined by it after receiving a
report submitted by the Commissioner appointed in
that behalf. It is clear that if for computing in
terms of money the value of the benefit claimed by
the workman, an enquiry is required to be held and
evidence has to be taken, the Labour Court may do
that itself or may delegate that work to a Commissio. ner appointed by it. This position must be taken to
be well settled after the decision of this Court in the
Punjab National Banlc Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda (1 ).
The question which arises for our decision is,
however, slightly different. It is urged by the appellant that sub-s. (2) can be invoked by a workman who
(ll 1962 (ll L. L.J.2a..
-
3 S.C.R.
SUJ>REME COURT REPORTS
147
is entitled to receive from the employer the benefit
there specified, but the right of the workman to
receive the benefit has to be admitted and could not
be a matter of dispute between the parties in cases
which fall under sub-s. (2). The argument is, if
there is a dispute about the workman's right to claim
the benefit, that has to be adjudicated upon not
under sub-s. (2), but by other appropriate proceedings
permissible under the Act, and since in the present
appeals, the appellant disputed the respondent's
right to claim the special allowance, the Labour
Court had no jurisdiction to deal with their claim.
In other words, the contention is that the opening
words of sub-s. (:l) postulate the existence of and
admitted right vesting in a workman and do not
cover cases where the said right is disputed.
..
-
l
On the other hand, the respondents contend
that sub-s. (2) is broad enough to take in all cases
where a workman claims some benefit and wants the
said benefit to be computed in terms of money. If
in re;isting the said claim, the employer makes
several defences, all those defences will have to be
tried by the Labour Court under subs. (2). On this
argument all questions arising between the workmen
and their employers in respect of the benefit which
they cldim to be computed in terms of money would
fall within the scope of snb-s. (2).
Before dealing with the question of construction thus raised by the parties in the present proceedings it would be material to refer briefly to the
legislative history of this provision. .The Act, as it
was originally passed, made relevant provisions on
the broad basis that industrial disputes should be
adjudicated upon between-trade Unions or representatives of labour on the one hand and the workmen's
employers on the other. That is why section IO (1)
which deals with the reference of disputes to Boards,
Courts or Tribunals, hai been intrrprrtrd by this
Ctntr•l Bank •/
lndia
l".
••
!'. S. R•j•lfi•la•
. \'
,
.
, , : 1148 . SUPREMECOURT!REPOR.TS [1964],VOL.
: <cmirt to mean the disputes which ·are.referable:urider
.. C,.~ ef ·1.-10(1),.should:beidisputes which;are·raised.by.the
-,. , 19"
:-" TIZlliiiLld.
. ::tradeUnioris to which the workmen belong or .by the
-·,. ~P:'S: R;1.g;p~an-· "representatives of workmen acting in such.a represen·
.- -
; : .tative character.: It was,: however, :realised: that in
.Ca;lt)dr<&aJku J, .de!Jying to the individual employees.a speedy remedy
,.
·
'. . ·to ·enforce their existing rights, the AcL had failed
· ~-;;·ito• give due. protection· to: them._· . · If an individual
,: _.employee does not seek to raise an industrial.dispute
" :1in the sense- that he does not•want any. change,in the__
,.,,frr.ffis and ·conditions ·of service, i buLwants only to
· ·implerrient or enforce , his existi_ng rights, it should
. '.:not be necessary for him : to .. have to take recours'e to
. ! : the remedy·prescribed bys. 10(1) oftheAct;thatwa,
i:•::the criticism ;made .a~ainst the omissi6n~£theAct
to provide for --speedy · enforcement of·. individual
. workman's existing rights. In order to mret this
l-::·criticism,-an amendment.was made by the Legislature
-,,,,:in•l959··by section·20 of ·the Industrial Disputes·
:':(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (No • .48 ofl950J;:Sec: ti on 20 of this Act provided for recovery of m9ney due
.;; from•an employer under an award or decision. :iThis
· ·: provision filled up the lacuna which' was discovered,
. '· · because·. even after an : award was made -individual
-workmen_ were not' given_.a speedy remedy to imple- .
··mentor execute the said award, and so s.20:purported
•to supply· that remedy.'· Section 20(1) provided that
if· money was due under an award or decision of an
industrial tribunal, it may be recovered as arrears of
.- ·· land revenue or as' a public demand by the appropriate
· ·--~Government on an application made to'it by the person ·
· --; entitled•to the said money; -"Section 20(2) thenidealt
• d with the cases where •ariy. workman was entitled to.
•receive from the• employer any benefit , under· an ·
· ' ' award or decision •of an-industrial tribunal which is
· r;·-capable of· being. computed in terms of money, and
· • 0 ·'·,it provided that the amount at which the said benefit
' : • ·could be computed may be determined. subject to the
·c rrules ·framed., in that behalf;- by that industrial tribu.
: :, rial' and the amount so determined ·may be .recovered
'
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'
·- ..
\
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3 s.c.R•. ,):;UPRBME.COURT REPORTS;' 149,•,,
·as .provided .. for; in. suo-s .. (1). In other.words, the, ..
1963, .• ·
. P!"<!visions .of s.20 (2) roughly correspond to the pr~· , ; c.,,;;;;;;;,k~~j,, ',
V!Slons of s.33C(2) :of, the· Act. :There are, however,. ..· India Lid"'"··
. · two points of distinction. Section 20(t) was confined· 1 r. s., R:jqzopQJan
/ to the benefits claimable by workmen under an award
· - -..
\ or decision of an :Industria_l tribunal; and the 1applica- CajendragadluvyJ.-.·, ..
tion,, to ,betmade'.in.that behalf had to be filed before·""
the industrial tribunal which· made ,:the. said :award.-.,
or decision.;. These two. limitations.have. not,been·;1
introduced"· in' . s.: 33C(2) .... Section. 20(3),. corres,, i.
ponds t_o · s.33C(3) .. It. would· thus: .be ,noticed,.-,
that,, s.,, 20 of: this. , Act provides. a ·speedy. /.
reme.dy.to individual workmen to execute their ,rights,,
under. awards or. decisions of industrial. tribunals • •,.:·
Incidentally, we may add· that secti<in 34 of this ,Act ·; ·
made a.special provision for adjudication as· io whe~ ' :
ther. conditfons .. of. service . had been changed during:.
the pendency of industrial proceedings at the instance;;..:
· of an individual workman and for that purpose
inserteddn .the Ac~ s.33A... Act4S of,1950 by.which
s.20,was enacted.
came. into. force on May
20,~.19~Q.,,:,, ·
.
.
.
·~
. '!
! ... ·:-
·In. 1953, the Legislature took a further step by·~';
. providing. for1 additional rights· to the workmen'by"'·
adding Chapter VA'· to · the: Act, . and' passed' an·;;..
Amending Act No .. 43 of 1953. Chapter VA deals . '
with .. the workmen's claims in· cases ·of lay-off and ·
retrenchment. Section. 25(1) whicli. wa~. enacted"iiJ·i · l
this·.Chapter ·provided· for. the: machinery•to recover( i;
moneys' due: from~ the employers tinder this ChapterJ '.''
It laid down;-inter alia,' that ariy money due from·• an"'-':
employer ·under: the ··provisions of Chapter-VA"mlly '.'I
be recovered in.the same.manner as an arrear.of 'Jandl•'-'
revenue;::orvas·:a public· demand'by the appropriafo·,,;,i
Govem~ent on; an' application· made to ;it' by the'··;-,
· work.inan · entitled; to •the said·money. This· was; 'of~.,"
course;. without prejudice to the workman's righ\'tO'"~'
adopt ·'anY' other mode of recovery." This ·provisjcifi'P'-'
shows: that, having,· created additional: rights, in·th'e".'. i ·
workmen1 in· respect ofc1 lay·offiand retrenchment th'c""t
~·
11}0
lffl
Cnm•I BMlc of
l•ii• Ltd.
v.
P• .I. R•j•1.P.l••
G~r.,aAor J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [191!!4] VOL.
legistature took the precaution of prescribing a ·speedy
remedy for recovering the said amounts from their
employers. This Amending Act came into force on
December 23, 1953.
About three years later, the legislature passed
the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellan·
eous Provisions) Act, l!l56 (No. 36 of 1950). This
Act repealed· the Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act No. 48 of 1950, s. 25-I in Chapter VA
and inserted s. 33C(l), (2) and (3) ands. 36A in the
Act. The result of these modifications is that the
recovery provisions are now contained in section 33C
and an additional provision is made by s. 36A which
deals with cases where doubt or difficulty may arise
in the interpretation of any provision of an award or
settlement. This Act canie into force on August
28, 1956.
-
In order to make the narration o'f the legislative
background of s. 33C complete, we may refer to the
fact that by the Amendment Act No. 18of1957,
two more provisions were added to Chapter VA
which are nmnbered ass. 25FF ands. 25FFF. This
Act ·came into force on June 6, 1957.
•
The legislative history to which we have just
referred clearly indicates that having provided broadly for the investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, the legislature recognised that ind 1vidual workmen should
be given a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights, and so, inserted s. 33. A in the Act in
1950 anc! added s. 33-C in 1956. These two provisions illustrate t11e cases iu which individual workmen
c:an enforce their -rights without having to take
recourse to s. 10(1) of the Act, or without having t.o
depend upon their Union to espouse their cause.
Therefore, in construing s. )l3-C we have to bear in
mind two relevant considerations. The construction
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3 S.C.R.
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS
151
should not be so broad as to bring within the scope
of s. 33-C cases which would fall under s. 10( I).
Where industrial disputes arise between employees
acting collectively and their employers, they must
be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the
Act, as for instance, by refe1 cnce under s, HJ( I).
These disputes cannot be brought within the purview
of s. 33C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the
policy of the Legislature in enacting s. 33C is to provide
a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce
or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases
of existing rights which are sought to be implemented
by individual workmen. In other words, though in
determining the scope of s. 33C we must take care
not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within
its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases
which fall under s. 10(1) of the Act for instance,
can.not be brought within the scope of s. 3~C.
Let us then revert to the words used in s. 33C( 2)
in order to decide what would be its true scope and
effect on a fair and reasonable constuction. When
sub-s. (2) refers to any workman entitled to receive
from the employer any benefit '.there specifitd, does
it mean that he must be a workman whose right to
receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer? According to the appellant, the scope of subs. (2) is similar to that of sub-s. (1) and it is pointed
out that just as under sub-s. (1) any disputed question
about the workmen's right to receive the money due
under an award cannot be ad judicatcd upon by the
appropriate Government, so under sub·s. (2) if a
dispute is raised about the workmen's right to receive
the benefit in question, that cannot be determined by
the Labour Court. The only point which the Labour
Court can determine is one in relation to the compu·
talion of the benefit in terms of money. We arc
not impressed
by this
argument. In
our
opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction
1963
Ctntral BtJnk bf
lntlia Ltd
v.
P. S. Ra1ag11ftJ!nrt
Gaj1rul1ogt1dor I
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[I964) VOL.
of sub-s. (2) it is clear that if a workman's right
to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have
C1ntral Bank of
to
be determi1.ed by the Labour 'Cow t. Before
Indi2 Ltd.
proceeding
to compute the benefit in terms of money
••
P. S. Raja:opa/an
the Labour Cou·t inevitably has to deal with the
Ga}1ndra3adkor J.
question as to whether the workman has a right to
receive that beuefit. If the said right is not disputed,
nothing more needs to be done and the Labour
Court can proceed to compute the value of the
benefit in terms of money ; but if the said right is
disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that
question and decide whether the workman ·has the
right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and
it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in
favour of the workman that the next question of
making necessary cr.mputation can arise. It seems
to us that tbe opening clause of sub-s. (2) does not
admit of the construction for which the appellant
contends unless we add some words in that clause.
The Clause "Where any workman is entitled to
receive from the employer any benefit" does not
mean "where such workman is admittedly, or
admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit." The
appellant's construction would necessarily introduce
the addition of the w.ords "admittedly, or admitted
to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that 'if 1the appellam s
construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean
that it would be at the option of the employer to
allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy
provided by sub-s. (2), because he has merely to raise
an objection on the ground that the right claimed by
the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction
of the Labour Court to entertain the workman'.,
application. The claim under ·S. 33 c.(2) clearly
postulates that the determination of the question
about computing the benefit in terms of money may.
in some cases. have to be preceded by an enquiry in.
to the existence of the right and such an enquiry must
' be held to be incidental to the main determination
;--;
1969
I
•
3 SiC.R.
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
1113
which has b~en assigned to the Labour Court by
sub-s. (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an
Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants
the power ofdoin ; all such acts, or employing such
means, as are essentially necessary to its execution(')." We must accordingly hold that s. :me (2)
takes within its purview cases of workmen who
claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled
should be computed in terms of money, even though
the right to the benefit on which their claim is based
is disputed by their employers. Incidentally, it may
be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd
that under·sub·s. (3), the Labour Court should have
been authorised to delegate the work of computing
the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner
if the determination of the said question was the only
task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-s. (2).
On the other hand, sub·s. 3 becomes intelligible
if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of thP. assignment of the
Labour Court under sub-s. (2).
It is, however, urged that in dealing with the
question about the existence of a right set up by the
workman, the Labour Court would necessarily have
to interpret the award or settlement on which the
right is based, and that cannot be within its jurisdiction under s. 33C (2), because interpretation of
awards or settlements has been specifically and
expressly provided for by s. 36A. We have already
noticed that s. 36A has also been added by ·the
Amending Act No. 36 of I !J56 along with section
330, and the appellant's argument is that the
legislature introduced the two sections together
and
thereby indicated
that
questions of interpretion fall within s. 36A and,
therefore, outside s. 330 (2). Thereis no force in
this contention. Section .36A merely provides for
the interpretation of any provision of an award or
settlement where any difficulty or doubt arises-a•
(I) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutc1 p. 350,
lfb!J
C1rit,.1 B<ni;,.f
lndia Lid.
v.
~. S. Rajagopaldo
Gaj1n4razad"4r J.
1li4 SlJPREl.\l:E CbiJRt REPORTS [1964] VOt.
c,.,,.1 B..k •!
l•ii• lli.
v.
P. 'S,. Rajagopalan
to the said interpretation. Generally, this power is
invoked when the employer and his employees are
not agreed as to the interpretation of any award or
settlement, and the appropriate Government is
satisfied that a defect or doubt has arisen in regard
to any provision in the award or settlement. .Sometimes, cases may arise where the awards or settlements are obscure, ambiguous or otherwise rresent
difficulty in construction. It is in such cases that
s. 36A can be invoked by the parties by moving the
appropriate Government to make the necessary
reference under it. Experience showed that where
awards or settlements were defective in the manner
just indicated, there was no remedy available to the
parties to have their doubts or difficulties resolved
and that remedy is now provided by s. 36A. But
the scope of s. 36A is different from the scope of
s. 33C (2), because s. 36A is not concerned with the
implemention or execution of the award at all,
whereas that is the sole purpose of s. 33C (2).
Whereas s. 33C(2) deals with cases of implementation
of individual rights of workmen falling under its
provisions, s. 36A deals merely with a question of
interpretation of the award where a dispute arises
in that behalf between the workmen and the employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that
the dispute deserves to be resolved by reference
under s. 36A.
Besides, there can be no doubt that when the
Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing
individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution
powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is
open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree
for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true
that the executing Court' cannot go behind the decree,
nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of
the decree. These limitations apply also to the
Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the
,...._...
-
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPRENiE COURT REPORTS
15~
Labour Court would alstJ be competent tu interpret
the award or settlement on which a work111aR bases
his claim under s. 330 (2). fhercfore, we feel no
difliculty in holding that for Liu: purpose of making
the necessary determination under s. 330 (2), it
would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour
Court to interpret the award or settlement on which
the workman's right rests.
•
"
..
-
We have already ntJliced that in enacting
s. 33C the legislature has deliberately omitted some
words which occurred in s. 20 (2) of the Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. It is
remarkable that similar words of limitation have
been used ins. 33C (1) because s. 33 C (1) deals with
cases where any money.is due under a settlement or
an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA.
It is thus clear that claims made under s. 33C (1),
by itself can be only claims referable to the settlement, award, or the relevant provisions of Chapter
VA. These words of limitations are not to be found
ins. 33C (2) and to that extent, the scope of s. 33C
(2) is undoubtedly wider than that of s. 33C (1). It is
true that even in respect of the larger class of cases
which fall under s. 33C (2), after the determination
is made by theLabour Court the execution goes back
again to s. 33C (1). That is why s. 33C (2)
expressely provides that the amount so determined
may be recovered as provided for in sub-section ( l) .
It is unnecessary in the present appeals either to
state exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what
other categories of claims can fall under s. 330 (2).
There is no doubt that the three categories of claims
mentioned ins. 33C (l) fall under s. 33C (2) and
in that sense, s. 33C (2) can itself be deemed to be
a kind of execution proceeding; but it is possible
that claims not based on settlements, awards or made
under the provisions· of Chapter V A, may also be
competent under s. 33C (2) and that may illustrate
its wider scope. We would, however, like to indicate
Central B•ok of
l•dio ltd.
v.
P. S. R•i.,..P•lan
il56 SUPR:EM,E COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
some of the claims which would not fall under
s. 33C (2), because they formed the subject matter of
C1nlrol Bank .of
lndi· 'ltd,
the appeals which have been grouped together for
v.
P. S. Rajogopalan · our.decision along with· the appeals with which we
are dealing at present. lfan employee' is dismissed or
Gllj1ndrogadkar /,
demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make
a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under
s. 33C (2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise
to an industrial dispute which may be .appropriately
tried, but once it is shown that the -employer has
dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the ·dismissal
or demotion is unlawful and. therefore, the employee
continues to be the workman of the employer and
is entitled to the benefits due to him under a :preexisting contract, cannot be made under s. 33 .c (..2).
If a settlement has been duly reached between .the
employer and his employees and it falls under
s. 18 (2) or (3) of the Act and is.governed bys. 19(2),
it ·Would not be open to an •employee, notwithstanding the said settlement, to claim the benefit as
though the said settlement had come to an end.
If the settlement exists and continues to be operative
no claim can be made under s. 33C (2) inconsistent
with the said settlement. If the settlement is
intended to be .terminated, proper steps may have
to be taken in that .behalf and a dispute that may
arise thereafter may to be dealt with according to
the •other procedure prescribed by the Act. Thus,
our conclusion is that ·the scope of s. 330 (2) is
wider than s. 330 (1) and cannot be wholly assimilated with it, though for obvious reasons, we do not
propose to decide or indicate what additional
cases would fall under s. 330 (2) which may not fall
under s. 330 (I). In this connection, we may inciden·
tally state that the observations made by this Court in
·the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd (1 ), thats. 330
it;;a provision ·in the nature of execution should-not
be interpreted to mean that the scope nf s. 330 (2) is
exactly the same as-1. 330 (l) (pa&'e 238).
(I) l~G2 (I) L. L. J, 23',
j
-
-
,__,_
3· S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
It now remains to refer to some decisions which
are relevant. In M/s. Kasturi and Sons (Private)
Ltd v. Shri N. Salivateeswaran (1 ), where this Court
was con~idering the question about the scope and effect
of s. 17 of the Working Journalists (Condition of
Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955,
(No. 45 of 1955), reference was made to the
fact that the procedure prescribed by the said
s. 17 was different from the procedure prescribed
by s. 33C (2), and it was observed that
under the latter provision where an employee
makes a claim for some money, an enquiry into the
claim is contemplated by the Labour Court, and
it is only after the Labour Court has decided the
matter that the decision becomes enforceable under
s. 33C (l) by summary procedure .• No such enquiry
was contemplated by the said s. 17.
•
In Shri Ambica Mills Oo. Ltd. v. Shri S.B.
Bhatt ('\, section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act,
l\136 {No. 4 of l!J36) fell to be construed, and it
was held that under the said section, when the
authority exercises its jurisdiction which is made
exclusive by s. 22, it has necessarily to consider
various questions incidental to the claims falling
thereunder, and it was added that although it would
be inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast rule
for determining the scope of such questions, care
should be taken not ~o unduly extend or curtail
its jurisdiction. As we have already indicated, we
have adopted the same approach in interpreting
s. 33C (2).
The respondents relied on the decision of
the Bombay High Court in M/s. Sawatram
R,amprasad Mills Oo. Ltd., Akola v. Baliram (').
In support of the very broad
construction
which they seek to place on the provisions of
s. 33C (2). In that case, the High Court was dealing with a claim made under Chapter VA of the Act,
(I) [1959] S. O. R 1.
(2) [1961] 3 S. C.R. 220,
tS) (1962) 65 Bom. L. R. 91.
1969
C•ntral Bank of
Indio Lttl
v.
P. S. R•j•g.,.,.,, ·
Gajendra1adkar J.
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL,
there can be no doubt that such aclaim together
"" ef and
with all a question incidental to its decision can be
Cmtral BMA
lndi• Lt;.
v.
' I'.
a. 1'aj11apalar_i
properly determined under s. 33C (2). In reaching
its conclusion, the High Court has no doubt made
certain broad and general observations in regard to
the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the
'Labour Court under s. 33C (2). Those observations
are in the nature of obiter dicta and in so far as
they may be inconsistent with our present decision,
they should be held to be not justified by the terms
of s. 33C (2). In the result, the preliminary point
raised by the appellant that the Labour Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the respondents' applications fails and must be rejected.
That takes us to the meiits of the respondents'
claim. We have already seen that the main basis
on which the respondents have claimed the special
allowance under paragraph 164 (b) (l) of the Sastry
Award is that they have been operating 'upon the
adding machines provided by the appellant for use
in its clearing department. The appellant, however
has contended that the special allowance can be
claimed only by Comptists, and since Lhe respondents
had not even claimed that they are Comptists, their
applications should be rejected. For deciding this
dispute. it is necessary to refer to the relevant
provisions of-the Sastry Award as they were modified
.by the decision of the Lab.mr Appellate Tribunal.
Chapter X of the Sastry Award deals with the
problem of special allowances .. In paragraph 161
. of this Chapter, the Sastry Tribunal observed that
there were certain posts even in the clerical and
subordinate grades for whirh an incumbent requires
. special qualifications or skill for the efficient
discharge or his duties, and so, it thought that an
extra payment in such cases is necessary by way
of recognition of and compensation for this special
skill or responsibility. In paragraph 162, the
Tribunal examinrd three 11lternatives suggested for
;,
-..,
3 S.C.R.
,I(
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
its acceptance for making a provision for same
special payment, and it ultim1tely decided that
a special allowance should be paid to those
categories of employees who, by
their special
qualifications or skill, deserve recognition. In paragraph 163, the Tribunal observed that the special
allowance which it was about to prescribe was the
minimum and it was open to the banks to pay higher
allowance if they thought necessary to do so. Then
followed paragraph 164 in which it specified 10
categories fit for special allowances. The first of
these categories was Graduates and the claim of this
category of employees was dealt with by the Tribunal in paragraph 164(a). Paragraph 164(b) deals with
the remaining 9 categories and the Compti1ts
are the first in these 9 categories. The Tribunal
provided th1t the Comptists should
receive
Rs. l 0/- p.m. as special allowance in cases
of all the four classes of banks A,B,C and D. It is on
this provision that the respondents rely in support
of their claim.
When the Sastry Award went before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the Labour Appellate
Tribunal dealt with this question in paragraph 140
of its decision. The 'Tribunal observed that during
the course of the hearing it became clear that the
nomenclature by which particular categories of
employees are described differed from bank to bank,
and so, in order to avoid disputes between banks and
their employees as to whether a particular category
of employees is entitled to a special allowance under
the Award or not. the Tribunal asked the banks to
supply it with statements of different names given to
the categories of employees for whom special allowances have been provided by the Sastry Award.
Accordingly, some of the banks supplied the necessary
information. The Tribunal then set out eight of the
categnries the equivalents of '.which ·had been
suj11plied in the statements of the banks. As. against
1,63
••
P. S- &i•t•;at ..
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963.
Cent•a/ Bank of
/11f#a Ltd.
v.
P•. S. Rojagopalan
the Comptists, Statement No. B-247 which had been
supplied by the Imperial Bank of India, showed that
the nomenclature adopted by the said Bank in respect
of the said category was adding machine operators,
Addressographers. Having set out these equivalents,
the Tribunal took the precaution of adding that the
equivalents set out . by it were helpful, but did not
exhaust the subject, and so, in the absence of data,
it had to be left to the banks· to pay the
appropriate allowances having regard to the duties
and responsibilities of a post. That is how the matter
ended.
·
1:n the present proceedings, the respondents
seem to base their case on the sole basis that they
are operJting the adding machines and can, there:
fore, be · treated as adding machine operators, and
they argued· that since adding machine operators
were equated· in the statement of the Imperial Bank
of India with Comptists, they must be held to be
Comptists for the purpose of paragraph 164 (b) (1) of
the Sastry Award and thus entitled to the special
allowance of Rs. ·10 /-> In fact, in allowing the -respondents' claim the Tribunal seems to have accep·
ted this contention, for it has observed that according
to the decision of the Labour appellate Tribunal, the adding machine operators must be held to be~in the ·
same category as Comptists. In other words, the Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since the Impe•
rial Bank of India described the employees who did
the work of Comptists as adding machine operators,
it followed that whenever any bank employee was operating on the adding machine for howsoever
small a period it may be, he must be held to be a
Comptist and as such entitled. to the special allowance; In our opinion, this is clearly erroneous._
It is true that the Imperial Bank of India adopted
the nomenclature of adding machine operators for
its Comptists and that may presumably be for the
reason that at the relevant time, its Comptists were
-
3 s.c.R.
SHPRENiE COURT REPORTS
i61
doi•: the work ef addin: machine "perat11rs and Address\'Jgraphers; so that it made n& difference whether
the bank called them Comptists or adding machine
operators or Addressographers, all the three types
of work being entrusted to one category of employees;
but however that may be, the nomenclature adopted
by the Imperial Bank of India cannot be said to be
binding on the other banks which did not adopt it,
and so, it is obviously erroneous to hold that the
equivalent adopted by the Imperial Bank of India
must be taken to have been adopted by all the other
banks. Indeed, the Award recently made by Mr.
Justice Desai who was appointed the National
Industrial Tribunal in the Bank Disputes clearly
brings out the distinction between Comptists on the
one hand, and adding machine operators, addressographers and photostat machine operators on the
other in paragraphs 5. 242 and 5. 265.
,.
In the present appeals, no evidence was led on
behalf of the respondents. The appellant, however,
examined its officer Mr. Shivodkar. This witness
stated that an adding machine can be operated l.iy a
clerk with half an hour's practice. It only does
additions mechanically. Operating a comptometer,
however, involves complicated calculations and in
order to handle it efficient! y, the employee has to
take three months training and practising. He
added that about two hours' work is put on the
adding machine by the several respondents, but it is
inc:luded in their normal working hours. There hi,lll
been some discussion at the Bar in the present appeals
as to the nature of the work which is done on the
comptometer and on the adding machine, but there
can be no doubt that compared to the comptometer,
the adding machine is a simple mechanism and for
operating on it, not much experience or technical
training is required; in fact, it may not even require
,that amount of skill and efficiency which is expected
of a typist and it is significant that a claim made
19'3
Ctntr~l Ba11k oj
India. Ltd:
v.
/'. S. Raja1•f4la'
Gaj1ntlragM/car J. .
,·
"'-
, '
.
'
J, '.,..,.....~- ·,,, j\
\
'
,'.f
i62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l9B4JVOL.\.
·,,
196J .
by :the typists for special allowance.was ~ejected by'
the Sastry Tribunal. - That shows how the respon.
.. f,.,[U LIJ.
v.
dents' claim for.special allowance as Comptists solely
.P• .S. "ll•felll{>f1111t
on the ground that they can be described as adding
Gafaa/r&:d.a' J.
machine operators, cannot be sustained. Therefore,
the sole basis on which the respondents' claim has
"been allowed by the Labour Court is unsound, and
so the order passed by it cannot be affirmed.
.
C-.JBaioJ
..
'
It has, however, . been urged before us by the
respondents that they should be given an opportunity ·to substantiate. their claims on the merits. It is
argued that they were _advised . that the equivalent
supplied by the Imperial Bank of India by itself
furnished a firm basis ·for their claims; and so, no.
other allegations were madt> by them in the present
proceedings and no evidence was. led by them to
prove the nature of the work done by them and the
· · time_ for which they do the special kind of work to
· justify the- claim for special_... allowance. On
·,
· the other hand, the. appellant h_as stren.uously
contended that ~he delay
made
by ··the
respondents -in making the present applications
_ speaks for itself, and so, no indulgence should be
shown to the respondents for ·remanding the present
".
cases to· the Labour Court once it is found that the
basis on which the claim has been allowed is not
justified in law; ' It is true that though the. Sastry
Award was passed in 1J53 aud the Labour Appellate
Tribunal's decision was pronounced in 1954 and it
became final on October 21, 1955, the respondents
did not make their claims until 1962. \Ve have had
occasion in the past to emphasise - the fact that
industrial a?judication should. not encourag:e ~nduly
belated claims; but on the other hand, no hm1tation
;!
is prescribed for an application under s. 33C(2) and
it Would, on the· whole, not be right for us to refuse
:an opportunity to the respondents to prove their case
. only on the ground that they moved · the Labour
.Court after considerable delay. We would, therefore·
'
.
'
3 5.C.R.
-
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
set aaide the order passed by the Labour Court and
remand the proceedings to that Court with a direction
that it should allow the parties to amend their
pleadings if they so desire and to lead evidence in
support of their respective cases. It may be open to
the respondents to prove that they are doing the work
which may be properly described as the work of
Comptists.__.In that connection, it may also be open
to them incidentally to show that the work which
was being done in the Imperial Bank of India by the
adding machine operators who were shown as equiva·
lents of the Comptists at the relevant time is being
done by them in the appellant's branches. If the
Labour Court is satisfied that the work done by the
respondents can be reasonably treated as the work of
Comptists as properly understood in the banking
industry, then it should proceed to determine the
respondents' claim on that basis. We have already
referred to the fact that the Labour Appellate
Tribunal made it perfectly clear that the particular
nomenclature was not decisive and that what
mattered in these cases was the nature of the duties
and responsibilities of a post. If the nature of the
duties and responsibilities of the posts held by the
respondents legitimately justify the conclusion that
they are comptists, then the special allowance can be
claimed by them. It is in the light of these observations that the Labour Court should proceed to deal
with these cases after remand. If the parties want to
amend their pleadings, they should move the Labour
Court in that behalf within a fortnight after the
receipt of the record in that Court. Then the Labour
Court 1hould fix an early date for taking evidence
and should deal with these matters as expeditiously as
possible.
The result is, the appeals are allowed, the
orders passed by the Labour Court are set aside and
the matters sent back to that Court for disposal in
1963
Cmtra/ Bonk oj
lnr!ia Ltd.
••
P. S. Raj~gttftalan
Gaj1rulra1ai/.ar I
164
196J
Clllllr•I Bo.k •f
l•diis Ltd,
.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
accordance with law.
to costs.
There would be no order as
••
Appeals allowed.
Cases remanded.
P. S. · Rajogopalan
Gajmdratatkat J,
1969
UNION OF INDIA
.dpil 19.
v.
A. L. RALLIA RAM
(B. P. SINHA C. J., J.C. SHAH and
. N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Arbitration-Tender for purchase of goods-Acceptance of
-0.lause for reference to arbitration-If binding on Government
-Reference of specific question of law-Arbitrator framing
$1$Ues-Parties agreeing to iasuea being decided-If amounts to
reference of specific question of law-Setting aside of awardBrror on the face of the award-Government of India Act, 1935,
(<ho. 5 Oh. 2.), a.175 (3).
.
•·
In 1946, the Chief Director of Purchases (Disposals),
Food Department, Government .of India, invited tenders for
purc!iasing war surplus Amedcan Cigarettes. The respondent
submitted a tender offering to purchase the entire stock. This
tender was accepted by a letter with which was enclosed a
Form containing the general conditions of contract including a
clause for arbitration. The respondent took delivery of29,93, 597
packets and paid Rs. 17,78,573/6/4 for them. On inspection
some of the cigarettes were found to be mildewed and unfit for
use. Ultimately, the Government decided to cancel the contract
with respect to the undelivered cigarettes and. offered to take
back from the respondent cigarettes which "wei:e in their original
packing and could be identified, subject to the condition that
no claim will be made by the respondent in respect of freight,
storage, rents, charges or any other expenses incurred by him
in respect of the cigarettes taken back.". The respondent
accepted this offer reserving his right to claim incidental
expenses. He returned 24,13,500 packets and Government
refunded Rs. 14,54,215/7/- to him. Thereafter, each party, in
accordance with the arbitration clause, appointed an arbitrator
~
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