ADDAGADA RAGHAVAMMA AND ANR. versus ADDAGADA CHENCHAMMA AND ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 April 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 933 | 1963 INSC 94
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 April 1963
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 165/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 933
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 94
Text of the judgment
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
933
1963
and answer the question .in favour of the assessee.
The assessee will be entitled to the costs throughout.
Champaru. Cane
Appeals allowed.
Conce1n
v.
Sttlfe of 13ihar
Dai J•
•
ADDAGADA RAGH.\VAMMA AND ANR.
"·
ADDAGADA CHENCHAMMA AND ANR.
(K. SuBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)
•
Hindu Law-Partition-Adoption-Burden of proof and
onu• of proof-Di•tinction-S.paration-Elements necessa'71
to make it effective-Declaration and knowledge-Doctrine. of
relation back if affect vested right-Concurrent findings of fact,
if and when can be interfered with'-Oertifir,ate granted under
Art. 133-Scope and limit-Constitution of India, Art. 133.
The appellants and the respondents trace their interest
and rights through their genealogy to one Veeranna who died
in 1906. One of his sons Pitchayya, predeceased him in 1905
and it is alleged that sometime before his death Pitchayya took
Venkayya, the son of his brother Chimpirayya, in adoption.
It is further alleged that a partition of the joint family properties.between Veeranna and his four sons took place. Venl>ayya
died in 1938 having a •on Subbarao. Chimpirayya died in
1945 having executed a will whereun<ler he gave his properties
in equal shares to Subbarao and Kamalamma, the daughter
of.his predeceased daughter. He also directed Raghavamma,
the wife of his brother Pitchayya, to take possession of' the
entire property belonging to him, manage it and to hand over
the same to his two grand children when they attained majo-·
.rity. Chimpirayya excluded his daughter-in-law Chenchamma
from management as well as inheritance. But Raghavamma
allowed Chenchamma to take possession of the property.
Subbarao died in 1949. In 1950, Raghavamma filed a.suit for
possession of the property impleading Chenchamma &s the first
defendant, Kamalamma as the second defendant and Runn~yya
as· the tJiird defendant.
1963
April 9,
934 SUPREN.IE COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
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Chenchamma, the first defendant and the present first
respondent, contended that Venkayya was not given in adoption
and that there was no partition as alleged by the plaintiff.
She averred that Chimpirayya died undivided from his grand·
son Subbarao and therefore, Subbarao became entitled to all
the properties of the joint' family by 1 ight of survivorship.
The trialJudge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff
had not established adoption of Venkayya by her hasband
Pitchayya and that she aho failed to prove that Cnimpirayya
and Pitchayya were divided from each other and in the result
dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court upheld the
above two findings ol the trial Judge. A new plea was raised
by the appellant before the High Court that the will executed
by Chimpirayya contained a clear intention to divide and that
this declaration constituted a severance in status enal,Jing him
to execute a will. The High Cc..urt rejected this contention
also and in the result dismis<ed the appeal.
•
On appeal by certificate, the appellants contended : ( l)
that the findings of the High Court on adoption as well as on
partition were vitiated by the High Court not drawing the
relevant presumptions permissible in the case of old transactions, not appreciating the great evidentiary value of public
documents, ignoring or at any rate nor giving weight to
admissions made by parties and witnesses, adopting a mechanical instead of an intellectual approach and perspective and
above all ignoring the consistent conduct of parties "spread over
a long period, inevitably leading to the conclusion that the
adoption and the partition set up by the appellant were true.
(2) On the assumption that there was no partition by metes
and bounds, the court should have held on the basis ot the
entire evidence that there was a division in status between
C.himpirayya and Pitchayya, conferring on Chimpirayya the
right to bequeath his divided share of the family property.
(3) The will itself contained recitals emphasizing the fact that
he had all through been a divided member of the family and
that on the date of execution of the will he continued to
possess that character of a divided member so as to entitle
him to execute the will in respect of his share and, therefore,
the recitals in the will themselves constituted an unambiguous
declaration of his intention to divide and the fact that the
said manife:itation of the intention was not communicated
before his death to Subbarao or his guardian Chenchamma
could not affect his status as a divided member. (4) Chenchamma, the guardian of Subbarao, was present at the time of
execntion of the will and, therefore, even if communication was
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2s.C.R.
stJ i>REME COtJRt REPORTS
935
nece.,ary for bringing about a divided status, it was made in
the present case.
The respondents raised a preli1ninary objection, that the
-certificate i!Sued by the High Court did not contain any issue
relating to adoption or partition. Hence, this Court should
not allow the appellants to raise these questions. Secondly,
it was contended that since the question, whether <leclaration
. in the will constituted a partition was raised in the High Court
for the first time it should not be allowed to be raised. It
wa• further urged that on the issues of partition and adoption,
there were concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and
the High Court and this Court should not interfere.
Held that a successful party can question the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that a certificate was
wrongly fasued by the High Court in contravention of Art. 133
of the Constitution, but ifthe certificate was good, the provisions of that Article did not confine the scope of the appeal to
the certificate.
•
Thi.s Court has th.e power to review the concurrent findings
of fact arrived at by the lower courts in appropriate cases.
But this Court ordinarily will not interfere with concurrent
findings of fact except in exceptional cases, where the findings
are such as "shocks the conscience of the Court or by disregard
·to the forms of legal process or some violation of some
principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial· and gravr,
injustice has been done' '. It is not possible nor advisable to
define those circumstances. It must necessarily be left to the
discretloa of this Court having regard to the facts of a particular case. The present case is not one of those exceptional
cases where a departure from the salutary practice adopted by
this Court is justified.
Case Law referred to.
~
.
There is an essential distinction between burden or
proof and onus of proof; burden of proof lies upon the person
who has to prove a fact and it never shifts but the onus of proof
shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the
evaluation of evidence. The criticism levelled against the
judgments of the lower courts, therefore, only pertain to the
domain of •ppreciation of evidence.
It is well settled that a person who seeks to displace the
natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must
discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum
of adoption and its validity. In the present case, the apnellant
ha• failed to discharge that burden.
1963
Add'Jgada
Raghavamma
••
Addszafi'J
Chen~smmlJ
936 SUPREME COURT, REPORTS [l964]VOL.
1963
Addazad•
R•ghammmc
...
AdtU.goda
Cltta.eMmma
The burden is upon that person who sets up partition to
prove that fact. The general principle is that a Hindu. family
is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is. proved. The
finding whether there was partition or not is a finding of fact.
An interference in the concurrent findings of fact on this point
by the courts below is not j11stified.
Bhagallali Pra8ad Shah v. D1dbi RameBh11ariJuar, (1951]
S. C. R. 603, referred to.
It iJ settled law that a member of a joint Hindu family
can bring about his separation in status hy a definite and un·
equivocal and unilateral declaration of his intention to separate
himself from the family and enjoy his share in scverality.
One cannot declare or manifest his mental state in a vaccum.
1~o declare is to make known, to assert to others. Others must
necessarily be those affected by the said declaration. Therefore,
a member of a joint Hindu family seeking to separate himlclf
from othen will have to make known his intention to the other
members of the family from whom he seeks to separate.
A declaration to be effective should reach the per>on or persons
affected by one proccos or other api;ropriate to a given situation.
Adujalath KathU8umma v. Adujalath &tehu, l.L.R. 1950
Mad. 502, Suraj Narain v. Igbal Narain, (1912) l.L.R .. 35
All.SO (P. C.), Ramalinga Annavi v. Narayanan Annavi, (1922)
I. L. R. 45 Mad. 489 (P. C.), Sayed Kaaam v. Jorawar Sitl{lh,
(1922) J.L.R. 50 Cal. 84 (P. C.), Soundararaya,. v. Arunaclza.
lam GM.U11, (1915) I. L. R. 39 Mad. 159 (P.C.), Bal Kr;.hna v.
RamKriahna, (1931) I. L. R. All. 300 (P. C.), Babu Ramaaaray
PraMJd Choudhary v. Radhika Devi, (1935) 43 L. W. 172 (P.C.),
Kamtpalli A•ilamma v. Manmen YenketG1Wt1my, ( 1913). 33
M. L.J. 745, Rama Ayyar v. Meenafc.hi Ammal, (1930) 33
L. W. 384, Narayana Rao v. Pu,.hothama Rao, I. L. R. i938
Mad. 315 and Indira v. Sivapraaad Rao, I. L. R. 19j3 Mad.
245, discussed.
Once the declaration i• expressed and brought to . the
knowledge of the person affected, it relates back.to.lhc date.of
.
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
937
declaration or the expression of intention to .separate. As the
doctrine of relation back involves retroactivity, it cannot affect
vested rights. It would follow that, though the date of severance is that of manifestation of the Intention to separate, the
rights accrued to others in the joint family" property between
the said manifestation and the knowledge of it by the other
members would be saved.
JHJ
Applying the above principles to the present case it must
be held that on the death of Chimpirayya'his interest devolved
on Subbarao since it has not been rstablished that Subbarao or
his guardian had knowledge of the contents of Chimpirayya's
will before Chimpirayya died.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 165 of 61.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
December 20,, 1955, of the former Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Appeal Suit No. 716 of 1952.
D. Narsaraju, Advocate-General for the St,ate of
Andhra Pradesh, and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the
appellants.
K. Bhimsankaram, G. Jagapathi
Satyanafflyana, for the respondent No. 1.
Rao. and
'K. R. Ghoudhry, for the respondent No. 2.
1963. April 9. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered. by
4
•
SuBBA RAo J .-This appeal by certificate is
preferred against the Judgment and Decree of the
. High:.Court of Andhra confirming those of the
· Subordinate Judge, Bapatla, dismissing the suit filed
by the appellants for. possession of the plaint schedule
.properties. ,The following,:genealogy will be useful
Subi• Roo I.
.
938 $UPREME COURT REPORTS [lll64] VOL
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/96S
Adrlo_~•da
..
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in appreciating the facts and the contentions of the
parties :
Roelut.f9mm•
Veeranna (d. 2.2.1906)
Md.tad•
Clier.chJmma
I
s,.;6a R.. I.
Seshamma
(2nd wife)
Atchamma
(!st wife)
I .
I
I
Chimpirayya
(d.5-5-1945)
Pitchayya
(d .1-9-100/i)
I
I
i,
I
Daughter
(d. l-ll-1905)
1
j
:
Raghavamma
( Plff.-Applt.)
I
Vcnkayya=Chcnchamma (Dl, R l)
(alleged adopted)
I
I
I
I
...l--'~------S-ub_b_a_ra_o~(d.28- 7-1 !149)
I
I
I
\
I
I
Vcnkayya
Saraswatamma
i
(d.24-5-l!J38)
(alleged to have Komalamma
been adopted by
(D-2/R-2)
Pitchayya)
I
Raghavayya
(b.28-10-1910
d. 1916)
China Punnayya
(D-3, R-3)
Peda Punnayya
(died unmarried)
•
..
I
I
Isl wife
(died issueless)
I
Alivelamma
I .
2nd wife
Subbamma
L.R. ofD3/R3
I
I.
Venkayamma
..
-.
2 s.c.11.
SUPREME COURT REPORts
939
It will be seen from the
genealogy that
Veeranna had two wives and that Chimpirayya and
Pitchayya were his sons by the first wife and Peda
Punnayya and China Punnayya were his sons by
the second wife. Veeranna died in the year 1906
and his second son Pitchayya had predeceased him
on 1-9-1905 leaving his widow Raghavamma. It is
alleged that sometime before his death, Pitchayya
took Venkayya, the son of his brother Chimpirayya
in· adoption; and it is also alleged that in or about
the year 1895, there was a partition of the joint
family properties between Veeranna and his four
sons, Chimpirayya, Pitchayya, Peda Punnayya and
China Punnayya, Veeranna taking only 4 acres of land
and the rest of the property being divided between
the four sons by metes and bounds. Venkayya died on
May 24, 1938, leaving behind a son Subbarao.
Chimpirayya died on May 5, 1945 having executed
a will dated January 14, 1945 whereunder he gave
his properties in equal shares to Subbarao and
Kamalamma, the daughter of his pre-deceased
daughter
Saraswatamma; thereunder he also
directed Raghavamma, the widow of his brother
Pitchayya, to take possession of the entire property
belonging to him, to manage the same, to spend the
income therefrom at her discretion and to hand over
the property to his two grandchildren after they
attained majority and if either or both of them
died before attaining majority, his or her share or
the entire property, as the case may be, would go to
Raghavamma. The point to be noticed is that his
daughter-in-law, Chenchamma was excluded from
management as well as from inheritance after the
death of Chimpirayya. But Raghavamma allowed
Chenchamma to manage the entire property and she
accordingly came into possession of the entire property
after the death of Chimpirayya. S11 bbarao died on
July 28, 1949. Raghavamma filed a suit on October
12, 1950 in the Court of the' Subordincite Judge,
Bapatlal, for possession of the plaint scheduled
1969
Adiag•do
Raghaiamma
v.
Mda1.Ja
Chenchammo
Subba Rao J.
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964] VOL.
1963
Add.tad.
&1111>uottttna
v.
Add.gala
Chrncharmna
properties; and to that suit, Chenchamma was
made the first defendant; Kamalamma, the
second defendant; and China Punnayya, the
second 8on of Veeranna by his second wife,
the third defendant. The plaint consisted of
A, B, C, D, D-1 and E schedules, which are
alleged to be the properties of Chimpirayya. Raghavamma claimed possession of A, B and C ~cheduled
properties from the lst defendant, for partition and
delivery of half share in the properties covered by
plaint-schedule D and D-1 which are alleged to
belong to her and the 3rd defendant in common and
a fourth share in the property covered by plaintschedule E which are alleged to belong to her and
the lst and 3rd defendants in common. As Kamalamma was a minor on the date of the suit, Raghavamma claimed possession of the said properties under the
will - half in her own right in respect of Subbarao's
share, as he died before attaining majority, and the
other half in the right of Kamalamma, as by then she
had not attained majority, she was entitled to
manage her share till she attained majority.
The first defendant denied that Venkayya was
given in adoption to Pitchayya or that there was a
partition in the family of Veeranna in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. She averred that Chimpirayya died undivided from his grandsoD" Subbarao
and, therefore, Subbarao became entitled to all the
properties of the joint family by right of survivorship. She did not admit that Chimpirayya executed
the will in a sound and disposing frame of mind. She
also did not admit the correctness of the Schedules
attached to the plaint. The second defendant filed .a
statement supporting the plaintiff. The third defendant filed a statement denying the allegations in
the plaint and disputing the correctness of the extent
ofsome of the items;in the plaint schedules. He al90
averred that some o£the items belonged to him exclu:sively and that Chimpirayya.had no right.tothesamc.
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2 1S.C:R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9!1
On the pleadings various issues were raised and
the main issues, with which we are now concerned;
are· is8ues 1 and 2, and they are : (1) whether the
adoption of Venkayya was true and valid ; and (2)
whether Pitchayya and Chimpirayya were divided
as alleged by the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate
Judge, after considering the entire oral and documentary evidence in the case, came to the concluaion that
the plaintiff had not established the faotum of adoption of Venkayya by her husband Pitchayya and
that she also failed to pwve that Chimpira yya and
Pitchayya were divided from each other ; and in the
result he dismissed the suit with costs.
On appeal, a division Bench of the Andhra
High Court reviewed the entire evidence over again
and affirmed the findings of the learned Subordinate
Judge on both the issues. Before the learned Judges
another point was raised, namely, that the recitals
in the will disclose a clear and unambiguous declaration of the intention of Chimpirayya to divide, that
the said declaration constituted a severance in status
enabling him to exetute a will. The learned Judge
rejected that plea on two grounds, namely, (1) that
the will did not contain any such declaration ; and
(2) that, if it did, the plaintiff should have claimed
a division of the entire family property, that is, not
only the property claimed by Chimpirayya but also
the property alleged to have been given to Pitchayya
and that the suit a~ framed would not be maintainable. In the result the appeal was dismissed with
costs. The present appeal has been preferred by the
plaintiff by certificate against the said judgment.
-.
Learned Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh, '
appearing for th!' appellant. raises before us
the following points : (1) The findings of
the High Court on adoption as well as on partition
were vitiated by the High Court not drawing the.
relevant presumptions permissible in the case of old
1963
Addagada·
R1gh0Vamm•
••
Addagadn
C/ur.ch.amma
Subha Rao }.
942
/963
Addag ufa
R.,1w..,,,,,,.
Y.
Md.tu•
CJi111charnm•
~ubba
Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
transactions, not appreciating the great evidentiary
value of public documents, ignoring or at any rate
not giving weight to admissions made by parties
and witnesses adopting a mechanical instead of an
intellectual approach and perspective and above all
ignoring the consistent conduct of parties spread over
a long period inevitably leading to the conclusion
that the adoption and the partition set up by the
appellant were true. (2) On the assumption that
there was no partition by metes and bounds, the
Court should have held on the basis of the entire evidence that there was a division in status between Chi·
mpirayya and Pitchayya, conferring on Chimpirayya
the right to bequeath his divided share of the family
property. (3) The will itself contains recitals emphasizing the fact that he had all through been a divided
member of the family and that on the date of execution of the will he continued to possess that character of a divided member so as to entitle him to
execute the will in respect of his share and, therefore, the recitals in the will themselves constitute
an unambiguous declaration of his intention to
divide and the fact that the said manifestation of
intention was not communicaterl before his death to·
Subbarao or his guardian Chenchamma could not
affect his status as a divided member. And (4)
Chenchamma, the guardian of Subbarao, was present
at the time of execution of the will and, therefore,
even if communication was necessary for bringing
about a divided status, it was made in the present
case.
Mr. Bhimasankaram, learned counsel for the
contesting first respondent, raises a preliminary objection to the effect that the certificate given by the
High Court was confined only to three questions which
did not include the issues relating to adoption or
partition and, therefore, the appellant could not question the correctness of those findings in respect of those
issues and that the question whether the recital~ in t4e
• •
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'
-
943
will themselv~s constituted a partition in status
could not be allowed to be raised, as that point was
raised only for the first time in the High Court. He
further contends that both the Courts below gave
concurrent findings of fact on the question of
adoption as well as on partition and this Court will
not reconsider the evidence as a rule of practice and
there are no excep•ional circumstances to depart
from that salutary practice in this appeal. He
further seeks to sustain the findings of the High Court
on the evidence adduced in the case.
We shall take the preliminary objection first.
The material part of the certificate issued by the
High Court rea<is thus :
" ......... this Court doth certify that the value
of the subject matter of the suit in the court
of firqt instance is upwards Rs. 20,000/(Rupees twenty thousand) and the ·value of the
subject matter in dispute on appeal to the
Supreme Court of India is also of the value of
upwards of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty
thousand) and that the affirming decree
appealed from involves the following substantial questions of law : 1. Whether a will executed by a member
of a joint Hindu family would of itself be
operative to effect a severance between him
and the other members of the family by reason
of the disposition contained in the will.
'
-
.
2. Whether a will executed by a member
of a joint family on the assumption not proved
to be well founded or correct that as a result
of an anterior partition in the family he, the
testator. was solely entitled to the properties
disposed of by the will~ woqld be e~e<;~iye tQ
196'
AiY4PJ•
H11thavM11ma
AJJ1•i•
Ch~nchMnfn4
Subba -R•D J.
944
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Adddtcd•
· Ra:1llo1Jt111StM
~
A.ldogod.
C/lnulumm•
S•Ha R•• J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
create a severance between the testator and the
other members as on the date of the will, and
3. Whether the afore5aid pleas cou Id be
raised for the first time on appeal without
their having been raised in the pleadings or at
any stage of the trial."
.
The said certificate was granted _within the
terms of Article 133 ( 1) of the Constitution. - The
material part of Article 133 (I) reads :
'
"An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court
from any judgment, decree or final order
............ if the High Court certifies-( a) that
the amount or value of the subject matter of
the dispute in the court of first instance and
still in dispute on appeal was and is not less
than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum
as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament ; (b) that the judgment, decree or final
order involves directly or indirectly some claim
or question respecting property of the like
amount of value ; or (c) that the case is a fit
one for appeal to the Supreme Court ;
'
and where the judgment, decree or final order
appealed from affirms the decision of the court
immediately below in any case other than a
case referred in sub-clause (c), if the High Court
further certifies that the appeal involves some
substantial question of law."
Mr: Bhimasankaram contends that the conditions laid down for issuing a certificate must also
govern the scope of the appeal to the Supreme Court,
for, otherwise, the argument procr.eds, the said
conditions would become otiose. He concedes that
the Supreme Court can exercise an unrestricted
power of reviewing the judgment of the High Court
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
945
in the case o~ a certificate hedged in with. conditions
by resorting to its power under Art. 136 of the
Constitution, but this is not a case where it can do
so especially having regard to the fact that the
appellant did not stek to invoke that power.
•
•
./
•
•
Addagada
Raghavamma
••
Addagada
Ghencliarnma
Subba Rao J •
Under Art. 133 of the Constitution the certi·
ficate issued by the High Court in the manner
prescribed therein is a precondition for the maintainability of an appeal to the Supreme Court. But the
terms of the certificate do not circumscribe the scope
of the appeal, that is to say, once a proper certificate
is granted, the Supreme Court has undoubtedly the
power, as a court of appeal, to consider the correctness of the decision appealed against from every
standpoint, whether on questions of fact or law.
A successful party no doubt can question the main·
tainability of the appeal on the ground that the
certificate was issued by the High Court in contravention of the provisions of Art. l:i3 of the Constitution,
but once ·the certificate was good, the provisions of
Art. 133 did not confine the scope of the appeal to
the certificate. We, therefore, reject this preliminary
objection.
,
His next objection is that both the learned
Subordinate Judge and, on appeal, the learned
Judges of the High Court gave con.current findings
of fact on adopt~on as well as on partition and it is
the usual practice of this Court not to interfere with
such findings, except m exceptional circumstances
and there are no such circumstances in the present
case.
•
J9H
;\r~icle 133 of the Constitution does not in any
way hmit the scope of an appeal, provided a proper
and valid certificate is issued by the High Court
thereunqer. This Court has undoubtedly the power
to review the concurrent findings of fact arrived at
by the lower Courts in appropriate cases. But it has
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 964j VOL.
1963
...
Atidatad12
Raghaiamma
Addagada
Clun:ha 11"'4
Su66a Rao J.
been a long_standing practice of the Privy Council .
not to interfere with such findings based upon
relevant evidence, except under extraordinary and
exceptional
<;ircumstances:
Vide
Rani v.
Khagendrar (1); Fatima Ribi v. Ahmed Bakshi('):
l!arerulra v. l!aridasi ('); and Bibhahati v.
Ramendra ('); The same practice has been adopted
and followed by this Court since its inception : see
Nanalal v. Romhay Life Assurance Co. 1'); Firm
Sriniva.~ Ram v. 11! ahabir Prasad ('): Trojan &,
Co. v. Naganna ('); Ra.iinder Chand v. M.~I. Sukhi (B);
Rhikka v. Charan Singh ('); llf.M.B. Catholico., v.
T. Paulo Avira (10 ) and Narayan Bhn.gwantrao
Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinanyak Gosavi (11 ).
•
The reason for the practice is stated to be
that when facts have been fairly tried by two Courts
and the same conclusion has been reached by both, it
is not in the public interest that the facts should be
again examinr.d by the ultimate court of appeal.
Whatever may be the reason for the ml~. the practice
has become fairly crvstallized and
this Court
ordinarily will not interfere with concurrent findings
pf fact except in exceptiolJal cases, where the finrlings
are such that it "shock• the conscience of the Court
or by disregard to the forms of legal process or some
violation of some principles of natural justice or
otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been
done." It is not possible nor advisable to define
thme circumstances. It must neres~arilv he left to
the discretion of this Court having regard to the
facts of a particular case. ·We have heard learned
counsel on merits and we do not think it is one.of
those exceptional cases where we should depart
from the salutary practice adopted by this-Court.
Learned Advocate-General contends that the
learned Subordinate Judge as well as the High Cou,rt
did not draw the appropriate presumptions arising
from the fact that the transactions were old ones,
(Tl (IOQI) J.L R.. ql Cal. R71,
f5) (191") J.1..F. •1 C'a1.972, 988.
(2) (l9Uq\ I J..R q~ Cal. 271.
(41 rtQ4fiJ Sl r.wN 98, 147.
15) A.IR. 1•50 S.C. 172.
(~) A IR. 1•~1 c. C. 177.
(71 A.IR. 19~3 s.r.. ?35,
1R) A.l.R s.r:. 28~.
(9) [19Sg) Supp 2 S.C.R. 798
110> A,I R 19~9 S.C. 31.
(II) [1960) i S.C.R. 773
.
.-
.
)
-
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
947
nor did they give sufficient weight to the entries in
the revenue records, the admissions made by the
parties and to the conduct of the parties and such
other important circumstances and, therefore, their
findings are liable to be questioned in this appeal.
This argument in effect and substance means that
the Courts below have not given due· weight to
particular pieces of evidence. There is an essential
distinction between burden of proof and onus of
proof; burden of p~oof lies upon the person who has
to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of
proof shifts. The burden of proof in the present
case undoubtedly lies upon the plaintiff to establish
the.factum of adoption and that of partition. The
said circumstances do not alter the incidence of the
burden of proof. Such considerations, having regard
to the circumstances of a particular case, may shift
the onus of proof. Such a shifting of onus is a
continuous process in the evaluation of evidence.
The criticism levelled against the judgments of the
lower Courts, therefore .. only pertain to the domain
of appreciation of evidence. We shall, therefore,
broadly consider th_e evidernze not for the purpose of
revaluation, but to see whetJier the treatment of the
case by the Courts below is such that it falls in the .
category of exceptional cases where this Court, in
the interest of justice, should depart from its usual
practice.
We shall first take the question of adoption .
It is well settled that a person who seeks to
displace the natural succession to property by
alleging an adoption must discharge the burden
that lies upon him by proof of the Jae tum of adoption
and its validity. Here, the appellant alleges in the
plaint that Venkayya: the son of Chimpirayya, was
taken in adoption by her husband, Pitchayya. The
first defendant, the widow of Venkayya, denies in
her written ·statement that her husband was adopted
196J
Mdagada
Raghav.2mma
.,,
Adtiatat!a
Ch1ncliammt
Subba Raa /.
•
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[i964] VOL.
1963
Adtlag uia
Roghao.1mnia
v.
Add1ga'1a
Chrnchamma
by Pitchayya. On the said pleadings the following
issue was framed : "Whether the adoption of'
Venkayya is true and valid." On the pleading the
burden of pro:if has rightly been placed on the
plaintiff. The adoption is alkgcd to have taken
place in the year 1905. Th~ circumstances obtaining at that time were as follows : Chimpirayya was
about 40 years old; he had only one son, Venkayya,
who was aged about 2 years: Pitchay\'a was about
25 years old an::!, therefore, ordinarily he had every
·prospect of having ch;ldren of his own; it is, tl>crefore
highly improbable, unless there are special circums. tances, that an only son of an elder brother was
taken in adoption by his younger brother; though
there is no legal prohibition, it is well known that
ordinarily an only son is neither given nor taken in
adoption. P.\V.l. admits that Addagada family i~
a prominent and afHuent family in the village. But
curiously no document of adoption was executed, n'.J
invitations were sent to relatives and village officers,
and no expenditure incurred in connection with the
adoption was entered in the accounts. Unless the"re
were compelling and extraordinary circumstances
which necessitated dispensing with all formalities, it is
unthinkable that in a village there could have been
an adoption made in such an afHuent family without
pomp and show. P. w~. l and 2 speak to the
adoption. P. W. l is t'1e cousin of the appellant
and P.W. 2 is appellant herself. P. W. I says that
Pitchayya adopted his brother's son Vcnkayya and·
he lived for on~ month thereafter. The reason for
the adoption, according to her, was that he was sick
and was afraid that he would die. She graphically
describes that
Alivclamma,
the wife
of
Chimpirayya, gave her son in adoption to the
accompaniment of "mantrams and t-mtmms", that.
one Subbayya of Upputur was the prohit who
officiated in the ceremony. In the cross-examination she says that Pitchan a did not die suddenly
of an attack of fever but was suffering from dropsy
.'
...
..
..
2 S.C.R.
-
.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 949
for about a month and also even earlier; she admits
that for important functions like marriage and adop. tion in their family . they would invite the village
officers and other important people of the village,
but no such officers or important people were invited
when Venakayya was taken in adoption. This
witness was 60 years old in 1961 and therefore she
would have been about 15 years at the time of the
alleged adoption. Assuming for a moment that
'Pitchayya was suffering from dropsy, there is no
reason why no important persons were invited for
the function. If her evidence were true, Pit cha yya
took part in the· alleged ceremony and it cannot
therefore be suggested that he was so ill that all the
formalities had to be . dispensed with. Indeed; if he
.was ill and if the adoption was made without inviting the important people, that should have beea the
very reason why the village officers would have been
invited and a document to evidence it executed.
P. W. 2 is the appellant Raghavamma. She says that
there was a ceremony of adoption officiated by the
prohit Subbayya and that her brother.in-law and his
wife gave the boy to her and her husband in adoption. She also deposes 'that her father and his
brothers were present at the adoption. In· the crossexamination she says that her husband lived for
about 3 months after the adoption. She admits that
no document was executed and that though there
were accounts, no entries relating to the expenses of
the adoption were entered therein. While P.W. l says
that Pitchayya lived for one month after the adoption, P. W. 2 says that he lived for about 3 months
thereafter. Neither in the pleadings nor in the
evidence the date of adoption is given. The
evidence of P. W. l is vague and appears to be
improvised and the evidence of P. W. 2 discloses the
improbabilities inherent in such an adoption. They
also contradict each other on material circumstances.
The
Courts below have. disbelieved
their
evidence.
AddagtJdti.
Raghovamma
v.
Addagala
Chenct1amma
Subha Rao ~-
950
Atldugad11
Ro1Mrxzmrr1a
••
Atldagatl"
CtunduJ,,..a
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
The appellant and the first respondent relied
upon the conduct of the parties subsequent to the
alleged adoption and filed a number of documents
to support their respective cases. Documentary
evidence considered [omitted] ..
x
x
x
x
x
x
So far as the documentary evidence goes, the
position is as follow.>: Till 1911 there was no
document recording the fact that Venkayya was the
adopted son of Pitchayya, and that after 1911 there
had been contradictory recitals in the documents.
Broadly speaking whenever Venkayya executed a
document he described himself as the son of
Chimpirayya, and whenever third parties executed
documents, he was described as the adopted son of
l'itchayya. He filed suits, sometimes as the son of
Chimpirayya and sometimes as the adopted son of
Pitchayya. His name was entered in the accounts
relating to Paruchur, but not in the accounts relating
to Upputur; he gave evidence declaring himself as the
son of Chimpira yya and also insured his life as such
he operated on the accounts of third parties as the
son of Chimpirayya; while in the will executed by
Chimpirayya, he was described as the adopted son of
Pitchayya on the death of Venkayya the appellant
herself, who under the will was entitled to continue ·
in possession and . management, handed over the
entire management to the first respondent indicating
thereby that the will was not really intended to take
elfect. In this state of evidence it is not possible to
say that there had been a consistent pattern of
conduct from which a Court should draw the
inference that the adoption mus.t have taken place.
'
...
Attempt is made to reconcile these contradictory descriptions in the documents by developing
different theories.
Learned Advocate-General
suggests that there was no reason why Chimpirayya
should have put forward Venkayya falsely as the
-
..
2 S.C.R.
.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
adopted son of Pitchayya as early as 19 ll when he
should not have gained any advantage fhereby, for
without the aid of adoption the entire property
of Pitchayya would have .come to him by survivor-ship. Mr. Bhimasankaram surmises that Chimpirayya
put forward the adoption without the knowledge of
Raghavamma to safeguard his family interests against
the possible adoption later on by Raghavamma of
a stranger and that subsequently both joined together
with a view to put pressure upon the first respondent
to marry her son Subbarao to .{(amalamma. He also
suggests that Chimpirayya began to put forward
his son Venkayya as the adopted son of Pitchayya
only after the birth of his second son in 1910 and
that after the death of that son in 1916, his only
interest was to see that his grand son by his son
Venkayya was married to hi> grand-daughter by his
daughter and that the will was executed only to p1Jt
pressure upon the first respondent. That the will
was executed only . for this limited purpose, learned
counsel• argues, is clearly demonstrated by the fact
that Raghavamma, though she was entitled to be
put"in possession of the entire property, handed over
the management of the same to the first respondent
after the death of Chimpirayya. The said suggestions
made by learned counsel on both sides are only
based on surmises and they cannot be made the basis
for a court's conclusion. In this state of evidence
when both the Courts found, on· a careful consideration. of oral and documentary evidence and the
probabiiities arising therefrom that the appellant on
whom 'the burden of proof lay to establish that
Venkayya was adopted to Pitchayya has failed to
discharge it, we· cannot say that the finding was
vitiated by such errors that we should review the
entire evidence over again and come to a conclusion
of our own. We therefore, accept the concurrent
finding of fact that there was no adoption.
The next question is whether the concurrent
finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below on the
1963
Addaf!ada
Raghauamma
••
Addag•1da
Chencnamma
Suhla R.ao J.
952
1963
Advog•d&
Rolhotammo
v.
Addo1aJa
Chtrrchamru
Subba Ru/,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
question of partition calls for our interference. In
the plaint neither the details of the partition nor the
date of partition arc given. In the written·statemcnt
the first respondent states that Chimpirayya died
undivided from his son's son Subbarao and so
Subbarao got the entire property by survivorship.
The second issue framed was whether Chimpirayya
and Pitchayya were divided as alleged by the plaintiff.
The partition is alltged to have taken place in or
about the year 1895; but no parti1io11 deed was
executed to evidence the same. The burden is
certainly on the appellant who sets up partition to
prove the said fact. P.W. I, though she says that
Veeranna was alive when his sons effec:ted the
partition, admits that she was not present at the time
of partition, but only heard about it. P.W. 2, the
appellant, deposes that her husband and his brothers
effected partition af!er she went to live with him;
she adds that in that partition her father·in·law took
about 4 acres of land described as fl(mrr1fa Chenu
subject to the condition that after his death it should
be taken by his four sons, that at the time of parti\ion
they drew up partition lists and recited that each
should enjoy what was allotted to him and that the
lists were written by one Manchella Narasinhayya;
she also admits that the lists are in existence, but
she has not taken any steps to have them produced
in Court. She says that each of the brothers got
pattas according.to the partition, and that.the pattas
got for Pitchayya's share are in his house; yet she
does not produce them. She says that she paid kist
for the lands allotted to Pitchayya's share and
obtained receipts; but the receipts are not filed. She
admits that she has the account books; but they have
not been filed in Court. On her own showing there
is reliable evidence, such as accounts, pattas, receipts,
partition lists and that they are available; but they
are not placed before the Court. Her inter~stcd
evidence cannot obviously be acted upon when a\I
the relevent evidence has been suppressed.
.,
.
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.
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'
,
.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
Strong reliance is placed upon the alleged
admissions made by D.W.8 and D. W. 10. D.W. 8
is the karnam of Paruchur for over 30 years. He
says in his evidence that Veeranna took 3 acres and
63 cents. of land with a condition that it should go
to his sons in equal shares and the rest of the lands
were divided into two shares, one taken by
Chimpiryya and Pitchayya and the other by Peda
Punnayya and China Punnayya. He explains that
some lands, where the soil is partly good and
partly bad, were divided into four parts and one
good and one bad went to each sharer. This
evidence does not contain any admission that there
was a partition inter .se between the four brothers;
indeed it only supports the case that there was a
partition between the children of Veeranna by his two
wives. The division in four plots in respect of certain
lands was only for .an equitable distribution of the
said lands between the sons of two wives. D.M. 10
in his evidence says that he does not know in.what
year the partition took place; that it went on for two
months; that some of the ·lands were divided into
four plots. Hi~ evidence is also consistent with the
evidence of D. W. 8. There is no admission by
defendants' witnesses that the division was between
the four brothers. The oral evidence therefore, does
not support the case of the appellant that there was
a division inter se between Chimpirayya and
Pitchayya.
Now coming to 'the documentary evidence; as
we have already indicated, all the relevant documents
admitted to have been in existence have not been
placed before the Court and . an ad verse inference has, therefore, to be drawn against the
appellant. Even the documentary evidence filed in
the ca1e does not help the appellant. The family
property is situate in three villages, Paruchur, Upputur and Podapadu. If there was a partition inter se
between the 4 brothers, in ·the ryotwari settlement
'
1963
Mdo11:ta
Raghavamma
Vo
Addogoda
ClllMilatll...
Subba Rao J,
•
954 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
·1963
Adtfagod~
Raglaowzmma
••
Addagadd
Chmch2mma
Subl>a Rao J
•
effected in 1906 the names of the brothers should
have been entered separately in the revenue accounts
but the relevant register pertaining 'to that settle·
ment has not been filed. Even -in the later accounts
of the year 1918 the name of Venkayya was entered
only in respect of some lands in village Paruchur,
but no such entries are found in respect of the
other villages. Those entries were made on a repre·
sentation made by Chimpirayya and no one was
interested to object to the entries. Even these ac·
counts show that in the earlier register Pitchayya 's
name was not entered. Though they have some
probative value of possession, they do not show
that the said lands shown against Venkayya fell. to
the share of Pitchayya at the partition in the
year l8L!5. hi Benga/a Chenu alleged to have been
given to Veeranna with a condition that after his
death the · fonr sons should take it in equal shares,
V cnkayya did not· get his share as he should if Pitchavya was divided from Chimpirayya and if he was
adopted to l'itchayya. P. W. 2 admits that Chimpi·
rayya had two acres in Bengala Chenu and l'unnayya
had the other two acres. This admission belies the
statement that there was a partition inter se among
the four brothers, for if the said partition was true,
one acre should have fallen to Pitchayya's branch.
P. W. 3 also says that Chimpira yya was in enjoy·
ment of the said two acres.
Exs. B-52, B-53, B-54, B-55, B-56 and B-57
established that the original mortgage of 1900
executed in favour of Veeranna was later on re·
'newed only by Chimpirayya and Punnayya,
that after the alleged partition separate mortgages
were executed for portions of the debt in
favour of Chimpirayya and Punnayya, that the pro·
perty which was the subject matter of the mortgages
was sold in favour of Chimpirayya and l'unnayya,
and thereafter, under Exs. B·til, B·62 and B-63,
Chimpirayya and Punnayya sold the said land to
•
I
•
••
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'F REPORTS
955
third parties. These series of documents support the
case that there was no partjtion inter se between
Chimpirayya and Pitchayya. So too, another land
obtained by Veeranna under an oral sale in 1886
was formally sold by a registered sale in favour of
Chimpirayya and Punnayya under Ex. B-60 in 1911.
If Pitchayya had a share, Venkayya should have
been one of the vend!ies. Exs. B-67 and B. 68 are the
assessment orders of the year 1933 and Chimpirayya
was assessed as representing a Hindu undivided
family. At the time of assessment if Venkayya was
not a member of the Hindu joint family, there was
no other male member in the family. The assessment could only be explained on the basis that
Venkayya and Chimpirayya were members of ·a
Joint Hmdu family. Both the Courts, on the basis
of the said evidence and other evidence, came to the
conclusion that it has not been established that in
the partition of 1895 there was a division inter se
between Chimpir_ayya and Pitchayya.
'
Some argument is made on the question of
burden of proof in the context of separation in a fami·
ly. The legal position is now very well settled. This
Court in Bhagwati Prasad Sak v. Dulhin Rameshwari Juer (1), stated the law _thus :
....
•
"The general principle undoubtedly is that a
Hindu family is , presumed to be joint unless
the contrary is proved, but where it is admitted
that one of the coparceners did separate himself.from the other members of the joint family
and had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him, there is no presumption
that the rest of the coparceners continued to be
joint. There is no presumption on the other
side too that became one member of the family
separated himself, there has been separation
with regard to all. It would be a question of
fact to be determined in each case upon the:
(I) (1951) S. C. R. 603, 607.
1963
Addigada
Ragliaoamma
••
Addagada
Ch1nduzmma
Suh6a Raa J.
956
1963
Addaga/a
Ragha::amma
v.
Addagada
Cliend1amm1
Subba Raa /,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
•
evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there wa~ a separation amongst
the other coparceners or· that they remained
united. The burden would undoubtedly lie
on the party who asserts the existence of a
particular state of things on the basis of which
he claims relief."
Whether there is a partition in a Hindu joint family
is, therefore, a question of fact; notwithstanding
the fact that one or more of the members of the joint
family were separated from the rest, the plaintiff
who seeks to get a specified extent of land on the
ground that it fell to the share of the testator has to
prove that the said exteut of land fell to his share;
but when evidence has been adduced on both sides,
the burden of proof ceases to have any practical
importance. On the evidence adduced in this case,
both the Courts below found that there was no
partition between Chimpirayya and Pitchayya as
alleged by the appellant. The finding is one of fact.
We have broadly considered the eviJence only for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the said concurrent
finding of fact is supported by evidence or whether
it is in any way vitiated by errors of law. We find
that there is ample evidence for the finding and it is
not vitiated by any error of law.
Even so, learned Advocate.General contends that
we should hold on the evidence that there was a division in status between Chimpirayya and the other
member of the joint Hindu family i. e.. Subbarao,
before Chimpirayya executed the will, or at any rate
on the date when he executed it.
It is settled law that a member of a joint
Hindu family can bring about his separation in status
by a definite and unequivocal declaration _of his
intention to separate himself from the family and
enjoy his share in severality. Omitting the will, the
'
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
•
-
earlier documents filed in the case do not disclose
any such clear intention. We have already he!J
that there was no partition between Chimpirayya
and Pitchayya. The register of changes on which
reliance is placed does not indicate any such intention.
The statement of Chimpirayya that his younger
brother's son is a sharer in some lands and, therefore,
his name should be. included i'1 the register, does.
not ex facie or by necessary implication indicate
his unambiguous declaration to get divided in status
from him. The conflicting descriptions in various
documents introduce ambiguity rather than clarity
in the matter of any such declaration of intention.
Be it as it may, we cannot therefore hold that there
is any such clear and unambiguous declaration of
intention made by Chimpirayya to divide himself
from Venkayya.
Now we shall proceed to deal with the will,
Ex. A-2 (a), on which strong reliance is placed by
the learned A_dvocate·General in support of his
contention that on January 14, 1945, that is, the
date when the will was executed, Chimpirayya must
.be deemed to have. been divided in status from his
grandson Subbarao. A Will speaks only from the
date of death of the testator. A member of an
undivided coparcenary has the legal capacity to
execute a will; but he cannot validly bequeath his
undivided interest i 1 the joint f .mily property. If
he died an undivided member of the family, his
interest survives to the other members of.the family
and, therefore. the will cannot operate on the interest
of the joint family property. But if he was separated
from the family before his death, the bequest would
take eff~ct. So, the important question that arises
is whether the testator ·i11 the present case became
separated from the joint family before his death.
The learned Advocate-General raises before w the
following contentioµs in the alternatives: (1) Under
1963
Adrlagada .
Raghavamma
v.
Addagada
Cf.enchammtl
·Sulbo Rao };
958
196!
Ad!fa.roda
R'lgh;ivamma
v.
Addngada
Cluncl,amma
Sut:ha Rao J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
•
• the Hindu law a manifested fixed intention as con·
tradistinguished from an undeclared
intention
unilaterally expressed by a. member to separate
himself from the joint family is enough to constitute
a division in status and the publication of such a
settled intention is only a proof thereof. (2) Even
if such an intention 1s to be manifested to the
knowledge of the persons affecttd, their knowledge
dates back to" the date of the dee laration, that is to
sav, the said member is deemrd to have been
separated in status not on the date when the other
m~mbers have knowledge of it but from the date
when he declared his intention. The learned
Advocate-General develops his argument m the
follo'hing steps (I) the Will, Ex. A-2 (a), contains
an unambiguous intention on the part of Chim·
pirayva to separate himself from Subbarao, (2) he
manifested his declaration of fixed intention to
divide by executing the will and that the Will itself
was a proof of such an intention; (:l) when the Will
was ex~cuted, the first respondent the guardian o~
Subba Rao was present and, therefore, she must be
deemed to have had knowledge of the said decla·
ration; (4) even if she had no such knowledge
;i.nd even if she had knowledge of it only after
the death of Chimpirayya, her knowledge dated back
to the date when the Will was executed, and,
therefore. when Chimpiravya died he must be
deemed· to have died separated from the family with
the result that the Will would operate on his separate
interest.
The main question of law that arises is whether
a member of a joint Hindu family becomes separated
from the other members of the family by a mere
declaration of his unequivocal intention to divide
from the family without bringing the same to the
knowledge of the other member of the family. In
this context a reference to Hindu Jaw texts would
be appropriate, for they arc the sources from which
•
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2 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
the Courts evolved the doctrine by a pragmatic
approach to the problems that arose from time to
time. The evolution of the doctrine can be studied
in two parts, namely, (I) the declaration of the
intention, and (2)_ the communication of it to others
affected thereby. On the first part the following
texts would throw· considerable light. They are
collated and translated by Viswanatha Sastri J., who
has a deep and abiding knowledge of the sources of
Hindu Law in Adivalath Katheesumme v. Adiyalath
Beechu (1 )·; and we accept his translations as correct
and indeed learned counsel on both sides proceeded
on that basis. Yajnavalkya Oh. II, _6, I21. "In
land, corrody (annuity, etc.), or wealth received from
the grandfather, the ownership of the father and the
son is only equal." Vijnaneswara commenting on
the said sloka says :
" ............... And thus though the mother is
having menstrual courses (has . not lost the
capacity to bear children) and the father has
attachment and does not desire a partition, yet
by the will (or desire) of the son a partition
of the grandfather's wealth does take place."
(Setlur's Mitakshara, pp. 646-648.)
•
Sa•aswati Vilasa, placitum 28 : "From this it is
known that without any speech (or explanation)
even by means of a. determination (or resolu·
tion) only,' partition is effected, just as an
appointed daughter is constituted by mere
intention without speech."
Viramitrodaya of Mitra Misra: (Oh. II. pl. 23)
"Here too there is no distinction between a partition during the lifetime of the father or
after his .death and partition at the desire
of the sons may take place or even by the desire
(or at the will) of a single (coparcener).
(I; I.L.R. 1950, Mad. 502.
J9b'J
A.ddagada
Raghav.1mm11 ...
v.
Addogada
Chencfiamma
Fubha Rao J.
960
• J96S
--·
Md•gaia
'
Ra11Wu.oat1u11a
v.
Aodagoda
ChtnchamTTUJ
S.lla Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1964] VOL.
.•
Vyavahara Mayukha of Silakantabhatta : (Ch. IV,
S. iii-I) :
"Even in the absence of any common (joint
family) property, severance does indeed result
by the mere declaration "I am separate from
thee" because s:vcrance is a particular state( or
condition) of the mind and the declaration is
merely a manifestation of this mental state
or condition)."
The Sanskrit expressions "sankalpa" (resolution)
in Saraswati Vilas, "ekechchaya" (will of a single
coparcener) in Viramitrodaya, "budhivisesha"
(particular state or condition of the mind) in
Vyavahara Mayukha, bring out the idea that the
severance of joint status is a matter 9f individual
discretion. The Hindu law texts, therefore support
the proposition that severance in status is brought
about by unilateral exercise of discretion.
Though in the beginning there appeared to be
a conflict of views, th"e lat~r decisions correctly
inierpreted the Hindu law texts. This aspect has
been considered and the Jaw pertaining thereto
precisely laid down by the Privy Council in a series
of decisions; see Sumj Nnmin y. lqlml Ynrain (');
GirJa lJni v. Srulashiv Dhundiraj ('); l\au·al Nain v.
JJudh 8inr1h (3 ); and Uam.11/in~a. Annui:i v. Naray,,na
Anrnui ('). In Syed KrMrw1 v . .Jorawar Sin{fh ('); the
judicial Committee, after rcvitwing its earlier decision laid the settled la'". on the subject thus :
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"It is settled law that in the case of a joint
Hindu family subject to the law of the
Mitakshara, a severance of estate is effected
by an unequivocal declaration on tl1e part of
one of the joint holder;· of his intention to hold
his share separately, even though no actual
division takes place ............ "
(1\ (19121 l LR. 35 All 80 1P.C) (7) '19 6) I.I. R. 41 C".al 1031 (PC. i.
t3) (1917) IL R. 39 All 496 IP C > (41 11'172) l.L.R. 4' ~lad. 489 (PC.)
(5) (1922) 1.L.R. 50 Cal. 81 \l'.C.)
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2 S.C.R. SUPREME aouRt REPOR Ts
961
~o far,
therefore, the law is well settled, namely,
that a severance in estate is a matter of individual
d!scretion and that to bring about that stale there
should be an unambiguous declaration to that effect
are propositions laid down by the Hindu law texts
and sanctioned by authoritative decisions of Courts.
But the difficult question is whether the knowledge
of such a manifested intention on the part of the
other affected members of the family is a necessary
condition for constituting a division in status. Hindu
law texts do not directly help us much in this regard
except that the pregnant expressions used therein
suggest _a line of thought which was pursued by
Courts to evolve concepts to meet the requirements
of a changing society. The following statement in
Vyavahara Mayukha is helpful in this context :
" ......... severance does indeed result by the
mere declaration" "I am separate from thee"
because severance is a particular state (or condition) of the mind and the declaration is merely
a manifestation of this mental state (or condition)."
•
One cannot declare or manifest his mental state in
a vacuum. To declare is to make known, to assert to
others. "Others" must necessarily be those affected
by the said declaration. Therefore a member of a
joint Hindu family seeking to separate himself from
others will have to make known his intention to the
other members of the family from whom he seeks
to separate. The process of manifestation may vary
with circumstances. This idea was expressed by
learned Judges by adopting different terminology,
but they presumably found it as implicit in the concept of declaration. Sadasiva Iyer J., in Soundarajan
v. Arunachalam Ohetty {1 ), said that the expression
"clearly expressed" used by the Privy Council inBuraj
Nara.in v. Iqbal Nara.in ('), meant "clearly expressed to the definite knowledge of the other coparceners."
. (I) (1915) l.h.R. 59 Mad. 159 (P.O.)
(2) (1Ul2) l,L,R. SS All. 80 (P.a.)
1961
Adda.r:ada ·
R11ghav4mma
v.
Atfdar:ada
Chenchmnmo
Suhba Rao J.
002
J96J
A.dda.eado
Raghaoammo
••
A.ddagada
Clun<iuvnmo
3wbb• Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
In Girj€1 Bai v. Sadashiv Dliundiraj ('), the Judicial Committee observed that the manifested
intention must be "clearlv intimated" tu the other
coparceners. Sir George Lowndes in Br:slkrishrv:s v .
Ram krishrv1 (2), took it as settled law that a separa·
tion may be effrctcd by clear and unequivocal
declaration on the part of one member of a joint
Hindu family to his coparcenersof his desire to separate himself from the joint family. Sir John Wallis
in Babu Ramasray Praslld Choudhary v. Radhika
Devi (9), again accepted as settled law the proposition that "a member of a joint Hindu family may
effect a separation in status by giving a clear and
unmistakable intimation by his acts or declaration
of a fixed intention to become separate ....... " Sir
John Wallis C. J., and Kumaraswami Sastri J. in
Karnepalli Avilamma v. Jfannem Venkataswrimy (1),
were emphatic when they stated that if a coparcencr
did not communicate, during his life time, his intention to become divided to the other cuparcener or
coparceners, the mere declaration of his intention,
though expressed or manifested, did not effect a
severance in status. These decisions authoritatively
laid down the proposition that the knowledge of the
members of the family of the manifested intention
of one of them to separate from them is a necessary
condition for bringing about that member's severance
from the family. But it is said that two decisions of
the Madras High Court registered a departure from
the said rule. The first of them is the decision of
Madhavan Nair J. in Rama Ayyar v. ilfeenakshi
Ammal ('). There, the learned Judge held that
severance of status related back to the date wJ1en the
communication was sent. The learned Judge deduced
this proposition from the accepted principle that the
other coparceners had no choice or option in the
matter. But the important circumstance in that
case was that the testator lived till after the date of
the service of the notice. If that was so that decision on
the facts was correct. W c shall deal with the doctrine ·
(I) (1916) 1.L.R. 43 Cal. 1031 (P.C.) (2) (1931) l.L.R. 33 AIL sot (P,C.)
(9) (19") 43 L.W. 172 (P.C.)
(4) (1917) 13 M.LJ1 7fe.
(5) (19311) Bl L,W, 51K.
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2 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
963
· of relating back at a later stage. The second decision is that of a Division Bench of the Madras High
Court, consisting of Varadachariar and King, JJ., in
Narayana Rao v. Pnrnshotama Rao (1 ) •. Th~re, a
testator executed a will disposing of his share in the
joint family property in favour of a stranger and
died on August 5, 1926. The notice sent by the
testator to his son on August 3, 1926 was in fact
received by the latter on August 9, l 926. It was
contended that division in status was effected only
on.August 9, 1926, when the son received the notice
and as the testator had died on August 5, 1926 and
the estate had passed by survivorship to the son on
that date the receipt of the notice on August 9, 1926
could not divest the son of the estate· so vested in him
and the will was therefore, not valid. Varadachariar
J., delivering the judgment of the Bench observed
thus
"It is true that the authorities lay down generally that the communication of the intention
to become divided to other coparceners is necessary, but none of them lays down that the
seyerance in status does not take place till after
such communication has been received by the
other coparceners."
After pointing out the various anomalies that might
arise in accepting the contention advanced before
them, the learned Judge proceeded to state :.
"It may be that if the law is authoritatively
settled, it is not open to us to refuse to give
effect to it merely on the ground that it may
lead to anomalous consequences but when the
law has not been so stated in any decision of
authority and such a view is not necessitated or
justified by the reason of the rules, we see no
reason to interpret the reference to "communication" in the various cases as implying that
the severance does not arise until notice has
(1) I.L.R. 1963 Mad, 315, 318.
. 1963
Addagada
Rr.gh(,jvamma
v.
Addagada
Chencflan,ma
Su&bo Rao J,
964 SUPREME COURt REPORTS [1964] Voi..
116!
&,-.
Mda1od.
"
At/Joi: ida
Clomdlamma
~dk Rao~.
a:ctually been received by the
addressees."
•
addressee or
We regret our inability to accept this view. Firstly, because, as we have pointed out earlier, the law has been
well settled by tl">c decisions of the Judicial Committee that the manifested intention should be made
known to the other members of the family affected
thereby ; secondly, because there would be anomalies on the acceptation of either of the views. Thirdly
it is implicit in the doctrine of declaration of an
intention that it should be declared to somebody and
who can that somebody be except the one that is
affected thereby.
•
There is yet another decision of the :\1adras
High Court, which is of H ajamannar C. J. and
Vcnkataramma Ayyar, .J. in Indira v. Sivapms<ida
Rao (1). There, the testator despatched a telegram
addressed to his 'Undivided brother on August 4,
evening. In the ordinary course it must have been
delivered on August ;i. The testator died on August
ti morning. Learned counsel appearing for the
brother contended that it had not been established
that the telegram reached his client before the
testator died and, therefore, the will did not operate
on the tcstator·s interest in the joint family property.
The learned Judges rejected that contention on the
basis of the judgment ofVaradachariar and King .JJ.
in Narayrinrs Rao v. Pur'Uslwtluww. Rao('). As a
division Bench they were bound by the decision of
another Division Bench; but the real basis of the
decision is found at p. 256 :
"In the case before us, the telegram was
despatched on the 4th evening and in the
ordinary course it must have been delivered on
the 5th
. and
,, the testator died only on the 6th
mormng.
(1) I. I. R. 1953 Mad. 245, 256.
(2) l.I.R. 1958 t..~11. 315, SIS.
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
965
It appears that in the circumstances of the case the
learned Judges presumed that the telegram must have
reached the testator's brother before the testator died.
The conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges
would certainly be right on the said facts. But we
cannot agree with the view in so far as they agreed
with that expressed by Varadachariar and King, JJ.
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Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Adiyalath Katheesumma v. Adiyalath Beechu (1), elaborately and
exhaustively considered the question that is now
posed before us. There, a member of a tarwad
served a notice of his unambiguous intention to
separate from the other members of the family on the
Karna van of the tarwad. The question was whether
the communication of his intention to the Karnavan
was sufficient. The appeal first came up before
Satyanarayana Rao and Panchapagesa Sastri JJ.
Satyanarayana Rao J. held that the notice was not
sufficient to constitute a severance, as it was not
served on all the other members of the tarwad; and
Panchapagesa Sastri, .J., held that the service on the
Karnavan or the manager of the joint family was
sufficient as he was representative of the family. As
there was difference of view between the two learned
Judges, the matter was placed before Viswanatha
Sastri J. and the learned Judge agreed with Panchapagesa Sastri .J. But in the course of the iudgment,
the learned Judge went further and held that a
unilateral declaration of an intention to become
divided on the part of a member of a joint Hindu
Family effects severance, in status and therefore the
despatch to, or receipt by, the other members of the
family of the communication or notice announcing
the intention to divide on the part of one member of
the family is not essentia 1 or its absence fatal to a
severance in status. The conclusions of the learned
Judge on .the question now raised before us are
expressed m two places and they are at pp. 543
and 549:
(I) I. L. R. 1953 ~ad. 245, 206,
1963
Addagada
Raghavamma
v.
Addagada
Chenchammt
Subb• Rao J.
966
1963
Addaga1a
Raghatamrna
v.
.4dtfa.~ado
Clunthanima
SubbD Rao J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
"The only reasonable rule that can be deduced
from the texts and the several decisions of the
Judicial Committee is that the declaration of
an intention to divide on the part of a member
of the family should be clear and unequivocal
and should be indicated, manifested, or
published in rnch a manner as is appropriate in
the circumstance: of the case. One method, but
not the only Ill~thod, of such manifestation
or publication is by delivering a notice
containing a declaration of intention to become
divided to the other members of the family."
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At p. 549 it is stated:
''There must be some manifestation, indication,
intirnatiou or expression of that intention to
beconll" d ividcd, so as tu serve as authentic
evidence in case of doubt or dispute. What
from th<it manifestation, expression, or intimation of intention should 1:1ke would depend
upon the circumstances of each case, there
being no fixed rule or right formula. The
despatch to or receipt by the other members
of the family of a communication or notice
announcing the intention to divide on the part
of one member of the family is not essential
nor its absence fatal to a severance in status."
\Ve agree with the learned Judge in so far as he held
that there should be an intimation, indication or
expression of the intention to become divided and
that what from that manifestation should take would
depend upon the ci rrnmstanccs of each c;Lse. But
if the learned J udgc meant that the said declaration
without it being brought to the knowledge of the
other members of the family in one way or other
constitutes a severance in status, we find it difiicult
to accept it. In our view, it is implicit in the
expression "declaration" that it should be to the
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
967
knowledge of the person affected thereby. An
uncommunica ted declaration is no better than a
mere formation or harbouring of an intention to
separate. It becomes effective as a declaration only
after its communication to the person or persons who
would be affected thereby.
It is, therefore, clear that Hindu Law texts
suggested and Courts evolved, by a process of reaso·
ning as well as by a pragmatic approach, that such
a declaration to be effective should reach the person
or persons affected by one process or other appro·
priatc to a given situation.
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This view does not finally solve the problem.
There is yet another difficulty. Granting that a
declaration will be effective only when it is brought
to the knowledge of the other members affected,
three questions arise, namely, (i) how should the
intention be conveyed to the other member ·or
members; (ii) when it should be deemed to have
been brought to the notice of the other member or
members; and (iii) when it was brought to their
notice, would it be the date of the expression of the
intention or that of knowledge that would be crucial
to fix the date of severance. The questions posed
raise difficult problems in a fast changing society.
What was adequate in a village polity when the
doctrine was conceived and evolved ca.n no longer
meet the demands of a modern society. Difficult
questions, such as the mode of service and its
sufficiency, whether service on a manager would
be enough, whether service on the major members
or a substantial body of them would suffice, whether
notice should go to each one of them, how to give
notice to minor members of the family, may arise for
consideration.. But we need not express our opinion
on the said questions, as nothing turns upon them,
for in this appeal there are only two member$ in the
joint family and it is not suggested that Subba Rao
1963
Atidagat!a
Raghovamma
••
Addagala
Chtni,hamma
Subba Rao I.
968
19~3
Addsgadu
Rtglk.i ..mma
Add11a1a
Chttichomrn'l
Subba R.,o J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)VOL.
did not have the knowledge of the terms of the will
after the death of Chi.mpirayya.
The third question falls to be decided in this
appeal, is this : what is the date from which
severance in status is deemed to have taken place ?
Is it the date of expression of intention or tlie date
when it is brought to the knowledge of the other mem·
bcrs? If it is the latter date, is it the date when one of
the members first acquired the said knowledge or the
date when the last of them acquired knowledge or the
different dates on which each of the members of the
family got knowledge of the intention so far as he
is concerned ? If the last alternative be :icceptcd, the
dividing member will be deemed to have been
separated from each of the members on different
dates. The acceptance of the said principle would
inevaaiJly lead to confusion. If the first alternative
br accq,ted, ic would be doing lip service to the
d"ctrine of knowledge, for the member who gets
k11owlcdge of the intention first may in no sense of
tlie term be a representative of the family. The
second alcernative may put off indefinitely the date
of severance, as the whereabouts of one of the
members may nor be known at all or may he known
afcer many years. The Hindu law texts do not
provide any solution to meet these concingencies.
The decided cases also do not suggest a way out.
It is, therefore, open to this Court to evolve a reason·
able and equitable solution witho11t doing violence
to the principles of Hindu law. The doctrine of re·
Jation back has already been recognised by Hindu
Law as developed by Courts and applied in that
branch of the law pertaining for adoption. There
are two ingredients of a declaration of a mcmher's
iutention to separate. One is the expression of the
intention and the other is bringing that expression
to the knowledge of the person or persons affected.
When once that knowledge is brought hom~-that
depends upon the facts of each r.asc-it r~lates hack
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
to the date when the intention is formed and expressed. But between the two dates, the person
expressing the intention may lose his interest in the
family property; he may withdraw his intention to
divide; he may die before his intention to divide
is conveyed to the other members· of the family: with
the result, his interest survives to the ·other members.
A manager of a joint Hindu family may sell away the
entire family property for debts binding on the family.
There may be similar other instances. If the doctrine
of relation back is invoked without any limitation
thereon, vested rights so created will be affected and
settled titles may be disturbed. Principles of equity
require and common sense demands that a limitation which avoids the confusion of titles must be
placed on it. What would be more equitable and
reasonable than to suggest that the doctrine should
not affect vested rights ? By imposing such a limitation we are not· curtailing the scope of. any well
established Hindu law doctrine, but we are invoking
only a principle by analogy subject to a limitation
to meet a contingency. Further, the principle of
retroactivity, unless a legislative intention is clearly
to ~he contrary, saves vested rights. As the doctrine
of relation back involves retroactivity by parity of
reasoning, it cannot affect vested rights. It would
follow that, though the date of severance is that of
manifestation of }he intention to separate, the
tights accrued to otherc in the joint family property
between the said manifestation and the knowledge
of it by the other members would be saved .
Applying the said principles to the present
case, it will have to be held that on the death of
Chimpirayya his interest devolved on Subbarao and,
therefore, his will, even if it could be relied upon for
ascertaining his intention to separate from the family,
could not convey his interest in the family property,
as it has not been established that Subbarao or his
19~3
Addagada
Ra_ghauamma
v.
Addagada
Ch1ndiamma
Subba Rao
1•
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
1963
AdJt1.~cia
guardian had knowledge of the contents of the said
will before Chimpirayya died.
•
Ragha1>tJmm1
v.
Addataia
Clund1imma
Subht1 Rao J.
It is contended that the first respondent, as the
guardian of Subbarao, had knowledge of the con·
tents of the Will and, therefore, the Will operates
on the interest of Chirnpirayya. Reliance is placed
upon the evidence of P. W. 11, one Komanduri
Singaracharyulu. He deposed that he was present
at the time the Will was executed by Chimpiryya
and that he signed it as an identifying witness. In
the cross·examination he said that at the time of the
execution of the Will the first clefendant-respondcnt
was inside the house. This evidence 1s worthies~.
The fact that she was inside the house cannot m
itself impute to her the knowledge of contents of the
Will or even the fact that the Will was registered
that day. D. \V. 4 is the first respondent herself.
She says m her evidence that she did not know
whether the Sub· Registrar came to rrgister the Will
of Chimpiray)'a, and that she came to know of the Will
only after the suit was filed. In that state of evidence
it is not possible to hold that the first respondent, as
guardian of Subbarao, had knowledge of the con·
tents, of the Will.
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In this view, it is not necessary to consider the
further question whether the Will contained a clear
and unambiguous declaration of intention on the
part of the testator to· divide himself from the
members of the joint family.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with co~ts.
A p]Jea.l dismissed.
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