M/S. KESORAM COTTQN MILLS LTD versus GANGADHAR AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 April 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 809 | 1963 INSC 85
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 April 1963
- Bench
- K.N. WANCHOO*, K.C. DAS GUPTA
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 425/1962
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 809
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 85
Text of the judgment
";
I
1
I
, ·2, S.C.R.
SUPRIEME COURT REPORTS
809
' The conduct of· the E?tcise Inspector in tampering
with 'the seizure memo is such as' to affect his
,bona fides and therefore ther~ .is a lot of doubt about
_ the .alleged confession .by the appallant being
voluntary. I am not .satisfied about the tonfession
beihg voluntary and would therefore not use it in
Sl\pport of the unsatisfactqry· statements of the
prosecution witnesses about !he recovery of the ganja
from his possessiop and would not sustain the
conviction even though the High Court has.recorded
a finding of fact that Ganja. was recovered from the
appellant's possession.' The High Court did not
' i::o:osider the tampering of. the seizure memo in ,all
its aspects or its .effect on the alleged voluntarines~
·of the confession and, consequently, on rile case.
-19_63
Ral?J Ram JaiJwal
v.
Stale of Bihar
Roghu6ar DaJal J,
Appeal allowed.
M/s. KESORAM COTTQN MILL~ LTD.
1963
v.
April I
GANGADHAR AND OTHERS
(K. N. WANCHOO and K. C. DAS GU!'TA JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Go slow and strike-AgreementSusp•naion of Workmen pending inquiry-No
inquiry
held-R•ferenCB to adjudication-If workmen entitled to
wqvea for period of, auspension-,/nquiry-Natural Juatioe-No
examination-'in-chief of witnessea~Previou. statement i;:eadOopy of statement not given to workmen-Propriety of procedure.
The appellant suspended 1600, workmen as they resorted
to go slow at\d illesal strikes. On December 23, 1957, all
-'
';~.
-''4\''*-?l!Wft W.
~
810
JJ63
Kugrd11J C1Uan
Mi/11.td
••
GQn1aJ1tsr
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
agreement was arrived at between the workers Union and;the
management under which the workmen resumed work. Clause
7 of the agreement provided that the suspended workmen
shall not be entitled to any wages
or compensation for the
suspension period. Clause 9 provided that 29 of the work·
men shall remain suspended pending inquiry and disciplinary
action by the management. The management did not hold
any inquiry and had the n1attcr referred for adjudication.
With re•pect 10 another 5 workmen the management held an
inquiry on various charges and dismissed thern. In the
inquiry, the management did not examine their witnesses but
had their previous staternents read out, and without giving
copies of those statements to the workmen asked them to cross:
CJ<amine the witn"5ses. The dispute arising out of the dis·
missal of these 5 workmen was also referred to adjudication.
With rrspect to the 29 workmen the Triounal permitted the
dismissal of 9 and ordcrf'd rcins1atcmcnt of the remaining and
awarded 12 mon1hs' wages to the dismissed workmen and
15 months' wages to the reinstated workmen for the period
during which they remained suspended. With respect to the
5 workmen dismissed the Tribunal held that the inquiry was
not held in accordance with the principle. of natural justice
but that the evidence produced before the Trilmnal justified the
dismissal of 4 of the workmen. The appellant contended that
in vif"\V of c:I. 7 of the agreement none of the 29 workmen
were entitled to any compensation or wage. for the period of
suspension and that the inquiry with respect to the 5 workmen
was in accordance \Vith principles of natural justice. The
workmen contended that all the 29 workmen were entitled to
full wagC' for the period of suspension.'
Held that r.I. 7 of the agreement referred to the period of
!U9pension up to the date
of
the agreement and
not
to
the suspension thc,.aflrr. Ordinarily, the law is that a
workman may be suspended pending inquiry and disciplinary
action; and if after the inquiry he is dismissed he is not
"ntitlcd to any \vag~s for the suspension period, hut if he is
reinstated he is entitled to full
wages for the period of sus-
pension. Clause (9) envisaged suspension pending inquiry and
also cnvisage<l the legal consequences.
accordingly just ifir.d in awarding ,\·ages
The 1"ribunal was
for the suspension
period subsequent to the date of the agreement.
TM Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind, [1962] Supp.
3 S. C. R. 618 referred to.
H ,Id further that all the 29 suspended workmen were
entitkd to full wages from the date of the agreement up to the
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:.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
1963
date of the award, There was no provmon in the standing
orders, nor was there any term of service, which entitled the
!t1soram Colton
management to suspend a workman without payment of wages.
Mill• Ltd.
In the!e circumstances there was no justification for depriving
v.
Gangadha' ·
the workmen who had been ordered to be re-imtated and
to whom the Tribunal had awarded 15 months wages
for any period of their suspension. The 9 workmen , who
had been allowed to be dismissed were also entitled to
full wages for the entire period of suspension. Under cl. (9)
of the agreement they were to remain suspended pending
inquiry and disciplinary action, but the management held no
inquiry and took no disciplinary action, but applied for the
dispute to be referred to adjudication. As the management .
wanted to dismiss these workmen without holding an inquiry,
the workmen were entitle<! to their full wages up to the date
of the enforcement of the award.
The Management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi v. Hotel
Worker&' Union, [1960) 1 S. C.R. 476 and M/s. Basa Musa
Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, [1959) Supp.
2 S. C. R. 836, releid on.
Held further, that the inquiry with respect to the five
workmen violated principles of natural justice. The rules of
natural justice do not change from tribunal to tribunal; but
since their purpose is to safeguard the position of the person
against whom an inquiry is being conducted so as to enable him
to meet the charges against him, the nature of the inquiry and
the status of the person charged will have a bearing on what
should be the minimum requirements of the rules of natural
justice. In a domestic inquiry in an industrial matter the proper course for the management is to examine the witnesses
from beginning to end in the presence of the workman at the
inquiry itself. In exceptional cases, a wjtness may~ be asked
merely to confirm his previously recorded statement and then
tendered for cross-examination by the workman, but in such
cases the previous prepared statement of the witness should be
given to the workman well in advance before the inquiry begins
at least two days before.
The Union of India v. T. R. Verma, [1958] S. C.R. {99,
State of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur, [1963) 2 S. C.R. 943, and
New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co.
(!957] S. C.R. 98, referred io.
CIVIL APPELLATE jURISDICTioN : Civil Appeals
Nos. 425 and 426 of 1962.
812
1963
K1s0Yam ColtOfl
Mills ltd.
v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1ll. C. Setalvad and B. P. Maheshwari, for
the appellants (in C. A. No. 425 of 1962) and the
respondents (in C. A. No. 426 of 1962).
Gangadhar
Y. Kunuir, for the respondents (in C. A. No.
425 of 1962) and the appellants (in C.A. No. 426 of
1962).
1963. April 4. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Won<hoo J.
WANCHOO J.-These are two appeais by special
leave against the same awar:l of the First Industrial
Tribunal, West Bengal and will be dealt with
together. Appeal :\o. 420 is by the employers and
Aprea! No. 426 is by the workmen. The employers
wil be referred to as the appellant throughout this
judgment while the workmen will be referred to as
the respondents. There was a dispute between the
appellant and the respondents with respect to two
matters, which were referred to the tribunal for
adjudication by the Government of West Bengal in
the following terms:(I) To what relief the suspended workmen
whose names are mentioned in list 'A' are
entitled ·:
"(2) Whether the termination of employment
of the workmen whose names are
mentioned in list •B' was justified ? Are
they entitled to reinstatement and/or
compensation ':
List 'A' consisted of 29 workmen while list 'B'
consisted of 12 workmen.
The genesis of the dispute as to the su9pended
workmen was this according to the case of the
2 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813 .
appellant. The workmen of the weaving department of the appellant commenced slow down from
October 28, 1957 in spite of the warning given by
the appellant. On November 3, 1957, doffers of
carding refused to work on new machines. The
workmen of loose godown and folding section started
slow down from October 27, 1957 and November
4, 1957 respectively. On November 23, 1957, the
workmen of the spinning department adopted slow
down tactics and indulged in other subversive activities and left their respective machines in groups
rendering the work in backward and forward
processes idle. .As a result of this conduct of the
workmen for a period of about four weeks, the
appellant had to lay-off a large number of workmen
without compensation. Then on December 3, 1957,
the workmen of dye house and printing department
went on an illegal stay-in-strike. In the first week
of December, 1957, the workmen of· blow room
and carding went on strike. On December 9, the
strike was commenced in the engineering department,
cotton godown, bale godown, canteen, high speed
winding and old stores department. In the circumstances the appellant had to suspend 1600 workmen
on charges of slow down and various other charges.
Thereafter negotiations were started between the
union of the workmen and the management and an
agreement was arrived at on December 23, 1957.
The interpretation of some of the terms of the
agreements is in dispute and we shall refer to them
in due course. Suffice it to say here that by this
agreement the workmen resumed work and undertook
not to take recoqrse to go-slow activities either
individually or jointly and not to take recourse to
illegal methods and means for the achievement of
their demands or for getting their grievances redressed.
It was also agreed that maintenance of discipline was
of paramount importance and the workmen as also
the union at all times would co-operate with the
management in taking appro,P~i.ate disciplinary
1968
Kesorom Cotlott
Mill.< Ltd.
v.
Ga•gad"4r
Wanchoo i
•
814
1963
KtJorn111 Catton
Mills l.td.
v.
uan,~har
Wanrh~
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i964) VOL.
action against the workmen for the maintenance of
discipline in the factory. The agreement however
provided that thirty workmen named in annexure 'A·
thereof would remain suspended pending inquiry
and disciplinary action by the appellant. The first
term of reference with respect to suspended workmen
is about the thiny workmen who were to remain
suspended undc'r the terms of the agreement of
December 23, 1957.
The twelve workmen with which the second
term of reference i~ concerned, were claimed by the
appellant to have been guilty of various acts of
misconduct for which they were liable to dismissal
under the standing orders. They were duly charge·
sheeted and inquiries were held against them and
thereafter they were dismissed according to the
provisions of law. As however the dismissals had
taken place during the pendency of a dispute before
the first industrial tribunal in which the appellant
was a party, applications were made under s. 33 (2)
(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14of194i),
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) for approval of
the action taken by the appellant in regard to these
twelve workmen. It seems, however, that before
these applications could be disposed of, the dispute
before the tribunal was decided, with the result that
no orders were passed by the tribunals on these
applications. The appellant, however, claimed that
the dismissal of these workmen was justified and
tnerefore no case for reinstatement or compensation
arose. This claim of the appellant was disputed by
the respondents and therefore we find this dispute
being referred for adjudication in· the second term
of reference.
We shall first deal with the matter relating
to susi>ension of the twenty-nine workmen in list 'A'
to the order of reference. It may be mentioned that
though in annexure 'A' to the agreement there were
2 S.C.R..
·SUPRE~E COURT
REPORTS
815
thirty workmen, the reference was made only with
respect to twenty· nine, as it is said that one of the
workmen out of 30 had died by the time the reference
came to be made. Further out of the W workmen
with which the first term of reference was concerned,
the respondents gave up the. case of five of the
workmen. The tribunal therefore dealt with the case
of the remaining 24. These 24 workmen were divided
by the tribunal into five groups. The first group
consisted of two workmen, the second group of five
workmen, the. third group of 13 workmen, the fourth
group of two workmen and the fifth group of two
workmen. Learned counsel for the appellant has
not pressed the appeal with respect to six workmen
:in groups I, IV and V, and we need not therefore
consider the order of the tribunal with respect to these
workmen, who are Govindo (No. 1), Bholanath (No.
8), Khageswar (No. 7), Ramjatan (No. 27),
Rampujan (No. 26) and Khetrabasi (No. 28) of list
'A' attached to the order of reference.
As to the five workmen in group II, namely,
Gangadhar (No. 2). Ramchandra (No. 3), Babaji
Nayak (No. 4), Pahraj (No. 5) and Shankdardas
(No. 6) of list 'A' attached to the order of reference,
the tribunal ordered that they should be reinstated
in their jobs with effect from the date the award
came into force and should be paid compensation
amounting to fifteen months' wages in all for the
period during which they remained suspended. The
appellant has challenged this order of the tribunal.
As to group III, the trib~nal decided that nine
of the thirteen workmen should be dismissed. As to the
remaining four the tribunal held that they should be
reinstated- It may be mentioned that the reason
why the tribunal proceeded to consider whether any
of the workmen in list 'A' to the order of reference
should be dismissed was on account of the appellant's
filing an application under s. 33 (1) (b) of the Act
Kutt_,, CfitM
Mills LtJl.
•• ..
c.,,,.,u,
W•ch•• J,
•
816 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196'] VOL.
/96J
Kt1r,.,rym C""""
.Ui!/J Ltd.
'"
Gan1adlr12r
N a11choo J,
before the tribunal for permission to dismiss the
twenty nine workmen. The order of the tribunal
with respect to the reinstatement of four workmen,
namely, Gulzarali (No. 18), Farid (No. IU), Din
Mohd. (No. 17) and Mohd. Islam (No. 24) of list
'A' attached to the order of reference is being
challenged by the appellant on the ground that there
was no reason for the tribunal to treat these four
workmen out of this group of 13 differently from the
other nine as the evidence was the same in all these
cases. Finally, the tribunal also ordered }Vith respect
to all the 24 workmen on an interpretation of the
agreement of December 2:1, 1957, that they should
b~ paid 12 months' wages for the period of their
suspension irrespective of whether it was permitting
them to be dismissed or not. This order of the
tribunal is also being attacked by the appellant.
We shall first take the case of the five workmen '
in group II. The contention of the appellant in
that behalf is two-fold. In the first place it is
urged that these workmen were charged with
adopting go·slow tactics by causing spindle stoppage
unnecessarily and there was clear documentary
evidence to support this charge and the tribunal's
decision that there was no proof of go-slow tactics
in the circumstances was perverse. In the second
place, it is urged that all these five workmen were
charged with other misconduct also and the tribunal
did not consider the evidence with respect to other
misconduct at all and gave no finding thereon and
so the case of these five .workmen at any rate should
bt> remanded to the tribunal for considering the
evidence on the other charges against them.
Now the appellant relied on an extract from
two registers, Exs. AA and AA-1, which had been
produced before the trib~nal in th!s connectio~ ~nd
this extract was set out m the special leave pclltion.
The respondents, however, contended th~t what was
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2.s.a.R. SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS
...
817
set out in the special leave petition was not an extract
at all from Exs. AA and AA-1. On the other hand
it was said to be a spurious document prepared to
mislead this Court at the time of the admission of
the appeal and so it was urged that the leave should
be revoked. This extract related to four workmen,
namely, Paharaj, Shankdardas, Gangadhar and
Babaji, and was with respect to spindle 'stoppage
from November 10 to 23, 1957. In view of the
charge made by the respondents, the original registers were sent for and have been examined by us
and we have come to the conclusion that the extract
given in the special leave petition was not a true
copy of Exs. AA and AA-1 as it should have been,
if it was merely an extract from those registers. The
figures of spindle stoppage given in the extract
certainly tally with the figures in the two registers
but the registers do not show the names of the persons
who were manning the four machines, the spindle
stoppage of which was given in this extract. It
is 'however urged that the names of the· four workmen were given in the extract though they were
not to be found in the registers because these workmen actually manned the machines on the dates
mentioned in th~ extract and reference was made to
SOM.e evidence in that connection. Even assuming
that these workmen manned these machines we find
ailother serious misrepresentation in this extract.
Paharaj was charge-sheeted on November 17 and was
suspended forthwith. Therefore he could not have
w•rked after November 17, but this extract shows
as 'if he continued working even after November 17
UJ!to November 23. It is remarkable that serious
spindle stoppage occurred on the machine which
Paharaj was said to be manning mainly after
Neve!Jlber 17 when it must have been manned by
somebody else. Similarly Shankdardas was chargesheeted on Nove~ber 17 and suspend~d forthwith
and.could not have worked thereafter. But in his
<;~sc also the extract shows as if he continued to
1969
Ke1oram Collon
Mills Ltd,·
v.
Gangadhar
Wanchoo J.
818 SUPREME COURT REPOR ts [1964) vot.
JJfJ
£11•• c.ttn
Milli W.
v.
G.t""'-'
work thereafter from November 18 to 23, and
the more serious spindle stoppage is during this
period when he obviously could not have manned
this machine. Babaj i was charge-sheeted on
November 18 and suspended forthwith. He could
not have therefore worked on the machine on which
his name is shown in the extract between Novem·
ber 19 and 23 and the more serious spindle stoppage
occurred after November 18 when somebody else
must have been manning this machine. Gangadhar
was charge-sheeted on November 22 and was suspended forthwith. In his case also the extract shows as
ifhe had worked on November 23. We strongly
deprecate the manner in which the extract was used
in the special leave petition to convey a wrong
impression to this Court. But we do not think that
we should revoke the special leave granted in this
case on this ground alone. However our examination of the extract which we have set out above
clearly shows that the contention of the appellant
that the tribunal had patently misunderstood Exs.
AA and AA-1 cannot be made out. It seems to us
that the reasons given by the tribunal for holding
that go-slow by these five workmen had not been proved cannot be said to be inad9uate for the purpose
of coming to the conclusion which it did. We may
only note one reason which is given by the tribunal
and which shows that everything was not all right in
the appellant company in this matter. Thou~h the
charge-sheets to these workmen of the spmning
department were given on November 17, 18 and 22,
it 1s remarkable that in the written-statement o( the
appellant before the tribunal the case made out was
that the workmen of the spinning department adop·
ted slow down tactics and indulged in other subversive activities from November 23, I 957. This seems
to be surprising statement to make in the face of the
charges given to these five workmen and can only
show that the appellant did not really know what
the correct facts were. It is further remarkable that
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2 $.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
srn
in the application under s. 33 (1) (b) which was made
four months after the written-statement of the appellant had been filed the same thing was repeated and
it was said that the workers of the spinning department adopted ~o-slow tactics on November 23 and
indulged in other subversive activities. It is true
that in the evidence the appellant tried to prove
that slow down tactics had started earlier ; but if in
the circumstances the tribunal refused to believe
the evidence it cannot be said that it went wrong.
The contention of the a pp ell ant therefore that the
view taken by the tribunal was perverse and clearly
against the two registers to which we have referred
above must fail.
This brings us to the other contention of the
appellant with respect to this group of workmen,
namely that the tribunal did not consider the evidence with respect to other charges. It is true that
in the last paragraph of the award dealing with these
five workmen, the tribunal said that the appellant
had failed to prove that these five workmen had
adopted go-slow tactics and did not say anythinl:'
about the other charges. But a perusal of the entire
discussion by the tribunal with respect to this group
of workmen shows that it considered the oral evidence
of all the witnesses with respect to other charges and
held that their evidence was not worthy of acceptance, though it did not say so in so many words
that that evidence was insufficient to prove the other
charges also. On the whole however a reading of
th.~ discussion of the tribunal with respect to this
group of workmen convinces us that the tribunal had
considered the entire evidence including the evidence
with respect to other charges and did not consider
that evidence worthy of acceptance. The mistake
that the tribunal made was that when it recorded its
conclusion in the final paragraph dealing with this
group. of workmen it confined itself only to say that
go-slow tactics had not been proved and did not say
1963
Kesoram Cotton
Mills Ltd.
v.
Gangatfhar
Wanch1'o J,
820
x-...
c""'"
Milli Lid.
••
c..,<MA•r
I
W-.W. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!164] VOt. '
anything about other charges. Even so we are of
opinion that the consideration of the entire award of
the tribunal with respect to this group of workmen
leaves no doubt that the evidence on the other charges
was also considered and was found unworthy of
acceptance. We may add tjlat the reason why the
tribunal seems to have confined itself only to go-slow
in the final paragraph is that every body before the
tribunal was concentrating on go-slow and did not
worry to see what the other charges were. This will
be clear when we consider the case of some other
workmen in group Ill which will show that though
there was no charge against those workmen of
go-slow, the evidence was given about go-slow ~d
the tribunal also came to the conclusion that
those workmen were guilty of go-slow. It seems
therefore that nobody worried about any other charges
before the tribunal and that is how the tribunal
seems to have confined its conclusion only to the
charge of go-slow, even where no such charge-shei:t
was given to the workmen. On the whole, however,
we do not think that any case is made out for remand
for consideration of other charges against these five
workmen, for the tribunal seems to have considered
all the evidence and did not think it worthy of accep·
tance. In the circumstances the appeal with rellpect
to these five workmen in group II must fail.
Then we come to the four workmen in group
III whose names we have already mentionecl.
These workmen were charged with having incited
on and from various dates in October 1957 their
co-workers to slow down work. The entire evidence
against these workmen was considered by the tri~u
nal and it did not place any reliance on it for one
main reason. In the case of Gulzarali the tribunal
found that there was no written report against hiin
as was the case with respect to others, and in the
case of the other three the 11ribunal found that t~e
written report which ·had been produced very late
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i s.e.R..
SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS
821
before it did not bear the endorsement of the weav·
fiig master as it should have done, as in the case of
other such reports made by the Assistant weaving
master. In the circumstances when the evidence
was considered by the tribunal and for reasons given
by it no reliance was placed upon it, we cannot say
that it went wrong in not relying on that evidence.
The appeal of the appellant with respect to these
four workmen of gro,µp III must also fail.
We now come to the general attack on the
order of the tribunal awarding 12 months wages to
all the 24 suspended workmen whose cases were
preilsed before it by the respondents. We have in
this co·nnection to consider four clauses of the
agtel!fuerit dated December 23, 1957, which are as
be!Ow :1.
(b)-It is agreed between the parties that
the charge-sheets against such workmen
who are allowed to resume duty in terms
of para (1) herein, however, shall not be
withdrawn. It is further agreed that
the suspension of workmen whose names
are contained in the annexure A herein,
shall continue and their respective order
of suspension shall remain operative
pending enquiry as laid down hereinafter.
7.
The suspended workmen shall not be
entitled to any wages or compensation
for the suspension period. The workmen
sh11;ll not_ raise any dispute or make any
claim with regard to the suspension
period or lay-off period in any shape or
form.
8.
Without prejudice to the other provisions
of this agreement or claims relating to the
suspension order serveq on the wor~m,en
I96S
/r,m.,,. Cotti•
Milli Ltd.
.
y,
GiZntadMr
w-1wo /.
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
respectively and the lay·off order . by
the company and/or all claims or
issues for the period connected with
slowing down of production and dis·
ciplinary action taken thereon .by the
company are hereby finally settled
and all workmen are bound by this
agreement and no worker . shall be
entitled to make any demand or claim in
this behalf.
KtsM•m Ci/tin
Mills Ltd.
v.
Gtllrt•Jiin1-VanthlO J,
9.
The workers in annexure 'A' shall remain
suspended pending enquiry and disci·
plinary action by the management. The
management will try to reach an amicable
settlement with the Union regardinc
disciplinary action taken or may be taken
by them against the said workmen. If
the parties fail to ·reach settlement, the
matter will be referred to the tribunal
for settlement of the disrute in this behalf.
The tribunal has held that cl. (7) which lays
down that the suspended workmen shall not be
entitled to any wages or compensation for the
suspension period docs not apply to workmen who
remained suspended under cl. (9), and the reason
given by the tribunal for this view is that cl. (7)
only applied to those workmen who were allowed
to resume duty in the first clause of the agreement.
This view of the tribunal has been challenged by the
appellant and it is contended that . the seventh
clause applies even to workmen who remained
suspended under cl. (9) and therefore in view of
el. (7) such workmen were not entitled to any
compensation whatsoever for the entire period of
their suspension whether before December 23, I95i
or thereafter. We agree with the contention of the ·
appellant that cl. (i) applies to all suspended
workmen whether they went back to work according
.,
2 S.C.R.
SUPRBNIE COURT REPORTS.
.
823
to the first clause of the agreement or remained
suspended according to cl. (1) (b) set out above.
. But as we read this agreement we are of opinion that
cl. (7) read along with cl. (8) refers only to suspension upto the date of the agreement and not to
suspension thereafter. Clause (7) says that the
suspended workmen shall not raise any dispute or
make any claim with regard to the suspension period
or lay off period in any shape or form. This
provision could only refer to suspension or lay-of'
in the past; it could not be the intention
of the agreement, for example, that if any
lay·off took place in future cl. (7) would apply
to it. Further though under cl. (9) suspension of
30 workmen continued, that suspension was pending
enquiry and disciplinary action. We cannot read
cl. (7) and cl. (9) together for the future also unless
there are clear terms to that effect. Ordinarily, the
law is that a workman may be suspended pending
enquiry and disciplinary action. If after the enquiry
the misconduct is proved the workman is dismissed
and is not entitled to any wages for the suspension
period; but if the inquiry results in the reinstatement
of the workman he is entitled to full wages for the
suspension period also along with reinstatement,
unless the employer instead of dismissing the employee
can ~ive him a lesser punishment by way of withholdmg of part of the wages for the suspension
period. In The Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind ('),
this Court was considering what would happen where
approval was granted or withheld on an application
under s. 33. (2) (b) of the Act, and it was pointed
out that "if the tribunal does not approve of the
action taken by the employer, the result would be
that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed .never to have
been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the
service of the employer." It follows therefore that
if a workman is fully exonerated after the inquiry,
he would remain in the service of the employer ai;id
\I) !19§2] liupp. S S.C.R. 61~.
196!1
Kuormn Cotton
Mills Lli,
v.
G11111adl11w
Wanehto J,
824
196J
K1!M4tm C9tton
Mills ltd.
v.
:;~taihar
fVilnc/uio J,
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
would be entitled to his full wages during the period
of his suspension also. Therefore wken cl. (!I)
envisages suspension pending inquiry and disciplinary
action it also envisaged the consequence, namely, that
if the inquiry results in dismissal, the workmen would
get no wages for the suspension period while if the
inquiry results in the reinstatement of the workman
he would be entitled to full wages for the suspension
period, if he is fully exonerated or to such less wages
as the employer may give in case the exoneration is
not complete and some punishment less than dis·
missal can be inflicted. We see nothing in cl. (i) which
clearly takes away this legal consequence following
an inquiry and disciplinary action, and it seems to
us that cl. (7) must be confined to the period of
su>pcnsion upto the date of agreement and there is
nothing in it which would induce us to hold that it
must apply to the future also. So far as the future
is concerned it is cl. (!l) which must wholly apply
and that clause envisaged inquiry and disciplinary
action and the consequence thereof depending upon
the inquiry going one way or the other must also be
envisaged by it in the absence of any provision about
the future in this agreement. If the intention was
that the workmen who remained suspended under
cl. (9) would get no wages for the future, even if
they were fully exonerated after an inquiry under
that clause we should have found a specific provision
that to effect in cl. (9) itself. We are therefore of
opinion that cl. (7) refers to the period up to the date
of the agreement including the period of grace given
to the workmen in cl. (1) in order to join their duties
and not to the future. In this view of the matter
the tribunal was not unjustified in granting wa~es
for the suspension period after the date of this
agreement to those whom it reinstilted. The conten- ·
tion of the appellant in this behalf must fail with
respect to those reinstated. We shall consider the
case of nine workmen permitted to be dismissed
when considering the appeal of the workmen.
2 s.c.R.
•
SUPRE!\fE COURT REPORTS
825
Coming now to the second term of reference,
we find that inquiries were held in the case of the
·five workmen with whom we are concerned. The
respondents however contended that the inquiries were
not in accordance with the principles of natural
justice inasmuch as the witnesses were not examinedin-chief before the inquiry officer. What actually
happened at the inquiries was that when the :witnesses
were produced, previously prepared signed statements
of the witnesses were read over to them and they
were asked whether the statements were correct, and
they had signed them. Statements were also read
over and explained to the workmen charged and they
were then asked to cross-examine the Witnesses. No
copies of' statements of witnesses were supplied to
the workmen at any time. The tribunal has held
that this procedure followed by the inquiry officer
was open to objection and was against the principles
of natural justice and that the witnesses should
have been examined-in-chief in the presence of the
workmen against whom the inquiries were going on.
The requirements of principles of natural justice
were laid down by this Court in The Union of India
v. T. R. Verma (1 ), where it was observed:"Rules of natural justice require that a party
should have the opportunity of adducing all
relevant evidence on which he relies, that the
evidence of the opponent should be taken in
his presence, and that he should be given the
opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses
examined by that party, and that no materials
should be relied upon against him without his
being given an opportunity of explaining them.
If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not
open to attack on the ground that the procedure
laid dowa in the Evidence Act was not strictly
followed."
This matter was further considered Jn the
State -of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur ('), where the
(2) (lftiS) 21,C.ll, Ht
ff0
t:,;;;41" :cwnaii
Mills LU.
.: .
('l..,iiib
w;;;;;-;.
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964-] VOL.
/~J
~, •
following obervations were made:-
.,,. C•llnt
•.
. J.JiU1 Lt<i.
·~'
W411CAn /.
"\Vhen the evidence is oral, normally the
examination of the witness will in its entirety,
take place before the party charged, who will
have full opportunity of cross-examining him.
The position is the same when a witness is
called, the statement given previously by him
behind the back of the party is put to him,
and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is
given to the party, and he is given an opportu·
nity to cross-examine him. To require in that
case that the contents of the previous statement
should be repeated by the witness word by
word, and sentence by s(ntence, is to insist on
bare technicalities, and rules of natural justice
are matters not of form but of substance. In
our opinion they are sufficiently complied
with when previous statements given by wit·
nesses are read over to them, marked on their
admission, copies thereof given to the person
charged, and he is given an opportunity to
cross-examine them."
It is urged on behalf of the appellant that rules
of natural justice are the same whether they apply to
inquries under Art. 311 or to domestic inquiries by
managements relating to misconduct by workmen. It
may be accepted that rules of natural justice do not
change from tribunal to tribunal. Even so the purpose
of rules of natural justice is to safeguard the position
of the person against whom an inquiry is being
conducted so that he is able to meet the charge laid
against him properly. Therefore the nature of the
inquiry and the status of the person against whom the
inquiry is being held will have some bearing on
what should be the minimum requirements of the
rules of natural justice. \\There, for example, lawyers
are permitted before a tribunal holding an inquiry
and the party against whom the inquiry is bein~
2 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
held is represented by a lawyer it may be possible
to say that a mere reading of the material to be
used in the inquiry may sometimes be sufficient:
(see New. Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarn•
Transport Co. (1 ), but where in a domestic inquiry
in an industrial matter lawyers are not permitted,,
something more than a mere reading or statements
to be used will have to be required in order to safeguard the interest or the industrial worker. Further
we can take judicial notice of the fact that many of
our industrial workers are illiterate and sometimes
even the representatives of labour union may not be
present to defend them: In such a case to read over a
prepared statement in a few minutes and then ask the
workmen to cross-examine would make a mockery
of the opportunity that the rules of natural justice
require that the workmen should have to defend
themselves. It seems to us therefore that when one B
dealing with domestic inquiries in industrial matters,
the proper course for the management is to examine
the witnesses "from the beginning to the end in the
presence of the workman at the enquiry itself. Oral
examination always takes much longer than a mere
reading of a prepared statement of the same length
and brings home the evidence more clearly to the
person against whom the inquiry is being held.
Generally speaking therefore we should expect a
domestic inquiry by the management to be of this
kind. Even so, we recognise the force of the argument on behalf of the appellant that the main
principles of natural justice cannot change from
tribunal to tribunal and therefore it may be possible
to have another method of conductin~ a domestic
inquiry (though we again repeat that this should not
be the rule but the exception) and that is in the
manner laid down in Shibavasappa's case ('). The
minimum that we shall expect where witneSlles are
not examined from the very beginning at the enquiry
in the presence of the person charged is that the
person charged should he given a copy of the
(ll pg,111.a.a. !Ill.
(2J t1!10•12 s.c.a. ~•s.
lt61
K~~,.. C.na.
Mill• LtJ..
~.
Gm:a"!,D
ltcntM I.
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOl..
K'1Iir'111IZ'i4.10n
Milli Lu.
,.Y.
C'11J•i!tar
"'""'"'' 'j,
staiements made by the witnesses which are to be
used at the inquiry well iri advance before the
inquiry begins and· when we say that the copy of the
statements should be given well in advance we mean
that it should be given at least two days before the
inquiry is to begin. If this is not done and yet the
witnesses arc not examined-in-chief fully at the
inquiry, we do not think that it can be said that
principles of natural justice which provide that the
person charged should have an adequate opportunity
of defending himself are complied with in the case of
a domestic inquiry in an industrial matter. In the
present case all that had happened was that the
prepared statements were read over to the workmen
charged and they were a>ked then and there to
cross,examinc the witnesses. They were naturally
unable to do so and in the circumstances we agree
\Vith the tribunal-though for different reasons-that
the ·enquiry did not comply with the principles of
natural justi~e- The order of the tr:ibunal therefore holding that the inquiries were vitiated by the
disregard of rules of natural justice is correct. \Ve
may add however that inspite of the above finding
the tribunal permitted termination of the service of
four of these five workmen and reinstated only one.
We shall deal with this aspect of the matter further
when considering the appeal of the workmen.
Turning now to the appeal by the workmenrespondents, the first contention raised on their
behalf is that the tribunal went completely wrong in
permitting the dismissal of nine workmen in list 'A'
to the order of reference, namely, Hanif (No. 10),
Narayan (No. ll), Khalil (No. 12), Abdul Subhan
(No. 13), Bhagwan Singh (No. 15), Ram li'.kbal
(No. 19), Mangroo (No. 20), Satish (No. 21 ), and
Raja Ram (No. 22). The contention in this behalf
is that these nine workmen in group III were charged
with inciting other workers to slow down work and
that' was the only charge given to them ; there w11s
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
829
no charge of go-slow by these nine workmen themselves. · But the tribunal allowed evidence to be led
to the effect that these nine workmen were actually
guilty of go-slow themselves and gave a finding to
that effect and therefore permitted them to be dismissed. It was also urged that there was no finding
by the tribunal and no evidence to the effect that
these workmen had incited other workmen to slow
down work and therefore there was no proof of the
charge given to these workmen. Consequently, they
could not be dismissed on a charge which was never
made against them completely ignoring the charge
which was in fact made against them and which had
not been proved. We have therefore to see in the
case of each workman whether this contention of .the
respondents is correct.
Hanif is the first workman in this group ..of
nine. It appears from the discussion in the. award
with respect to Hanif that though in the finding
part there is a suggestion as if this workman was
guilty of go-slow himself, it appears that the tribunal
kµew that the charge against Hanif was for inciting
co-workers to slow down work. There was evidence
before the tribunal to the effect that Hanif roamed
about in the department and incited workers to slow
down work and that evidence was considered by the
tribqnal. It also appears that the tribunal accepted
that evidence and the final conclusion at which the
tribunal arrived was that Hanif was rightly chargesheeted by the appellant and the appellant should
be permitted t.o dismiss hin;i. In the ci~cumstances
it, canµot be said so far. as this workman 1s concerneg
that there was no ·evidence to support the charge
actually framed against. him. I~ . would also .be
wrong to say that the tribunal. did n?t find that t~e
charge actually framed agamst him . had . been
pra'ved, though it may be. admitted th\lt there is. an
undercurrent iri the discusiiion as if Hanif was guilty
0 { go-slow: !J.imself. _Even so the tribunal appears to
K'tlorot-G'oltt11
Millt Lii. ·
.Y•
G"'ltJiw
~00
-·.
196J
/(1s•r.am Crtt'flri
.A.fif/J l.t'f.
••
Ga.t•ihar
U'-c.lo, J.
SUPREME COURT RtPORts (lll64] vot.
have found him guilty of inciting other workers ancl
this would clearly be misconduct under standing
order No. 2:.! (k), for which a workman could be
dismissed. Jn the circumstances we are of opinion
that there is no reason for our interference with the
order of the tribunal in the case of Hanif.
The next workman is Narayan. He was also
charged with having incited other workers to slow
down work. In his case also the tribunal apparently
came to the conclusion that he took part in deliberate
slow-down, but during the discussion in the award,
the trib1mal started by saying that he was charged
with inciting other workers to slow down work and
referred to the evidence which showed that Narayan
had gone round in the department and asked the
workmen to work two looms instead of four and to
give low production. This evidence was apparently
accepted by the tribunal, though at the end of the
discussion the tribunal did say that Narayan took
part in deliberate go-slow tactics. Though therefore the conclusion of the tribunal with respect to
Narayan seems to suggest as if he was dismissed for
taking part in go-slow himself, the discussion in the
award with respect to him shows that the tribunal
was apparently satisfied that he had also incited
other workers to slow down. In the circumstances we
do not think that a case has been made out for interference with the order of the tribunal in the case
of Narayan.
Then we come to the case of Khalil. He was
also charged with having incited other workers to
slow down. In his case also there was evidence
that he had incited other workers to slow down which
was apparently accepted by the tribunal. Though
therefore the discussion in the award was with respect
to incitement by this workman, at the end however
the tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant had succeeded in proving that Khalil was
.
•
~ s.c.R..
·SUPREME cotJR.t REPORTS
sat
indulging in go·slow tactics, causing fall in production
anp therefore the tribunal permitted the dismissal
of Khalil for the misconduct of slowing-down as
shown in the charge-sheet. It seems that tribunal
has not expressed its conclusion in this and other
cases in proper words and has perhaps taken the
incitement of other workmen to slow down work as
amounting to the misconduct of go-slow by the workman himself. )3ut the entire discussion in the award
shows that the tribunal had accepted the evidence
to the effect that Khalil was inciting his co-workers
to slow down. In this view of the matter we are
of opinion that there is no reason to interfere with
the order passed by the tribunal simply because its
conclusion was not expre!sed in appropriate words.
Next we come to the case of Abdul Subhan.•
In his case also the charge was for inciting other
workmen to slow-down work. The evidence was
that he incited other workers to work two looms
instead of four. This evidence was apparently
accepted by the tribunal but in the end it said that
the appellant had succeeded in proving that Abdul
Subhan had indulged in go-slow tactics and therefore
permitted his dismissal. Here again it seems to us
that the conclusion of the tribunal has been expressed in inapprofriate words, though the real finding
is that Abdu Subhan had incited other workers
and thus brought about go-slow. In his case also
therefore we see no reason to interfere with the
finding of the tribunal.
Next we come to Bhagwan Singh .. He was char·
ged with incitement of other workers to slow down
work and evidence was led before the tribunal that
Bhagwan Singh went round instigating the weavers
not to work more than fwo looms, though they were
expected to work on four looms. This evidence was
apparently accepted by the tribunal, though it
expressed its conclusion by saying that Bhagwan
ILeuf.ia ·Collm
Milli I.Ii.
v.
--
GcniaJli4r
Wanchaw J.
832 SUPREME COURT REPORT1'1 [196'] VOL.
J~~
.'f .11, ·t,,.
K1.1010t C111011
T.
.•.alJlll>i.a,
uranchod J.
Siugh had committed the mis-conduct of deliberate
go-slow tacticts. Here again, we are of opinion
that the conclusion of the tribunal has been expressed
in inappropriate words, though in fact it did find
that Bhagwan Singh was guilty of inciting other
workers to slow down, We therefore sec no reason
to interfere with the order of the tribunal with
respect to Bhagwan Singh.
Next we come to Ram Ekbal. His case is
exactly similar to that of Bhagwan Singh and the
evidence is
also exactly the same. In the
circumstances we see no reason to interfere with the
order of the tribunal in his case either.
Next we come to Mangroo. The charge against
him was of incitement of other workers to slow down
work. In his case also the evidence was that he
went round in the weaving-shed asking the weavers
to-work two looms instead of four looms. This
evidence was apparently accepted by the tribunal,
though it expre~sed its conclusion inappropriately
to the effect that Mangroo had adopted go-slow
tactics as shown in the charge-sheet and therefore
his.dismissal was permitted. We arc of opinion that
the conclusion of the tribunal in this case also was
expressed inappropriately but in fact the finding was
that Mangroo had incited other workers to go-slow.
As we have already said, the tribunal seems to think
that this incitement of other workers to go-slow
amount5 to adoption of deliberate go-slow tactics by
the person who is guilty of incitement and that· is
why the tribunal expressed its final conclusion in
words which we consider inappropriate. But in
substance the finding is that Mangroo was guilty of
inciting other workers to go-slow. We therefore sec
no reason to interfere with the finding of the tribunal
with respect to Mangroo.
Next we come to Satish .. He was also charged
with incitiog other workmen to go.slow. There was
'.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
evidence before the tribunal that Satish incited other
weavers to slow down work and this evidence was
apparently accepted by the tribunal. In his case
also the tribunal expressed its conclusion in. inappropriate words by saying that it .held that Satish had
mdulged in go slow tactics as charged in the charge·
sheet. It therefore permitted his dismissal. We
are however of opinion that on a consideration of the
discussion of the matter in the award the substance
-of the finding is that Satish was guilty of inciting
other workers. In the circumstances we see no
reason to interfere with the finding of the tribunal.
/96S
K1s01arn Collon
Mi/Ir Ltd.
v.
Gari.gadhar
Wanclioo J.
Lastly we come to Raja Ram. His case is
exactly similar to that of Satish and the evidence
was also to the same effect viz., that they were going
round together and inciting other workers to slow
down work. In the circumstances we see no reason
to interfere with the order of the tribunal.
'
;
The next contention on behalf of the respon·
dents is that the tribunal should have allowed full
wages to the workmen in list 'A' in whose case it had
ordered reinstatemen.t, and not merely 15 manths' '
wages as it actually did. It is well settled that
"under the ordinary law of master and servant
the power to suspend the servant without pay could
not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of
service between the master and the servant but must
arise either from an express term in the contract
itself or a statutory provision governing such contract:
(see The management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi
v. Hotel Workers' Union('). No provision in the
standing orders has been brought to our notice which .
entitles the appellant in this case to suspend the
workman without payment af wages. But, as
held in The Hotel lmperial's case('), where under
s. 33 of the Act the right of the employer to dismiss
an employee except with ,the permission of the
·industrial_ tribunal, was taken away, it would be
(l) (1960) l S.C.R. f76.
•
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
196!
XuMam Cotl4n
MiUs Lid.
••
. Gllllf•dhot
open to the employer to suspend the workman
pending inquiry and permission of the tribunal. In
such circumstances such a term in the contract of
employment would be implied and the result would
be that if the tribunal granted the permission, the
suspended t:ontract would come to a11 end and
there would be no further obligation on the part of
the employer to pay any wages after the date of
suspension. If on the other hand, the permission
was refused, the wcrkmcn would be ·entitled to all
their wages from the date of su~pms!on. It follo\\S
therefore that in the case of those workmen who ha\'e
been ordered to be reins1 ated there can be no
justification for depriving them of their wages from
the date of the suspension which in the case of the
workmen in list 'A' to the reference, in view of the
agreement of Decembrr 23, 1957, must start from
Decemder-24, 1957. Therefore, so far as these 15
workmen, out of the 29 workmen, of list 'A' are
concerned, who have been ordered to be' reinstated
we see no reason for depriving them from their full
wages for tr.e entire period from December 24, 1957.
The appeal of the respondents therefore with
reference to these fifteen workmen in list •A' must
be allowed and the order of the tribunal is hereby
varied to the effect that they will be paid full
wages frnm December 24. Hl57.
As to the five workmen in list ·B' to the
reference, one workman, namely, Hiralal Bhomick,
was ordered to be reinstated by the tribunal and he
was allowed compensation equivalent to 15 months'
wages. His case in our opinion i~ on a par with the
case of the fifteen workmen in list 'A' which we
have considered above and he will therefore be
entitled to his full wages from the date of his suspension and not only 15 months' wages as ordered by
the tribunal.
•
Then we come to the case of nine workmen
from list' A' whose cases we have already considered
-
2 S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
and who were permitted to be dismissed. Further
there are four ,workmen of list 'B' namely, Misra
(No. I), Abdullah (No. 2), Narayan Tewari (No. 5)
and Din Mohd. (No. 6), whose services were
allowed to be terminated with effect from the date
ofthe enforcement of the award; The first nine
workmen were allowed 12 months' wages while the
other four workmen were paid wages for a period
of one month along with compensation equivalent
to 15 days' average pay for each completed year of
service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
It is contended on behalf of the respondents that
these workmen should have beell allowed full wages
upto the date the award became enforceable, even
though the tribunal had eventually permitted their
dismissal or allowed their services to be terminated.
So far as the nine workmen in list 'A' are
concerned, their case in our opinion is fully covered
by the decision of this Court in Messrs Basa Musa
Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobmt-i Khan (1 ). Clause (9)
of the agreement which permitted the continuance
of the smpension of these workmen, also provided
that they shall remain suspended pending inqujry
and disciplinary action by the management. The
clause went on to say that the management would try
to reach an amicable settlement with the union
regarding disciplinary action taken or to be taken by
it against the workmen and that if the parties failed
to reach a settlement, the matter would be referred
for adjudication. The contention on behalf of the
respondents is that this clause clearly contemplated
inquiry by the management followed by disciplinary
action and as the appellant held no inquiry whatsoever and straightaway applied when the dispute
was referred for adjudication, for permission to
dismiss these workmen they would be entitled to full
wages till the date of the enforcement of the award.
On the other hand it is contended on behalf of Lhe
appellant that though cl. (9) euvisaged inquiry and
(I) [1959] Supp 2 S.C.R. 836.
1963
Kesoram CollOll
Mills Ltd.
••
C•nf!•tihar
836
1969
Kuoram Cotton
Milu Ltd.
••
c..,a41i4,
w..,,h.. 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l964J VOL.
disciplinary proceedings against the suspended
workmen it also provided that the management
would try to reach an amicable settlement with the
union, failing which there would be a reference to
adjudication. It is said that in view of this the
appellant held no inquiry. Particularly, the factory
manager stated that he had discussions with the
secretary of the union over the matter of these
workmen and no settlement could be reached. He
also stated that the management wanted to hold
inquiries but the Secretary of the union stated that
no useful purposi- would be served by holding
inquiries because before final action was taken by
the management, it had to consult the union. This
statement was made by the factory manager who
appeared as the last witness in the case. The
secretary of the union appeared long before as the
first witness in the case ~d he was not questioned
on this matter at all. No such case was made out
even in the application for permission to dismiss
which was filed on June 29, 1959, to the effect that
the inquiries were not held because the secretary of
the union suggested that it would be useless to do so; ·
nor was any such allegation made in the written·statement of the appellant. In the circumstances it would
be dif_ficult to hold that the reason why no inquiry
was held was that the recpondents did not want the
inquiry. In the circumstances then fore this is a
case where the management wanted to dismiss the
workmen without havir;g held an inquiry and !he
decision in S11sa Mma r,1:se (1 ), would be fully applicable to these nine workmen who have been
permitted to be dismissed and they would be entitled
to full wages fromlDecember 23, 1957 till the date
the tribunal's award permitting dismissal becomes
enforceable.
Lastly we come to the case of the four workmen
whose services have been allowed to be terminated.
Nothing was urged before us with respect to the
(IJ 11959) Supp. 2 s.c.R. 836.
...
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
order permitting termination of service. Nor do·we
think that the order of the tribunal in this behalf is
wronef. · In their case the tribunal has said that if
the inquiry proceedings had not been defective, these
four persons would be liable to dismissal as ordere4
by the appellant. It is only because there was
defect in the inquiry proceedings as stated above that
it was held that the dismissal was unjustified. The
tribunal therefore went on to permit the termination of service of these four workmen under one
of the standing orders and finally ordered payment
of wages for a period of one month alongwith
compensation at the rate of 15 days average wages
for every completed year of service or any part
thereof in excess ·of six months. The circumstances
of the case are not exactly similar to those in the
Basa Musa case (1 ), and therefore the principle of
that case would not necessarily apply.
In the
circumstances we do not think that we should interfere with the order of the tribunal.
In the result, the award of the tribunal is
affirmed in the light of and subject to 'the above
modifications; and consequently the appeal by the
management is dismissed and by the workmen allowed
only with respect to the grant of wages in the manner
indicated above. In the circumstances parties will
bear their own costs in both appeals.·
o: A. 425 of 1962 dismissed• .
O~ A. 426 of 1962 allowed in part.
(I) (1959J Supp ·2 s.c.a. 8!16.
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