RAJA RAM JAISWAL versus STATE OF BIHAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 April 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 752 | 1963 INSC 84
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 April 1963
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL*, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 125/1961
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 752
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 84
Text of the judgment
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1963
}j_lramju lvjerb-~1!'1
(Pl l t,/.
v.
Stelt of Jo./ali11rtJJhtra
Shoh J.
from the payment of land revenue. The futility
of the argument that the expression "person" when
it first occurs in sub·s. (3) includes the estate-holder,
becomes obvious if the clause is read after substituting
the expression "est~te-holder" for "person".
In that view of the case, this appeal fails and
is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
J9G3
RAJ A RAM J AISW AL
Ap<il I
V.
STATE OF BIHAR
(K. Si;nsA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and
J. R. MUDIIOLKAR JJ.)
Exciu O.fficu-Confession made to a7' Excise /n.•f"clor
in the cour.oe of i1westigalion-lf a wnfession made to a police
ufficer-"l'olicc O.Oie€r" jJeaniny of--Excisr. Inspector, if a
polict officer-Cod• of Criminal Procetkm 1898 (Act V of l.90~)
ss. 1.;1;, 162-lnaian Evidenr,e Act, 1872 (Act I of 11!72)
s. 25-Bihur nnrl Ori'8a Exc;.e Act, 191.5 (Act 2 of 1915),
ss. 2 (S), 7, 47 (a), 68, G9, 70, 71, 72, 73, 71, 78, SO,
82, 95, 96 . .
1
The appellant alongwith five other people, one of whom
was driving the car, were travelling in a car belonging to
the appellant's brother. The car was stopped by the Excise
Inspector who conducted a search of the car and recovered
five bundles of Ganja, four from the luggage boot and one
from the leg space in front of the seat of the car. The boot
could be opened with the keys in the possession of the appellant
as \\'ell as one of the keys in the posses5ion of the driver. 'l'hc
appellant made a confession to the Excise Inspector admitting
his guilt. At the trial of the apprllant alongwith the other
persons he pleaded an alibi and pleaded innocence. The
•
...
SlJPREml COURT REPORTS
753
trial court acquitted all the other accused but convicted the
appellant under s. 47 (a) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act.
1915, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. On appeal
the High Court affirmed .this conviction and sentence.
The appellant thereupon appealed to this Court with special
leave.
In the appeal before this Court it was contended that
the confessional statement Ex. 3 upon which reliance was
placed by the High Court as supporting the evidence ,of
P. W. 2, P. W. 3 and P. W. 4 was inadmissible and if this
statement was put' aside the evidence of these prosecution
Witnessi:o was insufficient in law to sustain the conviction of
the appellant. In objecting to the admissibility of the
statement reliahce was placed on s. 25 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 ands. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in as
rnuch as it was recorded by the Inspector of Excise while he was
investigating into an exci•c offence under Ch. XIV of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Hi/4 (per Subba Rao and Mudholkar JJ.) the words
·•Police Officer" in s. 25 of the Evidence Act are not to be
construed in a narrow way but have to be construed in a
wide and popular sense.
Those words are however not to be
coustrucd in so wide a sense as to include p~rsons on whom
only some of the
conferred.
powers exercised
·
by the police are
· Stat• of Punjab v. Barka,t Ram [1962] 3 S, C. R. 338
referred to.
.
By virtue of s. 77 (2) read withs: 78 (3) of the Bihar &
Orissa· Excise Act, 1915, an Excise Inspector or Sub-Inspector
in the State of Bihar shall be deemed to be an officer in charge
of a police station and is entitled to investigate any offence under
the' Excise Act. He can exercise all the powers which an officer
in charge of a police station can exercise under Ch. XIV of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore a confession
recorded by him during an investigation into an excise
offence cannot reasonably be regarded as anything different
from a confession to a police officer.
The test for determining whether a person is a "police
ofl"icer" for the purpose of s. 25 of the Evidence Act would be
whether the powers of a police officer which are conferred on
him or which arc exercisable by him because he is deemed to
be an officer in charge of a police station establish a direct or
1963
Raja Ram Jaiswal
v.
~tatt of Bihar
•
754'
1163
Rojo R.lln Jdswol
••
Stou ef BIAm-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
substantial relationship with the prohibition enacted by '· 25
of the Evidence Act that is the recording of a confesoion. In
other words the test would be whether the powers are such ao
would tend to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confemon
from a suspect delinquent.
It is the power of investigation which establishes a direct
relationship with the prohibitions under s. 25 of the Evidence
Act. Therefore where such power is conferred upon an officer,
the mere fact that he posoesses some other powers under
another law would not make him any the leso a police ofl"ICCr
for the purpose of s. 25.
•
The object of enacting s. 25 of the Evidence Act wao to
eliminate from consideration confes•ion made to an officer who
by virtue of his position, could extract by force, torture or
inducement a confession.
An Excioe Officer acting uncl.cr
s. 78 (3) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act, 1915, would be in
the same position as an officer in charge of a police otation
making an investigation under Ch. XIV of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. He would likewise have the same
opportunity of extracting confes.•ion from a ou•pect. It i<
therefore difficult to draw a rational distinction between a
confesoion recorded by a Police Ofl'lcer •trictly so called
and recorded by an EJ1cise Officer who is deemed to be a police
officer.
Ca<c law reviewed.
Harbhanjan Sao v. Emperor, (1927) I. L. R. 54, Cal. 601,
Matilal Kalwar v. Emperor, A. I. R. 1932 C'.al. 122, Af>lfen SM,.
ri•f v. Emperor, (1934) I. L. R. 61 Cal. 607, Nanoo &eilr.la
Ahmed v. Emperor, (1926) I. L. R. 51 Hom. 78, Public
Praauu/.or v. C. ParamtuJimm, A. I. R. 1953 Mad, 917, lbrahim
v. Emptror, A. I. R. 1944 Lah. 57, Radlia Ki•hun MaMDari
v. King Emperor, 1932 I. L. R. 12 Pat. 46 and Qmm v.
Hvrribok Clnmder Ghose, ( 1876) I. L. R. I Cal. 207.
referred to.
There is one more reason also why the confession made
to an Excise Sub·Inspector must be <itcluded, that io, it i< a
statement made during the course of investigation to a person
who exercises the power of an officer in charge of a police station.
Such a statement is excluded from evidence by s. 162 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure except for the purposes of contra·
diction. Therefore both by s. 25 of the Evidence Act ao well
as s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code the confession of tho
appellant is inadmi,.,<ible in evidence
-
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREMB COURT REPORTS
~55
Ptr Rachubar Dayal, J. The appeal should be allowed
but for diffi:rrcnt reasons.
A scrutiny of the various provmons of the Bihar &
Orissa Excise Act, 1915, leads to the conclusion that the legal
position of an Excise Officer io similar to that of the Customs
Officer whom this Court has held to be not a "police officer"
in the case of Stat• of Pu1tjab v' Barkat Ram, A. I. R. 1962
s. c. 276.
The provioions of ss. 7, 89, 95 and 96 of the Bihar and
Orissa EJ<cise Act, 1915, are sufficient to indicate that the
action 0f Excise Officers under the Act and under any other law
relating to excise revenue is treated alike. The Act is like Sea
CustQms Act primarily concerned with the collection of the
Excise revenue.
An Excise Officer cannot be a police officer for the
purpose of s. 25 of the Evidence Act at all times. He cannot
be a police officer only when he is discharging the duties of
an investigating officer. The mere fact that the Excise
Officer vossesscs certain powers similar to those of po lice
officers in regard to infraction of excise laws is not a sufficient
ground for holding them to be police officers within the meaning of s. 25 Evidence Act.
Under s. 85(3) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act, 1915
all officers other than collectors who make arrests, searches
or seizures under the Act are deemed to be police officers for
the purpose of the provisions relating to arrests, searches
and seizures in the Criminal Procedure Code. It is therefore
clear that the Legislature did not contemplate that Excise
Officers performing other duties corresponding to the duties
of the regular police officers be deemed to be police officers
merely on account-Of their performing those duties. It follows
that Excise Officers when investigating offences under the Act
are not to be deemed police officers for the purpose of the
provisions about investigation in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The effect of s. 78(3) can only be that in view of the
provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 156 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure no proceedings by the Excise Officer so
empowered shall be called into question on the ground that he
was not empowered tP investigate an offence.
The history of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as
.the Excise law shows that Excise Officers have been considered
1963
Raj11 Ram Jaiswal
v.
State nf Bifu1r
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
J963
&fa R""' /"""111
••
Sl4U ef Bl/lar
di!l'erent from police officen and that clear provisions were
created for certain officers of the Revenue and Police departments to be deemed Excise Officers .
The Excise Inspector and Sub-Inspector empowered by
the State Government under s. 77 (2) of the Act are not police
officen within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act and
that the aforesaid officers cannot be treated to be police
officers for the purpose of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE Ju1tISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 125 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated January 20, 1961 of the Patna
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1274 of
1960.
A.S.R. Chari, M.K. Ramamurthi, R.K. Garg,
8.C. Agarwala and D.P. Singh, for the appellant.
D. Goburdhan, for the respondent.
1963. April 4. The Judgment of Subba
Rao and Mudholkar JJ. was delivered by Mudholkar J. Dayal J. delivered a separate Judgment.
MuDHOLKAU J.-In this appeal by special
leave from the judgment of the Patna High Court
affirming the conviction of the appellant under
s. 47 (a) of the Excise Act and the sentences of
rigorous imprisonment for one year and of fine
amounting to Rs. 2,000 awarded by the Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Patna, the substantial
question which falls for decision is whether a confession made by the appellant and recorded by the
Excise Inspector who was investigating the case is
inadmissible by reason of the provisions of s. 25 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
It is not disputed before us by Mr. Chari that on
August 3, 1957, a motor car bearing No. WBC 562
2 s.e.R. SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS
757
was stopped by the Excise Inspector, R.R.P.
Sinha (P.W.l) on the Bayley Road, near the New
Secretariat, Patna, at 10.00 p.m. The car belongs
to the .appellant's brother Radhey Sh yam; but he
was not at that moment in the car. The car was
then being driven by Jagdish Sah and the appellant
was sitting by his side. Four other persons were
sitting on the back seat. The Excise Inspector
searched the car in the presence of three witnessess
Debendra Prasad Singh (P. W. 2), Paresh Nath
Prasad Singh (P.W. 3) and Rabindra Prasad Singh
(P.W. 4) and recovered from the car five bundles
of non-duty paid Nepali Ganja. According to the
prosecution four of them were recovered from the
luggage boot of the car while one was recovered
from the leg space in front of the front seat of the
car. According to the appellant, however, no ganja
was carried in the car and, therefore,. none was seized
from the car. Further, accordiag to the prosecution, the appellant produced the keys with which
the luggage boot was opened. The Excise
Inspector made a seizure memo Ex. 2 and recorded
the statements of all the persons who were in the
car, including the appellant. Exhibit 3 is the
1
statement of the appellant.
After the investigation was completed all the
persons who were in the car at that time including
the appellant and Radhey Shyam, the brother of the
appellant, were put up for trial before the Judicial
Magistrate. He convicted all of them but in appeal
the Sessions Judge, Patna, acquitted all except the
appellant. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to
the defence taken by the acquitted persons. The
appellant's defence was that he was not travelling in
the car at the relevant moment and that he was at
that time in the house of Kanhai Singh (D. W. 1)
which is ·situate in Subjibagh Mohatla of Patna
where he was arrested by the Excise Inspector .
~t 6.00 on the morning of August 4. His defem;e
1969
Raja Ram J.Uwal
Y.
S1a11 of Bihar
Mudholk111 J.
758
1963
R1Jja Jf11111 Jais111'J
••
'i'ltr/1 of Bi11ar
Afut/h~lKtsr J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
further is that after his arrest R. R. P. Sinha, P. W.
I and other officers of the Excise Department took
him in a jeep, subjected him to threats and abuse.!,
assaulted him and eventually took his signature on a
blank paper. Thus his defence is that he was falsely
implicated by the Excise Inspector. In view, however,
of the fact that all the courts have accepted the
evidence o( the prosecution witnesses which establishes
the fact that the appellant was actually in the car
when it was stopped by the Excise Inspector, Mr.
Chari has rightly not challenged that finding. He
has also not contended that the appellant's signature
was taken on a blank paper by the Excise Officers.
The argument he advanced, however, is that there
is no legally admissible evidence on the basis of
which the appellant's conviction can be sustained.
The confessional statement Ex. 3 upon which reliance
has been placed by the High Court as supporting the
evidence of P. W. 2 Debendra Prasad Singh, P. W.
3 Paresh Nath Prasad Singh and P. W. 4 Rabindra
Prasad Singh is attacked as being inadmissible in
evidence and it is said that if this statement is put
aside the evidence of the three prosecution witnesses
on whom reliance has been placed by the High
Court is insufficient in law to sustain the conviction
of the appellant under s. 47 (a) of the Excise Act.
The relevant portion of s. 47 runs thus :
"Penalty for unlawful import, export, transport, manufacture, possession, sale, etc.If any person, in contravention of this Act,
or of any rule, notification or order made,
issued or given, or license, permit or pass
granted, under this Act,-
(a)
imports, exports, transports, manufactures,
possesses or sells any intoxicant ; or
he shall be liable to imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one year or to
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
fine which may extend to two thousand
rupees, or to both."
~
1969
Raja 11JJm Jaisw•I
y,
The evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4 taken
along with the evidence of the Excise Inspector establishes the following facts :
(1)
that the appellant was s1ttmg by the side
of the driver when the car was stopped by
the Excise Inspector ;
(2)
that five bundles of non-duty paid Nepali
Ganja were recovered from the car;
(3) that four bundles were recovered from the
luggage boot of the car and one from the
leg space in front of the front seat ;
(4) that a bunch of keys marked Ex. 2 series
was recovered from the pocket of the appellant and another bunch of keys marked Ex.
1 series was recovered from the possession
of the driver Jagdish Sah ;
(5) that every key of Ex. 1 series could open
the lock of the luggage boot and two keys
of Ex. 2 series could also open the
lock.
In order to est<lblish this, the prosecution has
relied on the seizure memo Ex. F and the evidence
ofthe Excise Inspector and P. W. 2 Debendra
Prasad Singh. P. W. 3 Paresh Nath Prasad Singh and
P. W. 4 Rabindra Prasad Singh. A perusal of Ex. F
would, however, show that material alterations and
erasures appear to have been made in that document
by reason of which no reliance can be placed upon
it. The High Court has wholly ignored this fact
and we are, therefore, entitled to take it into consiqenltion. ~t, WO\lld appear that originally it was
State flf BiluJr
Mudholkar J.
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19M] VOL.
1963
Rai1J Ram Jaint:al
v.
Statt oj Bi_har
:lfudho/kor J.
shown in col. 5 and 6 taken tt>gether that a bundle
containing 35 seers of ganja was found in the leg
space in front of the rear seat but what was written
originally in col. 6 has been over-written by inserting words describing meaningless facts on top of the
words originally written and in continuation of them.
In Col. 5 the weight of the bundle is given as 35
seers and below it weights of four other bundles are
mentioned. They are :~5 seers, 26 seers, 18 seers and
6 seers. The weight of the first bundle was
excluded
from
the bracket in which the
weights of the first three bundles were included.
Then by introducing another bracket, the first
bundle was included within it. Against the
bracket it is stated in col. 6 that the bundles
were found in the luggage boot. The bundle
weighing 6 seers is not included in the bracket.
Against it, there was some other remark in col. 6
which has been clumsily erased and in its
place it is stated "In the leg space in front of front
seat.'' Again, in col. 8 wherever the appellant's
name appears there appears to have been something
else originally which was erased and his name
written there subsequently. A bare look at the
document shows that it has been materially altered
and is, therefore, not a kind of material on which
reliance can be placed. It is only with the aid of
the confession that it can be accepted as incriminating the appellant, For, even the direct evidence of
witnesses was not regarded by the High Court as
worthy of credence, unaided by the confession.
It is indeed the prosecution case that one bundle
of ganja was found in the leg space in front of the front
seat. Bearing in mind the fact that there were six persons in the car at the time and that the lu_ggage boot
in which the bundles were kept could be opened not
merely with the keys which were recovered from
the appellant but also with the keys which were
recovered from the driver it is not possible to say,
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
though the driver has been acquitted, that the
appellant was in exclusive possession of the ganja
which was found in the car except with the aid of
the confessional statement, Ex. 3. It follows, there-.
fore, that the appellant's conviction could be main·
tained on! y if, we hold that the confessional statement is admissible in evidence.
~
Mr. Chari besides objecting to the admissibility
of the confessional statemi:nt relying on s. 25 of the
Evidence Act also contends that that statement is
rendered inadmissible by the provisions of s. 162,
Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as it was recorded by R. R. P. Sinha, Inspector of Excise while
he was investigating into an excise offence under
Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 25 of the Evidence Act reads thus :
"No confession made to a police officer shall be
proved as against a person accused of any
offence."
Undoubtedly th6 Inspector R.. R. P. Sinha is an
Excise Officer and not a police officer in the sense
that he does not belong to the police force or the
police establishment. It has, however, been held
in a large number of cases, including the one decided
, by this court, The State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram ('),
that the words "Police Officer" to be found in
s. 25 of the Evidence Act are not to be construed in
a narrow way but have to be construed in a
wide and po_pular sense. Those words, according
to this Court, are however not to be construed in so
wide a sense as to include persons on whom only
some of the powers exercised by the police are conferred. This Court was there concerned with
the question whether a Customs Officer can be
regarded as a Police Officer and consequently whether
a confession made to such an officer is hit by the
provisions of s. 25 of the Evidence Act. In the
(1) p962] 8 I, C, R. SSS,
1963
Raja Ram Jaiswa I
v.
Stale o/ ./Jj/rar
Mudholkar J,
762
1903
R6}• Ra"' Ja1wal
••
SW 1 •f Bihor
Mut0t6/k4r J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
majority judgment
served :
Raghubar Dayal J., has
ob.
"The Customs Officer, therefore, 1s not
primarily concerned with the detection and
punishment of crime committed by a person,
but is mainly interested in the detection and
prevention of smuggling of goods and safe·
guarding the recovery of customs duties. He
is more concerned with the goods and customs
duty, than with the offender." (p. 279).
After pointing out that Customs Officers, when they
act under the Sea Customs Act for the prevention of
smuggling of goods, also act judicially inasmuch as
they are entitled to confiscate the goods and levy
penalties on the person found smuggling, he said
that the mere fact that similar powers in regard to
detection of infractions of Customs laws have been
conferred on Officers of the Customs Department as
are conferred on Officers of the Police is not
sufficient for holding them to be police officers within
the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act because
the powers of search etc., conferred on the former
are of a limited character and have a limited object
of safeguarding the revenues of the State. The
majority, however expressed no opinion on the
question whether officers of departments other than
the police on whom the powers of an officer·incharge of a police station under ch. I 4 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure arc conferred arc police
offic"rs or not for the purpose of s. 25 of the Evidence
Act. The question whether an Excise Officer is a
Police Officer was thus left open by them.
It is precisely this question which falls for
consideration in the present appeal. For, under
s.78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915
(2 of 1915) an Excise Officer empowered under
s. 77, sub-s. (2) of that Act shall, for the purpose of
2 S.C.R.
SUPRENfE COURT REPORTS
763
1963
s. 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be deemed .
to be an officer in charge of a police station with
respect to the area to which his appointment as an Raja Ramv. /aiswel
Slate of Biht1r
Excise Officer extends. Sub-section (l) of s. 77 em•
powers the Collector of Excise to investigate without
Mudholkar J.
the order of a Magistrate any offence punishable
under the Excise Act committed within the limits of
his jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) of that section
provides that any other Excise Officer specially empowered in this behalf by the State Goverument in
respect of all or any specified class of offences punishable under the Excise · Act may, without the order
of a Magistrate, investigate any such offence which
a court having jurisdiction within the local area to
which such officer is appointed would have power to
inquire into or try under the aforesaid provisions.
By virtue of these provisions the Lieutenant Governor
of Bihar and Orissa by Notification No. 470-F dated
January 15, 1919 has specially empowered Inspectors of Excise and Sub-Inspectors of Excise to
investigate any offence punishable under the Act.
It is not disputed before us that this notification is
still in force. By virtue of the provisions of s. 92 of
the Act it shall have effect as if enacted in the Act.
It would thus follow that an Excise Inspector or SubInspector in the State of Bihar shall be deemed to
be an officer in charge of a police station with respect to the area to which he is appointed and is in
that capacity entitled to investigate any offence under
the Excise Act within that area without the order of
a Magistrate. Thus he can exercise all the powers
which an officer in charge of a police station can
exercise under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, He can investigate into offences, record
statements of the persons questioned by him, make
searches, seize any articles connected with an offence
under the Excise Act, arrest an accused person,
grant him bail, send him up for .trial. before a
Magistrate, file a charge sheet and so on. Thus his
position in so far as offences 1.1nc!er the Excise Act
764
196J
R•jo R•m Joiswal
v.
St.u ef BiM•
Mlllilwlkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
committed within the area to which his appointment
extends are concerned is no different from that of an
officer in charge of a police station. As regards these
offences not only is he charged with the duty of
preventing their commission but also with their detec·
tion and is for these purposes empowered to act in
all respects as an officer in charge of a police station.
No doubt unlike an officer in charge of a police
station he is not charged with the duty of the maintenance of Iaw and order nor can he exercise the
powers of such officer with respect to offences under
the general law or under any other special laws.
But all the same, in so far a~ offenc~s under the Excise
Act are concerned, there is no distinction whatsoever
in the nature of the powers he exercises and those
which a police officer exercises in relation to offences
which it is his duty to prevent and bring to light.
It would be logical, therefore, to hold that a confession recorded by him during an investigation into
an excise offence cannot reasonably. be regarded as
anything different from a confession to a police
officer. For, in conducting the investigation he
exercises the powers of a police officer and the act
itself deems him to be a police officer, even though
he docs not belong to the police force constituted
under the Police Act. It has been held by this court
that the expression "Police Officer" in s. 25 of the
Evidence Act is uot confined to persons who are
members of the regularly constituted police force.
The position of an Excise Officer empowered under
s. 77(2) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act is not
analogous to that of a Customs Officer for two
reasons. One is that the Excise Officer does not
exercise any j udici<d powers jusl as the Customs
Officer docs under the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
Secondly, the Customs Officer is not deemed to be
an officer in charge of a police station and therefore
can exercise no powers under the Code of Criminal
Procedure and certainly not those of an officer in
charge of a police station. No doubt, he too has t!ie
2 s.c.R.
StJPRENIE COURT REPORTS. 765
power to make a search, to seize articles suspected to
hal'e been smuggled and arrest persons suspected of
h:J.ving committed an offence under the Sea Customs
Act. But that is all. Though he can make an
enquiry, he has no power to investigate into an
offence under s. 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whatever powers he exercises are expressly
set out in the Sea Customs Act. Though some of
those set out in ch. XVII may be analogous to those
of a Police Officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure they are not identical with those of a police
officer and are not derived from or by reference to
the Code. In regard to certain· matters, he does not
possess powers even analogous to those of a Police
Officer. Thus he is not entitled to submit a report
to a Magistrate under s. 190 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure with a view that cognizance of the offence
be taken by the Magistrate. Section 187(A) of the
Sea Customs Act specially provides that cognizance
of an offence under the Sea Customs Act can be
taken only upon a complaint in writing made by the
Customs Officer or other officer of the customs not
below the rank of an Assistant Collector of Customs
authorised in this behalf by the Chief Customs
Officer.
It may well be that a statute confers powers
and imposed duties on a public servant, some of
which are analogous to those of a police officer. . But
by reason of the nature of other duties whic;h he is
required to perform he may be exercising various
other powers also, It is argued on behalf of the
State that where such is the case the mere conferral
of some only of the powers of a police officer on
such a person would not make him a police officer
and, therefore, what must be borne in mind is the
sum total of the powers which he enjoys by virtue of
his office as also the dominant purpose for which he
is appointed. The contention thus is that when an
officer has to perform a wide range of duties and
•
1969
Rf.i• Rtm l•i.rai•l
v.
Stal• •f Bihor
Mud/Jolk., J.
766 SUPREME COURT ltEPORTS [1964] VOL.
196J
..
Rdj0 Ram }diJwal
Stalt of Bihor
Mutihel.Aar J.
exercise correspondingly a wide range of powers,
the mere fact that some of the powers which the
statute confers upon him are analogous to or,even
identical with those of a police officer would not
make him a police officer and, therefore, if such
an officer records a confession it would not be
hit bys. 25 of the Evidence Act. In qur Judgment
what is pertinent to bear in mind for the purpose
of determining as to who can be regarded a "police
officer" for the purpose of this provision is not the
totality of the powers which an officer enjoys but the
kind of powers which the law enables him to
exercise. The test for determining whether such a person is a "policer officer" for the purpose of s. 25 of
the Evidence Act would, in our judgment, be whether
the powers of a police officer which arc conferred
on him or which are exercisable by him because he
is deemed to be an officer in charge of a police
station establish a direct or substantial relationship
with the prohibition enacted by s. 25, that is, the
recording of a confession. In our words, the test
would be whether the powers are such as would
tend to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect or a delinquent. If they do,
then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant
purpose for which he is appointed or the question as
to what other powers he enjoys. These questions
may perhaps be relevant for consideration where the
powers of a police officer conferred upon him arc of
a very limited character and are not by themselves
sufficient to facilitate the obtaining by him of a
confession.
As an instance of a law which confers on an
officer powers of a limited character which are
analogous to those conferred upon police officers,
we may refer to the Sea Customs Act itself. This
Act confers a wide range of powers on Customs
Officers. But powers analogous to those of a police
officer are to be found only in ch. XVII which deals
•
!! S.C.R. SUPRBNID COURT REPORTS
767
IR63
with "procedure relating to offences, appeals etc."
Under s. 169 a Customs officer is empowered to R'l}• &m l.U•,.
v.
search on reasonable suspicion any vessel in any
Si.11 of Bi"4r
port in India or any person who. has landed from
Mudholkat J, .
any vessel. This power, however, is subject to the
right given by s. 170 to that person to require the
Customs officer to take him before his search to a
Magistrate or Customs Collector. Where such
person exercises that right the question as to whether
he should be searched or not would depend upon
the Magistrate or the Customs Collector being
satisfied about the existence of reasonable grounda
for the search. No such restriction is imposed upon
a police officer making a search under s. 102,
sub-s. (3) of the Code. Again, whereas an officer
in charge of a police station can search any place
in connection with a cognizable offence under investigation after recording in writing his reasons, a
Customs Officer cannot search any place on land
where a dutiable or prohibited goods or documents
relating to such goods are secreted without first
obtaining a search warrant from a Magistrate.
Under s. 173 of the Act a Customs Officer has the
power to arrest a person against whom reasonable suspicion exists that he has been guilty of
an ,offence under the Act. But he is required to
produce that person forthwith before the nearest
Magistrate and it will be for the Magistrate either
to commit that person to jail custody or release him
on bail at his discretion. An officer in charge of a
police station has, however, the power, to release
an arrested person on his furnishing bail and is not
required for the purpose to obtain an order of a
Magistrate. It is only where he does not release
him on bail that he must produce him before a
Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. We may add
that the existence of the power to grant bail in an
officer in charge of a police station itself enables him
to exercise authority over the arrested person and
influence his conduct if he so wishes. Finally, a
768
1963
Rdja Rmn J(Jiswal
Y.
Sl&Je of Bihar
MuilwJkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL·.
Customs Officer has power to seize anything lialile
to confiscation under the Act. But wh~re he has
seized anything he is liable. on demand of the person
in charge of the thing so seized, to give him a
statement in writing of the reasons for such seizure.
Similarly where he has arrested a person, he is bound
to give to that person, if that person so demands, a
statement in writing disclosing the reasons for the
arrest. No such duty is cast upon a police officer
seizing an article or arresting a person. Chapter
XVII deals with 110 other powers which could be
said to be analogous to those of a police officer.
The whole of that chapter shows that the other
powers conferred upon a Customs Officer are such,
as arc necessary for preventing the commission of
offences under the Sea Customs Act and matters
incidental thereto. It is worthy of note that the
powers of investigation into offences which a police
officer enjoys are not conferred upon a Customs
Officer. It is the possession of these powers which
enables police officers and those who are deemed to
be police officers to exercise a kind of authority over
the persons arrested which facilitate the obtaining
from them statements which may be incriminating
to the persons making them. The law allows the
police officer to obtain such statements with a view
to facilitate the investigation of the offences. But
it renders them inadmissible in evidence for the
obvious reason that a suspicion about voluntariness
would attach to them. It is the power of investigation which establishes a direct relationship with
the prohibition enacted in s. 25. Therefore, where
such a power is conferred upon·an officer, the me~e
fact that he possesses some other powers under
another law would not make hiin any the less· a
police officer for the purposes of s. 25.
In this connection it would be pertinent to
bear in mind the object with which the provisio~s
of s. 25 of the Evidence Act were enacted. For th1S
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
purpose we can do not better than quote the following passage from the judgment of Mahmood J. in
Queen Empress v. Babulal (1).
" .................. the Lagislature had· in view
the malpractices of police officers in extorting
confessions from accmed persons in order · to
gain credit by securing convictions, and that
those malpractices went to the length· or
positive torture; nor do I doubt that the
Legislature, in laying down such stringent
rules, regarded the evidence of police officera
as untrustworthy, and the object of the rule•
was to put a stop to the extortion of confession,
by taking away fronl the police officer1 the
advantage of proving such extorted confession•
during the trial of accused· persons."
'
This provision was thus enacted to eliminate
from consideration confessions made to an officer
who, by virtue of his position, could extort by force,
torture or inducement a confession. An Excise
Officer acting under s. 78 (3) would be in the same
position as Officer in charge of a police station making
an· investigation under Ch. XIV of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. He would likewise have the
same opportunity of extorting a confession from a
suspect. It is, therefore, difficult to draw a rational
distinction between a confession recorded by a
Police Officer strictly so called and one recorded by
an Excise Officer who is deemed to be a Police
Officer.
A large number of decisions were cited at the
bar b~aring on the question as to whether the
expression "Police Officer" used in s. 25 of the
Evidence Act is restricted to the members of the
force or has a wider meaning. It is unnecessary to
refer to those decisions because in Barkat Ram' a
case ('), it has clearly been held that the expression
(l) (1884) 1.L.R, 6 All. 509, 523.
'
\2) [ !962J 3 S. c. R. 338,
19~1 '
lt.•i• RM1l lailw•l
y,
SM!e of· ~i/1•
M.JJiolku 1.
'70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964] VOL.
'*'
Raja Ram laiiwal
v.
Sl4t1 of Biluu
Mudholkar J.
is not to be construed in a narrow way. \Ve may,
however, refer to certain. decisions in which
the question whether an Excise Officer is a Police
Officer within the meaning of that section has been
I here is, however, no
specifically considered.
unanimity in those decisions. Thm in Ah Fo011g v.
Emperor (1), Ilarbhanjan Sao v. Emperor ('),
Matilall Kalwar v. Emperor ('), it was held that an
Excise Officrr is not a Police Officer, A contrary
view was, however, taken in Ibrahim Ahmed v.
King Emperor('). The view taken in that case was
affirmed by a Full Bench in Ameen Sharif v.
Emperor ('). The view taken in the Full Bench
case as well as in Ibrahim Ahmed's case ('), follows
that of the Bombay High Court in Nanoo Sheikh
Ahn1ed v. Emperor ('). A similar view was also
taken in Public Prosec1ttor v. C. Paramasivam (1),
Ibrahim v. Emperor ('). In Radha K ishun MaruYJri
, v. King Emperor ('), it wa~, however, held that an
Excise Officer functioning under the Bihar Excise
Act is not a Police Officer and that a statement
made to him is not within s. 25 of the Evidence Act.
We need not; however, consider the last mentioned
decision because there the learned Judges have construed the expression "Police Officer" in s. 25 of
the Evidence Act to mean only an officer of the
police force. That, however, is not in accord with
what this Court has held in Barkat Ram's case ( 10 ).
We will briefly examine the other decisions.
In Ah Foong's case('), all that Sanderson CJ.,
who delivered the leading judgment has said was
that he dirl not think that Excise Officers in the
case before the court could be said to be Police
Officers and that the statements made by the accused
to them were not admissible by rea~on of the fact
that they were made to Police Officers. There is
thus no discussion of the question at all. Apart
from that the offence concerned in that case was
one under the Op:um Act and an Excise Officer
(1) (10IR' T.t.. R. 4• r.al. 411.
(3) A.l.R. 1032 r.1 1n.
(5J 1193~) 1.1 .. R. fil C.I 007.
171 A.l.R. 1913. Mad 917.
(9) (1.9321 IL R. 12 Pat 46 EB.
12\ (19271 l.L.R: 54 rat 601.
1') (1931) 1.L R. SB Cal. 1160.
(RI (192611.L.R. Sl Bom. 78
18) A.!.R. 19441.ah 57.
( 10 [1962] 3 S.Cll. 338.
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
·acting under that Act was not conferred with the
powers of an dficer in charge of a police station
under lh. XIV of the Code' of Criminal Procedure.
Harbhanjan Sao's case ('), merely followed this
case as also did Matilr!l's ca.qe ('). Ibrahim Ahmed's
case ('), was a case which arose after the amend·
ment of the Opium Act and it followed the view
taken in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed's case ('). In
Nanoo Sh•ikh Ahmed's case('), a Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court examined a large number of
decisions commencing from The Queen v. Hurribole
Chunder Ghose ('). Ma~ten C. J. quoted with
approval the following two passages from that case :
"Its humane object is to prevent confessions
obtained from accused persons through any
undue influence, being received as evidence
against them ..... ; ......................... ! consider
that the term 'police officer' should be reac.
not in any strict technical sense, but according to its more comprehensive and popular
meaning.'' (p. 215).
" ......................... and I think it better in
construing a section such as the 25th which
. was intended as a wholesome protection to
the accused to construe it in its widest and·
most popular signification." (p. 216) .
.
The Full Bench pointed out that in Ah Foong'a
case ('), there was hardly any discussion of the
question and further pointed out that Excise Officers
had limited power in Bengal under the Opium Act
of l 878 whereas in Bombay they exercised the
powers of investigation and so on. The learned
Chief ]'1stice then observed :
" ........ in my judgment, we should hold that
as the Bombay Legislature has deliberately
(1) (1927) IL R. 5\ Cal 601.
<9) ll93l) l.L.R. 51 Cal 12GO.
(5) (1876) I.LR. I Cal. 207.
(2) A I.R. 1992 Cal. 122.
,4, (1926) I.L.R, 51 Boin. 78,
(6) (1918) l.L R. 46 Cal. fll.
1"6S
Raja Ram l•itlllll
••
Swt1 of Bihar
Mud/Joi/tar. i
772 SUPREME COURT.REPORTS[l964] VOL.
11!6J
RajO Ram Jaiswol
••
S14t,.J Bi/uzr
Mudli.U.11r I.
conferred upon these Abkari officers substan·
tially all the powers of a Police Officer, they
have thereby in effect made them Police
Officers within the meaning of section 25,
and that, accordingly" any confession made
to such an officer in the course of his investigation under the Abkari Act or the Criminal
Procedure Code is inadmissible in evidence."
(p. 94)
According to Shah J. s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act
embodies an important rule, which is to be given
effect to as a matter of substance and not as a mere
matter of form and that it is a perfectly fair interpretation of s. 25 to say that the Police Officer
within the meaning of that section is an officer, who
exercises the powers of police conferred upon him
by law, whether he is called a Police Officer or
he is called by any other name and exercises other functions also . under other provisions
of law, if. for the investigation of offences under a
particular Act he is empowered to exercise the
powt>rs of an officer in charge of a police station for
the investigation of a cognizable offence. · Fawcett
J. pointed out that since the Legislature did not
amend the Act even after 'the decision in llurribole'a
case ('), ·where the exprcs5ion "police officer" was
given a wide meaning the courts would be justified
in adhering to it. Kemp J. was of the opinion that
though 'the term · ;Police Officer" should not be
construed strictly it was not safe to lay down generally th at the term should not be construed in i•s
popular and most comprehensive sense. All the
same he held that an Excise Officer acting under the
Abkari · Act of Bombay must be deemed to be a
Police Officer inasmuch as he had the power of
investigating into excise offences, Mirza J. concurred with this view but did not state any reasons.
0
In Ameen Sharif's case ('), the following
question was relerred to a Full Bench : "Is an excise
.<IJ (1876) l;L.R. I Cal.107.
(2) (1934) I L.R. 61 ra1.r>01.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
officer who, in the conduct of investigation of an
offence against the excise, exercises the powers
conferred by the Code of Criminal l'rocedure upon
an officer in charge of a police-station for the investi·
gation of a cognizable offence, a police officer
within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian
Evidence Act ?" That case .arose under the Bengal
Excise Act and Mukerji J. who delivered the
leadingjudgmer,t, after pointing out that the powers
of an. Excise Officer acting under the Opium Act
(I of 1878) prior to its amendment by Opium
(Bengal Amendment) Act, (Bengel Act V of 1933)
are not quite the same as those of an Excise Officer
acting under the Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act V
of 1909) observed that during arguments a much
broader question had been submitted for the decision
of the Full Bench as arising upon the order of
reference taken along .with the facts of the cases in
which the reference was made. The learned Judge
then said that to answer this question one has necessarily to consider the meaning of the term "Police
Officer" as used in s. 25 of the Evidence Act which,
though it may not rank with 'ancient statutes' in the
_ sense in which that expression is used in forensic
language, great ·regard ought to be paid, in constru.ing · a statute enacted long ago to the construction
which was put upon it by those who lived about the
time or soon after it was made, because the meaning
which a particular word or expression bore in those
days may have got mixed up or blurred during the
interval that has elapsed. From .that point of view
.he regarded the decision in the case of Queen v.
Hurribole Ckunder Gkose ('), one of very great .im·
portance. We have already referred to that decision
·but we have· llOt proceeded upon the view .that while
·construing the relevant provision we should apply
·the principle followed in construing an ancient
atatute. The Evidence Act is.of the year 1872 and
in . Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan
Chopra (.'), this court while considering the quesiton
(I) (1176) I.L.R. I Cal, 207.
'
(2) [1962] 3 S, C, R. 1•6,
1963
Raja.Ram Jaiswal
••
~tata of Bihar
Mudlwlka• J,
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
196J
Raja Ram J.UUJ<I
••
SUI/• of Bi/ta
Mu/i.,a,, J.
as to the meaning to be given to the expression
"Telegraph line" occurring ins. 3, sub·s. (4) of the
Telegraph Act, 1885, pointed out that the maxim
oontemporanea exposilio as laid down by Coke was
applied in construing ancient st ltutes but not in
i:lterpreting Acts which arc comparatively modem.
Indeed, the rule of construction which ought to be
applied to a statute either ancient or modern is the
same ·and that is to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature. We, however, agree that it would be
inappropriate to attach wide meaning to the words
used by the legislature in a law made in remote ages
when society was static and that the position would
be different with respect to words used in a Jaw
made in a modem progressive society in which
the frontiers of knowledge are fast expanding. The
Evidence Act was enacted at a time when already
a revolution in men's ideas had set in and considerable scientific advances had already been made.
The maxim laid down by Coke cannot therefore
properly be applied for construing the language used
by the Legislature in s. 25 of the Evidence Act.
The learned Judge did not, however, rest his judgment solely upon this ground. Upon a consideration
of a large number of decisions of the Indian High
Courts, he came to the conclusion that an Excise
Officer exercising the powers :>f an officer in charge
of a police station within the area to which he is
appointed would fall within the expression "police
officer" occurring in s. 25 of, the Evidence Act. The
learned Judge, there referred to s. 6 of the Police
Act and some other proviliions thereof and pointed
out:
"The police, therefore, were instruments for
the prevention and detection of crimes with the
concomitant powers 0£ apprehension and
detention of offenders in order to their being
brought to justice, such powers varying accor·
ding to the position or status of the particular
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
inember of the body. In other words, "police
officers" were officers whose duty was to
prevent aud detect crimes. Apart from any
technical meaning which the term "police
officer," occurring under any particular Act,
might bear, the more comprehensive and
popular meaning of the term was what has
jmt been stated. In the Oxford Dictionary,
two of the senses in which the word "police"
is used are said to be the following :'The department of government which is
concerned with the maintenance of public
order and safety, and the enforcement of the
law; the extent of its functions varying greatly
in different countries and at different periods.
The civil force to which is entrusted the duty
of maintaing public order, enforcing regulations for the prevention and punishment of
breaches of the law, and detecting crime; construed as plural, the members of a police
force; the constabulary of a locality.'
All these duties which police officers discharge are
but different phases of and means for carrying out
the two more comprehensive duties, namely, of
prevention of crimes and detection of crimes. It
is true that it has nowhere been defined what
minimum aggregation of functions will constitute a
person a police officer within the meaning of section
25 of the Act, but the more comprehensive and
popular signification of the term ·•police officer",
such as it was in 1861, is not difficult to appreciate
from what was said by the leghlature in the Police
Act (V of 1861). Powers and duties of police
· officers under Act V of 1861 or under Act XXV of
1861 or under any other statute, .or the di:lfP.rent
powers which different grades of police officers have
under any particular enactment, are mere matters
· of details worked out in order to enable the entire .
1963
Rajo Ram Jai!wol
.
v.
State of Bihar
Mudf.otkar /.
7i6 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS (1964]VOL ..
/969
Rlljd Rttm Jai1UJal
v.
Stal• of Bihtu
Mudholkar J.
body, taken as a whole, to carry out the two
essential duties entrusted to them, namely, the
prevention and detection of crimes. These, two
features of the duties which the police have to
discharge and especially that of detection of offenders, which involves the duty of holding investiga·
tions, have always been regarded as marking them
out for special treatment in so far as confessions
made to them are concerned." (pp. 623-4).
We agree with the learned Judge that by and
large it is the duty of detection ot offences and of
bringing off~nders to justice, which ·requires an
investigation to be made, that differentiates police
officers from private individuals or from other
agencies of State. Being concerned with the in.
vestigation, there is naturally a desire on the part
of a police officer to collect as much evidence as
possible against a suspected offender apprehended
· by him and in his zeal to do so he is apt to take
recourse to an easy means, that is, of obtaining a
confession by using his position and his power
over the person apprehended by him. We, therefore, agree with the observations of the· learned
Judge at p. 621! which are to the following effect :
"I can find no reason why in 1872 in respect
of an offence under the then Opium Act
(XIII of 1857) the legislature could ·have
thought of excluding a confession made 1to a
member of the regular police force but not a
confession made to an abkari or excise officer,
if such officer was, in• fact, holding an in·
vestigation into an offence and was exercising
such powers as a police officer is competent
to exercise. The fact is that, in those days,
he had no such powers and so· could not
exercise them. When, in course of time,.he
came to . have those powers and was able to
exercise · them •in respect of offencea which
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
1963
were not known to law in those days and only ·
subsequently came to be regarded as such, R•i• ,Ram Jcisw•l
v.
such an officer, when so acting, is an officer
S/?''
•f
Bil!U
for, whom the term "police officer" .used in
Mudholkar
J,
section 25 of the Evidence Act was meant."
The learned Judge then considered two points which
were raised · before :the Full Bench as militating
against the view ·expressed by him-one being that
there is a distinction: between "police officers'" and
"revenue officers" and the other that in s. 25 of the
Evidence Act in respect of an officer of the police
there is a personal 9isability implied irrespective of
the question whether he is holding an investigation
. or not, while no ·such disability can be said to have
been ·intended in the case of an Excise Officer.
· So far as the · first of these points was concerned the learned Judge agreed with the answer
given by Marten· C. J. in the case of Nanoo Sheikh
Ahmed ('), at p. 95 of the report to meet a similar
·point. As ·regards the second point he said that,
whereas police officers, by reason of section 22 of
Act' V of 1861, are to be always considered on duty
for the purposes of the Act, . all revenue officers, on
the other hand, are not police officers and it is only
such of them as may be exercising the powers of
police officers and only when exercising such powers
that they may be regarded as police officers.
We are in complete agreement with this view;
· Mallik and Ghose JJ. agreed with Mukherji .J.
ButJack J.did not accept Hurribole's case ('),a1
· an authority for holding that an Excise Officer is a
Police Officer merely because .he .. has certain power1
of. a police officer. His conclusion, however, w;is
that the application of s. 25 of the -Evidence Act,
in ilie case of an excise officer should be limited to
:a. confession made to him .in· the course of an
jnvestigation of an:offence by. virtue of section 74(3)
(I) (19261 I.L.R. 51 Bom. 78,
(2) (1876) I.L,R, I Cal, 207,
i78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
JH3
Raja Ram ,'•iswal
v.
S1o11 •f BiMr
Mu</roll., /.
of the Excise Act, which gives him the status of a
police officer for the purposes of the investigation. In
Qther words, what he means is that though an Excise
Officer cannot be regarded as a Police Officer, still,
when he exercises certain functions under s. 74(3)
of the Excise Act he will be acting as a Police Officer
and, therefore, a confession made to him would be
hit bys. 25 of the Evidence Act. Costello J. however,
differed from the other learned Judges and based
himself largely upon the decision in Ra1ha K ishun
lll arwari' s case (') and in conclusion he observed :
"In my opinion, endless difficulties inevitably
arise \vhen Judges endeavour to extend . the
plain provisions of any statutory enactment.
Where the language of an enactment is unam·
biguous it should be interpreted strictly and,
in a case such as the present, it is, to my
mind, in the highest degree unsound, and indeed
dangerous for the court, by subtlety of argument
or by resorting to other statutes to extend pro·
visions such as that contained in section 25.
I am clearly and definitely of opinion that
when the legislature med the expression 'police
officer' they meant a police officer in the sense
in which that expression is generally understood
by the populace at large and in no other sense
at all." (p. 648).
The learned Judge apparently overlooked the
fact that in the popular sense Excise Officers are
also regarded as Police Officers, being referred to
as "the Excise Police."
Thu5 a consideration of the decisions of the
High Courts in India shows that the preponderance
of judicial opinion is in consonance with the view
which we have already expressed.
There is one more reason also why the confes·
sion made to an Excise Sub-Inspector must be
.
(I) (1932) I,L.R. 12 Pat. 46. F.B,
2 S.C.R.
•
...
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
779
1963
excluded, that is, it is a statement made during the
course of investigation to a person who exercises the
powers of an officer in charge of a police station.
Such statement is excluded from evidence bys. 162
of the Co:le of Criminal Procedure except for the
purpose of contradiction. Therefore, both by s. 25
of the Eviderrce Act as well as bys. 162, Cr.P.C.
. the confession of the appellant is inadmissible in
evidence. If the confession goes, then obviously
the convictiog of the appellant cannot be sustained.
Accordingly we allow the appeal 'and set aside the
conviction and sentences passed oii the appellant.
--·
'Rt1,ja R11m Jaiswal
RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-'l agree that the appeal
be allowed and the conviction and the sentences
passed on the appellant be set aside, but for different
reasons which I proceed to state :
RathubharD•yal J.
I do not consider the confession to be inad ·
'missible in evidence as being made. to a police officer.
The admissibility of the alleged confession of the
appellant depends on the question whether the
Excise Inspector comes within the expression 'police
officer' in s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. I am
of opinion that he does not.
·In State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (1), this
Court held that a customs officer is not a police
officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence
Act. The view was based on the following considerations :
·
(1) The powers which a police officer enjoys
are powers for the effective prevention and detection
of crime in order to maintain law and order while
'a customs officer is not primarily concerned with the
detection and punishment of crime committed by a
·person but is mainly interested in the detection and
prevention of smuggling of goods and safeguarding
the recovery of customs duties.
·
.
m [1962J s s.c.R. ssa.
v•
.Stalt of Bih«r
Mudholk&r J.
780
196J
R•j• RaM Jtrisrr.ol
v.
~t.U cf Bihar
a.,-.
Da;o/ J.
SUPREME COURr REPORTS [1964) VOL
(2) 1he mere fact that customs officers possess
certain powers similar to those of police officers in
regard to detection of infractions· of customs laws,
is not a sufficient ~round for holding them to be
police officers withm the meaning of s. 25 of the
Evidence Act, even though the words 'police officer'
are .not to be construed in a narrow way but have
to be construed in a wide and popular sense, as
remarked in Queen v. Hurribole ('). The expression
'police officer' is not of such wide meaning, as to
include persons on whom certain police powers.are
incidentally conferred.
(") A confession made to any police officer,
whatever be his rank and whatever be the occasion
for.making it, is inadmissible in evidence, but a
confession made to a customs officer when he be
not discbarging any such duty which corresponds to
the duty of.a police officer, will be inadmissible even
if the other view be correct that he was a police
·officer when exercising such powers.
(4) The Sea Customs Act itself refers .to
.'police officer' in contra-distinction to 'customs
officer'.
(5) Customs Officers act judicially when they
act under the Sea Customs Act to prevent smuggling
of goods and . imposing confiscation and penalties,
and proceedings before them are judicial proceed·
ings for the purpose of ss. 193 and 228 I. P. C. .
A..,crutiny of the various provisions of the Bihar
. and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (Act II ofl915), herein.. after called .the Act, leads to a similar conclusion with
respect to Excise Officers on whom powers of.in·
. vestigating. offences under the Act have been conferr·
. ed. ,.It
be useful to quote the relevant pro' yjsions of the Act and Government Orders which
lead to such a conclusion.
wiil
(I) (1876) liL.R. I Cal. 207.
..
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
781
1969
The preamble of the Act reads :
Raja RtJll'I. Jaiswal
"Whereas it is expedient to amend and reenact the law in the Province of Bihar (and
Orissa) relating to the import, export, trans·
port, manufacture, possession, and sale of
certain ,,kinds of liquor ·and intoxicating drugs;
According to cl. (8) of s. 2, 'Excise Officer'
means the Collector or any officer or other person
. appointed or invested with powers under s. 7. The
relevant portion of s. 7 reads :
" (I) The
administration of the Excise
and the collection, of the excise
revenue within a district shall ordinarily be
under the charge of the Collector.
Departmen~
(2) The State Government may by notification applicable to the whole ofthe State or to
any specified local area,(a) appoint an officer who shall, subject to
such control as the State Government may
direct, have the control of the administration
of the Excise Department and the collection
of the excise revenue;
x
x
x
x"
Excise Commissioners are appointed under s. 7(t)(a).
Among the other officers appointed under the other
clauses of sub-s (2) of s. 7 of the Act are Suprr·
intendents of Excise, Inspectors ·of Excise and SubInspectors of Excise. The Superintendent of Excise
exercises certain specified powers of the Collector to
whom he is subordinate.
••
Stole of BU..r
R11hui"' JJ"!:f"l /.
782
1963
Ro}•Ram J•iswal
••
!'toll of Bil.ar
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
Chapter VIII deals with offences and penalties.
Section 63 provides for penalty for contempt of
Court and reads :
"Every proceeding under this Act before a
Collector, or before any officer, of such rank as
the State Government may, by notification
prescribe, who is exercising powers of a
Collector, shall be deemed to be a 'judicial
proceeding' within the meaning of s. 228 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
Officers who may exercise the powers of a Collector
are Superintendents of Excise, Sub-Divisional
Officers and Deputy Collectors.
Section 68 provides that the Collector or any
Excise Officer specially empowerea by the State
Government in that behalf, not below the rank of
Depury Collector or Superintendent of Excise, may
compound offences and release property liable to
confiscation in certain circumstances on payment to
the Collector or such Excise Officer of a sum of
money not exceeding Rs. 500/·.
'
Section 69 empowers the Excise Commissioner,
Collector or any Excise Officer not below such rank
as ihe State Government may, by notification,
prescribe and subject to any restrictions prescribed
by the state Government by rule made under s. 89,
to enter and inspect any place of manufacture or
storage or sale of any intoxicant by a licensed manu·
facturer and to test and seize measures and to
examine accounts and regi~ters or a place where an
intoxicant is kepi for sale by such licensed person
and to seize them if he had reasons to believe them
to be false. Excise Officers not below the rank of
a Sub-Inspector have been empowered under s.69,
under Notification No. 470-F datl'd January 15,
1919, of the Financial Derartment of the
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
Government of Bihar and Orissa, and we understand
thai this Notification is still in force.
Section 70 authorizes any officer of the.Excise,
Police, Salt, Customs or Land Revenue Department
or any·person empowered by the State Government
in that behalf by notification, to arrest without
warrant any person found committing offences punishable under ss.4 7, 49, 55 or 56 of the Act and to
seize and detain any article which he has reason to
believe to be liable for confiscation under the Act
or any other law for the time being in force relating
to the excise·revenue and to detain and search any
pers011 upon whom, and any vessel, raft, vehicle etc.,
upon which, he may have reasonable cause to suspect
any such article to be. Sections 71 and 72 provide
for the Collector or any Magistrate empowered to
try offences punishable under the Act to issue
warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has
reason to believe to have committed or abetted any
·offence punishable under ss.4 7, 49, 55 or 56 and to
issue a warrant for the search of any intoxicant,
material, still, utensil etc. in respect of which the
alleged olfer_ice has been or is likely to be committed.
Sectio"n 73 empowers the Collector or any SubDivisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class
to arrest or direct the arrest in his presence or to
search or direct a search to be made in his presence
when he be competent to issue a warrant of arrest
or a search warrant. Section 74 empowers an Excise
Officer n'Jt below such rank as the State Government
may, by notification, prescribe, to arrest .certain
offenders when such Officer has reason to believe that
an offence had been committed or was being committed and when the obtaining of a search warrant might
afford the offender an opportunity to escape or conceal
evidence of the offence. The State Government has
prescribed that Excise Officers not below the ran.k of
a Sub- Inspector can exercise the power under this
section.
'
196!
Rqja Ram Jtliswal
••
Stat1 of l/ihar
&ahub111 D11>al J. ·
784
196'
..
Raj•. Ram Joiswal
.
Stolt of SiAar
Ratfi•la Do;•/ J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS-(1964] VOL.
Section 77 is important for our purpose and is
set out in full below:
"(I) A Collector may, without the order of a
Magistrate, investigate any offence punishable
under this Act which a Court having juris·
diction over the local area within the limits
of the Collector's jurisdiction would have
power to enquire into or try under the provi·
sions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 18!!8, relating to the place of in·
quiry.or trial.
(2) Any other Excise Officer specially empo·
wered in this behalf by the State Government
in respect of all or any specified class of
offences punishable under this· Act may,
without the order of a Magistrate, investi·
gate any such offence which a Court having
jurisdiction over the local area to which such
officer is appointed would have power to
inquire into or try under the aforesaid
provisions."
Under sub-s. (2) of s. i7, the State Government has
specially empowered Inspectors of Excise and Sub·
Inspectors of Excise to investigate any offence
punishable under the Act.
Section 78 reads :
"(l) Any Collector, or any Excise Offic~r
empowered under section 77, sub-section (2),
mav, after· recording in writing his reason
for· suspcctinl!' the commission of an offence
which he is empowered to investigate, exer·
cise(a) any of the powers conferred ·upon a
Police Officer inaking an investi~ation,. or
upon an officer' in charge of a pohce·st~tlon,
.I
! S.C ..k.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
by sections 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (5of1898), and
(b) as regards offences punishable under
section 47, section 49, section 55, or section
56 of this Act-any of the powers conferred
upon Police Officers in respect of cognizable
offences by clause first of sub-section (l) of
section 54 and by section 56 of the said Code;
and the said portions of the said Code shall·
apply accordingly, subject to any restrictions
or modifications prescribed by the State
Government by rule made under section 89,
clause (o).
(2) Subject to any restrictions prescribed by
the State Government a Collector or an
Excise Officer empowered under section 77,
sub-section (2), may, - without reference to a
Magistrate, and for reasons to be recorded
by him in writing, stop further proceedings
against any person concerned, or supposed to
be concerned, in any offence which he or any
Excise Officer subordinate to him has
investigated.
;f;it
~·
•
(3) For the purposes of section 156 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)
the area .to which an Excise Officer empowered
under section 77, sub-section (2), is appointed
shall be deemed to be a police-station, and
such officer shall be deemed to be the officer
in charge of such station.
(4) As soon as an investigation by a Collector
or by an Excise Officer empowered under
section 77, sub-section (2), has been completed, if it appears that there is sufficient evidence
to justify the forwarding of the accused to a
Magistrate, the investigating officer, unh:ss he
1969 -
Raj• Ram Jaiswal
v.
Stat~ of Bihar
Raghubar Dayal_ J.
786
1963
.
~ Ram
Jaisw.J
St4J,.f Bi/ta
R.,Mikr Dayal J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
proceeds under sub-section ( 2) of this section
or under section 68 of this Act, shall submit a
report [which shall, for the purposes of section
190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
(5 of 1898) be deemed to be a Po'ice-report]
to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire
into or try the case and empowered to take
cognizance of offences on Police-reports."
Section 79 deals with security and bail and
empowers any Excise Officer not below such rank
as the State Government may, by notification, pre·
scribe, to release persom on bail or on their c.wn
bond. The State Government has prescribed that
any £xcise Officer not below the rank of SubInspector can exercise this power,
Section 80 provides that articles seized and
persons arrested under the warrant of the Collector
shall be produced before the C'.ollector and that
articles seized and persons arrested under the Act by
persons or officers not having authority to release
arrested persons on bail on their own bond, shall be
produced before or forwarded to the Collector or an
Excise Officer empowered under s. 77 (2) to investigate the offence, or to the nearest Excise Officer who
has authority to release arrested persons on bail or
on their own bond, or the officer in charge of the
nearest police station, whoc,·er be nearer. '
Section 82 reads 1
"When any Excise Officer below the rank of
Collector, or any officer in charge of a policestation, makes, or receives information of. any
arrest, seizure, or search under this Act, he
shall, within twenty-four hours thereafter,
make a full report of all the particulars of the
arrest, seizure, or search, or of the in(ormation
received to the Collector, and to the Excise
Officer (if any) empowered under section i7,
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
sub·section (2), within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the arrest, seizure, or search
was made."
Section 84 directs that any person arrested for an
offence under the Act shall be informed as soon as
may be of the grounds for such arrest and shall be
produced before the nearest Magistrate within a
period of 24 hours of such arrest, excluding tl;ie
time necessary for the journeys from the place of
arrest to the Court of the Magistrate and no such
person shall be detained in custody beyond such
period without the authority of the Magistrate.
Its sub s. (2) reads :
"(2) A Magistrate to whom an accused
person is forwarded under section 167 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, l 8ll8 (5 of 1898),
by a Collector or an Excise Officer empowered
under section 77, sub-section (2), may exercise
the powers conferred upon a Magistrate by the
said section 167."
Section 85 reads :
"(l) Save as in this _Act otherwise expressly
provided, the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), relating
to arrests, detentions in custody, searches,
summonses, warrants of arrest, search warwnts
and the production of persons arrested shall
apply so far as may be, to arrests, detentions
and searches made, summonses and warrants
issued, and the production of persons arrested
under this Act.
(2) · For the purposes of the said provisions
of the said Code, a Collector shall be deemed
to be a Court.
(3) Officers to whom a Collector's warrant
is directed or endorsed and officers (other than
JY63
Raj" Ram Jaiswal
v.
State of Bilw
1Uighu6-r DaJol
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
1965
Collectors) making arrests, searches or seizures
under this Act, shall, for the purposes of 1he
said provisions of the said Code, be deemed to
be Police Officers."
•j• Ram JaiJwaJ
••
Stalt of Bih•r
•thuhar Dayal ~·
Section 89 empowers the State Government to
make rules to carry out the objects of the Act or
any other law for the time being in force relating to
the excise·revenue.
Section 95 provides that no suit shall lie in
any Civil Court against the Government or any
Excise Officer for any act in good faith done or
ordered to be done in pursuance of this Act or of
any other law for the time being in force relating to
the excise-revenue.
Section 96 provides for
and prosecutions and reads :
limitations of suits
1
'No Civil Court shall try any su.it against the
Government in respect of anything done, or
alleged to have been done, in pursuance of this
Act,
and, except with the previous sanction
of the State Government, no ~Iagistrate shall
take cognizance of any charge made against
any Excise Officer under this Act or any other
law relating to the excise-revenue or made
against any other person under this Act,
unless the suit or prosecution is instituted
within six months after the <late of the act
complained of."
'
The provisions of ss. 7, S!l, 95 and 9fi are sufficient
to in<licate that the action of Excise Officers under
the Act' and under any other law relating to excise·
revenue is treated alike. The Act is, therefore, like
-
2 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
1963
the Sea Customs Act, primarily concerned with the
collection of the excise·revenue. The object of the Raja Rom /ai.s
Act according to the preamble, is not to provide for
••
the prevention and detection of crime but is to pro- . Stdt1 of Bih111
vide for conditions on w.hich liquor and intoxicating · Raghubar Vayat
drugs can be imported, exported, transported,
manufactured and possessed and sold. Offences created under the Act are for contravening provisions in
that regard and the power of Excise Officers to
make arrests, searches or seizure or to investigate
offences under the Act is incidental to the general
power to see that the pr0visions of the Act are ob·
served. The first consideration for holding Customs
Officers not to be police officers would equally apply
to the case of Excise Officers empowued to investi·
gate offences.
An Excise Officer. too cannot be a police
officer for the purpose of s. 25 of the Evidence Act
at all times. He can be a police officer only when
he is discharging the duties of an investigating
officer. In view of consideration No. 2, subject to
what is said iil s.. 85 (2), the expression 'police officer'
in s. 25 of the Evidence Act cannot embrace
Excise Officers on whom certain powers corresponding to the powers of the police officers are conferred.
Section 82 draws a distinction between an
officer in charge of a police station and an Excise
Officer who is empowered under s. 77 (2) of the' Act,
as the former had to give information of any arrest,
seizure or search under the Act which he makes, or
. about which he receives information to the Collector
and to the Excise Officer empowered under s. 77 (2)
exercising jurisdiction in the area where any of these
acts are done, and so consideration No. 4 is equally
applicable in th; ase.
Excise Officers npt below ~he rank qf Superintendent of Excise and Deputy Collector can
790
1963
Raja Ram Jt.isu·ol
••
S1at1 of Biliar
Rnthubar Da.1al J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
compound offences and relrnse propcrt y liable to
confiscation in the exercise of, powers conferred
under s. 68. Such a power implies that the culprit
accepts his guilt and is prepared to compound the
offence. Ordinarily the culprit will express such a
desire to an Excise Inspector or Sub-Inspector
in the first instance. It appears to me to be
incongruous that a confession to such an Excise
Officer be considered to Ile inadmissible on trial of
a suspect in Court by considering these Excise
Officers to be police officers, while the Act itself
allows the superior Excise Officer to compound the
offence with the culprit and discharge him in view
of s. 68 and the Government l'io1ification. Further
all proceedings before the Collector or Superintendent
of Excise, S. D. 0. and Deputy Collector exercising
the powers of the Collector arc judicial proceedings
within the meaning of s. 228 I. P. C.
Section 85 (3) provides about the officers who
and the circumstances in which they can be deemed
to be police officers for the purposes of the Criminal
Procedure Code. All Officers other than Collectors
who make arrests, searches or seizures under the Act
are to be deemed 'police officers' for the purpose of
the provisions relating to arrests, searches or seizures
in the Criminal Procedure Code. It is therefor.:
clear that the Legislature had in mind the police
officers who perform the duti•s of making arrests,
searches, and seizures, under the Criminal Procedure
Code and provided that Excise officers or other
persons authorized under the Act to perform these
acts be deemed to be police officers for these purposes.
It is therefore clear that the Legislature did not
contemplate that Excise Officers performing other
duties corresponding to the duties of the regular police
officers be deemed police officers merely on account
of their performing those duties. It follows that
Excise Officers when investigating offences under the
Aet are not to be deemed police officers for the
-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
791
purposts of the provisions about investigation in the
Code of Criminal Procedure. If the Legislature had
intended that officers who investigate offences under
the Act be also deemed to be officers for the purposes
of provisions regarding investigation in the Code of
Criminal Procedure or s. 25 of the Evidence Act or
for any other purpose under any other law, it could
have made an express provision in that regard.
It is not suggested for the appellant that a
Collector who is an Excise Officer and on whom the
power of investigating offences under the Act is
conferred under s, 77 of the Act is a police officer
within s. 25 of the Evidence Act. Sub s. (3) of s. 85
does not even provide that he be deemed to be a
police officer when he makes arrests, searches or
seizures under the Act. The Act itself therefore
contemplates that the possession of a power to
investigate offences under s. 77 and the right under
s. 78 of the Act to exercise any of the powers
conforred upon a police officer making an investigation or upon the officer in charge of a police station
by ss. 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
do not make the officer so empowered a 'police
officer'.
Great reliance however is placed on the
provision of sub-s. (3) of s. 78 of the Act for the
contention that Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of
Excise are police officers for the purposes of s. 25 of
the Evidence Act. Sub-s. (3) of s. 78 reads: ,
"For the purposes of section 156 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) the area
to which an Excise Officer empowered under
, section, 77, sub-section (2), is appointed shall
be deemed to be a police-station, and such
officer shall be deemed to be the officer in
charge of such station."
1963
R•j4 Ram JaistHI
••
State •f BihaT
&ghuhr Dayal J.
792
1963
Raja Ram Jaiswal
v.
State of IJ;n.,
R•gh•b°' Do)'oJ J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
It is argued that these provisions definitely provide
that the area to which the Excise Officer empowered
under s. 77 (2) is appoin1cd is to be deemed a police
station and he be deemed to be an officer in charge
of the said police s'.ation, and that therefore such
an Exci~e Officer is a police officer within the meaning of that expression ins. 25 of the Evidence Act.
I do not agree. The area is deemed to be a
police station and he himself is deemed to be a
police officer in chari;e of 1ha1 police station for a very
limited purpose. He is to be so comidered for the
purposes of s. Hi6 of the Code or Criminal Procedure
and not for any other purpose.
Now, s. 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
reads :
"(l) Any officer in charge of a police-station
may, without the order of a Magistrate investigate, any cognizable case which a Court having
jurisdiction over the local area within the
limits of such station would have power to
enquire into or try under the provisions of
Chapter XV relating to the place of enquiry or
trial.
(2) No proceeding of a police-officer in any
such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which
such officer was not · empowered under this
section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate i::mpowered under section
190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned."
What sub-s. (I) of s. 156 of the Code provides is
already provided under sub-s. (2) of s. 77 of the
Act which empowers such officers to investigate,
without the order of a Magistrate, any such offence
which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
1962
to which such officer is appointed would have the power
to enquire into or try under the aforesaid provisions. R'Jja Ram Jaiswal
Sub-s. (l) of s. 156 of the Code does nothing more· Sta.te of
•• Bihar
than authorize an officer in chaq,e of a police station, without the order of.a Magistrate, to investigate &ghub.,. Dayal J.
any cognizable offence which the Court having
jurisdiction over the local area or within the limits
of the police station would have the power to inquire
in to or try under the provisions of Chapter XV
relating to the place of enquiry or trial. The effect
of sub-s. (3) of s. 78 can only be that in view of the
provisions ofsub-ss. (:l) & (3) of s. 156 of the Code,
no proceeding by the Excise Officer so empowered
under s. 77 (2) shall, at any stage, be called in question on the ground that he was not empowered to
investigate that offence and that any Magistrate
empowered under s. 190 Cr. P. C. can order such
an Excise Officer to investigate an offence under
the Act. In this view, the provisiom of s. 78 (3)
are of no help in concluding that the Excise Officer
empowered under s. 77 (2) is a police officer for all
the purposes of the investigation under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, or for the purpose of s. 25 of the ·
Evidence Act.
Further, the limited nature of the effect of subs. (3) of s. 78 is also apparent when it is considered
that sub-s. (1) of s. 78 provides that an Excise Officer
empowered under s. 77 (2) can exercise any of
the powers conferred upon a police officer making an
investigation or by an officer in charge of a police
station by ss. 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. If the provisions of sub-s. (3) make an
Excise Officer empowered under s. 77 (2) a police
officer in charge of a police station. for the purposes
of the entire investigation, there was no necessity to
provide in sub-s. (1) that he could exercise the
powers under certain sections specified therein.
The powers which the Excise Officer as an
Iiives~igating Officer exercises under s. 78 ( l) are
794
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
also limited in scope. Under s. 160 Cr. P. C. he ~an
Raja Ram JaiJu,.J summon persons for the purpose of investigation.
v.
He may examine such persons orally about the facts
Stare •f Bili"'
and circumstances of the case, just as a police officer
Roghuhar D1yal J, can do un<ler sub-s. (I) of s. 161. But the person so
examined does not appear to be bound to answer all
questions relating to such case put to him by the
Excise Officers though he is bound to answer the
questions put by the police officer in view of sub-s, (2)
of s. 161 Cr. P. C., and by the Customs Officer under
s. 171-A of the Sea Customs Act. Section 162 of
the Code does not confer any power on a police
officer. It only provides that any statement made
by a person to a police officer in the course of an
investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code could
be used for no purpose except for the purpose
provided in that sub-section, at any enquiry in
respect of that offence under investigation at the
time when that statement was made. An investi, gation by the Excise Officer is not an investigation
under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. He may take similar steps during investigation which a police officer has to take, but that
does nol make his investigation an investigation
under Chapter XIV of the Code.
1963
Again, s. 163 has no application so far as the
question of conferring power is concerned. It rather
enjoins upon a police officer not to offer or make or
cause to be offered or made, any such inducement,
threat or promise as is mentioned in the Indian Evidence Act, section 24, and not to prevent any person
from making a ·voluntary statement in the course of an
investigation. Section 164, again, deals with the
recording of statements and confessions by Magistrates during the investigation under that Chapter,
and can at best be said to empower by implication
that these Excise Officers can send a confessing
accused for the recordinj?; of confession to a Magistrate. In exercise of the powers under &. 165,
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
Cr. P. C., the Excise Officer can search in certain
circumstances a place for a thing which may be
found useful for the investigation and, in view of
s. 166 Cr. P. C. he can require any other Excise Officer
or police officer to a cause search to be made.
Section 168 of the Code is of no use as it
requires any subordinate police officer making
investigation to report the result to the Station Officer
as all Inspectors and Sub· Inspectors of Excise are
required by s. 78 (4) of the Act to report to the
Magistrate for trying the accused if he has not
stopped further proceedings in exercise of the powers
under s. 78 (2) and which he would do when there
be not sufficient evidence to send the accused to the
Magistrate for Trial. For similar reason, s. 169
Cr. P.C., is of no use to the Excise Officer empowered
under s. 77 (2). Section 170 empowers the officer
in charge of a police station to send up the accused
to a Magistrate if there be sufficient evidence.
Under s. 171, he can send up a witness on complaint,
in certain circumstances, in custody to a Magistrate.
I may now consider certain cases in which a
view has been expressed that when an officer, who
is not an officer of the regular police force, is invested
with · powers of ·the Station Officer in charge of
a police station for the purposes of the investigation
of offences he is competent to investigate, that officer
will be a police officer within the meaning of s. 25 of
the Evidence Act during the course of the investi·
gation he be making. The considerations which led
to that view were mainly two. One was 'that
neither the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861
which originally enacted a provision identical with
the one in s. 25 of the Evidence Act, nor the
Evidence Acf of 1872 itself defined a police officer,
that the definition of the word 'police' in the Police
Act of 1861 was not a definite definition but only an
inclusive one and that the expression 'police officer'
1963
Raja Ram Jaiswal
••
State of BihtJr
Raghuhar Dayal I.
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
R4ja RaM JWwal
v•
.~lalt ef Bihat
Rqliul>a• Dayol J.
being not precise in defining the class of officers
covered by it was to be interpreted according to
what the original intention and object of the
Legislature must have been in their enacting s. 25
of the Evidence Act. The second was that the
expression 'police officer' in s. 25 of the Evidence
Act should be construed according to the meaning
that expression carried at or about the time that
enactment was made and for that purpose, the view
expressed in Hurribole's Case (1 ), was not only
accepted but was interpreted to mean that anyone
whom the people at large looked upon as a police
officer would be included in that definition. I would
first consider Hurribo/e's Case ('), to which reference
had been made in Barkat Ram's Case(').
In Hurribole's Case('), Mr. Lambert who was a
member of the regular police force and was so regarded outside Calcutta to which city the police Act of
1861 did not apply, was posted at Calcutta as Deputy
Commissioner of Police. He was also invested with
the powers of' a Magistrate. The accused in that
case made a confession originally to two policemen.
It was taken down in writing. He was then brought
before Mr. Lambert, the Deputy Commissioner of
Police, at the police office. He a!!irmed the truth of
his former statement to Mr. Lambert, who, in his
capacity of a l\fagistrate, received and attested the
statement. The question was whether this confession
was hit by s. 25 of the Evidence Act or not. The
decision of this question depended on the view
whether Mr. Lambert was a police officer within the
meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act. Garth C. J.,
repelled the contention that the expression 'police
officer' comprised only that class of persons who
were called in the Bengal Police Act members of the
police force and observed; at p. 215:
" ...... that the term 'police officer' should be
read not in any strict technical sense, but
(I) (1876) I.L.R. l Cal. 207.
(2) [1962] 3 8.C.R. 338.
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
797
according to its more comprehensive and
· popular meaning. In common parlance and
amongst
the generality of people, the
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of
Police are understood to be officers of police,
or in other words 'police officers' quite as much
as the more ordinary members of the force;
... I think it bettrr in construing a section such
as the 25th which was intended as a wholesome
protection to the accused, to construe it in its
widest and most popular signification."
These observations simply mean that Mr. Lambert
who was a regular member of the police force did not
cease to be a police officer when posted as Deputy
Commissioner of Police at Calcutta with l\fagisterial
powers, that he would still be considered to be a
police officer by the people in general and that
therefore he should be held to be a police officer.
The use of the comparative words 'narrow' and 'wider' .
with respect to the meaning to be given to the term
'police officer' have a par1 icular reference in the
context to the effect that a person, even though
strictly not a police officer during the period of his
tenure of office as Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Calcutt;i, but a police officer in view of his regular
service conditions, must be held to be a police officer
as the people at large cannot make any distinction
between the temporary character of his status when
he was posted at Calcutta as Deputy Commissioner
ot Police, who according to the definition, probably·
did not come within either the Bengal Police Act or
the Police Act of 1861. I cannot take it that Garth
C. J., meant, that in construing the term 'police
officer' ins. 25 of the Evidence Act, Courts should
resort to their notbns as to whether the people at
large considered the particular officer to be a police
officer or not. Any such basis for construing this
expression in s. 25 would be very slippery as there
1963
Raja Ram J aiswal
v.
State of Bifar
Raghut•r Dayal /
798
1969
Raja Ram Jaiswal
v.
St•l1 of Biltar
Ra1hub~ Day1l J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1964] VOL.
would be no real basic standard to form the
foundation for such an interpretation.
Another question raised in that case was that
the confession was admissible in view of s. 26 of the
Evidence Act which provided that no confession
made by a person in police custody would be
admissible in evidence unless it was made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate, · that
Mr. Lambert was a Magistrate and that therefore
the confession made to him was admissible in
evidence. This contention was repelled on the
ground thats. 25 of the Evidence Act was imperative
and a confession made to a police officer under any
circumstances was not admissible in evidence against
the maker thereof. This means that Mr. Lambert's
status as a Magistrate was completely ignored. The
confession was not deemed to be taken by a
Magistrate. It was taken to be made to a police
officer as Mr. Lambert was a police officer on
account of the service to which he belonged. It
was merely as a Deputy Commissioner of Police
that he enjoyed certain powers of a Magistrate. This
view, therefore, can also be used in support of the
contention that the mere conftrment of certain powers
of an officer of one class did not make that officer an
officer of the class whose powers had been conferred
on him. If conferment of powers of another officer
could make the officer an officer of the other type
during the period he be exercising the functions of the
other· officer, Mr. Lambert could have been treated
a Magistrate when he purported to act as a Magistrate
in receiving the confession of the accused. In my
opinion. the case does not support the opposite view
in any way. The o,1Jy effect of the observations of
the lrarne<l Chit f J usticc to the effect that s. 25 of
the Evidence Act be construed in its widest and most
popular signification is that the expression 'police
officer' is not restricted to only those police officers
who come within the definition of 'p.:>lice officer'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
799
within a certain Act dealing with police, but can
include officers who belong to the police in general.
Its effect is not to widen the scope of 'police officer'
in s. 25 to such an extent as ~o make the Court
embark on a general enquiry about popular concept
in a certain area, about.one being a police officer in
the mind of the people at large.
It is true that the Criminal Procedure Code
of 1861 or of later years does not define the ex·
ptession 'police officer' while its various sections
refer to police officers. For the purpose of this case,
we may refer to s. 148 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, I 861 (Act XXV of 1861).
Section 148 was :
"No confession or admission of guilt made to
a Police Officer shall be used as evidence
against a person accused of any offence."
"";
Which Officers were contemplated to be 'police
officers' by t.he Code of Criminal Procedure of
1861 ? I am of opinion that the Code of Criminal
Procedure could not have but referred to the regular
police officers for the purpose of its various enactments. It must have fixed upon a particular class
of officers on whorn the :various powers of a police
officer were being conferred by the Code and on
whom the Code imposed certain important duties.
Surely these powers were not conferred and duties
were not imposed on a vague class of persons whose
powers or liability would be subject to determination by Courts in accordance with the popular impression. · The only definite class of people would be
then members of the pol ice according to the various
enactments in force and not necessarily under the
general Police Act of 1861 or any special Police Act
applicable to the Presidency Towns,· or those who,
under certain statutory provisions be deemed to be·
19<3
...
Raja Ram Joisw.J.
Slate If Bih•r
Ra:lwbar Dayal J,
800 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS (!964] VOL.
,
J96J
R..ja R4m Jaiswal
v.
Stale of Bihar
Raghubar DaJal J.
police officers as, in that case, it would be the
Legislature which itself would lay down the class
of persons who would be treated to be police officers.
I may say that it was not foreign to the Legislature
in 1861 to make provisions with respect to certain
persons being deemed to be officers of a cer1ain class.
Historically, I do not find the expression
'police officer' or 'police' to be a vague one. In
1703, a number of Regulations were made by the
Governor General in Council. They dealt with
many a subject connected with the adminhtration
of the territory under the control of the East India
Company. The preamble of Regulation XXII of
179:! indicates that the object of that Regulation
was to establish .an ~mcient police throughout the
country whereby offen :lers may be deprived of all
hope of eluding the pursuit of officers of justice as
the clause in the engagements of the landholders and
farmers or land bv which they were bound to keep
the peace, and in the event of any robbery being
committed in their respec1ive estates or farms, to
produce both the robbers and the property plundered,
was found nug 1tory. Section II of this Regulation
reads :
"The police of the country is, in future, to be
comidcred under the exclusive charge of the
officrrs "ho may be appointed to the superintenrlcncc of it on the part of Government.
The landholders and farmers of land who were
bound to keep up establishments of tannahdars
and police officers for the preservation of tbe
peace are accordingly required to discharge
them, and all landholders · and farmers of
land arc prohibited from entertaining such
establishments in future."
Section II I specifically provided that in future land·
holders and farmers would not be considered
•
'
•
2 s.c.R. SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS
801
responsible for robberies committed in their respective
estates or farms unless certain facts mentioned therein existed,. This seems to be the first Regu Jar Code for
the establishment of the efficient police in the country
under the control of the British. Formerly, it was the
landholder and the farmer of land who discharged the
functions of the police for the maintenance of peace
and for preventing the commission and detection of
crimes, especially, crimes against property, robbery,
theft, etc. It is to be noticed that according to the
preamble and the provisions of s. II of this Regulation, the entire police was to be in the exclusive
charge of the officers appointed by the Government.
The Government had to appoint the police officers
as such.
Subsequent Regulations and Acts developed
the law about the police on the foundations laid by
this Regulation. The object of the Police Act of
1861 is also to cover the entire police in the country.
Its title is : 'An Act for the Regulation of Police';
and its preamble reads :
"Whereas it is expedient to reorganise the
Police and to make it a more efficient instrument
and detection of
. for the
,, prevention
.
crime .........
The expression 'general police district' according to
1, embraces any Presidency, State or place, in
which the· Act shall be ordered to take effect.
Section 2 provides that the entire police establishment under a State Government shall, for the
purposes of the Act, be deemed to be one police
force and shall be formally enrolled; persons of this
establishment, therefore, formed a class by themselves. Section 3, however, provides that the superintendence of the police throughout a general policedistrict shall vest in and shall be exercised by the
State Government to which such district is subordinate. This does· not speak• of the superintendence
s.
1963
Raja Ram J12iswal
v.
State oJ B1ht1.t'
Raghubar Dayal /,
•
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Riii<i;R-•• '"'"""'
S1ai.of Bi.la<
J!.,m.ffr D<gol J,
of the police force or the police establishment, but
puts the entire police within the State under the
control of the Government. The administration of
such entire police is vested in the Inspector General
of Police by s. 4 and within ,1 district 1s vested in the
District Superintendent. These officers exercise no
administrative control over the Excise Officers.
f
Section 47 makes it lawful • for the State
Government to declare that any authority which is
being exercised by a Magistrate of the District over
any village watchman or other village police officer
for the purpose of police shall be exercised, subject
to the general control of the Magistrate of the·district, by the District Superintendent of Police. This
is a clear indication that f he Act purported to bring
the entire police whether controlled under the Act
or not, ·.vithin its purview in the area where the Act
be in force.
It was on account of the various persons under
several Acts or otherwise discharging the functions of
the police that the Police Act of 1861 provided that
the word 'police' in the Act mean•· to include all
persons who would be enrolled under that Act, indicating thereby that the expression could cover·
persons other than those enrolled under that Act.
Section 21 of the Police Act refers to some of them,
viz., hereditary or other police officer or police
officers appointed under Act XX . of 1856, the
Bengal Chowkeydari Act. The inclusive •definition··
of 'police' does not appear to me to be so wide as
to include any one to whom powers similar to those
of a police officer are conferred by any Act. '
The history of the Excise Law also shows that
Excise Officers have been coniidered different from
police officers and that clear provisions were enacted
for certain officers of the Revenue and Police
Departments to be deemed' Excise Officers.
2 s.C:.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
803
Regulation XX.XIV of 1793 re-enacted with
modifications the rules passed on April 16, l 790,
and subsequent dates, for levying a tax upon
intoxicating liquors and drugs and for. preventing
illicit manufacture and vend of them. This was
repealed by Regulation X of 1813.
Section I of Regulation X of 1813 states with
respect to the purpose of the Regulation :
" ...... and whereas it will tend to the public
convenience to reduce the whole of the· Regu·
lations at present in force with respect to that
branch of the public revenue, and respecting
likewise the duties on intoxicating drugs, taury,
and putchwye, to one Regulation, with alterations and amendments, the following rules have
been passed".
and thus emphasized that the Regulatian related to
the branch of public revenue. Section XVIII
provided that for the more convenient collection of
the duties on spirituous liquors etc., officers would be
appointed by the collectors to be denominated
abkarry darogahs for the collection of the said duties.
These darogahs were to apprehend and send to the
Collector any individual having an unlicensed still
in his possession or engaged in the illicit sale of
spirituous liquors etc. Section XXII provided that
all investigations which it may be necessary to institute respecting the illicit manufacture or sale of
spirituous liquors etc., shall be conducted by the
collectors of land revenue or other public officers
entrusted with the charge of the abkarry mohaul.
Section XXII further empowered the Collector or
other officers entrusted with the charge. of akbarry
mohaul to cause the persons charged with or suspected of offences under the Regulation to be apprehended so that a regular enquiry might be made into the
merits of the case. Officers in charge of the abkarry
1963
Roja Rttm J ~iswal
v•
."tall of Bif,ar
Raghu.tar Daysi J
80(
1963
Raja Rtrm Joi1wol
v.
~tat• ttf Bihdr
SUPREME COUR t REPOR ts [1 !l64] vot.
mohaul were given power under s. XXIII to issue
search warrants. Section XXXI made the collectors
of land revenue entitled lo a commission on the net
amount of the abkarry revenue realised by them.
Act XXI of 1856 repealed Regulation X of
1813. Its title is 'An Act to consolidate and amend
· the· law relating to the Abkarce Revenue in the
Presidency of Fort William in Bengal' and the
preamble states :
"Whereas it is expedient that the laws relating
to the manufacture of spirits and the sale of
spirituous and fermented liquors and intoxicatmg drugs, and the collection of the revenue
derived therefrom, should be consolidated and
amended : It is enacted as follows."
Section II says that the Collectors of land revenue
will be in charge of the collection of the revenue.
arising from the manufaciure of spirits and the sale
of spirits, liquors and intoxicating drugs. Section IV
empowered the Collectors to appoint darogahs,
jemadars, peons, surveyors, gaugers and other officers
for the collection of the abkaree revenue and for the
prevention of smuggling. The office of abkaree darogah could be combined with that of any tuhseeldar,
.naib tuhsecldar or· peshkar. In such cases s. IV
provided that those officers and officers Subordinate
to them would be held and deemed to be Abkaree
officers within the meaning of the Act. The
Abkaree officers were empowered under s. LV to
enter and inspect shops or premises of licensed Manufacturers or retail vendors. Section L VI empowered
them to stop and detain any person carrying articles
liable to confiscation under the Act and to seize
such articles and also to arrest the person in possession of them. ' Powers of arrest under certain circumstances were also conferred on them by s. LVII.
Section LXV further provided that all police
officers were required to aid the Abkaree Officers in
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
the due execution of the Act upon notice given or
request made by such officers. The expression
'police officers' and 'abkaree officers' in these sections
refer to officers of the regular police and officers of
Abkaree respectively. The Act makes a distinction
between the two, and rightly. Section LVIII empowered an Abkaree officer above the rank of a jemadar
of peons to enter and search certain places in the
presence of the darogah or other officer of police i.n
circumstances specified in that section.
Section LIX provided for the vesting of certain
powers in the officers of the Police, Customs and
Revenue Departments and authorised the Government to invest those officers with powers with respect
to the seizure of and search for spirituous and fermented liquors and intoxicating drugs and the arrest
of persons found in possession of them. It further
provided that all such officers when so empowered,
as well as all police, Customs and Revenue Officers,
when acting under the authority conferred by that
section, for the suppression of illicit dealings in
opium, would be held and deemed to be Abkaree
Officers within the meaning of the Act.
It is clear, therefore, from the provisions of
ss. IV and LIX that the Legislature specifically
provided, whenever it considered necessary, for
certain officers to be deemed to be Abkaree Officers '
when, by virtue of their regular service, they were
not Abkaree Officers.
It was in 1861, as already stated, that the
Criminal Procedure Code, by s. · 148, provided
that no confession made to a Police Officer
would be used in evidence against an accused.
person. In view of the provisions of the first Regulation XXII of 1793 dealing with the creation of
the Police under the direct control of the
Government and of the Abkaree Department
Raja Ram Ja•swol
••
State of Bihar
Raghubar Dayal J.
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19M] VOL.
1993
R•j• R•m JairtP11l
v.
Stott oj 8ihar
govel"l'led by Regulation XXXl V of l i9;{ up to
1856, it is not po!sible to say, in my opinion, that
the Legislature when using the expression 'police
officer' in s. 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1861, intended that expression to include the
Abkaree Officers who had powers of investigation,
though without any reference to the procedure to
be followed in carrying out the investigation neces!ary
for the purpose of establishing the offences under
the Abkaree Act against the alleged culprits. It is
also clear from certain provisions referred to above
that the Legislature did state in clear terms that
certain officers of the other departments would be
deemed to be Abkaree Officers in certain circumstances. It follows therefore that if the Legislature
had intended to use the expression 'police officers'
in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 18Hl or i11
s. 25 of the Evidence Act of 1872 in such a sense
as to include such officers of departments other
than the Police on whom powers of investigation
were conferred, it could have very easily said
that a confession to a police officer or such other
officers would be inadmissible in evidence or
it could have explained the expression 'police
oflicer' for the purposes of that section, that is,
s. I 48 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861
or s. 25 of the Evidence Act of 1872. I ts omission to do so, to my mind, is a clear indication of
the fact that the Legislature had no intention to use
the expression 'police officer' in s. 25 of the Evidence
Act in such a general sense in which it is construed
in Nanoo v. Emperor (1 ), Ameen Sharif v.
Emperor ('), Public Prosecutor v. Paramasfram (1 l.
I may refer to the case cited as Radii.a
Kishtm Jlarwari v. King Emperor ('), where
it was held that an Excise Officer was not a
police officer within the meaning of s. 25 of
the Evidence Act. Of the three Judges, Courtney
Terrel, C. J., expressed his disagreement with the
(I} (t926) l.L.R. 51 Dom, 78.
(3) A.!,R, 19~3 Mad, 917.
(2) (1934) I.L.R. 61 Cal. 607,
(4) (1932) l,L,R. 12 l'•~ '@,
,2 ·s.C.R. SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS
807
view, of the Bombay High Court in Nanoo v.
Emperor (1), and, after stating that the decision in
.· Hurribole'.s case('), had been much mis-understood,
said ..
"The fact is that the term 'police officer' is
sufficiently well understood to allow of its use
without any pr.i!cise definition. Thus it is well
recognised that different countries and states
confer upon their respective police officers
..different powers. Nevertheless it is not difficult
· ·to decide whether any particular individual is,
or is not, a police officer in any particular
country and it has been held that a confession
made to a police officer of a foreign force in the
cm,mtry where he is in fact a police officer is not
admissible in an Indian trial."
He ,also expiessed the opinion that the Courts of
.JustiCe 'were not primarily concerned with the objects
With which the legislature enacted any particular law
and that the legislature might not have finally enacted
aprovision to ca~ry .out the entire object with which
it tended to enact it, and that in cases where .the
· legislature had not thought fit to express its intention
otherwise than by the use of the words of the section;
those words must be followed. Faz! Ali, J. agreed
with his 'views ·and stated at p. 56:
"It appears to me that the distinction between
a person who is nothing but a police officer and
one who is primarily not a police officer but
merely invested with the powers of a police
officer is material and cannot be ignored for the
purpose of construing section 25 of the Evidence
Act."
He pertinently remarked at p.57:
"To take this view would, in' my opinion, be
to ignore the popular meaning of the .term
(I) (1926) l,L.l\. 51 Bom, 78.
(2) (1871) I.L.R. I Cal. 21YT.
1963
Raja &m I al1""1
••
Stal1 of Biltisr
Raghubar Doy«l /,
<
-·-808
'
'
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) WOL.
.~
l \-.
~
1963
...~,.
Raja Ram Jaiswal
••
State of Bihar
I
I
I·
Raghuba' Dayal J.
'police officer' and· ·enlarge unduly theri si:;6pe
of the-~ection .. T]lere was nothing t\) prevent-the
framers of the· Evidence Act from saying •ex·
pressly that confessions made to a- polieelofficer
as well as those perspns who are for,.the time
being and for certain limited purposes invested
with the powers of a police o1ficer',are inadmi ·
ssible in evidef\ce."
-~garwala J., expressed the opinion that th~expression
'.police officer' in s. 25 of the Evidence' Act referred to
the, police officers -~nrolled in or a.Ppointed as
members of the police force.
.
I agree with respect with the wider view taken
by, the learned ChiefJ us.tice ,and Faz\, Ali, J.
I therefore hold that the .Excise.,Ipspe<;tor fllld
Sub-Inspector empowered by the State .Goveqn;~ent
under s. 77(2) of the Act are not police officers within
the meaning of s. 25 of l:he ·Evidence Act and that
the aforesaid officers cannot be treated to
p.olice
officers for the purposes of s. 162 of the Codci of
Criminal Procedure. Section 162 does not. confer
any power on a'police officer. lt;de\(ls.with' the use
which can be made of the statementlj recordei!,by
a police officer carrying ouf investiga \ion .wuler
Chapter XIV of the Code. The investigation which
the aforesaid .Excise Officer conduct~ ia not under.
Chapter XIV of the Code, but is under .t!Je-provisions
of the Act and therefore this is a further reason for
non-applicablity ofs. 162 Cr. P. C. to any.statements
made by a person to an Excise Officer .during the
course of.his investigating an-offence under the Act.
·9!!
In this case, the evidence on record about
the appellant's being found in possession •of 1Nepali
Ganja is not such on which reliance could be placed
for majntaining his conviction. Th<; ·High Court
relied on it in view of the confession 'of the appellant.
•
";
I
1
I
, ·2, S.C.R.
SUPRIEME COURT REPORTS
809
' The conduct of· the E?tcise Inspector in tampering
with 'the seizure memo is such as' to affect his
,bona fides and therefore ther~ .is a lot of doubt about
_ the .alleged confession .by the appallant being
voluntary. I am not .satisfied about the tonfession
beihg voluntary and would therefore not use it in
Sl\pport of the unsatisfactqry· statements of the
prosecution witnesses about !he recovery of the ganja
from his possessiop and would not sustain the
conviction even though the High Court has.recorded
a finding of fact that Ganja. was recovered from the
appellant's possession.' The High Court did not
' i::o:osider the tampering of. the seizure memo in ,all
its aspects or its .effect on the alleged voluntarines~
·of the confession and, consequently, on rile case.
-19_63
Ral?J Ram JaiJwal
v.
Stale of Bihar
Roghu6ar DaJal J,
Appeal allowed.
M/s. KESORAM COTTQN MILL~ LTD.
1963
v.
April I
GANGADHAR AND OTHERS
(K. N. WANCHOO and K. C. DAS GU!'TA JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Go slow and strike-AgreementSusp•naion of Workmen pending inquiry-No
inquiry
held-R•ferenCB to adjudication-If workmen entitled to
wqvea for period of, auspension-,/nquiry-Natural Juatioe-No
examination-'in-chief of witnessea~Previou. statement i;:eadOopy of statement not given to workmen-Propriety of procedure.
The appellant suspended 1600, workmen as they resorted
to go slow at\d illesal strikes. On December 23, 1957, all
-'
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