AHMED ADAM SAIT & OTHERS versus INAYATHULLAH MEKHRI AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 March 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 647 | 1963 INSC 77
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 March 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 308/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 647
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 77
Text of the judgment
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURt REPORts
647
1963
AHMED ADAM SAIT & OTHERS
v.
INAYATHULLAH MEKHRI AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
and K. C. DAS GuPTAJJ.)
Public Religious Trust-Scheme-Suit to set aside 'chemeBen•ficiaries, not a particular sect of Muslim Community-Plea
of res judicata-Character and nature of representative auitCiroumstances under which a scheme can be set aside-Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, (Act V of 1908), ss. 11 Exp. VI, 90, Or.
J. rr. 6, 8.
The respondents filed a suit under 1. 92 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 claiming to represent the Sunni Mu;lims
population of Bangalore and praying that a scheme should be
•ettled for the proper administration of the Jumma Masjid,
Bangalore.
.....
The plot on which the Masjid was built was purchased
about a century ago by a large number of Muslims consisting
of several groups from all walks of life. The mosque was
constructed from the funds given as gifts by a large number of
Muslims. A grant of land made to the mosque shows that the
mosque and its properties were intended for the benefit of the
Muslim Community as a whole. For about 60 years the
mosque and its properties were under the management of non·
Cutchi Memons and prior to this the management was not
exclusively in the hands of Cutchi Memons but predominently
in the hands of Dekkhani Muslims of the locality. In subsequent
years on some occasions the management was predominently
in the hands of the Cutchi Muslims but the Dekkhani Muslims
in Bangalore numbered about 30,000 and the Cutchi Muslims
never exceeded 300.
Prior to the present suit a suit under'· 92 was filed
in 1924 and a scheme was settled and Trustees were appointed
and they had been in management ever since. In the said
proceedings, the plaintifffs, both in the application made co the
Collector for sanction under s. 92 Code of Civil Procedure and
In the plaint, specifically averred that the Masjid in question
was an institution belonging to the Cutchi Memon Community
Alarch 29
048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [lti(Hj VOL.
/963
and they purported to represent the int<re<ts of that Cnmm1Jnity and no other. l'ht:re \\'ere so111e defcn<la11ts in the ~uit
v.
who Y.'rre non Cutchi ~fuslirns but they \\'l'.'lt': sued as trcslnaJ(!fhz:lla.~ J11Ahri passer:s and their 011 ly interest in defending the suit ,,·as to
support their individual rights.
Ahmttl Adam Soil
In the suit out of \vhich the present appeal has arisen
the respondents claimd that the Masjid with its adjcrncts
Comrnunity of Bangalore
belonged to th~ \vhoJe ~Juslin1
and not exclusively to the Cutchi Muslims. It was further
ciairne<l that the schen1e frarnt"d
under the earlier sui1 was
the result uf collusion and that the said decree did 11ot IJirtd
the non-Cutchi ~fcn\ons and that the present trustees \Vere
guilty of mis1na11angement and Ureach of 11 ust. ~fhe ;1 ppeJlants contended that the Curchi ~.femon~ \Vere the exclusive
beneficiaries and that the suit \vas barred liy ru j1ulicata and
denied the allegations of collusion, bredch of trusr and rnisn1anagcn1ent.
The trial court rejecrcd the contentions of the respondents
and upholding the plea of ra judicata rai<ed by the appell.rnts
Thereupon the rt:"spondcnts appealed to
disn1isscd the suit.
the High Court and the High Court while rejecting the picas
of collusion and bre"ch of trust differed from the trial COUI t on
the question of ru judico'a. It found that the Mosque and
its adjuncts belonged to the whole of the Muslim community
and not exclusively to the Cutchi Memons. Therefore the
High Court while agreeing with the trial cou1t that a scheme
1hould not be lightly disturbed found that a case had been
n1ade out fJr framing a nc\'r' schcrne and remanded the casc- to
the trial court. The present appeal is by way of special leave.
The first point raised in the appeal was that the suit w;is
barred by rea judicaltl on the ground that a suit under s.92 Code
of Civil Prccedure \Vas a representative suit and the prcsc-nt
respondents would be bound by it whether they were parties
to it or not since they \Vere interested in the l'rtL,t. It \\'as
further contended that since both the courts below had rejected
the pica of rnis1nanage1ncnt and brea:h of trust and since the
High (!ourt had found that the present trustcts were managing
the tru~t reasonably and in a responsible manner this Court
should not lightly disturb the said findings.
[Jeld lhat the mo!lque and its adjuncts carne into being
and continued to be an institution belonging to the Sunni
~fuslim Commun i1y of Bangalore and it cannot be held that
its managen1cnt \vas exclusive If in the hands of Cutchi ~f croons
at any time before 1~24.
'
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
Reading ss. 11, 92 Exp. VI, 0. I rr. 6 and 8 of the Code
of Civil Procedure it is clear that in determinin~ the question
about the effect of a decree passed in a representative suit, it
is essential to inquire which interests were reprr.sented by the
plaintiffs or the defendants. If the decree was passed in a suit
under s. 92 it will become necessary to exa1nine the plaint in
order to decide in what character the plaintiffs had sued and
what interests they had claimed.
The basis of the principle that a decree under s. 92
iuit binds all persons interested in the tru~t, is that the interests
of all persons interested in the trust are represented in the
suit as required by Exp. VI to s. l l and if that basis is absent
the decree cannot create a bar of res judicata against persons
claiming an interest not represented in the earlier suit.
The plaint in the earlier suit as we!l as the application
to the Collector for sanction proceeded on a clear and un·
ambiguous basis that the mosque belonged to the Cutchi
Memons amd the suit was instituted on their behalf by persons
who claimed to be intrrested in the mosque as Cutchi
Memons. Once it is found as it has been found in the present
case, that this basis of the claim made in the plaint was not
well founded and that the mosque belonged to all Sunni
Muslims of Bangalore it would be difficult to accept that the
euit can be regarded as a representative suit so far as the
interest• uf the Muslim Community other than the Cutchi
Mcmons residing in Bangalore arc concerned.
Raja Anandrao v. Shamrao, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 930, Rama.
dos v. Hanumantha Rao, (1911) I. L. R. 36 Mad., 364 and
Khaja Hassanulla Khan v. Royal Mosqu. Trust Board, I. L. R.
(1948) Mad. 257, distinguished.
There can be no doubt that if a scheme is framed in a
suit brought under s. 92 it should not be changed unless there
are strong and substantial reasons to do so. It must be clearly
shown not only that the scheme does not operate beneficially
but that it can by alteration be made to do so consistently with
the object of the foundation.
AUorney General v. Bishop of Worcestor (1851) 68 L. R.
530 and .4.Uorney General v. Stewart (1872) L. R. 14 Eq. 17.
The impugned scheme in the present suit proceeded on
tbe erroneous assumption that the Mosque belonged to Cutchi
Memons and that the said community alone was entitled to it5
exclusive administration. This assumption has clearly introduced certain infirmities in the scheme. The scheme must
/963
•.
Ahmed Ad1m Sail
fna)'ath1Jlla~
Mekh1i
6f1()
1963
A!,mv{ Ada?J Sail
••
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (HHHJ VOL.
be rrvised on the true basis that the i\-losque docs not belong
exclusively to the Cutchi ?\.1emons, but belongs to all the
Sunni ~fusalmans of Bangalore .
lntJ.Ja!hullah Af1/rJ11i
C1nL APPELLATE jumsn1CTJON : Civil Appeal
No. 308 of 1901.
Appeal by special leave from 1he judgmenl
and decree dated November ;{, l!J58 of the Mysore
High Court in Regular Appeal No. 120 of 1950·51.
M. C. Setalvad, M. L. Venkatanarasimhaiah,
S. N. Andley, llam.esluvar Rath and /'. L. Vohra,
for the appellants.
A. V.
Vis10am1tha
Sa.~tri,
Jf. S. K.
Sastri
and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No. I.
196;{. March 29. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Gaje11MaiaiJ;a1 J.
GAJENDRAGADKAH .J .--This appeal by special
leave aris.:s out of a suit instituted by the rcspon·
dents in the Court of the District .J •1dge, Bangalore
under section 92 of the G>de of Civil Procedure
(O.S. No 2 of Ull 7). The respondenls claimed to
represent the Sunui l\Iuslim popubtion of the Civil
and Military Station at Bangalore, and as such they
prayed in their plaint that a scheme should be settled
for the proper administration of the Jumma !llasjid
which is situated on Old Poor House Road, C & M
Station, Bangalore. Their case was that the Masjid
in question along with its adjuncts such as Idgah,
Makkhan, Madrassa, Kutubkhana and Musafarkhana
as well as large movable and immovable properties,
constitutes a Trust created for public purposes of a
religious nature coupled with charity, and that the
Dakkhani Muslims as well as the Cutchi Memons
residing in Bangalore are the beneficiaries of the
Trust and have an abiding interest in its proper
management, control and direction.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
It appears that a similar suit had been filed in
1924 (O.S.No.32of1924) in the same Court and in
that wit a scheme had been framed in 1927. Pursuant
to the said scheme, Trustees were appointed and
they have been in management of the Trust properties since then. The respondents alleged that in the
said suit, it was represented that the Masjid belonged
mainly to the Cutchi Memons of Bangalore and that
the Cutchi Memons were entitled exclusively to its
management. It is on this basis that the said suit was
prosecuted by consent and a scheme was drawn up by
the court after considering different schemes put before
it by the respective parties. To that suit seven
defendants were impleaded; defendants 2 and 7
claimed the right of management of the Trust under
wills executed by the deceased Mutawalli Abdul
Gaffar. Defendant No.2 was then a minor and his
mother was impleaded as defendant No. I both in her
own right and as guardian of defendant No.2.
Defendants 3 to 6 were the Executors under the will
of Abdul Gaffar on which defendant No.2 relied.
All those defendants were non-Cutchi Memons and
the appellants who had filed the suit were Cutchi
Memons. While the said suit was pending, six
persons who were Cutchi Memons applied to be
joined as defendants to the suit. Their case appears
to have been that no scheme need be framed. Their
application was rejected by the District Judge, but
on revision before the Court of Resident in Mysore,
the District Judge's order was set aside and they
were ordered to be impleaded. That is how
ultimately, 13 defendants were joined to the said suit.
While the administration of the Trust and the
management of its affairs and properties were thus
entrusted to the Board of Trustees appointed under
the scheme, and the same was being continued
after the scheme decree was passed, an application was made by the present respondents on
January 22, 1945 under 0.1 r.10 and sections 141 and
1963
A.f.med Adam Sa{t
v.
lt1ayathull~h Mekhri
Gajendrazadkar J
•
ll52
1963
Altmtd Atlam Sait
v.
lruiyallmlluh .\f11Jiri
Gajtntlrotadkar J,
SUPRE:-.fE COURT REPORTS [l!Jll4] VOL.
L:il o( the Code in which they prayed that 1hey may
be joined as parties to the proceedings under the
scheme and that the Trustees should be ordered to
convene a fresh meeting of the general body of
worshippers of the ~Iasjid and prepare a list containing their namrs and submit the same to the Court
irrespective of whether they happen to belong to the
Cutchi Memon Jamayet or the Dakkhani Muslim
Community of Bangalore. Their contention was
that a meeting which had been held in pursuance of
the order on C. M. P. No. 242 of 1944 was invalid,
null and void, and so they wanted to be joined
to the proceedings; they desired that a fresh
meeting should be called for the purpose of
preparing a list of worshippers as prescribed by
the scheme. In support of this application, an
elaborate affidavit was filed in which they set out
their grievance that the management of the Trust
which had been left exclusively in the hands of
Cutchi Memons was inconsistent with the scheme
and on the merits, unjustified and unfair.
This application W<lS r~jccle<l by the learned
District .Judge on .Julv 20, l!lt5. The learned
.Judge, while rejecting the applicaiion, observed
that there was some force in the contention of
the petitioners that the suit in which the scheme
was framed, was not fully representative and that
!here were some "commissions in the proceedings"
taken under the dccrre which ma v tend to show that
the management of the Trust was not to be
exclusively by the members of the Cutchi Mcmon
Community. In fact, he noticc<l that the suit had
been filed in very peculiar circumstances without
impleading the members of the Dakkhani Muslim
Comminity. He however held that after the framing of the scheme, the management had, in fact,
been entrusted solelv to the Cutchi Memon
Community and that it would be inappropriate to
make any change in the pattern of management in
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
653
the proceedings initiated by the application; that
can be done, he thought, in a regular suit. It is
this order that has led to the present suit by the
respondents.
/9e3
Ahmed Adam S:iit
v.
lnayathulloh Mekhri
Gajtndragadkar J.
In the present suit, the respondents joined the
five appellants and others as defendants and claimed
reliefs against them. Their case was that the scheme
decree which was passed in the earlier suit was the
result of collusion and that the said decree did not
bind the non-Cutchi Memons who were the
beneficiaries of the Trust. According to them,
though the Cutchi Memons were entitled to claim
the benefiit of the Trust, the predominant interest in the Trust was of the Dakkhani Muslims
who had built the Mosque and contributed sub·
stantially to its financial progress and prosperity.
They further pleaded that the five appellants who
were in charge of the administration of the Trust
were guilty of breach of trust. According to them,
even the scheme which was framed in the earlier
suit did not confer a monopoly of manage:nent on
the Cutchi Memons as appears to have been assum·
ed in making the appointment of Trustees ever since
the said decree was passed, and it was urged that if
on a correct interpretation, the scheme did confer
such a monopoly, it should be held to be bad in law.
It is on these allegations that the respondents wanted
the Court to settle a scheme taking into account
all the worshippers of the Masjid both Dakkhani
Muslims and Cutchi Memons, and recognising the
right of the Dakkhani Muslims also to manage the
Trust and its affairs. As a consequential relief the
respondents claimed that the appellants be r~moved
from their position as Trustees and that a Committee
of Trust appointed under the old scheme should be
dissolved and new Trustees should be appointed
in its place. That, in short, is the nature of the
claim made by the respondents in their present
suit .
•
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
Ahmul Adam Sait
v.
l114,1alhull£h J..l1AJ,,i
-
The appellants disputed the respondents' claim
on several grounds. It was urged by them that the
Cutchi Memons were entitled to the exclusive
management of the Masjid and its affairs; it was
pleaded that the present claim was barred by res
j1ulical<1 and that the respondents had not any interest in the Trust and as such, had no locus stm1di
to file the present suit under section 92 of the Code.
The allegation of collusion made by the respondents
in regard to the earlier suit was traversed and it was
contended that if an)' relief was intended to be asked
in respect of the modification of the said scheme, the
proper remedy was an application undc:r clause 25 of
the scheme itself and not the present suit. The charge
that the appellants had committed a breach of trust
was seriously disputed and emphasis was laid on the
fact that even if a case for change in the scheme
was made out that case should not be accepted
unless 1here are over-riding considerations to do so.
On these pleadings, the learned District Judge
framed appropriate issues. He held that the respondents had not shown that they had sufficient interest
to bring the suit under s. 92 of the Code. He also
found that their plea that the decree in the earlier
suit had been obtained by collusion had not been
established, nor had they succeed~d in showing that
the Trustees under the said scheme had committed
a breach of trust. In regard to the contrntion of rea
jut/iwf/I raised by the appellants, he held that the
decree passed in the earlier suit was a bar to the
maintainability of the present suit, and he expressed
the opinion that the reliefs claimecl by the respon
cie:its by their present action could have been claimed
by them by an application under clause 25 of the
scheme. Then the learned .Judge considered the q ucstion as to whether the scheme should be modilkd
and he took the view that in such matters, it was
necessary to exercise utmost caution before disturbing
a settled scheme. Since no satisfactory reason had
•
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
been shown by the respondents in support of their
case that the scheme should be changed, the trial
Judge rejected their claim and dismissed the suit.
The respondents challenged this decree by preferring an appeal in the High Court of Mysore. The
High Court agreed with the trial Court in rejecting
the respondent's case that the decree in the earlier
suit had been obtained by collusion and that the Trustees appointed under the said scheme had committed
breach of trust. It, however, differed from the trial
Court on the question of res judicata. It took the
view that the plea of res judicata could not be sustained and so, it came to the conclusion that the present
suit under s. 92 was competent. The High Court
agreed with the trial Court that in law, a scheme
once settled should not be lightly disturbed or modified, but in its opinion, a case had been made out for
framing a new scheme, beause it was satisfied that
the Mosque in question really belonged to the whole
of the Sunni Muslim Community of C & M Station,
Bangalore, and the basis of the earlier suit tbat the
Cutchi Memons were entitled to the exdusive management of the said M,1sq ue, its properties and its administration was not well-founded. On these findings,
the High Court set aside the decree passed by the
trial Court and remanded the case to the said Court to
take further proceedings in the light of the appellate
judgment for the purpose of framing a new scheme.
It is against this order that the appellants have come
to this Court by special leave.
Before dealing with the merits of the contention
which have been urged before us by Mr. Setalvad on
behalf of the appellants, it is necessary to set out
briefly the history of the Mosque with which we are
concerned, and the background of the incidents which
have led to the institution of the present suit. The
finding recorded by the High Court in regard to
the history of the Mosque, its origin and further
1963
..
Ahmed Ad.m Stit
-
lrioy1th•11/ah Me~h1i
Gaj1ndrnga'1<ar J.
656
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
development, and the part played by the Dakkhani
Muslim Community in both the matters. has not been
disputed before us, and so, we must proceed to deal
lna.10thull'Jh ,\f,klrri
with the appeal on the basis that the said finding
Gojtndra1a44ar }.
truly and correctly represents the facts proved in this
case. It is in the hght of the said finding, thtrefore, that we propose to set out the histury of the
institution and the background of the dispute.
•.
Ahnt1d A.i..o Sait
It is not disputed that the Mosque came into
existence as a relatively small structure more than
100 years ago and that it was rebuilt in its present
form some time about 1885. The oral evidence led
by the parties in support of their respective contentions
is as often happens, not very satisfactory, and so, the
High Court dealt with this part of the case on docu·
mcntary evidence. The respondents have produced
numerous documents to prove their case that in the
original building of the Mosque, in its reconstruction
in 1885 and in its progress from year to year, the
Dakkhani Muslims have played a dominant part,
though it is conceded by them that later on the
Cutchi Memons were also actively associated with
the affairs of the Mosque and have made contribu·
tions to its prosperity and progress. The earliest
document on the record (Ext. Kl which is a sale-dead
executed on January 4, 1823 shows that the
generality of the people wished to construct a Masjid,
anrl so, the open plot covered by the sale-deed was
purchas~d. The purchasers were a large number
of lvI 1slim> consisting of several groups described
a> traders, bakers, sweetmeat makers, copper-smiths,
rope-makers, mutton butchers, beef butchers,
gardeners and other Muslims. That shows the very
broad basis of the cross-section of the Muslim
community which joined in purchasing the open
polt on which the mosque was built. Then followed
a gift deed executed on November I, l!l23 (Ext. 'L')
which was a voluntary undert?king given by a large
number of Musalmans to coutribute funds in the
I
~ S.C.R.
SUPREME COtJRT REPOR1'S
657
construction of the Mosque. A grant of land made
on October 4, 1830 (Ext. YYYY) clearly brings
out that the Mosque and its appurtenances were
intended for the benefit of the whole Muslim
Community represented by the local Kazi. In about
1850, Abdul Khuddus appeared on the scene and
it is common ground between the parties that he was
actively associated with the institution for about
half a century. He appears to have been a very
influential person in the locality and helped to
popularise the institution and acquired considerable
properties for it; thereby, he rendered the mosque
useful to the community in various directions. Abdul
Khuddus was in management of the Mosque till
1905 when he died. He was followed by his son
Abdul Gaffar who died in 1922. It appears that
Abdul Gaffar left b~hind him two wills under which
two different claims for the Mutavalliship of the
Mosque were made. About this time, the eariler
suit of 1924 was instituted. 1tis thus not disputed
that for nearly 60 years and more, Abdul Khuddus
and his son who were non-Cutchi Memons were in
management of the Mosque and as we have already
noticed, prior to 1850 when Abdul Khuddus came on
the scene, the management does not appear to have
been in the hands of the Cutchi Memons exclusively,
but it was predominantly in the hands of the
Dakkhani Muslims of the locality.
On June, 29, 1880, a Power of Attorney
was executed by the Jamayat in favour of Abdul
Khuddus in order to enable him to enter into
transactions on behalf of the Mosque. Of the ten
presons who executed the Power of Attorney, three
were Cutchi Memons and the rest Dakkhani Muslims.
This document shows that Cutchi Memons had by
then associated themselves with the administration
of the affairs of the Mosque and formed part of the
Jamayat which owed allegiance to the Mosque but
amongst the Trustees who executed the Power of
1963
AAme! Adem Soit
v.
lnqy athulloh Mekhr'i
Gojcnlirtf:ndkr,r J
•
658
1963
.4hmccf ..fdom Sail
v.
bl'lJOtliul/oh lvftirhri
C:ojt•dragodka• J.
SUPREME COURt REPORTS [1964] VOL
Attorney in favour of Abdul Khuddus, the proportion
was :i: 7 .
On December 2U, l 8U2, a sale deed was
executed by one Thulsibayama (Ext. HHHH) conveying her house property in favour of Abdul Khuddus.
Abdul Khuddlls was described as the Head Trustee
of the Jumma Masjid. The other Trustees mentioned
in the document who numbered i:J, represented the
Dakkhani Muslims and the Cutchi Memons in the
proportion of "i:G. It is true that on some occasions,
the Headmen appeared to have been predominantly
Cutchi :VIcmons; for instance.
the document
pertaining to the transfer of f azel :Vlahorncd Asham
Sait's right to Jumma l\fasjid (Ext. UUU) was
cxecut~d in favour of six Headmen all of whom
appear to be(' 1tchi l\kmons; but as the High Court
has observed, : !1is can have no special significance
since in this d ,cument, Abdul Khuddus himself is
not mentioned :· nd that may show that the Headmen
did not include the main person who was looking
after the Masjid. However, one fact is significant
that the Dakkhani Muslims numbered about 30,000
and the Cutchi Mcmons never exceeded 300 and
this fact has· to be borne in mind in dealing with the
question of the administration of the properties
belonging to Jumma !llasjid, and, so it would be
clear that though the Cutchi Memons were associated
with the administration of the Trust, they were not
at all in its exclusive management. Before his death
Abdul Khuddus had executed a Power of Attorney
in favour of his son Abdul Gaffar on June 14,
HJ05, and as we have already seen, Abdul Gaffar
stepped into the management.
Thus, the documentary evidence which the High Court has accepted
supports its finding that the :Vfosque came into being
and continued to be an institution belonging to the
whole Sunni Muslim Community of Bangalore and
that it could not be held that its management wa~
exclusively in the hands of Cutchi Mcmons at any
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
time before 1924. Having regard to the very
prominent and Powerful part played by Abdul
Khuddus in the development of the Mosque and its
properties, it is not surprising that the Mosque came
to be known as "Khuddus Saheb's Mosque." This
description of the Mosque is found in a document
executed on June 7, 1884 (Ext. RRRRRR-1).
Subsequently, when the Cutchi Memons filed a suit
in 1924, they alleged that the Mosque was known as
the Sait's Mosque, but that is undoubtedly a later
development.
It may be conceded that the several J amayats
of Muslims residing in Bangalore in different localities
have their separate mosques, and as often happens,
the Muslim residents of a particular locality
generally offer prayers in the mosque situated in the
locality and in that sense, owned by the Jamayat of
the said locality. The position of the Jumma Masj id
with which we are conctrned, however, appears to
be that of a central _Mosque to whkh allegiance is
owed by all the Sunni Muslims of Bangalore. In
fact, evidence adduced in this case clearly shows
that the Cutchi Memons constituting a Jamayat by
themselves have a mosque of their own in Fraser
town. This fact was admitted, though with reluctance and then too not clearly, by Haji Saleh
Mohamed Sait whom the appellants examined on
their behalf. It also appears from the evidence of the
said witness that the bulk of Nikahs in the J umma
Masjid (Ext.Y-6) consists of those Muslims other
than Cutchi Memons and that rather shows that
amongst the usual worshippers at the J umma Masjid
the non-Cutchi Memons occupied an important
place. It is in the light of these facts that the
controversy between the parties in the present
litigation has to be judged.
It appears that about 1920, when the non-cooperation movement was in full force, there was a
1963
Ahm:d Adam Sail
v.
btayathuliah A1el.hr i
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
19~S
sharp division in the Cutchi 1\.Icmon Community as
well as the Dakkhani Muslims at Bangalore. The
Altmtt! Alam S•il
majority of the community sympathised with the
••
l••>·•thull.i. Mllllri non·co-operation movement and aµplaudcd those
who took part in it, whereas the minority led by
Haji Sir Ismail Sail disapproved of the movement
and publicly denounced it. That led to the usual
development of excommunication of the minority,
and so, Haji Sir Ismail Sait filed a suit '.'lo. 6/1921
to vindicate his right of access to the Mosque for
performing religious ceremonies and claimed an
injunction against the managers of the Mosque
restraining them from interfering with the exercise
of his right in that behalf. During the pcndency of
the suit, however, Abdul Gaffar died on January 9,
1922. That tended to accentuate the division in the
Community and it was this sharp division in the
Community which was further complicated by the
rival claims made by t" ,, different persons who had
set up two different wills of Abdul GafJar that led to
Suit No. 32/l!l24 being filed. In that suit, it was
claimed that the Mosque was primarily developed
by the Cutchi Memons and that the Cutchi :\lemons
were entitled to the exclusive management of the
affairs of the Mosque. The defendants who had
been impleaded to that suit first appeared to resist the
claim. \Ve have already seen who these defendants
were. They were interested in supporting their
individual rights in respect of the management of the
Mosque and it appears that they reached an amicable
settlement with the plaintiffs and ultimately submitted to a preliminary decree directing that the
scheme be framed. Those defendants who were nonCutchi Memons did not represent the non-Cutchi
Memon Community as such and were interested only
in their personal rights based upon the wills executed
by Abdul Gaffar. After the parties agreed that the
scheme should be drawn up, the District Judge
directed thrm to file their respective schemes. The
Court then examined the said schemes and finally
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
framed its own scheme. Thereafter, Trustees have
been appointed under the Scheme from time to time
and the administration of the Trust and the management of its properties has remained in the hands of
Trustees who have always been Cutchi Memons.
That, in short, is the history of the commencement
and the development of the Mosque and of the facts
leading to the present dispute.
The first point which has been pressed before
us by Mr. Setalvad is that the present suit is barred
by reason of the fact that in the earlier suit instituted under s. 92 of the Code a scheme had already
been framed by a court of competent jurisdiction and
the decree by which the said scheme was ordered to
be drawn binds all parties interested in the Trust. A
suit under s. 92, it is urged, is a representative suit,
and so, whether or not the present respondents
actually appeared in that suit, they would be bound
by the decree which had framed a scheme for the
proper administration of the Trust. In support of this
argument, reliance is placed on the decision of this
Court in Raja Anandrao v. Shamrao (1 ), where it is
observed that though the Pujaris were not parties to
the suit under s. 92, the decision in that suit binds the
pujaris as worshippers so far as the administration of
the temple is concerned, because a suit under s. 92
is a representative suit and binds :not only the parties
thereto, but all those who are interested in the Trust.
Mr. Setalvad has also relied on the twu decisions of
the Madras High Court, (1) in Ramridos v.
Hannmantha Rao ('). and (2) in Khaja Hasrnnullah
Khan v. Royal Mosque Trust Board('). The effect
of those two decisions is that a decree passed in a
suit filed under s. 92 framing a scheme is binding on
all and it prevents every person whether a party to
the suit or not from asserting in a subsequent suit
rights which conflict with or attack the scheme.
Jn assessing the validity of this arguement. it is
necessary to consider the basis of the decisions that
(1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 930, 940.
(2) (1911) !,L,R, 36 Mad, 364.
(3) !.L.R. (1948) Mad.• 257.
(
1963
Ahmed Adam S•l •
v.
lnaJalhullah Mekh r
;ajendragatfkar J.
6tl2
AJ;mtd Adr.m 5oil
v.
lrl'l)'Ofhuliali llftli'1ri
{;afrnrfrngad~ar
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL
a decree passed in a suit under s. 92 binds all parties.
The basis of this view is that a suit under s. 92 is a
reprcsentati\·c suit and is brought with the necessary
sanction required by it on behalf of all the beneficiaries interested in the Trust. The said section autho·
rises t\\'O or more persons having an interest in the
Trust to file a suit for claiming one or mon." of the
reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (h) of sub·section
(I) after consent in writing there prcscribl'd has been
obtained. Thus, when a suit is brought under s. 92,
it is brought by two or more persons interested in the
Trust who have taken upon themselves the responsi·
bility of representing all the beneficiaries of the
Trust. In such a suit, though all the beneficiaries
m.1y nut be expressly impleadcd, the action is insti·
tuLcd on their behalf and relief is claimed in a
representative character. This position immediately
attracts the provisions of explanation VI to s. 11 of the
Code. Explanation \"I provides that where persons
litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a
private right claimed in common for themselves and
others, all persons interested in such right shall, for
the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under
the persons so litigating. It is clear thats. 11 read
with its explanation VI lca<ls to the result that a
decree passed in a suit instituted by persons to which
explanation VI applies will bar further claims bv
persons interested in the same right in respect of
which the prior suit had been instituted. Explana·
tion VI thus illustrates one aspect of constructive
resjiulicata. Where a representative suit is brought
un<ler s. !12 and a decree is passed in such a suit, law
assumes that all persons who have the same interest
as the plaintiffs in the representative suit were represented by the said plaintiffs and, therefore, arc
constructively barre<l by re.~ jwlicalr! from reagitating
the matters directly and substantially in issue in
the said earlier suit.
A similar result follows if a suit is either brou~ht or defended under 0. I, r. 8. Io that case,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
persons either suing or defending an action are doing
so in a representative character, and so, the decree
passed in such a suit binds all those whme interests
were represented either by the plaintiffs or by the
defendants. Thus, it is clear that in determining
the question about the effect of a decree passed in a
representative suit, it is essential to enquire which
interests were represented by the plaintiffs or the
defendants. If the decree was passed in a suit under
s. 92, it will become necessary to examine the plaint
in order to decide in what character the plaintiffs had
sued and what interests they had claimed. If a suit
is brought under 0. 1 r. 8, the same process will have
to he adopted and if a suit is defended under
0. I r. 8, the plea taken by the defendants will have
to be examined with a view to decide which intereitts
the defendants purported to defend in common with
others. The decision of this question would be
material in determining the correctness ofthe argument urged by Mr. Setalvad before us.
Let us, therefore, examine the plaint filed in
the earlier suit of 1924. Before filing the said suit,
an application had been made to obtain sanction of
the Collector as required by s. 92. In that application, the petitioners had specifically averred that the
Masjid in question was an ancient and important
institution belonging to the Cutchi IVIemon Community and there were properties attached to it worth
over a lac of rupees : the net income from them
being about Rs. 2,400/- per annum. On this basis,
the petitioners claimed that they were interested in
the Trust and wanted a scheme to be framed. It
would thus be clear that the application for sanction
proceeded on the narrow and specific ground that the
Mosque belonged to the Cutchi Memon Community
and the interest which the petitioners purported to
represent was the interest of the Cutchi Memoq
Community and no other,
1963
AhMed A:iam Sail
v.
lna)athullah :\.:tekhr;
Gajendragadkar J.
664
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
After permission was obtained from the
Collector, the suit was filed.
In the plaint, th~
v.
same
position
was
adopted.
It
was averred that
{111_~·atJm!Jah .Wtk~ri
the Mosque had been mainly founded by the Cutchi
Mcmun .Vlohammadens residing at Bangalore and
it was alleged that the :\fohmmaden communities
other than the Cutchi Memon had established other
independent mosques for their use and benefit and
for the last over a century, the Gutehi Memons had
been maintaining and managing the said l\1osque.
The plaint further claimed that the plaintiffs as
members of the Cutehi :'vlemon Community were
interested in the proper management of the suit
:\losque and that as :\fohammadens and members of
the said Community they had the right to perform
tlicrcin their daily and usual prayers as well as
funeral and other special prayers. Consistently
with this attitude, the plaint in its prayer clause
claimed. inter 1Jlia, that a scheme should be framed
safcguarrling the rights and privileges of the Cutchi
Memon Community. It is thus clear that the plaint,
like the application for the sanction of the Collector,
prncecded on a clear and unambiguous basis that the
;\fosque belonged to the Cutchi .Memon Community
and the suit was instituted only on behalf of the
Cntchi Memon Community by persons who claimed
to be interested in the f\fosque as Cntchi Memons.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the plaintiffs in the
said suit did not claim and in fact, did not represent
the interests of any community other than the Cutchi
Memon Community. Once it is found as it has
been in the present case, that this basis of the claim
made in the plaint was not well-founded and that the
:\·fosque belongs to all the Sunni Mohmmadcns of
Bangalore, it would be difficult to accept the argum~nt that the suit instituted on the narrow basis to
which we have just referred can be regarded as a
representative suit so far as the interest of ~foslim
Communities other than th~ Cutchi Memon Community residing in llangalore arc concerned. These
.-l~med
.4.f1un Sail
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
who filed the said suit expressly pleaded that no
other community was concerned or interested in the
said Trust and, therefore, it would be idle for them
now to contend that they purported to represent the
interests of the other communities.
It is true that defendants 1 to 7 who had been
impleaded in that suit were non-Cutchi Memom,
but as we have already observed, these defendants
were sued as trespassers and their only interest in
defending the suit was to support their individual
right to manage the property. The written statements filed by them leave no doubt at all that they
did not purport to represent non-C:utchi Memons
residing in Bangalore. Their pleas centered round
the rig-hts which they claimed under the wills of
Abdul Gaffar. Similarly, the written statements
filed by defendants 8 to 13 in that suit cannot be
pressed into service for supporting the argument that
non·Cutchi Memons' interests were represented.
These defendants were Cutchi Memons and. in substance, they agreed ·with the plaintiffs in that suit
that the Mosque belonged to Cutchi Memons alone.
No doubt, they made some other plea> disputing
some of the allegations made in the plaints, but
those pleas have no relevance on the point with
which we are concerned. It is thus clear that the
allegations made in the plaint, as well as the averments made by the respective defendents in their
written statements do not justify the contention that
the earlier suit was either filed by persons who
could claim to represent non-Cutchi Memom, or was
defenJed by pers~ns who could make a similar
claim. If that be so, the very basis on which the
binding character of a decree passed in a suit under
s. 92 of the Code rests disappears; we have already
seen that the basis of the principle that a decree
under s. 92 suit binds all persons interested in the
trust, is that the interests of all persons interested in
the Trust are represented in the suit as required by
1963
Ahmed Adam Sail
v.
Inayathullah ~Wekhr
Gajendragadkar J.
666 SUPREl\·fE COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
1963
Ahmed Adtu11 Sait
v.
/na.J4/hullah ,\J,J;hri
~ajvu!ragodJ;M
explanation VI to s. 11; and if that basis is absent,
the decree cannot crea1e a bar of res judiwtn
againt persons claiming interest not represented in
the earlier suit.
J.
In the case of llaja Anandrao ('), this Court
has no doubt observed that a decree passed in a
representative suit under s. 92 binds not only the
parties thereto, but all those who arc interested in
the Trust, and l'\lr. Sctalvad has naturallv relied
upon this ohservation in support of his pica' of res
judicata : but it would be unreasonable to treat the
said observation as laying do\\'n a broad and un·
qualified proposition like the one which Mr. Setalvad
had submitted before us. The context in which the
observation has been made must be borne in mind
and that context clcarlv shows that the earlier suit
had been filed in respect of a Hindu Temple and it
was plain from the recitals in the plaint filed in that
suit that the plaintiffs who had brought the said
suit represented the interests of all worshippers
and devotees of the said temple, including the
worshippers who had brought the subsequent suit.
In other words, in accepting the plea that the
worshippers
subsequent suit brought by the
was barred by res Judimta, this" Court affirmed
the finding that the interests of the said worship·
pers had been represented in the earlier suit,
and so, it made no difference to the binding
character of the decree passed in that suit that the
said worshippers personally did not appear in the
earlier litigation. This decision, therefore, proceeds
on the basis that the party who was held prrcluclc<l
from filing a subsequent suit was constructi,-cly
represented in the earlier litigation and the provisions
of explanation VI to s. 11 therefore, applied. It is
thus clear that the observations made in Jfoj11
Anandrao's r,ase (') do not support Mr. Setalvad's
contention in the present appeal.
(lj [1961] SS. C. R 930, 940.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
That takes us to the next question as to whether
it would be appropriate to change the scheme in the
present litigation even though the present suit may
not be technically barred by res judicatci. Mr.
Setalvad contends that it is a well-recognised
principle of law that a scheme in regard to a public
trust once framed should not be altered lightheartedly unless there are su bstan ti al reasons to do
so and he has strenuously relied on the finding of the
High Court that the Trustees appointed under the
scheme ever since it was framed have, on the whole,
managed the trust properties and its affairs in a
reasonable and responsible manner and that the
allegations of breach of trust which had been made
against them in the present suit have been held not
to be proved by both the courts below. There can
be no doubt that if a scheme is framed in
a suit brought under s. 92, it should not be changed
unless there are strong and substantial reasons to do
so. This position is well established and cannot and
has not been disputed before us. As observed by
Halsbury, when a scheme has been sett led by the
Charity Commissioners, the Court will not interfere
with it unless the Commissioners have acted ultra
vires. or the scheme contains something wrong in
principle or in law, or by reason of changed circumstances, the continuance of the charity under the
constitution established by the scheme has become
impracticable. This principle was )aid down as
early as 1851 in the case of the Attorney-General v.
The Bishop of Worcester (1 ), where it was held that
schemes which have been settled under the directions
of the Court arc not to be disturbed upon merely
speculative view or in matters of discretion or regulation upon which Judges m Attorneys-General may
differ in opinion, or except upon substantial grounds
and clear evidence, not only that the scheme does
not operate beneficially, but that it can by alteration
be made to do so consistently with the object of the
~I) ll851] 68 E. R. 530.
J96J
Ahmed Adam Sait
v.
fnfJYathulloh Mekhri
Gajend1agadkar J.
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
•.
Ahmtd Atlarn .\alt
foundation.
in 187~ in
The same principle was reiterated
the case of A Uorney.Ue11aal v.
Stewart(') .
Pi11Jalhu//ah Mtkhri
r.ajtrulrl'Jg(/(/(ar J,
There are, however, two considerations which
must be borne in mind in dealing with Mr. Setalvad's
argument on this point. It is not disputed that even
after a scheme is framed in a suit properly instituted
under s. 9~, if supervening considerations justify its
alteration or modification, the bar of re" judicata
cannot then be pleaded against such alteration or
modificati0n. Hesidrs, in the present case, it has
now been discovered •hat the scheme framed in 1927
proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the
ilfosque belonged to the Cutchi :\fcmon Community
and that the said community alone was entitled
to its exclusive administration. It may be that t!Je
parties who conceded in that suit that the said
assumption was right did not collude, but, neverthe·
less, the said assumption has clearly introduced
a serious infirmity in the scheme. Speaking numeri·
cally, the interests of the non-Cntchi :\frmons who
numbered about 30,000 were ignored and atten·
tion was paid exclusively to the interests of Cutchi
Mcmons who never numbered m0re than 300. Once it
is found that the Mosque is a Central Mosque anrl
the Dakkhani Muslims residing in Bangalore were
responsible for the constructions of the l\1osque and
were vitally interested in offerin~ worship in the
l\fosque and in taking part in the administration of
the Mosque, its affairs and properties, it would be
difficult to resist the respondents' case that the scheme
framed in Ul27 must be revised bearing in mind the
interests of all those who are interested in the :\1osque.
Therefore, we arc satisfied that the High Court was
right in corning to the conclusion that the scheme
must be revised on the true basis that the Mosque
rloes not belong exclusively to the Cutchi Memons,
but belongs to all the Sunni Musalmans of
Bangalore.
I l) ( !U72) L. R. 14 Eq, Cuca 17.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORts
669
The next question which we have to consider
is whether it is necessary that the order of remand
passed by the High Court should be confirmed and
the District Judge directed to frame a new scheme in
the light of our decision. We are inclined to take
the view that it is not necessary to frame an entirely
new scheme in the circumstances of this case. We
have already referred to the fact that the High Court
was satisfied that the scheme has worked, on the
whole satisfactorily. We have examined the 25 clauses
of the scheme and have heard the learned counsel
for both the parties in regard to the modification's
which these clauses may need and we are satisfied
that if suitable changes are made in clauses (iv), (v),
(xxiv) and (xxv), that would meet the requirements
of justice and fair administration of the Mosque,
its affairs and its properties. Broadly stated, the
scheme framed in 1927 provided for the appointment
of a Committee of five Trustees who were to hold
office for seven years commencing from the date on
which the scheme came into force. Clause (iv) then
made a provision for the appointment of fresh
Trustees at the completion of the seven years'
period prescribed by cl. '(i). This clause reads
thus:"Six months before the completion of the seven
years mentioned above, the committee of
trustees shall prepare a list of male adult
worshippers, and submit the same to the Court
within a month thereafter; and the Court shall
as soon as convenient nominate from among
the worshippers a committee consisting of 15
worshippers. Each member of the committee
of worshippers shall hold office for ten years
from the date of his appointment; and any
vacancy arising among them for any of the
reasons specified in clause 3 supra shall be filled
up by the Court. And this committee shall elect
from among their number 5 (five) persons to
1963
Ahmed Adam Sait
••
lnay1thullah Mekhri
Gaj1ndragatlkar J.
•
670
JY63
AJw11d Adum Soil
••
lr.r:iyatlmlloll ,\ft4'11i
Gojtridrngodk.{)r J
StJP.REME COURT REPORTS [1964]Vbt.
perform the duties of trustees after the expiry
of seven vc;11s aforrsaicl."
Clause (v) which is also relevant re els thus:
"The tru>tees so elected shall hold office for a
term of five vears ancl whtnever anv vacancv
arises among the elected trmtees bj: reason 0°1
death or resignation or if any member shall be
absent from the Bangalore C & '.\! Station for
a continuous period of six months, or be an
undischarged insolvant or be convicted of any
criminal offence involving moral turpitude or
refuses or in the opinion of the Court becomes
unfit or incapable of acting as trustee or
ceases tn be a member of the committee
of worshippers the same shall be filled up by
the comniittec of worshippers, from amongst
themselves the person so appointed to hold
office for the remaining period of five years.
The procedure described in clause (4) shall
be adopted for ekcting trust~es for each
successive period of five years.''
It is obvious that clause (iv) has worked itself out;
but it provides for the basic structure for the appoint·
ment of Trustees, and we are inclined to think that
that basic structure must now be alterad in view of
the fact that the number of worshippers is wry much
!arger than was then assumed. 'Worshippers' in the
context, would mean not ilfusalmans who are
entitled to offer worship. because that view would
takr. in ~fosalmans not only from llau~alore but from
all over the country. The 'worshippers', in the
context, should include persons who usually worship
in the said '.\fosqur. In our opinion, it is not
necl'Ssary to make any list of male adult worshippers
as provided by cl. (iv), nor should a Committee of
worshippers br appointed as contcmpla ted by it.
We think, it is desirable that the appointment of
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61i
five trustees from time to time should be made by
the District Judge from amongst the worshippers of
the Mosque, the class of worshippers.being determined
in the sense which we have just clarified. It appears
that after the scheme came into force, trustees were
appointed, when necessary, by a kind of election.
We have no doubt that this course should be avoided.
We would, therefore, insert in place of els. (iv) and
(v), cl. (iv) in these words :
"The district judge of Bangalore should
nominate five persons from amongst male
adult worshippers of the mosque as trustees
to look after the mosque, its affairs and ita
administration. The trustees so nominated
shall hold office for a term of five years
and whenever any vacancy occurs among
them either by reason of death, or resignation, or otherwise, the District Judge shall
fill that vacancy by nominating another
Trustee in that behalf. The remaining
trustees will continue to function till the
vacancy is filled."
The result would be that cl. (iv) & (v) a& they stand
would be removed and cl. (iv) as we have formulated
will take their place.• and the remaining clauses will
be renumbered accordingly.
Clause (xxiv) which gives the right to demand
copies of the rules and of translations thereof in
Urdu language only to the members of the cutchi
Memon Community will now be available to all the
Sunni Musalmans residing in Bangalore. Thorefore,
the modification in the clause would be that in
place of the words "any member of the Cutchi
Memon Community" shall be substituted the words
"any Sunni Musalman of Bangalore".
for
Clause (xxv) which enables the Trustees to apply
advice or direction to the District Court as
1963
Ahmed Adam Sait
v.
Inayathullah Mehhri
Gaj~ndragadkar
J.
672
1963
A.hmeti A.dam S1Jit
v.
lna)'athullah Atekhri
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vot.
occasion may arise, should be so amended as to enable
the Trustees or any person interested in the Trust to
apply fur modification of the sch< me. Clause ('xv)
so amended would read thus:-
Gajenira1adliar J,
"The Trustees may apply for advice or direction, and the Trustees or any person interested
in the Trust may apply for modification of the
scheme to the District Court of the C & M
Station, Bangalore, as occasion may arise."
By modifying the clause in this way, we wish to make
it clear that if in future an occasion arises for
changing or altering the terms of the scheme, it shoald
not be necessary to file a separate suit.
Before we part with this appeal, there is one
point to which we may incidentally refer. During
the course of the hearing of this appeal, an argument
was urged before us by both the parties as to the true
denotation of the word "worshippers" used in cl. (iv).
Mr. Setalvad contended that in the context of the
pleadings filed by the parties in that suit and in the
light of cl. (xxiv), it was clear that the word
"worshippers" must mean only worshippers from the
Cutchi Memon Community. If that argument is
upheld, it would emphatically bring out the fact that
in the suit, the only interest that was represented was
that of the Cutchi Memons and that would clearly
help to negative the plea of res judicata. On the
other hand, if the word "worshippers" received a
larger denotation, it may show that the scheme binds
all the worshippers interested in the Trust, but it
would
immediately raise the question of clarification of the scheme because in the administration
of the scheme, the word "worshippers" has consistently received the narrow interpretation, and the
Trustees as well as the committee of worshippers has
always been constituted out of members of the Cutchi
Memon Community and oo others, so that on this
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
alternative basis, the plea of res judicata may be
upheld; but an occasion will clearly arise for either
clarifying the scheme or redically changing it so as
to make the other worshippers eligible for appointment as Trustees.
1963
Ahmed At!am Sai t
v.
Iriayathul foh M ~khri
Goj~ndrogotJkar
In the result, we reject all the contentions
raised by the appellents and confirm the findings
recorded by the High Court in favour of the respondents. We are, however, not inclined to affirm the
order of remand passed by the High Court, because
we have held that the scheme framed in 1927 should
be left as it is with the modifications which we have
indicated in our judgment. Therefore, the order of
remand passed by the High Court is reversed and
the respondents' claim for a modified scheme
allowed. The appeal is di,missed with the above
modifications. The appellants will pay the costs of
the contesting respondents throughout.
MADAMANCHI RAMAPPA & ANR.
v.
MUTHALUR BOJJAPPA
(l:'. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO
and K. C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
Civil Procedure-Concurrent findings of fact-Powers of
.<econd app.Zlate court-Insufficiency of evidence, if a ground
for interference--Equity, if must yield to expre.ss provisions of
/;xw-Single Judge's deci8ion-Grant of Special Leave-Constitution of India (1950), Art, 133 (3)-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), s. 100.
The appellants' father bought 35 years hefore the date of
the suit 40 acres of land from one Krishnappa out of his land
measuring 166 acres. After the purchase the appellants'
1963
M11.rrh 29
J.
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