PATEL GORDHANDAS HARGOVINDAS versus MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER, AHMEDABAD
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 March 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 608 | 1963 INSC 76
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 March 1963
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 253/1956
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 608
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 76
Text of the judgment
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
1963
Match 28
PATEL GORDHA:"lDAS HARGOVJNDAS
v.
MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER, AHMEDABAD
(B. P. SINHA c. ].,
s. K. DAS, A. K. SAU KAR
K. N. vVA:\'CI!OO, and K. c. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
Municipality-lmpoaitt'.on of rate on vacant land-ll'h,thu
rnt. to be based on annual wlue or capital ralue of landWhether rules ultra vires-llistory of rates in England and
Inclia-Gf)1:er111ncnl of [11dir1 Act 1 JfJ.)5 (2U Geo. 5 ch. 2),
Set:ent!t ._)'r::liulufr, /.,ist 1.ihm 6.j, Liat 11, ite1n 42-Brnnbay
.lfunicipal lloroag/,s Act, Jf/25 (li01n. 18 of zn6), 88. 73, 76
llule• 243, 3-50-A.
'
A suit was filed by the appellant• to challenge the imposition of a rate by the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad
on vacant lands situate within the municipal limits. The rate
was levied under section 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs
Act, 1925, rca<l \vith
E~planati'->11
to s. 75 of the Act.
The
Municipality framed rule 350-A for rating open lands which
provides that the rate on the area of open lands shall be levied
at 1 per centum on the valuation based upon capital. The
contention of the appellants was that reading the two rules
together, the rate was levied at a percentage of the capital
value of open lands and that the municipality could not do.
Rule 350-A read with rule 243 wa. ultra vires ss. 73 and 75
inasmuch as it pcrtnirte<l tlie fixation of rate at a percentage
of capital ,·alue and that was not permitted by the Act.
'l'he word "rate-'' 11'.\ed in s.73 had acquired a special meaning by
the time the Act came to be passed and meant a tax on the
annual value of land< and buildings and not on their capital
value. It was also contended that if the Act permitted the
levy of a rate on a percentage of capital value of the lands and
buildings, that "'as 11ltra 1:ires the Provincial Legislature. It
was further contended that the assessment ba.!cd on rule
350·A read \Yith rule 243 was u..ltrfl i·irea and the assc!sment
list prepared pursuant to the said rule wa. illr,gal and void
The trial court held that rule 350-A read with rule 243
was illegal and void and beyond the authority given to municipality under s. 73 of the Act. The trial Court granted the relief
claimed by the appellants. The High Court reversed the erder
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 609
of the trial court and the appellants came to this court after
getting a certificate.
1963
Patel Gordhindas
Hargovindas
rule 243 is ultra vircs s. 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Municipalv.Commissio•
Act, 1925, read with Explanation to s. 75. The assessment
ner, dhmedabad
H.Zd (Slrkar J., dissenting), that rule 350-A read with
list for the year 1947°48 published by the municipality for
levying the said tax in so for as it was prepared under
rule 350-A is illegal, ultra vires and void. The municipality
was restrained from recovering the said tax on the open lands
from the appellants.
The word "rate" had acquired a special meaning in
English legislative history and practice and also in Indian
legislation where that word was used and it meant a tax for
local purposes imposed by local authorities. The basis of the
tax was the annual value of the lands or buildings on or in
connection with which it was imposed, arrived at in one of the
three ways, namely, (1) actual rent fetched by land or building
where it is actually let, (2) where it is not let, rent based on
hypothetical tenancy, particularly in the case of buildings, and
(3) where either of these two mode• is not available, by valua·
tion based on capital value from which annual value has to be
found by applying a suitable percentage which may not be the
same for lands and buildings. When in 1925, s. 73 (1) of the
Act while specifying taxes which could be imposed by a municipal borough, used the word 'rate' on buildings or lands situate
within the municipal borough, the word 'rate' must have been
used in that particular meaning which it had acquired in the
legislative history and practice hath in England and India
before that date. The use of the word 'rate' in cl. (i) definitely
means that it was that particular kind of tax which in legislative history and practice was known as a 'rate' which the municipality could impose and not any other kind of tax.
That though mathematically it may be possible to arrive
at the same figure of the actual tax to be paid as a rate whether
based on a capital value or based on annual value, the levying
of the rate as a percentage of the capital value would still be
illegal for the reason that the law provides that it should be
levied on the annual value and not otherwise. By levying it
otherwise directly as a percentage of the capital value, the real
incidence of the tax is camouflaged and the electorate not
knowing the true incidence of the tax may possibly he subjected
to such heavy incidence as in some cases may amount to confiscatory taxation.
Per Sarkar J .-Rate is the na111e given to an in1post levied
by a local authority to raise funds for its expenses irrespective
610 SUPRE!vIE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
of the basis on which it is levied. There is no authority for the
proposition that the word 'rate' has acquired a technical meanPatti Gordhania1
ing indicating a levy on the basis only of yearly value of
H1r:Qvindas
property. Such authority is not furnished by the fact that in
v.
Mrmicipcl CommUsio·· England in all rating statutes the yearly value has always been
adopted as the basis of valuation for calculating rate!. The
n!r, Ahm1tf•b11d
English text books on rating only stated that in England in fact
the rating statutes ahvays based on rates on yearly value. In
our country, legislatures have used both the words 'tax' and
'rates' to indicate the impost by a local authority and in some
cases have permitted a local authority to levy a "property tax"
at a percentajle of its capital value.
!96J
The word 'rate' in s. 73 of the Bombay Municipal
Boroughs Act, 1925 which authorises a Municipality to illlpose
a rate on lands cannot be understood in any technical sense.
This view is supported by the explanation in cl. (a) of s. 75 of
the Act which provides that rules may be made specifying that
the rate authorised bys. 73 may be levied on the basi• of the
capital value of land. There is nothing to indicate that in the
explanation the word• "capital value" had been med only for
the purpose of finding out the annual value froin it and not to
form by itself the basis of the valuation OJ.l vvhich tJ1c rate is
to lte imposed.
Rule 350-A framed under '· 75 of the Act read with r. 253
specifying that the rate on the land shall be levied at one per
cent of the capital value of laud is not ultra vi res the Act.
The Act imposes a t.x on lands and is within item 42 or
Li>t II of the Government of India Act, 1935. The fact that
it authorised that tax being quantified on the bash of the
capital value of the land subjected to it does not take it out of
that item and place it under itern 55 of List I dealing with
"tax~s on capital value of the assctsn
lccislature can le\'y.
\vhich onJy the Central
The identification ,,f the subject-matter of
the tax is to be found in the charging section onfy aad the
charging section in the present c.1.sc is s. 73 anrl the suhjcctmatter \vhich it taxes is land and not the capital value of it.
The subject.matter of taxation is sornething different from the
measure provided for quantification of the tax and one has no
effect on the other. :\Toth\vith!ltanding the meaCJure of the tax
being based on the c?.pital value, the t;\x in the present case i3
nonetheless a tax on land.
Slate of Jfarlras \". Gamw11 IJ1tnk"ley & Co., [1959)
S. C.R. 379, l'roi•incial 1'reasu1·er of Alberta v. Kerr, [1933]
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
A. C. 710, R. 0. Jall v. Union of India, [1962] Supp. 3
S. C. R. 436 and Ralla Ram v. Province of East Punjab,
[1948] F. C.R. 207, referred to.
·
CIVIL APPELLA'l'E juRISDIC'.l'ION : Civil Appeal
No. 253 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
April 6, 1953 of the Bombay High Court in First
Appeal No. 223 of 1950.
P. B. Patwari, S. M. Tailor, Atiqur Rehman
and K. L. Hathi, for appellants Nos. 2, 4, 6, 8-10,
12-14 and 22.
P·urshottam Tricumdas, R. M. Shah, J. B.
Dadachanji, 0. O. Mathur and Ravinder Narain,
for respondent No. 1.
R. Ganq,pathy Iyer
respondent No. 2.
and R. H. Dhebar, for
1963. March 28. The .Judgments of the Court
were delivered by
WANCHOO J.-This appeal on a certificate
granted by the Bombay High Court arises out of a
suit brought by the appellants to challenge the imposition of a rate by the respondent Municipal
Corporation of Ahmedabad on vacant lands situate
within the municipal limits, The rate was levied
under s, 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,
No. XVIII of 1925, (hereinafter referred to as the
Act) read with the explanation to s. 75 of the Act.
The Municipality framed r. 350-A for rating open
lands which provides that the rate on the area of
open lands shall be levied at l per cen1um on the
valuation based upon capital. "Valuation based
upon capital" was defined in r. 243 as the capital
value oflands and buildings as may be determined
from time to time by the valuers of thP. municipality,
who shall take into consideration such reliable data
1963
Patel·Gordhanr'1s
HargrJr;indar
v.
Municipal Con1mis.uo~
ner, Ahmedahad
612 SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1964j VOL.
1163
P•ll/ Gor~ts
Ha~
••
Municip.J CommissiD·
""· J/Jnu'41tlJ/
w..m.. '·
as the owners or the occupiers thereof may fumish
either of their own accord or on being called upon
to do so. The contention of the appellants was that
reading the two rules together, the rate was levied at
a percentage of the capital value of open lands and
this the municipality could not do. Two submissions
were made in support of this contention. In the
first place it was urged that r. 350-A read with r. 243
was ultra vires ss. 73 and 75 inasmuch as it permitted
the fixation of rate at a percentage of capital value
and this was not permitted by the Act, for the word
"rate" used in s. 73 (I) (i) had acquired a special
meaning by the time the Act came to be passed and
meant a tax on the annual value of lands and
buildings and not on their capital value. In the
second place, it was urged that if the Act permitted
the levy of a rate on a percentage of capital value of
the lands and buildings rated thereunder, it was ultra
vires the Provincial Legislature because of item 5;),
List I, of the Seventh Schedule to the Govemment of
India Act, 1935. The appellants finally contended
that the asscssmen t based on r. 350- A read with
and the assessment
r. 243 was ultra vires
list prepared pursuant to the said rule was
illegal and void. They therefore prayed that
r. 350-A read with r. 243 for assessment of vacant
lands as well as the assessment charged on vacant
lands under the said rule since April I, 194 7, and the
assessment lists for the year 194 7-48 which were prepared for that purpose be declared illegal and ultra
vires and further prayed that an order of permanent
injunction might be made against the respondent
'Municipality restraining it from collectin~ or causing
to be collected from the appellants any sum of money
as assessment for vacant lands for the year 1947-48
or for any year thereafter, based on capital valuation
on the strength of the said rule.
The suit was resisted by the municipality. Its
defence in substance was that the rule was intra vires
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
1909
and the assessment lists had been properly prepared
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Paid Gardlw.nia1
Hort•rintl'4
were not open to any objection. The trial court held
that r. 350-A read with r, 243 was illegal and void Mu11icipal••CommiJsio~
ntr, Alrm1~1ia.d
and beyond the authority given to the municipality
under s, 73 of the Act, inasmuch as it would amount
r¥11nc111w }.
to taxing the open lands as assets of individuals,
within the meaning of item 55 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act.
The trial Court therefore decreed the suit and granted
the relief as claimed by the appellants.
Then followed an appeal to the High Court
which was allowed. The High Court held that the
manner in which open lands were rated did not bring
the rate within item 55 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule to the Government of India Act, as the
method employed was only a mode of levying the
rate. The High Court therefore held that r. 350-A
read with r. 243 was not ultra vires. As to the other
contention that the rule was ultra vires ss. 73 and 75
of the Act, the High Court held that even if it be
assumed that by adopting the basis of capital value
the municipality must determine the annual value of
the property and levy rate on such value, it made no
difference to the result, as the municipality might
levy much higher rate of tax on the annual value of
the property determined on the basis of its capita!
value. The High Court pointed out that the
municipality, by adopting this method, had done in
one step what could be done in two steps, and that
would have merely involved first determining the
capital value and then the annual value, and
then fixing the rate on the annual value at a much
higher percentage. It was of the view that it was
all a matter of fixing a reasonable rate on open
land, and if the rate was otherwise reasonable it
would be difficult to hold that the rule levying the
rate was ultra vires ss. 73 and 75. Thereupon the
appellants applied for a certificate of ~tness to enabl~
614
1963
Patti G1Jrdha11das
l/argor:i11dos
v.
,\frmitipd/ Co11tmiHio·
r.tr, .1lmtdabad
lt-'oncf1c11
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
them to appeal to this Court, which was granted; and
that is how the matter has come up before us.
The same two points which were raised in the
High court have been urged before us. We shall
first consider the point, whether r.:~50-A read with
r.2-J:I is ullm vires ss.7:l am! 7:) of the Act. The
relevant part of s.
is as roJJows: -
n
"(I) Subject to any general or special orders
which the State Government may make
in this behalf and to the provisions of
sections 75 and 7(), a municipality may
impose for the purposes of this Act any of
the following taxes, namely:-
(i)
a rate on buildings or lands or both
situate within the municipal borou~h;
,,
Section i;) provides the procedure preliminary to
imposing any tax provided under s. i:3. The relevant
part thereof is as follows:-
"A :\[unicipality before imposing a tax shall
observe the following preliminary procedure: -(a) it shall, by resolution passed at a general
mealing, select for the purpose one or
other of tlie taxes specified iu section 73
and approve rules prepared for the
purposes of clause (j) of section ii8 prescribing the tax selected, and in such resolution
and in such rules specify.--·
(i)
(ii)
(iii) in the case of a rate on buildings or
lands or both ; the basis, for eac)l class
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
of the valuation on which such rate is
to be imposed ;
1963
Patel Gordhandar
Hargovind4S
v.
Municipal Commis.rfo.
ner, Ahmedabad
Explanation--In the case of lands the
basis of valuation may be either capital
or annual letting value."
It will be seen that though s. 73 opens with the words
"the municipality may impose for the purposes of
this Act any of the following taxes", the particular
tax specified on lands or buildings is designated as a
rate on buildings or lands or both. The use of the
word "rate" in cl.(i) of s.73 (1) must be given its
due significance and the kind of tax which s. 73 (1)
(i) empowers the municipality to impose on lands
and buildings is a rate on lands and buildings. The
contention on behalf of the appellants is that the
words "rate on buildings or l"nds" had come to
acquire by the time the Act was passed a special
meaning and the tax which s. 73 (1) permitted the
municipality to impose on lands and buildings was
that kind of tax which had come by then to be
known as "rate on buildings and lands''. It is urged
that by the time the Act was passed, the words "rate
on lands or buildings" signified a tax not on their
capital value but on their annual value and therefore
whens. 73 (1) permitted the municipality to impose
a rate on buildings or lands or both it only gave it
jurisdiction to impose a tax by way of certain
percentage on the annual value of lands or buildings
and not by way of a percentage on their capital
value. Reliance in this connection is placed on the
decision of this court in The State of 1viadras v.
Gannon Dunkerly and Co. (' ), where this Court held
that "the expression 'sale of goods' was, at the time
when the Government of India Act, 1935, was
enacted, a term of well-recognised legal import in
the general law relating to sale of goods and in the
(1) (1959] S. C. R. 379.•
Wanch"o J.
616
1963
P11ltl GordJJ1ridns
/{nrgcri1u/11.I
,..
.\.1111icip.1i C6nrniisin,,,r, ..thmNi!J 111tl
fVar.rh'>O J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
legislative practice relating to that topic and must be
interpreted in Entry ·18 in List II in Sch. VII of the
Act as having the same meaning as in the Sale of
Goods Act, UJ30". It is urged that the legislative
practice prevalent in England as well as in India
up to I !):?5 showed that wherever the term "rate" was
used in wnncction with local taxation it meant a tax
on the annual value of lands and b11ildings and not
on their capital value. It is therefore necessary to
look at the legislative history and practice to find out
what the word "rate" meant when the Act was
passed in l\J25.
The word "rate" has come to our country for
the purpose of local taxation from England. It will
therefore be useful to fincl out what exactly the word
· rate" when used in connection with local taxation
meant in England. The English Rating Law is
largely derived from the Poor Relief Act, Will
(4:l Eliz. Cap. 2) which provided for raising "weekly
or otherwise, by taxation of every inhabitant, parson,
vicar and other and of every occupier of lands,
houses, tithes impropriate or propriations of tithes,
coa I mines or saleable underwoods, in the said parish
in such competent sum and sums of money as they
shal I think fit, a convenient stock of flax, hemp, wool
thread, iron and other necessary ware and stuff to
set the poor on work". The chief provision of this
Act was to levy a tax on the occupier of lands and
houses and this tax in course of ti me c:ame to he
known as a rate. In ·•Rating Valuation Practice"
by Benn and Lockwood, the authors observe as
follows at p. I :"The purpose of rating Valuations is to arrive
at a figure termed rateable value on which rates
arc levied upon the ratepayer at so much in
the pound in order to defray the expenses of
local government. The present rating law is
largely derived from the Poor Relief Act, 1601,
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
which provided for the levying of taxation
on 'every occupier of land, house ......... towards
the relief of the poor'. Under this enactment
occupiers were to contribute to a poor rate
according to their means but no specific method
of assessment was laid down. The annual
value of a person's property within the parish
gradually became recognised as the most
satisfactory basis and this was first given
statutory approval in 1836".
This passage shows that gradually by judicial
decisions what was levied on the occupier's lands
and buildings under the Poor Relief Act came to be
known as a rate on the annual value of the property
in beneficial occupation within the parish and this
practice was given statutory approval in 1836. The
word "rate" thus gradually came to be applied to
such local taxation till we find that the Poor Rate
Act, 180 L was passed providing for certain appeals
and other remedies to persons on whom rates were
levied. Then came the Poor Rate A~sessment and
Collection Act, 1869, which by its first section
provided that the occupier of any rateable heredita·
ment shall be entitled to deduct the amount paid by
him in respect of any poor rate assessed upon such
hereditament from the rent due or accruing due to
the owner, and every such payment shall be valid
discharge of the rent to the extent of the rate so paid,
thus affording relief to the occupier. This history
will show that the rate was assessed generally on the
occupier of lands and buildings on account of his
beneficial occupation of such lands and buildings.
The very fact that the rate was a~sessed on the
occupier of lands and buildings leads clearly to the
inference that the rate was to be levied on the annual
value of the land or building to the occupier and
had nothing to do with the capital value of the
land and building to the owner. In other words,
the rate was to be leyieg on the ~nnual value of tlw
1963
Patel Cordhandas
Hargovindas
••
Municipal Commissie·
ner, Ahmedabad
Wanchoo J,
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l9M) VOL.
1963
PdttJ Go1dl,muf1JJ
lfargovi.1 "'as
v.
.\lu11 icipal Comm iss/o·
ner, A.lanudahad
ll'and100 J,
land or building depending upon its letting value
and not on the capital value.
In 1869, another Act was passed known as the
Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 186!!, which applied to
the city of London. That Act defined a "ratepayer" as meaning "every person who is liable to
any rate or tax in respect of property entered in any
valuation list". It also defined "gross value" as
meaning "the annual rent which a tenant might
reasonably be expected, taking one year with
another. to pay for an hrreditament". Lastly, it
definecl the words "rntcablc value" as meaning "the
gross value after deducting therefrom the probable
annual average cost of repairs, insurance, and other
expenses as aforr,said". Clearly therefore the rate
under this Act was a tax lcviable on the rateable
value, which meant the gross value subject to certain
deductions and the gross value was the annual rent
which a tenant might reasonably be expected to pay.
Finally, in llJ2;), came the Rating and Valua·
tion Act, 1!12/i, which was meant to simplify and
amend the law with respect to the making and
collection of rates by consolidation of rates and
otherwise and to promote uniformity in the valuation
of property for the purpose of rates. This Act was
passed about 1he same time as the Act with which
we arc concerned; and it provided for the levy of a
general rate and tht rateable value of a hereditament was to be the net annual value thereof. In
s. 08. the "rate" was defined as a rate the proceeds
of which were applicable to local purposes of a
public nature and which was leviable on the basis
of an assessment in respect of the yrarly value of the
property. "Ratepayer" was defined to mean every person who was liable to any rate in respect of property
entered in any valuation list. "Gross value"' was defined to mean the rent at which a hercditament might
reasonably be expected to let from year to year, and
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
"hereditament" meant any lands, tenements, hereditaments or property which were or might become
liable to any rate in respect of which the valuation
list was made under the Act. .Section 22 rprovided
how the rateable value which was the net annual
value was to be arrived at from the gross value.
This history of the use of the word "rate" for
purposes of local taxation in English Law clearly
shows that the word "rate" was used with respect
to a tax which was levied on the net annual value or
rateable value of lands and buildings and not on
their capital value. It would therefore not be wrong
to say that in the legislative history and practice in
England upto 1925, "rate" for the purpose of local
taxation meant a tax on the annual value of lands
and buildings liable to such taxation.
In Wharton's Law Lexicon, the word "rate"
is defined as a "contribution levied by some public
body for a public-purpose, as a poor rate, a highway
rate, a sewers rate, upon, as a general rule, the
occupiers of property within a parish or other area".
This again emphasises the fact that rate was levied
not on owners of property but on occupiers, from
which it follows that it could only be levied for
beneficial occupation, which, in its turn would
bring in the annual rental value so far as the occupier
was concerned. The Rating and Valuation Act of
1925 to which we have already referred only gave
final recognition to this meaning of the word "rate"
and consolidated various rates prevailing for various
purposes by providing for a general rate for all
purposes. This general rate was raised on so much
of the pound of the rateable value of each hereditament according to the valuation list.
The methods in use for the purpose of arriving
at rateable value were generally th~ee. Where the
)and or building was actually let, the valuation was
1963
Patil Gordhantfas
Hargovindas
v,
Municipal CommissioM
ner, Ahmedabad
Wanchoo J.
620
I rt CJ
alt/ Gqrdhaf.dtu
lftJrgo11in"tH
v.
Municipal Commiuio·
nrr, Ahmet/abad
IVonrho:i J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196-1] VOL.
based on the rent at which it was let. Where, however, the land or building was not let, two methods
were evol\'cd for the purpose of finding out the
rateable value. The first was lo assume a hypothetical tenancy (slleh as where the same person is the
owner and occupier) and find out the rent at which
the premises would be let. The second was based
on the capital val uc of the premises. But the tax
was not levied on the capital value itself; the
capital value was determined on the structural
value of the building to be assessed by what was
known to be c0ntractor's mnhod or coutractor's
test in addition to the market value of the land.
Sometimes the words "effective capital value:'
were also used since in some cases the actual capital
cost of the building plus the market value: of land
might for some reason or the other be ineffective 1'..e.,
it might not be rent producing. Having arrived at
the effective capital value it was necessary •.o apply
percentages tlicrcto in order lo arrive at the annual
value. In England, the usual percentage in the case
where the property was used for commercial purposes, was ii per centum for the building and ·1 per
centum for the land. It was after this annual value
was arrived at that the rate was imposed on this
annual value: (see Complete Valuation Practice by
Mustok Eve and Anstey, 5th Edn. pp. :?;'i3-2ii8).
Faraday "On Rating" also mentions that "it
is the nccupier who is rateable in respect of his
occupation of rateable property" (p. 1). After referring to the Poor Relief Act, HiOI, Faraday says
that later legislation had left the occupier as the
main bearer of the burden of rate, and the basis
of the rate i! the beneficia I occupation, meaning
thereby the ocrnpation of a hereditament for
which somebodv would be prepared to pay somebody net rent. · Faraday also mentions the same
three ways of valuing this beneficial occupation
for the purpose of arri\·in.~ at the rateable value or
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
62i
1963
annual value of lands and buildings, in order to
levy the rate : (see Chap. II of Faraday "On Patil GordhantioJ
Har:ovinrlos
Rating".)
v.
Cammissia~
The same scheme is to be found in Ryde "On Municipal
ner, Ahmedabad
Rating". At p. 7 it is mentioned that the rateable
Wanclioo J.
person under the Poor Relief Act 1601 is the occupier and not the owner of the land, though the
liability is put in some cases by later Acts on the
owner. Ryde further points out that the Poor Relief
Act of 1601 did not attempt accurately to define
how the value of land was to be measured, and it
was for the first time in 1836 that the first statutory
definition of "net annual value" was given in the
Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, thus giving statutory recognition to the pratice which was being
followed till then and this definition was "the rent
at which the hereditament might reasonably be
expected to let from year to year, free of all usual
tenant's rates and taxes, and tithe, commutation rent
charge, if any, and deducting therefrom the probable
average annual cost of the repairs, insurance and
other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain it in a
state to command such rent" : (see pp. 242-243).
The methods for arriving at the net annual value
are given as the same three, namely, (i) the actual
rent if the premises were let, (ii) hypothetical
tenancy, and (iii) capital cost from which the annual
value was determined at a certain percentage : (see
Chapters XII and XIV).
That it is the annual value and not the capital
value which has always been the basis of the rate
upto 1925 is well brought out in the following
passage at p. 329 of Ryde "On Rating" : ,,Where property is of a kind that is rarely let
from year to year, recourse, is sometimes had to
interest on capital value or on the actual cost,
of land and buildings, as a guide to the ascertainment of annual value. There was some
622
lf63
Poltl (:r.rdlionda.1
I Jar got-inda.1
v.
}vfu11in/1a' Commi;.ifo·
ntr, Ahmuiabad
IVanchoo J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
apparent, if not real, conflict of decisions upon
the question whether intcrl'st on capital value,
or on co>t, might bt'. rnnsidcrtd at all; but the
dilhculty disappear' if the rule be th<Js stated :
the mca5ure of net annual value is defintd by
statute as the rent which might reasonably be
expected; interest on cost, or on capital value,
can11ot be substituted for the statutorv measure,
but in the absence of the best evidc1;ce, that is,
actual rents, it can be looked at as prima facie
evidence in order to answer the question of fact
what rent a tenant may reasonably be expected
to pay"1
It will thus be clear from the various statutes to
which we have referred and the various books on
rating in England that the rate always had the
meaning of a tax on the annual value or rateable
value of lands or buildings and this annual vnlue
or rateable value is arrived al by one of three modes,
namely, (i) actual rent fetched by land or building
where it is actually let. (iij where it is not let, rent
based on hypothetical tenancy, particularly in the
case of buildings, and (iii) where either of these two
modes is not available, by valuation based on capital
value from which annual value has to be found by
applying a suitable:: percentage which may not be the
same for lands and buildi11gs, and it was this position
which was finally brought out in bold relief by the
Rating and Valuation Act, l92G. It is clear further
that it is not the Rating and Valuation Act of 1!125
which for the first time applied the concept of net
annual value and rateable value as the basis for
levying a rate for purposes of local taxation; that
basis was alwavs there for centuries before the
Act of 1925 was 'passed.
The present position 1s summed up in
Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition (Vol. :!2),
2 S.C.R. SUPREME cOtJRt REPORTS
623
paras 9 and 10. Paragraph 9 deals with the liability to the rate in general and is in these terms :-
1963
Patel Gordh1mJas
Har1ooinda1
"The general rate is leviablc by taxation of Municipalv.Commis.i:io
every parson and vicar, and of every occupier of ner, Ahmedahad
lands, houses, tithes, impropriate, propriations
Wanchoo J.
of tithes, coal mines, mines of every other kind,
woodlands, sporting rights, and advertising
rights. In certain cases the owner of property
is rated in place of the occupier; and in a few
instances, owners as such are rateable .........
,, ..
o o o o 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 0 . 0 o o o 0 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 'o 0 o o o o 0 0 o o 0 o o o 0 o o o o o 0 0 0 I 0 0
Paragraph 10 deals with the meaning and nature of
rate in these terms :"The expression 'rate' means a rate the
proceeds of which are applicable to local purposes of a public nature and which is leviable
on the basis of an assessment in respect of the
yearly value of the property".
This meaning of the word "rate" in England is, as
we have shown above, not merely based on the
Rating and Valuation Act, 1925; itis borne out to
be so by English legislative history and practice even
before the Ra ting and Valuation Act of 1925, was
passed. Therefore, it cannot be doubted that in
England from where in this country we have
borrowed the word "rate", that word had acquired
a special meaning namely that it was a tax on the
annual value of lands and buildings found in one of
the three modes we have already indicated.
It is also pertinent to note that Land Tax as
such was a different tax altogether in England and
was levied for the first time by the Land Tax Act of
1797. Land tax is a charge on land, and not on the
income likely to arise from occupation of land and
the intention was that it should be borne by the
owner of the land. The existence of this tax as
624
1963
Paltl Gordho,oJ
Har101 in des
,.,
MUJ1icipai Commi.Hio-
ner, Ahm~tl•btJd
IVanrhoo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] Vot.
distinct from the rate on lands and buildings brings
out what the word "rate" has always meant in local
taxation in England as indicated above : (sec p. :!32
of Benn and Lockwood on Rating Valuation
Practice, Fifth Edition).
,.
Let us now look at the legislative history and
practice in India upto 1925. The Bombay City
Municipal Act (No. Ill of 1888), bys. I:lU provided
for property tax. Section 154 (1) thereof provided
for valuation of property assessable to property taxes
in these terms : -
"In order to fix the rateable value of any
building or land assessable to a property tax,
there shall be deducted from the amount of the
annual rent for which such land or building
might reasonably be expected to let from year
to year, a sum equal to ten per centum of the
said annual rent, and the said deduction shall
be in lieu of all allowances for repairs or on
any other account whatever".
It may however be noted that this Act did not use
the word "rate", though it has used the words
"rateable value" in s. liiJ.
The Bengal District Municipalities Act(No. III
of 1884) provides bys. 8ii for a rate on the annual
value of holdings situate within the municipalities,
and the word "holding" is defined in this Act as
"land held under one title or agreement''. By its
very definition the rate is on the annual value in this
Act.
The Madras District Municipalities Act
(No. IV of 1884) provides for a rnx on lands and
buildings, and further provides that the tax shall be
on the annual value of the buildings or lands or both.
This Act does not use the word "rate" but what in
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
actual fact it provides for is a rate based on the
annual value of lands and buildings.
1963
Patti Gordhar:tlas
Hargovinr'as
v.
The Calcutta Municipal Act, (No.III of 1899)
specifically uses the word "rate" and provides for
imposition of rates on all buildings and lands by
s. 147. Section 151 provides for valuation of build·
ings and lands for the purposes of rate, and it is the
annual value of lands and buildings which is the
basis of the rate, and that annual value is deemed to
be the gross annual rent at which the land might
reasonably be expected to let from year to year
(subject to certain deductions).
In North-Western Provinces and Oudh Municipalities Act (No. 1 of 1900), s. 59 provides for a tax
on houses, buildings and lands situate within the
municipality, and the tax is based on their annual
value. Here the word "rate" is not used but the tax
is nothing other than a rate, for it is on the annual
Value of lands and buildings.
-I
-
Section 59 of the Bombay District Municipalities Act (No. Ill of 1901 }, provides for the imposition
of a rate on buildings or lands or both situate within
the municipal district. The words in this Act are
exactly the same as in the Act under our consideration. Section 63 provides for the preparation of assessment lists and cl. (d) thereof lays down the annual
letting value or other valuation on which the property i~ assessed.
In the Central Provinces Municipalities Act
(No. XVI of 1903), s. 35 provides for a tax on
houses, buildings and lands, and the tax is not to
exceed 7 per centum of the gross annual letting value
of the house, building or land. Here again the
word "rate" is not used. although the tax is no more
than a rate.
Municipal Commissio•
ner, Ahmedabad
Wanchoo J.
626
1963
P.ul GonJlumr/as
HareaviRd«s
v.
MuJli,ifMJ Comrni1rif·
rur, Ahm1Uhad
WdU/loo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
The J\.fadras Municipal Act (No. III of I 904)
by s. 129 provides for the levy of tax on buildings
and lands. It has not used the word "rate" but the
levy is on the annual value of buildings and lands
and the annual value bv s mo is deemed to be the
gross annual rent at whi~h the lands might r~ason
ably be expected to let from year to year or from
month to month {subject to certain deductiom). It is
remarkable how the words used in the various Indian
Acts are almost the. same as in English statutes and
how they follow the English definitions of gross value
or annual value almost word for word. Though,
therefore, the word "rate" wa1 not usd in this Act,
the levy was on the annual value of the land.
Lastly, the Punjab Municipalitie.q Act, (~o. III
of 1911) provides for a tax on buildings and lands
and it further provides various modes for assessment
one of which is based on the annual letting value.
Two other ways are provided in this Act, namely,
so much per square yard of the ground area and "SO
much per foot of frontage on streets and bazars.
But that also does not change the nature of the tax
>Nhich is not based on capital value.
It will thus be seen that all Indian statutes
till 191 l dealing with municipal taxation impose a
tax on the annual value of lands or buildings without
always using the word "rate." In some of the statures
the word "rate" is used but the tax is again on the
annual value. The le.gislation on this subject has
been summed up by Aiyangar in "Municipal Corporations in British India," (Vol. III, 1914 Edn.J at
p. I 53 in these words :·-"All municipal corporations in Brirish India
are empowered to levy taxes on all buildings
and lands within their local limits subject to
certain specific exemptions. The owners are
made primariiy liable in some municipalities,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
while in others both the owners and occupiers
are made liable. Taxes which they can levy
form a fixed percentage on the rateable or annual values of all the said buildings and lands.
The percentage varies in the different municipalities and the mode of ascertaining the rateable or annual value also varies."
Turning now to the Acts passed in India between
1912 and 1925, we find the same state of affairs.
The U. P. Municipalities Act, (No. II of 1916)
provides for a tax on the annual value of buildings
or lands or of both bys. 128 {I) (i).
The Madras City Municipal Act, (No. IV
of 1919) imposes a property tax bys. 98. This tax
is to be levied, under s. 99 on all lands and buildings
within the city at such percentages of the annual
value of buildings and lands as may be fixed by the
council, subject to a maximum and minimum, the
maximum being 20%.
The Madras District Municipalities Act,
(No. V of 1920) imposes a property tax bys. 81 (l);
it is to be levied, by its sub-s. (2), at such percentages of the annual value of buildings or lands as
may be fixed by the municipal council.
The C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, (No. II
of l!J22) provides for a tax payable by the owners of
lands and buildings situate within the limits of the
municipality, with reference to the gross annual
letting value of the buildings or lands.
The Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, (No.
VII of l 922) provides by s. 82 ( 1) (a) for a tax upon
persons in sole or joint occupation of holdings within
the municipality. Further by cl. (b), (c), {d) and
(e) of this section, provision is made for a tax on all
holdings, a water tax, a lighting tax, and a latrine
1963
Patel Gordhandtu
Hargooindas
v.
Municipal C1Jmmissia·
ner, Ahmedabad
Wanchoo J.
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
/91~
l'al1l GordlwulaJ
HargovinddJ
••
Municipal OJmm issi..
""'' Ahm1dc•ad
tax on the annual value of holdings. The other
sections prescribe the ma~imum beyond which the
taxes will not be levied. As the tax under s. 82 (I)
(a) is on occupation it necessarily follows that it
could only be levied on the annual value.
Wo•uhff J
It will thus be seen that these Acts which were
passed between 1912 and l!l25, which repeal the
earlier Acts also provide for taxation on lands and
buildings. and though the word "rate" is not used in
any of these Acts, the tax is still on the annual value
of lands and buildings. This shows that there was a
uniform legislative history and practice in India also
though sometimes the impost was called a tax on
lands and buildings and at others a rate. But it was
always a tax
on
the
annual
\·aiue of
lands and
buildings.
In any case where·
ver it was called a rate it was always on the
annual value. It would therefore be not improper
to infer that whenev~r the word "rate" is used with
respect to local taxation it means a tax on the
annual value of lands and buildings.
It will be clear further that in India up to the
time the Act with which we are concerned was passed
the word "rate" had acquired the same meaning
which it undoubtedly had in English legislative
history and practice up to the year 1!)25, when the
Rating and Valuation Act came to be passed consolidating the various rates prevalent in England. It
would therefore be right to say that the word "rate"
had acquired a special meaning in English lq~islative
history and practice and also in Indian legislation
where that word was used and it meant a tax for local
purposes imposed by local authorities, and the basis
of the tax was the annual value of the lands or build
ings on or in connection with which it was imposed,
arrived at in one of the three ways which we have
already indicated. It seems to us th~refore that when in
192!) s. 73 (!)of the Act while specifying taxes which
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
1963
could be imposed by a municipal borough used the
word "rate" on buildings or lands situate within the !atfl Gordh,mJas
Hurgovindas
municipal borough, the word "rate" must have been
v.
used in that particular meaning which it had acquired Mu11icipal C1Jmmissio~
ner, Ahmtdabad
in the legislative history and practice both in
England and India before that date. The matter
Wanchoo J.
might have been different if the words in cl.(i) of
that section were "a tax on buildings or lands or
both situate within the municipal borough", for then
the word "tax" would have a wide meaning and
would not be confined to any special meaning. But
the use of the word "rate" in cl. (i) definitely means
that it was that particular kind of tax which in
legislative history and practict: was known as a "rate"
which the municipality could impose and not any
other kind of tax. It is true that in the opening
words of s. 73 (1) it is said that the municipality may
impose any of the following taxes, which are thereafter specified in els. (i) to (xiv). But when cl. (i)
specifies the nature of the tax as a rate on buildings
or lands or both we must find out what the word
"rate" used therein means, for it could not be an
accident that the word "rate" was used in that clause
when dealing with a tax on lands or buildings.
Further if we find that the word "rate" had acquired
a special meaning in legislative history and practice
in England and India before 1925 with reference to
local taxation, it must follow that when the word
"rate" was used in cl. (i) instead of the general word
"tax" it was that particular kind of tax which \·•as
known in legislative history and practice as a rate
which the municipalities were being empowered to
impose. It may be added herewith some advantage
that the word "tax" in the opening words of s. 73(1)
has been used in a general and :ill-pervasive sense as
defined in s. 3(20) of the Act and not in any restricted
sense; and therefore when the word "rate" is used in
cl.(i) it was clearly used not only in the specific and
limited sense, but also with the intention, to convey
the meaning that it had acquired by the time the
630
SUPRE!v1E COURT H.EPOkTS [l!l64) VOL.
196j
Act was passed. It is remarkable !hat in some other
clauses of s. ?a(l) also the grneral word "tax" has
p,it/ G'ordharulaJ
lla1got>indas
not been used, though of course all the imposts in
v.
ftf11nir ·joa/ Commi.ssio- els. (i) to (xiv) are called taxes in the opening word~
ner, :1hmtdabad
of s. 73( J) for obvious reason. In cl. (iii) the words
used are "a toll on vehicles" which obviously mran
11 t!f'zchoo J.
that only that kind of tax which was known as toll
which could be imposed on vehicles. In cl. (iv) the
word used is "octroi" on animals or ioods, implying
thereby that kind of tax which was known as octroi
could be imposed and not any kind of tax within
the meaning of the general word "tax". Similarly
in cl. (v) the words used arc "a terminal tax on
goods" meaning thereby that kind of tax which was
known as terminal tax cou Id be imposed. Therefore
when the first clause of s. i:3 (I) gives power to the
municipality to impose a rate on buildings or lands
it meant that kind of tax which had acquired a
special meaning and was known as rate in the
legislative history and practice of England as well
as of India upto then. That legislative history and
practice we have considered and it shows that the
word "rate" whenever used upto 1!l25 with reference
to local taxation meant a tax on the annual value of
lands and l..uildings and not a tax on the capital
value.
1
lt has however been urged that by virtue of
the explcmation to s. 75, it is open to the municipality
in the case of lands to use two bases of valuation,
namely, either capital or annual letting value. That
is undoubtedly so. But it docs not mean that
because the municipality is empowered to use capital
as one basis of valuation it has bc<>n empowered
when fixing a rate to fix it as so much percentage of
the capital value. That expl<tnation carries in our
opinion only the meaning which is in accordance
with the practice in England and also in this country
and it seems to us that it is that mraninR which
should be given when the basis of valuation is capital.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
631
1963
We have already pointed out that in England also
one basis of valuation for the purpose of a rate was Patel Gordhandas
Hargrn;indaf
to find out first the capital value or the effective
y,
capital value. Then a certain percentage of the Municipal CommUsio·
ner, Ahmedabad
effective capital value was taken as the annual value
and the tax was levied on the annual value so arrived
T+anchoo J
at. In such a case though the tax was levied on the
annual value the basis of valuation would still be
capital. Therefore the fact that the explanation
used the words "the basis of valuation may be
capital" it does not mean that the tax would be at
mch and such perecentage of the capital; it only
means that in order to arrive at the annual value for
purposes of levying a rate which is a tax on the
annual value, the municipality may use the capital
value and then a percentage thereon to arrive at the
annual value. This would be in accordance with
the third way of arriving at annual value to which
we have referred earlier. Therefore we are of opinion
taking into account the fact that the word "rate" has
been used in the first clause to s. 73(1 ), the explanation when it says that in the case of lands basis of
valuation may be capital, only means that that
method of valuation which was in vogue in England
and which we have described as the third method of
valuation may be used to arrive at the annual value
from the capital value and the rate may then be
determined as a tax on the annual value. In this
view of the matter r. 350-A read with r. 243 by which
the municipality has fixed the tax on the basis of
capital value directly is against .the provisions of
s. 73 (I) {i) and the explanation to s. 75. The whole
difficulty in this case has arisen because unfortunately
the word~ "nte" or "rateable value" have not been
defined anywhere in the Act, though they have been
defined in some other contemporaneous statutes in
force at the time the Act was passed and to which we
have already referred.
Our att&ntion was drawn in this connection
to an amendment made in the Madras District
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
Patel Gord1111ndts
//ar11vindas
••
A1"n1ripal CommLJsiontr, A.hmtdahad
Municipalities Act, (No. V of l!J20), by the inserrion
of sub·s. (a) in s. 81 of that Act. This was done in
1930 and provided that "in case of lands which are
not used exclusively for agricultural purposes and are
not occupied by, or adjacent and appurtenant to,
buildings" the property tax may be levied at such
percentages of the capital value of such lands or at
such rates with reference to the extent of such lands
as may be fixed. This amendment was a sort of
exception to s. 81 (2), which provided generally for
levying these taxes at such percentages of 1he annual
value of lands and buildings as may be fixed by the
municipal council. In the first place this am<nd·
ment made in rn:rn cannot affect the legiilative
history and practice, as it was up to I 925 when the
Act with which we are concerned was passed. Be·
sides this was an express provision providing in so
many words for levying property tax at a percentage
of the capital value in the case of certain exceptional
lands. The amendment was made in 1930 before
the Government of India Act, 1tl:~5, had come in·
to force with its separate legislative lists and there
could be no question then of the competence of the
provincial legislature to make such an amendment.
In any case this exceptional provision made after
i 925 in express words cannot detract from the
meaning of the word "rate" particularly when the
Act has not used the word "rate" anywhere. Fur·
ther the provision in the Act with which we are
concerned is not in express terms, All that the
explanation provides is that in case of open lands,
the basis of valuation may either be capital or
annual Jetting value. Valuation based on capital
was well -known in England with respect to the levy
of rates as it was the third method to which we
have referred. Therefore when the e.cplunation
uses these words it must in our opinion be held to re·
fer to that well known method of valuation prevailing
in England with resprct to levy of rates and cannot
be read to mean a percentage of the capital value
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
itself. At any rate there are no express words in the
explanation to that effect and therefore it should be
read to mean the third method of valuation in force
in .England to which we have already referred.
The amendment therefore made in 1930 in the
Madras Act does not in any way affect the legislative history and practice relating to the word "rate"
which, as we have pointed out, was not even used in
that Act. We may add that we express no opinion
as to the validity of this amendment after the
Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution
of India have come into force.
It is however urged that it really makes no
difference whether the rate is levied at a percentage
of the capital value or is a percentage of the annual
value arrived at on the basis of capital value by
fixing a certain percentage of the capital value
as the yield for the year. It is true that
mathematically it is possible to arrive at the same
figure for the rate by either of these methods.
Suppose that the capital value is Rs. 100/- and, as
in this case, the rate is fixed at 1 per centum of the
capital value, it would work out to Re. 1/-. The
same figure can be arrived at by the other method.
Assume that 4 per cent is the annual yield and thus
the annual value of the piece of land, the capital
value of which is Rs. 100/-, will be Rs. 4/-. A rate
levied at 25 per cent will give the same figure,
namely, Re. 1/-. Mathematically, therefore it may
be possible to arrive at the same amount of rate
payable by an occupant of land, whether the rate is
fixed at a particular percentage of the capital value
or a particular percentage of the annual value. But
this identity would not in our opinion make any
difference to the invalidity of the method of fixing
the rate on the capital value directly. If the law
enjoins that the rate should be fixed on the annual
value of lands and buildings, the municipality cannot fix it on the capital value, and then justify it
Fa 'el Gordlumtlas
llar:o1iridas
v.
Municipal Commissio·
ner, Ahmed11bad
Wanchco J.
G:J4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [IUG4] VOL
1963
P,r,[ Gordliatttfa1
Ha1tovi1~cJ
v.
Mu1,icipal I ommiJ1iontf', Altnudal:nd
IVa1111too J.
on the ground that the same result could be arrived
at by fixing a higher percentage as the rate in case
it was fixed in the right way on the annual value.
Further by fixing the rate as a percentage of the
capital value directly, the real incidence of the levy
is camouflaged. In the example which we have
given above, the incidence apprars as if it is only
I percent but in actual fact the incidence is 25
percent of the annual value. Further if it is open to
the municipality to fix the rate directly on the capital
value at l percent it will be equally open to it to fix
it, say at 10 percent, which would, taking again
the same example, mean that the rate would be :!50
percent of the annual value and this clearly
brings out the camouflage. Now a rate as IO ptT·
cent of the capital value, may not appear extortionate but a rate at 250 percent of the annual value
would be impossible to sustain and might even be
considered as confiscatory taxation. This shows the
vice in the camouflage that results from imposing
the rate at a percentage of the c.1pital val11c and
not at a percentage of the annual value as it ,110uld
be. Lastly, municipal corporal ions are elected
bodies and their members arc an•wcrable to their
electorates. In such a case it is necessary that the
incidence of the tax should be truly known. Taking
the example which we have given above, the
municipal councillors may not feel hesitant in impos·
ing a rate at I percent of the capital value, but if they
were to impose it at 25':., of the annual value they
may hesitate to do so, because they have to face the
electorates also. We arc therefore of opinion that
though mathematically it may be possible to 'lrrive at
the ~ame figure of the actual tax to be paid as a rate
whether based on capital value or based on annual
value, the levying of the rate as a percentage of
capital value would still be illegal for the reason
that the law provides that it should be levied on the
annual value and not otherwise. By levying it
otherwise directly at a percentage of the capital
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
1963
value, the real incidence of the rate is camouflaged,
and the electorate not knowing the true incidence PIJtel Gordhnndas
Ht.,govindas
of the tax may possibly be subjected to such a heavy
v.
incidence as in some cases may amount to confisca- Municipal Commis.tio~
ner, Ahmedabad
tory taxation. We are therefore of opinion that
fixing of the rate at a percentage of the capital value
Wanchoo J,
is not permitted by the Act and therefore r. 350-A
read with r. 243 which permits this must be struck
down, even though mathematically it may be
possible to arrive at the same actual tax by varying
percentages in the case of capital value and in the
case of annual value. It follows therefore that as
the tax in the present case is levied directly as a
percentage of the capital value it is ultra vires the
Act and the assessment based in this manner must
be struck down as ultra vires the Act.
In the view that we have taken of the meaning
of the word "rate" with the result that r. 350-A read
with r.243 has to be struck down as ultra vires the Act,
it is not necessary to consider the ~econd question raised before us, namely, whether the explanation would
be ultra vires the Provincial Legislature because of
item 55, List I, of the Seventh Schedule to the
Government of India Act, 1935, if it authorises the
municipality to levy the rate at a percentage of the
capital value. We have already said that that is
not the meaning of the words used in the explanation
and the second point therefore does not fall to be
considered.
We therefore allow the appeal and set aside
the order of the High Court and declare that r. 350-A
read with r. 243 is ultra vires s. 73 of the Act read
with the explanation to s. 75. It is further declared
that the assessment list for the year 1947-48, published on January 25, 1948, by the municipality for
levying the said tax in so far as it is prepared under
r. 350A is illegal, ultra vires and void. The respondent municipality is therefore restrained from
G3G
/901
Patti ~ ordhanias
l/argot:indas
v.
Afunicipal Commits•·
tur, Ahrnt~'abai
IVt:lfch~
St: PRE.ME COURT REPORTS (l!JG4] VOL.
recovering from the plaintiffs, appellants the said tax
on the open lands assessed in the said assessment list
for that year and later years. The appeal is herebv
allowed with costs throughout in favour of the
plaintiffs-appe II ants.
J,
S'arkar J.
SARKAR J.--The appellants are holders of
vacant lands within the limits of the respondent
The Corporation framed a rule
Corporation.
providing that the rate payable on open lands would
be on the basis of their capital value. The question
at issue is whether this rule is void.
The Corporation was formed under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, to two of
the provisions of which only it is necessary to refer
for the purpose of this appeal. The first is s. 73
which provides that, "a municifality may impose for
the purposes of this Act any o the following taxes,
namely :-'(i) a rate on building• or lftnds or both
situate 1\"ithin the municipal borough.' The other
is s. 7:i which states: "A munici p:ility before imposing a tax shall observe. the following prc'iminary
procedure :-(a) it shall, by resolution ..... select. .....
one or other of the taxe~ specified in s. 7:1 and
approve rules ...... prc.~crih;ng the lax sekc1ed and in
such resolution and in such rules specify : -...... (iii)
in the case of a rate on buildings or lands or both,
the basis, for each class of the valuation ou which
such rate is to be imposed ; ................................ .
..................... .. ............... ... ...... ................. .
.
B.i:plmuition-ln the case of lands the basis of valua-
tion may be either capital or annual letting value."
It is under this section that the rule in question was
framed. That rule so far as material is in these terms :
Rule 350 A.-" ...... the rate on open land shall
be levied a~ under : -
(I) ............................. .
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
(II) Rate on ...... open land ... shall be
levied at 1 % of the valuation
based on capital.. ....... ".
1963
Pti.tel Gordhanda
Ha11ovin,as
v.
Rule 253 provides that "Valuation based upon
capital shall be the Capital value of buildings and
lands as may be determined from time to time by the
valuers of the Municipality."
There is no doubt that as a result of these
sections and rules, the appellants were being made
to pay 1 % of the capital value of their lands as asse·
ssed by Corporation's valuers. The appellant's had
some objection to the valuation on its merits but it is
conceded that these cannot be raised in the present
proceedings. Learned counsel for the appellants
has, therefore, confined himself entirely to challenging
the Corporation's power to impose the levy 011 the
basis of the capital value of the lands.
The challenge has been based on two grounds,
none of which, to my mind, is sustainable. It is first
said that the Corporation's . power to levy a tax on
lands is confined by s. 73 to that variety of tax which
is called a "rate" and a ''rate" is an impost which is
leviable on the basis of an asse~sment in respect of
the yearly value of property. Hence, it is contended,
the Corporation had no power to levy any tax based
on the capital value of the lands and its rule~ giving
authority to do so are, therefore, void.
The foundation on which this contention rests
is that the expression "rate" has a technical meaning
namely, a levy on the basis of yearly value of
property. Support for this contention is sought from
various well known En~lish text books on "Ka ting."
I doubt very much if these authorities meant to say
that a "rate" must be based on yearly value; I think
they stat~d, "rates" are in fact based on yearly values.
The two are not, in my view, the same. Furthermore,
A1u'licip~l CfJmmi.isi•·
ner,
~hm,dtl/,aJ
Sarkar J,
638
1963
P•ltl GrwdhtJ11das
Hargouit1das
v.
Mwticipal CDmmissiP~
ntr, Ahm1dahad
Sarkar ).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)VOL.
in England the law of rating has always been
statutory : see Hulsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed.)
vol. 32 p. 3. It would follows that all that these text
books could say was that in all the successive rating
statutes the basis of yearly values has always been
adopted. I am unable to agree that it folkw; from
this that the expression rate can be said to have
acquired a technical meaning as referring only to an
impost based on annual value.
Reference was made at the Bar to the State of
Gann0n Dunkerley and Co. Ltd.('). In
that case it was hdd that in deciding the scope of
an entry in a legislative list in the Government of
India Act, 1935 reference might legitimately be made
t(1 legislative practice and to the well·recognised
legal imports of terms used in that entry. It seems
to me that the problem here is different. We have to
decide what the plain English meaning of the worrl
'rate' is and not the scope of legislative power.
~fadras v.
Now, as to the plain meaning, Mie Shorter
Oxford Dictionary defines 'rate' as 'amount of assessment on property for local purposes.' So in
Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed.) vol. 32 p. 3
it has betn •aid that "Rates are principal means by
which money to defray local government expenses is
raised by direct levy on occupiers, or in certain case.•
owners, of property within the area of the authority
making the rate." Rate, therefore, is an expression
used to indicate an impost levied by a local authority
to raise fnt1ds for its expemes. Such an impost would
be rate irrespective of the basis on which it is levied.
Of course, the authority cannot levy a rate. or indeed
any impost, unlc>s a statute gives it the power to do
so and the manner in which it can levy that impost
must also be decided by statute. Rate is only the
name given to an impost and there is nothing inherent in its nature to indicate that the impost must be
assessed in a certain way, I find nothing in the
(I) (19IQ] S.C.R. 3;9,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
authorities to support the view that in England rate
must always be levied . on the basis of annual value
and an impost not so levied, would not be rate at all.
So far as our country is concerned, the foundation for the argument is much weaker. We have
a large number of statutes in which an impost by a
local authority though based on annual value has been
called "tax"; see for examples -The Bombay City
Municipal Act (Act No. III of 1888), The Madras
District Municipalities Act (Act No. IV of 1884). The
North·Western Provinces and Oudh Municipalities
Act, (Act No. 1of1900) and The Central Provinces
Municipalities Act (Act XVI of 1903). Our practice
has, therefore, departed from the English practice at
least to this extent that we do not always call imposts
levied for local government or municipal expenses,
"rates". Also according to our legislative practice.
even a "tax" may be based on annual value ; an
assessment on the basis of an annual value need not
necessarily be called a "rate". It cannot, therefore,
be said that in our country the world "rate" has
acquired any technical meaning as indicating only an
impost by a local authority assessed on the basis of
annual value of property. Our legislatures have
discribed the impost indifferently both as "tax" and
as "rate" as it suited them and have in each case
provided for the method of its as~essment. In fact
s. 81 (3) of the Madras District Municipalities Act,
1920 permits a municipality to levy "property tax"
on certain lands "at such percentages of the capital
val11e of such lands ......... as it may fix".
I also do not think that the argument had been
presented to the High Court in this form. We have,
therefore, not the ad vantage of the views of the High
Court as to whether the expression "rate" has" acquired a technical meaning. Neither do I think that
much material had been placed before us by counsel
for the appellants in this connection. All this makes
1963
Patti Gordhandas
Hargovindas
v.
Municipal Commissio
ner, Ahmtdabad
6!0 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL,
196!1
Patil Gordii ..das
Hariovrlac/41
v.
Mrmi~"ipal C•mrni~sio·
it necessary for us to be fully satisfied about the
suggested technical meaning of the term "rate" before we pronounce in its favour, and speaking for
myself, I confess I am very far from being so satisfied.
ner, Ahmtdabad
Sarf.ar J.
There is yet another difficulty in the appellant's
way. No doubts. 73 uses the word "rate", but it is
clear that the rate is a kind of tax for the section
says so. Section i5 gives the municipality the power
to frame rules specifying the basis of the valuation
on which a rate on lands is to be imposed. The explanation to this section puts it beyond doubt that
the municipality may in the case of lands specify at
its pleasure as the basis either the capital value or
the annual letting-value. The Act, therefore, contemplates a rate which can be based on capital value.
Qpite plainly, therefore, the word "rate" has not
been used in the Act in a technical sense, even if it
has one. It would follow that the rule under challen·
ge was properly framed under s. 75 read with the
explanation.
It is however said that the explanation to s. 75
must be ignored as it is in conflict with mai11 provision authorising the levy, namely, s. 73. The contention is that since s 7~ authorises only the imposition
of a rate, that is, an impost based on annual value,
the explanation to s. 75 which permits the impost to
be based on capital value is outside the scope of the
main provision and hence must be left out. I am
entirely unable to accept thi~ contention. The different parts of a statute arc not intended to be in conflict with each other and, therefore, if not impossible
they should be read as consistent parts of a whole. In
the present case I find no difficulty in so reading
them. Section 73 empowers the imposition of a tax
which 'it calls a rate. Section 75 authorises the tax
to be assessed either on capital or on annual value.
Obviously the intention is that the tax is not a rate
in the technical sense, if there is such a seme in which
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
it must be based on the annual value. The word
"rate" must be understood, whatever it might in its
technical sense mean, to have been used in the statute
to describe a tax the basis of which can be capital
value.
1~63
Patel Gor:lharufas
Hargovindas
v.
Municipal Com mi isioa
n,,, Ahmedabad
Sarkar J.
Then it was said that the explanation does not
show that the basis of the tax was not intended to
be annual value for one of the well known methods
of finding out the annual value is first to find out the
capital value and then from it the annual value by
finding out what yearly income the capital would
produce if invested at a rate of interest which would
be considered reasonable at the current market conditions, and it is only for the purpose of finding out
the annual value by this method that the explanation provides that the basis of the valuation for the
imposition of the rate might be the capital value.
This seems to me to be quite an impossible contention. It is based on the assumption that what is
imposed being a rate which must be based on annual
value, the explanation must be read so as to harmonise with it. If this were not so, there would of
course be no reason to contend that capital value had
been mentioned only as the first step for ascertaining
the annual value. But, there is nothing in the explanation to show that capital value has been mentioned only for the purpose of finding out the annual
value from it. We have to read many words into
it to produce that result. Such a thing is not permissible and there is no warrant for doing it either.
Again, this reading does much more than bring
about harmony ; it makes the explanation quite
superfluous, quite unnecessarily enacted. For, if the
impost was a rate in the sense the appellants stated,
it had necessarily to be based on annual value and
there was, therefore, no need to enact by the explanation how it was to ~e based or to expressly provide
that the annual value might be ascertained first by
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
finding out the capital value or by any of the other
recognised methods of doing so for all such methods
PtJtd Gordliarulas
would necessarily be available. Since, however, staHargoriindru
tutes
are not enacted unnecessarily;· the explanation
••
MMJJicipat Commi1siomust have been put there to serve a purpose. That
t11r, All11Udatlad
purpose can only have been to pro\'ide that the rate,
Sw.m J,
a tax, authorised bys. i3 coul<l be lawfully imposed
on either of the basis mentioned in the explanation.
The contention of the appellants, therefore, that
under s. 73 only an impost based on the annual value
of the lands could be levied and r. 350-A read with
r. 243 must be held to be beyond the powers given
by the Act, cannot be sustained.
I tum now to the other ground on which the
power to impose the tax on the basis of capital value
was challenged. It was said that if the rule permitting the imposition on the basis of capital value had
been authorised by the explanation to s. 75 or by
any other provision in the Act, these provisions would
be void and illegal as they could be beyond the legislative competence of the Bombay Legislature by
whom the Act was enacted. This argument was
founded on the Government of India Act, l!l35.
The Bombay Act was passed in l\):j5, that is,
before the Government of In<lia Acl, 1931> was
pa5sed. The rule under which power was taken to
impose the rate on the basis of capital value was
however framed in February 1941, that is, long after
the Government of India Act 19:!5. After the
Government of India Act had come into force, a
new sub-section numbered sub section (2) was insert{ d
in s. 73 of the Bombay Act which provided that
"Nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any tax which the Provincial Legislature has
no power to impose in the Province under the
Government of India Act 1935." It was, therefore,
contended that the power to impose the rate based
on the capital value of lands even if conferred by
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
s. 73 'or s. 75 of the Bombay Act would be void
unless it was a tax which the Bombay legislature
could lawfully impose under the Government of
India Act. This contention is perfectly legitimate.
I think I should point out now that as this case is
concerned with assessment for the years 1947-48 and
1948-49, it is unnecessary to consider the question of
legislative competence _pf the legislature of the State
ofBombay under the Constitution.
Tne question then is : Is the tax imposed in the
present case outside the powers of the Provincial
legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935?
The respective powers of the Provincial and Central
legislatures as defined by that Act are contained in
Lists II and I in the Seventh Schedule to it. Under
item 42 of List II, the Provincial Legislatures had
power to pass an Act imposing "taxes on lands and
buildings." The Corporation contends that the
Bombay Act comes fully within item 42 of List II.
The Appellants, on the contrary contend that it is
really a legislation under item 55 of List I under
which the Central legislature has the power to
legislate, to impose "taxes on the capital value of
the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies." They say that this is so
because the Bombay Act permits the tax to be
imposed on the basis of capital value of the lands.
If this contention is correct, 110 doubt the imposition
of the tax in this case would be illegal and void.
As I have earlier said, in my opinion, the
appellants' contention is unsound. In my view, the
Bombay Act imposes a tax on lands and is, therefore,
within item 42 of List II. The fact that it has
provided for that tax being quantified on the basis
of the capital value of the land taxed does not take it
out of item 42 of List II and place it under item 55
of List I. It is quite obvious that in providing the
two items, namely, item 55 of List I and item 42 of
1969
Ptltel Gordhan/tu
Hargovindot
v.
Municipal Commissio•
n1r, Ahmedabad
iarkar J.
6a
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
196J
List II, the makers of the Government of India Act
contemplated
two different varieties of taxes. The
Patd Gardliaitt!as
Provincial Legislature had been given the power to
Hargo~·inti11s
v.
tax units of lands and buildings irrespective of their
Municipal Commissfovalue and the Central Legislature the power to tax
"~'• Ahmlflabad
the value of assets. As was said in the Provincial
Treasurer of Alberta v. Kerr ('). "The indentification of the subject.matter of the tax is naturally to
be found in the charging section of the 'tatute, and
it will only be in the case of some ambiguity in the
terms of the charging section that recourse to other
sections is proper or necessary." Now the charging
section in this case is in a manner of speakings. 73.
That permits only a tax on lands and buildings.
We havr. not got in the records the resolution under
s. 75 selecting the tax. on land and buildings as a
tax which the municipality chose to impose. There
is no question, however, that such a resolution was
passed and it must have been in terms of s. 73. The
charging provision that we have in this case does not,
therefore, travel outside the power conferred by
item 42 in List II. Nor has it been suggested that it
is ambiguous.
The only question, therefore, is whether by
providing that the tax might be levied at I% of the
capital value of the land taxed, the entire scope of
the charging section is being altered and in reality
the tax levied becomes a tax on capital asset ? I feel
no doubt that the question must be answered in the
negative. The importance of the distinction between
the levy of a tax and the machinery of its collection
has often been pointed out by judicial pronouncements of the highest authority. One of the more
recent of these is R. C . .Tall v. Union fl,f India (').
I suppose the machinery of colkction would include
the measure of the tax; in any ca~r.. I think, they arc
on a par. The subject· matter of taxation is. obviou~ly something other than the measure provided
for the quantification of the tax.
(l) [1933) ,\.C. 7111, 720.
(2) A.l.R. (1%2) S.C. 1781.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
1963
In Ralla Ram v. Prorince of East Punjab ('),
Patel Gordhandas
the Federal Court upheld a Provincial statute which
Hargouindas ..
imposed a property tax assessed on the annual value
v.
. .
of the property and rejected the contention that such Municipal CommisS11t •
ner~ Ahmedabad
a tax was really a tax on income which only the
Centre could impose under item 64 of List I. I
Sarkar J,
think it may be legitimately said that if a tax
expressly levied on land and • made assessable on
its annual value, that is, its income, is not by reason
of such method of assessment a tax on income, a tax
on land cannot become a tax on capital value of
assets because it is made assessable on the basis of
the capital value of the land.
'·
There are however other reasons why the tax in
the present case cannot be said to be a tax on the
capital value of assets. This tax is leviable on land
on the basis of its capital value even though the
land may be subject to a charge and even though
that charge may exceed the capital value of the land.
In such a case for the purpose of assessment the
charge can be completely ignored and the tax levied
notwithstanding that to the owner the property is of
no value in view of the charge. If the tax was
in reality a tax on capital value of assets it
could
not in the circumstances that I have
imagined, be levied at all. That very clearly
marks out the essential difference between this Act
and an Act imposing a tax on capital value of assets.
Another distinction is that in the case of a tax on
capital value of assets the tax can be levied only on
individuals owning the assets. That I think follows
from the words of item 55 of List I. Under s. !<5
of the Bombay Act, however, the present tax can be
levied on a person in occupation of the land who
hol~s it on a building lease taken from another.
He IS not the owner of it but nonetheless is liable to
be taxed under the Act on the basis of the full capital
value of the land and not on the value of his leasehold only. If the tax was on the capital value of
(IJ [1948] F. C.R. 207.
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS Cl964] VOL.
196J
P ·ftl Gorcflt411das
Jlar1oriM01
v.
Afunfripal CommiJsW·
nu, A.hmeclabad
Sa.~or J.
assets, such a person could not have been so
taxed. Again, under the same section a proportionate part of the tax which is primarily payable
by the owner under the Act, may be recovered from
a tenant in possession of the land and this would of
course not be possible if the Bombay Act, was an
Act imposing a tax on the capital value of assets of
individuals for the assets, that is, land did not belong
to the tenant at all. I think, therefore, that the
contention of the appellants that the Act really
authorises the imposition of a tax on the capital
value of assets of individuals and is thus an Act
which the Central legislature could pass under the
Government of India Act and the Provincial
legislature could not, must be rejected.
I would for these reasons dismiss the appeal
with costs.
BY COURT : In accordance with the majority
opinion the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
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