LAXMIDAS DAHYABHAI KABARWALA versus NANABHAI CHUNILAL KABARWALA AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 March 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 567 | 1963 INSC 74
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 March 1963
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, A.K. SARKAR*, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 759/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 567
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 74
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
567
as to burden of proof governs the additional
assessment.
In our opinion, this appeal has no substance; it
fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
19~3
Srilekha Bandfjee
v.
Commission1r of
Income-Tax,
Bihar & Orissa
Hidayatullah J,
LAXMIDAS DAHYABHAI KABARWALA
1963
v.
Mar<h 27
NANABHAI CHUNILAL KABARWALA
AND ORS.
(S. K. DA.s, A. K. SARKAR and N. RAJAGoPALA
AYYANGAR JJ.)
Civil Procedure-Amendment of Pleading•-Buit for decree
on aettled accaunts-Oounter·claim made in written statementCourt-fee paid a. on plaint-Court if can treat counter-claim
a. plaint in cro8'-8uit-Amendment when to be refused or
alwwed-P/,ainl in cross-suit when shouUJ, be treated "" having
been filed-Liability of aurviving partner-Goodwill of a flrmExerciae of discretion by trial court, when can be interfered withConatitution of India Art. 136-Partnership Act. 1932 (9 of 1932)
s. 37-0od< of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act Ii of 1908) 0. 6, r. 17,
0. 8, r. 6
The appellant filed a suit for the enforcement of an
agreement to the efl'ect that a partnership between himself
and one Bai Itcha since deceased had been dissolved and
that the partners had arrived at a specific amount to be
paid by the appellant in full satisfaction of the share
of Bai Itcha in the partnership. The respondents who
were the heirs of Bai ltcha, not only denied the allegations
in the plaint but also made a counter-claim in the written
1tatement for the rendition of account against the appellent
and paid court fee on the counter-claim as on a plaint. At a
later stage, the respondents made a prayer to treat the counterclaim a• a plaint in a cross-suit. The trial court dismissed
tho 1uit oa the 11rc•uad that appellant had failed to prove the
568
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
agreement.
'fhc
counter-claim \vas
also dismissed on the
ground that it did not lie and the prayer of the respondents
c.-n;das Dahyabhai to treat the counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit was
Kaba1wala
also rejected, the respondents being asked to seek their relief
by filing a fresh suit. The respondents appealed against
Nanabhai ChunUol
the order of the trial court but their appeal was dismissed.
Kabanoo/o
However, the High Court accepted their appeal and set aside
the dismissal vf the counter-claim and remanded the case
to the trial court \Vith a direction that the countcr-clai1n be
treated as a plaint in the cross-;uit and the reply of the
plaintiff to tbe counter-claim be treated as a \Vrittcn statement
to the cross-suit and tl1e cross-suit be tried and disposed
of in accordance with law. The appellant came t" this Court
by special leave.
••
Held (per Das and Ayyangar JJ.) that the order of the
High Court was correct and there was no ground for
interference with the same under Art. 136 of the C'.<.mstitution.
1here was no miscarriage of Ju~tice.
It \vas pi:>intrd out
that if what i• rc;,lly a plaint in a cross-suit is made a part
of a written statement either by being made an annexure to
it or as part and parcel thereof, though described as a counterclaim, there could be no legal ohjection to the court treating
the same as a plaint and granting such relief to the defendant
as would have been open if the pleading had taken the form
of a plaint. However, the appellant was allowed to li'e
a fresh written statement. The respondcn'.S were also allowed
to file a fresh plaint in place of their counter-claim provided
there was no substantial variation in the allegation to be
made or the relief to be claimed by them.
Held also, that the curcial date for the purpose of
determining when the plaint in a cross-suit should be treated
as having been filed was not the date on which the conversion
was ordered but the date on which the written statement
containing the counter-claim was filed.
Held also, that save in exceptional cases, leave to
amend under Or. 6, R. I 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure will
ordinarily be refused when the effect of the amendment
would be to take away from a party a legal right which had
accrued to him by lapse of time. This rule can apply only
when fresh allegations arc added or fresh reliefs arc sought
by way of amendment. However, where an amcndrr.cnt iJ
sought which merely clarifies an existing pleading and docs
not in substance add to or alter it, it had never been held
that the qucatioo of a bar of limitation ii one of the queation
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter
already contained in the original pleading. The decisions
holding that amendments should not ordinarily be allowed
beyond the period of limitation did not apply to the present
case.
Section 37 of the Partnership Act lays down the
substantive law realating to the liability of a surviving partner
who without a settlement of account with the legal
representatives of a deceased partner, untilises the assets of
the partnership for continuing the business as his own. This
section cannut stand in the way of conversion prayed for by
the respondents.
The good-will of a firm being part of the assets has
to be sold just like other assets before the accounts between
the partners can be settled and partnership wound up.
Even if the trial court and the first appellate court
exercised a discretion in refusing the respondent's prayer to
treat the counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit, they did
so on grounds not legally tenable and the High Court
was justified in ignoring the exercise of their discretion.
Saya Bya v. Maung Kyaw Shun (1924) I. L. R. 2,
Rangoon 276, Gurrimbbhoy and Go. Ltd. v. Greet (1932) L.R.
60 I. A. 297, (Main) Pir Bux v. Mohomed Tahar A.LR. 1934
P. C. 235. Gour Chandra Goswami v. Chairman of the
Nabadwip Municipality A. I. R. 1922 Cal. I and Baj Bhuri v.
Rai Ambalal Ohotalal First Appeal No. 737 of 1951 (Bombay
High Court), referred to.
Per Sarkar J. A defendant has no right apart from a
statutory provision to set up a counter-claim strictly so called
that is, one to enforce a right independent of and unconnected
with the claim in the plaint. Nor hr.s he any right whatever
to claim that such a counter-claim made by him in his
written statement be treated as a plaint in a cross-suit. A
court permitting a counter-claim to be treated as a plaint in
cross-suit does so merely by way of granting an indulgence.
Where a counter-claim is so treated as plaint, the plaint
must be deemed for the purposes of the law of limitation
to have been filed on the day the court made the order
permitting it to be so treated.
Bai Bhuri v. Rai Ambalal Ohotalal, First Appeal No. 737
of 1951 (Bombay Hi11h Court) dissented from.
Laxmidas Dohy.lbhai
Kabarwala
v.
Nanabhai Chunilal
Kabarwal•
570
1963
IAxmiclos l>ahyahW
Eabaru:olo
••
Nanaltoi Cliu•ilal
KaNtu:a/4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
CIVIL APPELLATEJumsDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 759 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment
and order dated August 22, 23, 1961 of the Gujarat
High Court, in Appeal No. 29 of 1960.
S. T. Desai and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
appellant.
M. H. Ghhatrapati, J.B. Dadaclianji, 0. G.
.Mathur and Ravinder Narain for the respondents.
1963. March 27. The Judgment of Das and
Ayyanger JJ. was delivered by Ayyangar J.
Sarkar J. delivered a separate Judgment.
AYYANGAR J.-The principal point that is
raised for consideration in this appeal by special
leave is as regards the legality and propriety of an
order by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
of Gujarat directing a counter-claim filed by the
respondents to be treated as a plaint in a cross-suit
and remanding the case for trial on that basis.
The facts necessary to appreciate the points
raised before us are briefly as follows : The plaintiff,
who is the appellant before us, and one Jamnadas
Ghelabhai were partners in a business commenced
in October 1913 and carried on under the name and
style of Bharat Medical Stores at Broach, the two
partners having equal shares. During the subsistence of the partnership and from and out of the
assets thereof an immovable property-a house was
purchased at Broach in July 1932. Jamnadas
Ghelabhai died on August 12, 1943 but the partnership business was continued thereafter by the plaintiff-appellant taking in Bai Itcha-the widow o(
the deceased partner-in his place. A change
was, however, made in the shares of the two partners, in that Bai Itcha was given only a lth share
as against the i share enjoyed by her husband.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
571
196J
With this alteration the same business was carried on
between the two partners. In the early part of 1950 Laxmidas Daloyabt..i
Ka/JMwalo
Bai Itcha fell ill. It was the case of the plaintiff
v.
that there were negotiations between the two partners Nan11bhai Clnmil«l
Eab11Twal11
as regards the winding up of the firm and it was his
further case that on July 9, 1950 two matters were
the subject of a concluded agreement with her.
These were (1) that the partnership would stand
dissolved fromJuly 15, 1950 and that Bai Itcha would
receive from the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 13,689/- in
full satisfaction in respect of the capital contributed
by her as well as for her share of the profits of the
firm, (2) that the plaintiff was to take over the immovable property in Broach purchased by the firm in
July 1932 for its book value and that he should on
that account pay over to Bai Itcha Rs. 2,202/9/9
being a moiety of the book value. The agreement
was stated to be wholly oral and was admittedly not
reduced to writing. Before, however, anything was
done in pursuance of the alleged arrangement, Bai
Itcha died on July 31, 1950 leaving as her heirs the
respondents who were the sons of a brother of Jam- .
nadas Ghelabhai-Bai Itcha's husband. It was the further case of the appellant that after the death of Bai
Itcha respondents 1 and 2 examined the accounts of
the partnership and after satisfying themselves that
Rs. 13,689/- was the proper figure of the sum due to
the deceased partner agreed to receive the same in
full satisfaction of the amount to · which they were
entitled in respect of that item. All these allegations about the agreement with Bai Itcha and the
confirmation by them of the said agreement after her
death were, however, denied by the respondents who
insisted upon their rights under the law as legal
representatives of the deceased partner.
The appellant consequently filed a suit in the
Court of the Civil Judge at Broach for enforcing
the agreement which he alleged and for relief on that
basis. It would be necessary to set out and discuss
•
•
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
L•miidM Dahyahhai
Er.b.z1wala
Y.
Nanahhlli CluaaiJaJ
KabarwaJa
A).'1angar J.
in detail the reliefs claimed in this suit as the same
have a material bearing on some of the arguments
addressed to us. We shall, however, revert to this
after completing the narrative of the proceedings up
to the stage of the appeal before us. To this suit
the respondents who had been impleaded as defendants filed a Written Statement which was mainly
concerned with denying the truth of the agreement
with Bai I tcha and the story regarding the subsequent
confirmation by themselves and they wound up the
statement by a counter·claim which might usefully
be extracted even at this stage. In paragragh 25
of the Written Statement they pleaded :
"25. In view of the above facts the plaintiff
suit may please be dismissed and the defcnfendants costs may be awarded. The defendants further pray that if the Honourable
Court holds that the said partnership was
dissolved upon the death of Bai Itcha on
date 31-7-50, the same may be legally wound
up under the supervision and directions of the
Honourable Court. And necessary instructions
for the purpose may please be given, the
accounts upto the date of complete winding
up may be lawfully taken, the claims of the
parties against one another may be ascertained
and the costs of the defendants may also be
awarded. .'fhe defendants have filed this
counter claim for this purpose."
The concluding paragraph-paragraph 26 contained
details of the valuation of the counter.claim and of
the court fee they paid for the relief which they
sought in the preceding paragraph.
The plaintiff thereafter filed a
r~ply
to the counter-claim and of the content10ns
raised in this reply it is sufficient if at this
stage we notice the plea that a counter·claim was
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
not legally maintainable and they prayed for the
dismissal of the counter·claim with costs. The
Civil Judge framed the necessary issues but most of
them related to the claillll made in the plaint on
the basis of the alleged agreement and Issue No. 15
relating to the counter-claim and the plaintiff's
objection to the maintainability thereof ran :
"15.
Are defendants entitled to the counter·
claim made by them ?"
On these pleadings and the issues as framed the
parties went to trial.
By judgment dated
November 30, 1954 the Civil Judge recorded findings
on the several issues relating to the plaintiff's claim
and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that
he had failed to prove the agreement. Coming to
Issue No. 15 relating to the counter-claim the learned
Judge considered, in the first place, a contention
urged by the defendants-the respondents before
us-that the suit was virtually one for dissolution
and the taking of accounts on a particular basis,
viz., <:'n the basis of a settled account and that when
the plea of settled accounts failed the suit got
reduced into a plain one for the taking of the
accounts of a dissolved partnership and on that
footing the defendants had a legal right to have the
relief of accounting. The learned Judge negatived
this contention basing himself on the allegations
in the plaint and holding the real nature of the
suit to be one for the specific enforcement of the
agn ement set up. He next considered the question
whether the counter-claim was admissible in law and
after an examination of the decisions on the point
reached the conclusion that in the absence of any
specific provision therefor in the Civil Procedure
Code and in the light of certain decisions of the
Privy Council and of the High Courts a counter·
claim was not a.dmissible in the Muffasil. A prayer
by the defendants to treat the counter-rhim as a
1963
Laxmidas Dahyabhai
Kabarwt.la
v.
Nonabhai Dahyabhai
Kabarwola
Ayyanga1 J.
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
plaint in a cross suit by them was rejected. The
learned Judge therefore dismissed the counter-claim
/Axmidos Dahyabhdi
but
he added that the defendants could bring a
Kobarw12la
separate suit for accounts and for a share of the
••
N anabMi Chll!JiJal
profits of the dissolved partnership if so advised .
.Kabarwala
The plaintiff was content with the judgment
claim but the defendants
preferred an appeal to the District Judge Broach
questioning the correctness of the order dismissing
the counter-claim as not maintainable. The learned
District Judge examined the authorities and reach·
ing the same conclusion as the trial Judge, dismissed
the appeal. Thereafter the defendants brought the
matter before the High Court by way of a second
appeal and before the learned Single Judge who heard
it an oral application was made to treat the counterclaim made in paragraph 25 of the written state·
ment as the plaint in a cross-suit and that the same
should be tried and disposed of as if it were such
a suit. An objection was raised by the plaintiffrespondent before that Court to the granting of
this prayer on various grounds, the main one being
that on the date when the matter was before the
High Court and when such an order was being
prayed for-in August 1961, the claim for accounts
was hopelessly barred
by limitation.
The
learned Judge, however, following an unreported
decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court in September, 1956 allowed the applica·
tion and passed an order setting aside the dismissal
of the counter-claim and remanding it to the trial
Judge "with a direction that the counter-claim be
treated as a plaint in the cross-suit and that the
reply of the plaintiffs to the counter-claim be treated
as a written statement to the cross-suit and that the
cross-suit be tried and disposed of in accordance
with law", adding that the issues arising in the
c.ross-suit which also arose in the suit and which
had been disposed of already should not be tried
'~ hich he obtained on his
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
over again and the final decisions on those issues
reached in the suit and the appeal therefrom shall
be binding on the parties in the cross·suit. It is
the correctness of this order by the learned Single
Judge that is challenged in this appeal.
J96J
La~~-d~ D:inyabh.111
Kabotwala
••
Narialtlt.i GhuniJ,,J
Eabarwola
AJJIUl.fOT J.
~
The first submission made by Mr. Desai,
learned Counsel for the appellant was that no counter-claim was maintainable in the Muffasil. There
is not much controversy before us about this point
and in view of the course of the proceedings it really
does not arise for consideration, though we must add
that we are not to be understood as doubting the
two propositions that a right to make a counter-claim
is statutory and that the present case is admittedly
not within O.VIII. r. 6, Civil Procedure Code. We
say it does not arise because a finding adverse to its
maintainability was recorded by the trial Judge and
by the District Judge on appeal on a consideration of
, the decisions of the Privy Council and the various
High Courts and when the matter was in the High
Court the learned Judge also proceeded on the
basis that a counter-claim was not admissible and
the respondents have not preferred any appeal therefrom and that has become final. We might therefore proceed with the point~ arising in the case on
the basis that a counter-claim is not admissible in
the Muffasil, and the only question is whether
the Court could treat a counter-claim as the plaint
in a cross-suit.
Learned Counsel for the respondents however
made two alternative submissions : ( l) That even
without ,converting the counter.claim into the plaint
in a cross suit the defendants in the present case were
entitled to the taking of the accounts of the dissolved
partnership on the pleadings as they stood, and (2)
that in the circumstances of the case the order of the
learned Judge directing the conversion was legal
and was proper and justified on the merits. We
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
IAxmidas LJaJryahhoi
KobmwalO
••
Nt1R4bhai Chunilal
liabarwala
consider that the first of the above submissions has
no substance. The point urged was that the plaintiff's suit was in substance one for the taking of the
account~ of the dissolved partnership, though in form
the primary relief claimed was for a decree on the
basis of a settled account. It was submitted that
when that primary relief, viz., a decree on a settled
account was rejected, because the facts alleged were
not proved, there remained a plaint praying for an
~ccount of which the defendant was entitled to take
advantage and claim the same relief. In support of
this submission a number of decisions rendered on
the construction of s. 69 (3) (a) of the Partnership
Act were referred. In these decisions it was held
that in every suit for dissolution a prayer for accounts
and a relief for accounting was implicit. We
consider that these authorities are of no assistance
for determining the nature of the plaint before us. It
was in substance one for specific performance of an
agreement by which one partner agreed to convey
his intere~t to his co-partner. In such a suit there
could obviously be no prayer for any relief for
accounting and unless there is a prayer for account·
ing there is no question of a defendant claiming the
benefit of that relief in the same suit. The decisions
in which it has been held that in a suit for accounts
between accounting parties a defendant is virtually
a plaintiff have no application to cases where the
relief prayed for by the plaintiff is not one for the
rendition of accounts. That situation will apply
only to cases where the relief sought is common to
the parties, though ranged on either side. The suit
in the present case filed by the plaintiff prayed for
no such relief and could not in the nature of things
pray for any such, and hence unless there is a claim
made by the defendant for accounting and that claim
is treated as a plaint the defendant is entitled to
no relief.
The other submission of learned Counsel for
•
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
the respondents seeking to support the judgement of
the High Court stands on quite a different footing.
Mr. Desai contended that the learned Judge
of the High Court had no jurisdiction to treat the
counter-claim contained in paragraph 25 of the
Written Statement as the plaint in a cross-suit. As
we stated earlier, the learned Judge took this course
because he considered there was authority for this
mode of proceeding in the decision of a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court. Mr. Desai
contended that this decision of the Division Bench
was wrong. He pointed out that the sole authority
for the adoption of such a treatment of a counterclaim was a passage in Mr. Mulla's commentary
on the Civil Procedure Code (12th Edition) at page
634 where the learned author relies on a
decision of a Bench of the Rangoon High Court
in Saya Bya v. Maung Kyaw Shun ('). Mr.
Desai pointed out that no reasons are adduced
for the proposition laid down by the learned Judges
of the Rangoon High Court for their conclusion
that "There is nothing to prevent a Judge treating
the counter-claim as a plaint in a cross suit and
hearing the two together if he is so disposed and if
the counter-claim as properly stamped". His fur•
ther contention was that the view here expressed
was contrary to two decisions of the Privy Council reported in Currimbhoy and Co. Ltd. v. Greet ('), and
(Mian) Pir Bux v. Mohomed Tahar (8). It is, no
doubt, true that no authority is cited in the Rangoon
decision for the dictum and the learned Judges seem
to proceed on the basis that in the absence of any
established principle or binding precedent their
conclusion was reasonable, but the further submission of Mr. Desai that their view is opposed to the
decisions of the Privy· Council is not correct.
Currimbhoy and Co. Ltd. v. Greet ('), is not
anthority for any proposition other than that a
counter-claim is not maintainable in the Muffasil
(I) (1924, I.L.R. 2 Rangoon 276,
12) (1932) L.R. 60 I.A. 297.
(S) A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 235.
1969
Laxmidas Dshyabluil
Kabarwala
v,
N anabhai Ghunllal
Kabarwala
•
578
1963
L=.idas D./ual!hai
Ea6oruiala
v.
Nonabhai C/runi/al
Eab111wolo
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
and the other case-(Mian) Pir Bu:r v. Jlfohmed
Tahar ('), which is to the same effect merely affirms
the law as accepted in Currimbhoy aml Co. Ltd.
v. Greet ('). Neither of these two decisions, Mr.
Desai admitted in terms, refrrs to the conversion
into or treatment of a counter-claim as a cross-suit,
nor do they in terms or even inferentially negative
the legality of the adoption of such a course.
For such a position, however, Mr. Desai,
relied on the decision of the Calcutta High
Court in GO'Ur Chandra Goswami v. Chairman of
the Nabadwip Municipality ('). where the learned
Judges set aside in revision an order of the Munsif
allowing the defendant's additional Written Statement to be treated as a cross plaint. There is no
doubt that this is some authority for the proposition
contended for by Mr, Desai. It is not, however,
clear from the judgment whether it proceeds upon
the facl~ of the case then before them particular! y as regards the contents of the Written Statement which was treated by the District M unsif
as a plaint in a cross-suit or whether the proposition
of law was intended to have a wider application.
The learned Judges correctly pointed out that a
counter-claim is the creation of the statute and in
the absence of a provision in 0. VIII of the Civil
Procedure Code for a counter-claim apart from the
relief specified in r. 6 thereof, a counter-claim as
such was inadmissible. From this the learned
Judges proceeded to equate the bar to the maintainability of a counter-claim to a bar to a counterclaim being treated as a cross-suit. It must, however, be pointed out that for effecting this equation
no reasons are adduced by learned Judges nor for
holding that a Court was precluded from treating
an additional Written Statemer,t as a cross plaint.
The question has therefore to be considered on
principle as to whether there is anything in law\1) A.J.R, 1934 P.C. 235.
(2) (1932) L,R. 60 I.A. 297.
(3) A.!.R. 1922 Cal. I.
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
1969
statutory or otherwise-which precludes a court
from treating a counter-claim as a plaint in a cross Laxmidas Dahysbhoi
Kabarwala
suit. We are unable to see any. No doubt, the
v.
Civil Procedure Code prescribes the contents of a Nanabhai Chunilal
Kabarwala
plaint and it might very well be that a counterclaim which is to be treated as a cross-suit might not
Ayyangar J,
conform to all these requirements but this by itself
is not sufficient to deny to the Court the power and
the jurisdiction to read and construe the pleadings
in a reasonable manner. If, for instance, what is
really a plaint in a cross-suit is made part of a
Written Statement either by being made an annexure
to it or as part and parcel thereof, though described
as a counter-claim, there could be no legal objection to the Court treating the same as a plaint and
granting such relief to the defendant as would have
been open if the pleading had taken the form of a
plaint. Mr. Desai had to concede that in such a
case the Court was not prevented from separating
the Written Statement proper from what was describ·
ed as a counter-claim and treating the latter as a
cross-suit. If so much is conceded it would then
become merely a matter of degree as to whether the
counter-claim contains all the necessary requisite;
sufficient to be treated as a plaint making a claim
for the relief sought and if it did it would seem
proper to hold that it would be open to a Court to
covert or treat the counter-claim as a plaint in a
cross suit. To hold otherwise would be to erect
what in substance is a mere defect in the form of
pleading into an instrument for denying what justice
manifestly demands. We need only add that it was
not suggested that there was anything in 0. VIII. r.6
or in any other provision of the Code which laid an
embargo on a Court adopting such a course.
Mr. Desai's next contention was that even if it
was open to the Court to treat the counter-claim as a
plaint in a cross suit, the action of the learned Single
580
196J
Lami/4t Dallyabluai
Ka6arw~a
Y,
x..u1un Ghumlol
KabMwola
.d7JG111ar /,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
Judge in granting this relief was, in the circumstances of this case, illegal or, at any rate, improper.
In support of this further submission he urged two
points: ( l) The conversion of a counter-claim into a
plaint in a cross suit was not any inherent or enforceable right of a defendant but the matter lay in the
discretion of the Court to be exercised on judicial
principles so as not to cause hardship to either side.
In the present case he urged that the relief by way
of counter-claim had been objected to by the plaintiff
as not maintainable but the defendants had, till the
very end, persisted in claiming this inadmissible relief. Besides, both the learned trial Judge as well as
the District .Judge on appeal had considered the
prayer for treating the counter-claim as the plaint in
a cross suit and had, for very proper and cogent reasons and in the exercise of their discretion, rejected
it. The learned Single Judge oC the High Court,
however, it was submitted, had, without even considering the grounds upon which the Courts below had
exercised their discretion and without assigning any
reasons of his own set aside their judgments and
allowed the defendants the relief for which they
prayed.
(2) Mr. Desai further submitted that at the
worst even if the prayer of the defendants was allowed, having regard to the long interval between the
date of the counter-claim and the date when the conversion was being allowed as an indulgence to the
defendants the learned Judge ought to have put the
defendants on terms and not have granted the relief
in the absolute terms which we have extracted
earlier.
We shall now proceed to consider these objections in detail. When analysed they fall under
three heads : ( l) The reason adduced by the trial
Judge and the lst appellate Court for refusing to
grant the prayer for conversion have not been considered by the High Court and if these had been taken
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
into account the learned Judge would have disallowed the prayer, (2) If, as it must be conceded, the
trial Judge and the District Judge on appeal had a
discretion to convert or not to convert the counterclaim into a plaint in a cross-suit, the learned Single
Judge had no jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure
Code to interfere with that discretion and, in any
event, there were no sufficient reasons set out to jus·
tify such interference, and (3) Having regard to the
circumstances of the case _the defendants ought to
have been put on terms.
It was pointed out that there were three matters
which were taken into account by the trial Judge for
disallowing the defendants' prayer for treating the
counter-claim as a cross-suit: (a) limitation, (b)
s. 37 of the Partnership Act, and (c) goodwill. The
point of limitation was this : The prayer in the
counter-claim being one for the taking of the accounts
of a dissolved partnership-on the basis that the
partnership was dissolved on the death of Bai Itcha
on July 31, 1950, a suit claiming the relief of accounting could under the Indian Limitation Act, be filed
only within three years from the date of dissolution
(Art. 106). As the Written Statement of the defen·
dant was filed on October 18, 1951 no doubt if the
counter-claim itself be treated as the _plaint, the .
suit would be in time. But the learned trial Judge held
that limitation had to be computed on the footing
that the suit was filed on the date when an application was made to him in November 1954 at the stage
of the arguments for treating the counter-claim as a
plaint in a cross suit. If so computed obviously the
cross suit would be barred by limitation and that
was assigned as one of the reasons for rejecting the
prayer for conversion. It was urged before us that
the learned Judge of the High Court had not addressed himself to this aspect of the matter. It was
also submitted that strictly speaking the correct date
en which the plaint in the cross-suit should be taken
196$
LaxmitltJJ Dahyabhai
Kaborwala
v.
Nanabhai Chunil4l
Eaharwols
A»""I"' J.
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964jVOL. ·
1963
LlxmiJJ.S f :a/a 1tibhai
K'lbmv·l/a
v,
N ....bhai Cluinilal
Eoharwato
to have been filed, in view of the orders of the trial
and 1st appellate courts rejecting this prayer was
that on which the oral prayer was made before the
learned Single .Judge i. e., 1961. It is obvious that
the learned Judge considered that the correct date
for the computation of limitation in such cases had
been decided in the unreported decision of the
Division Bench of the llombay High Court to which
we have already made a reference. The learned
Judges there took the view that the crucial date for
the purpose of determining when the plaint in a
cross suit should be treated as having been filed was
not the date on which the conversion was ordered
but the date on which the Written Statement containing the counter-claim was tiled. We considered that
this decision of the Bombay High Court lays down
the correct rule in cases of this kind. It is, no
doubt, true that, save in exceptional cases, leave to
amend under 0.6,r. l 7 of the Code will ordinarily be
refused when the effect of the amendment would be
to take away from a party a legal right which had
accrued to him by lapse of time. llut this rule
can apply only when either fresh allegations are
added or fresh reliefs sought by way of amendment.
Where, for instance, an amendment is sought which
merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in
substance add to or alter it, it has never been held
that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the
questions to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter already contained in the original
pleading. The present case is a fortiori so. The
defendants here were not seeking to add any allegation nor to claim any fresh relief which they had
not prayed for in the pleading already filed. If on
the allegations contained in that pleading the relief
prayed for could not be obtained by the defendants,
the plaintiff is not precluded from urging such a
contention. The defendants had valued the relief
sought as if it were a plaint in a cross suit and had
paid the requisite court fee payable on such a plaint
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
and there was no dispute that either the valuation
or the Court fee was incorrect. Mr. Desai sought to
belittle the circum~tance about the valuation of the
relief and the payment of the court fee payable thereon by the defendants by pointing out that the court
fee was a comparatively small sum. If under the
relevant statute the court fee payable for a particular type of relief is a small sum and a party has paid
it, he has done all that the law requires, and the
legal consequence of such an act cannot be discounted
merely because the pecuniary burden borne by the
party is not heavy.
In the circumstances, there being no addition
to the allegation or to the relief, it is not possible to
accept the argument that by the conversion' of that
pleading which was contained in the Written Statement into a plaint in a cross suit a fresh claim was
made or a fresh relief which had not already been
prayed for was sought which would enable the
plaintiff to contend that limitation started from the
date on which the conversion took place. To the
facts of the present case therefore the decisions
holding that amendments could not ordinarily be
allowed beyond the period of limitation and the
limited exceptions to that rule have no application.
The learned trial Judge next referred to s. 37
of the Partnership Act and expn;ssed the opinion that
in view of the provisions of that section the conver•
sion prayed for should not be granted. He observed:
"Defendants have been given special rights
under s. 37 of the Indian Partnership Act.
No issues have been framed in this suit regarding the matter covered by s. 37 of the Indian
Partnership Act ...... the questions under s. 37
are not within the scc>pe of this suit. Such
questions can be within the scope of defendant's
/96J
Laxmidas Dahyabhai
Kabarwala
••
Nanabhai Dahyabhai
'
Kabarwala
Ayyanga1 I.
584
1963
Lumidas Dahyabhoi
Ka/uJrwalo
v.
}{anabhai Clrunil ''
Kabarwalo
.1,,...,., J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
suit for an account and share of the profits of a
dissolved partnership."
It is, however, difficult to appreciate the import of
these remarks. So long as the counter-claim 1s held
to be inadmissible as the basis on which a defendant
could be granted relief and so long as the conversion
of it into a plaint is not granted, the questions raised
by s. 37 would not be within the scope of the suit,
and naturally until such a convrrsion is effected, no
issues could or would be framed. But by themselves
the matters set out could hardly be objectiom to the
exercise of the discretion by the Court to grant the
prayer for conversion. Again, what the provision in
s. 37 has to do with the exercise of the discretion to
permit the conversion is not also clear. That
section reads :
"37. Where any member of a firm has died
or otherwise ceased to be a partner,
and the surviving or continuing partners
carry on the business of the firm with the
property of the firm .vithout any final
settlement of the accounts as between
them and the outgoing partner or his
estate, then, in the absence of a contract
to the contrary, the outgoing partner or
his estate is entitled at the option of himself
or his representatives to such share of the
profits made since he ceased to be a
partner as may be attributable to the use
of his share of the property of the firm or
to interest at the rate of six per cent per
annum on the amount of his share in the
property of the firm :
Provided that where by contract
between the partners an option is given to
surviving or continuing partners to purchase the interest of a deceased or outgoing
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
partner, and that option is duly exercised,
the estate of the deceased partner, Qr the .lmmiidas Dd v1bhti'
Ka6a,wala
outgoing partner or his estate, as the case
may be, is not entitled to any further or J(anabhai•• Chimilal
Kabarwala
other share of profits ; but if any partner
assuming to act in exercise of the option
AJ>J""I"' J.
does not in all material respects comply
with the terms thereof, he is liable to
account ..Q_nder the forgoing provisions of
this section."
It would be seen that s. 37 lays down the substantive
law relating to the liability of a surviving partner
who without a settlement of account with the legal
representatives of the deceased partner utilises the
assets of the partnership for continuing the business
as his own. If in the present case the plaintiff
has done so he would be liable to the obligation
laid by the provision and if he has not, he
would not be so liable. Therefo<e the section
cannot stand in the way of the conversion prayed (or
by the defendant. Mr. Desai suggested that what
the learned trial Judge had in view in referring to
the section was the complete absence of any allega·
tion in the counter-claim that the plaintiff had
utilized the assets and had thus become liable for the
obligations laid down by the provision. But if this
were so it would only mean that the accounts which
the plaintiff would be entitled to obtain if his
counter-claim were treated as a plaint in a cross-suit
would be an accounting without reference to s. 37,
but that again would not be a ground for refusing the
conversion. If such were the construction of the
counter-claim as the plaint in a cross-suit, the plain·
tiff might not be entitled to particular reliefs. In the
circumstances therefore we consider that the learned
trial Judge fell into an error in considering that the
provisions contained in s. 37 and the reliefs that
would be open to a plaintiff under its provisions
rendered it improper for the Court to allow the
conversion.
585 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [191>4] VOL.
1963
/.AJmri4aJ DolryaJ,hai
Kab111wala
••
N-bllli Chtmi/oJ
The third circumstance that was referred to by
the learned trial Judge and which was also rrlied on
by Mr. Desai was as regards goodwill. On this part
of the case the trial Judge remarked :
Kdtuwafa
~gorJ.
"Defendants also urge that there was a goodwill of business. Whether there was a good·
will or not and what is the value of the good will are also questions of fact for which no
issues have been framed in the suit. I am not
therefore disposed to hear the counter-claim as
a cross-suit along with the plaint in this suit.
All these questions about goodwill ......... are
not within the scope of this suit".
We consider that the question of goodwill has even
less bearing on the exercise of the discretion by the
Court than even the accounting contemplated by s.
37. Goodwill is a part of the assets of a firm and
s. 55 ( 1) of the Partnership Act enacts that in
settling the accounts of a firm after dissolution the
goodwill shall, subject to contract between the
partners, be included in the assets and it may be
sold either separately or ~long with other property
of the firm. The prima f acie rule therefore is that
the goodwill of the firm being a part of the assets
has to be sold just like other assets before the
accounts between the partners can be settled and
the partnership wound up. Why there should be
any particular reference to goodwill which is only
one of the several assets of a firm in a plaint for
taking accounts of a dissolved partnership is hard
to see. How similarly, the existence of goodwill
as an asset of the firm which has to be sold and
the proceeds divided between the partners in the
account-taking is a bar to the conversion of a
counter-claim into·· a plaint in a cross-suit is not
easy to comprehend.
These were the only three matters which were
taken into account by the learned trial Judge in
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
refusing the defendants' prayer for treating the
counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit.
The way in which the matter was dealt with
by the learned District Judge on appeal was this.
He first expressed doubts about the correctness of
the decision of the Rangoon High Court in
Saya Bya v. Maung Kyaw Shun ('). But on
the assumption that the Court had jurisdiction to
effect the conversion his reasons for rejecting the
prayer of the defendants were: ( 1) The suit of the
plaintiff and the counter-claim of the defendants
were totally dissimilar i. e., the evidence needed to
prove the facts in each would be different, (2) In
the counter-claim a question about the goodwill
of the firm and the right to use the premises of the
firm would arise, (3) No issues had been raised in
regard to the matters alleged in the counter-claim,
(4) That the defendants would not be prejudiced if
they were asked to file a fresh suit. We consider it
unnecessary to canvass the relevancy or correctness
of these reasons as what we have stated already as
regards the judgment of the trial Judge would suffice
to show that they are untenable. In this view we
do not consider. that the appellant derives any
advantage by the criticism regarding the absence of
any reference to the grounds on which the discretion
was exercised by the trial and appellate courts
in the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
The next submission of Mr. Desai was, and
he laid considerable stress upon this, that the learned
Judge of the High Court could not, in second appeal,
have interfered with the discretion exercised by the
Courts below. We consider that in the circumstances
of this case this particular aspect loses all significance
because, as already indicated, we are satisfied that
even if the Courts below exercised their discretion
they did so on grounds not legally tenable and the
learned Judge was justified in ignoring the exerci11e
of their discretion.
(IJ (19241 I. L. R. 2 Ran~ooa 276,
1969
Loxmid11r Dahyabhai
Kc.harwalo
••
N1UUZbhai Clumilal
Kabarwala
Ay;angar /,
.,
588
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
1963
It was next submitted that the leamed Judge
of the High Court had not assigned any reason for
C.....U.S Daii)'<b"4i
exercising a discretion in favour of the defendants
K.Jxnwa/o
••
at the stage of the second appeal and that on that
N...Moi ClumiW
account we should set aside that Judgment. It i1 no
KalJorwol•
doubt true that the leamed Judge has not adverted
d)'J<mf•' J.
to or assigned any reason why he was allowing
the conversion and contented
himself with
referring to . the unreported
decision of the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court as
justifying the course that he took. We are, however,
not persuaded that considering that this appeal iJ by
special leave under Art. 136 any interference is
called for with the order passed by the learned Judge.
We are satisfied that there has been no miscarriage
of justice by reason of the order and that even if he
had properly !applied his mind to it and considered
the matter from the point of view of his having a
discretion, the same conclusion would have been
arrived at. We are not therefore disposed to interfere
with the order directing the treatment of the counter·
claim as a plaint in a crosss·suit.
The next part of Mr. Desai's submission was
concerned with his grievance that the learned Judge
ought to have put the plaintiff on terms before he
passed the order directing the conversion. The
"terms" could obviously not be terms as to costs,
because in this case the counter-claim was dismissed
with costs by the trial Judge and the appeal therefrom was also dismissed with costs. So far as the
costs in the High Court were concerned, they were
directed to be the costs in the cause.
Mr. Desai, however, urged that apart from any
order as to costs, "terms" ought to have been
imposed as regards the nature of the accounting to be
ordered if a decree were passed, directions given
restricting the date from which such accounting
11hould start and 5uch like tcrm1. Wc are unable to
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
agree that it would have been proper for the Court
to have imposed such terms. The whole basis of the
order of the High Court was that the defendants had
by their counter-claim filed practically a plaint duly
valued and court fee payable thereon paid, though
in a defective form. The defendants had on the
basis that the counter-claim was as such inadmissible
under the Civil Procedure Code prayed to the Trial
Court for an order for treating that counter-claim as
a plaint in a cross-suit. That had been opposed by
the plaintiff and the prayer had been rejected on
grounds which, as we have pointed out elsewhere,
were wholly insufficient. Besides, the plaintiff had
come forward with a case of the accounts having
been settled and the story which he put forward
had been disbelieved and his suit dismissed and that
decision had become final. In the circumstances it
is not easy to see the propriety of imposing any terms
either as to the manner or as to duration etc. of the
accounting which ought to take place on the averments in the counter-claim if the defendant succeeded
in that cross-suit. We. therefore, consider that no
legitimate objection could be taken to the unconditional order passed by the learned Judge.
Lastly, Mr. Desai contended that the learned
Judge erred in confining the plaintiff to the pleas
which he had raised in the reply to the counter-claim
and in not allowing him to file fresh pleadings to
the counter-claim when it was being treated as a
plaint. It was pointed that the objections taken in
the reply statement were on the basis of their being
answers to a counter-claim, and that if the defendants
were being permitted to alter the character of their
pleading, the plaintiff should be given a chance to
add such further defences as would be open to him
to the claim in a plaint. In this connection Mr.
Desai pointed out that in the unreported decision
of the Bombay High Court on which the learned
Single Judge relied, the parties had been permitted
1963
Laxrnida.r Dahy.blull
Kabarwalo
•.
Nanabhai Giunilol
E•ban.v.ta
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
19~J
to file fresh pleadings to make the same accord with
Z.....ldot D•h71hAai the requirements of a plaint and Written Statement
Kobarwala
under the Civil Procedure Code. We consider that
v.
Ntara!iliai Ch<nilal there is force in this submission. No doubt, the
J,:obarwala
plaintiff had traversed the allegations of fact and the
sustainability in law of the claim made in the
counter-claim, but still this was on the basis of the
defendant's plea being a counter-claim merely.
Taking into account the circumstances in which the
plaintiff's plea in regard to the counter-claim were
filed, we are clearly of the opinion that justice requires that he should be afforded an opportunity to
raise his defences on the footing that the counterclaim, even when originally made, should be treated
as a plaint in a cross-suit, and this he should be
permitted to do in a Written Statement which he
should be permitted to file and there will be a
direction to that effect in the decree to be drawn up
by this Court. As the trial of the claim by the
defendants has already been delayed the plaintiff
should file this fresh Written Statement within 8
weeks from the date of the receipt of this order by
the trial Court.
A question has also been raised as to whether
the defendants should not be likewise permitted to
file a fresh pleading more in accordance with the
form indicated by 0. VII of the Civil Procedure
Code-as was permitted 10 be done in the Bombay
case above referred to. Mr. Desai indicated that he
would not object to any such liberty bein1; given.
There will be a direction that the defendants are at
liberty to file a fresh pleading in the place and stead
of their counter-claim contained in paragraphs 25
and 26 of the Written Statement dated October 17,
1951, provided however that there shall be no substantial variation in the a.llegations to be made or
the reliefs to be claimed by them in such fresh fleading. This they might file within 4 weeks o the
receipt of this order by the trial Court. In the event
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
of the defendants exercising the option hereby given,
the plaintiff shall file the Written Statement within 4
weeks thereafter. We ought to make it clear that
by the directions we have given above we do not
intend to preclude the parties from seeking any other
or further amendment of the pleadings or to fetter,
in any manner, the power of the Court to permit
such amendment under O. VI. r. 17, Civil Procedure
Code at any subsequ~nt stage of the proceedings.
1969
Laxmit!o.s DahJ.;6"41
Kaburwala
••
Nanabhai Chunilal
Ko6arwala
Ayyanzar J.
Subject to the above directions, the appeal
fails and is dismissed with costs.
SARKARJ.-The appellant carried on a business
in partnership with one Jamnadas Ghelabhai from
sometime in 1923 till August 12, 1943, whenJamnadas died. Thereafter the business was carried on
in partnership between the appellant and J amnadas's
widow, Bai lchha. Bai lchha died on July 31,
1950. Disputes then started between the respondents,
who are Bai lchha's heirs, and the appellant concerning the partnership and a certain house and
those disputes led to the suit out of which this
appeal arises.
The appellant contended that by an agreement
made with Bai lchha shortly prior to her death,
the partnership between them had been disolved
as from July 15, 1950, and it had been decided that
upon the appellant paying to Bai lchha the amount
found due to her on the taking of the accounts, she
would give up her rights in the business which would
thereafter become the sole property of the appellant;
that Bai lchha died before the accounts could be
taken; and that thereafter the accounts were settled
between the respondents and the appellant whereby
a sum of Rs. 13,689/- was found due to the respon·
dents in respect of Bai Ichha's share in the firm.
The appellant also contended that Bai Ichha had
agreed to convey to him a half share in a house which
Sarkor /,
592
196'
!atrtitl"' Dali106hai
Ko/#wo/o
v.
Naa6Mi Ci...ilal
A'.HrwaJa
'i111A.r J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
she had inherited from her husband and the other half
share in which be longed to the appellant, for a sum
of Rs. 2,202-9-9. The appellant said that he had
offered the said ,um of Rs. 13,689/- to the respondents in respect of Bai Ichha's share in the firm and
requested them to convey the half share in the
house upon payment of Rs. 2,202-9-9 but the respondents wrongfully denied the agreements and adjustment of accounts and refused to convey their share
in the house to the appellant and were further
obstructing him in the conduct of business. On
these allegations the appellant filed the suit in the
Court of the Civil Judge, Broach, on July 15, l95l
claiming the following reliefs :-(a) a declaration that
the partnership between him and Bai lchha stood dissolved as from July 15, 1950, or from July 31, 1950,
and that its accounts had been settled, (b) an order
directing the respondents to convey to him a half share
in the house upon payment of Rs. 2,202-9-9 and
(c) an injunction restraining them from interfering
with his conduct of the business.
The respondent No. l filed a written statement
in that suit on October 18, l9fil, which was adopted
on the same day by the other respondents. The
respondents denied that there was any agreement
with Bai Ichha about the dissolution or otherwise
and also that there had been any settlement of
accounts with them. The written statement contained a paragraph in which it was stated that the
partnership between the appellant and Bai Ichha
stood dissolved on her death on July 31, 1950 and
it was claimed that the accounts of the firm be taken.
In the end of this paragraph it was stated, "The
defendants have filed this counter-claim for this
purpose." They paid counter-fee on the counterclaim as on a plaint claiming the accounts of a
dissolved firm. The appellant filed a reply to the
written statement in which dealing with thr- counterclaim, he stated that it was "not in accordance with
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
Jaw and the defendants have no right to make such
a counter-claim."
The appellant's suit was dismissed by the trial
court on November 30, 1954. With regard to the
counter-claim which was for accounts of the partnership, the trial court held that it was "incompetent
and any such claim must be enforced by a separate
suit." It appears that at the stage of arguments
learned counsel for the respondents had verbally
requested the court to treat the counter-claim as a
plaint in a cross·suit and this the court refused to
do. The appellant did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court but the respond en ts did
from the decision holding that the counter-claim was
incompetent and not maintainable. That appeal
was heard by the District Judge of Broach who on
April 27, 1956, upheld the decision of the trial
court. It appears that he also had been asked to
treat the counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit
but refused to do so.
The respondents then went up in further
appeal to the High Court of Bombay. This appeal
was on the creation of the State of Gujarat transferred
to the High Court at Ahmedabad. In the High
Court it was contended, as it had been in the two
courts below, that the counter-claim was maintainable
and the High Court was also requested verbally to
treat the counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit.
The High Court did not go into the question of the
competence of the counter-claim but by its judgment
and order of August 22, 1961 accepted the request of
the respondents to treat it as a plaint in a cross
suit. Relying on an unreported judgment of the
Bombay High Court in Bai Bhuri v. Rai Ambalal
Chotalal (1 ), to which I will have to refer later, it
rejected the contention of the appellant that the
counter-claim could not be treated by the High
Court as a plaint in a cross-suit because a suit
on tl1at plaint had become barred by limitatioll
(I) (First Appeal No. 737 o.f 1951,)
1961
L<txmitht Dt1!11lh•i
K'tJharwala
v.
Nanahh•i Chuiilal
Kabariaala
Ssrkar J,
59+
!HJ
-·l.nxmit!as
Dff':;·nb.~ni
Ji-abnr1J·1J/a
••
J\··.,,,ablrtti CAm1il~J
Kahrrrwtifa
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19114] VOL.
long before the matter had come to that Court.
The High Court held that the cross-suit would be
within time as it must be deemed to have been filed
on the date that the written statement containing
the co11ntcr-cla11n had been filed. In the res11lt, the
High Court sent the matter back to the learned trial
Judge with a direction to treat the counter-claim as a
plaint in a cross-suit and the reply of the appellant
to it as his written statement and to trv tlw crosssuit according to law. It i~ from this judgment that
the present appc<1l arises.
i'\ow the counter-claim made by the respondents
was clearly to enforce an independent right unconnected with the claim made in the plaint. It is a counterclaim strictlv so called and not intended to be •
defence to the claim in the plaint. Our law~, except,
it appears, a rule made by the Bombay High Court
for its Original.Jurisdiction, have made no provision
for such a counter-claim. In other courts, lil:e the court
in Broach, a defendant is permitted to plead a set
off as contemplated in 0. 8, r. fi of the Code of
Civil Proccdare and also what is called an equitable
set off. Plainly, the present counter-claim is not
either of these. I would like to observe here that in
England, a counter-claim strictly so called has always
been the creature of statute : !lee Halsbury's Laws
of England, 3rd ed. vol. XXXIV p. 410. In
England apparently no equitable right to such a
counter-claim is recognised. The reason perhaps is
that a suit can always be filed on the subject-matter
of the counterclaim and where there is remedy in
law, aid of equity is not available. The position
should be no different in our country. There is,
therefore, no justification for a llowin~ a counter-claim
as such in the absence of a statutory provision. The
decision of trial court and the Court of first appeal
that the counter-claim was not maintainable was
obviously right. As I have already said the High
Court did not go into this question,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll95
It was then said that the suit of the appellant
was really a suit for the accounts of the partnership
and in such a suit each side was in the position of a
plaintiff and, therefore, the respondents were entitled
to a decree for the accounts even without the counter-claim. This contention is clearly unfounded, for
the suit was not for the partnership accounts at all.
It was a wholly different suit, for it asked for a
declaration that the partnership accounts had been
taken out of court and could not, therefore,
be ordered by the court. In such a suit a defendant
partner has obviously no right to ask that the partnership accounts be taken.
The real question that was argued in this appeal
was whether the High Court was right in directing
the counter-claim to be treated as a plaint in a
cross-suit. I do not think it was. First, it is
obvious that the respondents themselves had no
right in law or equity to have their counter-claim
treated as a plaint. As no counter-claim is maintainable to enforce a right independent of the claim
in the plaint, as I have earlier said, the respondents
should have filed a suit to enforce the subject matter
of the counter-claim. If they did not, that was
their error and an error cannot create a right. It is
true that in the law reports there are a few cases
where courts have permitted a counter-claim to be
treated as a plaint in a cross.suit. I will assume
that a court has the power to do so. But even m,
the court exercises the power by way of granting
the defendant an indulgence out of pity at the
defendant's folly. It is not a case of granting a
discretionary relief in which case the party asking
for the relief would have a right to it, a right at
least that the discretion be judicial! y exercised. I
think it is entirely for the court asked to grant the
indulgence, to decide as its free choice, whether it
will do so or not. . No question of its decision being
(:rroneous . can arise for there can be no error in
1963
Laxmidas Dahyabhoi
Kabarw•la
••
Nnnabhai Cbunilal
Kabarwala
'l~arkar
J.
596
1963
LumidaJ Dahr"bhni
Kt1ba11c·11l~
v.
.lVn'211hlia1 C·111J1fal
li'ob11ru ~1!a
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
refusing to grant that to which there is no right.
That being so, I think that the High court had no
right in appeal to set aside the order of the courts
below
refusing
.
. to treat the counter·claim as a plaint
111 a cross·sun.
I also venture to think that the High Court's
order was erroneous for another reason. Under s. 3
of th<: Limitation Act a suit instituted after the
period of limitation prescribed for it must be dismis.
sc<l and a suit is instituted when the plaint is duly
presented to the court. Now it seems to me that
when, as in the present case, a court directs a counterclaim to be treated as a plaint in a cross-suit. the
date of presentation of that plaint is the date of the
court's order. The reason is this. I have earlier
said such an order is made only by way of an in·
dulgence for no one has any right or equity to
have what was not a plaint, treated as a plaint. It
is the court's order which makes what was not a
plaint, a plaint for obviously if there was already a
plaint filed, no order would be necessary treating it
as a plaint. As the order turns something which was
not a plaint into a plaint, that plaint comes into
existence on the date of the court's or<lor; it must,
therefore, be a plaint filed on that date. I would
like here to observe, as indeed is well known, that no
court has any power to extend the prescribed period
of limitation and from this it would follow, a court
has no power either to treat a plaint filed on a
certain date as having been filed on an earlier date
so as to avoid the bar of limitation. If this is the
correct view, as I think it is, a court would not make
an order treating a counter·claim as a plaint on a
date when a suit filed on that plaint would be barred,
for the court would not make a futile order.
It seems to me that the order in the present case
is futile for the reason mentioned above. The cross·
suit which came into existence as a resl!lt of the
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
High Court's order in this case was for the accounts of
a partnership which was dissolved on July 31, 1950.
Under Art. 106 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, such a suit would be barred if filed after
July 31, 1953. The order of the High Court was
made long after that date, namely, on August 22,
1961. That order was, for the reasons earlier mentioned, completdy futile as it brought into existence
a suit which was bound to be dismissed.
The High Court following Bai Bhuri's case (1),
earlier mentioned, however, took the view that in
such a case the plaint in the cross-suit must be
deemed to have been filed when the written statement
containing the counter-claim was filed. The reason
for this view is in the judgment in Bai Bhuri's case
to which I now turn. In that case the plaintiff had
objected to an order treating the counter-claim as a
plaint in a cross-suit on the ground that the court
would thereby "be permitting an amendment to the
written statement after a suit for specific performance
is barred by lapse of time"_ The counter-claim
there, it appears, was for specific performance of a
contract. This objection was rejected and the Court
observed, "We are unable to agree with the contention ...... By putting the written statement in the
form of a plaint in a counter claim of a cross-suit,
the defendants are not seeking to make any new
averment which was not contained in the written
statement. What the defendants are seeking to do
is merely to put the written statement in the form oj
a plaint in a cr'Jss suit. To such an amendment the
rule that an amendment will not be permitted to be
made if it takes away from the oµposite party a
defence which he has acquired by lapse of time, will
not apply."
I venture to think that the contention dealt
with by the Court in Bai Bhuri' s Clise was based on a
misapprehension. There is no question of amendment
(I) (Firot Appeal No. 737 of 1951.)
1963
L~xmidaJ Doh 'P 1bh§i.
Kt1.b~1u:lfla
v.
Nar.abhai Chuni/ol
K~barw11la
S•rka1 J.
,,,,
lA•iJ&J DMy•6Mi
1°•601••1•
••
}(au6Ui Cltai/.L
.c••.,, •• ,.
Scrtcr /.
598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
when a court orders a counter-claim to be treated
as a plaint in a cross-suit, because initially a counterclaim is part of a written statement and by amendment a written statement cannot be converted into a
plaint. I am not aware of any rule which permits
of such amendment, nor has any been brought to our
notice. Indeed what is done here is to split up a
pleading expressly filed as a written statement into
two, one of which remains a written statement and
the other becomes a plaint. That is why it is said
that the counter-claim is treated as a plaint in a
"cross-suit". Even if such a thing is permissible, it
does not seem to me that it is achieved by an amendment and its propriety cannot be judged by rules
whereby amendment of pleadings is governed
Neither does it seem to me that the order can
be treated as one curing an irregularity ; as a case
where the counter-claim had been a plaint from the
beginning.but as it had not complied with the rules
concerning a plaint it had been a plaint
irregularly filed. First, the respondents never
contended that they had filed a plaint. They said,
they had filed a written statement in which they
had made a counter-claim and that counter-claim
was maintainable as such. That was their contention. They persisted in this attitude all through.
They did not even raise an issue as to whether they
were entitled to treat the counter-claim as a plaint.
It would be strange if the Court said that the respondents had filed a plaint though they did not themselves
say so. Secondly, I am not aware that a plaint and
a written statement can be combined in one pleading
so that the filing of the one is the filing of the other.
This is impossible under our procedure. It must be
taken that what had originally been filed was a
written statement, and, therefore, that no plaint had
at all been filed. If no plaint had been filed, no
question of curinr, any irregularity in the filing of a
plaint can arise.
2 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
For these reasons I would allow the appeal with
costs here and in the High Court.
BY CourtT : In accordance with the majority
opinion the appeal is dismissed witll costs subject to
the directions contained in the judgment.
. . 1963
laxmitlas /Ja/Jysihai
' ILabarw~la
v.
Nn11abht1i Cht1flilttl
Kaharwdfc:
Appeal dismi$sed.
UNION OF INDIA
v.
BIRLA COTTON SPINNING & WEAVII\G
MILLS LTD.
(B. P. SINHA a. J., J. a. SHAH and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGARjj.)
.Arbitration-Balance of pl'ice of goods llf1Jplied under o
wntract-Liability to pay admitted-Invocation of the a.rbitration clause in the contract to set off money due nnder a different
and independent contmct-Whether permi..ible-Arbitration
Act, 1940 (•T of I940), s.. 34.
The re•pondent •upplied to the appellants goods of the
value of R>. I,06;670.89 nP. under a contract..entered into by
the parties and received about Rs. 93,727/- a• part payment.
The appellant declined to pay the balance on the pica that an
amount of about R5. I0,625i- was due to the appellant under
ar:iother contract between the parties. 'l'he re~pondent tl1crcupon filed a suit before the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi,
for realisation of the amount. The appellant applied under
o. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for stay of the suit alleging
that a dispute had arisen between the parties and there being
an arbitration agreement it could be invoked by the appellant.
The respondent submitted that there was no <lispute concerning
the contract which \Va! covered by any va1icl arhitrati0n clause
and which attrarted the application of s. 34· of the Arbitration
Act,
1963
Mareh 27
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