MIRZA RAJA SHRI PUSHAVATHI VIZIARAM GAJAPATHI RAJ MANNE SULTAN BAHADUR & ORS. versus SHRI PUSHAVATHI VISWESWAR GAJAPATHI RAJ & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 March 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 403 | 1963 INSC 62
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 March 1963
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 170/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 403
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 62
Text of the judgment
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
1963
held, on the aforesaid circumstances and other evidence; that Accused-IO was an active participant in
Sardul Singh
the conspiracy. In our view, there is ample material
C1ve1shar
to justify it. In the result Criminal Appeal No. 67 of State of MaharoshtrtA
••
1959 is dismissed.
Subb• Rao J.
...
Or. A. No. 82 of 1962 dismissed.
Sentence modified.
Or. A. No. 83 of 1962 dismissed.
Sentence modified.
Or. A. No. 136 of 1959 dismissed.
Or. A. No. 172 of 1959 dismissed.
Or. A. No. 67 oj 1959 dismissed .
MIRZA RAJA SHRI PUSHAVATHI
VIZIARAM GAJAPATHI RAJ
MANNE SULTAN BAHADUR & ORS.
v.
SHRI PUSHAVATHI VISWESWAR
GAJAPATHI RAJ & ORS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAH, M. HIDAYATULLAH
and J. c. SHAH JJ.)
Hindu Law-Joint family-Partition-Impartible estateJncidenls of-Rule of incorporation-If applicable both to immov~ble and moi·able property-Family custom of impartihilily of
movablu~Alienation, power of holder-Statute abolishing estate,
J1uildings incorpnrat-d in impartible estate, if become partibleJ{adms Impartible Estates Acts, (.lllad. II of J.902), (Marl. II
of 1903) and (Jlad. 1I of 1904)-Madras Estates (Abolition and
clYllversiOn into Ryot1mri) Act, 1948 (Mad. €6 of J.948), s. 18 (4).
The Vizianai:ram family was a joint Hindu family. It
owne<). a very large estate which was impartible and devolved by
primogeniture.
At various times the holder of the est<1\e
1963
March 19
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1963
acquired other properties, moveable as well as immovable, some
of which were incorporated in the impartible estate. In 19411,
Push,,'41athi Viziaram
G11j•;11thi Raj M11n1u the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act, 1948 was enacted and the Vizianagram estate was taken
v.
Push111Mihi Visu:eswar over by the State. The holder of the estate filed a suit for parti·
Cl:j11p11t1ii Raj
tion of the joint family properties, claiming as impartible the
estate as originally granted to the ancestors of the p•rty together
with certain immovable properties subsequently acquired and
incorporated in the original estate and certain jewels described
as regalia. The suit was contested, int.r alia, on the grounds
that the subsequently acquired immovable properties were not
impartible, that the theory of incorportion could not apply to
movables and that even if the buildings had been incorporated
in the °'tate by virtue of s. 18 (4) of the Act they became
partible.
Held that the immovable property subsequently acquired
which had been incorporated in the estate originally granted
was also impartible. An ancestral estate to which the holder
has sncceeded hy the custom of primogeniture is part of the
joint estate of the undivided lfindu family. Though the other
rights enjoyed by member of a joint Hindu family are inconsislant in the case of an impartible estate the ri,~ht of survivorship
still exists. Unless the power is excluded by statute or custom,
the holder of customary impartible estate, by a declaration of
his intention, can incorporate \Vith the estate his self-acquired
irromovable property and thereupon the said property accrueo
to the estate and is impressed with all its incidents including a
custom of descent by pri_mo).{eniture. In all ~uch cases the
crucial test is one of intention. A holder of an imputible
estate can alienate the estate by gift inter vit!Qs, or even by a
will, though the family is 1mdivided; the only limitation on thh
power could be l>y a family custom to the contrary or the conditions of the tenure which have the same effect. The M idras
Impartible Estates Acts, 1902-1904 have expreS5ly m•de
impartible estates inalienable; this inalienability attaches not
only to the e>tate as originally granted but also to the pcopertie<
incorporated in it.
Shiba Pr(lJJarl Sin~h v. Rani l'rayag Kumari Devi (1932)
L. R. 59 I. A, 331, Rani Sartaj Kuari v. D•oraj Kuari (1882)
L. R. 15 I. A. 51, Venkata Surya v. Court of 1Vard8, (1888) L.R.
26 I. A. 83-Rarn R>W v. Raja of Pittapur, (1918) L. R 45
I. A. l4ll and Collector of Madra.• v. Mootoo Ramalinyi
S«thupathy, (1868) 12, Moo. I. A. 397, referred to.
The theory of incorporation does not apply to movable
property. But if a family eu•tom is proved that a c~.'!rtaiq
2 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
1969
category of movable property is recognised by the family as
impartiblc, that custom would be recognised. A family
ViziaMm
custom, like any other special custom should be ancient and l'uslwvathi
Gajap:ithi.RaJ Mann~
invariable and must be proved by clear and unambiguous
v.
evidence. In the case of a family custom, instances in support Push(JJ)a hi Visweswar
Gajopathi Raj
of the custom may not be as many or as frequent as in the
case of customs pertaining to a territory or to a community.
In dealing with family customs, the consensus of opinion
amongst the members of the family, the traditional belief
entertained by them and acted upon by them, their state·
ments and their conduct would all be relevant. The evidence
in the present case established that there was a family custom
under which some of the ceremonial jewels were treated as
forming part of the regalia which belonged to the holder of
the estate.
·
1
Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanantha Perumal Sethurayar,
(1872) 14 Moo. I. A. 570 and Abd1d Elusse-in IUian v. Bibi
Sona (1917) L. R. 45 I. A. JO, referred to.
The buildings which had been incorporated in the
impartible estate were not made partible bys. 18 (4) of the
abolition Act. The buildings falling within s. 18 (4) were
v~sted in "the person who owned them immediately before the
vCstingn. The expression "the person who owned" refers only
to the landholder and not to other persons. The fact that the
word "landholder" was not used in s. 18 (4) made no
difference.
CIVIL APPELLA'l'EJURISDIO'l'ION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 170-177of1961.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
March 30, 1956 of the former Andhra Pradesh Court
in 0. S. A. Nos. 129 and 131of1954 and 3 and 34
of 1955.
G. S. Pathal:,, P. Ram Reddy, V. V. Raghavan,
/{, S. Redd11 and A. V. V. Nair, for the appellant
(in C. A. Nos. 170 and 171 of 1961) and respondent
No. 1 (in C. A. Nos. 172 to 177of1961).
ilf. G. Setalvad, C. K. Daphtary, SolicitorGeneral of India, S. Mohan ](ummgamanga lam,
G. Ramakrishna, S. .M'Jhan, T. Suryanarayaoo
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964JV6t..
I96J
PwMu.llti Vidor_,,.
G1jopa1hi Raj A-fart/fl
v.
Pwh.utlti ViJi£1JWM
Gojapat!i Roj
i1furthy and 1'. V. R. 1'citachari, for the appellant
(in C. As. ~os. l 'i:! and 173 of l!J61) aud respondent
.No. 1 (iu C. A. .Nos. I 'ill and 171of1961) and respondent :'\o. 2 (in C. As. :\us. 174 to 177 of l!J61).
A. V. Viswanathr' Sastri, D. V. Sastri and
R. Gop<i/akrishnrin for the appellants (in C. As. Nos.
174 and 175 of UJul) and respondents Nos. 3 and 4
(in C. As. Nos. 110 to li3 of 1961) and respondents
Nos. 4 and 5 (in C. As. Nos. 170-171 of Hlul).
C. B. A(fa1uala and ]{. K. Jain, for the
appellant (in C. As. Nos. 176 and 177 of 1961) and
respondent No. 4. (in C. As. Nos. 114-175 of 1961).
1963. March l!J.
was delivered by
GajtnJ111aJl:or I.
The Judgment of the Court
GAJE~DHAGADi\AH J.-Thi5 group of eight
appeals which has been brought to this Court with a
certificate issued by the Andhra Pradesh High Court,
arises out of a partition suit filed by the plaintiff
Viziaram Gajapathi Raj II against his younger
brother Visweswar Gajapathi Raj, defcndent No. I,
his mother Vidyavathi Devi, defendant No. 2, his
defenuncle Sir Vijayanand Gajapathi Raj,
dant ~o. 3, and his grand-mothtr Lalitha Kumari
Devi, defendant ~o. 4. The parties to this liti5ation
are members of the \'izianagram family which owns a
very large estate. This estate is impartiblc and
devolves by primogeniture. The relevant genealogy
of the family which is set out at the end of this judgment clearly brings out the relationship between
the parties, and shows at a glance how the Vizianagram Estate was held by different holders from time to
time. ~arayana Gajapathi Raj may be regarded a;
the founder of the family. His son who succeeded
to the estate 011 the death of his father in 1845 can
claim to be the real makl·r of the fortunes of this
family. He managed the estate from 184ii to 187\J
and during the course or his management he bought
~ s.c.k.
st.Ji>kEME douR.t REPORts
407
a large amount of property, movable and immovable
including a large estate in and around Banaras. At Pushtit•1Jt!U Vi.!itr•m
his death he left behind him his only son Ananda G4jop1thi R<tj Mtmr1i1
Gajapathi Raj and his
daughter
Appala Pu~h.1Jvcihi••Vi.rwtswar
G,j4p1thi Rnj
Kondayamba I. Appala Kondayamba I subse·
queutly became the Maharani of Rewa. Ananda Gajentira:n.iktw J.
Gajapathi Raj died issueless on l'viay 23, 11197.
Before his death, he had executed a will bequeathing
all his properties to his maternal uncle's son Chitti
Babu. Later, on December 18, 1897, Ananda
Gajapathi Raj's mother Alak Rajeswari I adopted
Chitti Babu to her husband so that as a result of his
adoption, Chitti Babu became the adoptive brother of
Ananda Gajapathi Raj who had executed a will in
his favour before his death. It appears that chitti
Babu bad been brought up in the Vizianagram
family and when Ananda Gajapathi Raj executed
his will, it was anticipated that Chitti Babu would,
in due course, be adopted by Alak Rajeswari I.
Alak Rajeswari I died in 1901 after executing a will
by which she gave a life ei;tate in her properties to
her daughter, the Maharani of Rewa, and the
remainder to the Children of Chitti Babu. On
October 28, 1912, Chitti Babu executed a Trust Deed
in favour of a trustee for the benefit of his minor son
Alak Narayana, subject to payment of maintenance
to maintenance holders and payments due to his
creditors. On December 14, 1912, the Maharani of
Rewa died, but before her death, she had executed a
will bequeathing all her properties to Chitti Babu
for life and the remainder in equal shares to Alak ·
Narayana and his younger brother Vijayananda
Gajapathi Raj. During Chitti Babu's life-time the
Impartible Estate Acts passed by the Madras Legis·
lature in 1902, 1903 and 1904 came into force.
Chitti Babu died on September, 11, 1922. On his
deafl1, Alak N arayana succeeded to the estate.
In 1935, the Vizianagram Estate and the other
properties belonging to Alak Narayana went under
408
19~3
Pwltacatlti Vi;ia.ra.111
G•i•f!alhi R1j Mann<
"·
PuJ/rnatld ViswtS(('O'
.,ajopatlii Raj
Gaj,.dragadm J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
the management of the Court of Wards and continued
to be in such management till they were handed over
to Alak Narayana's son \'iiiar~m Gajapathi Raj,
the present plaintiff, in HH6, Alak Narayana having
died on October 25, 1937. During the time that
the estate wa~ being managed by the Court of \Vards,
Vijayananda Gajapathi Raj, defendant ~o. 3, made
a claim before the Court of Wards for his half share
in all the properties of Chitti Babu, except the
impartiblc estate. The Court of Wards referred this
claim to Sir D' Arey Reilly, a retired Judge of the
Madras High Court for enquiry. Sir D' Arey accordingly held an enquiry and submitted his report to the
Court of Wards. Thereafter the claim of defendant
compromise and on
No. ;j was settled by
October 9, 1!)4!, defendant No. 3 executed a deed
of release in favour of the plaintiff and Visweswar
Gajapathi Raj, defendant No. I who were then
represented by the C:ourt of Wards. Under the
terms of this release deed, defendant No. H received
a payment of a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-and a further
sum of Rs. 54, W3f-and, in tum, relinquished all his
claims to any share in the movable and immovable
properties of Chitti Babu including properties which
he had alleged were joint family properties. That is
how the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant
No. 2 on the one hand and their uncle, defendant
No. 3 was amicably resolved.
In 1948, the Madras Legislature passed the
Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
(Ryotwari) Act, !!)48 Mad. 2G of 194.8) (hereinafter
called the Act), and pursuant to the material provisions of the said Act, a notification was published in
August, 19,IU by which the Vitianagram Estate was
taken over by the State as from September 7, 1949.
Since the taking over of the estate by the State was
apprehended to lead to disputes between the parties,
the plaintiff chose to file the present suit No. 4!l5/l!l4!l
on the file of the High Court of Madras for partition
-
2 s.c.k.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
I96J
of the joint family properties. In this suit, he claimed
that large number of immovable properties and a Pushavathi Viii11r!.lm
substantial number of jewels were impartible, Gajapathi y,Raj Manni
whereas the other properties, both movable and im- Pushaoathi Visweswa1
Gajapathi 11.•j
movable, were partible. The High Court of Madras
passed a preliminary decree for partition in this suit Gajendragaikar J,
on September 11, 1950. This preliminary decree
declared that the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and
defendant No. 2 were each entitled to l/3rd share in
the partible properties of the joint family of which
they were members along with the deceased Alak
Narayana. As the law then stood, defendant No. 2
was not entitled to any share in the agricultural
properties of the family, and so, in the said properties
plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were held entitled to
l /2 share each.
After the preliminary decree was passed, parties
put in lists of properties and made their respective
claims in regard to them. It appeared that 106 items
of immovable properties were in suit and about 581
jewels were also involved in the controversy. As we
have already indicated, the plaintiff claimed that in
addition to the properties originally granted by the
Sanad to the ancestors of the parties, certain immov·
able properties which had been subsequently acquired
had been incorporated in the original estate by the
holder for the time being. and so, they, along with
the original estate, must be held to be impartible ;
similarly, he alleged that out of 581 jewels, 141
were items which can be conveniently described as
items of regalia which were not partible and as such,
defendants l and 2 had no share in them. This claim
was resisted by defendants 1 and 2 and that dispute
naturally raised questions both of law and fact.
At this stage, defendant No. 4 also actively
joined the dispute by filing an application
(No. 4830/1950). By this application, she claimed
that some of the items in the Toshakhana which
410
SUPREMt COUR.t Rtl.>ORTS [1964] vot.
1963
had been included in the suit constituted her 'stri·
dhan' and were, thr.reforc, not available for partiGoj11jJGhi {lrj 1l10t'1lt tion bctwern the plain1iff and dcfeudauts l and :!.
Push4Ii4Jhi Visct•au;ar According to defendant No. ·1, 1he number of jewels
Gofa~thi Raj
to which she was thus entitled was \Hi. She filed a
list of those ornaments; i6 of these which were
Gaj111ir11Ui;or J.
shown in Appendix A were, according to her case,
given to her by her husband, and 19 which were
shown in Appendix B were given to her by her
parents. Defendant ~o. 2 similarly set up a claim
to 55 items of the jewellery as her 'stridhan', where·
as the plaintiff wanted to exclude 140 items of the
jewellery on the ground 1hat they constituted 1he
regalia of the Zamindar and were impartible.
..
ru1'-a11ii Vi.?iorMn
On these pleadings, l :i issues were framed by
the learned trial Judge before passing a final decree.
In support of their respective contentions, the parties
were content to rely mainly on documelltary evi·
dcnce; except for defendant No. '1, none of them has
stepped into the witness box. Defendant No. 4 was,
however, examined on commission and she gave
oral evidence in support of her claim.
The learned trial .Judge held that the estate
was impartible by custom while it was in the hands
of Viziaram Gajapathi and Ananda Gajapathi and
that they had the power to incorporate subsequently
acquired immovable properties into the estate. He
found that when the estate became impartible under
Act II of 1!)01, the provisions of the Act took within
their purview all accretions to the estate made prior
to 18!Ji which had been incorporaled into the estate.
The question as to whether any of the subsequently
acquired properties had been incorporated in the
estate was then tried by him as a question of fact
and in doing so, he placed the onus to prove incor·
poration on the plaintiff. He also found that whatever was an integral part of the impartible zamindari
of Vizianagram before the notified date within the
-
2 s;Cl.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
1963
meaning of the Act, including lands and buildings
which had been incorporated with the zamindari, Pushauathi Vizi1"'111J
would be governed by the provisions of the Act; G11japathi v.R•j A/1111111
the apportionment of lauds would be governed by Pushovathi Vis~e~w•r.
Gajopatlri 114i
ss. 12 and 47 of the Act, whereas the buildings in·
corporated with the zamindari prior to the Act would Gaj,ndrag~dkar J;
vest in the plaintiff after the notified date and they
would not be partible. In the result, the learned
trial Judge recorded his findings on the several issues
and passed a final decree. It is unnecessary to refer
to all the details of the decree. It would be enough
merely to state the broad items allotted to the parties
which are in dispute before us. In regard to the
claim made by the plaintiff that 140 jewels con·
stituted regalia, the learned Judge recognised his
claim in respect of 36 jewels only. Those jewels
were items 1 to 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 46, 56, 57, 79,
80, 108, 116, 124, 125, 126, 127 and 128 of Appen·
dix A. Through oversight, the learned Judge had
also included item No. 25 in this list, but it is con·
ceded that that is an error. As to the plaintiff's claim
that subsequently acquired properties had been incorporated in the estate, the learned Judge upheld his
claim in respect of the Prince of Wales Market at
Vizianagram, permanent lease·hold rights in respect
of nine villages, and the Admirality House at
Madras, Waltair House and Elk House at Ooty.
Defendant No. 4's claim was partly recognised by the
learned Judge who passed a decree in h~r favour in
respect of 15 items ol jewels claimed by her. These
were items 20, 45, 49, 54, 186, 203, :l30, 348, 349,
two of the gold anklets in items 364, and 535 and
items 136, 138, 141, and 297. The reference to
the items is according to the list made by Mr.
Sathianathan (Ext. P-157). It is conceded before
us that this list included three items in Appendix
B filed by defendant No. 4, and since defendant
No. 4 had conceded the right of defendant No. 2
in respect of all the ornaments in appendix B, the
inclusion of these three items was erroneous. In
412
1963
PuJ/tat:olhi Vi.;:;Wam
Ga}apoclti &j Mannt
••
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (Hl64] vat.
other words, defendant No, 4's claim should be
treated as valid only in respect of 12 jewels under
the decree passed by the trial Court .
PushtzNtJU Yiswe.su·ar
Gli•P•t/U R.j
G•jrndraz1dAar J.
This decree ga vc rise to four appeals by
the respective parties. Plaintiff's
appeal was
No. 34/1955, defendant >l'o. l's 3/1955, defendant
No. 2's No. 129(195! and defendant No. 4's
No. Ial/l!l5!. It appears that the last appeal
was allowed to be withdrawn and instead, defendant
No. 4 was permitted to file cross-objections in regard
to her claim. These appeals were, in due course,
transferred to the High Court of Andhra because as
a result of the reorganisation of Andhra State, it is
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh that assumed
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute in
these appeals. Before the High Court, parties argued
the same questions of fact and law and pressed their
respective claims. The High Court has held that the
trial Court was right in coming to the conclusion that
the Prince of Wales Market and the permanent leasehold rights in respect of nine villages had been incorporated in the impartiblc estate. It has also held
that the trial Court was right in rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the Bungalow at Ootacamund
known, as 'Shoreham' as well as the Bungalow at
Coonoor known as 'Highlands' had been incorporattcj
in the estate and were impartible. The High Couri,
however, differed from the trial Court in respect of
three Bungalows, Admirality House, \Valtair House
and Elk House, and it came to the conclusion that
the plaintiff had failed to prove that these properties
had been incorporated. That means that these three
properties like the bungalow 'Shoreham' at Ootacamund and the Highlands at Coonoor were, according
to the Appeal Court, partiblc between the plaintiff
and defendants l & 2. In other words, the plaintiff
Jost in respect of the said three properties before the
Appeal Court. In regard to jewels, the Appeal
Court has taken the views that items l2!l and ::! fiO, in
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
1963
addition to the 36 items covered by the trial Court's
decree, should be held to constitute the regalia of the Pushauathi Vi,:iar1m
zamindar. That means that the plaintiff's claim in Gajapdthiv.Raj M111n1
that behalf succeeded to the extent of 38 jewels. In PushtWcthi Visw~lwar
G•j,pathi Raj
regard to the claim made by defendant No. 4, the
Court of Appeal considered her evidence and was not Gaj,.,Jrag•dkar J,
inclined to accept her testimony at all. In the result,
the decree passed by the trial Court in her favour
has been set aside. Thus, the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 part! y succeeded before the Court of
Appeal whereas, defendant No. 4 wholly lost her
case.
This decision of the Appeal Court has given
rise to the present group of eight appeals. Civil
Appeals Nos. 170 & l 71/1961 are by the plaintiff,
C. A, Nos. 172 & 173/l961 are by defendant No. l,
C. A. Nos. 174 & 175/1961 are by defendant No. 2
and C. A. Nos. 176 & 177of1961 are by defendant
No. 4. In his appeals, the plaintiff contends that the
Appeal Court should have recognised his claim to
treat the five buildings which are situated outside the
limits of Vizianagram Zamindari as impartible; these
buildings are : the Admirality House, the Waltair
House, the Elk House, the Little Shoreham and the
Highlands. He also argued that the Appeal Court
should have granted his claim in respect of 102 items
of jewels which he alleged constituted regalia, In
respect of this latter claim, Mr. Pathak for the
plaintiff stated before us that he would confine
his claim to 83 items of jewels and even as to that,
he did not press his case. The plaintiff's case was
therefore, substantially confined to these five house
properties.
ln their appeals, defendants 1 and 2 challenged
the correctness of the decision of the Courts below
that the Prince of Wales Market was impartible and
that the permanant lease-hold rights in respect of
nine villages were also not partible. They also con~rncjecj tqat the Courts below were ip error ill holding
414
SU PRE.ME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
that any jewels could be treated as regalia of the
Zamindar and as such impartiblc. According to
Cdj•f>dJhi Raj· .lt,fannt them, none of the 38 jewels should have been held
v.
Defendant No. 4 contends that
PuMar1.thi V'Uu·tJu-nr to be impartiblc.
Ga)•P•thi Raj
the Court of Appeal was in error in revrrsing the
decisions of the trial Court particularly when the
C11jtndra.~ail:a1 J.
conclusions recorded by the trial Court in her favour
were based mainly on the appreciation of her oral
evidence. That, in brief, is the nature of the dispute
before us in this group of 8 appeals.
/963
Pwlun:1thi Vi;:iaran1
Before dealing with the dispute between the
plaintiff and defendants l & 2, it may be convenient
to deal with the claim of defendant No. 4. She is the
widow of Chit ti Babu and the grandmother of the
plaintiff and defendant No. I. Parties have agreed
before us that her claim which was allowed by the
trial Court should be decreed in her favour subject
to the modification that the items in append.ix
B in respect of which defendant No. 4 made a
concession in favour of defendant No. 2 should be
excluded; in other words, her claim should be
confined only to 12 of the items decreed by the
trial Court in list A.
This concession has been
made unconditionally by the plaintiff and defendant
No. 2 and conditionally by defendant No. J. !\Ir.
Kumaramangalam for defendant l\'o. I stated that
his client was agreeable to have the decree passed in
favour of defendant No. 4 restored subject to the
modification just indicated, only if defendant No. 4
allows him to take his I /4th share in the jewels
allotted to her by this compromise arrangement.
This can be conveniently arranged, says Mr.
Kumaramangalam, if defendant ~o. 4 gets the jewels
allotted to her share valued by proper \'aluers and
defendant No. I is then given an option to choose
the jewels whose value would be I/4th of the total of
the jewels of defendant No. 4's share. If this I ;4th
valuation cannot be worked out with mathematical
accuracy, adjustment can be made by payment of
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
196!1
cash by one party to the other as may be found
necessary. Mr. Aggarwal who has appeared for Pu.shavathi Vi.tiar.m
defendant No. 4 expressly agrees to this condition. Gajapathi R•f ,\{c1111e
Therefore, by consent, we set aside the order passed Pusluw.athi••ViJw1sw.cr
G6j11.;4thi R•i
by the Court of Appeal and restore the trial Court's
decree passed in favour of defendant No. 4, subject Gt1jrni11gaikar J,
to the modifications and conditions just specified.
This compromise arrangement disposes of defendant
No. 4 's appeals Nos. 176 & 177 of 1961.
We would now revert to the dispute between
the plaintiff and defendants 1 & 2. In dealing with
this dispute, it is necessary to consider some points of
law which have been argued before us. The first
point which must be examined is in regard to the
character of an impartible estate such as that which
the Vizianagram family owns. Since the decision of
the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani
Prayag [{umari Debi (1), it must be taken to be wellsettled that an estate which is impartible by custom
cannot be said to be the separate or exclusive property
of the holder of the estate. If the holder has got the
estate as an ancestral estate and he has succeeded to
it by primogeniture, it will be a part of the joint
estate of the undivided Hindu family. In the illuminating judgment delivered by Sir Dinshah Mulla for
the Bo;trd, the relevant previous decisions, bearing on
the subject have been carefully examined and the
position of law clearly stated. In the case of an
ordinary joint family property, the members of the
family can claim four rights ; (I) the right of partition; (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head
of the family except for necessity; (3) the right of
maintenance; and (4) the right of survivorship. It is
obvious that from the very nature of the property
which is impartible the first of these rights cannot
exist. The second is also incompatible with the
custom of impartibility as was laid down by the Privy
Council in the case of Rani Sartaj J(u~ri v. Dearaj
J( uari ('), and the First Pittapur case-Venkata Su,ryli
\ll, (1932) l ,_R. 99 LA, 331. (2) (!888) L,R, 15 LA, 51: 10 AU, 27<-
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
v. Court of Jrards(' ). Even the right of maintenance
as a matter of right is not applicable as laid down in
the Second Pittapur Case-Ram Rao v. Ra,ia of
v.
The 4th right i:iz., the right of survi·
Pusltm:athi Viswtsw:lr Pitu1JY1ir (').
Gajapathi Raj
vorship, however, still remains and it is by reference
to this right that the property, though impartiblc,
GojrndragaJ/iar J.
has, in the eyes of law, to be regarded as joint family
property. The right of surdvorship which can be
claimed by the members of the undivided family
which owns the impartible estate should not be con·
fused with a mere spes succcsbionis. Unlike spes
succcssioni8, the right of survivorship can be
renounced or surrendered.
Pushaziathi VUitJram
Gajapathi Raj .Mannt
It also follows from the decision 111 Shiba
Prasad Singh's case (3), that unle~ the power is excluded by statute or custom, the holder of customary
impartiblc estate, by a declaration of his intention
can incorporate with the estate self-acquired immov·
able property and thereupon. the property accrues to
the estate and is impressed with all its incidents.
including a custom of descent by primogeniture. It
may be otherwise in the case of an estate granted
by the Crown subject to descent by primogeniture.
As Sir Dinshah Yfulla has pointed out, questions of
incorporation have been dealt with in several decisions of the Board as well as decisions of Indian High
Courts, but the competency of incorporation was not
challenged in any of them. It is clear that incor·
poration is a matter of intention and it is only where
evidence has been adduced to show the intention of
the acquirer to incorporate the property acquired b\·
him with the imparti ble estate of which he is a holder
that an inference can be drawn about such incor·
poration. In all such cases, the crucial test is
one of intention. It would be noticed that the
effect of incorporation in such cases is the
reverse of the effect of blending self-acquired
property with
the
joint
family
property.
In the latter category of cases where a person
(I I (18119) L.R. 26 I.A. 83: 22 Mad. 383.
(2) (1918) L.R. 4~ I.A. 148: 41 Mad, 778. (S) (1952) L.R. 59 J.A.131·
I
'
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
1988
acquires separate property and blends it with the
property of the joint family of which he is a co- PushotJthi Viziartim
parcener, the separate property loses its character as G11j•jlathi Raj Manni
a separate acquisition and merges in the joint family Pushovathi••Visw1sw1ir
property, with the result that devolution in respect
Gajapathi Rgj
of that property is then governed by survivorship Gajendr•tcikwr J.
and not by succession. On the other hand, if the
holder of an impartible estate acquires property and
incorporates it with the impartible estate he
makes it a part of the impartible estate with the
result that the acquisition ceases to be partible and
becomes impartible. In both cases, however, the
essential test is one of intention and ·so, wherever
intention is proved, either by conduct or otherwise,
an inference as to blending or incorporation would
be drawn.
It was urged before the Privy Council in the
case of Shiba Prasad Singh (1), that to allow the
operation of the doctrine of incorporation, would
really give the holder of impartible estate a right to
prescribe a customary rule of succession different
from that of the ordinary law, but this argument was
rejected on the ground that "under the Hindu
system of law, clear proof of usage", even if it be a
family usage, "will outweigh the written text of the
law, vide Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga
Sathupathy (2 ). "The power to incorporate", ob. served Sir Dinshah Mulla, "being a power inherent
in every Hindu owner applies as well to a customary
impartible Raj unless it is excluded by statute or
custom". It is, of course, true that none of the
considerations which are relevant in respect of immovable property, would apply to movable
the theory of incorporation
property and so,
cannot apply to such movable property. That,
however, is not to say that by a family custom,
movable property cannot be treated as impartible.
If a family custom is proved in the manner in which
family customs have to be proved that certain
(I) (1~32) L.R. 59 I.A. 331.
(2) (1868) 12 Moo. I.A. 397, 436,
•
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
Pu,1uzu1thi Vizicr.m
fJaj1poilii &j Mant11
v.
Pushe•thi Vis<ttsu:at
Grja;othi Raj
Gajtmlra~1ti4ar
J.
category of movable property is treated by the family
as impartible, that custom will, no doubt, be recognised. That, broadly stated, is the position of
Hindu law in respect of impartible property which
has been clcarlv enunciated in the case of Shiba
Prasad Singh. ·
There is another :;ispect of this mattl°r to which
reference may be made at this stage. Prior to the
decision of the Privy Council in the case of R<1ni
Su.rtaj Kum-i v. Deoraj Kwri ('), it was always
assumed that a holder of an ancestral impartiblc
estate cannot transfer or mortgage the said cotate
beyond his own life-time so as to bind the coparceners, except, of course, for purposes beneficial to
the family and not to himself alon~. The reason
for this view was that in a large number of cases
irnpartible estates were granted on military tenure,
arid so, if alicnatiom were freely allowed, the purpose
of the grant itself would be frustrated if not destroy·
ed. In 1888, however, this view was shaken bv
the decision of the Privy Council in lfoni S1,tr;j
Kwiri's wse ('). In that case, the holder of the
estate had gi ftcd I 7 of the villages of his estate to
his junior wife and the validity of this gift was
questioned by his son. The son's pica, howcver,
failed became the Privy Council held that "if, as
their Lordships arc of opinion, the eldest son, where
the ~Iilakshara Jaw prevails and there is the custom
of primogeniture, docs not become a co-sharer with
his father in the estate, the inalienability of the
estate depends upon custom, which must be provr.d,
or it may be in some cases, upon the nature of the
tenure". This decision was again affirmed by the
Privv Council in the First l'itt11pur case ('). As a
resuit of these decisions it must be taken to be settled
that a holder of an impartible estate can alienate
the estate by gift inter vivos, or even by a will,
though the family is undivided; the only limitation
on this power would flow from a family custom to
( l) (l8BB) L.R. 15 I.A. 51: LO All. 272.
(2) 1889 L.R. 26 I.A, 83, 22 Mad, 383,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS. 419
the contrary or from the condition of the tenµre
which has the same effect.
Soon after these decisions were pronounced by
the Privy. Council, the Madras Legislature stepped
in because those decisions very rudely disturbed the
view held in Madras about the limitations on the
powers of holders of impartible estates in the
matter of making alienations of the said estates.
That led to the passing of the Madras Impartible
Estates Acts II/1902, II/1903 and II/1904. The
Legislature took the precaution of making necessary
enquiries in regard to impartible estates within the
State and made what the legislature thought were
necessary provisions in respect of the terms and
conditions on which the said estates were held. It
may be stated at this stage that the result of the
relevant provisions of the ivladras Acts is that the
question of inalienability of impartible estates does
not depend in Madras on the family custom, but is
expressly provided for by the relevant provisions of
the statutes.
We have already observed that the principle of
incorporation does not apply to movables and we
have noticed in that connection that it is only by
proving a family custom that a class of movables
belonging to a family may be treated as impartible,
The law in regard to the proof of customs is not in
doubt. As observed by the Privy Council in the case
of Ramalakshmi Ainmal v. Sivanantha Perumal
Sethurayar ('), "it is of the essence of special usages
modifying the ordinary law of succession that they
should be ancient and invariable; and it is further
essential that they should be estabfohcd to be so by
clear and unamibiguous evidence. It is only by means
of such evidence that the Courts can be assured of
their existence, and that they possess the conditions of
antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal
title to recognition depends." In dealing with a
(I) 14 Moo, I.A. 970•
1963
Pushav~thi Yii~'aram
Gajapathi Raj Manne
y.
Pushavathi Viswe1war
Gajapdthi Rai
Gaje.ndra-gadkar J,
420
190
.J
l"uJU~•thJ Yiti•r'1111
G•j•1111hi Ncj Alnne
v.
1'1uh4oatlti Viut1Ju;111
Cdj•J«tlii lt•j
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
family custom, the same principal will have to be
applied, though, of course, in the case of a family
custom, instances in support of the custom may not be
as many or as frequent as in the case of customs
pertaining to a territory or to the community or to the
character of any estate. In dealing With family
customs, the consensus of opinion amongst the
members of the family, the traditional belief entertained by them and acted upon by them, their statements, and their conduct would all be relevant and
it is only where the relevant evidence of such a
character appears to the Court to be sufficient that a
specific family custom pleaded in a particular case
would be held to be proved, t•ide Abdul lluMain
Klian v. Bibi Sonu Daro ('). It is in the light of
these principles that we must now proceed to examine
the rival contentions urged before us in the present
appeals.
On behalf of defendants I & 2 it has been
argued before us that the effect of the provisions of
Act II of I \JilJ is that the properties covered by the
Sanad alone can be held to be impartiblc. The
Sanad which has been produced on the record of this
case (Ext. P. 7'i) and which was issued on
October 21, 181):3 shows that it confirmed the original
grant of l WO villages to the ancestor of the parties
before us and the argument is that the properties
acquired by the holders of the Zamindari estate
from savings made by them cannot claim to be
impartible. \\'e have already seen the genesis of the
Madras Act II of 1004. Section 2 (2) of this Act
defines an 'impartible estate' as meaning an estate
descendible to a single heir and subject to the other
incidents of impartible estates in Southern India.
Section 2 (:l) defines a 'Proprietor of an impartible
estate' as meaning the person entitled to possession
thereof as single heir under the special custom of the
family or locality in which the estate is situated or if
there be no such family or local custom under the
(1) (1917) L, R; f j J, A. IQ.
2 S.C.R.
SUPRil:ME C:OUR.t REPORTS
421
19~9
general custom regulating the succession to imparti ·
ble estates in Southern India. Section 3 is the I ruhovathi Viziaram
principal section of this Act and it provides that the GajapathiY.Raj Mam11
cstates,included in the Schedule shall be deemed to Pvs/r4DDl11i Viswtswar
~ojepathi Rqj
be impartible estates. Section 4 (1) imposes restri·
ctions on alienations of impartible estates, and s. 4 (2)
provides for permissible alienations. With the other
provisions of this Act we are not concerned. The
Schedule enumerates the zamindari estates districtwise. Mr. Setalvad contends that the very fact that
the Vizianagram estate is specified under two
districts wherein its properties are situated, shows
that it is only the property which was granted by the
Sanad that is intented to be covered by the Schedule
and therefore,, governed by section :3 of this Act.
If the holders of the estates have made subsquent
acquisitions, they cannot claim to be impartible,
because they are outside the Vizianagram estate as
described in the Schedule. We are not impressed by
this ii.rgument. The fact that the Vizianagram estate
is shown under two districts is obviously referable to
the requirements of administrative convenience. There
can be no doubt that as a result of the enquiries
made in that behalf, the legislature was satisfied that
certain estates in the State of Madras were impartible and the legislature was anxious to declare their
impartibility and to prescribe restrictions on their
alienations. This became necessary as a result of
the Privy Council's decisions to which we have
already referred. Therefore, it seems clear that the
Vizianagram estate included in the Schedule to. this
Act must be deemed to include all the impartible
property constituting the said estate. The principle
of incorporation which has been recognised
by the customary law has had its operation after the
Sanad was granted and before the Act of 1904
passed, and if by the operation of the said principle
subsequently acquired properties had, in fact, been
incorporated by the holder of the zamindari for ihe
time being with the impartible estate, that would
was
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
have formed an integral part of the estate and WO\lld
Pwlionum Vi.rioram be included in the Vizianagram · estate as dcscri.bed
Gajapathi Raj M4M1 in the Schedule lo this Act. Whether or not any
v.
PwlcacaJlri Vi1w1rwor particular property not included in the sanad ·but
Gqjapalhi Hoj
subsequently acquired has been incorporated is a
question of fact and it will have to be decided on
Cajt11tlro1adk4r /,
its own merits. But it would not be right to contend that even if certain immovable properties
had been incorporated before this Act was passed,
they would not be included in the estate as described in the Schedule and would, therefore, be outside
the purview of this Act. Therefore,· the argument
that the effect of Act II of 1904 is to prevent the
plaintiff from making any claim that subsequently
acquired properties have been incorporated, cannot
be sustained.
The next question which has been strenuously
urged by !\fr. Setalvad is in regard to the buildings
which have been found lo have been incorporated
with the imparible estate. ~fr. Setalvad contends
that as a result of the provisions of s. 18 (4) of the
Act, defendants 1 & 2 arc entitled to claim a share
in the buildings lo which the said provision applies.
For deciding this question it is necessary to refer to
some of the definitions prescribed by s. 2 and other
relevant provisions of the Act. Before doing so,
however, let us read s. 18. Section 18 (1) deals
with buildings situated wit11in the limits . of an
estate, which immediately before the notified date,
belonged to any landholder thereof and was then
being used by him as an office in connection with
its administration and for no other purpose, and it
provides that such buildings shall vest in the
Government, free of all encumbrances, with effect
on and from the notified date. Section 18(2) deals
with buildings which belonged to any such land·
holder and the whole or principal part whereof was
then in the occupation of any religious, educational
or charitable institution, and it provides that they
2
s.d.R.
SUPREME cotJR.t REPORTS 423
shall also vest in the Government, free of all encum·
brances from the same date, There is a proviso to
this sub-section which it is unnecessary to consider.
Section 18 (3) then deals with buildings which fell
either under clause (i) or clause (ii) on July 1, 1947,
but
which
had been sold
or otherwise
transferred or ceased to be used for the purposes
specified in clauses (i) and (ii) between July 1, 1947
and the notified date, and it provides that in respect
of such buildings, their value shall be assessed by the
Tribunal in such manner as may be prescribed, and
the Tribunal shall pay to the Government such
value from out of the compensation deposited in its
office under s. 41, sub-s. (1). It is common ground
that the buildings in respect of which the present
argument has been urged fall under s. 18(4). Section
18(4) reads as under:"Every building othl!r than a building referred
to in sub-sections (I), (2) and (3) shall, with
effect on and from the notified date, vest in the
person who owned it immediately before that
date; but the Government shall be entitled :
•
(i)
in every case, to levy the
assessment thereon; and
appropriate
(ii) in the case of a building_ whi.ch vests in a
person other than a landholder, also to the
payments which such person was liable
immediately before the notified date to
make to any landholder in respect thereof,
whether periodically or not and whether
by way of rent or otherwise, in so far as
such payments, may accrue due on or
·
after the notified date."
Mr. Setalvad suggests that the buildings falling under
s. 18 (4) vest in the person who owned them im·
mediately before that date and that takes in the
1963
PuJhavatlii Vizit1.ram
Gajt1.Ji~thi Raj Ma.1111"
v.
Pushavathi Vi.tWesWQr
Gaj4pathi RaJ
G~j1ntfrtigadfar J.
424 SUPREJ\!E COURT REPORTS [l!IG4] \rot.
1'6!1
P~VWoram
Gofepclri ~ M"'""
Y.
Pusliac6t!U VUwisw01
Gajapolhi R•j
G<Jj11fir.,./J;01 J.
members of the plaintiff's family. He relics on
the fact that according to the decision of the Privy
Council in Shiba Prasad Si11gl1 's case, an impaniblc
estate is joint family property devolution to which
is governed by the rule of survivorship and that
inevitably makes the members of the family owners
of the said property in a theoretical sense. The
right of the members of the family to succeed to the
property is not speg succcssionis, and so, they can
claim to be persons who owned the property along
with the plaintiff immediately before the notified
date. In support of this argument, 1\fr. Setalvad
has naturally relied on the fact that whereas s. 18,
sub·ss. ( !) and (:!) specifically refer to a landholder,
s; 18(4) does not use the word 'landholder' but refers
to the person who owned the property, and this
departure is intended to cover a larger class of
persons than the landholder. Prima facie, the
argument does appear to be attractive; but when we
examine the matter closely in the light of the defini·
tions, it would be clear that the expression
"the person who owned" refers only to the landholder and no other person. Section 2 (8) defines a
landholder as including (i) a joint Hindu family,
where the right to collect the rents of the whole or
any portion of the estate vests in such family; and (ii)
a darmila inamdar; ands. 2 (l 2) defines a 'principal
landholder' as meaning the person who held the
estate immediately before the notified date. Now,
if we bear in mindt he definition of the word 'land·
holder', it would be noticed that the joint Hindu
family consisting of the plaintiff
and defendants l & 2 cannot claim the benefit of s. 18 (4). It
is the landholder or the proprietor as defined under
the earlier Act of IH04 that is contemplated by the
expression "the person who owned" in sub-s. (4) of
s. 18. Besides, if we take into account s. 18 (4)
(ii) where it is provided that in the case of a building
which vests in a person other than a landholder,
it would follow that the person who is specified
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREl'VIE COURT REPORTS
425
ins, 18 (4) must be a landholder and no other.
It is true that the legislature might well have used
that word ins, 18 ("ll; but the change in the use of
the relevant words in s, 18 (4) does not, in our
opinion, justify the argument that a larger class of
persons is intended to be included within the said
clause.
There is also another aspect of this matter
which points to the same conclusion. Section 43 of
the Act provides for the apportionment of compensation in the case of certain impartible estates, and
the class of persons who are entitled to claim apportionment is limited bys, 45 (2) (a) and (b). If the
construction for which Mr, Setalvad contends is
accepted, it will lead to this anomalous result that
whereas the apportionment of compensation can be
claimed by the narrower class of persons specified by
s, 45, a much larger class of persons would be entitled
to claim the benefit of s, 18 (4). That obviously
could not have been the intention of the legislature.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the Courts below were
right in holding that defendants l and 2 cannot
claim the benefit of s, 18 (4),
That takes us to the question as to whether the
Appellate Court was right in its conclusions on the
issues raised by the contentions of the respective
parties in regard to incorporation of buildings in the
impartible estate, In this connection, we will first
deal with the pleas raised by defendants I & 2.
Mr. Setalvad contends that the courts below were in
error in holding that the Prince of Wales Market
built at Vizianagram forms part of the impartible
estate. This market was constructed by Vijayaram
Gajapathi in 1876 on a site which admittedly
belonged to the estate, It appears from the report
submitted by Mr. Sathiauathan that when Vijayaram
Gajapathi returned from Banaras and assumed charge
of the estate from the District Collector, he set out
19G3
Pushavathi ViziartJHt.
Gajapallli Raj ft{anne
v.
Pushavtlthi Visw1swar
G•japathi Raj
G(l.jendrozo.dkar I.
426
1963
Fuil;.ntalhi V1.;:i111 mu
Gejr.futtlri !<tJj ,\/anrrt
..
l'usha;.:athi Viiwesu.·ar
GtJjap.lhi Rr;j
G'sjtniratadA·ar J.
SUPREME C0URT REPOR'rs [1964]
vot.
to improve the condition of the town, Accordingly,
roads were laid, drinking- water wells and tanks were
consllucted and hospitals, schools and colleges were
opened. He recognised the need for a proper
market, and so, in 1876 the formation of the market
had been completed. The whole of the market was
sub-divided into four compartments- the gr~in
market, the timber market, the cattle market and the
fish market. The l\funicipal Council approved of
the opening of this new market and directed the
removal of all the then existing markets to the Prince
of Wales '.vfarket. Evidence shows that the management of the market was entrusted to the Municipality
and was carried on undt'r its supervision. In the
courts below, reliance was placed by the plaintiff on
several facts to show that this market had been in'
corporated into the impartible estate by Vijayaram
Gajapathi. It was pointed out that the :vfunicipality corresponded with the holders of the Zamindari at all stages that the income of the property was
shown in the Ayan accounts. that the accounts
maintained a distinction between Ayan accounts
which referred to the estate and family accounts,
that the market was treated as a unit of administration in the Zamindari for the purpose of management and for collection of fees, that Government also
treated the property as that of the Samsthanam, that
:Mr. Sathianathan in his report also took the view
that the property belonged to the Samsthanam. that
the occasion for the building was to commemorate
the visit of the Prince of Wales to India in 187i). that
the object of the building was to provide a public
amenity along with others for the town of Vi~iana
gram, the headquarters of the estate; that during the
time that the Court of Wards was in its management,
it seemed to treat the property as forming part of the
impartible estate, and, on the whole, the course of
conduct shows that it was always treated as such.
!I.fr. Setalvad has no doubt quarrelled with some of
the reasons given by the Appellate Court in support
2 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
42_1
of its conclusion that the Prince of \Vales Market
had been incorporated in the impartible estate. It Push11walhi _ViziAmm
Manne
may be conceded that some of the reasons set out in Gaj1Jpatlii-_Raj
v.
the judgment of the Court of Appeal are inconclu- Pushavslhi Visweswar
sive. But there are two considerations which have · G?j'f!athi /laj
weighed in our minds in dealing . with this aspect of Gajmdragatikar J.
the matter in the present appeals. The first consideration is that the question as to whether a particular immovable property has been incorporated with
the impartible estate or not is ultimately a question
of fact; no doubt, the decisive test being one of intention, and both the courts have concurred in holding that the Market must be held to have been incorporated with the impartible estate. Besides, there
are two outstanding facts in respect of this Market
which cannot be ignored. It has been built on a
site admittedly belonging to the estate, and it has
been built to afford a public amenity to the citizens
of Vizianagram. It is not likely that in 1876 when
this Market was built by Vijayaram Gajapathi he
could have thought of the market as a profit yielding
business; he must have thought of it as a project
undertaken by him in his capacity as a zamindar
responsible for the well-being of the citizens of Vizianagram and in that sense, at the very time that he
thought of building the Market, he must have intended to treat that as part of the impartible estate.
That, in substance, is the view taken by the courts
below and we see no reason to interfere with it.
The other items of properties in respect of
which Mr. Setalvad has challenged the conclusions
of the courts below is in regard to permanent leasehold rights in respect of 9 villages. This is item
No. 31 in issue No. 3 framed by the trial Court. The
villages in qurstion are : Thummapala, Annamraju·
peta, Kottavalasa, Abmativalasa, Jammu, Duvvam,
Chintapallipeta, Seripet~, Manesam Sudha and
Sujjangivalasa. These villages are held under a permanent Mustajari lease by Mr. Venkata Reddi. Both
428 SUPREMt COURT Rt':POR1'S [1964,] VOL.
1963
the courts below have found that this Reddi was only
a nominee of the Vizianagrarn Samsthanam and that
the leasehold interest was an accretion to the estate.
PuJ"41.·aflU ~'i1wtsUJ:Jr In our opinion, the conclusion of the courts below is
Gt1jo/J11th.i Raj
obviously right because a bare recital of the relevant
facts which terminated in the acquisition of the said
G'ajrndrncari/;ar J.
leasehold rights by Mr. Rcddi would speak for itself.
These nine villages originally formed part of the
properties granted to the family by the Sanad. It
appears that some time before 1850 these villages
were sold for arrears of pcislu;kush and they were
purchased by the Zamindar of Bobbili. Subsequently, the purchaser filed a suit for establishing his
rights in respect of the said villages. Government
intervened and brought about an ambicablc settlement between the two Zamindars. This settlement
(Ext. P-112) provided, inter ali.a, tbat the said villagts
should be given on a permanent nmstajuri lease to
Mr. Venkata Reddi and that the Zamindar of
Vizianagram should execute a guarantee letter in
favour of the Agent in respect of the amount payable
by the lessee. Pursuant to this term, the Raja of
Vizianagram passed a letter to the Agent on
January 10, 185i. The purchaser, Raja of Bobbili,
also wrote a letter to the Agent agreeing to withdraw
the suit, and so, the lease came to be excutcd. Under
the lease, the bill inukhl was fixed at Rs. 22,568/· per
annum. There is also other correspondence in respect of this transaction which shows that the Raja of
Vizianagram treated the leasehold interest as his
own and was very actively interested in the transaction. It was presumably thought derogatory to the
dignity of the Raja of Vizianagram that he should
take a lease from the Raja of llobbili. The trust
deed executed by Chittibabu in rn12 also shows that
Chittibabu recognised that the lease-hold rights
formed part of the impartiblc estate and the conduct
of the trustee who took up management of the estate
supports the same conclusion. A portion of two of
the said villages was acquired by the Government
1"1/dia( athi i '1.:iaro.:11
C:ajcftJthi llaj ,\fnnnt
v.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
1963
for the construction of a railway crossing between the
villai:e of Alamanda and the town of Vizianagram. Pushtwathi Vizior•m
The proceedings taken for the apportionment of com- Gajapcthi v.RQj MMinl
pemation show clearly that the two rival claimants Pushav•thi Viswuw<Ar
G•i•Palhi Raj
for compensation were the Raja of Bobbili and the
}{aja of Vizianagram, and that the dispute was settled Gaj1ndrazadk1r J,
on the basis that the lands had reverted to the Vizianagram Samsthanam subject to the annual charge of
Rs. 22,568/-. It is common ground that all these
villages are surrounded by the other estate villages
aad that the officials in their correspondence have
alway5 treated the leasehold rights as forming part of
the estate. These facts clearly indicate that the
courts below were right in accepting the plaintiff's
case that the villages formed part of the impartible
estate.
The next point which has been urged before
us by Mr. Setalvad as well as Mr. Sastri on behalf
of defendants 1 & 2 respectively is that the Court
of Appeal was in error in holding that 38 jewels can
be created as constituting regalia and as such,
impartible between the plaintiff and defendants
l & 2. It will be recalled that the trial Court had
upheld the plaintiff's case in respect of 36 jewels,
whereas the Court of Appeal. has added two jewels
to the said list; and defendants 1 & 2 · seriously
quarrel with the correctness of this conclusion.
In attacking the correctness of this finding,
Mr. Setalvad has argued that it is inappropriate to
speak of regalia in connection with the Vizianagram
family, because it was not a ruling family, and there
could be no occasion for coronation as such. He
has also urged that even if there was some justification for installation while the zamindari estate was
in existance, after the abolition of the zamindari
estate as a result of the Act which was passed in
1948, there could be no occasion for any installation
and the plea that certain jewels constituted regalia
430
1963
Pusltat·athi Vi~iaram
•aiapathi R•j ,1fn1:11e
v.
f'uJ./uu:all:i Viswtsucr
Gajapa1Jii RtJj
(;ajtndrogddAar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964JVOL.
must, therefore, be rejected. It is true that the
original Sanad (Ext. P-77) granted to the ancestors
of the parties was in the nature of a grant for
military service; but it is by no means clear that as
zamindars, the family never exercised what may
euphemistically be described as power and authority
of a ruling family.
In the first half of
the Hith Century, the Saranjamdars
and the
Zamindars who received grants from ruling
monarchs regarded themselves as petty chieftains or
rulers and purported to exercise authority in that
behalf over the villages granted to them. In fact,
we have it in evidence that an installation ceremony
was held in 1922 and it was stated at the Bar that
it was also celebrated in l!l4 i after the plaintiff
attained majority. Besides installation, there many
be other ceremonial occasions on which j<:wcls
described as regalia may be worn by the holder of
the Zamindari and his wife. The argument that
the abolition of the Zaminrlari
estate must
automatically terminate the customary impartibility of the jewels which were
treated as
regalia by the family, overlooks the fact that many
times custom outlives the condition of things which
gave it birth. As was observed by Lord Atkinson
in delivering the opinion of the Board in Rai
J(ishore Singh v. JI st. (;,ihenabai ('), "it is dillicult to sec why a family should not similarly agree
expressly o:· impliedly 10 continue to observe a cus·
tom necessitated by the condition of things existing
in primitive times after that condition
had
completely altered. Therefore, the principle embodied in the expression 'cessat ratio ccssat lex' docs
not apply where the custom outlives the condition
of things which gave it birth." That is why we
think, the contention raised on the ground that
there was no justification for regalia in early times at
all and that if initially there was any justification,
it ceased after the abolition of the Zamindari Estates,
cannot be upheld.
(t) A.I. R. (1919) P. C. 100,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREIVIE COURT REPORTS
431
1963
The main attack against the finding of the
Court of Appeal, however, proceeds on the basis Pushavathi Viziaram
that Chittibabu took the whole of the estate as a devi- Gajapathi v,Raj Manne
see under the will executed by Ananda Gajapathi Pusho.1Jathi Visweswilr
Gajapathi- Raj
Raj and not as an adopted son of Vijayaram Gajapathi Raj. We have already noticed that Ananda Gajendrag'adkar J;Gajapathi had executed a will on July 23, 1896 be·
queathing the whole of his property to Chittibabu
and that Chittibabu was subsequently adopted on
December 18, 1897. In other words, the will of
Ananda Gajapathi spoke from May 23, 1897 when
he died and the argument is that before Chittibabu
was adopted by Alak Rajeswari, the property bequeathed by Ananda Gajapathi's will had already
vested in him as a devisee legatee under the will.
That being so, even if some of the jewels belonging
to the Vizianagram family were, by family custom,
treated as impartible, the said custom ceased to
be operative and the property came in the hands of
Chittibabu free from the burden of that custom.
It has been emphasised before us that in both the
courts below, parties have proceeded to a trial on
this basis and it is urged that once the full significance ofthis important fact is realised, it would be
noticed that the proof of custom attaching to the
impartibility . of the jewels would become very
dillicult. This aspect of the matter, it is urged, has
not been considered by the courts below. It is also
contended that Chittibabu was a minor until I 911 and
even after he became a major the property seemed
to be substantially under the control of the Maharani
of Rewa who was a creditor of the estate to a very
large extent. Reliance is placed on a statement
made in one of the letters of Chittibabu that he had
not seen the jewels of the family and it is suggested
that the Court would need strong evidence in support
of the plea that Chittibabu and those who followed
him have by their conduct furni•hed such satisfactory
evidence about the custom of impartibility as to
justify the plaiqtiff's claim in respect of the 38 jewels.
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
If at the time when Chittibabu got the estate under
the will of Ananda Gajapathi the jewels could not
G•j•fUJlri Raj .Ha'"' be said to be impressed with any family custom of
v.
Pu1h~t:tJ 11ri Viswuwar impartibility, it will be necessary to establish such
Gajopathi Raj
custom subsequent to the acquisition of the property
by Chittibabu and that, it is argued, has not been
Gfljtni1agaJkar J.
successfully done in the present case.
Pw!ia1'4thi Vi;:iaram
On the other hand, though, technically, it may
be true that Chittibabu must be deemed to have
got the property as a devisee under the will of
Ananda Gajapathi we cannot ignore the fact that
Chittibabu was brought up in the Vizianagram
family and was adopted soon after Ananda Gaja.
pathi died. It is remarkable that when Chittibabu
had to face a challenge to his title in suit No. 18
of 1903, he resisted the challenge by setting up his
own adopt ion in support of his title and wh~n the
said litigation ended in a compromise decree in
appeal :'-lo. 114 of l!lil!J on March 12, l\J!a, the
plaintiffs who had challenged Chittibabu's title fully
admitted the validity and the binding character of
his adoption by .:\faharani Alak Rajeswari to her
husband. Therefore, it is perfectly clear that when
Chittibabu came in possession of the property and
had to establish his title to it, he relied more prominently on his adoption than upon the will executed in his favour by Ananda Gajapathi. When the
circumstances under which the said will was executed
and the adoption of Chittibabu which followed
are taken into account, the attitude adopted by
Chittibabu can be easily understood and apprrciated. He was brought up by Alak Rajeswari from
his childhood and even Ananda Gajapathi anticipated
that he would be adopted by Alak Rajeswari since
Ananda G~japathi had lost hi' wife and had no son.
The adoption deed r.xecuted by Alak Rajeswari
clearly shows that Chittibabu was treated as the
member of the family from the start. Therefore,
11fter Chittibabt1 rntered the family as the adopted
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPRE1\1E COURT REPORTS
433
1963
son, all the members of the family believed that the
line continued without interruption and Chittibabu PusluvaJhi VU:iaram
and Maharani of Rewa and all others looked upon Gajapathiv.R4i Mann~
the property as belonging to the Vizianagram family PushQvllhi Visweswar
Gy1pathi Raj
which was then held by the adopted member of the
family. Even technically, the adoption of Chittibabu Gajendragadkar J,
would relate back to the date of his adoptive
father's death and in that sense a break in the
continuity of the line would be avoided. But apart
from this technical aspect of the matter, we must have
regard to the attitude adopted by the parties and
their course of conduct at the relevant time when
we are dealing with the question of family custom.
The argument urged by defendants 1 & 2 naturally
assumes that prior to the death of Ananda Gajapathi
there was a custom in the family which treated
certain jewels as constituting the regalia of the
Zamindar. If that is so, it would not be easy to
accept the argument that by the death of Ananda
Gajapathi, the past custom was cut as under and the
arrival of Chittibabu on the scene as an adopted son
made a vital difference to the continuance of the said
custom. Chittibabu became a major in 19 ll, was
married, had children, ·and the family grew in
numbers thereafter and yet, throughout this period,
as we will presently point out, the parties did not
regard Chittibabu as a stranger who had arrived at
the s·cene by virtue of the will executed in his favour
by Ananda Gajapathi, but as an adopted son of
Vijayaram Gajapathi who continued. the line and
held the property subject to all the traditions and
customs of the family. It is true that in order to
uphold the plaintiff's plea in respect of the 38 jewels,
the Court will have to be satisfied that there is
evidence in regard to the conduct of parties subse·
quent to Chittibabu's adoption, but if evidence has
been adduced by the plaintiff in regard to the
conduct of parties subsequent to 1897 and that
evidence otherwise appears to be satisfactory and ·
cogent, it would be no apswer (o the effectivepess· of
434
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
the said evidence to contend that Chittibabu got the
estate as a devisee and not as an adopted son. In
GlljopaJhi Roj Moruu the matter of the proof of family custom, it is not the
v.
PuJ&u11hi VisWtlWtar technicalities of the law that would prevail but the
Gaj•P.thi R•j
evidence of conduct which unambiguously proves
that the parties wantej to continue the old custom,
Gaj1nd1o.io:JUr /,
as though Chittibabu who had come into the
family by adoption had, in substance, got the
property as such adopted son. That is why we think
the courts below were right in not attaching undue
importance to the effect of the will executed by
Anada Gajapathi in favour of Chittibabu.
PwhnotJU YitWa:m
Let us then consider whether the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff is sufficient to prove the
custom rlcadcd by him in regard to the 38 jewels.
Some o this evidence is prior to 18!l7, but the most
imporrant piece of evidence is subsequent to 1897.
The first document on which the plaintiff relics is
the will of Ananda Gajapathi himself (Ext. P-6).
In this will, Ananda Gajapathi bequeathed all his
movable and immovable property to Chittibabu
subject to the other liabilities mentioned in the will.
In describing the propertic; the testator refers to the
movable and immovable property of the Samstha·
nam as well as his personal property to~ether with
all rights, titles, privileges, honours and msignias of
the family. It would be noticed that the properties
of the Samsthanam which arc impartible properties
arc described as both movable and immovable and
that shows that the testator recognised the existence
of a family cmtom which treated some movable
properties as being impartible since they belonged to
the Samsthanam.
The deed of adoption (Ext. P-7) executed in
favour of Chittibabu recites the material facts leading to his adoption and refers to the authority conferred on the adoptive mother by her husband to
make an adoption, if necessary, Alak Rajeswari
tt
~ ··
_,
2 s.c.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
1963
the adoptive mother, executed a will on January 15,
1898, (Ext. P-9). In this will, she bequeathed her Push1Wathi Viziar am
properties to her daughter for her life and the Gojapathiv.Roj Manne
remainder to Chittibabu whom she had brought up Pushavathi ViswtJwar
Ctefapuhi Raj
since his birth in her family and to wqom her son
Ananda Gajapathi had bequeathed all his properties. Gajendragadkar J.
On December 14, 1911, the Maharani of Rewa
executed a will (Ext. P-10). This document is very
important from the plaintiff's point of view. By her
will, the Maharani bequeathed all her properties to
Chittibabu. Paragraphs 5 & 6 of this will
are relevant. They read as under :
"5.
The Vizianagram Samsthanam owes me
a sum of about 17 lakhs of rupees out of
which 9 lakhs represent the amount of
loans which I have made to the Samsthanam and 8 lakhs represent part of the
legacy due to me under the will of my
deceased brother which sum I have also
lent to the Samsthanam. My own jewellery
is considerable. It comprises jewels given
to me by my father, mother, brother and
by my husband as well as those purchased
by myself. As regards the state jewellery
in my possession such as Sarpesh N akshatra J oth, Jayamala, Emeralds Bhjuaband,
Diamond Bujuaband and emerald and
pearl necklace in the central pendant on
which is inscribed the name of my mother
in several langu31ges, it is part and parcel
of the Samsthanam and impartible and
inalienable property. The State. jewels
are Regalia and heirlooms of the family
of Vizianagram passing along with and as
part of the estate.
6.
I hereby pequeath all my movable and
immovable properties subject to the
several le~acies and clirectiops herein
..
436
1963
Push~z:athi Viz;.ram
Gnjapmhi Roj Mannt
v.
Pushavathi Viswesw01
Gajapathi Raj
GtJjtndragadkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
contained, to Chittibabu Vizia Ramaraju,
Rajah of Vizianagram for his life only
on condition that he abides by the provisions of this will and that he does not
ali\!natc and keep intact all the State
jewellery as well as the following jewels
of mine. (I) Necklace of emeralds and
diamonds (2) diamond and gold bangles
used by me which I wish to be preserved
along with state jewels."
These paragraphs show that the Maharani who was
the creditor of the Samsthanam for such a large
amount of 17 lakhs of rupees, was very much interested in good management of the properties of the
Samsthanam and her relations with the Samsthanam
and Chitrihahu in particular were very cordial.
Paragrnryh :) shows that as a security for the loan
which she bad advanced to the Samsthanam, certain
jewels had hccn kept with her. Out of these jewels,
she described five jewels as constituting State Regalia;
they are Sarpesh :'\akshatraJoth, Jayamala, Emerald
Bujuaband, Diamond Bujuaband and Emerald and
Pearl necklace in the central pendant on which is
inscriucd the name of her mother in several languages. The first of these five has not been identified
but the four others have been identified and these
four have been described by the ~faharani as forming
part and parcel of the Samsthanam and impartible
and inalienable property. It is true that by paragraph () she purports to impose an obligation on
Chittibabu not to alienate the said items of State
jewellery as also two jewels of her own which ~he
had specified in the said paragraph. ':'low, it is clear
that at the time when this will was executed by the
:'viaharani of Rewa, there was no dispute pending
in regard to the existence of any State jewellery; her
relations with Chittibabu wer~ good and the statement that certain jewels formed part of the State
jewellery was n•t in hec interest. In fact, she was
-
>·~
2 S.C.R. StJl>REME cotJRt REPORTS
437
1963
disposing of all the property in favour of Chitti
Babu, and the statements made by her as to the Pusha<1athi Vh:ial'am
existence of the State jewels can, without any diffi- Gajapo.thi v.Raj A-fanne
culty, be taken to be the statements bonafide made Pushavothi Viswtswar
Gajapathi Raj
by a person in her position who had ample means
of knowing the family traditions and who was, Gajendragadkar J.
besides, actually supervising the administration of
the estate. Both the courts below have naturally
relied upon this statement in support of their
conclusion that even after Chitti Babu was adopted,
the family tradition and custom of treating certain
jewels as impartible was adopted and continued.
The deed of trust exe«uted by Chittibabu on
October 28, 1912, merely shows that he recognised
the existence of two kinds of property, one belonging
to the Zamindari which was impartible and the other
which was partible. We will have occasion to refer
to this document later in dealing with the points
raised by the plaintiff in his appeals.
The next important evidence in support of the
plaintiff's case is furnished by the conduct of
defendant No. 3 when he made a claim for partition
before the Court of Wards. In his statement of claims
defendant No. 3 clearly admitted the existence of
jewellery which was treated as State regalia. The
effect of this admission cannot be under-estimated.
Defendant No. 3 as the junior member of the
generation was asking for his share and since the property in question is of a very large magnitude, it is
not possible to assume that defendant No. 3 did not
consult his lawyers before he made his claim and yet
he expressly admitted the existence of certain jewels
which, by the tradition of the family, were treated
as State Regalia and, therefor(', impartible. We have
already seen that he was paid more than Rs. 10 lakhs
in satisfaction of his full claims and thereafter he
passed a deed of relinquishment in favour of the
plaintiff and defendant No. 1.
..
43S
J!MS
Fusha~othi".Vi.ri4ram
Gojo'°tlii R•j Mantc1
••
Pushoothi Viswuw11
.1ajapalhi Raj
Gaj111,r:1gat!Mr J,
SUPREME COURT R.EPotrrs [1964.] vot.
During the course of the management of the
estate the Court of Wards made a survey of the
Vizianagram estate jewellery in I !J46 (Ext. P-160).
In that behalf the Court of Wards issued instructions
pointing out to the existence of the ceremonial
jewellery and suggested that the said jewellery should
be reduced to the minimum really necessary for
ceremonies hereafter according to modem standards.
During the course of this survey, defendant No. 2
contended that jewellery intended to be wom on
various occasions by the ladies, men or boys of the
family formed part of the impartible estate and
descended to the holder of it. The survey report also
shows that the ornaments which were clamied to be
regalia and intended for ceremonial use were, in
fact, kept together with the kiritam and its
pattani which are admittedly ceremonial. Therefore,
we are satisfied that, on the whole, the courts below
were right in coming to the conclusion that both prior
to 18!J7 and subsequent to 1897 when Chittibabu was
adopted, the family has always and consistently treated
some ceremonial jewels as forming part of the regalia
which belonged to the holder of the Zamindari estate.
That naturally raises the question about the
identity of these jewels, and the finding recorded by
the Appeal Court in this matter rests frincipally on
two documents. The first is the wil executed by
the Maharani of Rewa and the other is an entry
in the list of jewels made by Mr. Fowler which has
been signed by Mr. V. T. Krishnamachari and
defendant No. 4. We have seen how the Maharani of
Rewa referred to five jewels constituting the regalia of
the Zamindari Estate!. The list signed by Krishp~ma
chari and defendant No. 4 shows that on the
occasion of the installation ceremony of Alak Narayana Gajapathi which took place on September 29,
1922, ornaments described as I to 19 were taken out.
The entry begins thus : "Taken out for the installation ceremony on the 29th September" and then
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORtS
439
1963
follows the list. Both the courts below have held .ihat
this list shows that the jewels and articles specified· in PulhaDathi Vi.r;ior 1m
the list were treated as regalia and were intended to Gaj11pathi Raj Mo1111e
be used on ceremonial occasions. That is why treat- Pushtmothi••Viswe.swa,
Gaj~j>allii Rllj
ing this list and the will of Maharani of Rewa as the
safe basis, the Court of Appeal has come to the con- Gajentl.rag4Jka J.
clusion that 38 jewels claimed by the plaintiff must
be held to be regalia and not subject to partition.
It has been urged before us that it is not shown when
the ornaments mentioned in the will of Maharani of
Rewa or Krishanamachari's list were actually purchased and it is argued that unless it is shown that
these ornaments were purchased long before 1911 or
1922, it would be difficult to impress upon them the
character of impartibility. We do not think that
this argument is well-founded. The family custom
may well be that ornaments which are treated as
essential for certain ceremonial occasions like the installation ceremony, or other auspicious ceremony in
the family, would be impressed with the character of
impartibility and in order that the custom should
succeed, it is not always necessary that they must
have been purchased long before and must have been
used as such for a fairly long time. As the courts
below have observed, the character of most of these
ornaments is such that they would be needed on
ceremonial occasions. Besides, it is not unlikely that
these articles which were taken out on September 29,
1922, may have been kept separately together. It is
also pointed out that some of the articles mentioned
in the list, such as serial Nos. 7, IO and 11, are now
treated as belonging to defendant No. 2, and the
same comment is made in respect of ornament No. 5
described in paragraph 5 of the will of Maharani of
Rewa. It must, however, be remembered that though
certain ornaments may have been treated as regalia
and as such impartible, there was nothing to prevent
the holder of the estate from making a gift of these
ornaments to members of the family. If, for instance,
one of the ornaments mentioned in paragraph 5 of
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]V0t.
1969
Maharani's will was gifted to the daughter-in-law in
the
family, that will not necessarily disprove the
Pwh«Jolhi V"uidr~m
Gqjapotlri Raj MoMt recital in the will that the said ornament formed
v.
part of the regalia of the Zamindar. We are free to
p.,/un:alhi Visu:tswar
confess
that the evidence about the identity of the
Gqjapothi &j
jewels which can be safely taken to constitute regalia
Gojrndra1atlka1 iJ.
in the present case, does not appear to us to be as
satisfactory as it should have been; but we are reluctant to interfere with the conclusion of the Court
of Api->eal. because in our opinion, the evidence fully
establishes the existence of custom in the family even
after Chitti Babu was adopted which treated certain
ceremonial jewels as constituting regalia. Now,
which items of these jewels and ornaments were
treated as impartible by custom is a pure question of
fact. In regard to 36 out of the 38 jewels, both the
courts have held concurrently against defendants I &
2 and in favour of the plaintiff, and in respect of the
two jewels which have been added to the list by the
Court of Appeal, viz., items 129 and 360, the Court
of Appeal has proceeded on die basis that the recital
in the will of Maharani of R ewa should not have
been rejected by the trial Court because there was
no corroboration to it. On the whole, we do not
think that a case has been made out for our interference with the conclusion thus reached by the Court
of Appeal.
The result is, the appeals preferred by defendants I and 2 fail and are dismissed.
That leaves the plaintiff's appeals to be considered and in these appeals, Mr. Pathak has confined his arguments to the 5 bungalows owned by
the family which are outside the limits of the Vizianagram Zamindari. The trial Court has held that
three out of these 5 bungalows had been in.:orporated into the impartible estate, whereas the Appeal
Court has differed on that point. In regard to the
two other bungalows, both the courts have found
against the plaintiff. The Admira\ity House was
2 s.c.k.' SUPREME COURT REPORTS
441
1963
purchased in 1891 by Ananda Gajapathi for a sum
of Rs. 20,000/-. Some other plots forming part Pwhavathi Vi.eiaram
of that property were purchased by him later. The GajafuJihi v.Raj Manne
bungalow at Waltair was purchased in 1861 by Pusliavo.thi Viswtswar
Gajapathi Raj
Vijayaram Gajapathi for Rs. 7,000/-, Elk House
at Ootacamund was purchased in 1889 for a sum of GrJjendragadkar J.
Rs. 60,000/-, and Shorham at Ooty was purchased in
1892 for Rs.18,000/ whereas the Highlands at Coonoor
was purchased in 1896 for Rs. 75, 000 /-. The Court of
Appeal has held that in regard to all these bungalows, the evidence of conduct is wholly ambiguous
and there is no circumstance of any significance
from which the plaintiff's theory of incorporation
can be legitimately inferred. These bungalows are
no doubt built outside the Zamindari Estate and
they are built in places of importance, such as headquarters of the estate or headquarters of the district
or a hill station. It may be that the Zamindar
used to reside in these bungalows according to his
convenience but it is not suggested that the junior
members of the family were not staying along with
him and so, the course of conduct in regard to the
use of these bungalows can hardly assist the plaintiff's
case of incorporation. No doubt, the trial Court
had held in favour of the plaintiff in respect of
the Admirality House, the Waltair House and the
Elk House, but as the Court of Appeal has pointed
out, the said conclusion of the trial Court was based
more on presumptions than on reliable evidence.
In fact, the trial Court had observed that the desire
that the Zamindar should own his residence at each
of these three places is certainly intelligible, particularly if the problem is considered with reference
to the views that should have prevailed among the
Zamindars of that class towards the end of the 19th
century; and it added that it should even be possible
to co-relate the residence of the Zamindar with the
use of the building for Zamindari purposes, a test
which, if satisfied, would prove incorporation.
While proceeding to deal with the question on this
442 SUPREME cotJR.t REPORts [1964] VOL.
1963
basis. the trial Court did not think it necessary to
Pushai·11th1 ''i::ia:n;n
require that the plaintiff should have adduced some
Gajnpatlti Raj ,\fa.,nr
evidence
to show that Zamindari business was
v.
fuslr'JCathi Visw~.su;ar transacted at any of these buildings and it concluded
G?japathi H·1j
with the observation that there wa5 nothing in the
evidence on the record to indicate any contrary in·
Gojmdragodlcar J
tcntion on the part of Ananda Gajapathi or even that
of his successors, though the intention of the successors may not be so very material as evidence. It is
clear that this approach adopted by the trial] udgc
of placing the onus partly on the d~fendants is
clearly erroneous. \,Ve are, therefore, not inclined
to interfere with the conclusion of the Court of
Appeal in regard to the three bungalows in question.
In regard to the two remaining bungalows,
both the courts below have made concurrent findings'
against the plaintiff and we see no reason to allow
the plaintiff to challenge that finding on evidence
before us.
Realising this difficulty, Mr. Pathak based his
argument mainly on the construction of the deed of
trust executed by Chitti Babu. He urged that this
document shows that Chitti Babu wanted to in·
corporate these buildings in the Zamindari estate.
For the purpose of raising this contention, l\fr.
Pathak conveniently assumes that the properties dealt
with by the deed of trust were the separate properties
of Chittibabu since the said properties had devolved
on him under the will of Ananda Gajapathi; other·
wise if the properties in question were ancestral
properties in the hands of Chittibabu it was
realised by Mr. Pathak that C:hitti Babu could not
make any incorporation in respect of them. We
have already noticed that in dealing with the
question of the implTtibility of:38 jewels, !\fr. Pathak
was constrained to contend that though, in law, the
will of Ananda Gajapathi bequeathed all the properties of Chitti Babu, in fact Chitti Babu got them as an
adopted son in the family and not as a devisee under
~$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
443
1963
the will. We have already dealt with this aspect of
the matter. We are referring to it again at this stage Pushao"thi Vi.ciaram
in order to emphasise the fact that the attitude adop- Gnjapathi v.Raj Manne
ted by the plaintiff in supporting his case of incorpo- Puslw.vathi ViJweswar
GaJapathi Raj
ration of the buildings into the impartible estate on
the strength of the trust deed executed by Chitti Babu Gaj1ndragadkar J.
is not consistent with his attitude in regard to his case
as to jewels. But apart from this aspect of the
matter, it seems to us clear that the trust deed does
not support the theory of incorporation on which
Mr. Pathak relies. By this trust deed, the settlor
appointed Mr. John Charles Hill Fowler as a tru,tee
to manage the estate on behalf of his minor eldest
son Alak Narayana Gajapathi. For the purpose of
dealing with Mr. Pathak's argument, it is not necessary to refer to the scheme of the document; it would
be enough if we mention the two clauses on which
Mr. Pathak relies. In the preamble to the document, the settlor says that he is seized and possessed of
or entitled to as for an estate of inheritance all that
impartible estate and zamindari descendible to a
single heir according to the law and custom of primogeniture applicable to similar estates in Southern
India more particularly described in the First
Schedule and commonly called the Vizianagram
Zamindari or Samsthanam and also the various other
properties situated in the presidencies specified. In
other words, the preamble refers to the whole of the
property consisting of the impartible estate and other
properties, and that would take in the houses in
question. Then the settlor provides that he is settling
the properties in trust in the manner mentioned in
the document for the benefit of his eldest son "so that
he may have the same kind arid nature of estate right
and interest in the said Zamindari, its accretions and
appurtenances and other properties hereby settled
upon him as he would have if the same were now to
devolve upon him from the settlor by right of inheritance according to the said law and custom of primogeniture subject, nevertheless, to the payment of
/
444 SUPREME COURT R.tPORtS (19G4] VOL.
1963
i'uJhm·1,1hi Vi.tioram
Gujapatlti Raj ,\fanru
v.
Pushauithi Visu:1swar
G·tjt.Jpatlti Raj
Gajtndra;adkar J.
maintenance and other allowances to the Raja and
some other mcml:irrs of the familv as hereinafter
provided and for the purpose of providing for the
payment of all the creditors of the said settlor as
hereinafter mentioned." The argument is that by
creating a trusi in favour of his eldest minor son, the
settlor has incorporated all the non-impartiblc
immovable properties into the Zamindari subject lo
the liabilities specified by the document. :\Ir. Pathak
also relies on the fact that there arc certain items of
property which are excluded from the operation of
the deed, and they are specified in paragraph 2 of
the document; and he contends that the b11ildings in
question are not amongst the excepted properties.
That is why the buildings must be deemed to have
been incorporated by Chitti Babu with the impartible estate. We arc not impressed by this argument.
In con~idcring the effect of this argument, it would
be relevant to recall that about this time, Chitti
Babu had to fight for his title which was challenged
by four persons in suit No. 18 of 1908, and in that
litigation Chitti Babu was asserting his title more as
an adopted son than as a devisee under the will of
Ananada Gajapathi. If that be so, Chitti Babu was
claiming the properties as an adopted son and as
such, properties which came into his hands as ancestral properties could not be incorporated by him with
the impartible Zamindari estate. Besides, the very
clause on which :\fr. Pathak relies dearly shows what
Chilli Babu intended to be the effect of this
document. The document says that the properties
have been settled on the trustee for the benefit of his
minor eldest son in the same way as his son would
have got the said properties if they had devolved
upon him by survivorship and that means that Chitti
Babu did not intend to confer on the son any larger
estate than he would have got by survivorship ifChitti
Babu had died at the relevant time :tnd the estate
had devolved upon his son by survivorship. There
is no doubt that if the son had obtained the estate by
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
445
1953
survivorship, he would have got impartible Zamindari
estate as such and the other properties which had, Pushavathi Viziaram
till then, not been incorporated with the Zamindari Gajr1pathi Rai Manne
estate would have retained their character as partible Pushavathi••Vi"swe1war
Gajapathi Rai
properties. The same result is intended to be achieved by the deed of trust. Therefore, we do not think Gajendragadkar J.
that the argument based on the trust deed executed
by Chitti Babu really supports the plaintiff's case that
the buildings in question had been incorporated by
Chitti Babu with the impartible Zamindari estate.
In the result, the plaintiff's appeals also fail
and are dismissed.
Three petitions were filed in this Court,
C.M.Ps. Nos. 740/1962, 741/1962 and 1821/1962 for
adducing additional evidence. These applications
are dismissed. We make no order on the C.:M.P.
No. 1822/1962 and we have partly allowed C.M.P.
No. 2631/1962. By this petition, defendant No. 1
seeks to raise additional grounds to which reference
must be made before we part with these appeals.
Mr. Kumaramangalam has invited our attention to
the fact that there are certain properties which still
remain to be dealt with and there are certain inaccurate statements in the judgment under appeal
which need to be corrected. In its judgment, the
Appeal Court has observed that it is contended for
the Rajkumar that Ex. P-132 cannot be deemed as
containing a list of buildings owned by the Samsthanam. for it is pointed out that even the Vizianagram Fort and the connected buildings which
admittedly belonged to the estate were not included
therein. ]\fr. Kumaramangalam points out that
the reference to the Vizianagram Fort as admittedly
comtituting a part of the estate is wrong. In fact,
the question about the character of the Vizianagram
Fort is pending before the learned Subordinate
Judge, Vishakhapatnam in 0.S. No. 120 of 1948.
In that suit defendant No. 1 has specifically claimed
that the Fort is not an impartible property but
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
1963
Pusltawthi Vi;:iar•m
GajafxJthi Raj .'1a1111t
v.
PuYtavathi Viswtsu:ar
Gajapathi Raj
Gajnulragadkar J.
belongs to the joint family and, therefore, he has a
l/3rd share in it. It is conceded by Mr. Pathak
that the reference to the Vizianagram Fort in the
statement of the Appeal Court judgment is erroneous
and should be treated as such, and the matter should
be tried between the parties according to law in 0.S.
No. 120 of 1948.
The other point on which Mr. Kumaramangalam
wants a clarification is in regard to the home farm
lands. Both the court~ below have left this matter
to be decided by the appropriate Tribunal under
sections 12 and 47 of the Act. Mr. Kumaramangalam
suggests and rightly that we should make it clear
that in leaving this issue to be tried under the relevant
sections of the Act, the courts below have not decided
as to which particular items of property are, or not,
home farm lands. That question is at large between
the parties and may have to be tried on the merits
whenever it arises.
The third point on which it is necessary to
make some correction is in respect of the statement
contained in the judgment of the trial Court in
regard to items under issue No. 4. This statement
is that items 33 (b) and [)8 were not identifiable at
all. Mr. Kumaramangalam points out that it is not
correct to say that item 3:l (b) is not identifiable and
in this connection, he has invited our attention to
the fact that his client has in fact made a claim
before the Receiver for this item which is Daba
Gardens and Bungalow. This position also is
conceded by ;..-rr. Pathak. Mr. Kumaramangalam
also wants us to make it clear that in regard to properties in suit in respect of which no finding has been
specifically recorded by the courts below, it would
be open to the parties to ask the Court to deal with
them and consider the rival contentions of the parties
in respect of them. This position is also not disputed.
In the circumstances of the case, we direct
that parties should bear theit own costs in this Court.
'
\J
Narayana Gajapathi Raj (D. 1845)
I
Sir Vijayarama Gajapathi Raj I (D. 1879)
Alak Rajeswari (D. 1901)
I
I
I
Sir Ananda
Gajapathi Raj
(D. 23·5-1897)
Appala Kondayamba I
Maharani of Rewa
(D. 14-12-1912)
I
Chittibabu Viziaram Raj
(B. 27-8-1893, D. 11-9-1922)
(adopted by Alak Rajeswari I
18-12-1897 Lalitha Kumari
Devi (defendant No. 4)
I
I
Alak Narayana
Gajapathi Raj
(B. 1902,
D. 25-10-1937)
Vidyavathi Devi
(deft. N.2)
I
Appalakondayamba II.
.
I
I
Alak
Rajeswari
II
Sir Vijayananda Gajapathi
Raj (B. 25.12. 1905)
(defendant No. 3)
Viziaram Gajapathi
Raj II (B.l.l'>.1924)
(plaintiff)
I
Jaya Devi
J
Visweswara
Gajapathi Raj
(defendant No.I)
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