DR. RAGHUBIR SHARAN versus THE STATE OF BIHAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 March 1963 | [1964] 2 S.C.R. 336 | 1963 INSC 59
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 March 1963
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL*, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 87/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 2 S.C.R. 336
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 59
Text of the judgment
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 964] VOL.
1963
Brahm PerJuah
v.
.~foobir Sin.t:h
Ayyan.~ar J.
never put forward before the learned Judges. As
the point is one not of pure law but springs from the
factual inadequacy of the property mortgaged to him
to discharge his debt it is too late for the appellant
to raise such a plea in this Court.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.
A ppe"/s dismi8sed,
1963
A1arrh 14
DR.
RAGHUBIR SHARAN
t•.
THE STATE OF BIHAR
(K. SrrnnA RAO, RAOHUBAR DAYAL and
.J. R. M l'.Dl!OLKAR .J.J.)
Criminol Trial·-Rtvision application to Hiyh Court for
P.:tpunyiny renirzri.·-'j froni jud!1ment of Lou.Jtr Court-J::r.Jent of '
i1Uu·.rc11l }Jo!1,•1:r of !ligh (}ourt-./urisrliciion token to he exerci•edCo1fo of Criminal l'rocedure (Act 1· of l89S), .<. jl;JA.
In a criminal case pending in the court of a Munsif
'.\lagistratc, two accused persom moved a bail application on
the ground of serious illness in jail. The Magistrate called
upon the appellant, ,vho \\'as at that tin1e a Civil Assistant
Surgeon and al~o Superintendent of the Sub-Jail, to submit a
1ncdical repvrl. On the report, the .\fagistrate released the
accused persons on bail but made certain observations against
the appellant as a doctor, which are sought to be expunged.
Against the said order, the medical officer filed a revision
petition in the 1ligh Court \Vhich \Vas dismis,ed. On appeal by
special !cave: the appellant's main contention \Vas that the High
O>urt should have expunged the remarks which would affect
the appellant's future official career. The question for decision
in this coar1 \Vas whether in a case \vhere the judgment has
become final, that is to say, when no appeal has been preferred
against the judgment by an aggrieved party, the High Court
can expunge any remarks found therein at the instance of a
third party.
Jlei<I, (per Mudholkar and Dayal J.J.), that every High
Court as the I Jighest Court c~ercising criminal jurisdiction in a
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT R:liPORTS
337
-1963
state has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of
•ccuring the ends of justice. This power extends to expunction
Dr, Rnghubir Sht1rtll'I
or ordering cxpunction of irrelevant passa2_'c" from a j11dgment
or order of a Subordinate Court and would be exercised hy it in
St11te of lJihar
appropriate cases for securing the ends of justice. Being an
extraordinary power it \Vill, however, not be pressed in aid
except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court
of its powers such as by passing comn1ent upon a rnatter not
relevant to the controversy before it and which is un\varranted
or is likely to harm or prejudice another.
•.
The remarks in the present case were not of such a
character, so as to call for the exercise of the extr:iord inary
·power of the High C<.urt under s 561 A. The appeal, therefore, n1ust fail.
1'he State of U. P. v . .J. N. Bagga, Crl. A. No. 122/1959
decided on Jan. I6, 1961, In the matter of Ii. Daly (1927)
I. L. R. 9 Lahore 269, Panchanan Banerji v. Upendra Nath,
(1926) I. L. R. 49 All. 254; Royers v. Shriniva8 Gopal Kewale,
I. L. R. (1940) Born. 415, Emperor v. C. Dnnn, (1922) 44
All.401, Emperorv. Sidaramaya, (1917) 19 Born. L. R. 912
and State v. Nilkanth Shripail Bhave, I. L. R. (1954) Born. 148,
referred to.
Per Subba ·Rao J. In the present case the following
principles emerge: (I) A judgment of a crhninal court is final;
it can be set aside or modified only in the n1anner prescribed
by law. (2) Every Judge, whatever may be his rank in the
hierarchy, must have an unrestricted right to express his views
in any matter before him without fear or favour. (3) There is
a corelative and self imposed duty in a judge not to n1ake
irrelevant remarks or observations without any foundation,
specially in the case of witnesses or parties not before him, affecting their character or reputation. (4) An appellate court has
jurisdiction to judicially correct such remarks, but it will do so
only in exceptional cases where such remarks would caUsc
irrevocable har1n to a witness or a party not before it.
Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad, A.LR. 1945 P. C. 18, Jairan
Da.s v. Emperor, (1945) 47 Born. I.. R. 634 (P. C.), Panchanan
Ban'1·ji v. Upendranath Bhattacha.rji, ( 1926) I. L. R. 49
All. 254. In the matter of Daly, ( l 927) I. L. R. 9 Lahore 269,
Rogers P. J, v. Shriniva' Gopal I. L. R. 1940 Born. 415,
Bhutnath Khanwas v. Dasrathi Das, A. I. R. 1941 Pat. 544,
In re Public Prosecutor, A. I. P. 1944 Mad. 614, referred to.
SfJJte v. Nilkanili Shripad, I. L. R. 1954 Born. l 48, held
applicable.
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VbL.
19&3
Dt. Ra~huhir Sharn11
••
St1t1 of Hihar
Hdd further, that a judicial officer does not surrender
his judgment in medical m:ittc•s to the ipsi di:rit of the doctor.
In this ca!e t!ir. observation of the l\l.1gistrJtc "'as neither
irrelevant nor without foundation and tl1e appcll.Jtc co11rt was
right in not treating it as an exceptional case and judicially
correct the said obscrvati·u1s. Besides, it is not such an cxrep·
tional case which calls for the interference of this court under
Art. 136 of the Constitution.
CRDIINAL APPELLATE JumsDIC'l'!ON : Criminal
Appeal No. 87 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order . dated October 7, 1960 of the Patna High
Courtln Criminal Revision No. 460 of 1960.
B. JJ. Tawakley, :J/rs. !~. Udayaratnam and
R. C. Pras1Jd, for the appellant.
D. P. Singh, 111. /(. Ramam1trthi, R. K. Garg
and S. C. Agarwal, for respondent No. I.
1963. March 1 L Suhba Rao J. delivered his
own Judgment. The Judgment of Dayal and
Mudholkar JJ., was delivered by Mudholkar .J.
0
J
ubbo R~o I.
ScBDA RAO .J .-I have perused the judgment
prepared by my learned brother i\fodholkar .J. r
agree that the appeal should be dismissed. But I
would prefer to give my own reasons for doing so.
The facts giving rise to this appeal arc simple.
The appellant is a medical practitioner and during
the year 1959 he was acting as Deputy Superinten·
dent, Jahanabad Sub-Divisional Hospital and
Superintendent, Sub Jail, Jahanabad. A criminal
case was pending before the Court of the Munsif·
ll,.fagistrate, First Class, Jahanabad, and the two
accused therein filed a petition in that Court for
releasing them on bail. On October 3, 1959, the
learned Munsif.Magistrate called for a report from
the said medical officer of his opinion on the health
of the said accused. The said officer examined the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREI\IE cobilt REPORTS 339
accused and sent the following report to the MunsifMagistrate :
-
-
"Examined accused Ramsewak Dusadh and
Ramdeo Dusadh of village Havellipur,
P. S. Ghosi, district Ga ya and found that both
of them are suffering from Hookworm infections
and are anaemic."
On October 19, 1959 the learned Munsif-Magistrate
made the following order granting bail to the said
accused:
"In view of the order dated 3-10-1959 a petition
signed by Superintendent, Sub-Jail, Jahanabad,
is received. In this petition it is mentioned that
the accused persons are suffering from Hookworm infection and hence they are anaemic.
From the petition it appears that its body portion has been written by somebody else and it is
simply signed by Mr. R. Saran, Superintendent.
It is curious to note that no actual examination
report has been attached with this petition. It
is an extreme case of carelessness on the part of
the Doctor concerned. He ought to have
realised that a judicial order would be passed
on his actual report and not on his petition.
Hence let the copy of this petition and order sheet
he forwarded to the Civil Surgeon, Gaya, for
information. It is argued by the lawyer appearing on behalf of the accused that these accused
persons are poor and would not be in a position to defend themselves, in case they would
not be allowed bail. I therefore on considering their poor circumstances and ill health
allow them to remain on bail on Rs. 500/with one surety for the like amount."
After making some infructuous attempts through
administrative channels to get .the said remarks
196S
Dr. Ra:hulir SharMI
V;
Ste.le of Bi~ar
Sultb~ Rco
J.
•
340
IU3
Dr. Rn.~hubir Sharan
v.
Stolt oj IJ1ha1
·''ubba U,10 J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
against him expunged, the said medical officer filed a
revision petition under ss. 435 and 4:rn of the Code of
Criminal Pr;iccdure against the said order in the
High Court of Judicaturc at Patna. The High Court
dismissed the revision petition. Hence the appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant contendend
that the remarks made by the learned lvlunsif·
:Vlagistrate were unjustified and groundless and that
they would affect the appellant's future official career
and, therefore, the High Court should have expunged
the said re~rks. Learned counsel for the respon·
dents, apart from justifying the remarks, contended
that the High Court had no jurisdiction to ex·
punge the remarks from the judgment which had
become final.
At the outset I would like to make it clear that
I am not expressing my opinion on the question
whether the High Court in an appeal or a revision
filed therein by an aggrieved party can expunge the
remarks made by the trial Court in its judgment in
disposing of the said appeal or revision. I am only
addressing myself to the limited question whether in a
case where the judgment has become final, that is to
say, when no appeal has been preferred against the
judgment by an aggrieved party, the High Court can
expunge any remarks found therein at the instance
of a third party. I am also confining the scope of
my judgment to the power of an appellate Court to
expunge remarks in a criminal case.
The only power on which reliance is placed by
learned counsel for the appellant is that contained in
s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
reads:
"Nothiug in this Code shall be deemed lo limit
or affect the inhcreut power of the High Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to give
-
2 s.c.R.
341
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
The Judicial Committee in two decisions, viz.,
Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad ('), and Jairam Das v.
Emperor('), had taken the view that the said section
gives no new powers but only provides that those
which the Court already inherently possesses shall be
preserved.
What is the scope of this inherent power? Can
it be invoked in a case where the judgment has
become final to expunge the remarks made therein ?
By expunging remarks what does the appellate Court
do ? Substantially it strikes out a part of the judment. Sometimes tht! part struck out may be an integral part of the judgment, that is to say, the conclusion may not flow in the absence of the part deleted. On some occasions remarks made by a Court
on the credibility of a witness, however exaggerated
they may be, may be the sole reason for not believing
that witness. There may also be other occasions when
the remarks may be so irrelevant that they may not
have any direct impact on the judgment, but such
instances will be very rare. Whatever may be the
decree of impact, the result of expunging remarks
from a judgment is that it derogates from its finality.
There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which enables an appellate Court in a case
where the order of a lower Court has become final
between the State and the accused to modify the said
order by deleting or striking out some of the observations found therein. Does s. 561 A of the
said Code confer such a power ? The conflicting
views on this question are reflected in some of the
judgments cited at the Bar. SulaimanJ. in Panchanan Banerji v. Upendra Nath Bhattacharji ('), holds
that s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which was added in 1923, confers such a power and
(I) A. I. R, 1915 ~. C. 18, 22.
(2) (190) 47 Bom, L, R. 6'41 (P.O.)
(I) (lg26J I, L, R, 49 All. 25i, 2~6,
.
'
Dr.· Rathubir SMrau
••
The State ef Bih.,
Subha Rao J,
3•2
/'193
Dr. lf.•thniir SUr•n
••
7 h1 Stitt •f Bih1r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
he does not see any reason why such an inherent
power shou Id not comprise a power to order a deletion of passages which are either irrelevant or inadmissible and which adversely affect the character
of persons before the Court. Tek Chand J. In the
mattrr of D1sly (' ), also concedes such a power
to an appellate Court. Beaumont C. J. in Rogers,
P . .!. v. Shriniicas Gopal ('),remarks tersely that no
Court can claim inherent power to alter the judgment
of another Court. Dhavle ]. in Blmtnath Khu.was
v. Dasrathi Das ('), agrees with Beaumont C . .J. in
holding that no Court can claim inherent power
to alter the judgment of another Court. The Madras
High Court in In re Public Prosecutor('), holds that
an appellate Court has power to expunge remarks
in a judgment in a suitable case. The Full Bench
of the Bombay High Court oin St<Jte v. Nilkanth
Shripad (5 ), posed the question thus : "The important question that arises is whether a superior Court
has inherent power to alter the record, as it were,
by changing or altering a judgment which has already been delivered and has become final as far as
that particular Court is concerned", and expressed
its view as follows :
"A judgment of a lower Court may be wrong;
it may even be perverse. The proper way o
attack that judgment is by bringing it undtr
the scrutiny of the superior Court and g ettieg
the judgment of the lower Court judicia[ny
corrected ............................................ .Jin
our opinion, the inherent power that the
High Court possesses is, in proper cases, even
though no appeal or revision may be preferred
to this Court, to judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by pointing out that
the observations made by the Magistrate were
not justified or were without any foundation or
were wholly wrong or improper."
With respect, I agree with the conclusion arrived
(I) (1927) !. L. R. g Lah. 269, 275.
(J) A, J, R, Ii+! Pat.~.
(2) I L.R. 194-0 Dom. +15, 418.
(4) A.I.R. 1944 Mad, 6H.
(5) J,L,R., U54 Dom, 148, 157, IGQ,
2 s.c.R.
-
SUPRENTB COURT REPORTS
343
1963
at by the Bombay High Court. This judgment, if
I may say so with respect, reconciles the doctrine of Dr. Raghubir Sharan
finality of a judgment and the necessity to give relief The State•• of Bi her
in an appropriate case to a person who is not a party
Subba R«• J,
to a proceeding, if uncharitable, unmerited and irre·
levant remarks are made against him without any
foundation whatsoever. The other decisions takin~
the contrary view infringe the fundamental principle
of jurisprudence that a judgment made by a Court,
however inferior it may be in the hierarchy, is final
and it can only be modified in the manner prescribed
by the law governing such procedure. All the learned Judges construing the scope of s. 561 A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure have agreed on one question,
namely, to preserve the independence of judicial
officers so that they may express their views without
fear or favour. The observations made by some of
the Judges are apposite in this context. Tek Chand
J. observed in In the matter of Daly (1 ) :
"It is of the utmost importance to the administration of justice that Courts should be allowed
to perform their functions freely and fearlessly
and without undue interference by this Court."
Chagla C. J. in State v. Nilkanth Shripad ('),
observed :
"It is very necessary, in order to maintain the
independence of the judiciary, that every
Magistrate, however junior, should feel that he
can fearlessly
give expression
to his
own opinion in the judgment which he
delivers. If our Magistrates feel that they
cannot frankly and fearlessly deal with matters
that come before them and t;1at the High Court
is likely to interfere with their opinions, the
independence of the judiciary might be seriously
undermined."
I entirely agree with the remarks. I reiterate that
every judicial officer must be free to express his mind
(1) (1927) I.L.R, 9 Lah, 269, 275,
(2) I.L.R, 19$4 Born. 148, 1>7, 160,
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
in the matter of the appreciation of evidence before
him. The phraseology used by a particular
/)1. Hazhttl1ir Shil1·1Jn
Judge
depends upon
his
inherent reaction
v.
T111 Stalt oj Rihar
to falsPhood,
his comparative cornmand of
the English language and his felicity of expression.
Sabha Ra" J.
There is nothing more dr.leterious to the discharge of
judicial functions than to cre<lte in the mind of a
Judge that he should conform to a particular pattern
which may, or may not be, to the liking of the
appellate Court. Sometimes he may
overstep
the mark. \Vhen public interests conflict, the lesser
should yield to the larger one. An unmerited and
undeserved insult to a witness may have to be
tolerated in the general interests of preserving the
independence of the judiciary. Even so, a duty is
cast upon the judicial officer not to deflect himself
from the even course of justice by making disparaging
and undeserving remarks on persons that appear
before him as witnesses or otherwise. l\Ioderation in
expression lends dignity to his office and imparts
greater respect for judiciary. But occasions do
arise when a particular .Judge, without any justifiea·
tion, may cast aspersions on a witness or any other
person not before him affecting the character of
such witness or person. Such remarks may affect the
reputation or even the career of such person. In my
experience I find such cases arc very rare. But if it
happens, I agree with the full Bench of the Bombay
High Court that the appellate Court in a suitable
case may judicially correct the observations of the
lower Court by pointing out that t/1e observations
made by that Court were not j ustificd or were
without any foundation were wholly wrong or
improper. This can be done under its inherent
power preserved under s. 561 ·A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But that power must be exercised only
in exceptional cases where the interest of the Party
concerned would irrevocably suffer.
From the
aforesaid discussion the following
2 S.C.R.
-
SUPREllE COURT REPORTS
345
principles emerge : (1) A judgment of a criminal
Court is final ; it can be set aside or modified only
in the manner prescribed by law. (2) Every Judge,
whatever may be his rank in the hierarchy, must
have an unrestricted right to express his views in any
matter before him without fear or favour. (3) There
is a correlative and self-imposed duty in a Judge not
to make irrelevant remarks or observations without
any foundation, especially in the case of witnesses or
parties not before him, affecting their character
or reputation. (4) An appellate Court has jurisdic·
tion to judicially correct such remarks, but it will do
so only in exceptional cases where such remarks
would cause irrevocable harm to a witness or a party
not before it .
. Let me now apply the said principles to the
instant case. Here, a bail application was pending
before the Magistrate on the ground that the accused
were ill. The Magistrate asked the medical officer
to report on their health. The said officer sent a
report stating that he had examined the accused
and that they were suffering from hookworm infection
and were anaemic. In the statement of the case
the appellant says that- he made a clinical exami·
nation and also the examination of the stools of the
accused; but he did not send along with his report
the result of his clinical examination showing the
particulars of the blood and stool tests. The learned
Munsif-Magistrate pointed out that no actual
examination report was attached to the petition
(report) and that it was an extreme case of carelessness on the part of the doctor concerned. The
Magistrate felt that as a judicial officer he could not
accept the mere ipsi dixit of the doctor unsupported
by the results of clinical examination to come to a
conclusion one way or other whether the accused
were really so ill as to be let on bail. In the circumstances, if the Magistrate characterised the act of the
medicial officer in not sending the detailed report as
1963
Dr. Raghubir Sharan
v.
The State of Bih1u
Subh"a -Rao J.
346
1963
..
Dr. R•zhubir Sharan
Tli1 Stall qf Bihtu
.l)d)ba RIO /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
an act of extreme carelessness, can it be said that his
inference was such that the appellate Court should
treat it as an exceptional case and judicially correct
the said observations? Indeed, the High Court in its
judgment said :
"The observation of the learned MunsifMagistrate does not seem to be wholly unjustified. The doctor should have given the
reasons for calling the accused person on whose
behalf bail petitions were moved as anaemic."
It rightly concluded thus :
'·In the circumstances, if the Court said that
the doer.or was careless, I do not think that
there is any impropriety in such an observation.
It is likely that some other Court may take a
different view of the thing, but that is no
ground for upsetting the observations of a
Court.
To accept this contention would
amount to placing unnecessary fetters on the
discretion of the Court in as'iessing any witness
or any evidence in course of its judgment or
order."
With these observations, it dismissed the petition.
Now, the question i'i whether in such circumstances this Court in exercise of its powers under
Art. 1:rn of the Constitution should interfere with the
order of the High Court. Is it such an exceptional
case which calls for the interference of this Court?
The High Court in exercise of its discretion, for the
reasom given by it, refused to expunge the remarks.
It is certainly not a case meriting the interference of
this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction.
That apart, I entirely agree with the observations of the High Court. A jqcjir,ial omc~r does not
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
surrendar his judgment in medical matters to the
ipsi dixit of the doctor. The opinion of a doctor
has great weight, provided it is supported by the
material on which he formed the opinion. If he does
not disclose the particulars of the clinical results,
how can the Court come to a conclusion that the
accused were so ill as to be released on bail? In the
circumstances, the Magistrate said that the doctor
was grossly negligent. It is not possible to say that
the said observation is either irrelevant or without
foundation.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
MuDHOLKAR J. In this appeal by special
leave from a judgment of the High Court of Patna
the question raised is as to the powers of the High
Court under s. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in regard to expunging remarks made in its
judgment or order by a court against a person who is
neither a party nor a witness to the proceeding.
The question arises this way.
A bail application was moved in the court of Mr. B. Rai, Munsif
Magistrate, Jahanabad on behalf of two persons who
were accused in a criminal case pending in that
court on the ground that they were lying seriously
ill in jail. On October 3, 1959 the Magistrate
passed an order calling upon the Civil Assistant
Surgeon at that place. who, we are told, is also
Superintendent of the Sub-Jail to report whether
the accused persons are ill. On October 7, 1959.
Mr. Sharan the Civil Assistant Surgeon, signing as
the Superintendent of the Sub-Jail submitted the
following report :
"Ref: Copy of order sheet dated 3-10-1959 in
G. R. 367/59 Ghosi P. S. case 3 (8)/59.
Sir,
Examined accused Ramsewak Dusadh and
Ramdeo Dusadh both sons of Dillan DLTSadh of
1963
Dr. R•:hubir 5hilt.-n
••
Tht Statt of BU..1
Suhh•
R:•• J.
Mud11'.lk" I·
•
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
Raghubir 'Sharon
v.
Tht Stntr if Billflr
})r,
,\f11dho/k,"1
village Havellipur l'. S. Ghosi, district Ga ya
and found that both of them arc suffering
from hookworm infections and arc anaemic.
J,
Sdf
Yours faithfully,
x x x "
The report was addressed to the Magistrate. On
October 1I!, I !J5!J he passed his order releasing the
accused persons on bail, in the course of which he
made certain observations which arc sought to be
expunged. For some obscure reason the learned
magistrate has regarded what is plainly a report to
be a 'petition' and then blamed Dr. Sharan for not
realising that a judicial order could be passed only
on his report and not "his petition". That is not
all. He has found fault with Dr. Sharan because
(a) the report appeared to be in the handwriting of
some person other than himself and was only signed
by him and (h) "no actual examination report was
attached with this petition (sic)". For these reasons
he observed in his order : "It is an extreme case of
carelessness on the part of the Doctor concerned"
and ordered that a copy of the 'petition' and the
order sheet be sent to the Civil Surgeon, Gaya for
infonnation.
The report of Dr. Sharan is couched in the
usual form but if the Magistrate felt any doubt about
the matter he could well have sought to have it
cleared by writing to him for particulars. :'>lo doubt,
this might have entailed po~tponment of the case anrl
thus delayed passing an order. But it would seem
that the Magistrate did not really think that the
report was inadequate. For, acting upon it, he in
fact released the accused persons on ba ii on the very
day, that is October l!l.
All this is, however, very trivial and is not a
kind cif matter which ought ever to have been
brought up before this Court. :\o doubt the learned
2 s.a.i'l.
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS
349
Magistrate has said that the doctor was careless . and
by forwarding a copy of the order straight to his
departmental superior indicated that he expected
action to be taken on the basis of his remarks. But
in view of the fact that the learned Magistrate had
in fact acted upon the doctor's report and had
wrongly characterised it as a petition his remarks
could not reasonably have been regarded by the
doctor's superiors as being very serious. No harm,
much less any irreparable harm, could therefore be
expected to result from these remarks.
Upon this view we would not have said anything
further. But, Mr. D. P. Singh, appearing for the State
of Bihar has raised an objection to the jurisdiction
of the High Court under s. 561-A of the Code and
since it raises a question of general importance, it is
necessary to deal with it. That section reads thus :
"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit
or affect the inherent power of the High Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
This provision was introduced in the Code when it
was extensively amended in the year 1923. But it
does not confer and was. not intended to confer any
new powers on the High Courts. The courts exist
not only for securing obedience to the law of the land
but also for securing the ends of justice in its widest
sense. All courts, including the High Courts, can
exercise such powers as the laws of the land confer
upon them as well as such inherent powers to do
justice as are preserved expressly or are not taken
away by a statute. We shall confine ourselves to the
inherent powers of the High Court in criminal cases.
Now, s. 561-A says in clear terms that the inherent
power of the High Court to do certain things is
pr. Ragftub.ir .~liaran
v.
.Th• State of Bihar
Mudholkar J.
350
1963
•.
Dr, R•1liuiir Sh.rn
Tht Stnlt et/ Bihn
Muolt.11.• /.
SUPkEME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
preserved and what we have to ascertain is whether
the power to expunge any passage from the judgment
of a subordinate court is inherent in the High Court
and must, therefore, be deemed to have been
preserved.
The power of the High Court to expunge
remarks from the judgment or order of a subordinate
court while dealing with an appeal from that court
is not questioned by Mr. Singh. In fact expunction
of remarks was ordered by this Court in appeal in
1'!1e State of U. P. v. J. N. Ba.gga ('),but there is no
discussion in the judgment on the point, as the existence of the power was not challenged. We arc not
concerned here with the powers of the appellate
court. The question before us is whether the inherent
power of the High Court to secure the ends of justice
embraces the power to expunge passages from the
judgment of a subordinate court which is independent
of its statutory powers to alter, amend or reverse the
judgments of subordinate courts in appeals or revisions before it.
Observatiom made by a subordinate court in
its judgment or order may very seriously affect, in a
given case, only a party thereto in which event he
can, if the observations are irrclevent or unjustifiable,
seek redrt'Ss by appeal or revision, whichever of
the remedies is available to him at law. But what if
a stranger to the proceeding or a lawyer engaged in
the case is affected by the court's remarks of a similar
character? Has he no remedy? Must he suffer the
consequences of irrelevant or unjustifiable remark8 of
a court though if similar remarks were made
against a party to the proceeding that party is entitled to seek redress? It would be a travesty of justice
if an injured stranger to a proceeding should have to
suffer unheard as a result of unjustifiable and harmful observations made by a court against him. The
case of an injured stranger would be of a kind in
(I) Or. A. No. 122 ofl959 decided oo January 16, 1961.
-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME cotJR.t REPORTS
35i
1963
which redress would be possible only if some court
possesses such power and can exercise it to secure the Dr. Rag/whir Sllo'4'1
ends of justice. The question is whether the highest The St•tev. of Bihar
court in a State has and must always be deemed to
have had such pow€r. The further question is
Mudhol"4r J.
whether the exercise of such power would involve
alteration of a judgment or order and if so whether
that must be deemed to have been permitted by the
Code.
Certain cases were cited at the Bar and we will
· deal with them in chronological order. The first is
In the matter of H. Daly ('). In that case Tek
Chand J., said that the High Court has power to
expunge passages from judgments delivered by itself
or by subordinate courts and its power to do so has
been put beyond controversy by the enactment of
s. 56l·A in the Code of Criminal Procedure. While
coming to this conclusion the learned Judge has
referred to five decisions of the Chief Court of Lahore
and pointed out that that court claimed the
power to expunge remarks in appropriate cases.
It may incidentally be mentioned that he has
also referred to the decision in Panchanan
Banerjee v. Upendra Nath ('), in which it
was held that the High Court had inherent power to
order deletion of passages which are either irrelevant
or inadmissible and which adversely affect the
character of persons before the Court. It may,
however, be mentioned that that was a case where
the learned Judge, Suleiman J. was dealing with
an appeal against acquittal and ordered the expunction of remarks while exercising appellate jurisdiction though he has referred in this connection to the
inherent powers of the court. Neither of these decisions, however, contains any discussion upon that
point.
Then there is the decision in Rogers v. Shriniwas Gopal Kawale ('), in which Beaumont C. J.
(I) (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lab, 21i9.'
(2) (1926) J.L.R. 49 All. 25t,
(S) J,L.R. (1949) Bom. •t5,
31>2 SUPREME COURT REPOlri's tl964] Vot.
. J'J63
Dr, Rag1'11bir .\hatan
v.
Thi Stnle "'.f /Jilta1
1'!11J/i,,,JI; :r I.
held that the High Court had no power under
s. 561 ·A to expunge passages in judgments which
Ii ave not been brought before it in rrgular appeal
or revision. There, an application was made under
s. 5ul-A for expunging certain observations criticising
a witness made by the Additional Sessions Judge of
Poona in a criminal appeal. Dealing .with the
application the learned Chief Justice observed :
"It is obvious that, if the jurisdiction exists,
its exercise must place the Court in an anomal·
ous position. The Court must go though the
record of a case in which it is not called upon
to act judicially at the instance of a party who
is not aggrieved by the decision, and it may
well be that the Court will have to come to a
conclusion upon matters not in issue in the
proceedings."
He referred to the decision in Emperor v. C. Dunn('),
and Bmperor v. Sidaramaya. ('), in the first of which
it was held that the High Court had no such jurisdiction and in the second it was said that it was
doubtful whether such jurisdiction exists in the High
Court. He expressed disagreement with the view
taken in Pancli.anan Bancijee's case (3) and Daly's
case (') and observed :
"With all respect to the learned .Judges who
have taken a different view, I am quite unable
to see how section :361 A affects the question.
That section provides that nothing in the Code
shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
power of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order
under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. So that all that the section
does is to preserve the inherent powers of the
High Court without conferring any additional
power. In my opinion no Court can claim
(1) (192'1) 44 All. 4-01.
(3) (1926) I.L.R, 49 AU. 25f.
(2) (1917) 19 Bom. L.R. 912.
(f) (1927) I.L,R, 9 Lab. 269,
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
1969
inherent power to alter the judgment of another Court. All powers in appeal and revision Dr. Raghubi'(. Sharan
are statutory and not inherent in the superior The State••ef Bihar
Court. When once a 'matter is duly brought
before a superior Court, then no doubt inherent
Mudlwlkar /.
powers may be called in aid to enable the
Court to do complete justice; but the power to
bring a matter in appeal or revision before a
superior Court must be conferred by statute or
some enactment having statutory effect."
The learned Chief Justice obsetved that the power of
superintendence conferred upon the ·High Court by
s. 224 of the Government of India Act over Courts
subordinate to it does not enable .the High Court to
correct a judgment of a subordinate court and pointed out that ss. 435 and 439 Cr. P.O. only enable the
High Court to satisfy itself . about the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order
of an inferior court or of the regularity of the proceeding before it. Then he observed :
·
·,
"When the· High Court is hearing an application in appeal or revision, the whole matter
is before it and it can make any orde,r conse ..
quential or incidental to the order under review
and, in my opinion, in such a case the Court
is entitled to expunge any remarks in the lower
Court's judgment which it thinks ought not to
have been made. But it seems to be impossible to say that expunging passages ·from a
judgment giving reasons for an order which is
not under appeal involves anything consequential or incidental to the matter in. appeal. If
the Court thinks that any such action is called
for, it can itself send for the· record and act
. regularly in revision."
In the end the learned Chief J usfice held that the
decisiOn in Emperor v. Du.nn ('), was right and has
not been altered by the introduction of s. 561-A.
(I} (1922) ff All. WI.
3M SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
This judgment was partially overruled by a Full
Dr. R«1h1aiP SMt•n Rench in Sl/Jtt v. Nilkanth Shripad Bhave (').
v.
C. J., who delivered the judgment of the court
n. Sl•lt •! lfiltu Chagla
concurred with the observation of Beaumont C. J.,
fha t no court can claim inherent power to alter the
judgment of anoCher court and after pointing out that
Beaumont C. J., had also said in his judgment that the
·Court had inherent jurisdiction to alter the judgment
once the matter comes before it in appeal or revision,
said :
"It is difficult to understand, if the High Court
has no inherent jurisdiction to alter the judg·
ment of another Court, how that jurisdiction
arises merely because the matter comes before
the High Court in appeal or revision. Either
the Court has inherent jurisdiction or it has
not. If it has inherent jurisdiction, it can be
exercised either in appeal or in revision, or,
...... by an independent application made by
the party undcrs. 561-A."
The learned Chief .Justice then quoted the further
observations of Beaumont C. J., which we have reproducctl earlier and said :
"It is difficult tu understand how the Court
can act regularly in revision if there is no
effective order which can be challenged in
revision. Therefore, in our opinion this judgment was correctly decided to the extent that
it laid down that there was no inherent
jurisdiction in a superior Court to alter the
judgmmt of another Caurt. But to the extent
that this Division Bench laid down that the
power to judicially correct the judgment of a
lower Court only arose in appeals and revisions
it was not correctly decided. The power of
the High Court judicially to correct any
subordinate Judge exists independently of
applications which come before it by way of
(I) U .. ll. (lllM) llom. It~.
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
1963
appeal or revision. This Court can judicially
correct any subordinate Judge in any applica- Dr. Raghubir Shat an
tion made to it which it can entertain und<'r
v.
The State •f Bihar
s. 561-A of the Court."
Mudholkar J.
-
The learned Chief Justice then referred to an unreported decision of the Bombay High Court in
which the view was taken that the Court has jurisdiction to expunge remarks from the judgment of a
lower court although the matter was not before it
in appeal or revision and in which the Court expressed difficulty in appreciating the view taken in
Roger's case ('). Then the learned Chief Justice
pointed out that he did not find it casy to understand
how if, as was said by Beaumont C. J., the power
to alter the judgment of an inferior Court is not an
inherent power, it can be brought in aid as an inherent power provided only the matter is before the
High Court, in what he has called regular revision.
According to the learned Chief Justice in entertaining an application under s. 561-A "what the High
Court should do is not to expunge remarks but
judicially to correct by its judgment the judgment
of the lower Court." We also find it difficult to
understand what Beaumont C. J. meant when he
said on the one hand that the High Court has no
inherent power to alter the judgment of an inferior
court and on the other that when the matter is before
the High Court by way of regular revision it can alter
the judgment by exercising its inherent power. Either
the High Court has inherent power to alter a judgment of a subordinate court or it has not. If it has no
inherent power to do so the mere fact that a regular
proceeding arising out of the judgment of the sub·
ordinate court is before it would make no difference.
For, even then it cannot do anything as its revisional
powers under s. 439 Cr. P. C. do not enable it to
expunge rem irks. Yet, according to t!:te learned
Chief Justice, the High Court can then exercise its
inh~rent.power. How . it_ can do so when on the
(I) I.L.R. (1940) Bom,
••s.
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
19f.!
9r. 80.ehuiir Sh•t"'
••
1 he ~l•tt ,J Bih.1
Mil.httlk•r J.
earlier statement of the legal position, it kas no strch
inherent p.ower, is not easy to follow.
We also feel some difficulty in understanding the
judgment of Chagla C.J. when he says that by entertaining an application under s.561-A the High Court
can judicially correct the judgment of a subordinate
court but at the same time not expunge remarb
therein as doing so would be altering the judi:ment
the subordinate court. If the alteration or amendment of the judgment or order of a subordinate
court is not the necessary consequence of the judicial
correction of such j udgmcnt or order we fai I to see
how removing from it a passage which is not relevant
to the controversy decided by the judgment would
amount to such alteration. A judgment consists of
the verdict of the court and its reasons bearinc on
it. If a superior court supersedes or alters or amends
either of these it will be reversing, altering or amending the judgment. But if a document embodying
the judgment contains besides the court's verdict and
reasons therefor, any additional matter which is unrrlated to either of these lWO components of the
judgment it cannot properly be regarded as a part
of the judgment merely because it is contained in
the same document. By including within the judgment irrelevant matter the court cannot make them
an integral part of the judgment. The power to
delete or order the deletion of such matter for securing the ends of justice must be deemed to inhere
in the High Court.
or
The learned Chief .Justice seems to accept the
position that under s. 561-A an application can be
made to the High Court complaining of injurious
remarks by a subordinate court on the ground that
they are unjustifiable or irrelevant and that such
an applicati9n becomes a judicial proce-cdin& before
the High Court. He also accepts that the High Court
\:an thereupon correct the jud~mcnt of the subordi111ate
·~$.C.R.
SUPREME cotJR.t REPORTS
357
1963
court fu. appropri'ate circumstances. If the High
court has power in such a proceeding to Dr. Rc1/luiir Slion1
correct the judgment or order of a subordinate court 1h1 Stale•• ef Bilitr
how exactly and when does it exercise it ? Earlier in
J..ludh~lk~r J.
his judpnent the learned Chief Justice has said :
-
-
"A judgment of a lower court may be wrong;
it may even be perverse. The proper way to
attack that judgment is by bringing it under
the scrutiny of the superior Court and getting
thejudgment of the lower Court judicially
corre·cted. But is it proper for the superior
Court to alter or amend the judgment which has
already been delivered ? In our opinion, the
inherent power that the High Court possesses
is, in proper cases, even though no appeal or
revision may be preferred to this Court, to
judicially correct the observations of the
lower Court by pointing out that the observations made by the Magistrate were not justified or were without any foundation or were
wholly wrong or improper."
It may be mentioned that the Advocate-General who
appeared in the case had urged that merely making
observations of this kind or passing strictures on a
subordinate court stands on a different footing from
expunging objectionable remarks. The learned Chief
Justice observed :
"In our opinion it is not necessary to express
the displeasure of this Court against any observations made by a Magistrate or by a Sessions
Judge by expunging the remarks from the
judgment delivered by him. x
x
x
x
In our opinion, therefore, it would not be
correct to say that expunging remarks from a
judgment or deleting passages from a judgment
constitutes the inherent power of any superior
Court and, therefore, the inh@rent power of the
High Court."
358 . SUPREME COURT REPOR rs [1964) VOL.
1163
Dr. Rd_qlwbir Sha'Olt
v.
Thi SlaJe of Bih•r
Mullio/kar J.
The leamed Chief Justice quite rightly holds
that the High Court has inherent power judicially
to correct a subordinate court even for making harmful remarks against a person who is not a party to the
proceedings. But, according to him, the sole content
of this power consists of expression by the superior
court of its displeasure at the offending remarks.
We can discern no principle upon which such a limitation on the inherent powers of the High Court can
be justified.
.
Moreover, mere expression by the High Court
of its displeasure at the offending observations of a
subordinate court cannot even be regarded as amounting to "judical correction'' of the error committed
by such Court. For, despite the disapprobation,
the remarks continue to be there on the record
of the subordinate court. The form normally
adopted by a superior court for "judicial correction"
of an error of a subordinate court does not consist of
mere expression of its disagreement witl1 the view
taken by the subordinate court but of effacing that
error and thus depriving it of its legal effect. That
is precisely what ought to be done with respect to
irrelevant remarks of a subordinate court when they
are found to be unjustifiable and harmful. The
appropriate form in which this part of the judicial
process may be carried out would be either by expunging them or directing them to be expunged so
that they would cease to have any effect.
There can be no doubt that the judgment of a
tribunal empowered by law to adjudicate upon and
decide any matter affecting the rights of parties is
inviolable unless the law allows it to be questioned
or interfered with. In such a case the judgment can
be challenged only and interfered with only by the
specified authority and to the extent permissible by
the express provisions of law. No other court, not
even the High Court, unless expressly permitted by
2s.c.11.
SUPREME COURt REPORTS
196!1
law can entertain a challenge or exercise any power
with respect to a judgment. Its h11herent power is Dr. R1g~ubir SA«rft
not .exerciseable for this purpose because what is made 1 h1 Sttdt, (lj Bilc1r
final or inviolable by law is beyond the purview of
Muih1lliar J,
such power. But the inviolability which attaches
to a judgment must necessarily be confined to
its integral parts, that is the verdict and reasons
therefor. It cannot extend to matters which
though ostensibly a part of the judgment are not in
reality its integral parts. It is because of this that
the majority of the High Courts hold that they
have always had the power to expunge passages
from the judgments of subordinate courts in
certain circumstances. In other words that this
power has always been there and can be resorted
to for securing the ends of justice. It is significant
to note that despite this, though the Code was amended materially in 1!155 the legislature did not indkate
ins. 561-A or any other provision that this power
did not exist or is taken away. Clearly the High
Courts, by expunging remarks from an order or
judgment of a subordinate court, would not in any
event be altering it on merits or in any matter of
substance but be only deleting from it matter which
being alien to the matter before the court ought never
to have been there. When such only is the effect
of what the High Court does, can prohibition to this
court be inferred from the fact that ss. 423 and 439,
which deal with appellate and revisional powers,
are silent about such matters? We are clear that
they do not exclude such power. As already stated,
expunction of irrelevant remarks does not amount to
the alteration or amendment of a judgment or an
order of a subordinate court. No doubt, the exercise
of such power will have the effect of taking out of
the judgment or order something which was there
before and thus in a limited way to interference with
the content of the document embodying the judgment
or order. But bearing in mind the paramount
..
•
•
.
·'
360 StJPIIBME COt1Rt REPORtS (1964] VOL.
J96!J
D1. Rag/r:Jbir Sharon
••
1l1 Sto11 of Bhiar
Mo41i>lkar J.
importance of .securing the ends of justice the High
Court must be deemed to have such power.
When we speak of the inherent powers of the
High Court of a State we mean the powers which
must, by reason of its being the highest court in the
State having general jurisdiction over civil and
criminal courts ·in the State, inhere in that court.
The powers in a sense are an inalienable attribute of
the position it holds with respect to the courts subordinate to it. These powers arc partly administrative
and partly judicial. They are necessarily judicial
·when they are exercisable with respect to a judicial
order and for securing the ends of justice. When we
speak of ends of justice we do not use the expression
to comprise within it any vague or nebulous concept
of justice, nor even justice in the philosophical sense
but justice according to law, the statute law and the
common law. Again, this power is not exercisable
every time the High Court finds that there has been
a miscarriage of justice. For, the procedural laws
of the State provide for correction of most of the
errors of subordinate courts which may have resulted
in miscarriage of justice. These errors can be
corrected only by resorting to the procedure prescribed by law and not otherwise. Inherent powers
arc in the nature of extraordinary powers available
only where no express power is available to the
High Court to do a particular thing and where its
express powers do not negati vc the existence of such
inherent power. The further condition for its exercise, in so far as cases arising out of the exercise by
the subordinate courts of their criminal jurisdiction
are concerned, is that it must be necessary to resort
to it for giving effect to an order under the Code of
Criminal Procedure or for preventing an abuse of ·the
process of the court or for otherwise securing the ends
of justice.
The power to expunge remarks is no doubt an
extraordinary power but nevertheless it doer
-
•
2 s.a.R..
...
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
36i
1963
exist for redressing a kind
of grievan~e
for which the statute provides no remedy m Dr. Raghubir Sharan
express terms.
The fact that the statute recog- The State•• of Bihar
nizes that the High Courts are not confined to the
A!udhclka,. J.
exercise of powers expressly conferred by it and may
continue to exercise their inherent powers makes
three things clear. One, that extraordinary situations
may call for the exercise of extraordinary powers.
Second, that the High Courts have inherent power
to secure the ends of justice. Third, that the express provisions of the Code do not affect that power.
The precise powers which inhere in the High Court
are deliberately not defined by s. 561-A for good
reason. It is obviously not possible to attempt to
define the variety of circumstances which will call for
their exercise. No doubt, this section confers no
new power but it does recognise the general power to
do that which is necessary "to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice." But then, the statute does not
say that the inherent power recognised is only such
as has been exercised in the past either. What it
says is that the High Courts always had such inherent
power and that this power has not been taken away.
Whenever in a criminal matter a question arises for
consideration whether in particular circumstances the
High Court has power to make a particular kind of
order in the absence of express provision in the Code
or other statute the test to be applied would be
whether it is necessary to do so to give effect to an
order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the
process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.
When the question arises before the High Court
in any specific case whether to resort to such undefined power it is essential for it to exercise great
caution and circumspection. Thus when it is moved
by an aggrieved party to expunge any passage from
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS tI964] VOL.
1963
•.
Dr. Ratliubir Slra1an
1lu Stair "f Bil1ar
Mudnolkor J.
the order or judgment of a subordinate court it
must be fully satisfied that the passage complained
of is wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable, that its
retention on the records will cause serious harm to
the person to whom it refers and that its expunction
will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order.
This aspect of the matter has been emphasised
by Chagla C. J., in the aforesaid case and we have
no doubt that it is very necessary in order to maintain
the independence of the judiciary that every presiding officer of a criminal court, however junior,
should feel that he can fearlessly give expression to
his view in the judgment or order which he delivers
and that no impression should be allowed to be
created in the mind of the presiding officer that the
High Court is likely to interfere lightly with his
opinions. For, otherwise his independence will be
seriously undermined.
To sum up, every High Court as the highest
court exercising criminal jursidiction in a State has
inherent power to make any order for the purpose
of securing the ends of justice. This power extends
to expunction or ordering expunction of irrelevant
passages from a judgment or order of a subordinate
court and would be exercised by it in appropriate
cases for securing the ends of justice. Being an
extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed
in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a
subordinate court of its powers such as by passing
comment upon a matter not relevant to the controversy before it and which is unwarranted or is likely
to harm or prejudice another.
In the case before us, as we have already
indicated, the remarks arc not such as are likely to
cause harm to the appellant nor are such as shoul d
cause any harm to him. We, therefore, hold that
..
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR ts
363
this is not a fit case for the exercise of the extraordinary power of the High Court under s. 561-A. For
these reasons we dismiss the appeal.
Appe,al dismissed.
1963
Dr. Raghubir Sharan
v.
Thi State of Bihar
Mndholkar I.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
1963
v.
March 15
MOHAMMAD NAIM
(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and
K.
c. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
High Court-Inherent power in criminal cases-Remarks
in Judgment-Duty of Judge.-Expunging remarks-Power of
High Court-State Government, if can apply-Cork of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), •· 561-A.
While disposing of a criminal appeal the High Court
directed the issue of a notice to N, the investigating officer, to
show cause why a •omplaint should not be instituted against
him under s. 195, Indian Penal Code. N appeared and threw
himself at the mercy of the Court and asked for forgiveneso.
The High Court accepted the apology hesitatingly but made the
following among other remarks against the police force.
"(a) If I had felt that with my lone efforts I could
have cleaned this augean stable, which is the police
force, I would not have hesitated to wage this war
single handed.
(b) That there is not a single lawless group in the whole
of the country whose record of crime comes anywhere near the record of that organised unit which
is known as the Indian Police Force.
(c) Where every fish barring perhaps a few stinks, it is
idle to pick out one or two and say that it stinks."
The State applied to the High Court under s. 561-A, Code
of Criminal Procedure, for expuni:ing these remarks from the
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