TILKAYAT SHRI GOVINDLALJI MAHARAJ versus THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 January 1963 | [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561 | 1963 INSC 6
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 January 1963
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 652/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561
- Neutral citation
- 1963 INSC 6
Text of the judgment
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
561
to-an order for possession of the premises in question. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1963
Krishanl'I lshwarlnl
Dtsai
v.
Bai Vijkor
Gujendrai.Okar J.
TILKAYAT SHRI GOVINDLALJI MAHARAJ
196.1
v.
Ja,.uary, 2J.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. ]., P. B. GAJF.NDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
j. C. SHAH, jj.)
Nnthdwara Ttmple-I'ril'Gle or public t•mple-Te<l&Yalidity of enactment pro,.iding for proper arlministration of
temple-Constitutfo'Jl,ality-~\'athdu1ara Tf'm7J/e Act,
1959 (Raja.~
than .13 of 19-W) ss. 2 (viii), .1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 16, 21, 22, 27,
28, .JO, J:i, Jr;, 37-Consfitution of India, Art•. U, 19 (1) (/),
.."5 ' -''G) ' ·1 I (,_'') .
.
The history of the Nathdwara Temple in the District of
Udaipur showed that Vallabha, who was the founder of the
dcnominati0n known as Pushtimargiya Vaishnava Sampradaya,
installed the idol of Srimthji in a temple and that later on his
descendants built the Nathdwara Temple in I 761. The religious rcputati6n of the temple grew i11 importance and several
grants were made and thousands of devotees visiting the temple
made ofl'erings to the temple.
The succession to the Gaddi of
the 'filkayat received recognition from the Rulc::rs ofMewar,
but on seve1al occasions the Rulc::rs interfered whenever it was
found that the affairs of the temple were not managed pre perly.
In 1934 a Firman was issued by the Ucfaipur Darbar, by which,
inter alia, it was declared that according to the law of Udai ..
pur all the property dedicated or presented to or otherwise
coming to the Deity Shrinathji was property of the shrine, that
the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being was merely a custodian, Manager and Trustee of the said property and that the
Udaipur Darbar had absolute right to supervise that thr.
562 SUPREME COt]RT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
Ti/l;"J4l
Slrn Gocin•lalji
Mohiir"j
v.
't•te ef Rcja.sthan
property dedicated to the shrine was usecl for the legitimate
purposes of the shrine. The m1n1gement of the affairs by the
appellant Tilkayat was not successful and it became necessary
that a scheme should be framed for the management of the
Temple. On February 6, J 9j9, the Governor of Rajas than
promulgated an Ordinance, which was in due course replaced
by the Nathdwara Temple /\cl, J 9j9, The appellant challenged the validitv of the Act on the grounds, inter alia, that the
idol of Shrinathji in the Nathd-wara Temple and all the property pertainin'?' to it were his private properties and, as such,
the State Le~islature was not competent to pass the. Act, that
even if the ~athdwara Temple was held to be a public temple,
he as Mahant or Shebait had a beneficial interest in the office of
the high priest as well as the properties of the temple and thaf
on that footing, his rights •:nder Aris. 14, 19 (I) (f) and 31 (2}
of the Constitution of India had heen contravened by the Act.
It was also urged that the provisions of the Act infringed the
fundamental ·rights guar.lnteed to the Denomination
under
Aris. 55 (I) and 26 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The
question was also raised as to whether the tenel5 of the Vall.abha denomination and its religious practices required that the
worship by the devotees should be performed at the private
temple and so the existence of public temples was inconsistent
with the said tenets and practices.
Hdd, (I) that neither that tenet• nor the religious practices uf the V41labha school necessarily postulate that the
followers of the school must worship in a private temple.
(2) that in view of the documentary evidence in the case
it could not be held that the temple was built by the Ti!kayat of
the dJ.y as hh private temple or that it still coatinues to havc·thc
character of a private temple; that though from the outside
it had the appearance of a liaveli, the majestic st~ucture inside
was cohsistcnt "•ith the dignity of the idol and with the charac-
ter of the temple as a public temple.
(3) that an ausolule mnnarch was the fountain-head of
all Jegislativo, executive and judicial p:>wcrs, that it was of the
very essence of sovereignty which vested in him that he could
supervise and control the administration o~ public charity, and
that this principle applied as much to Hindu m:1narchs as to
any other absolute mo11arch. Any order i5sued by such a Ruler
would have the force of law and govern the rights of the parties
affected thereby: and that, accordingly, the Firman issued by the
Maharana of Cdaipur in 1934 was a law by which the affairs
of the :\athdwara Temple were governed after its issue.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
563
Madhaorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961]
I S. C.R. 9:17, relied on.
·
J96J
Tilkayat
(4) that under the law of Udaipur the Nathdwara Temple
was a public temple and that the Tilkayat was no more than
the Custodian, :0.fanager and Trustee of the property belonging
to the temple.
(5) that having regard to the terms of the Firman of 1934
the right claimed by the Tilkayat could not amount to a right
l:o property under Art. 19 (I) (f) or constitute property under
.\rt. 31 (2) of the Constitution; that even if it were held that
'his right constituted a right to hold property, the restrictions
.imposed by the Act must be considered as reasoaable and in the
interests of the public under Art. 19 (5).
Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balu.sami Ayyar, (1921) L. R. 48
I. A. 302 and the Commissioner, Hindu Rdigious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirt/ia Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,
[19541 S. C.R. 1005, considered.
(6) that the Art was not invalid on the ground of discrimination under Art. 14.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar,
[1959] S. C. R. 279, relied on.
(7) that the right to mana~e the properties of a temple was
a purely secular matter and could not be regarded as a religious
practice under Art. 25. (I.) or as amounting to affairs in 1 matters
of religion under Art. 26 (b). Consequently, the Act in so far
as it· provided for the inanagement of the properties of the
N'athdwara Temple under the provisions of the Act, did not
contravene Arts. 25 ( l) and 26 (b).
The Durgah Committee,
Ajmer v. Syed
Hussain Ali,
[1962] IS. C.R. 333, referred to.
(8) that the expression "Law'' in Art. 26 (d) meant a law
passed by a competent legislature and under that Article the
legislature was competent to make a law in regard to the ad~
ministration of the property belonging to the denominatilln and
that the provisions of the Act providing for the constitution of
a Board to administer the property were valid.
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay,
$·C.R. !Qj5, referrecl to,
·
p954)
Sh1i Govindl1tji
Maharaj
v.
State of Rajasthan
564
1963
Ti/4·11ya:
Shri (;cJl"inJlilji
Malaroj
••
Stat1 of R1jo1th'n
SUPRE:\1E COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
(9) that the schernc envisaged by ss. 3, 4, 16, 22 and 34 of
the Act 1ncrcly allo\\·ed the a<ln1inistration of the propcrtie! ef
the ternple \Vhich was a purely secular n1attr.r to be undertaken
by the Board and that the sections were valid.
(10) that under s. 5 (2) (g) it was necessary that the
members' of the Board other than the Collector of Udaipur
District should not only profr.ss Hindu religion but must also
belong to the P11shti Margiya \'allahhi Sampradaya; and
that the proviso to s. 5 (2) (g) which enabled a Collector
to be a statutory member of the Board even though he may not
be a Hindu and may not belong to the denomination, did not
contravene Arts. 25 (I) and 26 (b).
(II) that the expression "affairs of the temple" ins. 16
referred only the purely secular affairs in regard to the adminis·
tration of the temple and thar the section w~'s valid.
(12) that s. 30 (2) (a) in so far as it conferred on the
State Government power to m.i.ke rules in re:spect of the q11ali·
fications for h'>lding the oOice of the (f,'lswami, W.&! invalid.
(13) that "· 5, 7, JO, 11, 21, 27, 28, 3.i, .'l6 and 37
were valid.
C1v1r, ArrEUTt: Ji.:1t1~01crros: Civil Appeals
Nos. 652, 61):1 and 71)7 of l!l62.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
January 31, I 962, of the Rajasthan High Court in
D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. !JO of l 95!l.
AND
VICE VERSA
(b) Civil Appeals
of l!l62.
l\os. 6i>4,
fi;i5 and 758
Appeals from the judE(ment and order dated
January :lJ, l!l62, of the Rajasthan High Court in
·o. B. Civil Writ Petition No. :no of l!l.~!l.
Al\D
VICE VERSA
(c} Civil Appeal No. ll56 of J!Hi2.
1 S.Q.R.
SUPR.11.ME COURT REPORTS
565
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
January 31, 1962, of the Rajasthan High Court in
D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4~ I of 1960.
1963
Tilkt?y•t
Shri GfJointll•!fi ·
M 11haraj
(d) Writ Petition No. 74 of 1962.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,
G. S. Pathak, B. B. Desai, V. A. Seyid Muhammad
and B. C. Misra, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 652
of 1962) and respondent No. 1 (in C. As. Nos. 653
and 757 of 1962).
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
G. C. Kasliwal Advocate-General for the State of
Rajasthan, M. M. Tewari, S. K. Kapur, B. R. L.
Iyengar., Kan Singh, V, N. Sethi, B. R. C. K. Achar
and P. D. Menon, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in
.
C. A. Nos. 652 and 656/62) respondent No. 1 (in
C. A. No. 654/62), respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (m
C. A. No. 75'1/62), respondent No. 11 (in C. A.
No. 758/62) and appellants (in C. A. Nos. 653, and
655/62).
.
Sarjoo Prasad, S. B. L. Saxena and K. K.
Jain, for respondents Nos. 3 to 5 (in C. A. No. 652/62)
respondents Nos. 2-4 (in C. A. No. 653/62), respondents Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 (in C. A. No. 654/62),
the Board and its members (in C. A. No. 655/62),
respondents Nos. 3-12 (in C. A. No. 656/62) and the
appellants (in C. A. Nos. 757 and 758 of 1962.)
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Balkrishna Acharya
and M. V. Goswami, for the appellants (in C. A. No.
654/62), respondents Nos. 1-10 (in C. A No. 655/62)
and respondents Nos. 1-10 (in C. A. No. 758/62).
P. K. Chakravarty, for the appellant (in C. A.
No. 656/fi2).
v.
Ststa of RaJasth'J."I
566
1965
Tillcoyal
.Silti GM1ittilolji
Mah-.r6j
v.
S1ot1 of &j11StMn
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]
vot.
G. S. Pathak, B. Datta and B. P. Mahe&hwari,
for the petitioner (in W. P. No. 74/62).
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G S.
KaBliwal, Advocate-General for the State of Raja&·
than, M. M. Tewari, S. K. Kapur, B. R. L. Iyengar,
Kan Singh, Y. N. Sethi and P. D. Menon, for
respondents Nos. l and 2 (in W. P. No. 74/62).
S(trjoo l'ra&ad, S. 8. L. S e:ceoo and K. K.
Jain, for respondents Nos. 3-12 (in \V. P. No.74/62).
l!J63. January 2I.
was delivered by
Go1,.•••1dJc.,, J.
The J u<lgment of the Court
G.&JENDRAGADKAI!, J .-This group of seven
cross-appeals arises from three writ petitions field in
the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, in which
the validity of the Nathdwara Temple Act, J 95!)
(No. XIII of l\l."1'1) (hereinafter called the Act) has
been challenged. The principal writ petition was
Writ Petition No. DO of 1950; it was filed by the
p~esent Tilkayat Govindlalji (hereinafter. ~ailed the
T1lkayat) on February 28, 1959. That Petition challenged the validity of the ::\athdwara Ordinance, HJ59'
(No. II of 1959) which had been issued on Ftbruary
6, 1959. Subsequently this Ordinance was repealed
by the Act which, after receiving the assent of the
President, came into force on March 28, 1959.
Thereafter, the Tilkayat was allowed to amend
his petition and after its amendment, the petition
challenged the vires of the Act the provisions of which
are identical with the provisions of its predecessor
Ordinance. Along with this petition Writ Petition
No. 310 of 1959 was filed on August l 7, 1959,
by, ten
petitioners who purported to act
on behalf of the followers of the Pushtimargiya
Vaishnava Sampradaya. This petition attacked the
validity of the Act on behalf of the Denomination of
the followers of Vallabha. On November 3, 1960,
1 S.C.R. . SUPREME COURT REPORTS
567
the third Writ Petition (No. 421 of 1960) was filed on
behalf of Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji who as a
direct descendant of Vallabha, set up an interest in
himself in regard to the Nathdwara Temple, and as
a person having interest .in the said Temple, he
challenged the validity of the Act. These three petitions were heard together by the High Court and
have been dealt with by a common judgment. In
substance, the High Court has upheld the validity of
the Act, but it has struck down as ultra vires a part
of the definition of 'temple' ins. 2 (viii), a part ofs. 16
which refers to the affairs of the temple; s. 28, sub-ss.
(2) and (3); s. 30 (2)(a); ss. 36 and 37. The petitioners
as well as ·the State of Rajasthan felt aggrieved
by this decision and that has given rise to the present
cross-appeals.
The Tilkayat has filed Appeal
No. 652 of 1962, whereas the State has filed appeals
Nos. 653 and 757 of 1960. These appeals arise from
Writ Petition No. 90 of 1959. The Deno'!I\ination
has filed Appeal No 654 of 1962, .wh€reas the State
has filed Appeals Nos. 655 and 758 of l !Jo2. These
appeals arise from Writ Petition No. 310 of 1059.
Ghanshyamlalji whose Writ Petition '.'lo. 421of1U60
has been dismissed by the High Court on the ground
that it raises disputed questions of fact which cannot
be tried .u.nder Art. 226 of the Constitution, has preferred Appeal No. 656 of 1962. Since Ghanshyamlalji's petition has been dismissed in limine on the
ground just indicated, it was unnecessary for the
State to prefer any crms-appeal. Besides these seven
appeals, in the present group has been included Writ
Petition No. 74 of 1962 filed by the Tilkayat in this
Court under Art. 32. By the said writ petition the
Tilkayat has challenged the vires of the Act on some
additional grounds. That is how the principal point
which arises for our decision in this group is in
regard to the Constitutional validity of the Act.
At this stage, it is relevant to indicate broadly
the contentions raised ·by the parties before the High
1963
'Tiikayat
Shri Gtnimdlo{ji
MtthtJ.ruj ·
v.
State tJj R!ljaslhan
GtJjen(ragadkar~
J,
568 SUPREME COURt REPORtS [i964] VOL.
1963
7ilb)IGI
MN Gooittilolji
MeMr•j
••
S1411 oJ R<j11Stiln
G~1nbo1""'4r, J.
Court and the conclusions of the High Court dn the
points in controversy.
The Tilkayat contended
that the idol of Shri Shrinathji in the Nathdwara
Temple and all the property pertaining to it were
his private properties and as such, the State Legis·
lature was not competent to pass the Act. In the
alternative, it was urged that even if the Nathdwara
Temple is held to be a public temple and the Tilkayat
the Mahant or She bait. in charge of it, as such
Mahant or Shebait he had a beneficial interest in the
office of the high priest as well as the properties of the
temple and it is on that footing that the validity of
the Act was challenged under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the
Constitution. Incidentally the argument for the
Tilkayat was that the idols of Shri Navnit Priyaji
and Shri Madan Mohanlalji were his private idols
and the property pertaining to them was in any ca~e
not the property in which the public co.uld be ~aid
to be interested. The Denomination substantially
supported the Tilkayat's case. In addition, it urged
that if the temple was held to be a public temple,
then the Act would be invalid because it contravened
the fundamental rights guaranteed to the denomination under Art. 25 (l) and Art. 26 (b) and (c) of the
Constitution. Ghanshyamlalji pleaded title in himself and challenged the validity of the Act on the
ground that it contravened his rights under Art.
19 (l) (f).
On the other hand, the State of Rajasthan
urged that the Nathdwara Temple was a public
temple and the Tilkayat was no more and no better
than its manager. As such, he had no substantial benefical interest in the property of the temfle. The contention that the Tilkayat's fundamenta rights under
Art. 19 (1) (f) have been contravened by the Act was
denied; and the plea of the Denomination that the
fundamental rights guaranteed to it under Arts. 25 (1)
and 26 (b) and (c) had been infringed was also dispu·
ted. It was urged that the law was prefectly valid and
1 S.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
did no more than regulate the administration of the
property of the temple as contemplated by Art. 26 (c)
of the Constitution. The Tilkayat's claim that the
two idols of Navnit Priyaji and Madan Mohanlalji
were his private idols was also challenged. Against
Ghanshyamlalji's petition, it was urged that it raised
several disputed questions of fact wpich could not be
appropriately tried in proceedings under Art. 226.
The High Court has upheld the plea raised by
the State against the competence of Ghanshyamlalji's
petition. We 'Ought to add that the State had contended that the Tilkayat's case about the character
of the temple was also a mixed question of fact and
law and so, it could not be properly tried in writ
proceedings .. The High Court,. however, he)d t.hat it
would be inexpedient to adopt .a technical attitq.de
in this matter and it allowed the merits of the dispute
to be tried before it on the assurance given by the
learned counsel appearing for the Tilkayat that the
character of the property should be dealt with on the
documentary evidence adduced by him. Considering
the documentary evidence, the High Court came to
the conclusion that the temple is a public temple. It examined the several Firmans and Sanads on
which- reliance was placed by the Tilkayat and it
thought that the said grants supported the plea of the
State that the temple was not the private temple of
the Tilkayat. It has, however, found that the
Tilkayat is a spiritual head of the Denomination as
well as the spiritual head of the temple of Shrinathji.
He alone is entitled to perform 'Seva' and the other
religious functions of the temple. In its opinion,
the two minior idols of Navnit Priyaji and Madan
Mohanlalji were the private idols of the Tilkayat
and so, that part of the definition which included
them within the temple of Shrinathji was struck down
as invalid. In this connection, the High Court has
very strongly relied on the Firman issued by the
Maharana ofUdaipur on December 31, 1934, and it
IJ63
Ti/U;>.,
Mri G<Wini/o(j i
M•h•aj
v.
Stale tJj &jastlum
G•j•nirq•lklr, J.
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1963
TilU,1<ll
Slrti Gocit1llc1ji
M•"-1tt•j
v.
Sl•t1 ef Raj1111Mn
G•i""'8&•4"r, J.
has observed that this Firman clearly established the
fact that the temple was a public temple, that the
Tilkaya twas 110 more than a Custodian, :-.fan ager
and Trustee of the property belonging to the temple
and that the State had the absolute right to
supervise that the property dedicated to the shrine
was used for legitimate purposes of the shrine.
Havin~ found that the Tilkayat was the head of the
denommation and the head priest of the temple, the
High Court conceded in his favour the right of resi·
dence, the right to distribute Prasad and the right to
conduct or supervise the worship and the performance of the Seva in the temple. In the light of
these rights the High Court held that the Tilkayat
had a beneficial interest in the properties of the
temple and as such, was entitled to contend that the
said rights were protected under Art. 19 (1) (f) and
could not be contravened by the Legislature. The
High Court then examined the relevant provisions of
the Act and held that, on the whole, the major
operative provisions of the Act did not contravene
the fundamental rights of the Tilkayat under
Art. 19 (I) (f); ss. 16, s. 28, sub-ss. (2) and (3),
s. 30 (2) (a), ss. 36 & 3i, however, did contravene
the Tilkayat's fundamental rights acccording to the
High Court, and so, the said sections and the part of
the definition of 'temple' ins. 2 (viii) were struck
down by the High Court as ultra vire,,. The plea
that the fundamental rights under Art. 25 (I) and
Art. 26 (b) and (c) were contraveneisd did not appeal
to the High Court to be well-founded. In the
result, the substantial part of the Act has been held
to be valid. It appears that before the High Court
a plea was raised by the Tilkayat that his rights under
Arts. 14 and 31 (2) had been contravened by the
Act. These pleas have been rejected by the High
Court and they have been more particularly and
specifically urged before us by the Tilkayat in his
Writ Petition No. i4 of 1962. That, in brief, is the
,.
i. S.C.R. SUPREME COUR t REPORTS
571
nature of the findings recorded by the High Court
in the three writ petitions filed before it.
•
1963
T.tkayaJ
Shri GninJl,lji
Mc/Ju6}
Before dealing with the merits of tte present
dispute, it is necessary to set out brie!ly the historical State •f••R4;..sthan
background of the temple of Shrinathji at Nathdwara
and the incidents in ·relation to the management of
its properties which ultimately led to the Act. The
temple of Shrinathji at Nathdwara holds a very high
place among the Hindu temples in this country and
is looked upon with great reverence by the Hindus in
general and the Vaishna v followers of Vallabha in
particular. As in the case of other ancient revered
Hindu temples, so in the case of the Shrinathji temple '
at.Nathdwara, mythology has woven an attractive .
web about the genesis of its construction at
Nathdwara. Part of it may be history and part may
be fiction, but the story is handed down from gene·
ration 10 generation of devotees and is believed by_ all
of them to be true. This temple is visited by thous.;.1ds
of Hindu devotees in general and by the followers of
the Pushtimargiya Vaishnava Sampradaya in particular. The followers of Vallabha who constitute a
denomination are popularly known as such. The
denomination was founded by Vallabha (1479-1531
A. D.)* He was the son of· a Tailanga Brahmin named
Lakshmana Bhatt. On one occasion, Lakshmana Bhatt
had gone on pilgrimage to Banaras with his wife
Elamagara. On the way, she gave birth ta a sori in
1479 A. D. That son was known as Vallabha. It is
said that God Gopala Krishna manifested himself to
Vallahha on the Govardhana Hill by the name of
Devadamana, also known as Shrinathji. Vallabha
saw the vision in his dream and he was commanded
by God Gopala Krishna to erect a shrine for Him
and to propagate amongst his followers the cult of
worshipping Him in order to obtain salvation (').
Vallabha then went to the hill and he found the
image corresponding to the vision which he had seen
in this dream. Soon thereafter, he got a small
*Some ~cholar~ think that \ 7alfo.hha ,\·a<i born in 1473 A:D .. vide The
Cultural Heritage ol India vol. Ill at p. 347.
(1) Bhandarkar on 'Vaishnavism, S'aivi!m & Minor Religious aystem.s at p; 77,
572 SUPllMi COURT REPORTS [1964'] VOL.
'63
TiLll!J•I
·
SliTi G1r:'.rr,/lclji
MaltsrtJi
. v.
Slatt ef N•j&Jtlre
temple built at Giriraj and-installed the image in the
said temple. It is believed that this happened in
i500 A. D .. A devotee named Ramdas Chowdhri
was entrusted with the task of serving in the temple .
Later on, a rich merchant named Pooranmal was
asked by Govardhannathji to build a big temple for
him. The building of the temple took as many as
20 years and when it was completed, the Image was
installed there by Vallabha himself and he enga1'ed
Bengali Brahmins as priests ~n the said temple, (' ).
In course of time, Vallabha was succeeded by
his son Vithaltiathji who was both in learning and
in saintly character a worthy son of a worthy father.
Vithalnath had great organising capacity and his
work was actuated by missionary zeal.
In the
denomination, Vallabha is described as Acharya or
Maha Prabhuji and Vithalnath is described as Gosain
or Goswamin. It is said that Vithalnath removed
the idol of St.rinathji to another temple which had
been built by him. It is not known whether any idol
was installed in the earlier temple. Vithalnath lived
during the period of Akbar when the political
atmosphere in the c;ountry in Northern India was
actuated by a spirit of tolerance. It appears that
Akbar heard about the saintly reputation of Vithalnath and issued a Firman granting land in Mowza
of Jatipura to Vithalnathji in order to build
building11, gardens, cowsheds and workshops for the
temple of Govardhannathji. This Firman was issued.
in 1693 A. D.
Later, Emperor Shahajahan also
issued another Firman on October 2, 163 3, which
shows that some land was being ranted by the
Emperor for the use and expenses o Thakurdwara
exempt from payment of dues.
Goswami Vithalnath had seven sons. The tradi·
tion of the denomination believes that besides the idol
of Shrinathji Vithalnathji received from his father
(I) .Bliai M1nilal 0. Porekh'a 'A Religion of Grace',
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
seven other idols which were also "Swaroops" (mani·
festations) of Lord Krishna. Before his death, Vithal·
nathji entrusted the principal idol of Shrinathji, to
his eldest son Girdharji and the other idols were given
over to each one of his other sons. These brothers
in turn founded separate shrines at various places
which are also held by the members of the denomi·
nation in high esteem and reverence.
.
When Aurangzeb came on the throne, the
genial atmosphere of tolerance disappeared and the
Hindu temples were exposed to risk and danger of
Aurangzeb's intolerant and bigoted activities. Col.
Todd in the first volume of his 'Annals of Rajasthan'
at p. 451 says that "when Aurangzeb prescribed
Kanaya and rendered his shrines impure throughout
Vrij, Rana Raj Singh offered the heads of one hundred
thousand Rajpoots for his service, and the God was
conducted by the route of Kotah and Rampoora to
M~war. An omen decided the spot of his future
residence. As he journeyed to gain the capital of
the Sessodias, the chariot-wheel sunk deep into the
earth and defied extrication; upon which the Sookuni
(augur) interpreted the pleasure of the deity that he
desired to dwell there. This circumstance occurred at
an inconsiderable village called Siarh, in the fief of
Dailwara, one of the sixteen nobles of Mewar.
Rejoiced at this decided manifestation of favour, the
chief hastened to make a perpetual gift of the village
and its lands which was speedily confirmed by the
patent of the Rana. Nathji (the god) was removed
from his car, and in due time a tempte was erected
for his reception, when the hamlet of Siarh became
the town of Nathdwara. This happened about 1671
A. D." This according ·to the tradition, is the
genesis of the construction of the temple at
Nathdwara. Since then, the religious reputation of
the temple has ~rown by leaps and bounds and today it can legitimately claim to be one of the few
leading religious temples of the Hindus. Several
•'
1963
Tilkayat
Shri Gouirua.Jji
Maharaj
v.
Stat1 of Rajastltan
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
196:1
T1U·•yol
Shri Go; in1/,;/ji
Mahar"J
v.
S141t of R1Jja.sthari
Cajtnb~11dkar, J.
grants were made and thousands of devotees visiting
the temple in reverence made offerings to the temple
almost everyday throughout the year. No wonder
that the tern pie has now become one of the richest
religious institutions in the country.
The succession to the Gaddi of the Tilkayat
has, from the beginning, been governed by the rule
ot Primogeniture. This succession received recogni·
tion from the rulers of Mewar from time to time.
It appears that in 1813 A. D. Tilkayat Govindlalji
was adopted by the widow of Tilkayat Damodarji
and the ruler of .l\lewar recognised the said adoption.
Later, the relations between the ruler of Mewar and
the Tilkayat were strained during the time of
Tilkayat Girdharlalji. It seems that the Tilkayat
was not content with the position of a spiritual leader
of the denomination but he began to claim special
secular rights, and when the Darbar of Udaipur
placed the vilhges hdonginc; to the Nathdwara
Temple under attacl1mcnt, a protest was made by
the members of the denomination on behalf of the
Tilkayat. It was as a result of this strained relation·
ship between the Darbar and the Tilkayat that in 1876
Tilkayat Girdharlalji was deposed and was deported
from Nathdwara by the or<ler passed by the Ran11 of
Mewar on May 8, l SiG ...... The reason given for
this drastic step was that the Tilkayat disobeyed the
orders of the ruling authority and so, could not be
allowed to function as such. In place of the deposed
Tilkayat, his son Gordhanlalji was appointed as
Tilkayat. Girdharialji then went to Bombay and
litigation started between him and his Tilkayat son
in respect of e>;tensive properties in Bombay.
Girdharlalji claimed the properties as his own whereas his Tilkayat son urged that the fact that
Girdharlalji had been deposed by the Rana of
Udaipur showed that the properties no longer vested
in him. ft appears that the Bombay High Court ·
consistently took the view that the order passed by
.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
the Rana ofUdaipur on May 8, 1876, was an act
of a foreign State and did not effect his right to
property in Bombay. It was observed that
Girdharlalji was regarded as owner of the property,
he had not lost his right as such to the said property in
consequence of his deposition, and if he was merely a
trustee, he had not been removed from his office by
any competent Tribunal vide Nanabai v. Shriman
Goswami Girdharji (1 ). Goswami Shri Girdharji
Maharaj Shri Govindraiji J11aharaj Tilkayat v.
Madhowdas Premji and Goswami Shri Govardhanlalji
Girdharji Maharaj (') and Shriman Goswami Shri
108 Shri Govardhanlalji Girdharlalji v. Goswami
Shri Girdharlalji Govindrajji (3). So f<ir as the
N athd wara temple and the properties situated in
Mewar were concerned, the Tilkayat Gordhanlalji
who had been appointed by the Rana of Udaipur
continued to be in possession and management of the
same.
·
Unfortunately, in 1933, another occasion arose
when the Rana of Udaipur had to take drastic action.
After the death of Goverdhanlalji on September 21,
1933, his grand son Damodarlalji became the
Tilkayat. His conduct. however, showed that he
did not deserve to be a spiritual leader of the denomination and could not be left in charge of the
religious affairs of the Shrinathji temple at
Nathdwara. That is why on October 10, 1933, he
wa5 deposed and his son Govindlalji, the present
Tilkayat, was appointed the Tilkayat of the temple.
Before adopting this course, the Rana had given
ample opportunities to Damodarlalji to improve his
conduct, but despite the promises made by him
D.imodarlalji persisted in the course of behaviour
which he had adopted and so, the Darbar was left
with no othar alternatiye but to depose him. That
is how the present Tilkayat's regime began even
during the lifetime of his father.
(l] 12 Bom. 351.
(2) 17 Bom. 600.
(3) 17 Bom, 620
1963
Tilka,.vet
!>hri .t Guvindla/j •
Maharaj
y,
Stat(of Rqjast""'
G•j1ntlragadlrar, J.
576
1163_ ..
1iik.,.t .
SJ ri G1Wti/(llji
MllltlTaj
••
Sim of ~stM•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
As on the occasion of the deposition of
Girdharlalji in 1833, so on the occa~ion of the depo·
sition of Damodarlalji, litigation followed in respect
of Bombay properties. On January 6, 1934,
Damodarlalji filed a suit in the Bombay High Court
(No. 23 of 1934) against the Tilkayat and other
persons representing the denomination, In this suit,
he claimed a declaration that he was entitled to and
had become the owner of all the properties mentioned
in the plaint and that he was the owner of all the
rights, presents, offerings, and emoluments arising in
and accruing- from the ownership of the idols,
Shrinathji and Shri Navnit Priyaji as well a~ his
position as the Tilkayat Maliaraj in due course of
his succession. J,1 the said suit. the idols of Shrinathji
arid Shri Navnit Priyaji were added as defendants.
At. that time, the Tilkayat was a minor. Written
statements were filed on his behalf and on behalf
of the two idols. A counter claim was preferred on
behalf M the idol< tkll t 11c properties belonged to
them. Subsequently, the suit filed by Damodarlalji
was withdrawn; but the counterclaim made by the
idols was referred to the sole arbitration and final
determination of Sir Chimanlal H. Setalvad, a leading Advocate of the Bombay High Court. On
April 10, 1942, the arbitrator made his award and
in due course, a decree was passed in terms of the
said award on September 8, l!l42. This decree provided that all the properties, movable, and
immovable, and all
offerings and
Bhents
donated to the idol of Shri11athj i or for its
worship or benefit belonged to the said idol,
whereas properties donated, dedicated or offered to
the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being, or at the
Krishna Bhandar Pedhis if donated, dedicated 0r
offered for the worship or benefit of the idol belonged to the said idol. It also provided that the
Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being in actual charge
at Nathdwara is entitled to hold, use and manage
the "properties of the said idol according to the
•
l S.C.k.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
577
usage of the Vallabhi Sampradaya." The said
award and the decree which followed in terms of it
were naturally confined to the properties in the
territories which then comprised British India and
did not include any properties in the territories ·which
then formed part of princely Indla or Native States
as they were then known.
Meanwhile, after Damodarlalji was deposed
and his son Govindlalji was appointed the Tilkayat,
the Rana of Udaipur issued a Firman on Decem·
ber 31, 1934. By this Firman it was laid down that
the shrine of Shrinathji had always been and was
a religious institution for the followers of the
Vaishnavas Sampradayak and all the properties
offered at the shrine were the property of th,e si)rine
and that the Tilkayat Maharaj was merely a Custo·
dian,. Manager and Trustee. of the said proprrty for
the shrine. It also provided that the Udaipur
Darbar had absolute right to supervise that the
property dedicated _to the shrine is used for legitimate
purpose of the shrine. It also made· certain oth«
provisions to which we shall have occasion to return
later.
When he was appointed the Tilkayat,
Qovindlalji was a minor and so, the management of
the temple and the property remained with the Court
ol Wards, till April 1, 1948. On that date, the
management of the Court of Wards was withdrawn
and the charge of the property was handed over ..to
the Tilkayat. It appears that the ·management of
affairs by the Tilkayat was not very liappy or
successful and the estate faced financial difficulties.
In order to meet this difficult situation the T~lkayat
appointed a ·committee of management. corisisting
of 12 members belonging to the denomination some
time in 19.52. This wii.~ followed .by another commi·
ttee of 21 ·members appointed ori June II, i953 •
. Whil,t this• latter committee' was In Charge
the
of
1969
'Iilk"Jll(
Shri OoDlnll•U i
Ma/uJtqj ,
--y. '
.
Slalt •/ R4/dl"'°"
O•J••1•.·1
378
r.u.,.,
SArl GoWulloffe
'
•.
M.Uqj
Slelef ~llltMn
~"'"""· /,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)VOL..
management, some valuables stored and locked in the
room in the premises of the Temple of Shrinathji were
removed by the Tilkayat in December, 1957. This
news created excitement amongst the members of the
public in general and the followers of the denomination in particular, and so, the Rajasthan Government
appointed a Commission of Enquiry. In the preamble
to the notification by which the Commission of
Enquiry was appointed, it was stated that the State
of Rajasthan as the successor of the covenanting State
of Mewar had a special responsibility to supervise
that the endowments and properties dedicated to .the
shrine are safeguarded and used for the legitimate
pur~es of the shrine. The Commission of the
Enquiry made its report on October II, 1959. This
report passed severe strictures against the conduct of
the Tilkayat. At this stage, we ought to add that
the dispute between the Tilkayat and the Rajasthan
Government as to the ownership of the valuable
articles removed from the temple was later referred
to the sole arbitration of Mr. Mahajan, the retired
Chief Justi.ce of this Court. The arbitrator made
his award on September 12, 1961, and held that
except in regard to the items specified by him in his
award, the rest of the property belonged to the
Tilkayat; and he found that when the Tilkayat
removed the properties, he believed that they were
his persona 1 properties.
It was in the background of these events that
the State of Rajasthan thought it necessary that a
scheme should be drafted for the .nauagement of the
Temple and this proposal received the approval of
the 'J'.ilkayat. In order to give effect to this proposal·
it was agreed between the parties that a suit under,
s. 92, Code of Civil Procedure. should be filed in the·
Court of the District Judge at Udaipur. The parte
then thought that the suit would be non-contentious
and would speedily end in a scheme of ma:i8ea r
ment being drafted with the consent of parties
i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
Accordingly, suit No. 1 of 1956 was filed in the District Court at Udaipur, and in accordance with the
agreement which he had reached with the authorities,
the Tilkayat filed a non contentious written statement.
However, before the suit could make any appreciable
progress, Ghanshyamlalji and Baba Raj vi, the son of
Tilkayat, applied to be made parties to the suit and
it became clear that these added parties desired to
raise contention~ in the suit and that entirely changed
the complexion of the litigation. It was then obvious
that the litigation wou Id be a long-drawn out affair
and the object of evolving a satisfactory scheme ~or
the management of the affairs of the temple would
not be achieved until the litigation went through a
protracted course.
It was under these circumstances that the
Governor of Rajasthan promulgated an Ordinance
called the Nathdwara Ordinance, J959 '(No. II
of 1959) on February 6, 19J9. The Tilkayat
immediately filed his Writ Petition No. 90 of 1959
challenging the validity of the said Ordinance. The
Ordinance was in due course replaced by Act 13
of 1959 and the Tilkayat was allowed to amend his
original writ petition so as to challenge the vires of
tI.e Act. Shortly stat ~d, this is the historical
background of the present dispute.
The first question which calls for our decision
is whether the tenets of the Valla bh denomination
and its religious practices postulate and require that
the worship by the devotees should be performed at
the private temple owned and managed by the
Tilkayat, and so, the existence of public temples is
inconsistent with the said tenets and practices. In
support of this argument, the learned AttorneyGeneral has placed strong reliance on the observadons made by Dr. Bhandarkar in his work on
Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems,
ti 80. In the section dealing with Vallabh and his
1963
Tiltayat
jhri Goviruilolji
Maharaj
v,
State of RajtJJth!ln.
Gqjendra.fadkar, J,
1>80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL"
1963
r.u.,..
~ri
GoriNlloJji
MalatJroj
Y.
S1a11 •I R~"'tli.n
CojlodrU"dlar, J.
I
school; the learned Doctor has incidentally observed
that the Gurus of this sect ordinarily called Maharajs
are descendants of the seven sons of Vithalesa. Each
GiJru has a temple of his own, and there are no public
places of worship. He has also added that the
mfluence exercised by Vallabh and his successors
over their adherents is kept up by the fact that God
cannot be worshipped indcpendenily in a public
place of worship, but in the house and temple of the
Guru or the Maharaj which, therefore, has to be
regularly visited by the devotees with offerings. These
temples are generally described as Havelis and the
argument is that the said description also brings out
the fact that the temples are private temples owned
by the Tilkayat of the day. It· is true that the
observations made by Dr. Bhandarkar lend support
to the contention raised before us by the learned
Attorney-General on behalf of the Tilkayat, but if
the discussion contained in Dr. Bhandarkar's work
in the section dealing with Vallabh is considered as
a whole, it would be clear that these observations are
incidental and cannot be tak~n to indicate the
learned Doctor's conclusions after a careful examination of all the relevant considerations bearing on
the point. Since, however, these .observations are in
favour of the plea raised by the Tilkayat, it is necessary very briefly to enquire whether there is anything in the tenets or the religious practices of this
denomination which justifies the claim made by the
learned Attorney-General.
What then is the nature of the philosophical
doctrines of Vallabh? According to Dr. Radha
Krishnan ('), Vallabh accepts the authority not only
of the Upanishads, the Bha~vad ·git a and the Brahma
Sutras, but also of the Bhagavata Purana. In his
works, Anubhasya, Siddhantarahasya and BhagavataTikasubodhini, he offers a theistic interpretation of
the Vedanta, which differs from those of Sankara and
Ramanuja. His view is called Suddhadvaita, or
(I) ''Indian PhiloJOpby" by
Dr. Radba Krishnan, pp. 756 •nd 758.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
•
pure non·dualism, and declares that the whole world
is real and is subtly Brahman. The individual souls
Tilk"!Yal
Govim/lal}t
and the inanimate world are in essence one with Shri Maharaj
Brahman. Vallabha looks upon God as the whole
v.
and the individual as part. The analogy of sparks !.tale qf /!Jija1tl.m
of fire is employed by Him to great purpose. The Gaj1nJragod/uu. J.
Jiva bound by maya cannot attain salvation except
through the grace of God, which is called Pushti.
Bhakti is the chief means of salvation, though Jnana
is also useful. As regards the fruit of Bhakti, thPre
are diverse opinions, says Dasgupta ('). Vallabha said
in his Sevaphala·vivrti that as a result of it one may
attain a great power of experiencing the nature of God,
or may also have the experience of continual contact
with God, and also may have a body befitting tl:ie
service of God. Vallabha, however, is opposed to
renunciation 'after the manner of monistic sanya.~,a, ,
for this can only bring repentance; as being inefficacious. Thus, it will be seen that though. V i;tllabha
in his philosophical theories differs from Sankara and
Ramanuja, the ultimate path for salvation which he
has emphasised is that of Bhakti and by Bhakti the
devotee obtains Pushti (divine grace). That is why
the cult of Vallabha is known as Pushtimarg or the
path for obtaining divine grace.
1>r: ·Bhandarkar points out that according to
Vallabha, l\fahapushti, or the highest grace, is that
which removes great obstacles and conduces to the
attainment of God himself. Thus Pushtibhakti is-of
four kinds: ( l) Pravaha-Pushtibhakti, (2) MaryadaPushtibhakti, (3) Pushti-Pushtibhakti and (4) SudhaPushtibhakti. The first is the path of those who
while engaged in a worldly life with its me and mine,
do acts calculated to bring about the attainment of
God. The second is of those who, withdrawing
their minds from worldly enjoyments, devote themselves to God by hearing His praise and listening to
discours!S about Him. The third is ofthose who
already enjoyed God's grace and are made competent
(I) A history on "Indian Pbilo.K>pby" by Das GuE\!1. pp. US-356.
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
,
1961
Tilltoyal
~h1i
Gov1ttdlblji
Mdlunaj .
St11lt oj
•RajaJtlian
6'ajnu/rq10W, J.
to aquire knowledge useful for adoration and thus
come to know all about rhe ways of God. The fourth
is of those wh<> through mere love devote themselves
to the singing and praising of God as if it were a
haunting passion .. Thus, it would be seen that the
tenets of the cult emphasised the importance of
Bhakti, and the religious practices accordingly centered round this doctrine of Bhakti.
The practical modes of worship adopted by the
members of this cult bring out the same effect. Lord
Krishna as a child is the main object of worship.
His worship consists of several acrs of performance
every day in the prescribed order of ceremonies.
These begin wirh the ringing of rhe bell in the morning and putting the Lord to bed at nil{ht. After
the Lord is awakened by the ringing of the bell, there
is a blowing of the conch shell, awakening of the Lord
and offering morning refreshments; waving of lamps;
bathing; dressing; food; leading the cows out for
grazing; the mid-day meal; waving of lamps again;
the evening service; the evening meal and going to
bed. These rituals performed with meticulous care
from day to day constitute the prescribed items of
Seva which the devotees attend every day in the
Vallabh temple. In order to be able to offer Bhakti
in a proper way, the members of this denomination
are initiated into this cult by the performance of two
rites; one is Sharana .\fantropadesh and the other is
Atma Nivedan. The first gives the devotee the status
of a Vaishnava and the second confers upon him the
status of an Adhikari entitled to pursue the path of
service of devotion. At the performance of the first
rite, the mantra which is repeated in the ears of the
devotee is "Shree Krishna Sharanam Mamah" and
on the occasion a 'tulsi Kanthi' is put around the
neck of the devotee. At the second initiation, a
religious formula is repeated, the effect of which is
that the devotee treats himself and all his properties
as belonging to Lord Krishna. We have already
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5S3
referred to the original image which Vallabha ins·
tailed in the temple built in his time and the seven
idols which Vithalnathji gave to his sons. These
idols are technically described as 'Nidhi'Swaroops'.
Besides these idols, there are several other idols which
are worshipped by Vaishnava devotees after they are
sanctified by the Guru. It is thus clear that believing
in the paramount importance and efficacy of Bhakti,
the followers of Vallabha attend the worship and ser·
vices of the Nidhi Swaroops or idols from day to day
in the belief that such devotional conduct would ultimately lead to their salvation.
It is significant that this denomination does not
recognise the existence of Sadhus or Swamis other
than the descendants of Vallabha and it emphasises
that it is unnecessary to adopt ritualistic practices or
to repeat Sanskrit Mantras or in cantations in wor·
shipping the idols. Besides, another significant fea·
ture of this cult is that it does not believe in celibacy
and does not regard that giving up worldly. pleasures
and the ordinary mode of a house-holder's life
are essential for spiritual progrt:ss. In fact Vallabha
himself lived a house-holder's life and so have all his
descendants. This cult does not, therefore, glorify
poverty and it ·teaches its followers that a normal
house-holder's life is quite compatible with the prac·
tice of Bhakti, provided of course, the devotee goes
through the two ceremonies of initiation and lives up
to the principles enunciated by Vallabha.
The question which we have to decide is whether there IS anything in the philosophical doctrines
or tenets or religious practices which ate the special
features of the Vallabha school, which prohibits the
existence of public temples or worship in them. The
main object underlying the requirement that devotees
should assemble in the Haveli of the Guru and
worship the idol obviously was to encourage
collective and congregational prayers. Presumably
1969
Tilk4yal
Shti Gouindlalji
Maharoj
v.
Stale of Rajas""'"
Gajllldrogadkar, I·
584
1963
Tilu.JOl
,,,_'ii
Slui Govindlalji
••
Slal< ef RajastlitPi
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964)VOL.
it was realised by Vallabha and his descendants
that worship in Hindu pubEc temples is apt to
clothe the images worshipped with a formal and rigid
character and the element of personality is thereby
obliterated ; and this school believes that in order
that Bhakti should be genuine and passionate, in the
mind of the devotee there must be present the nece·
ssary element of the personality of God. It is true
that Vaishnava temples of the Val!abha sect are
generally described as Havel is and though they are
grand and majestic' inside, the outside appearance
is always attempted to resemble that of a private
house. This feature can, however, be easily explain·
ed if we recall the fact that during the time when
Vithalnathji with his great missionary zeal spread
the doctrine of Vallabha, Hindu temples were cons·
tantly faced with the danger of attack from
Aurangzeb. In fact, the traditional story about the
foundation of the Srinathj i temple at Nathdwara
itself eloquently brings out the fact that owing to the
religious persecution practised during Aurangzeb's
time, Srinathji himself had to give up his abode near
Mathura and to start on a journey in search of a
place for residence in more hospitable and congenial
surroundings. Faced with this immediate problem
Vithalnathji may have started building the temples
in the form of Havelis so that from outside nobody
should know that there is a temple within.
It may also be true historically that when the
first temple was built in the life time of Vallabha
it may have been a modest house where the original
image was installed and during the early years just a
few devotees may have been visiting the said temple.
Appropriately enough, it was then called a Haveli.
Later, even when the number of devotees increased
and the temples built by the Vallabha sect began to
collect thousands of visitors, traditional adherence
to time-honoured words described all subsequent
temples also as Havelis however big and maJcatic
.1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
they were. Therefore, we are satisfied that neither
the tenets nor the religious practices of the Vallabha
school necessarily postulate that the followers of the
school must worship in a private temple. Some
temple's of this cult. may have been private in the
past and some of them may be private even today.
Whether or not a particular temple is a public
temple must necessarily be considered in the
light of the ·relevant facts relating to it. There
can be no general rule that a public temple is prohibited in V allabha School. Therefore, the first
argument urged by the learned Attorney-General in
challenging the finding. of the High Court that the
Srinathji temple at Nathdwara is a public temple,
cannot be accepted.
The question as to whether a· Hindu temple is
private or public has often been considered by judi- .
cial .decisions. A temple belonging to a family
which is a private temple is not unknown to Hindu
law. In the case of a private te_mple it is also not
unlikely that the religious reputation of the founder
may be of such a high order that the private temple
founded by him may attract devotees in large
numbers and the mere fact that a large number of
devotees are allowed to worship in the temple would
not necessarily make the private temple a public
temple. On the other hand, a public temple can
be built by subscriptions raised by the public and a
deity installed to enable all the members of the
public to offer worship. In such a case, the temple
-would clearly be a public temple. Where evidence
in regard to the foundation of the temple is not
clearly available, sometimes, judicial decisions rely
on certain other facts which are tn·ated as relevant.
Is the temple built in such an imposing manner that
it may prima facie appear to be a public temple ?
The appearance of the temple of course cannot be a
decisive factor; at best it may be a relevant factor.
Axe the members of the public entitled to an entry
1963
TilknJ•at
Shri Gooindlalji
Maharaj
v.
State of Rajastlum
Gajendragadkar, J.
586
1963
r;Jt.y'll
Shri GDDW/lolji
Mah4Foj
••
StoU of RajaJINm
G•fandra1aJAar, J.
SUPREME COURT RE!'QRTS [1964) VOL.
in the temple ? Are they entitled to take part in
offering service and taking Darshan in the temple ?
Are the members of the public entitled to take part
in the festivah and ceremonies arranged in the
temple ? Are their offerings accepted as a matter of
right ? The participation of the membrrs of the
public in the Darshan in the temple and in the daily
Acts of worship or in the celebrations of festival
occasions may be a very important factor to consider
in determining the character of the temple. In the
present proceedings, no such evidence has been led
and it is, therefore, not shown that admission to the
temple is controlled or regulated or that there are
other factors present which indicate clearly that the
temple is a private temple. Therefore, the case for
the Tilkayat cannot rest on any such considerations
which, if proved, may have helped to establish either
that the temple is private or is public.
There are, however, certain ancient documents
which show that the tempk cannot be a private
temple. We have already referred to the Firmans
issued by Akbar and Shahjahan. These Firmans
are strictly not material for the purpose of the present
dispute because they have no relation to the temple
at Nathdwara .. However, aii a matter of history, it
may be worthwhile to recall that the Firman issued
by Akbar on May 31, 1593 A. Il. shows that
Vithalrai had represented to the Darbar that he had
purchased on paying its price land from the owners
thereof in the Mowzah of Jatipura, situated in the
Paraganah, adjoining Gordhan and had caused to be
built thereon buildings, gardens, cowsheds and
Karkhanas (workshops) for the temple of Gordhan
Nath and that he was residing there. Having rectived this representation, Akbar issued an order that
. the above-mentioned Mowzah had been given over
tax-free into the possession of the above-mentioned
Goswami from descendant to descendant. It would
thus be seen that though the grant by which the land
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
in question was exempted from payment {)f taxes is
in the name of the Goswami, there can be no doubt
that it was so named on the representation made by
the Goswami that he had purchased the land and
built structures on it for the temple of Gordhan Nath.
Thus, in substance, the grant was mad.e to :he
Goswami who was managing the temple of Gordhan
Nath. The grant of ~bah Jahan made in. 1633
A. D. is to the same effect. These grants are in
reference to the temple built by Vithalrai inJatipura.
We have already seen that the idol of Shrinathji was
removed from the said temple and brought to
Nathdwara in about 1671.
The earliest document in regard to Siarh is
of the year 1672 A. D. The document has been
issued by the Rana of Udaipur and it says that "Be
it know that Shrinathji residing at Sihod Let uncultivated land as may desire be cultivated till such time.
When Shrinathji goes back to Brij the land of
those to whom it belongs will be returned to them.
If any one obstructs in any way he will be rebuked."
The next document is of 1680 A. D. It has been
issued by Rana of Udaipur and is in similar
terms. It says that when Shrinathji goes back
to Brij from Singhad Brahmins will get the land
which is of the Brahmins. 1 hey will get the land as
is entered in previous records. So long as Shrinathji
stays here, no Brahmin shall cultivate towards the
West of Shah Jagivan's wall up to and across the foot
of the hillock. If any one cultivates a fine of Rs. 225/shall be realised collectively. Fortunately, for Nathdwara, the temple which was then built for Shrinathji
for a temporary abode has turned out to be Shrinathji's
permanent place of residence. These two documents
clearly show that after Shrinathji was installed in
what is now known as Nathdwara, the land occupied
for the purpose of the temple was given over for that
purpose and the actual occupants and cultivators
were told that they would get the land back when
Shrinathji goes back to Brij.
·
1963
Tilkayct
Shri Govmdlalji
Maharaj
v.
State of Rajaslho
Gajendragadkar, J.
588
/963
Tilka}'dl
Sltti
G~ilttllolji
MaA·•ruj
v.
Sto/1 of Rajaduua
Coj1Nf,01adJ:or, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
We have already cited the extract from Col.
Todd's 'Annals of Rajasthan' in which he has
graphically described the traditional belief in regard
to the choice of Siarh for the abc.Je of Shrinathji.
That extract shows that as soon the chariot wheel
of Shrinathji ·stopped and would •iot ml)ve, the chief
hastened to make a perpetual gift of the village and
its lands which was speedily confirmed by the pa tent
of the· Rana. Nathji was removed from his car and
in due course of time a temple was :rected for his
reception. That is how the hamlet of Siarh became
the town of Nathdwara. This assurance given by
the chief was confirmed by the tw" grants to which
we have just referred. Thus, tht.·e can be ·no doubt
that the original grants were for the purpose of the
temple.
A deed of dedication executed by Maharana
Shri Bhim Singhji in favour of Gusainji in Sambat
1865 also shows that the lands therein described had
bt'en dedicated to Shriji and Shri Gusainji and that
all the income relating to thos~ lands would be
dediCated to the Bhandar of Shriji.
A letter written by the Maharana on January
17, 1825, speaks to the same effect. "Our ancestors,"
says the letter, "kept the Thakurji Maharaj and
the Gosainji Maharaj at the village of Shinhad which
is near Udaipur and presented that village to the
Thakurji. After this, our ancestors became followers
of that religion and agreed to obey orders. They all
granted lands and villages for the expenses of the
God. Besides these certain Iands were granted for
the grazing of the cows belonging to the Thakurji."
This letter contains certain orders to the officers of
the State to respect the rights of the temple and
Gosainji.
Consistently with this record, we find a declaration made by Tilkayat Gordhanji in 1932 in which he
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
1963
stated that "the money of Shri Thakurji as is the prac- .
tice now, that it is not spent in our private expenditure
Trlkayat
the same will be followed", though along with this de- Slui Govindbilji
Maharaj
claration he added that the propriet::.ry right was· his
own from the time of the ancestors. In conformity with · St"te of &fiastha.n
the same, the entry will continue as usual in the acc- Gajrndragadkar, J.
ounts of credit and debit as is the continuing mutation.
Even though the Tilkayat set up the claim that the
temple was private, it is consistently adhered to that
the income derived from the properties of the temple
is not intended to be and has never been used for the
personal requirements of the Tilkayat.
•.
It is true that there are other grants which have
been produced on the record by the Tilkayat for the
purpose of showing that some gifts of immovable
property were made in favour of the Tilkayat. Such
grants may either show that the gifts were made to
the Tilkayat because he was in the management of
the temple, or they may have been made to the
Tilkayat in his personal character. Grants falling
in the former category would constitute the property
of the temple, whilst those fallin!' in the latter category would constitute the private property of the
Talikayat. These grants, however, would not affect
the nature of the initial grants made to the temple
soon after Shrinathji came to Nathdwara. Th'erefore
in our opinion, having regard .to the documentary
evidence adduced in the present proceedings, it would
be unreasonable to contend that the temple was built
by the Tilka yat of the day as his private temple and
that it still continues to have the character of a
private temple. From outside it no doubt has the
appearance of a Haveli, but it is common ground
that the majestic structure inside is consistent with
the dignity of the idol and with the character of
the temple as a public temple.
We have referred to these aspects of the matter
because thc!y were elaborately argued before us by
500
1963
Tilt..7"'
S!ri Goci•dlolji
M..Jtarqj
••
St.u ef R.V utli ...
GajnulragaJka•, J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
the . learned Attorney-General. But as we will
presently point out, the Firman issued by the Udaipur
Darbar in 1934 really concludes the controversy
between the parties on these points ;md it shows that
the Shrinathji Temple at Nathdwara is undoubtedly
a public temple. It is therefore, now necessary to
consider this Firman. This Firma:-. consists of four
clauses. The first clause declares that according to
the law of Udaipur, the shrine of Shrinathji has
always been and is a religious institution for the followers of the Vaishnava Sampradaya and that all the
property immovable and movable dedicated, offered
or presented to or otherWise coming to the Deity
Shrinathji has always been and is the property of the
shrine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time
being is merely a Ci;stodian, Manager and Trustee
of the said property for the shrine of Shrinathji and
that the Udaipur Darbar has absolute right to
supervise that the property dedicated to the shrine
is used for legitimate purpose of the shrine. The
second clause deals with the question of succession
and it provides that the law of Udaipur has always
been and is that the succession to the Gaddi of
Tilkayat Maharaj is regulated by the law of Primogeniture, and it adds that the Udaipur Darbar
has the absolute right to depose any Tilkayat
Maharaj for the time being if in its absolute discretion such Maharaj is considered unfit and also for the
same reason and in the same way to disqualify any
person who would othenvise have succeeded to the
Gaddi according to the law of primogeniture. The
third clause provides that in case the Tilkayat
Maharaj is a minor, the Darbar always had and has
absolute authority to take any measures for the
management of the shrine and its pr.lperties during
such minority. The la~t clause adds that in accordance with the said law of Udaipur, the Rana had
declared Shri Domodarlalji unfit to occupy the
Gaddi and had approved of the succession of
Goswami Govindlalji to the Gaddi of Tilkayat
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
Maharaj, and it ends with the statement that the
order issued in that behalf on October 10, 1933, was
issued under his authority and is lawful and in accordance with the law of Udaipur.
In appreciating the effect of this Firman, itis
first necessary to decide whether the Firman is a law
or not. It is matter of common knowledge that
at the relevant time the Maharana of Udaipur was
an absolute monarch in whom vested all the legis·
lative, judicial and executive powers of the State.
In the case of an absolute Ruler like the Maharana
of Udaipur, it is difficult to make any distinction
. between an executive .order issued by him or a legis·
lative command issued by him. Any order issued
by such a Ruler has the force of law and did govern
the rights of the parties affected thereby. This position is covered by decisions of this Court and it has
not been disputed before us, Vide Madhaorao Phalke
v. The State of !Yladhya Bharat (1). Ammer-un-Nisa
Begum v: Mahboob Begum ('), and Director
of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad v.
Akram Ali (').
It is 'true that in dealing with the effect of this
Firman, the learned Attorney-!}eneral sought to raise
before us a novel point that under Hindu law even
absolute monarch was not competent to make a law
affecting religious endowments and their administra·
tion. He suggested that he was in a position to rely
upon the opinions of scholars which tended to show
that a Hindu monarch was competent only to
administer the law as prescribed by Smritis and the
oath which he was eicpected to take at the time of
his coronation enjoined him to obey the Smritis and .
to see that their injuncti!lns were obeyed by his
subject. We do not allow the learned Attorney·
General to develop this point because we hold that
this novel point cannot be accepted in view of the
well-recognised principles of jurisprudence. An
(I) [1960] l s.c.R. 957.
(2) A.I.R. 1955
(3) A.J.R, 1956 8. C. 60.
s.c. 352.
1969
Tilka)'Ol
Skri Govindlalji
· Mahaaj
v.
Stall of R<jastlulll
Gqjendra1adkar, J.
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1901
Ti/Kayat
Shri Gotindlalji
Maharaj
.
y,
Stalt of Rojasthari
Gajtndragnd~ar,
).
absolute monarch was the fountain·head of all
legislative, executive and judicial powers and it is
of the very essence of sovereignty which vested in him
that he could supervise and control the administra·
tion of the public charity. In our opinion, there is
no doubt whatever that this universal principle in
regard to the scope of the powers inherently vesting
in sovereignty applies ?S much to Hindu monarchs as
to any other absolute monarch. Therefore, it must
be held that the Firman issued by the Maharana of
Udaipur in 193! is a law by which the affairs of the
Nathdwara temple and succession to the office of the
Tilkayat were governed after its issue.
Then the learned Attorney-General contended
that in judging about the effect of this Firman we
should not ignore the background of events which
necessitated its issue. Damodarlalji had been
deposed by Maharana and it was more in an~er that
the Firman was issued to meet the challenge of the
said incident. Damodarlalji had filed certain suits
in the Bomb<1.y High Court and it appeared as if a
doubt would arise in the minds of the followers and
devotees of the temple as to v. hether the deposition
of Damodarlalji was valid or not. It was with a
view to meet this specific particular situation that
the Firman was issued and so, it need not be treated
as a law binding for all times. In our opinion, this
argument is clearly misconceived. Whatever ·may
be the genesis of the Firman and whatever may be
the nature of the mischief which it was intended to
redress, the words used in the Firman are clear and as
provisions contained in a statute they must be given
full effect. There can be little doubt that after this
Firman was issued, it would not be open to anyone
to contend that the Shrinathji temple was a private
temple belonging to the Tilkayat Maharaj of the day.
This law declares that it has alwavs been and would
always be a public temple. The validity of this
law was not then and is not now open to any
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
1963
challenge when it set ks to declare that the temple in
question has always been a public temple. We have
Til.t.vlll
already seen that the original grants amply bear out Smi Gavill,t.lji
Malurtcj
the recital in cl. I of the Firman about the character
of this temple. The Firman then clearly provides St•l1 of ••
Rl!jast""11
that the Tilkayat Maharaj is merely a Custodian, GojtnthagadW, J,
Manager and Trustee of the said property and that
finally determines the nature of the office held by the
Tilkayat Maharaj. He can claim no better and no
higher rights after the Firman was issued. The said
clause also declares that the Darbar has absolute
right to see to it that the property is used for legiti·
mate purpose of the shrine. This again is an assertion
which is validly made to assert the sovereign's rights
to supervise the administration of public charity.
Clause 2 lays down the absolute right of the Darbar
to depose the Tilkayat and to disqualify anyone from
claiming the succession to the Gaddi. It shows that
succession to the Gaddi and continuing in the office
of the Tilkayat are wholly dependent on the discretion
of the Darbar. The Right of the Darbar to depose
the Tilkayat and to recognise a emccessor or not is
described by this clause as absolute. The third and the
fourth clauses are consistent with the first two clauses.
Reading this Firman as a whole, there can be no
doubt that under the law of Udaipur, this temple
was held to be a public temple and the Tilkayat was
held to hr no more than the Custodian, Manager and
Trustee of the property belonging to the said temple.
It is on the basis of this law that the vires of the Act
must inevitably be determined.
The learned Attorney.General has invited our.
attention to some decisions in which the temples of
this cult were held to be private temples. We would
now very briefly refer to these decisions before we
proceed to deal with the other points raised in the
present appeals. In Gossamee Sree Greedhareejee v.
R•~manlolljee Gossamee, (1), the Privy Council held
that when the worship of a Thakoor has· been
(I) 16 J, A. 157.
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
J96J
Toi~"'
SAri G"'""'1alji
Malwtqj
v.
s..u •! Rf!i•Sl/ion
Caj1.Jr.,""'4r, I.
founded under Hindu law, the shebaitship is held to
be v.ested in the heirs of the founder, in default of
evidence that he has disposed of it otherwis-:, or that
there has been some usage, course of dealing, or
circumstances tci show a different mode of devolution.
Greedhareejee who as the plaintiff appeared before
the Privy Council as the appellant had been deposed
by the Rana of Udaipur in lis7ti. He claimed the
rights of shebaitship of a certain consecrated idol and
as incident thereto to the things which had been
offered to the idol. This claim was based on the
allegation that by the rule of primogeniture he had
preferential right and not his opponent RumanlolI jee
Gossamee. The High Court of Calcutta by a
majority judgment had held that Greedhareejee's
title as a founder had been established and that the
bar of limitation pleaded by the respondent applied
to the temple and the hnd on which it was built but
not to the image and the movable property connected
with it. In the result, Greedhareejee got a decree
for so much of his claim as was not barred by lapse
of time. This conclusion was confirmed by
the Privy Council. It would be noticed that
since the dispute was between two
ri,·al
claimants neither of whom was interested in pleading
that the temple was a public temple, that aspect of the
matter did not fall to be considend in the said litigation, and so, this deci<ion can be regarded as an authority only for the proposition which it laid down
in regard to the succession of the Shebaitship. The
learned Attorney.General no doubt invited our atrention to the fact that in the course of his judgment,
Lord Hobhouse has mentioned that all the male
members of the Vallabh's familv are in their lifetime
esteemed by their community. as partakinl( of the
Divine essence, and as entitled to veneration and
worship. This observation, however, can be of little
help to the Tilkayat in the present proceeding~ where
we have to deal with the matter on the basis·of the
Firman to which we have just referred. Besides, we
i s.c.R.
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
595
may incidentally add that the Tilkayat's claims
to property rights in the present proceedings based
on the allegation that the members of the denomination regard all successors of Vallabha with the same
respect which they. had for Vallabha himself, sounds
incongruous with the essential tenets of Vallabha's
philosophy.
In Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj
(!), the di~pute which was taken before the
Privy Council was in regard to the right claimed
by the sons of a daughter to the shebaitship of the
temple of Vallabha sect, and in support of the said
right the sons of the daughter relied upon the earlier
decision of the Privy Council in the case of Gossammee Sree Girdharee}ee ('). In rejecting the plea made
by the ~aid sons, the Privy Council observed that the
principle laid down in the earlier case cannot be
applied so as to vest the shebaitship in persons who,
according to the usages of the worship, cannot perform the rites of the office. In that case it was found
that the sons of the daughter who were Bhats and who
did not belong to the Gosain Ku! were incompetent
to perform the "diurnal rites for the de.ty worshipped
by the sect" and so, the decision of the High Court
which had rejected their claim was confirmed. In
this case again neither party was interested in pleading the public character of the temple and so, that
point did not arise for decision.
The same comment falls to be made about the
decision of the Allahabad High Court in Gopal Lalji
v. Girdhar Lalji ('). It is true that in that
case the plaintiff challenged a gift deed executed by
one Goswami of the Vallabha sect in favour of another Goswami and in doing so he alleged that the
donor Goswami was a Trustee and not the owner of
the property. But in the course of the evidence, it
was virtually conceded by him that the property belonged to the donor Goswami, and so, the case was
(1) 40 I.A. 97.
(2) 16 I.A. 137.
(5) A.I.R 1915 All. H.
l,Y63
Tilkayat
Shri Go1indla!Ji
j\f ,.h~rnj
v.
Stqie of Rojasrh_11.n
G'ljenr/rag..ulk:u, !·
596
IHS
7i!U,.,
SAri G..;,uw ·;
MWroj ~
••
StoU •f Roj111,,,.,.
c.i;..w.,.au., /,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
deeided on that basis. In its judgment, the High
Court observed that there can be no doubt that if we
must regard the property as "trust property" in
the strict sense, dedicated for a charitable or religious
purpose in the hands of duly constituted trustees of
the charitable or religious object, one or more of such
trustees would h)lve no power to alienate the.. trust
property or delegate their powers and duties contrary
to the trust. But the High Court found that the evi·
dence adduced conclusively established that the property in question was private property and so, the
challenge to the validity of the !(ift was repelled.
This decision also cannot be of any assistance in deciding the question as to wherher the temple with which
the present proceedings concerned is a private or a
public temple. Besides, as we have already indicated,
this question is really concluded by the Firman of
1934 and so, the temple must be held to be a public
temple and in consequence the challenge to the validity of the Act on the b1sis that the Act has inter·
fered with the Tilkayat's rights of ownership over his
private property cannot succeed.
Let u~ now examine the material provisions
of the Act before dealing with the contentions of the
Tilkayat that the said provisions contravene his fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Arts. 14 and
31(2) even on the basis that the temple is a public
temple. The Act was passed to p mvide for the better
administration and governance of the temple of Shri
Shrinathji, at Nathdwara. It consists of 38 sections.
Section 2 is a qefinition section; under s. 2(i) "Board"
means the Nathdwara Temple Board established and
constituted under the Act, ar.d s. 2 (ii) defines
"Endowment" as meaning all property, movable or
immovable belonging to or given or endowed in any
name for the maintenance or support of the tt"mple
or for the performance of any service or charity con·
nected therewith or for the benefit, convenience or
comfort of the pilgrims visiting the temple, and
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l S.C.R.
597
includes-
1963
(a) the idols installed in the temple.
Tilkoya'
Shri Gouindl a/ji
Mu!uirqj
(b) the premises of the temple.
Stai. ef H•jastian
v.
Gqjenm•pd/iar, J.
(c) all jagirs, muafis and other properties,
movable or immovable, .wherever situate
and all income derived from any source
whatsoever and standing in any name,
dedicated to the temple or placed for any
religious, pious or charitable purposes
under the Board or purchased from out of
the temple funds and all offerings and
bhents made for and received on behalf of
the temple.
but shall not include any property belon·
ging to the Goswami personally although
the same or income thereof might hitherto
have been utilised in part or in whole in
the service of the temple.
Section 2 (viii) defines "temple" as meaning the temple of Shri Shrinathji at Nathdwara in Udaipur District and includes the temple of Shri Navnitpriyaji
and Shri Madan Mohanialji together with all additions thereto or all alterations thereof which may be
made from time to time .ifter the commencement of
the Act.
Sections 3 and 4 are important provisions of
the Act. Section 3 provides that the owne!'Ship of
the temple and all its endowments including all
offerings which have been or may hereafter be made
shall. vest in the deity of Shri Shrinathji and the
Board constituted under the Act shall be entitled to
their possession. In other words, all property of the
temple vests in the temple and the right to claim
possession of it vests in the Board. As a corollary to
5!18
1:16.1
Tilkayat
Slui Coti.ull11 ji
i\lalrotaj
'"
St.It ef Roj11stha11
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J64] VOL.
the provisions of s. 3, s. 4(1) provides that the admi·
nistration of the temple and all its endowments shall
vest in the Beard constituted in the manne.- hereinafter
provided. Sub section (2) lays down that the Board
shall be a body corporate by the name of the Nathdwara Tempk Board and shall have perpetual succession
and a comm or. seal with power to acquire and hold
property, both movable and immovable, and may sue
or be sued in the said name. The composition of the
Board ha! bee:1 prescribed by s. 5: it shall consist of
a President, the Collector of Ud<1ipur District and
nine other memb~rs. The provi5o to the section is
important : it says that the Goswami shall be one of
such members if he is not otherwise disqualified to· be
a member and is willing to serve as such. Section 5 (2)
prescribes the disqualifications specified in clauses (a)
to (g)-unsoundness of mind adjudicated upon by
competent Court, conviction involving moral turpitude; adjudication as an insolvent or the status of an
undischarged insolvent; minority, the defect of being
deaf-mute or leprosy; holding an office or being a
servant of the temple or bemg in receipt of any
emoluments or perquisites from the temple ; being
interested in a subsisting contract entered into with
the temple ; and lastly, not professing the Hindu
religion or not belonging to the Pushti-Margiya
Vallabhi Sampradaya. There can be no doubt that
"or" in clause {g) must mean "and", for the context
clearly indicates that way. There is a proviso to
s. 5 (2) which lays down that the disqual"ification as
to the holding of an office or an employment under the temple shall not apply to the
Goswami and the disqualification about the
religion will not apply to the Collector ; that is
to say, a Collector will be a member of the Board
even though he may not be a Hindu and a follower
of the denomination. Section 5 (3) provides that
the President of the Board shall be appointed by the
State Government and shall for all purposes be
deemed to be a member. Under s. 5 (4) the
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
Collector shall be an ex-officio member of the Board.
Section 5 (5) provides that all the other members
specified in sub-cl. (1) shall be appointed by the
State Government so as to secure representation of
the Pushti-Margiya Vaishnavas from all over India ••
This clearly contemplates that the other members of
the Board should not only be Hindus, but should
also belong to the denomination, for it is in that
manner alone that their representation can be ade·
quately secured. Section 6 gives liberty to the
Preaident or any member to resign his office by giving
a notice in writing to the State Government. Under
s. 7 (1), the State Government is given the power to
remove from office the President or any member,
other than the ex-officio member, including the
Goswami on any of the three grounds specified in
clauses (a), (b) & (c); ground (a) refers to the disqualification specified by s. 5 (2), ground (b) refers
to the absence of the member for more than four
consecutive meetings of the Boar:! without obtaining
leave for absence ; and ground (cl refers to the case
where a member is guilty of corruption or misconduct
in the administration of the endowment. Section 7 (2)
provides a safeguard to the person against whom
action is intended to be taken under sub-cl. (1) and
it lays down that no person shall be removed unless
he has been given a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against his removal. It would be
noticed that by operation of s. 7 (1 ), the Goswami
is liable to be removed, but that removal would, in
a sense, be ineffective because the proviso to s. 5
requires that the Goswami has to be a member of
the Board so that even though he is removed for
causes (b) and (c), he would automatically be deemed
to be a member under the proviso to s. 5. It would
be a different matter if the Goswami is removed by
reason of the fact that he is disqualified on any of
the grounds described• in s. 5 (2). Such a disquaJifi.
cation may presumably necessitate the appointment
of a successor, Goswami in lieu of the disqualified
1903
Tilkayat
Shri GorNullalji
Maha,aj'
v.
Stole of RojaJtluut
CGjmdrogatlkar, J.
61)() SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
TW..pu
Shri Gooil&dialj i
Malrarqj
••
Stott of RrjaJIMn
Gaj,,,JrqtHlkar, J,
one and then it would be the successor Goswami
who will be a member of the Board under the
proviso to s. 5 (l). This position is made clear if we
look at s. I I which lrovidcs that any person ceasing
to be a member shal , unless disqualified under s. 5 (2)
be eligible for re appointment, whereas other members
who are removed under s. i ( l) for causes specified
in clauses (b) and (c) may not be eligible for reappointment, the Goswami would be entitled to such
re.appointment. · Section 8 prescribes the term . of
office at 3 years. Section 9 provides for the filling
up of casual vacancies. Section IO empowers the
State Government to dissolve the Board and reconstitute it if it is satisfied that the existing Board i~ not
competent to perform or persistently makes default
in performing the duties imposed on it under this
Act, or exceeds or abuses its powers; and this power
can be exercised after due enquiry. This section
further provides that if a Board is dissolved, immediate action should be taken to reconstitute a fresh
Board in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 10 (2) provides a safeguard to the Board
against which action is proposed to be taken under
sub-s. (I) inasmuch as it requires that before the
notification of the Board's dissolution is issued,
Government will communicate to the Board the
grounds on which it proposes so to do, fix a reason·
able ti111c for the Board to show cause and consider
its explanation or objections, if any. Se1=tion IO (3)
empowers the State· (}overnment, as a provisional
and interim measure, to appoint a person to
perform the functions of the Board until a fresh
Board is reconstituted, and under s. IO (4), the State
Government is given the power to fix the remuneration of the person so appointed. Section I2 makes
every member of the Board liable for loss, waste or
misapplication of any money or property belonging
to the temple, provided such los5, waste or misapplication is a direct consequence of his wilful act or
omission, and it allows a suit to be instituted to
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
obtain such compensation. Under s. 13, members
of the Board as well as the President are entitled to
draw travelling and halting allowances as may be
prescribed. Section 14 deals with the office and
meetings of the Board and s. 15 provides that any
defect or vacancy in the constitution of the Board
will not invalidate the acts of the Board. Section 16 is important. It lays down that subject to
the provisions of this Act and of the rules made
thereunder, the B.Jard shall manage the properties
and affairs of the temple and arrange for the conduct
of the daily worship and ceremonies and of festivals
in the temple according to the cmtoms and usage of
the Pushti-M.irgiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. Section 17 (1) provides that the jewellcries or other
valuable moveable prop~rty of a non-perishable
character the adm:nistration of which vests in the
Board shall not be transferred without the·previous
sanction of the Board, and if the value of the ptoperty
to be transferred ex:ceeds ten thousand rupees, the
previous approval of the State Government has to be
obtained. Section 17 (2) requires the previous
sanction of the State Government for leasing the
temple property for more than five years, or
mortgagmg, selling or otherwise
alienating
it. Section 18 imposes a ban on the borrowing power of the Board. Section 19 ( 1)
provides for the appointment of the Chief Executive
Officer of the temple, and the remaining four subsections of s. 19 deal with his terms and conditions of
service. Section 20 speaks of the powers and duties
of che Chief Executive Officer which relate to the
administration of the temple properties. Section 21
provides that the Board may appoint, smpend,
remove, dismiss or reduce in rank or in any way
punish all officers and servants of the Board other
than the Chief Executive Officer, in accordance
with rules made by the State Government. Section
22 is very important. It provides that save as otherwise express! y provided in or under this Act, nothing
196J
Ti/kayat
Shri Govindlalji
Maharaj _
v.
State of Rajasthan
Gajendragatlkar, J.
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963
7 iU.a~·at
Shri GoVu dlolj i
lifaltaraj
"·
Stolt of Rojasthan
Cajnttfr(lgadAa• _ ).
herein contained shall affect any established usage
of the temple or the rights, honours, emoluments and
perquisites to which any person may, by custom or
otherwise, be entitled in the temple. Section 23
deals with the budget, s. t4 with accounts and s. 25
with the Administration R, port. Section 26. confers
on the State Government power to call for such
information and accounts as may, in its opinion, be
reasonably necessary to satisfy it that the temple
is being properly maintained, and its administration carried on according to the provisions of
this Act. Under this section, the Board is under au
obligation to furnish forthwith such information and
accounts as may be called for by the State Government. Under s. 27, the State Government may
depute any person to inspect any movable or immovable property, records, correspondence, plans, accounts
and other documents relating to the temple
and endowments, and the Board and its
officers and servants shall be bound to afford all
facilities to such persons for such inspection.
Section 28(1) specifics the purposes for which the
funds of the temple may be utilised and s. 28(2)
provides that without prejudice to the purposes
referred to in sub-s. (1), the Board may, with the
previous sanction of the State Government, order
that the surplus funds of the temp!e be utilised for
the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) to (e). Section 28(3) requires that the order of the Board under
subs. (2) shall be published in the prescribed manner.
Section 29 deals with the duties of trustee of specific
endowment; s. 30(1) confers the power on the State
Government to make rules for carrying out all or any
of the purposes of the Act ; s. 30(2) provides that
in particular and without prejudice to the generality
of the foregoing power, the State Government shall
have power to make rules with reference to matters
covered by clauses (a) to (i). Under sub-section (3)
it is provided that the rules made under this Act
shall be placed before the House of the State
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
603
Legislature at the session thereof next following.
Section 31 provides that the State Government or any person interested may institute a
suit in the Court of District Judge to obtain a decree
for the reliefs mentioned in clauses (a) to (e). These
reliefs correspond to the relief which may be obtained
in a suit under s. 1!2 Code of Civil Procedure. In
consequence, s. 31(2) provides that ss. 9:! and 93 and
0. I, r. 8, of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil
Procedure shall have no application to any suit
claiming any relief in respect of the administration
or management of the temple and no suit in respect
thtreof shall be instituted except as provided by this
Act. In other words, a suit which would normally
have been filed under ss. 92 and \J3 and 0. I, r. 8,
of th~ Code has now to be filed under s. 31. Section
:Ji deals with the resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession and it provides that the order which
may be passed by the Magistrate in such matters
shall, subject to the result of any suit which may be
filed to establish the right to the possession of the
property, be final. Section 33 deals with the costs
of the suit, etc. Section :!4 provides that this Act
shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any law for the time being in
force or in any scheme of management framed before
the commencement of this Act or in any decree,
order, practice, custom or usage. Section :!5 contains
a transitional provision and it empowers the State
Government to appoint one or more persons to discharge all or any of the duties of the Board after the
Act comes into force and before the first Board is
constituted. Under s. 36 it is provided that if any
difficulty arises in giving effect to any of the provisions of this Act, the State Government may, by
order, give such directions and make such provisions
as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose
of removing the difficulty. Section 37 prescribes a
bar to suit or proceeding against the State Government for anything done or purported to be done by
1963
Tilkayat
Shri Gvvindlo/j1
Maharaj
v•
•~tale of Raja1lh1,11
G1Jjrt1du1gadl,&1, J,
604
1963
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
it under the provisions of this Act. The last section
deals with repeal and savings. The Rajasthan
Ordinance No. 2 of 1959 which had preceded this
Act has been repealed by this section. That in
brief, is the scheme of the Act.
Tilkayal
Shri Gotindloiji
..
A!aMraj
Stair of Roja.st/um
Gojnulro1adkar, J,
Later, we will have occasion to deal with the
specific sections which have been challenged before
us, but at this stage, it is necessary to coQsider the
broad scheme of the Act in order to be able to
appreciate the points raised by the Tilkayat and the
denomination in challenging its validity. For the
purpose of ascertaining the true scope and effect of
the scheme envisaged by the Act it is necessary to
concentrate on sections a, 4, 16, 22 and 34. The
scheme of the Act, as its preamble indicates, is to
provide for the better administration and governance
of the temple of Shri Shrinathji at Nathdwara. It
proceeds on the basis that the temple of Shrinathji
is a public temple and having regard to the background of the administration of its affairs in the past,
the legislature thought that it was necessary to make
a more satisfactory provision which will lead to its
better administration and governance. In doing so,
the legislature has taken precaution to safeguard the
performance of religious rites and the observance cif
•. religious practices in accordance with traditional
usage and custom. When the validity of any legisv lative enactment is impugned on the ground that its
matetial provisions contravene one or the other of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitu- ·
tion, it is necessary to bear in mind the primary rule
of construction. If the impugned provisions of the
Statute are reasonably capable of a construction
which does not involve the infringement of any
fundamental rights, that construction must be preferred though it may reasonably be possible to adopt
another construction which leads to the infringement
of the said fundamental rights. If the impugned
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
1963
provisions are reasonably not capable of the construction which would save its validity, that of course
Ti/kayat
Govirz4lalji
is another matter; but if two constructions are reason- ShriMaharaj
ably possible, then it is necessary that the Courts
••
should adopt that construction which upholds the Stal• oj RajaJthan
validity of the Act rather than the one which affects Gl!imdra1adku, /.
its validity. Bearing this rule of construction in mind,
we must el\amine the five sections to which we have
just referred. Section 3 no doubt provides for the vest·
ing of the temple property and all its endowments
including offerings in the deity of Shrinathji, and
that clearly is unexceptionable. If the temple is a ,
public temple, under Hindu Law the idol of Shrinathji is a juridical person and so, the ownership of
the temple and all its endowments including offerings
made before the idol constitute the property of the
idol. Having thus stated what is the true legal
position about the ownership of the temple and the
endowments, s. 3 proceeds to add that the Board
constituted under this Act shall be entitled to the
possession of the said property. If the legislature
intended to provide for the better administration of
the temple properties, it was obsolutely essential to
comtitute a pmper Baard to look after the said
administration, and so, all thats. 3 does is to enable
the Board to take care of the temple prop'erties and
in that sense, it· provides that the Board shall be
entitled to claim possession of the said properties. In
the context. this proviSion does not mean that the
Board wou Id be entitled to dispossess persons
who are in pmses•ion of the said properties : it
only means that the Board will be enti1led to protect
its possession by taking such steps as in law may be
open to it and necessary in that behalf. Section 4 is
:i mere corollary to s. 3 because it provides that the
administration of the temple and all its endowments
>hal1 ve;t in the Hoard. Thus, the result of reading
ss. 3 and 4 is that the statute declares that the pro·
perties of the temple vest in the deity of Shrinathji
and provides for the administration of the said
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
Tilk'!J'll
Shri Govmdlolji
Mahataj
••
Stat• of RajOJlhan
';ajtndrago.dkat, J,
properties by appointing a Board and entrusting to
the Board the said administration,
The true scope and effect of these provisions
can be properly appreciated only when they are corelated toss. 16 and 22. Section 16 prescribes the
duties of the Board; it requires that subject to the
provisions of the Act and the rules framed.under it,
the Board has to manage the properties and affairs
of the temple and arrange for the conduct of the daily
worship and ceremonies and of festivals in the temple
according to the customs and usages of the Pushtimargiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. It would be noticed
that two different categories of duties are imposed
upon the Board. The fint duty is to manage the
properties and secular affairs of the temple. This
naturally is a very important part of the assignment
of the Board. Having thus provided for the dis·
charge of its important function in the matter of
administering the properties of the temple, the sec·
tion adds that it will be the duty of the Board to
arrange for the religious worship, ceremonies and
festivals in the temple, but this has to be done accor·
ding to the customs and usages of the denomination.
It is thus clear that the duties of the Board in so far
as they relate to the worship and other religious
ceremonies and festivals, it is the tr<tditional customs
and usage which is of paramount importance. In
other words, the legislature has taken precaution· to
safeguard the due observance of the religious ceremonies, worship and festivals according to the custom
and usage of the denomination. ~ection 22 makes
this position still clearer; ·it provides that save as
otherwise expressly provided iu or under the Act,
nothing herein contained shall affect any established
usage of the temple or the rights, honours, emoluments and perquisit~s to which any person may,
by cu~tom or otherwisC', be entitled in the temple.
The saving provisions of s. 22 are very wide; unless
there is an express provision to the contrary in the
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS · 607
Act, all matters which have been saved by s. 22 will
be governed by the traditional usage and custom.
If only we consider the very wide terms in which the
saving clause under s. 22 has been drafted, it will be
clear that the legislature was anxious to provide for
the better administration of the temple properties
and not to infringe upon the traditional religious
ceremonies, worship and festivals in the temple and
the rights, honours, emoluments and the perquisites
attached thereto. Section 34 which provides for the
over-riding effect of the Act must be read along with
s. 22 and so, when it provides that the Act shall have
effect notwithstanding practice, custom or usage, it
only means that practice, custom and usage will not
avail if there is an express provision to the contrary
as prescribed bys. 22.Reading these five sections together, it seems to
us clear that the Legislature has provided for the
n ppointment of a Board to look after the administration of the property of the temple and manage
its secular affairs as well as the religious affairs
of the temple, but in regard to these religious
affairs
consisting of the worship, services,
festivals
and other ceremonies, the custom
prevailing in the tempi!" consistently with the tenets
of Vallabha philomph y are to be .respected. The
learned Attorney-General no doubt attempted to read
ss. 3 and 4 in a very wide manner and he sought to
place a narrow construction on s. 22, thereby indicating that even religious ceremonies and rites and
festivals would remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BJard without reference to the traditional
custom or usage. We do not think that it would be
appropriate to adopt such an approach in construing
the relevant provisions of the Act. We have no
doubt that when ruleq are framed under s. 30 of the
Act, they wou Id be framed bearing in mind these
es5ential features of the material provisions of the
Act and will help to carq• out the object of the Act
in keeping the religious part of the services and wor-
1963
Tilkq;iat
Shri Govindlalji
Maharqj
v.
State of Rajasthan
GajmdragadAar, J,
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1965
Tilhyot
·'-Mi Covindlolji
...
Ma."4roj
Sta11 of ti.njtJJ hon
Gcjtt1dragodkt1f, J.
ship at the temple apart from the secular part of the
administration of the temple properties. Broadly
stated, the former will be carried out according to the
traditional usage and custom and the latter according
to the provisions of the Act.
On behalf of the Tilkayat, the main contention
which h:is been raised before us by the learned
Attorney· General is that his right of property has
been infringed under Art. 19 (l) (f) and Mr. Pathak
has added that the relevant provisions infringed the
Tilkayat's rights under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.
As we have already indicated this latter contention
is raised in the writ petition filed by the Tilkayat in
this Court. Now in deciding the validity of these
contentions it is necessary to revert to thP. Firman
issued by the Rana of Udaipur in 1934, because the
rights of the Tilkayat have to be judged in the light
of the said Firman. We have already noticed that
the said Firman clearly declares that the Tilkayat is
merely a Custodian, Manager and Trustee of the
property of the shrine Shrinathji and that the Udaipur Darbar has the absolute right to supervise that
the property dedicated to the shrine is used for lt>gitimate purpose of the shrine. Having regard to the unam·
bie;uous and emphatic words used in clause l of the
Firman and having regard to other drastic provisions
contained in its remaining clauses, we are inclined to
think that this Firman made the Tilkayat for the time
being a Custodian, Manager and Trustee, and nothing
more. As a Custodian or Manager, he had the right
to manage the properties of the temple, subject, of
course, to the overall supervision of the Darbar, the
rie;ht of the Darbar in that behalf being absolute.
He was also a Trustee of the said property aud the
word "trustee" in the context mmt mean trustee in
the technical legal sense. In other words, it is not
open to the Tilkayat to claim that he has rights of a
Mahant or a Shebait; his rights are now defined and
he cannot claim any higher rights after the Firman
was issued. There can be no doubt that the right to
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
609
have the custody of the property such as the Custodian has, or the right to manage the property such as
the Manger possesses, or the right to administer the
trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary which
the Trustee can do, cannot be regarded as a right to
property under Art. 19 (l)(f) and for the same reason,
- it does not constitute property under Art. 31(2). If
it is l.eld that the Tilkayat was no more than a Custodian, Manager and Trustee properly so called,
there can be no doubt that he knot entitlec! to rely
either on Art. 19(l)(f) or on Art. 31(2). Therefore,
on this construction· of clause 1 of the Firman, the
short answer to the pleas raised by the Tilkayat under
Arts. 19(l)(f) and 31(2) is that the rights such as he
possesses under the said clause cannot attract Art.
19(1 )(f) or Art. 31 (2).
•
It has, however, been strenously urged before
us that the words "Custodian, Manager or Trustee"
should be liberally construed and the position of the
Tilkayat should be taken to be similar to that of a
Mahant of a Math ·or a Shebait of a temple. Under
Hindu Law, idols and Maths are both juridical persons and Shebaits and Mahants who manage their
properties are recognised to possess certain rights and
to claim a certain status. A Shebait by virtue of his
office is the person entited to administer the property
attached to the temple of which he is a Shebait.
Similarly a Mahant who is a spiritual head of the
Math or religious institution is entitled to manage
the said property for and on behalf of the Math.
The position of the Mahant under Hindu law is not
strictly that of a Trustee. As Mr. Ameer Ali delivering the judgment of the Board observed in Vidya
Varuthi 1'hirtha v. Balusami Ayyar ('), "called by
whatever name he is only the manager and custodian
of the idol or the institution." When the gift is directly to an idol or a tempie, the seisin to complete the
gift is necessarily effected by human agency. In
almost every case the Mahant is given the right to a
(I) (1921) L, R. 48 I.A. 302, 311.
Ti1loly•t
Shri Gtvindl•lj i
Mahttraj
••
Stale oj R•jasthan
Go.jenir•:•tlkar, J
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196'!] VOL.
1963
TUk.tJ.at
.'1hri
('~'fttlla/Ji
Mc.'i~11j
••
Stal# of RnjtJJtluzrz
part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment and the
amount of the usufruct depending again on usage and
custom. In no case was the property con\'cyerl to or
vested in him, nor is he a "trustee" in the Ellglish
sense of the term, though in view of the obligations
and duties resting on him, he is answerable as a
trustee in the general sense for mal-administration.
This position has been accepted by this Court
in The Conuni.~sioner, IJindu Rcliuiou.~ /~'ndo11.·111e11ts,
Mr1dras v. Sri f.A1kshmindm 'l'hirtha Su•amiar of Sri
Shirur Mntt. ('). Speaking for the unanimous Court
in that case, Mukherjea, J., observed, "Thus in the
conception of :\Iahantship, as in Shebaitship, both
the clements of office and property, of duties and
personal interest arc blended together, aud neither
can be detached from the other. The personal or
beneficial interest of the 1fahant in the endowments
attached to an institution is manifested in his large
powers of disposal and administration and 1i:, right
to create derivative tenures in respect to endmn cl properties; and these and other rights of a similar ch;iracter invest the office of the Mahant with the char.1cter
of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some
extent, is still a genuine legal right." On this view,
this Court held thar the right of this character vesting
in a Mahant is a right to property under Art. 19( I)
(f) of the Constitution. Relying on this decision, it
is urged that the Firman should be construed to make
the Tilkayat a Mahant or a Shebait and as such,
clothed with rights which amount to a right to property under Art. l!J(l)(f) and which constitute property under Art. 31 (2).
Assuming that the construction of clause I of
the Firman suggested by the learned Attorney.General
is possible, let us examine the position on the basis
that the Tilkayat can, in theory, be regarded as a
Mahant of the temple. What then are the rights to
which, according to the relevant evidenr:e produced
in this case, the Mahaut is entitled in respect of the
temple? As a Tilkayat, he has a right to reside in
(I) [1954] S.C.R. 1005.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6li
the tempk; as such Mahant he has a right to conduct
or arrange for and supervise the worship of the idol
in the trmple and the S("rvices rendered therein in
accordanc:c with the traditional custom and usage.
He has also the right to receive bhcnts on behalf of
the idol and distribute Prasad in accordance with the
traditional custom and usage. So far as these rights
arc concerned, they have not been affected by the
Act, and so, no argument can be raised that in affecting the said rights the Act has contravened either
Art. 19(l)(f) or Art. 31(2). It is, however, argued
that as a Mahant, the Tilkayat had the right to
manage the properties of the temple, to lease them
out and in case of necessity, to alienate them for the
purpose of the temple; and it is suggested that these
rights constitute a right to property under Art. 19(1)
( f) and property under Art. :H (2). The learned
Attorney-General fairly conceded that there was no
evidence to show that the right to alienate had ever
been exercised in this case, but he contends that the
existence of the right cannot be denied. It is also
conceded that the right to manage the properties
was subject to the strict and absolute supervision of
the Darbar, but it is suggested that eveu so, it is a
right which must be regarded as a right to property.
In dealing with this argument, it is necessary to bear
in mind that the extent of the rights available to the
Tilkayat under clause 1 of the Firman cannot be
said to have become larger by virtue of the fact that
the Constitution came into force in 1950. It is only
the rights to property which subsisted in the Tilkayat
under the said Firman that would be protected by
the Constitution, provided, of course, they are rights
which attract the provisions of Art. 19(l)(f) or
Art. 31(2).
This branch of the argument urged on behalf
of the Tilkayat naturally rests on the decision of this
Court in the .case of the Cmnmissinn-, Hindu Religi'.ous Endou·111ents, Mrulm.~ ('), that right of a Mahant
(I) [IV54] S.C.R. 1005.
lJ63
Tilkl,yat
Shri GellinJla(ji
Maharuj
v.
~\'tate of Rajas than
<:•jtndrazadkt.r, J.
612
U6!J
Ti~.u
Shri GIDiniWji
Mohn•i
v.
.<1111 ef &jutMtl
1;.;'"""""'· J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1864] vot.
does amount to "a genuine legal right" and that the
said right must be held to fall under Art. 19(1 ){f)
because the word "property" used in the said clause
o~ght to receive a very liberal interpretation. lt
will be recalled that in the said case, this Court in
terms and expressly approved of the decision of
Mr. Ameer Ali in Vidya Viruthi Thirtha's case('),
which ,exhautively dealt with the position of the
Mahant or the Shebait under Hindu law. We have
already quoted the relevant observations made in that
judgment and it would be relevant to repeat one of
those observations in which the Privy Council stated
that in almost every case the Mahant is given the
right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoy·
ment and the amount of usufruct depending again
on usage and custom. It is true that in the passage
in Mr. Justice .'.\Iukherjea's judgment in the case of
thr. Commissioner, Hindu Religi01is Endowments,
1l1adras ('), this partk·dar statement has not been
cited; but having refem,d to the rights which the
Mahant can claim, the learned Judge has added that
these and other rights of a similar character invest
the office of the Mahan! with the character· of
proprietary right which, though anomalous to some
extent, is still a genuine legal right. It is clear that
when this Court held that the rights vesting in the
Mahant as a manager of the Math amount to a
genuine legal right to property, this Court undoubtedly had in mind the fact that usually, the Mah ant
or Shebait is entitled to be maintained out of the
property of the Math or the temple and that the
extent of the right to a part of the usufruct and the
mode of enjoyment and the amount of the usufruct
always depended on usage and custom of the ;'\,fath
or the temple. It is in the light of these rights,
including particularly the right to claim a part of
the usufruct for his maintenance that this Court held
that the totality of the rights amount to a right to
property under Art. 19 (1) (f).
(IJ (1921) L.R. 46 I.A. 302, 311.
(2) [19)4J S.C.R. 1005.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
That takes us to the question as the nature and
extent of the Tilkayat's rights in regard to
the temple property. It is clear that the Tilkayat
never used any income from the property of the
temple for his
personal needs or private
purpose. It is true that the learned AttorneyGeneral suggested that this consistent course of conduct spreading over a large number of years was the
result of what he described as self-abnegation on the
part <?f the Tilkayats from generation to generation
and from Tilkayat's point of view, it can be so regarded because the Tilkayat thought and claimed that the
temple and his properties together constituted his
private property. But once we reach the conclusion
that the temple is a public temple and the properties
belonging to it are t!1e properties of the temple over
which the Tilkayat has rio title or right, we will have
to take into account the fact that during, th~ long
course of the management of this temple, the ·Tilkayat
has never claimed any proprietary interest to any
part of the usufruct of the properties of the, temple
for his private personal needs, and so, that proprietary interest of which Mr. Ameer Ali spoke in dealing
with (he position of the Mahant and the Shebait and
to which this Court referred in the case of Commissioner, Hindu Religions Endowments, Madras (1),-ls
lacking in the present case. What the Tilkayat can
claim is merely the right to manage the property, to
create- leases in respect of the properties in a reason·
able manner and the theoretical right to alienate the
property for the purpose of the temple; and be it
noted that these rights could be exercised by the
Tilkayat under the absolute and strict supervision of
the Darbar _of Udaipur. Now, the right to manage
the property belonging ·to the temple. or the right to
create a lease of the property on behalf of the temple,
or the right to alienate the property for the purpose
of the temple under the sup_ rvision of the Darbar
cannot, in our opinion, be equated with the totality
of the powers· generally possessed by the Mahant or
(I) (t954J S.C.R. 1005.
1163
Tilkayat
Shri Gooinlila(j i
Maharaj
v.
Stal• of Rcjaslhan
Gaju.drazadkar, J.
614
1963
'Tilkay«I
'hri (;ooind!a/;;
....fitharaj
v.
ttat1 ~J Rajo.'lh•n
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
even the Shcbait, and so, we are not prepared to
hold that having regard to the character and extent
of the rights which can be legitimately claimed by
the T1lkayat even on the basis that he was a Mahant
governed by the tenm of the Firman, amour.t to a
right to property under Art. 19 (I) (f) or constitl!te
property undrr Art. 31 (2).
Besides, we may add that even if it was held
that thesl' rights constituted a right to hold property
their regulation by the relevant provisions of the Act
would undoubtedy be protected by Art. 19 (5). The
temple is a public temple and what the legislature
has purported to do is to regulate the administration
of the properties of the temple by the Board of which
the Tilkayat is and has to be a member. Having
rt"gard to the large estate owned by the Tilkayat and
having regard to the very wide extent of the offerings
made to the temple by millions of devotees fr.:im day
to clay; the legislature wa> clearly justified in providing for proper adminis1ration of the properlies of the
temple. The restrictions imposed by the Act must,
therefore, be treated as reasonable and in the interests
of the general public.
Turning to l\fr. Pathak's argument that the
rights constitute properly under Ari. 31 (2) and the
Act contravenes the said provision because no compemation had been provided for, or no priociples
have been prescribed in connection therewith, the
answer would be the same. The right which the
Tilkayat posscsst:s cannot be rc.~ardcd as property for
the purpose of Art. 31 (:!).
Besides, even if the said
rights are held to be property for the purpose of
Art. :ll (i), there are some obvious answers to the plea
which may be briefly indicated.
After Ari. 31 (2) was amended by the Cunsti·
tution (Fourth Arr.endmcnt) Act, 19.?5, the pi_isition
wilh regard to the scope and effect of the provmons of
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
Art. :n (1) and 31 (2) is no longer in doubt. Article 31
(2) deals with the compulsory acquisition or requisition
of a citizen's property and it provides that a citizen's
property can be compulsorily acquired or requisi·
tioned only for a public purpose and by authority of
law which provides for compensation and either fixes
the amount of the compensation or specifies the
principles on which and the ma1;mer in which, the
compensation is to be determined and given; and it
adds that no such law shall be called in question in
any court on the ground that the compensation
provided by that law is not adequate. Art. 31 (2A)
which is expressed in a negative form really amounts
to this that where a law provides for the transfer of
the ownership or right to possession of any property
to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled
by the State, it shall be deemed to provide for the
compulsory acquiiition or requisition'of property. If,
on the other hand, the transfer of the ownership or
the right to possession of any property is not made
to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled
by the State, it would not be regarded as compulsory
acquisition or .requisition of the property, notwithstanding that it does deprive any person of his
property. In at.her words, the power to mah a
compulsory acquisition or requisition of a citizen',;
property provided for by Art. :l L(:2) is what the
American lawyers described as "eminent domain";
all other cases where a citizen is deprived of his property are covered by Art. :11 ( L) and they can broadly be said to rest on the police powers of the State.
Deprivation of property falling under the latter
category of cases cannot be effected save by authority of law; this Court has held that the expression
"save by authority of Jaw" postulates that the law
by whose authority such deprivation can be effected
must be a valid law in the sense that it must not
contravene the other fundamental rights guaranteec:j
by the Constitution,
1963
Tilkayat
Shri Gorindlalji
Maharaj
v.
Slate of RajtJStll.Ofl
Gajeru/ragal,".ar, J.
616
1963
Tilk1yct
Shri G1•inilclji
M<Jlurr1j
v.
S11t1 ef R6.iaslh111
C:i.jtt1drff1odkar 1 1:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
The argument which has been urged before us
by Mr. Pathak is that the right to administer the
properties of the temple which vested in the Mahant
has been compulsorily acquired and transferred to a
Board constituted under the Act which Board is controlled by the State. We will assume that the Board
in question is controlled by the State; but the question still remains whether the right which is allowed
to vest in the Tilkayat has been compulsorily acquired and has been transferred to the Board. In our
opinion, what the Act purports to do is to extinguish
the secular office vesting in tqe Tilkayat by which
he was rr.anaging the properties of the temple. It is
well-known that a Mahant combines in himself both
a religions and a secular office. This latter office
has been extinguished by the Act, and so, it cannot
be said that the rights vesting in the Tilkayat to
administer the properties .have been compulsorily
acquired. Acquisition of property, in the context,
means the extinction of the citizen's rights in the
property and the conferment of the said rights in the
State or the State owned corporation. In the present case, the Act extinguishes the Mahant's rights
and then creates another body for the purpose of
administering the properties of the temple. In other
words, the office of one functionary is brought to an
end and another functionary has come into existence
in its place. Such a process cannot be said to cons·
titute the acquisition of the extinguished office or of
the rights vesting in the person holding that office ..
Besides, there is annther way in which this
question may perhap> be considered. What the Act
purports to do is not to acquire the Tilkayat's rights
but to require him to share those rights with the
other member; of the Board. w~ have already seen
that the Act postulates that the Mahant for the time
being has to be a mern ber of the Board and so, the
administration of the properties which was so long
carried on b'y the Mahant alone would here after
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
have to oe carried on by the Mahant along with his
colleagues in the Board. This again cannot, we
think, be regarded as a compulsory acquisition of the
Tilkayat's rights. It is not suggested that the effect
of the relevant provisions of the Act is to bring about
the requisitioning of the said rights. Therefore, even
if it is assumed that the rights claimed by the
Tilkayat constitute property under Art. 31(2), we do
not think that the provisions of Art. 31(2) apply to
the Act. But as we have already held, the rights
in question do not amount to a right to hold property
under Art. 19(l)(f) or to property under Art. 31(2).
That takes us to the argument that the Act is
invalid because it contravenes Art. 14. In our
opinion, there is no substance in this argument. We
have referred to the historical background of the
presc::it legislation. At the time when Ordinance
No. II of 1959 was issued, it had come to the knowledge of the Government of Rajasthan that valuables
such as jewelleries, ornamenj:s, gold and silver-ware
and cash had been removed by the Tilkayat in the
month of Dec em her 195 7, and as the successor of
the State of Mewar, the State of Rajasthan had to
exercise its right of supervising the due administration of the properties of the temple. There is no
doubt that the shrine at Nathdwara holds a unique
position amongst the Hindu shrines in the State of
Rajasthan and no temple can be regarded as comparable with it. B,sides, the Tilkayat himself had
entered into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining
a proper scheme for the administration· of the temple
properties and for that purpose, a suit under s. 92 of
the Code had in fact been filed. A Commission of
Enquiry had to be appointed to investigate into the
removal of the valuables. If the temple is a public
temple and the le~islature thought that it was essential to safeguard the interests .of the temple by taking
adequate legislative action in that behalf, it is
difficult to appreciate how the Tilkayat can seriously
J96!J
Titkvat
Shri Gouindlalji
Maharaj
••
State of Rojasthan
Goj111d1agadkar 1 J,
618
1963
TilktfYat
o!J'lni Gor1fodlt;lji
Maharaj
v.
Stat1 of Rujasrh~n
Gajendragadkar, :J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
contend that in passing the Act, the legislature has
been guilty of unconstitutional discrimination. As
has been held by this Court in the case of Shri Ram
J[rishna D.t./mir& v. Shri J·ustice 8. R. Tendolkar ('),
that a law may be constitutional even though it
relates to a single individual if, on account .Df some
special circumstances or rea.iom 2-ppli..;able to him
and not applicable to others, that sing!.; individu.il
may be treated as a class by himself. Therefore, the
plea raised under Art. 14 fails .
•
The next point to consider is in regard 'to the
pleas raised more by the denomination than by the
Tilkayat hims~lf under Arts: 25 and 26 of the Consti,tution. The.attitude adopted by the denomination
in it> writ petition is not very easy to appreciate.
In the writ Retition filed on lJehalf oflhe denomination, it was urged that the Tilkayat himself is the
owner of all the .properties of the temple and as such,
wal; en ti tk<l to manage· tl1cm in his discfetion and
as he liked. This plea clearly supported the Tilkayat's
stand that the temple in question was .a-pr-ivate
temple belonging to h'.msdf and as such, ail the
temple properties were his private properties. The
denomination was cle~.i'ly ir, two minds. It was
inclined more to support the Tilkayat's case than to
~ut up an alternative case that the denominati0n was
interested in the mauagern~nt of th~se properties.
Even so, so111~ allegations have been made in the writ
petition filed on behalf :of the denomination from
which it may perhaps be inferred that it was the
alternative case of the denomination that the temple
and the properties connected therewith belonged to
the denomination according to its usages and tradi·
tion, 'and therefore, the manag~ment of the said
temple and the properties cannot be transferred to
the Board. It is this latter alternative plea which
.is based on Art. 2 5 (!} and Art. 26(b) of the Constitution. The argument i~ that the Art Contravenes
the right guaranteed io the denomination by
(I) [1949) S.C.R. 279, 297.'
,I
I
1 S.C.R~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
1963_
. Art: 25(1) freely to practise its religion and that it
also. contravenes the denomination's right guaranteed
Titka;pat
·under Art. 2G(b) .and (d) to manage its own affairs ShriMaharaj
Govindlalji
in matters of religion, and to· administer its property.
v.
in accordance with law. For the purpose of dealing· · Sta'• o] RajaJthan
with these arguments, we will assume that the Gojmdragadk.ar, J.
denomination has a beneficial interest in the properties of the temple.·
.'
Articles 25- and 26 constitute the fundamental
rights to freedom of religion guaranteed to the citizens
of this country. Article 25 (1) protects the citizen's
· fundamental right to freedom of conscience and his
right freely to profess, practise .'and propagate reli. gion .. The protection given to this right is, however,
not absolute. It is subject to public order, morality
and health as Art. 25 (1) itself denotes. It is also
subject . to the laws, existing or future, which are
specified in Art. 25. (2). . Article 20 guarantees
frt:edom of the denominations or sections thereof to
manage their religious . affairs and their properties.
Article 26 (b) provides that subject to public order;
morality and health, every religious denomination
or any section thereof shall have the right to manage
its own affairs in matters of religion ; and- Art. 26 (d)
lays down a similar right to administer the property
of the denomination· in · accordance with law.
Article 26 (c) refers to the right of the denomination
to own' and acquire movable and immovable .
property and it is in respect of such "property that ·
clause (d) makes the provision which we have just
quoted. The scope 'and effect of these articles has
been considered by this Court on several occasions.
"The word "religion" used in Art. 25 (l)," observed·
Mukherjea, J., speaking for the Court in the case of
the Commissioner; "Hindu Religious Endowments,
JJ!adras ('), "is a matter of faith-with individuals
and communities and· it is not necessarily thristic.
It undoubtedly has its basis in a system cif hP!iefs or
doctrines which are regarded l:iy those who profess
'.
{I) [1954) S.C.R. !COS.
620 S\.JPREME l.OURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
TilJ:OJOl
Sh.ri Got·iruilalji
Maharaj
v.
S1atr of Rajc1t1*i
Caj1ndra1adkar, J.
that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being,
but it is not correct to say that religion is nothing else
b•1t a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only
lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to
accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances,
ceremonies and modes of worship which arc regarded
as integral parts of religion and these forms and
observances might extend even to matters of food
and dress."
Shri Venkataramana
Devara v. The
State of Mysore ('), Venkatarama Aiyar, J.,
observed "that the matter of religion in Art. 26 (b)
In
inclurle even practices which are regarded by the
community as parts of its religion." It would thus be
clear that religiom practice to which Art. 25 (!)
refers and ~ffairs in m:1tters of religion to which
Art. 26 (b) refers, include practices which are an
i"ntegral part of the religi9n itself and the protection
guaranlcl'J by :\rt 1,; (I) and Art. 26 (b) extend~
to such practices.
In deciding the question as to whether a given
religious practice is an integral part of the religion or
not, the test always would br. whether it is regarded as
such by the C'l'll'll'tnity fo'!owing the religion or not.
This for.nub may in some cases present difficulties
in its operation. Take the case of a practice in
relation to food or dress. !f in a given proceeding,
one section of the community claims that while
performing certain rites while dress is an intrgral
part of the religion itself. whereas another section
contends that vcllow dress and not the white dress is
the essential part of the religion, how is the Court
going to decide the question ? Similar disputes may
arise in regard to food. In cases where conflicting
evidence is produced in respect of rival contentions as
to competing religious practices the Court may not
be able to resolve the dispute by a blind application
of the formula that the community decides which
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 895, 909.
1 s.~.R.
SUPREME COURt REPORts
621
practice is an integral part of its religion, because
the community may speak with more than one
voice and the formula would, therefore, break down.
This question will always have to be decided by the
Court and in doing so, the Court may have to
enquire whether the practice in question is religious
in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded
as an integral or essential part of the religion, and
the finding of the Court on such an issue will always
depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the
conscience of the community and the tenets of its
religion. It is in the light of this possible complication which may arise in some cases that this Court
struck a note of caution in the case of The Durgah
Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali ('), and
observed that in order that the practices in question
should be treated as a part of religion they must be
regarded by the said religion as its essential and
integral part ; otherwise even purely secular practices
which arc not an essential or an integral part of
religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form
and may make a claim for being treated as religious
practices within the meaning of Art. 25 (1).
In this connection, it cannot be ignored that
what is protected under Arts. 25 (1) and 26 (b)
respectively are the religious practices and the right
to manage affairs in matters of religion. If the
practice in question is purely secular or the affair
which is controlled by the statute is essentially and
absolutely secular in character, it cannot be urged
that i\rt. 25 (1) or Art. 26 (b) has been contravened.
The protection is given to the practice of religion
and to the denomination's right to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion. Therefore, whenever
a claim is made on behalf of an individul citizen
that the impugned statute contravenes his fundamental right to practis~ religion or a claim is made
on behalf of the denomination that the fundamental
right guaranteed to it to manage its own affairs in
(I) [1962) I S.C.R. 383, 411.
IMJ
Tilkoyt1t
Shri Gouinilclji
Mt1h«raj
••
Stat~ fJj Rajasthan
CajenJra:adkar, J
622 SUPREME COURT REPpRTS (1964] VOL.
1963
·1iU:ayat
lhti G~it1,l1/ji
Mahmoj
"
s..1, of RojostAon
matters of religion is contravened, it is necessary to
consider whether the practice in question is religious
or the affairs in respect of which the right of
management is alleged to have been contravt>ncd
are affairs in matters of religion. If the practice
is a religious practice or the affairs are the affairs in
matters of religion, then, of course, the rights guaranteed by Art. 25 (I) and Art. 26 (b) cannot be
contravened.
It is true that the decision of the question as to
whether a certain practice is a religious practice or
not, as well as the question as to whether an affair
In question is an affair in matters of religion or not,
may present difficulties because sometimes practices,
religious and secular, arc inextricably mixed up.
This is more particularly so in regard to Hindu
religion because as is well known, under the provisions of ancient Smritis, all human actions from birth
to death and most of the individual actions from day
to day are regarded as religious in character.
As an illustration, we may refer to the fact
that the Smritis regard marriage as a sacrament arid not a contract. Though the task
of disengaging the secular from the religious may
not be easy, it must nevertheless be attempted in
dealing with the claims for protection under Arts. 25
(1) and 26(b). If the practice which is protected
under the former is a religious practice, and if the
right which is protected under the latter is the right
to manage affairs in matters of religion, it is necessary
that in judging about the merits of the claim made in
that behalf the Court must be satisfied that the practice is religious and the affair is in regard to a matter
of religion. In dealing with this problem under
Arts. 25(1) and 26(b), Latham, C. J.,'s. observation
in Adela·1'.de Company of Jehovah's witne8ses lnr,or.
poraUd v. 'l'he Commonwealth('), that "what is religion to one is superstition to another", on which Mr.
Pathak relies, is of no relevance. If an obviously
(1) 67 C.L.R. 116, 123.
1 s.c.R..
Sut>RitME COUR.1' REPORTS
62S
secular matter is claimed to be ~atter of religion, or
if ~n obviously secular practice is alleged to be a religious practice, the Cpurt would be justified in rejecting the claim because the protection guaranteed by
Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b) cannot be extended to secular practices and affairs in regard to denominational
matters which are not matters of religion, and so, -a
claim made by a citizen that a purely secular matter
amounts to a religious practice, or a similar claim
made on behalf of the denomination that a purely
secular matter is an affair in matters of religion, may
have to be rejected on the ground that it is based on
irrational considerations and cannot attract the provisions of Art. 25(1) or Art. 26{b). This aspect of
the matter must be borne in mind in dealing with the
true scope and effect of Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b).
Let us then enquire what is the right which has
been contravened by the relevant provisions of the.Act.
The only right which, according to the denomination,
has been contravened is the right of the Tilkayat to
manage the property belonging to the temple. It
is urged that throughout the history of this temple,
its properties have been managed by the Tilkayat
and so, such management by the Ti!kayat amounts
to a religious practice under Art. 25( 1) and constitutes
the denomination's right to manage the affairs of its
religion under Art. 26(b). We have no hestitation in
rejecting this argument. The right to 'manage the
properties of the temple is a purely secular matter
and it cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as a religious practice so as to fall under Art. 25( I) or as
amounting to affairs in matters of religion. It is
true that the Tilkayats have been respected by the
followers of the denomination and it is also true that
the management has remained with the Tilkayats,
except on occasions like the minority of the Tilkayat
when the Court of Wards stepped in. If the temple
had been private and the properties of the temple had
hr.longed to the Tilkayat, it wa.q another matter.
1963
Tilkt1y«t
Shti G1M,.tll1lji
Maharaj
v.
Stile of Raj4st"4n
GtJjendt•zaikar, J,
..
1
024";'· 'sUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
\
/963
But once it is held that the temple is_a public temple,
it is difficult to accede to the argument that the tenets
Shri G•11i11tilalji
of the Vallabha :cult require as· a matter of religion'
M•lwaj
that the properties must be managed by the Tilkayat.
v.
,,'l•te ef Rajaslhan
In. fact, no' such tenet has been adduced before us. ·
So long as, the denomination believed that the pro:·
C1jmiraz«dku, J.
.perty belonged to the Tilkayat · like the temple, there ·
was no occasion· to consider whether ·the manage- ment of. the property should be .in the hands of any- -body. else. The course of conduct ·of the denomina-.
tion and the ·Tilkayat based on that belief may have
spread for . many years, but, in our opinion, such a course of conduct cannot be regarded as giving rise
to a religicius 'practiceunder Art; 25(1). · A distinction must always be made between a practice which ·
•is religious and a practice in regard to a matter. which
is purely· secular and has no element of religion associated with it. ·. Therefore, we, are satisfied that the
··claim made - by·· the denomination that the Act impinges. on the rights guaranteed to it by Art. 25(1)
and 26(b) must be rejected.
·
"'"· . Tilk•;111t ,
That leaves one more point to be considered
. under Art. 26(d). · It is urged that the right of the
denomination to administer its property has virtually
been taken away by the· Act, and so, it is invalid.
It would be noticed that Art. 26(d) recognises the
denomination's right· to administer its propertv, but
'it clearly provides that the said right to administer
the property must be in accordance with law. l\fr. ·
.Sastri for the denomination suggested that law in
the context is the la\v prescribed by the religious'
tenets of the denomination and not a legislative enact•·
ment passed by -a competent legislature: In our _
opinion, this argument is wholly untenable. In the ·
context, the law means a law passed by a· competent ·
legislature and Art. _26(d) provides that though the·
denomination· has .the right to .administer its pro- perty, it must ·administer the property in accordance
·-·with law. In other words, this clause emphatically . ·
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
19113
brings ciut the competence of the legislature to make
a law in regard to the administration of the
\l'".U.,.t
·-"~'I
property belonging to the denomination. It is >h<i M-.j
y,
true that under the guise of regulating the' admi..
&Ml
of
114i«1llwo
nistration of the property by the denomination, the
___,...
denomination's right must nQt be extinguished or {)qJ,,.,,.,..,, J,
altogether destroyed. That is what thi9 Court has
held in the case of the Oommissianer, Hindu Religiou9 Endowments JJ!adras .(1 ) and Ratilal Panai;oond
Gandhi v. The State of Bomhay (').
Incidentally, this clause will help to detennine
the scope and effect of the provisions of Art. · 26(·b).
Administration of the denomination's property which
is the subject-matter of this clause is obviously outside the scope of Art. 26 (h). Matters relating to the
administration of the denomination's property fall k>
be governed by Art. 26(d) and cannot attract the provi.sions of Art. 26(b). Article 26 (b) relates to affairs
in matters of religion such as the performance of tile
religious· rites or ceremonies, or the observance of
religious festivals and the like; it does not refer to the
administration of the property at all. A"ticle 26(d)
therefore, justifies the enactment of a law to regulate
the administration of the denomination's property
and that is precisely what the Act has purported to do
in the present case. If the clause "affairs in matters
of religion" were to include affairs in regard to all
matters, whether religious or not the provision under
Art. 26 Id) for legislative regulation of the administration of the denomination's property would be
rendered illusory.
It is however, argued that the constitution of
the Board in which the administration of the property now vests is not the denomination, and since
the administration is now left to the Board, the
den'.>mination has been wholly deprived of its right
to administer the property. It is remarkable that
this plea should be made by the representatives of· the
(IJ [1954] S,C.R. ICO~.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. JC»5.
626
/90J
Til.t.i1•1
Slwl Goootl/l•lii
. M•mlj
y.
&.u ef ~"-Ga}....,..... J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 964) VOL.
denomination who in their writ petition were pre·
pared to support the Til!<ayat in his case that the
temple and the properties of the tl"mple were his
private property. That apart, we think that the
constitution of the Board has been ddiberately so
prescribed by the ·legislature as to ensure that the
denomination should be arlequately and fairly represented on the Board. We have al!'t'ady construed
s. 5 and we have held thats. 5 12) (g) requires that
the members of the Board other than the Collector of
Udaipur District shou Id not only profess Hindu
religion but must also belong to the Pushti-Margiya
Vallabhi Sampradaya. It i~ true that these members
are nominated by the State Governmt"nt, but we have
not been told how else this could have been effrctively
arranged in the interests of the temple itself. The
number of the devotees visiting the temple runs into
lacs ; there is no organisation which comprehensively
represents the devotees as a cla~s ; there is no register
of the devotees and in the very naturt" of things, it is
impossible to keep such a register. Therefor<", thl"
very large mass of Vallabh's followf'rs who constitute
the denomination can be represented on the Board of
:nanagement only by a proper nomination made
~>y the State Government. and so, we are not
impressed by the plea that the management by
the Board constituted unrler the Act will not
be the management .,f the denomination. In
this connection, wr may refer to clause l of the
Firman which vt"sted in the Darbar absolute
right to supervise the management of the property.
As a successor-in-interest of the Darbar, the state of
Rajasthan can be trusted to nominate members on the
Board who would fairlv represent the denomina1ion.
Having regard to all the relevant circumstances of
this case: we do not think that the legislature could
have adopted any other alternative for the purpose
of constituting the Board. Tht"refore, we must hold
that the challenge to the validity of the Act on the
'.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
ground that it contravenes Arts. 25 (1), 26 (b) and
26 (d) must be repelled.
J96S
Tallwp
S/,ri Gollindhljl
It still remains to consider the provisions of the
Act which have been challenged by the Tilkayat and
the denomination as well as those which have been
struck down by the High Court and in respect of
which the State has preferred appe· ls. We will
take .these sections in their serial order.. We have
considered ss. 3, 4, 16, 22 and 34 and have held that
these sections are valid because the scheme envisaged
by the said sections clearly protects the religious
rites, ceremonies and services rendered in the temple
and the Tilkayat's. status and powers in respect
thereof. The said scheme merely allows the administration of the properties of the temple which
is a purely secular matter to be undertaken by the
Board, and so, it is not necessary to refer to the sa;d
sections again.
Section 2 (viii) which defines a temple as including the temple of Shri Navnitpriyaji and Shri
Madan Mohanlalji has been struck down by the
High Court in regard to the said two subsidiary
deities. The High Court has held that the two deities
Navnitpriyaji and Madan Mohanlalji are the private
deities of the Tilkayat and it was not competent to
the legislature to include them within the definition
of the temple under s. 2 (viii). It was urged before
the High Court that the said two idols had been
transferred by the Tilkayat to the public temple and
made a part of it, but it has held that there was no
gift or trust deed .by the Tilkayat divesting himself
of all his rights in tho~e two idols and its property
and so, the validity of the section could not be sustained on the ground of s11ch transfer. The correctness of this conclusion is rhallenged by the learned
Solicitor-General on behalf of the State. In dealing
with this question, the conduct of the Tilkayat needs
to be examined. On October 15, 1956 a report
M.Juw'!i
v.
S1ot1 of
/!Jij.utlwt
Gqjnulraga4ar, J.
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[I964] VOL.
1963
rilA:a;iat
Slrrl GoWtdloli
M"""'•i
Y.
51411 •/ RojaJlhan
C.jm/To1odAm, J.
was made by Mr. Ranawat to the Tilkayat in respect
of these two idols. It appears that the grant of some
villages in respect of these idols stood , in the name
of the Tilkayat and after the said villages were re·
sumed by the State, a question arose as to the compensation payable to the ow11er of tht said villages.
In that connection, Mr. Ra11awat reported to the
Tilkayat that it would be to the ajvantage of the
two idols if the said lands along with the idols were
treated, as a part of the public temple. He cited the
precedent ofthe lands belonging to the Nathdwara
Temple in suP.port of his plae. On receiving this
report, the Ttlkayat was pleased to "transfer the
ownership of Shri Thakur Navn"tpriyaji, Shri Madan
Mohanji and Bethaks to the principal temple of
Shri Shrinathji. Of course, he retained to himself
the right and privilege of worship over rhose temples
and Bethaks as in thr. case of Shrinathji temple.
The Tilkayat also expressed his concurrence with the
proposal made in this report and si~ned in token of
his -a~eement. It appears that after .orders were
issued in accordance with the decision of the
Tilkayat, the two temples were treated as part of .the
bigger temple of Shrinathji. This is evidenced by
the resolution which was passed •at· the meeting of
the Power of Attorney Hlllders of theTilkayat on the
same day i.e., 15·10-1956. One of the resolutions
passed at the said meeting shows that the proposal
regarding the temples and Bethaks owned by His
Holiness stating therein that His Holiness had been
pleased to transfer the ownership thereof to
Shrinathji, was considered. That proposal along
with the list of temples and Bethaks was produced
before the Committee. The Tilkayat was present
at the meeting and he confirmed the proposal and
put his signature thereon before the Committee.
Thereupon, the Committee accepted the proposal
with thanks and instro1cted the Executive Officer to
do the needful in that behalf. Thus, .the Tilkayat
proposed to the Committee of his Power of Attorney
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
Holders that the two idols and their Bethaks should
be transferred from his private estate to the principal
temple of Shrinathji and that proposal was accepted
and thereafter the two idols were treated as part of
the principal temple.
1963
Tilkayat
Govi•dl~ji ·
Mahoraj ·
v.
Siate of RtYasthon
Shri
Gujendragadkar, I•
After this transfer was thus formally completed
it appears that the Tilkayat was inclined to change
his mind and so, in submitting to the Committee a
list cif temples and Bethaks transferred by him to the
principal temple of Shrinathji, he put a heading to
the list which showed that the said transfer had been
made for management and administration only and
was not intended to be an absolute transfer. This
was done 011 or about November 23, 1956.
This conduct on the part of the Tilkayat was
naturally disapproved by the Committee and the
heading of the list was objected to by it in a letter
written on December 31, 1956. To this letter theTilkayat gave a reply 011 January 7, 1957, and he sought
to explain and justify the wording adopted in the
heading of the list. It is thus clear that the heading
of the list forwarded by the Tilkayat to the Committee must be ignored because that heading clearly
shows a change of mind on the part of the Tilkayat
and the question as to whether the two idols form
part of the principal temple ot Shrinathji must .be
decided in the light of what transpired on October 15, 1956. Judged. in that way, there can be
no doubt that the Tilkayat solemnly transferred the
two idols to the principal temple and in that sense,
gave up his ownership over the idols and a formal
proposal made in that behalf was accepted by the
Committee. In our opinion, the High Court was in
error in not giving effect to this transfer on the
ground that no gift or trust deed had been duly
executed by the Tilkayat in that behalf. A dedication of private property to a charity need not be
made by a writing: it can be_ made.orally or eveu cau
li30
'*'
Tui•.141
6Jrri c...,n-1i.u1
MlllrMoj
••
Stou oj Rojostb
""""".,,..,, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l!Jti4J VOL.
be inferred from conduct. In rhe present cas~, there
is much more than conduct in support of the State's
plea that the two idols had been transferred. There
is a formal report made by the Mana~er to the
Tilkayat which was accepted by the filkayat ;
it was followed by a formal proposal made by the
Tilkayat to the Commitree and the Committee at its
meeting formally accepted that proposal and at the
meeting when this proposal was accepted, the
Tilkayat was present. Therefore, we musr hold that
the two idols now form part of the principal temple
and have been properly included within the defini·
tion of the word "temple" under s. 2 (viii). We
should accordingly set aside rhe decision of the High
Court and uphold the validity ofs. 2 (viii).
The proviso to s. 5 (2) (g) has been attacked
by the learned
Attomcy·General. He contends
that in making the Collector a statutory member of
the Bt:'-rd even though he may not be a Hindu and
may not belong to the denomination, the legislature
has contrav~ned Arts. 25 (I) and 26 (b). We have
already dealt with rhe general plea raised under the
said two artides. We do not think that the provision that the Collector who is a statutory member of
the Board n~ed not satisfy 1he requirementS' of s. 5 (2)
(g), can be said to be invalid. The sole object in
making the Collector a member of the Board is to
associate the Chief Executive Officer in r.he District
with the administration of' the property of the
temple. His presence in the Board would naturally
help in the propr.r administration of the temple
properties and in that sense, must be treated as valid
and proper. This provision is obviously consistent
with the State's right of supervision over the management of the temple properties as specified in the
Firruao of 1934.
Sections 5, 7 and 11 have already been considered by us with particular reference to the possible
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631.
removal of the Tilka yat under s. 7 and its consequences. It may be that in view of the fact that
even if the Tilkayat is removed under s. 7 (I) (b)
and (c) he ha~ to be again nominated to the Board,
the legislature may well have exempted the Tilkayat
from the operation of s. 7 (1) (b) and (c). That,
however, cannot be said to make the said provision
invalid in Jaw.
Sections 10 and 35 have been attacked on the
they empower the State Governground that
ment
to leave the
administration of the
te.nple property to a non-Hindu. It will be noticed
thats. 10 contemplates that if a Board is dissolved
for the reasons specified in it. the Government is
required to direct the immediate reconstitution of
another Board and that postulates that the interval
between the dissolution of one Board and the constitution of a fresh Board' wauld b~ of a v~ry short
duration. If the legislature thought it necessary to
provide for the management of the temple propertie5
for such a short period on an ad hoc basis, the
provision cannot be seriously challenged. What is
· true about this provision under s. 10, is equally true
about the transitional provision in s. 35.
A ·part of s. 16 ha5 been struck down by the
High Court in so far as it refers to the affairs of the
temple. This section authorises the Board to
manage the properties and affairs of the temple.
The High Court thought that the expression "affairs
of the temple" is too wide and may include religious
affairs of the temple; and since in managing these
affairs of the temple, the section does not require
that the management should be according to the
customs and usages of the denomination, it came to
the conclusion that the clause "affairs of the temple"
is invalid an.cl should, therefore, be struck down.
We are not satisfied that this view is correct.
In the context the expre5sion "affairs of the temple"
1963
Ti/~·~•
Shri
c;;J;.di 'l(jl
MahM.j
••
Slal1 of Rajastlwa
Gajt11Jra1atlkt1r, J.
(i32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1963
Til.k,1oi
,(/iri &aUintllalji
}JaAlnoj
v.
S14to of Roj4•/"""
Gqj111drogndkor, J.
clearly refers tu the purely srcular affdirs in regard to
the administration of the temple. Clearly, s. Hi cannot be construed in isolation and must be read long
with s. 2:l. That is why it has been left to the Board
to manage the properties of the temple as well as the
purdy secular affairs of the temple, and so, this
management need not be governed by the custom
and usage of the den0mination. If the expression
"affairs of the temple" is construed in this narrow
sense as it is intended to be, then there is no infirmity
in the said provisions. We may add that the expression "affairs of the temple" has been used in
s. 28 (I) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitabl-:: Endowments Act No. 22 of 195!! in the same
sense. Therefore, we would hold that the High Court
was in error in striking down the clause "affairs of
the temple" occuring ins. 16.
The next section to ci:.nsider is s. 21. This
section gives to the Board complete power of appointment, suspension, removal, dismissal, or imposition of
any other punishment on the officers and servants of
the temple or the Board, the Chief Executive Offirer
being exempted from the operation of this section.
It has been urged before us that this section mighl
include even the l\fokhia and the Assistant Mukhia
who are essentially religious officers of the temple
concerned with the performance of religious rites and
services to the idols; and the argument is that if they
are made the servants of the Board and are not subjected to the discipline of the Tilkayat, that would
be contrary to Art. 25 (!) and 26 (b) of the Consti1.ution. In considering this argument, we must have
,·egard to the fact that the Mukhia and the Assistant
Mukhia are not only concernfd with the religious
worship in the temple, but ar ~ also required to
handle jewellery and ornaments of a very valuable
order which are put on the idol and removed
from the idol every day, and the safety of
the said valuable jewellery is a secular matter within
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
the jurisdiction of the BJard.
That is why
it was necessary' that the Board shou Id be given
jurisdiction over those officers in s<i far as they are
concerned with the property of a temple. \Ve
have no doubt that in working out the. , Act, the
Board will act reasonably and fairly by the Tilkayat
and nothing will be done to impair his status or to
affect his authority over the servants of the temple in
so far a~ they are concerned with the religious part
of the worship in the temple. ~ince the worship in the
temple and the ccremoriies and festivals in it are required to be conducted according to the customs and usages
of the denomination by s. 16, the authority of the
Tilkayat in respect of the servants in charge of the
said worship and ceremonies and festivals will have to
be respected. It is true that soon after the Act
was passed a:nd its implementation began, both
parties appeart;d to have adopted unhelpful attitudes.
We were referred at length to the correspondence that
passed between the Tilkayat and the Committee in respect of some of these matters. We do not think it neces·
sary to consider the merits of that controversy because
we are satisfied that once the Act is upheld, it will be
-implemented by the Board consistently with the true
spirit of the Act without offending the dignity and
status of the Tilkayat as " religious head in charge of
the temple : and the affairs in matters of religion
conn~cted with the temple.
Therefore, we do n;it
thin!(" it would be right to strike down any part of
s. 21 as suggested by the learned Attorney-Genera\.
The validity of s. 27 has been challenged by
the learned Attorney-General on the ground that it
empowers the State Government to depute any person
to enter the premises of the temple, though, in a given
case, such a person may not be entitled to make such
an entry. Even a non-Hindu person may be appointed by the;: State Government to inspect the properties
of the temple and if he insists upon making an entry
in the temple, that would contravene the provisions
•
I
:
1963
Talkayat
Got•indlalji
la-faharaj
~:;n·
••
State of Rajasthara
Gajendragadkar, },
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1963
Ti/4o.J41
Mri GoWtJ/alji
Mtzlr11aj
••
Sl•U of R1jttst~ori
Gajuulratadkar, J.
of Art. 25 (I) and 26 (b) of the Constitution; that is
the argument urged in support of the challenge to the
validity of s. 27. We do not think tliere is any substance in this argument. All that the section does is
to empower the State Government to depute a person
to inspect the properties of the temple and its records,
correspondence, plans, accounts and other relevant
documents. We do not think that the section constitutes any encroachment of the rights protected by
Art. 25 (1) or Art. 26 (b). If the administration of
the properties of the temple has been validly left to
the Board constituted under the Act, then tl7e power
of inspection is necessarily incidental to the power to
administer the properties1 and so in giving the
power to the State Government to depute a person to
mspect the properties of the temple,· no effective
complaint can be made against the validity of such
a power. The fear expressed by the learned Attorney-General that a non-Hindu may in.•ist upon enle·
ring the temple in exercise of the authority conferred
on him by the S1ate Government under a. 27 is, in
our opinion, far-fetched and imaginary. We are
satisfied that the power of inspection which the State
Government may confer Uj)On any person under s. 27
is intended to safeguard the proper administration of
the properties of the temple and nothing more.
Thr.refore, we do not think that s. 27 suffers from any
constitutional infirmity. In this connection, we may
add that a similar provision contained in the Madras
Religious Endowments Act has been upheld by this
Court in the case of The Oommiaaioner, Hindu Reli-
gious Endowment8, Madras (1).
That takes us to s. 28 (2) and (3). These two
sub-sections have been struck down by the High
Court because it thought that they were inconsistent
with the view expressed by this Court in the case ot
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi ('). While di!ICUSSing the
validity of these two sub-sections, the High Court has
observed "that without entering into an elaborate
(I) (195f] S.o.R.1005.
(2) [115t] Lc.a.11155,
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
1962
discussion on the point, we may point out that such
provision has been held to J:>e invalid by the Supreme
Tilka;·m
Govindialji
Court in the case of Rutilal Panachand Gandhi" ('). ShriMal:araj
The learned Solicitor-General contmds and we think,
••
rightly, that the observations on which the High Statrof Rojauhari
Court has relied sup;:iort the validity of the two sub- Gajendragadkar, J.
sections and are inconsistent with the decision of the
High Court itself. In the case of Ratilal Panachand
Gandhi (1 ), this Court was dealing with the validity
of ss. 55 and 56 of the Bombay Public Trusts
Act. 1950 (No. i!9 of 1950). Section 55 of the said
Act purported to lay down the rule of cy pres in
relation to the administration of religious and charitable trust; and s. 56 dealt with the powers of the
courts in-relation to the said application of cy pres
doctrine. This CJurt observed that these two sections
purported to lay down how the doctrine of cy pres
is to be applied in regard to the administration of
public trust of a religious or charitable character; ,md
then it proceeded to examine the doctrine of cy pres
as it was developed by the Equity Courts in England
and as it had been adopted by our Indian Courts since
a long time past. Ia the opinion of this Court, the
provisions of ss. 55 and 56 extended the said doctrine
much beyond its recognised limits and further introduced certain principles which ran counter to wellestablished rules of law regarding the administration
of charitable trusts. It is significant that what the
impugned sections purported to authorise was the
diversion of the trust property or funds for purposes
which the Charity Commissioner or the court considered expedient or proper although the original objects of the founder could still be carried oµt-and that
was an unwarrantable encroachment on the freedom
of religious institutions in regard to the management
of their religious affairs. In support of this view,
the tenets of the Jain religion were referred to and it
was observed that apart from the tenets of the Jain
religion, it would be a violation of the freedom of
religion and of the right which a religious
(I) (1958] S,C.R. 1055,
G3G
1Ukayot
~h•i Gouircdlulj t
M•ltfffo:j
v.
SlaJt oj Raj<ulM"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [UJ.64] \'OL.
denomination has, to manage its own affa:rs in matters
of religion, to allow any secular authority to divert
the trust money for purposes other than those for
which the trust was created. On this view, s. 5:i (3)
which contained the offending provision, and the
corresponding provision relating to the powers of the
Court occurring in the latter part of s. 56 (I) were
struck down. In this connection, it is, however,
necessary to bear in mind that in dealing with this
question, this Court has expressly observed that the
doctrine of cy pres can be applied where there is a
surplus left after exhausting the purposes specified by
the settler. In other words, the decision of this Court
in the case of Rutilal Panachand Gandhi (1 ). cannot be
applied to the provisions of s. 28 (2) and (3) which deal
with the application of the surplus in fact after this
·decision was pronounced, the relevant provision of the
Bombay Act has been amended an<l the application of
the doctrine of cy pres is now confined to the surplus
available after the purposes of the trust have been
dealt with. The High Court has not noticed the fact
thats. 28 (2) and (3) dealt with the application of
the surplus funds and that postulates that these two
sub·sections can be invoked only if and after the main
purposes of the public temple have been duly satisfied. Therefore, we hold that the High Court was
in error in striking down s. 28 (2) and (3) on the
gruund that they are inconsistent with the decision of
this Court in the case of Rati/al Panaclwnd Gandhi (').
We may add that this position was not seriouly disputed before us by the learned Attorney· General.
The next section is 30 (2) (a). It confers on
the State Government the power to make rules in
respect of the qualifications for holding the office of
and the allowances payable to the Goswami. This
sub-section has been struck down by the High Court
and the learned Solicitor.General does not quarrel
with the · conclusion of the High Court. He has,
however, fairly conceded that though the first part of
(I) (t95f] S.C.R. 105.5.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
s. 30 (2) (a) may be struck down, the latter part need
not be struck down. This latter part allows rules to
be framed by the State Government in regard to the
allowances payable to the Goswami. We think it is
but fair that this part should be upheld so that a
proper rule can be made by the State Government
determining the quantum of allowances which should
be paid to the Go1wami and the manner in which it
should be so paid. We would, therefore strike down
the first part of s. 30 (2) (a) and uph'Jld the latter
part of it which has relation to the allowances pay·
able to the Goswami. The two parts of the said
sub-section are clearly severable and so; one can be
struck down without affecting the other.
In regard to s. 36, the High Court thought that
it give1 far too sweeping powers to the Government
and so, it has struck it down. Section 36 merely
empowers the Government to give such directions as
nuy be necessary to carry out the objects of the Act
in case a difficulty arises in giving effect to the
provisions of the Act. We may, in this connection,
refer to the fact that a similar provision is contained
ins. :rn of the Jagannath Temple Act (Orissa 11 of
1955). The object of s. 3fl in the Act is merely to
remove difficulties in the implementation of the Act.
It i5 in that seme that the section must be narrowly
construed and the scope and ambit of the power
conferred on the State Government be circumscribed.
If the section is so construed, it would not be open
to any serious objection. Therefore, we are satisfied
that the High CJurt was in error in striking down
this section on the ground that -the powers conferred
on the State Government are too wide.
That takes us to s. 37 which has been struck
down by the High Court on the ground that it can
be utilised as a drfence to a suit under s. 31. We have
already noticed that s. 31 empowers a person having
an interest to imtitute a suit for obtaining any of the
1!63
Tilkayat
Shri Go1intllalji
Maharaj
••
)late of R12Ja1than
Gajentfra,e.idkar, J.
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 964) VOL.
1963
Ti/kayat
Sl11i Go11indl1lji
Mcltaraj
••
Sttttt of R'fia.1thon
1
."a}tndragaJkar, J.
reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (e) of that section.
The High Court thought that s. 37 may introduce an
impediment against a suit brought by a private individual under s. 31. We are satisfied that the Hi!(h
Court was in error in taking this view. All that this
section purports to do is to provide for a bar to any
suits or proceedings against the State Government
for any thing done or purported to be done by it
under the provisions of the Act. Such provisions are
contained in many Acts, like, for instance, Acts in
regard to Local Boards and Municipalities. It is
true that s. 37 does not require that the act done or
purported to be done should be done bona fide, but
that is presumably because the protection given by
s. :-11 is to the State Government and not to the
officers of the State. The effect of the srction merely
is to save acts done or purported to be done by the
State under the provisions of the Act; it cannot
impinge upon the rights of a citizen to file a suit
under s. 31 if it is shown that the citizen is interested
within the meaning of s. ~I (I). We are inclined to
hold that the High Court haJ, 'with respect, misjudged the true scope and effect of the provisions of
s. 37 when it srruck down the said section as being
inv?.Jid. We must accordingly reverse the said conclusion of the High Court and uphold the validity
of s. 37.
The result is that the appeals preferred by the
Tilkayat, the denomination and Ghanshyamlalji fail
and are dismi~sed. So does the writ petition filrd by
the Tilkayat fail and the sJme is dismissfd. The
appeals pt cferred by the Srate substantially succeed
and the decision of the High Court striking down as
ultm !'ires part of s. 2 (viii) in relation to the idols of
Navnitpriyaji and Madan .Mohanlalji; part of s. Hi
in so far as it refrrs to the affairs of the temple;
s. 28 (2) and (:l), s. ::16 and s. :ii is reversed. We
however, confirm the decision of the High Court in
so far as it has struck down s. 30 (2) (a) in regard to
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RgPORTS
639
the qualifications for holding the office of the
Goswami but we reverse its decision in so far as it
relates to the latter part of s. 30 (2) (a) which deals
with the allowances payable to the Goswami. In
the circumstances of this case, we direct that parties
should bear their own costs throughout.
1963
Tilkayal
";hri Govindlt1lji
Maharaj
v.
.51011 of Rajaslhan
Gqjmdr11adkar, J.
·Appeal dismissed.
1963
CHANDRA DEO SINGH
v.
PROKASH CHANDRA BOSE & ANR.
(S.J. IMAM,
K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAGHUBAR DAYAL,
and J. R. M UDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Criminal Law-Proceeding under •· 202 Criminal Pro<»dure Oode-Revision.pelitim by rllllpondent No. 1 and the other
persons-IVhelher rllllpondent No. 1 has locus Btandi to conteRt
criminal ca-Be before i..ue of process-Procedural defect-Powers
of M"ilistrate in committal proceedings and in con•idering
evidence-Recording of reasons-Gode of Criminal Proce·
dure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), sa. 202, 203.
A first information report was filed stating that the
respondent No. I and some others committed murder. Thereafter a person claiming t.; be a relative of the dccea•ed filed a
complaint alleging that the first information report was false
and that certain persons other than those stated in the first
information report had committed the murder. It was prayed
that process be issued against these persons. The Sub-Divi·
sional Ma~istrate before whom thii complaint was filed directed
the First Class Magistrate to inquire into the allegation and to
make a report. Subsequently the nephew of the deceased filed
a complaint alleging that respondent No. 1 had committed the
murder. The Sub-Division-11 Magistrate directed the First
Class Magistrate to enquire into this complaint also and to
report. During the enquiry aparl from the witness produced
January, 22.
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