STATE OF WEST BENGAL versus UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 December 1962 | [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371 | 1962 INSC 391
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 December 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- ORIGINAL SUIT No. 1/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 391
Text of the judgment
SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS
1 S.C.R.
371
and the order of the High Court transferring the
appeal to the District .Judge or the Additional
District Judge is set aside. It is directed that the
appeal be heard by the High Court itself, in the
absence of any law to the contrary. There will be
no order as to costs throughout, as the ·main respondent in this Court and below was a Court itsclC and
ordinarily no costs are granted against a Court.
1962
Lakshmi JVarain
v.
First Atldit~nal
Distlict Jutlt'"
Allahabad
Sinh1, C. J.
Appeal r&/lowed.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
1962
v.
December, 21.
UNION OF INDIA
(B. P. SINHA, c. ]., .JAFER IMAM, K. SUBBA
RAo; J. C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR and J. R. MuDHOL_KAR, JJ.)
Land, Acqni.<ition-State property-Goal bearing areasAcqui8ition ·by Union of lnrlia-Parliament, power to enact
law-Indian Constitution, if n"ot federal-Sovereignty, if lies in
StatM also-Fundamental ri!thts, whether can be claimed by
States-"Perso1i" and "Properly'', Connotation of-Coal
Be1tring Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (XX of
1957)-Gonstitution of India, Arts. 13, Jl, 7·3, 162,. 245, 246,
248, 249, 254, 294, 298, Seventh Schedule, List I Entries 52, 54,
97, List JI Entries 23, 24, List Ill Entry 42.
Under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) A~t, 1957, enacted by Parliament, the Union of India
propos~d to acquire certain coal bearing areas in the State of
West Bengal. The State filed a suit contending that the Act
-did not apply to lands vested in or owned by the State and that
if it applied to such lands the Act was beyond the legislative
.
compcten.ce of Parliament.
Held, (p_er Sinha C.J., Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and
Mudholkar, JJ.), that upon a proper interpretation of the relevan~
.
•
•
i
•
•
. .
,
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1961
Sto1' of Wul
Bmgal
••
Union of 11Ulia
provisions of the Act it was cicar that the Act applied also
to coal bearing areas vested in or owned by the State. The
preamble of the Act did not support the argumcut that the Act
was intended to acquire only the· rights of individuab and not
those ?f the States in coal bearing areas. Though the statement
of Objects and Reasons supported the contention of the State it
could not be used to determine the true meaning and effect of
the substantive provisions of the Act.
Held, further, (per Sinha C. J., Iman, Shah, Ayyangar
and Mudholkarfl. Subba Raoj., contra), that the Coal Be>ring
Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, l9j7, is not u/fra
vires the powers of Parliament and is valid. Under Entry 42
of List III of the Seventh Schedule to 1he Constitution, Parliament is competent to make a law for the acquisition for the
p1operty of a State.
The Constitution of India
is not truly Federal in
character. The basis of distribution of powers between the
Union and States is that only those powers \Vhich are concerned
with the regulation of local proble·m arc vested in the States
and the residue specially those which tend to maintain the
economic, industrial and com.m'!rcial unity of the <:ountry are
left to the Union. It is not correct to say that ful1 sovereignty
is vested in the States. Parliament which is competent to
destory a State cannot be held, on the tl1"ory of absolute
sovereignty of the States, to be incompetent to acquire by
legislation the property owned by the States. Even if the
Comtitution were held to be a Federation and the States regarded qua the Union as sovereign, the power of the Union to
legislate in respect of the property situate in the States would
remain unrestrictc<f. 'fhe p~wer of Parliarnent conferred by
Entry 42, List II f, a• acc=ory to the effectuation of the power
under Entries 52 and 54, List I, is not restricted by any provision of the Constitution and is capable of being exercised in
respect of the property of the States also.
From the fact that Art. 294 vests the property in the
States and, that Art. 298 empowers the States to transfer the
property it does not follow that the property of the States
cannot be
acquired
without a
constitutional
amendment,
Article 294 does not c'>ntain any prohibition a~ainst the transfer
of property of the States and if th• property is capable of being
transferred by the State it is capable of being acquired.
Under s. 127 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the
Central Government could require the Province to acquire land
i
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
373
on behalf of tbe Federation if it was private land and to transfer
it to the Federation if it was land belonging to the Province,
and the Provincial Government had no option but to comply
with the direction. It was not considered an infraction of
Provincial autonomy to vest such a power in the Central
Government. Absence of a similar provision in the present
Constitution made no difference. Under the Government of
India Act the power to compulsorily acqufre property was
exclusively vested in the Provinces but under the Constitution
the Union also has that power.
If the other provisions of the Constitution in terms of
sufficient amplitude confer power for makin!( laws for acquiring
State property, the power cannot be defeated because the express
power to acquire property generally does not specifically and in
terms refer to State property. Power to acquire and requisition property can be exercised, COIU:urrently by the Union and
the States but on that account there c~n be no conflict in the
exercise of the power as such a conflict is prevented by
Arts. 31 (3) and 254.
Under the Constitution fundamental rights can be claimed
not only by individuals and corporations but in some cases by
the State also. Property vested in the States may not be
acquired under a law made under Entry 42, List III, unless the
law complies with the requirements of Art. 31.
The rule that the State is not bound, unless it is expressly
named or by necessary implication _in a statute is one of
interpretation. In interpreting a constitutional document
provisions conferring legislative power rr.tust normally be inter. .
preted liberally and in their widest amplitude. There is no
indication in the Constitution that the word Hproperty" in
Entry 42 of List III is to be understood in any restricted sense;
it must accordingly be held to include property belonging to
the States also.
Per Subba Rao, J.-The. impugned Act in so far as it
confers a power on the Union to acquire lands owned by the
States, including coal mines and coal bearing lands is ultra viru.
Under the Constitution of India the political sovereignty is
divided between the constitutional entities that is, the Union
and the States, who are juristic pe~sOnalities possessing
properties and functioning through the instrumentalities created
by the Constitution. The Indian Comtitution accepts the
federal concept and distributes the sovereign powers between
the coordinate constitutional entities, namely, the Union and the
1962
State of We.st
IJ1ngal
v.
Union Df India
:i74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1962
Sl411 of W111
..
Dett_tal
l..inian of !Niio
States. This concept implies that one cannot encroach upon
the governmental functions or instrumenta)itie.o of the other
unless the Constitution provides for such interference. The
lc~slative fields allotted to the units cover subjects for legislation and they do not deal with the relationship between the
coordinate units iunctioning in their allotted fields. This is
regulated hy other provisions of the Constitution and their is
no provision which enables one unit to take away the property
of another except by agreement.
The power to acquire the property of a citizen for a public
purpose is one of the implied powers of the sovereign. Under
the Indian Constitution that sovereign power is divided between
the Union and the States. It is implicit in the power of
. acquisition by a sovereign that it must relate only to property
of the governed. for a sovereign cannot acquire its
own
property.
It is also implicit in the concept of acquisition and
requisition that they shall be for public purpose on payment of
compensation. The \VOrd "person" in Art. 31 does not include
"Sl.ltc 11 ; if Entry 42 were to empower Parliament to acquire
thr.. property of. a State, the State would not have the protection
of Art. 31 which is available to all other persons. Therefore,
Entry 42 List III docs not authorise either Parliament or a
State Legislature to make a law for the acquisition of the property of the other.
Nor do the residuary Art. 248 and Entry 97 List I confer
any power cm Parliament to acquire the property of a State.
The residuary legislative field cannot possibly cover inter-State
relation, for that matter is not distributed between the Union
and the States by way of legislative Lists. When a specific
provision is made for acquisition of
property, it would be
incongraous to confine that Entry to properties other than those
of the States and to resort to the residuary power for acquiring
the property of the States. Further the anomaly of the Union
acquiring the property of the States without compensation
would still remain.
;\!either Entry 24 of List JI nor Entry 52 of List r empowers a State Legislature before ·Parliament made a law declaring that the control of a particular industry by the Union is
expedient in the public interest or the Parliament, after such
declaration, to make such a law for acquisition of State land•,
for they deal only with the regulation of an existing industry
or an industry that may be started subsequently, but not with
acquiaition of lands.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
Act 12 of 1952 and Act 67 of 1957 deal only with the
regulation of mines an;! further the declarations contained in
the said Acts are e'.'prcssly confined to the extent of the regulation provided thereunder and, therefore, the declarations
therein could not be relied upon to sustain the validity
of the Act.
No inspiration can be drawn from fcireign con~titutions or
decisions made thereunder in construing the express provisions
of our Constitution in the context of its different set up. The
property of the states can be acquired by. the Union only by
agreement.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Suit No. 1 of 1961.
S. M. Bose, Advocate-General for the State of
West Bengal, B. Sen, S. 0. Bose, Milon K. Banerjee,
P. K. Chatterjee,' and P. K. Bose, 'for the plaintiff.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,
H. N. Sanyal, Addit·ional Solicitor General of India,
Bishan Narain, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for
the defendant.
B. Sen and I. N ..Shroff, for the Intervener
No. 1.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-G~neralfor the State oj
Punjab, R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. D.•'lllenon, for
Intervener No. 2.
·
B. O. Barua, Advocate-General for the State of
Assam and Naunit Lal, for the Intervener No. 3.
Dinabandhu Sahu, Advocate-General for the
State of Orissa, B. K. P. Sinha and. P. D. Menon,
for the Intervener No. 4.
A. Ranyanadha1n Olietty. and A. V. Rangam,
for Intervener No. 5.
Eal. Narayan Sinha, and D. Goburdhan, for
Intervener No. 6.
··~
1962
St•t• •!West
Bm:al
v.
Union of lnJia
37ti
1961
St"'4 of W1Jt
Bm;ai
••
Union of /Mia
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
K. S.
No. 7.
llajela and C. P. Lal, for Intervener
P. D. Merum, for Intervener No. 8.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate.General for State of
Punjab, and P. D. Menon, for Intervener No. 9.
G. S. Pathak, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar,
for Intervener No. 10.
1962. December 21. The Judgment of Sinha,
C. J., Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ.,
was delivered by Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
SiltM, C. J.
SINHA, C. J .-This is a suit by the State of
West Bengal agamst the Union of India for a declaration that Parliament is not competent to make a
law authorising the Union Government to acquire
land and rights in or over land, which are vested in
a State, and that the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (XX of 1957)-which
hereinafter will be referred to as the Act-enacted by
the Parliament, and particularly SS. 4 and 7 thereof,
were ultra virll8 the legislative competance of Parliament, as also for an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding under the provisions of these
sections of the Act in respect of the coal bearing
lands vested in the plaintiff. As will presently appear,
the suit raises questions of great (>Ublic importance,
bearing on the interpretation of quite a large number
of the Articles of the Constitution. In view of the
importance of the questions raised in this litigation,
notices were issued by this Court to all the AdvocatesGeneral of the States of India. In pursuance of that
notice, the States of Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Madras,
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh have
appeared, either through their respective AdvocatesGeneral or through other Counsel. The National
Coal Development Corporation Ltd., with its head
1 s.c.R. - SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
office at Ranchi in Bihar, has also intervened in view
of a pending litigation between it as one of the
defendants and the State of West Bengal as the
plaintiff. We have heard counsel for the parties at
great length.
1962
Stat' of West
Bengal
v.
Union of India
Sinha, C. J.
The Plaint is founded on the following allegations. The plaintiff is a State, specified in the First
Schedule of the Constitution, as forming part of
India, which is a Union of States. By virtue of
Art. 294 of the Constitution, all property and assets
in West Bengal, which were vested in His Majesty
for the purposes of the Government of the Province
of Bengal became vested in the State of West Bengal
for the purposes of the State. The State of West
Bengal, in exercise of its exclusive legislative powers,
enacted the West Bengal Estates Acquisition
Act, J954 (W. B. 1 of 1954 ). By notification issued
under the Act, as amended, all estates and rights
of intermediaries and Ryots vested in the State for
the purposes of Government, free from encumbrances,
together with rights in the sub-soil, including mines
and minerals. The Parliament enacted the impugned
Act authorising the Union of India to acquire any
!arid or any right in or over land, in any part of
India. In exercise of its powers under the Act, the
Union of India, by two notifications dated September 21, 1959 and January 8, 1960, has expressed its
intention to prospect for coal lying within the lands
which are vested in the plaintiff, as aforesaid.
Disputes and differences have arisen between the
plaintiff and the defendant as to the competence of
Parliament to enact the Act and its power to acquire
the property of the plaintiff, which is a sovereign
authority. In paragraph !l of the Plaint, a controversy had been raised as to whether or not the proposed acquisition was for a public purpose, but at
the actual hearing of the case, the learned Advocate·
General of Bengal withdrew that contention, .and,
therefore, that issue is no more a live one. Notice
378 SUPRtMt COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1961
Stmef Wut
under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is said to
have been duly ~erved.
Bmtal
u.;..••tf lnJi.
S...... C.J.
The Writte11. Statement of the defendant does
not deny the allegations of fact made in the Plaint,
but denies the correctness of each and all the sub·
missions or legal contentions as to the legislative
competence of Parliament to enact the Act and as
to the power of the defendant to acquire any property
of a State. It is also denied that the State of West
Bengal is a sovereign authority. The following
statement in·paragraph 12 of the Written Statement
brings out the policy underlying the enactment in
question :
"The defendant states that it is in the public
interest that there should be a planned and
rapid industrialization of the country. For
such rapid and planned industrialization, it is
essential that the production of coal should be
greatly increased as coal is the basic essential
for industries.
Regulation of mines and
mineral development under the control of the
Union has been declared by Parliament by
law to be expedient in the public interest. It
is submitted that in the circumstances, the
acquisition of coal bearing areas by the Union
is necessary for , the regulation of mines and
mineral development and for increased pro·
duction of coal in the public interest. The
defendant will rely on documents a list whereof
is hereto annexed."
On those pleadings, the following issues were
raised :
I. Whether Parliament has legislative compe
tence to enact a law for compulsory acquisition by the Union of land and other
properties vested in or owned by the State
as alleged in para 8 of the plaint ?
.
-
i S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2.
:n!J
Whether the State of West Bengal is a
sovereign authority as alleged in para S of
the plaint ?
a.
W!1ether assuming that the State of 'West
Bengal is a sovereign authority, Parliament is entitled to enact a law for compulsory acq~isition of its lands and properties ?
4.
Whether the Act or 1\nY of its provisions
arc nltra i•ires the legislative competence
of Parliament ·1
5.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to auy
relief and if so, what relief?
After the arguments on behalf of the plaint:ff,
and of the States in support of the plaintiff, had been
finished, application was marle for amendment of the
plaint praying that the !ullowing paragraph may be
added as paragraph !JA, which is as follows :"Alternatively the plaintiff submits that the
Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (Act XX of 1!157) on its true construction docs not apply to the lands vested in
or owned by the Plaintiff the State of West
Bengal. Further the notifications purported
to have been issued under the said Act arc
void and of no effect."
At the request of the learned Attorney-General
a short adjournment was gr an tcd to consider the
position as to whether or not the amendment sought
should be opposed on behalf of the defendant. As
the amendment sought was ·not opposed, it was
granted and an· additional issue was raised in these
terms :
"\Vhethcr Act XX of I !107 on its true construction applies to l~nds vested in or owned by the
Plaintiff State? "
1962
St'ltc of H'tJt
Buigal
v.
l.inion of India
~111.ha,
c. J.
380 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
.llalt of Wul
Rtngal
v.
Union of !ndi4
Sinha, C. J.
.
It will thus appear that the parties arc not at
issue on any question of fact, and the determination
of the controversy depends entirely upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution,
aud the scope and effect of the Act.
The issues joined between the parties arc mainly
two, (I) whether on a true construction of the provisions of the Act, they apply to lands vested in or owned
by the plaintiff; and (2) If this is answered in the
affirmative whether there was legislative competence
in Parliament to enact the impunged statute. The
scope and effect of the Act is the most important
question for determination, in the first instance,
because the determination of that question will affect
the ambit of the discussion on the second question.
As already indicated, when the case was opened for the
first time by the learned Advocate-General of Bengal,
he proceeded on the basis that the Act purported to
acquire the interests of the State, and made his further submission to the effect that Parliament had no
competence to pass an Act which had the effect of
affecting or acquiring the interest of the State. But
later he also took up the alternative position that the
Act, on its true construction, did not affect the interests or property of the State. The other States which
have entered appearance, through their respective
counsel, have supported this stand of the plaintiff and
have laid particular emphasis on those provisions of
the Act which, they contend, support their contention
that the Act did not intend to acquire or in any way
affect the interests of the States. In this connection,
the arguments began by rnaking pointed reference· to
the following paragraphs in the Statement of Objects
and Reasons, set out at pages 16- I 7 of the Paper
Book:
"According to the Industrial Policy Resolution
of I 95fi the future development of coal is the
responsibility of the State. All new units in
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
the coal industry will be set up only by the
State save in exceptional circumstances as laid
down in the Resolution.
The production of coal in India in 1953 was
38 ·milJion tons and the target for production for the
Second Five-Year Plan has been fixed at 60 million
tons per annum.
It has been decided tnat out of
.the additional production of 22 million tons
per annum envisaged. the public sector should
produce an additional 12 million tons per annum,
the balance being allocated to the private industry
for production from existing collieries and immediately contiguous areas.
Out of the additional 12 million tons in the
public sector, the bulk ( 10 million tons per annum)
will have to be raised by the development of
new coal fields, such as Korba, Karanpura, Kathara
and Jhilimili and Bisrampur. Very nearly all tre
coal bearing areas however are covered by min'.ng
leases held by private persons or prospecting licencees
which carry a right to mining lease. Hence it is
proposed to take power to acquire unworked coal
bearing area.s covered by private leases or prospecting
licencees which. are found surplus to the production
required in the private sector and to work these areas
as lessees of the State Government.
With the acquisition of zamindari rights by the
the State Governments, the rights in minerals are
now vested in all areas in the State Governments, and
it is not appropriate to use the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, for the acquisition of mineral rights, particularly because the Central Government does· not
intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the
States. There is no other existing Central or State
Legislation under which the Government has powers
to acquire immediately the lessee's rights over the
coal bearing areas acquired by Government for the
1962
State of W•st
Bengal
v.
[lnion of lntlia
Sinha, C. J.
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l064] VOL.
1962
Sl1JI~ of H"t1I
Btngnl
v.
l.,iiirm of India
S.nha, C, J,
additional coal production. It is accordingly considered necessary to take power; by fresh legislation to
acquire the lessees' tic;"!Hs over unworked coal-bearing
areas on payment of reasonable compensation to the
les>ecs, and without affecting the State Government
rights as owner of the minerals or the royalty payable
to the State Government on minerals.
The Bill provides for payment of reasonable
compensation for the acquisition of the rights of
prospecting licenccrs and mining lessees."
Besides setting out the policy of the State in the
matter of coal mining industry and the actual state
of affairs in relation thereto, the Statement of objects
and Reasons contains the crucial words on which
particular reliance was placrd on behalf of the
States, "because the Central Government docs not
intend to acrp1ire the proprietary rights vrstcd in the
States ... .. :· and, "without affecting the State
(;ovcrnment ri~IHs as owners."" It is however wellscttled that the: Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying a bill, whrn introduced in Parliament,
cannot be used to determine the true meauiug and
effect of the substantive provisions of the statute.
They cannot lie used except for the limited purpose
of understanding the background and the antecedent
state of affairs leading up to the legislation. But we
cmnot use this statement as an aid to the construction
of the enactment or to show that the legislature did
not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in
the State or in any way to affect the State Governments' righr.s as owners of minerals. ,\ statute, as
passed by Parliament, is the expression of the
collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and
any statement made by an individual, albeit a
Minister, of' the intention and objects of the Act
cannot be used to cut down the generality of the
words used in the statute.
It was then contended that the preamble of the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
Act was the key to the understanding of the scope
and provisions of the statute. The pre am hie is in
these words :
"An act to establish in the economic interest
of India greater public control over the coal
mining industry and its development by providing for the acquisition by the state of unworked
land containing or likely to contain coal
deposits or of rights in or over such land, for
the extinguishment or modification of such
rights accruing by virtue of any agreement,
lease, , licence or otherwise, and for matters
connected therewith."
Particular stress was laid on the Iast two lines of
the preamble, showing that only rights "accruing by
virtue of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise"
were being sought to be extinruished or modified by
the provisions of the Act. But ·this.argument omits to
take note of the words of the previous clause in the
preamble which has reference to the fact that the Act
also was meant for "acquisition by the state of unworked lands containing or likely to contain coal
deposits." Before proceeding to deal with the main
arguments it is necessary to advert to a submission of
the learned Advocate-General of Bengal that the
reference to the "State" in the words "acquisition by
the State" occurring in the preamble was a reference
to the "States" as distinguished from the union.
This contention has only to be mentioned to be
rejected as the entire object and purpose of the impugned Act was to vest powers in the Union Government to work coal mines and in that context the word
"State" could obviously refer only to the Union
Government.
The preamble, therefore, does not support the
argument that the Act was intended to acquire only
the rights of individuals, derived from prospecting
licences or based on leases, and to exclude from the
1962
Stat1 of W1St
Bmgal
v,
Uoion of India
Sinhtl, C. J
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1962
State of IVtst
Bengal
v,
f..lnio11 of India
Si'lha. C. J.
pun,iew of the Act the rights of States in coal.bearing
lands. Section 4, relating to thr issue of a preliminary notification of the intention to prospect for coal
in any given area, makes reference to "lands",
without any qualifications, and s. 6, which is consequential upon s. 4 lays down the effect of such
notification on prospecting licences and mining leases.
Section 7 also speaks of giving notice of the Government's intention to acquire the whole or any part of
the land, notified as aforesaid or any rights in or
over such land. Section !l, which provides for a
declaration of acquisition has also used the same
expression, "any land or any rights in or over such
land." The proviso to s. !l, which is in these
terms :
"Provided that, whert: the declaration relates
to any land or to any rights in or over land
belonging to a State Government which has or
have not been leased out, no such rleclaration
shall be made except after previous consultation
with the State Government"
is very important in this connection. This proviso
for the first time makes specific reference to any land
Pr to any rights in or over land "belonging to a
State Government.'' Section !lA authorises the
Central Government to dispense with the necessity
of complying with the provisions of s. 8, which
provides for hearing any objections raised to the
proposal to acquire any land which is notified under
s. 7 as the subject-matter of acquisition. Ordinarily,
if a notification is made by the Central Government
of its intention to acquire the whole o(any part of
the land or of any right in or over land, notified
under s. 4, it is open to any person interested in the
land to object to the acquisition of the whole or any
part of the land or of any rights in or over such
land. If any such objection is raised, an opportunity
has to be given for hearing such an objection or
I S.C.R.
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
385
objections, by the "competent authority." But under
s. 9-A, the Central Government, if it is satisfied that
it is necessary to acquire immediately the whole or
any part of the land, or any rights in or over such
land, may direct that s. 8 shall not come into operation, and, therefore, no proceedings thereunder
would be entertainable. Section 10 lays down the
consequences of the notification o~•declaration of
acquisition under s. 9. On such a declaration the
.land, or the rights in or over the land. shall vest
in the Central Government, free from all encumbrances, and
under sub-section (~) where the
rights acquired happen to have been granted under
a mining lease by a State Government, the Central
Government shall be deemed to have become lhe
lessee of the State Government. .\ good deal of
argument was addressed to us as to the significance
of the provision, contained in s. 10 (~) or the Act.
They will be dealt with later in the conrse of this
judgment. But it is open to Government to direct by
au order in writing that the land or the rights in or
over the laud, instead of vesting in the Central Government under s. 10 shall vest in a Govcrnmt'lll Company,
which has expressed its willingncsp to comply with
the terms and cuncli lions imposed by· the Central
Government. A 'Government Gompam•' means
a company as defined in s. !il 7 of the Companies
Act, l 95tl. In the case where the land or the rights
in or over the land become vested in a Government
Company, under s. 11 (I), that company shall be
deemed to have become a lessee of the State Government, as if the Company had Geen granted the
mining lease by the State Government under the
1Iineral Concession Rules. Compensation under
the Act on account of prospecting licence> ceasing
to have effect, or the rights under a mining lease
haying been acquired, or for any land acquired under
s. 9, has been provided for and the rules Jay down
the procedure for determining such compensation, in
s. 13. It is clear on a reading of the provisions for
1962
Stale of West
Bengal
v.
L·nion of India
Sinha, C. J,
:is6 "su1'RE1\1t couRt iU:~oRts [i964J vat.
'
1962
·"-:-
. Stat1 ef.lY'est
Bm;sl
v.
Union of India
SW.a, C. I.
_.
On,a bare reading ofthe p~ovision5 ~f the Act,
the expression "any land" or "any rights in or over
such land" would appea.r. to cover ·every interest
regardless of the person or authority who owns them,
including those of a State. Government. But it has.··
been argued that . on a· close examination of the
.. provisions aforesaid of the Act and .keeping certain
general principles of interpretaticin- of Statutes in .
view, the_ conclusiori follows that the Act does not
cover any . property or interest . iri -or over land
·belonging to a State Government. \Ve have already
indicated that neither the statement of objects and
.. reasons nor the preamble are of any help to the
· plaintiff or to States which have intervened and have
claimed that any property belonging to a State
Government is outside the scope and effect of the
·._Act.
Bearing in mind that the. words used in s. 4
...
·are comprehensive and unrestricted and apt to include
in their sweep lands "belonging to a State" and that ·
the reference in s. 7 is to lands which are notified
under s: 4 (1), we: shall now turn to the arguments'_
bearing upon the interpretation of certain specific
• provisions which are however claimed to suggest an
. _opposite conclusion: Firstly, it is urged that "any_
person:' used in s. 8 .could not b_e interpreted .as
mcludmg a State; This, argument 1s bound up with the other argument re1ating to the competence of.
Parliament to legislate in respect of property belonging to a State. It will, therefore, be convenient to deal ·
'.
I
.\
compensation in that section. that·-no-compensation
has. been provided for· · in· respect of minerals lying
unworked underground.\. Section 14 to 17. Jay down'
the method of determining 'compensation and other .
cognate matters relatini; to payment of compensation.
The rest of the provisions of the Act do not bear on
. the present. <iontroversy and, therefore, rieed not be
- adverted to.
· . .
· ·,
· · ·
.'
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
with this argument along with that topic. It is enough
to point out here that the explanation to s. 8 (1), and
particularly the words "undertaken by the Central
Government or by any other person", would lend
support to the argument· of the lean1ed AttorneyGeneral that the word "person" has been used in the
generic sense of including both a natural person and
a juristic pr rson. Secondly, it was argued with
reference to the words of the proviso to s. !J (I) that
where the Act intended to make any mention of a
State Government, it had done so specifically as in
ss. !), 10, 11 and 18 of the Act, and that, therefore,
the substantive provisions of the Act were not intended to apply to any rights or interest vested in a
State Government. The argument is plausible but
not sound. Section !l is the effective scrtion of the
Act, which provides that after the Central Government has investigated the prospect of obtaining coal,
after the issue ul' a notification under s. +, and after
notifying its intention to acquire the land covered by
the notification under s. 7, and after disposing of
objections, if any, under s. 8, the Central Government has to make the necessary declaration that that
land shou lei be acquired. The proviso to s. !l (I) only
requires consultation wi•l1 the concerned State
Government where it is the owner of the land, or
has any interest in or over such land. It lias rightly
been pointed ont on behalf of the Gen tral Government that if the right or interest of a State Government were not involved in the acquisition, it would
be wholly unnecessary to make any reference to the
State Government concerned. It was urged that
unless "lands belonging to a State Government" or
in which a State Government has an interest in or
over such land, WlTC within the operative words of
the main provisions in s. !) ( l ), it would be
meaningless to make a provision for the consultation
referred to in the proviso. We see force in this submission. The consultation with the State Government
is made a condition precedent to the declaration
1?62
State of West
Bengal
v.
Union of lndit1
Sinha, C. J.
:i88
1962
Slatt of Jt',,t
Bengal
v.
L nian of ltulia
Sinha, C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19f>4] VOL.
to be made by the Central Government in respect of the proposed acquisition. But consultation
docs not necessarily mean consent, though ordinarily
consultation betwlrn two governments or two public
authorities would signify the co-operation and
willingness to accede to the proposal-a situation
which is not contemplated with reference to the
interests of private persons.
On the question of the proper interpretation of
the proviso to s. !l (l ), a number of readings were
suggested, which went to the length of not only rewriting the section but of adding words which were
not there so as to m;ike the proviso mean what on its
plain reading it cannot. \'\'e arc not, therefore,
mclined seriously to examine tho~e se\'cral alternative readings of this part of the section. Similarly the
provisions of s. JO (2) were pressed in aid of the
construction suggcsteu on behalf of the plaintiff anu
the other inter\'cning States, that the interests of a
State Government were not wi1hin the purview of
the Act. Thi~ :w·t11nt11t is bsed on thr consideration that if rights ·,;r interest' of a State (;ovcrume11t
were also within tl1c purview of the Act, it would be
meaningless to provide that the Central Coverr1111ent
ur a Government Company, as contemplated by s. 11,
should be deemed to be the lessee of the State
Government in respect of the rights acquired. We
arc unable to aceccds to this construction. Sections liJ
(2) and 11 have particular reference to those cases
where the property acquired consists of rights uw 1er
any mining leases granted by a State Govcrnm t.
Apart from the kind of property contemplated oy
ss. 10 (2) and 11 (2), as aforesaid, there may be other
kinds of property acquired, e. g. coal-bearing land,
in which the entirety of the interest is vested in a
State Government. In such cases, thert' would be no
question of the Central Government or a Government
Company becoming or bring deemed to become a
lessee of a State Government. Reference was made
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
to s. 18 but the mention of a "State Government"
in the section is consequential upon the provisions of
ss. 10 and 11, that is to say, where the Central
Government or a Government Company has, by
operation of those provisions of the Act. become the
lessee of a State Government. In the case of any
differences between the Central Government and a
State Government on the question of how prospecting
is to be done or of how far the mineral Concession
Rules shall be observed, is, by virtue of this section,
to be resolved by arbitration or in such other manner
as the Governments concerned may deci<le.
It will thus appear that on a proper intcrprc.
talion of the relev:.111t provisions of the Act, it cannot
be said that either in express terms or by necessary
implication the prnvi,ions of the Act are implicable
to ri~hls or interests cif a Stale Government .or that
such lands are exd11ded. It is plain that the Act
is intended to cover lane\ or rights in or over land
belonging t>ithrr to an individual or to a juristic
person. Such lane\ may comprise not only surface
rights but also mineral rights. The land to be acquired by the Central Govt. might be_ virgin soil unencumbered by any prospecting licences or mining
leases .granted by the State or by an intermediary,
usin!j the expression to mean all interests below the
State. Such an interest as aforesaid may be vested
in a State or different interests may be vested in
different persons by virtue of leases or licences grantee\
by proprietors in permanently\ settled States or by
tenure-holders who have expressly obtained minini::
rights. The Act, therefore, had to use the compendious language "land or any interest in or over land"
to cover all those diverse rights and interests which
the Central Govt. would be interested to acquire
in order to have a free hand in developing the land
for coal mining in the public sector, as it is called,
The Act may have been more artistically drafted but
r.onstruing it as it is, we have no doubt tha.t
1962
State of ~Vest
Bengal
v.
l/nion of India
Sin.','a, C. J.
390
1962
Shit of U'tst
Btntai
v.
{j11io11 of Jrulia
Sinha, C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Parli?.ment intended to acquire a II rights and interests
in coal bearing land with a view to prospecting for
coal and for exploiting coal bearing mines. It must,
therefore, be held that th.e supplemt"ntary issue as
regards the intcrprela1ion of the :\ct joined between
the parties as a result of the amendment of the
plaint must be decided against the plaintiff.
Starting with the position that on a true
construction of the relevant provisions of the Act,
the rights and interests of a State Government in
coal bearing land had not been exdudcd from the
operation of the Act, either in express terms or by
necessary implication, the next question that arises
for consideration is the first issue which co\·ers
issues 3 and ·1 also. The competence of Parliament
to enact the Act has to be determined with reference
to specific provisions or the Co11stit11tion, with parti·
cu Jar reference to the entries in the Seventh SchednlcList I and List III.
By Entry 42 ip List III of the Seventh Schedule
to the ConstittJtion read with Ari. 2~6 (:!) power to
legislate in respect of acquisition and requisition of
property is conferred upon the Parliament as well as
the State J.c~islatures, l'rim1i fr11:ie, this power
may be exercised by the Parliament in respect of
all property, privately owned or State owned. But
on belialf of the S1<1tc of \\'est Bengal· and some of
tlie intavening Statts it was submitted that the very
nature of the right in propen y vested in the State
for goven1111ental purposes in1posed a limitation upon
the cxcrci'e of the p:iwer of the Union Parliament,
affecting St.1tc owned propertv. On behalf of the
State of l'unjab--one of the intervening States-it
was urged that if acquisition of property was necessarily incidental to the effective exercise of power by
Parliament in respect of any of the entries in Lists I
and III, the Parliament may legislate so as to
affect title of the State to property vested in it
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
provided it does not interfere with the legislative
power of the State.
Diverse reasons were suggested at the Bar in
support of the plea that the State property was
not subject to the exercise of legislative powers of
the Parliament. They may be grouped under the
·
following heads : (l)
The Constitution having adopted the federal
principle of government the £tates share the
sovereignty ol the nation with the Union, and
therefore power of the Parliament does not
~xtend to cn;Kling legislatiou for depriving the
States of properly vested in them as sovereir~n
authorities. Entrustrnent of power to legislate
must therefore be so read as to imply a restriction upon the Parliament under Entry 42 of
List Ill when it is sought to be exercised in
respect of the property owned by a State.
(2)
Property vested in the States by virtue of
Art. 294 ( l) cannot be diverted to Union purposes by compulsion of Parliamentary legislation.
(il)
The Government of India Act, 1935 provided
special machinery for acquisition of property of
the State by negotiations, and not by cornpul~ion in exercise of legislative power. That pro
vision recognised that the Central Legislature
of the Government of India had no power to
acquire property of the State by exercise of
legislative power, and even though no provision
similar to s. l:l7 of the Government of India
Act, Hl35 has been enacted iu the Constitution,
the recognition implicit· in that provision of the
• immunity of the property of the units must also
be dccmerl to be suprrirnposed upon the exercise
1962
State of West
Bengal
v.
Union of India
Sinha, C. J.
..
-·--:--.·,,.- -,.,,
',- ••
\
.':· _. Jgoz . .
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
\
I
i
·of legislative power v~sted in the Parliament
under the Constitution.
·
·, ·Stat1 ef JVtsl
Benzal
v.
Union of Inlia
lI·
Sinlia, C. J.
I
I
.
(4) · Absence of power expressly conferred. such as
is to be found in the . Australian Constitution,
to legislate for acquisition of the property of ·
the State indicates that it was not the intention
of the Constitution makers to confer that power
. upon the Union Parliament, under the general
· . legislative heads:
(5)
..
''.
l
<
If power be exercised by the Union to acquire
State property under Entry 42 of the Concurrent
List, similar power may also be exercised by
the States in ·respect ·of Union· property and
even to re-acquire the property from the Union
by exercise of the· State's legislative power.
The power· under Entry 42 can therefore never
be effectively exercised by the Parliament. ·
(6) · It cotild not have been the intention of the
. Constitution makers to confer authority upon the·
Parliament to legislate for acquiring property · ·
· of the States and thereby to make t.he right of
the :State to property owned by it even more
precarious than the right which individuals or
.. Corporations have under Constitution to their
· 'property. Individuals and Corporations have
. the guarantee under Art. 31 ( 2) of the Consti. · tution that acquisitim1 of their property will be
· for public. purposes and 'compensation ·will be
awarded for acquiring property.
Entry 42
must be read· subject to Art. 31, and inasmuch
as Fundamental rights are conferred upon
individuals and Corporations against executive
or legislative · actions, and States are . not
invested with any fundamental rights· exerciseable against the Union or other States, the
right to legislate for compulsory acquisition of
. State property cannot l;>e exercised,
1 S.C.R.
(7)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
Unless a law expressly or by necessary implication so provides, a State is not bound thereby.
This well recognised rule applies to the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore in the
absenct: of any provision express or necessarily
implying that the property of the State could
be acquired by the Union, the rights claimed
by the Union to legislate for acquisition of
State property must be negatived.
All these arguments, except the purely inter·
pretational, are ultimately founded upon the plea
that the States have within their allotted field full
attributes of sovereignty and exercise of authority
by the Union agencies, legislative or executive, which
trenches upon that sovereignty is void.
Re: (1)
Ever since the assumption of authority by
the British Crown under Statute 21 & 22, Viet .(1656)
Ch. 106, the administration of British India was
unitary and highly centralized. The GovernorGeneral was invested with autocratic powers to
administer the entire territory. Even though the territory was divided into administrative units, the
authority of the respective Governors of the Provinces
was derived from the Governor-General and the
Governor-General was responsible to the British
Parliament. There was, therefore, a chain of responsibility the Provincial Governments were subject
to the control of the Central Government and the
Central Government to the Secretary of State. Some
process of Rcvol.ution took place under the Government of India Act, HI 19, buJ; that was on Iy for the
purpose of decentralization of the Governmental
power but on that account the Government did not
cease to be unitary. The aim of the Government of
India Act, 1935 was to unite the Provinces and
lndian States into a federation, but that could be
J9f2
Stot1 of W111
Be1tgal
••
Union of lt1rfi4
S'utl1a, C. J,
394. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
·---~--
'· '
1962
· Stall of lV1st
BeRgal
v.
UniOll of /11.Jia
Sinha, C. J.
achieved only if a substantial . number of the Indian
States.agreed to join the Provinces in.the federation.
For diverse reasons the Indian States never joined the
. proposed federation and the part dealing with fede- .
ration never became effective. The Central Government as it was originally constituted under the Government of India Act, 1919, with some modification
continued to function. But in.the Provinces certain
alterations were made. Certain departments •were
administered with the aid of Ministers, who were
popularly elected, and who were in a sense responsible to the electorate. . The Governor was still au tho'
,rised t,o act in his discretion without consulting. his
Ministers in respect of certain matters. He derived .
his authority.from the British Crown, and.was subject
. to the directions which the Central Government gave
to carry into execution Acts of the Central Legis'. laturein the Concurrent List and for the· maintenance.
of means of communication, and in respect of all
matters for preventing 'grave menace to the peace
or tranquility of India or part thereof.. The administration continued to function as an agent of the
British Parliament..
By the Indian Independence Act, 1947 a
separate Dominion of India was carved out and by·
s. 6 thereof the Legislature was for the. first time
authorised to make laws for the Dominion. Such
· laws were not to be void or inoperative on the grom;id
· that they were repugnant to the law of England or to
the . provisions of any existing or future Act of
. Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any
order, rule or regulation made under any such Act,
and the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion
included the ·power to repeal or amend any
such Act, order, rule or· regulation. · The British
Parliament ceased to have responsibility as respects
.. . . governance of the territories' which were immediately.
- · · · before that date inc:luded in British India, and _
'suz~rainty of the Crowµ ayer the 1ndian States lapseq
··
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
and with it all treaties and agreements in force on
the date of the passing of the Act between the Crown
and the rulers of Indian States. The bond i>f agency
which bound the administration in India to function
as agent of the Birtish Parliament was dissolved and
the Indian Dominion to that extent became sovereign.
Then came the Comtitution.
The territory was
evidently ton large for a democratic set-up with
wholly centralized form of Government. Imposition
of a centralized form might also have meant a
reversal of political trends which had led to decentralization of the administration and some distribution
of power. The Cnnstitution had, therefore, to be in
a form in which authority was decentralized. In the
era immediately prior to the enactment of the Indian
Independence Act, there were partially autonomous
units such as the J'rovinces. There were Indian
States which were in a sense sovereign but their
sovereignty was extinguished by the various merger
agreements which the rulers of those States entered
into with the Government of India before the
Constitution. By virtue of the process of integration
of the various States there emerged a Centralised
form of administration in which the Governor
General was the fountain head of executive authority.
The Constitution of India was erected on the founda·
tions of the Government of India Act, 1935 ; the ·
basic structure was not altered in many important
matters, and a large number of provisions were incor·
porated verbatim from the earlier Constitution.
In some respects a greater degree of economic
unity was sought to be secured by transferring
subjects having impact on matters of common
interest into the Union list. A comparison of the
Lists in Schedule 7 to the Constitution with the
Schedule 7 to the Government of India Act, 1935
discloses that the powers of the Union have l!een
enlarged parti<;ularly in the field of economic unity
and this was done as it was felr that tl)ere should be
-1162
St•lt of W1d
B1ntaJ
v.
Union of In.lie
Sinha, C. /.
·~·' .
396 SUPRE?>fE COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
.: '·"-,
1962
Stat1 of_ IVest
·
Bingtil
v.
Union of In~io
Sinha, c. J.
centralized control and adminisir;{iio~ in certain
fields if rapid economic and industrial progress had
to be achieved by the nation. To illustrate this it is
sufficient to refer to National Highways (Entry 24),
inter-State Trade and Commerce (Entry 42)-to
mention only a few being transferred from List II of
.the Government of India Act to List I in the Cons ti. tution, to the new entry regarding inter-State rivers
(Entry 56), to the new Entry 33 in the· Concurrent
<List to_which it is transferred from List II, and to the
comprehensive provisions of Part XIII-which seek
to make India a single economic unit for Purposes of
. trade and commerce under the overall control of
the Union Parliament arid. the Union Executive.
The result was a Constitution which was not true
to any traditional pattern of federation. - There is ·no
warrant for the assumption that the Provinces were
sovereign, ·autunomous units which had parted· with
such power. as they considered reasonable or proper
for enabling_ the Central Governm~nt to function for
. the'comrrion good. The legal theory on which the
Constitution was based was the withdrawal or resumption of all the powers of sovereignty .into the people
of this country and the distribution of these powers
save those withheld .from both the Union and the
States by reason of the provisions of Part III-between the Union and the States.
. _
-(a)
A truly federal form of Government endsages
a compact or agreement between independent
and sovereign units to _surrender partially ·their
authority in their cC!mmon interest and vesting
it in a Union and retaining the residue of- the
authority in the constituent units. Ordinarily ·each constituent unit has its separate Constitution by which it is governed in all matters
exc.ept those surrendered to .the Union, and the
Constitution of the Union primarily operates
upon the administration of the units. Our
Oo1J.sti1utio1J. was · not t}).e res~lt of ~ny such
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
compact or agreement : Units constituting a
· unitary State which were non-sovereign were
tra1isformed by abdication of power into
a Union.
"
(b)
(c)
Supremacy of the Constitution which cannot be
altered e~ccpt by the confponen t units. Our
Constitution is undoubtedly supreme but it is
'liable to be altered by the Union Parliament
alone and the units have no power to alter it.
Distrib~tioi{ of powers between the Union and
the rcgiona.l units each in its sphere coordinate
. and independent of the ulhcr. The basis uf
such distribution of power is that in matters of
11ational importance in which a uuiform policy
is desirable in the interest of the units, authority
is entrusted to tl1c Union, and matters of local
concern.remain with the State.
(d) Supreme authority of the Court,; to interpret
the Constitution and to invali<latc action
A federal
violalive of the ColI3titution.
Com;tit~tion, by its very natur~, consists of
checks and balanc?s an<l must contain provisions.for resolving couflicts between the executive and legislative authority of the Union and
the regional units.
In our Constitution characteristic (d) is to Le found
in foll force, (a) and (b) are absent. There is undoubtedly distribution of powers between the Union
and the States in matters legislative and executive;
but distribution.of powers is not always an index
of political sovereignty. The exercise of powers lcgis·
lativc and executive in the al!otted fields is hedged in
by numerous restrictions, so that the powers of the
States. are not coordinate with the Union and arc
not in many respects independent.
196:'
-'!ate oJ II 'n1
/Jcn;at
'"
l 'nio11 oj· India
Sinha, C. J.
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
Ifft
St1l1 of ll'tJI
Be"'al
y,
1.:nin of Toiia
SW.., C. J.
Legal sovereignty of the Indian nation is vested
the people of India who as stated by the preamble
have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
Sovereign Democratic Republic for the objects
specified therein. The Political sovereignty is distributed between, as we will presently demonstrate, the
Union of India and the States with greater weightage
in favour of the Union. Article :lOO invests the
Government of India and the States with the character of quasi-corporations entitled to sue and liable to
be sued in relation to their respective affairs. By
Art. 299 contracts may be entered into by the Union
and the States in exercise of their rcspecti ve cxecu tive
powers and Art. 298 authorises in exercise of their
respective executive powers the Union and the States
tu carry on trade or business and tu acquire, hold
aud dispose of property and to make contracts. These
provisions and the entrustrnent of powers to legislate
on certain matters exclusive, and concurrently in
certain other matters, and entrustment of executi vc
authority co-extensive with the legislative power form
the foundation of the division of authority.
In India judicial power is exercised by a single
set of courts, Civil, Criminal and Revenue whether
they deal with disputes in respect of legislation which
is either State legislation or Union legislation. The
exercise of executive authority by the Union or by
the State and rights and obligations arising out of
the executive autliority arc subject to the jurisdiction
of the Courts which have territorial jurisdiction in
respect of the cause of action. The High Courts
have been invested with certain powers under
Art. 226 to issue writs addressed to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, for the enforcement of any of the rights con·
ferred by Part III and for any other purpose and
under Art. 227 the High Court has superintendence
over all courts in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is at the apex -Of the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
hierarchy of courts, civil, criminal, revenue and of
quasi-judicial tribunals. There are in India not two
sets of courts, Federal and State as are found functioning under the Constitution of the United States of
America. By Art. 24 7 power is reserved to the
Parliament by law to provide for establishment of
courts for better administration (!f. laws made by the
Parliament or of any existing laws with regard to the
matters enumerated in the Union List, but no such
courts have been constituted.
Sovereignty in executive matters of the Union
is declared by Art. 73 which enacts that subject to
the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power
of the Union extends. to the matters with respect to
which Parliament may make laws, and to the exercise
of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any
treaty or agreement. But this executive power may
not save as expressly provided in the Constitution or
in any law made by Parliame.nt, extend in any State
to matters with respect to which the Legislature of
the State has also power to make laws. By Art. 77
all executive actions of the Government of India
have to be. expressed to be taken in the name of the
President. Executive power of the State is vested by
Art. 154 in the Governor and is exercisable by him
directly or through otlicers subordinate to him in
accordance with the ConstitutiOn. The appointment
of the Governor is made by the President .a.,nd it is
open to· the Presidentto make such provision as he
thinks fit for the discharge of the function of a
Governor of the' State in any contingency not providded for in Ch. II of Part VI. By Art. 162 subject
to the provisions of the Constitution, executive power
·of the State extends to matters with respect to. which
the Legislature of the State has power to make laws,
subject to the restriction that in matters in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule, exercise of
executive power of the State is also subject to and
J!Jf2
Stat. of w,,1
Blln/IOI
v.
Union of India
Si•""' C• .I
400
".
. J91i2
Siate·of IV1sr
B1ngal
.
Y.
· Union of India
Sinha, C. J.
l
.
StJPRE~IE COtJRT REPORTS [i964] voi:..
limited by the executive power-expressly, conferred
by the Constitution or . by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof. Exercise of executive authority of the States is largely
. restricted by diverse Constitutional provisions. The, .
executive power of every State has to •.be so exerdsed .
·_as to ensure compliance with the laws made by
Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that
State, and not to impede or prejudice the executive
power of the Union. The executive power_ of the
_Union extends to the giving of such directions to a
State as may appear to the Government of India to
be necessary for those purposes and as to the constru ·
·ction and maintenance of means of communication
. declared to be of national or military importance and
·for . protection 'of railways.·· ·.The -Parliament . has
power ·to · dedare highways or waterways to be of
national importance; and -the Union may execute
those powers, and also construct and mamtain means
of communic:ttion as part of its function with respect
to naval, military and air force works •. The President
may also, with the consent of the •Government of a
State, entrust io that Government or to its officers
functions in relation to -any matter to which · the
executive power of the Union extends: Art. 258 (1).
Again the Union Parliament 'may by law made in
exercise of authority in respect of matters exclusively
within its . competence confer powers and duties or
authorise the conferment of powers and imposition
of duties· upon the State, or officers or authorities
thereof: Art 258 (2). Art. 365 authorises the President to· hold that a situation ·has arisen - in which the
Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, if the.
State fails to comply with or give effect to any directions given· in exercise of the executive power of the
Union.
. - ' . . -.
· .
. ·
-- ·-;--
These. are the restrictions on the. exercise_ Of the
.·executive power by the States, in normal times; in
, .
.~._-.--11 ·'_,>-.-. -..
·.• lS.C.R. c SUPREME COURT REPORTS
\'V
__
\,
\
,•
401
- · '
IliZ
',times of emergency· power to override' the exerci~e or-executive power of the State is entrusted to the - St1..te •f JVrsl
·. Union.· ·. Again the field of exercise of legislative
Ben:•l
... power being co-extensive with the exercise of the 'Uni•tJ v.
•/ lniid
· legislative power of the States, the restrictions impofed
SinluJ, C. J.
upon the legislative power al.so apply to the exerrise
of executive power.
•
.
. · Distribution of legislative powers. is effected by
Art. 246. In respect of matters set out in List I of the
Seventh Schedule Parliament has exclusive power
to make laws: ·in respect of matters set out. in List II
the State has _exclusive power to Legislate and in
respect of matters set out in List III Parliament and
the _State Legislature have concurrent power to
legislate. The residuary power, including . the
power to tax, by Art. 248 and item 97 of List I iS ·
vested in the Parliament. The basis of distribution
of powers between the Union and States is that only
those powers and authorities which ·are concerned
with the regulation of local problems are vested in
the States, and the residue specially those, which
tend to maintain the economic, industrial and
commercial unity · of the nation are left with the
Union. By Art. 123 the · President. is invested with
the power to promulgate Ordinances on matters on
whicl\ the Parliament_ is _/competent ·to· legislate,
during· recess of Parliament. Similarly under Art. 213
power is conferred upon the Governor of a State to
promulgate Ordinances on matters on which the St::ite
Legislature is competent to legislate during. recess
of the Legislature. · But upon the distribution of
legislative powers thus . made and entrustment of .
power to the State ' Legislature, restrictions are
imposed even in normal times. Article 249 authorises ·
the Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter
in the State List if the Council of States has declared
by resolution supported by not less than two-third of
the members present and voting that it is necessary
or expedient in the national interest tint Parliam'"1!t
402
IHI
Slatr of Wut
B1ngaJ
v.
i-,,ion of lrti1a
Sirz/ra, C. J.
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
should make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the State List specified in the resolution.
By Art. 252 power is conferred upon Parliament to
legislate for two or more States by conseut even
though the Parliament m:iy have no power under
Art. 246 to make laws for the State except as
provided in Art. 219 and. 250. Such a law may be
adopted by a Legislature of any other .State. By
Art. 253 Parliament has the power notwithstandin~
anything contained in Art. 246 to make any law for
the whole or any part of the territory of India for
implementing any treaty, agreement or convention
with any other country or countries or any decision
made at any international conference, association or
other body. In case of inconsistency between the laws
made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of the States, the laws made by the Parliament whether passed before or after the State law
in matters enumcr;1ted in the Concurrent List to
the extent of rcp11gn;1ncy prevail over the State laws.
It is only a law m:idc by the Legislature of a State
which had been reserved fnr the consideration of
the President and has received his assent, on a
matter relating to a Coucurrcnt List containing
anv provision repugnant to the provisions-of an
earlier law made by Parli<mcnt or an existing
law with respect to that matter, prevails in the
State.
Power of taxation (which is exercisable by
the States in comparatively minor fields, the more
important such as Incomc·tax, wealth·tax, exciseduties other than those on cerrain specified articles,
and customs, being reserved to the Union) conferred by various entries under List II on the States
is also severely restricted. Property of the Union,
save in so far as the Parliament may by law otherwise provide, is exempt from all taxes imposed by
the State or by any authority within the State. By
Art. Z~li imposition of a tax on sale or purchase of
\
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
goods where such sale or purchase takes place ~ut
side the State or in the course of import of the goods
into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of
India can only be imposed by Parliamentary legislation. A State is also prohibited unless the Parliament by law otherwise provides, from imposing a tax
on the consumption or sale of electricity which is
consumed by the Government of India or in the
construction, maintenance and operation of any
railway. Nor can levy of a tax be authorised in
respect of water consumed or distributed or sold by
any authority established by any existing law or
any law made by Parliament for regulating or developing any inter-State river or river valley, except in
so far as the Parliament may by law so provide.
The States depend largely upon financial
assistance from the Union. A share in certain taxes
levied and collected by the· Union such as tax on
non-agricultural income, duties in respect of succession to property other. than agricultural land,
estate duty in respect of property other than · agricultural land, terminal taxes on goods or passengers
carried by railway, sea or air, taxes on railway fares
and freights, tax~s on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published therein,
taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other
than newspapers where such sale. or purchase takes
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce,
is given to the States. Certain grants-in-aid of the
revenues of the States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and
West Bengal in lieu of assignment of any share of
the net proceeds in each year of export duty on jute
and jute products to those States may also be made.
Union duties of excise except duiies on medicinal
and toilet preparations are collected by the Union
but may be distributed in whole or in part among
the States in accordance with such principles of
distribution as may be formulated. By Art. 275
grants-in-aid of the revenue of such States as
-
1Jf2
Stole •! West
•mz.i
v.
Utti•n If /nji-.
SinM, C. J,
'
'.~
.
7;'~-:'--...
'
:·,
4i>! sui>.REMF: cotrR.t R.EPoR.fs
[1964] vo£.
"
,, _; ·.,;.!!!!_
.
State of lV1sl
- Bengal .
-· v.
. Union of Iniia
Sinha, C. J.
'
'
'
'
Parliament may determine to be.in need of assistan;
may also be made.
·
·
It is manifest that the States depend .for financial assistance upon the Union,· their own resources,
because of their restricted. fields of taxation, being .
inadequate. The power of borrowing is exercisable ,
by the States under Art. 293, but the same cannot be
exercised without the consent of the Government vf ·
' India, if there is stiU outstanding · any part of a Joan
· which has been made to the State by the Government
· of India or by its predecessor Government, or . in
respect of which a guarantee has been given by the ...
Union, or by, its predecessor. : . ·
.
. . .
In .times of _· national . political or financial
·. einergency, the States may exercise orily such powers
legislative and executive as the Union permits. · \Vhen
·a State of emergency is declared the Parliament has
power to make laws for the whole or any part of the_·
territory of India with respect to any matter in the
State List, and ·the laws made. by Parliament prevail,
over the Sta,te Laws in the event of repugnar;cy. If,
as.a. result. of war, external aggression or mternal
disturbances the security of India or any territory is
threatened, the President may declare a· . state of,
einergency, ·and the executive power of the Union'.
will , thereupon extend to giving directions to the .
States, as to manner in which the executive: power·
of the States is to be exercised, and the power of the
extend to making laws
Parliament to make laws
conferring or authorising . conferment of powers and:·
imposition. of duties, upon the Union or its officers.
and authorities as respect any matter, even if such
matter be not enumerated in'the Union List. The·
President may also during the emergency .suspend
the operation of Art. 268 to 279 and require that all .
money Bills shall be submiued to the President for his ·
- consideration, after they are passed by the Legislature
of the State.
.
·
· ..
will
•·
.. .
'
I. S.C.R; .. SUPREME .cqURT· REPORTS.
·,, · . · The . normal corp;rate existence of.~ States ·
entitles 'them to enter into contracts and invests them
with power . to carry on trade or business and the
· ·States·have the right to hold property; But having
regard to certain basic features of the Constitution,
the re5trictions . on the exercise of their powers
executive and legislative and on the powers of taxation, and dependence for finances upon the Union
Government it would not be correct to maintain that
absolute sovereignty ·remains vested in the States.
This is illustrated by certain striking features of our
constitutional set up. ·There is no dual citizenship
in India: all citizens are citizens of India and not of
the various States. in which they are domiciled. There
are no independent Constitutions of the States, apart
from the national Constitution of the Union of .
India: Ch. II, Part VI from Arts. 152 to 237, deals
with the States, the powers of the Legislatures of the
States, . the powers of the executive .and judiciary ..
What appears to militate against the theory regarding the sovereignty of the State is the wide power
with which the Parliament is invested to alter the
boundaries of States, ·and· even to extinguish the
existence of a State. There ··is\ no constitutional
guarantee against alteration of the boundaries of the
States.'By Art. 2·of the Constitution the Parliament
may admit into the Union or establish new States on
such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, and by Art. 3
the Parliament is by law allthorised to form a new
State by redistribution of the· territory of a State or
· by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by
uniting any territory to a part of any State, Jncrease
the area of any State; diminish the area of any
·State, · aUer the boundaries of any State, and alter
the name of any State. Legislation which so vitally
affects the very existence of the States may be moved
on the recommendation· of the President which in
practice means the recomrriendatio.n of the Union ·
.l\finistry, and if [the proposal in the Bill affects the
.~rea, boundaries or name of any of the States,· the
"'
'
•
.
•. ''
•
•
t
. o--~-,-
-
.
405
J9fi2
Stat1 of West
Bengal
v.
U11ion of ln~i ..
Sinha, C. J
'. I
406 SUP.REME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
11'1
.,.,.,
SUI<•] Wtsl
v.
u.;.. •f 1w
Si""4, C. J.
President has to refer the Bill to the Legislature of
that State for merely expressing its views thereon.
Parliament is therefore by law invested with autho·
rity to alter the boundaries of any State and to
diminish its area so as even to destroy a State with
all its powers and authority. That being the extent
of the power of the Parliament it would be difficult
to hold that the Parliament which is competent to
destroy a State is on account of some assumption as
to absolute sovereignty of the State incompetent
effectively to acquire by legislation designed for that
purpose the property owned by the State for govern·
mental purpose.
The parliamentary power of legislation to
acquire property is, subject to the express provisions
of the Constitution, unrestricted. To imply limita·
tions on that power on the assumption of that degree
of political sovereignty which makes the States coordinate with and independent of the Union, is to
envisage a Constitutional scheme which does not
exist in law or in practice. On a review of the
diverse provisions of the Constitution the inference is
inevitable that the distribution of powers-both
legislative and executive--Ooes not support the theory
of'full sovereignty in the States so as to render it
immune from the exercise of legislative power of the
Union Parliament-particularly in relation to acquisition of property of the States. That the Parliament
may in the ordinary course not seek to obstruct the
normal exercise of the powers which the States have,
both legislative and executive, in the field allotted
to them will not be a ground for holding that the
Parliament has no such power if it desires, in
exercise of the powers which we have summarisedted
do so. It was urged that to hold that property ves to
in the State could be acquired bv the Union, would
mean, as was picturesquely expressed by the learned
Advocate-General of Bengal, that the Union could
acquire and take possession of Writer's buildings
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
when~
the SecretJriat of the State Government is
functioning and thus stop all State Governmental
activity. There cc,uld be no doubt that if the Union
did so, it would not be using but abusing its power
of acquisition, but the fact that a power is capable
of being abused has never been in law a reason for
denying its existence, for its existence has to be
determined on very different considerations.
We might add that this submission is, as it
were, a resuscitation of the now exploded doctrine of
the immunity of instrumentalities which originating
from the observ~.tions of Marshall, C. J., in
]l'Jc Culloch v. Maryland('), has been decisively
rejectd by the Privy Council as inapplicable to the
interpretation of the respective powers of the
States and the Centre under the Canadian
and Australian Constitutions (vide Bank of
Toronto v. Lambe ('), and Webb v. Outrim (3 ), and
has practically been given up even in the United
States. The following passage in the judgment of
Lord Hobhouse in Lambe's case, though it dealt
with the converse case of not reading limitations into
provincial power might usefully be set out:
"The appellant invokes that principle to support
the conclusion that the Federation Act must be
so construed as to allow no power to d1e provincial legislatures under sect. 92, which may
by possibility, and if exercised in some extravagant way, interfere with the object of the
Dominion in exercising their powers under
sect. 91. It is quite impossible to argue from
the one case to the other. Their Lordships
have to construe the express words of an Act
of Parliament which makes an elaborate distri-.
bution of the whole field of legislative amhority
between two legislative bodies, and at the same
time provides for the federated province~ a
carefully balanced constitution, under which
(I) (1819) 4 WbeaL 316.
(21 (1887) 12 App. Oas. 57~.
t3J [1907] A.O. 81,
'
1962
Stat1 nf ~Vest
H~ngal
v.
l ·nion of India
Sinha, C, J,
'.
..408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
. Si«te ef We.tt
..1n:•l ·
' v.-
. UnW. •f lnii•
SVth•, C, J.
no one of the parts .c~il-pass laws'foritself
except i;;nder the control of the .whole, acting
through the Governor-General. · And the question they have to answer is whether the one
.. body or the -other has power to make a given
law. Jf they find that on the due construction
oL the ·Act a legislative power falls within
sect. 92, i~. would be quite wrong of them to
deny its existence because by some possibility
it may be abused, or may limit the range
which otherwise would be open to the Dominion
Parliament."
.___
!
I'
!i
"
!f
-•--
~
'
~
~
1
i'
I
I
..
\
!
It is pertinent also to note that under several
.entries.of List I it· is open to the Union Parliament
. to legislate directly upon properties which are situate
'in the State including properties which are vested in
thz States, for instance, Railways (Entry No. 22),
Highwa')'sdeclared by or under· ·law made by Parliament to be national -highways (Entry 23), Shipping
and Navigation on inland waterways declared by
Parliament by law to be -- national watenvays,
(Entry 24), Lighthouses including lightships· etc.
(Entry. 26), Ports declared by or under law made by
Parliament 'or existing law to be major ports · __ (Entry 27), Ainvays; aircraft and air -navigation,
provision of aerodromes etc. (Entry .29), Carriage of
passengers and goods by railways, sea or air, or by
national. watenvays in mechanically propelled vessels
(Entry 30), Property of the :Union and .the Revenue
therefrom, _but as regards property situated in a State
· subject to legislation by the· State, save in so far as
,
Parliament by law, otherwise provides (Entry 32);
. Industries,· the control of which by the Union ·is·
. declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in
the public interest (Entry 52), · Regulation and
development of oilfields and mineral oil resources,
petroleum and petroleum products, other liquids and
-~- substances 1 declared by Parliament by law to be
. . dangerously inflammable (Entry 53), Regulation of - . :-·
I.
.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREM;E COURT :REPORTS
409
mines and mineral devdopment (Entry 54), Regulation and development of inter·State rivers and river·
valleys (Entry 56), Ancient and historical monuments
and records and arnhaeological sites and remains
declared to be of national importance (Entry 67).
These are some of the matters in legislating upon
which the Parliament may directly legislate in respect of property in the States.. To deny to the
Parliament while granting these extensive powers of
legislation authority to legislate in respect of property situate in the State,' and even of the State,
would be to render the Constitutional machinery
practically unworkable. It may be noticed that in
the United States of America the authority of
Congress to legislate on a majority of these matters
was derived from the "Commerce Clause." The
commerce clause is not regarded as so exclusive as
to preclude the exercise of State legislative authority
in matters which are local, in their nature or operation, or are mere aids to commerce. As observed in
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations-8th Edition
p. lOOl "Mr. Justice Hughes, in delivering the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Simpson v. Shepard (');said :
"The grant in the Constitution conferred
upon Congress an authority at all times
adequate to secure the freedom of inter-state
commercial intercourse from State control, and
to provide effective regulation of t,hat intercourse as the national interest may demand;
The words 'among the several States' distinguish between commerce which concerns more
States than one, and that commerce which is
confined within one State and does not affect
other States. 'The genius and character of the.
whole government', said Chief Justice Marshall,
'seems to be, that its action is to be applied to
all the external concerns of the nation, and to
those internal concerns which affect the State~
(I) (1913) 230 U.S. 352: 57 L. ed. 1511.
1962
St11te of West
B1ngal
v.
lJnion of India
Sinha, C J.
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
Stat1 of WtSI
B1ngnl
v.
l.:nion nf bulia
Sinha, C. J.
generally; but not to tho1e which are comple·
tely within a particular State, which <lo not
affect other States and with which it is not
necr'>ary to interfere, for t.he purpose of executing some of the general powers of the Government. The completely internal commerce of
a State, then, may be considered as reserved
for the State itself. ·'Thi~' reservation to the
States manifestly is only of that authority which
is consistent with, and not opposed to, the
grant to Congress. There is no room in our
scheme of government for the assertion of State
pow~r in hostility to the authorized exercise of
Federal power. The authority of Congress
extends to every part of inter-state commerce,
and to every instrumentality or agency by
which it is carried on; and the full control by
by G>ngrcss of the subjects committed to its
regulation is net to be denied or thwarted by
the commingling of interstate and intrastate
operations. This is not to say that the nation
may deal with the internal concerns of the State,
as such, but that the execution by Congress of
its constitutional power to regulate inter-state
commerce is not limited by the fact that intrastate transactions mav have become so inter\\"ovcn tl1crcw.tl1 tlut tlic effective government
of the former incidentally controls· the latter.
This conclusion necessarily results from the
supremacy of the national power with its appointed sphere."
Our Constitution recognises no such distinction between the operation of a State law in matter~ which
are local, and which arc interstate. TJ an enactment falls within the Union List, whether its
operation is local or otherwise State legislation inconsistent therewith, will subject to Art. 2;H (2)
be struck down.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
_ The question may be approached from another
angle. Even under Comticutions which are truly
federal and full sovereignty of the States is recognised
in the residuary field both executive and legislative,
power to utilise or as it is said "Condemn" property
of the State for Uni•Jn purposes is not denied.
The power to acquire land so\Joght to be exercised by the Union, whicb is challenged by the State
of West Bengal, is power to acquire in exercise of
authority conferred by ss. 6, 7 and 9 of the Coal
Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act,
1957. The Act was enacted for establishit>is in the
economic interest of India greater public control over
the coal mining industry and its development by
providing for the acquisition by the State . of land
containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of
rights in or over such land for the extinguishment or
modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any
agreement, lease, licence or otherwise, and for
matters connected therewith. By .Entries 52 and 54
of List I the Parliament is given power to legislate
in respect of :
(52) "Industries, the control ofwiiich by the Union
is declared hy parliament by. law to be expedient in the public interest."
(54) "Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and
development under the control of the Union is
declared by Parliament by law to the expedient in the public interest."
In exercise of powers under Entry 36 of the Govemment of India Act, 1935 which corresponds with
Entry 52 of the Constitution the Central Legislature
enacted the Minerals & Mining (Regulation & Development) Act, 1948, (LIII of 1948). By s. 2 of the
Act it wa~ declared that it was expedient in the
1962
State of Wes'.
Bengal
v.
[Tnion of Indio
Sinha, C. J.
!
I
'412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!964] VOL.
·--- -·-
public interest that the Central Govemm~nt should
take
under its control the regu!a:tfon · of mines and
Stat1 Df JV1.•I
·oilfields and development of minerals to the extent
< · Brngal
specified in the ·Act. 'Mille' was defined under the
ltn~n of ]ndla
Act as meaning any excavation for the ·purpose of
Sinha, C. J.
searching for or obtaining minerals and includes an
oil well. No mining lease could . be ·given after
the commencement of the Act, otherwise than in .
accordance with the mies made under the Act •. · By
·. 's: 13 the pJ"ovisions of the ~ct:were. to be binding o!l
. the Government, whether m the. nght of the Dominion or·. of a State.' By the declaration by s. 2
"the' minerals became. immobilized. The Act is ·on
the Statute Book, and the declaration, in the future
. application of the -Act. since the Constitution must ·
·.also remain in force, as if it were made'-under Art.'52
. of the Constitution.
- . ··
..
-
'
I!
-- -
•• o.
After the Constitution, -. the Industries - (Deve- ·
lopment & Regulation) Act; 1951 (65 of 1951) was
enacted by the Parliament... By s. 2 it was- declared
that it is. expedient in the public interest that the
Union should take under its control the industries
' specified in the First Schedule' In the Schedule item
(3) ·"Coal, ·including Coke and other derivatives"
·was induded as one. of such industries. The Legis. lature then enacted the .Mines & Minerals (Regula- ·
.- tfon & Development) Act, 1957 (LXVII of 1957).
Bys. 2 a declaration in terms similar to the declaration in Act Liii of 1948 was made; · The Act deals
with au· minerals except oil, and enacts certain
amendments in• ACt Lill of-1948. There being a.·
declaration in terms "of item .· 52 the Parliament
- acquired exclusive authority to legislate in respect of.
· CoaI' industry set~ out in the Schedule tO Act 65
of 1951 and the State. Government had no authority
·in that behalf. · -· · . · . -- ·
·
Jn the American Constitution there is xio express : ·
j>ower conferred u,Pon the Con¥re5s to m~ke a ,Ja:iy f{i,r. ·
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41:.1
acqt!isition of any property for a public purpose.
But it has been held by a long course of decisions
that it i5 open to the Congress to lc."islate in respect
of matters within its competence even if such legislation may have a direct impact upon the States'
rights, to property. In the Sfr;tes of Oklahoma E.r
Rel. Leun Uo. Phillips v. Gny P. Atkinson Company
('), it was held that in enacting flood control legislation which authorised construction of a reservoir,
the Congress had the power to condemn lands owned
by a constituent State. It was observed "The Tenth
Amendment docs not deprive 'the national government of authority to resort tu all means for the
exercise of a granted power which arc appropriate
and plainly adapted to the permitted end' U11itcd
States v. Darby (:H2 U.S. p. 12.J) xx x Since the
cu11Structi•1n of this dam and reservoir is a valid
exercise by Congress of its commerce power, there is
no interference with the sovereientv of the State.
United States . v. Appalachian u Electric Power
Co. (:Hl U. S. 428). The fact that land is owned
by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the
United States. \Vaync Country v. United States,
5;1 Ct. cl. (!<') 417, allirme<l in 252 U.S. 57J."
Similarly it was held in '!'he Uhero/;ee Nntion v. 'l'he
Southern Ifonslis Railwli.y Cu. ('), ,that Congress has
the power to authorise a Corporation to construct
a railway through the territory of the Cherokee
Nation, for the United States may exercise the right
of eminent domain even within the limits of the
several States for purposes necessary to the execution
of powers granted to the general government by the
Constitution.
Power LO effectuate its lcgislati ve authority
which is entrusted in absolute terms bei11g essential
for carrying out of the powers, does not depend upon
the consent of the States, and cannot be thwarted bv
any opposition on the part of the States. The exte11t
of this power was aptly described by Strong, J., in
(1) (194-0) 313 U.S. 5(18: 85 L. ed. 1487.
(2) (1889) 135 U,S. 6411 34 L, ed. 295.
IS62
State r1f TVat
Bt,,gdl
v.
l}nitm of India
Sinha, C. J.
41-1 SUPRE:vtE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Kohl v. Unite1l Str1tes (') •
1961
,\ldlt of U.'ot
!1tn:al
v.
I 'nion of fnl111
.~inlia, (.,
J.
"ll has not been "criomly contended during the
argument that the United States Government
is without puwcr to appropriate lands or
other property within the States for its own uses
and to enable it to perform its proper functions.
Such an authority is essential to its indcpen·
<lent existence and perpetuity. These cannot
be preserved if the obstinacy of a private
person, or if any other authority, can prevent
the acyuisition of the means or instruments by
which alone governmental functions can be
performed. The powers vested by the Constitution in the General Government demand for
their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the
States. These arc needed foe forts, armories
and arsenals, for navy yards and light houses,
for custom·houses, post ollices and Court-houses,
and for other public uses. If the right to acquire
property for such uses may be made a barren
right by the unwillingness of property holders
to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting
a sale to the Federal Government, the constitutional grants of power may be rendered
nugatory, and the Government is dependent
for its practical existence upon the will of a
State, or even upon that of a private citizen.
This cannot be. No one doubts the existence
in the state governments of the right of eminent
domain-a right distinct from and paramount
to the right of ultimate ownership. It grows
out of the necessities of their being, not out of
the tenme by which lands arc held. It may
be exercised, though the lands arc not held by
grant from the Government either mediately
or irrnncdi.itcly, and indcpcndrnt of the consideration whether they would cscheat to the
Government in case of a failure of heirs. The
right is the offspring of political necessity; and
(I) {t876) 91 L".S. 449.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied
to it by its fundamental law."
In the United States of America power to ta~e
private property for public use is called by American
lawyers eminent domain. It is the power of the
State to take property upon payment of just
compensation for public use: it is an inherent attribute
of sovereignty-not arising even out of the. Constitution, but independently of it, and may be exercised
in respect of all property in the States for effective
enforcement of the authority of the Union against
private property or property of the State.
In Attorney-Oeneral fur British Columbia v.
Canadian Pacific Railway ('), one of the questions
which fell to be determined before the Judicial
Committee was whether power under s. 91 read with
s. 92 of the British North America Act 1867 which
secures to the Dominion Parliament exclusive
legislative authority in respect of lines of steam ar
other ships, railways, canals, telegraphs, and other
works and undertakings connecting any province
with any other, or others could be exercised so as to
authorise use of crown lands in the province for a
railway. The Judicial Committee observed at
p. 210:
"It was argued for the appellant that these
enactments ought not to be so construed as to
enable the Dominion Parliament to dispose
of Provincial Crown lands for the purposes
mentioned. But their Lordships cannot concur
in that argument. In Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Corporation of the Parish of Notre
Dame
de Bonsecours (1899 A. C. 367)
(a case relating to the same company
as the present) the right to legislate for the
railway in all the provinces through which
it passes was fully recognised. In Toronto
Corporation v. Bell. Telephone Co. of Canada
(I) [1906] A.O. 204.
1962
State of H-'e5t
B1nzal
v.
l..lniort oj' India
416
1962
~"I411 oJ HI;,,
Bmg11l
v.
Union of India
--·
Sinha, C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964JVOL.
(1905 A. C. 52) which related to a telephone
company whose operations wer.e not limited
to one province, and which depended on the
same sections, this Board gave full effect to legislation of the Dominion Parliament' over the
.streets of•Toronto whicl1 arc vested .in the city
corporation:" To constru\! the section now in
such a manner as to exclude tli'e power of
Parliament oveP Provincial Crown ·lands would
in their Io.ordships' opinion, be inconsistent with
the terms of the sections which they have to
......_ c,onstruc, with the· whole scope and purposes of
thc-·lcgislation, and with the principle acted
upon in, the previous decisions of this Board.
Their Lords.hips think/ tl1erefore, that tl\e
Dominion Parliament had .full power if it
thought fit,. t9 anthorize the-use· ofprovincial
Crown lands by the company for tlfe purposes
of this railway."
It.is not considered as inconsistent with a true
fi.:clcration like Australia to have a provision like
s. iil (:ll) of the Commonwealth of Austral~a
Act, 1900 which specifically empowers the Commonwealth to acquire "State" property, if needed for a
Commonwealth purpose, on terms of payment o( con;i·
pcnsation. In this connection it is to be noticed that
, there· is under the Common wealth of Auslralia Act a
provision as regards vesting of property in States and
m the Commonwealth on lines somewhat similar to
Art. 294-. In Canada, the decision of the Privy
Council have held that the acquisitiqn of ·property
by the Dominion for implemcnting;!'or carrying out
Dominion legislation under powers vested' in Parliament in that,behalf by s. !Jl was not inconsistent with
what might be termed the legislative sovereignty of
the Provinces in the fields marked out for them by
s. 02. And fltstly. even in America which is a true
federation, since tbc Constitution of the U. S. makes
no provision for the State Constitution·s, these being
I
~
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 417
determined by their own laws, it has been held that
the power of eminent domain of the Congres' for the
purposes of effectuating Congressional purpose comprehends the right to expropriate State property. In
these circumstances we are unable to appreciate the
argument that if the Constitution were to be held to
be a Federation, the States being considered as the
federative units, such a status necessarily involved a,
prohibition or negation of the right of the Union to
acquire the property of the State for the purpose of
giving effect to its legislative powers.
Therefore the power of the Union to legislate
in respect of property situate in the States even if the
States are regarded qua the Union as Sovere.ign,
remains unrestricted, and the State property is not
immune from its operation. Exercising powers under
the diverse entries which have been referred to earlier,
the Union Parliament could legislate so as to trench
upon the rights of the State in the property vested in
them. If exclusion of State property from the pur·
view of Union legislation is regarded as implicit in
those entries in List I, it would be difficult if not
impossible for the Union Government to carry out
its obligations in respect of matters of national importance. If the entries which we have referred to
earlier are not subject to any such restriction as
suggested, there would be no reason to suppose that
Entry 42 of List III is subject to. the limitation that
the property which is referred to in that item is of
individuals or corporations and not of the State. In
its ultimate analysis the question is one of legislative
competence. Is the power conferred by Entry 42
List I II as accessory to the effectuation of the power
under Entries 52 & 54 incapable of being exercised
in respect of property of the States? No positive
interdict against its exercise is perceptible in the
Constitution : and the implication of such an interdict
assumes a degree of sovereignty in the States of such
plenitude as transcending the express legislative
1!102
-
Sla11
ef W1.•t
llmg•I
••
Unian •f 1"'64
Sirm, C. J.
418
""
"'"" •f ll'ut
Btn1"1
v.;..••of 1.Ji.
Si.ola, L. J
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS[l964] VOL.
power of the Union. The Constitution which makes
a division of legislative and executive powers between
the Union and the States is not founded on such a
postulate : and the concept of superiority of the
Union over the States ip the manifold asptctl already
examined negatives it.
!le. (2).
By Art. 294 (a) all property and assets
which immediately before the commencement of
the Constitution wert: vested in the British Crown
for the Dominion of India, became vested in the
Union, and property vested for the purposes of the
Government of the Provinces, became vested in the
corresponding States. Under the Government of
India Act all property for governmental purposes was
vested in the British Crown. and by. .,irtue of the
Constitution that property became vested in the
Union and the States. By virtue of cl. (b) the rights,
liabilities and obligatious of the Government of India
and the Provinces, devolved upon the Union and the
corresponding States.
A considerable point was made of the fact that
Art. 294 had vested certain property in the State and
it was submitted that subject to the right of the State
by agreement to convey that property under Art. 2118,
the Constitution intended that the State should
continue to be the owner of that property and ·that
this vesting must be held to negative the Union's
right to acquire any property vested in the State without its coment. It was pointed out by the learned
Attorney.General that so far as the plaintiff-the
State of West Bengal-was concerned it did not own
the coal-hearing lands on the date of the Consti·
tution, and that it got title thereto only afte~ they
vested in the State by virtue of the provisions of the
Bengal Acquisition of Estates Act of 1954 (W. B. l
of 1954) and that the property thus acquired subse·
quently was not within the scope of Art. 294. We
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 419
have nodoubt that this would be an answer to the claim
of the plaintiff in this suit and particularly in the
context of the challenge to the validity of the notification now impugned but we do not desire to rest
our decision on any such narrow ground.
Article 298 runs :
"298. The executive power of the Union and
of each State shall extend to the carrying on of
any trade or business and to the acquisition,
holding and disposal of property and the mak·
ing of contracts for any purpose :
Provided that(a) the said executive power of the Union
i;hall, in so far as such trade or business or
such purpose is not one with respect to
which Parliament may make laws, be
subject in each State to legislation by
the States; and
(b) the said executive power of each State
shall, in so far as such trade or business or
such purpose is not one with respect to
which the State Legislature may make
laws, be subject to legislation by
Parliament."
The ai·gument was that the Constitution intend·
rd and enacted that property allotted to or vested in a
State under the provisions of Art. 294 or 296 shall
continue to belong to that State unless and until by
virtue of the pqwer conferred on the State by
Art. 298 it chose to part with it, and that without
a Constitutional amendment of these Articles such
property cannot be divested from the State. We
eonsider that this submission proceeds on a misconception of the function of Arts. 294 and 298 in the
scheme of the Constitution. To start with it has to
1962
fO:ta11 of West
Bengal
v.
Uniofl of Tttidia
Sinha, C. J.
420 SUPRE1fE COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1961
Sl4uof Wut
Bnigal
u.;,. ••of /Mia
sw..,c. J.
be pointed out that when Art. 298 confers on States
the power to acquire or dispose of property, the refo·
rence is to the executive power of the State to acquire
or dispose of property which would apply without
distinction to property vested under Art. 294 or under
296 by eseheat or lapse or as bona vacantia, or property acquired otherwise. BesiJes, Art. 298 is merely
an enabling Article-conferring on the State as owner
of the property, the power of disposal. That cannot
on any reasonable interpretation be construed as
negativing the possibility of the State's title to property being lost by the operation of other provisions
of the Constitution. Art. 298 has therefore no
relevance on the proper construction of Art. 294.
Article 294 was modelled on s. 172 of the
Government of India Act, 1935. As pointed out by
the Federal Court in In re the Allocation of L<.mds
und Buildings in a Chief Commissioner's Province(').
"Up to April 1st, 1937, when the greater part
of the Act came into force, the Government of
India was a unitary Government, to which all
the Provincial Governments were subordinate;
and hence all lands and buildings helonging to
Government or used for governmental purposes
of were vested in His Majesty 'for the purpose
of the Government of India.' This had been
the legal position ever since the Government
of India Act, 1858 (sec s. :rn of that Act. and
s. 28(1) and (3l of the Government of India Act.
which immediately preceded the Act of I !J:l.5).
But the setting up of a number of autonomous
Provinces, ind<'pendcnt of the Central Govern·
ment and dividing with the latter the totality
of executive and l~gislative powers in British
India, and the separation of the powers conncc·
tcd with the exercise of the functions of the
Crown in its relations with the Indian State;
(which were to be thenceforward exercised
(I) [1~41J F.C.R. 20, 23.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
exclusively by His Majesty's Representative
appointed for that purpose) made an allocation
necessary among these three authorities of the
lands and buildings which had hitherto been
vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the
Government of India alone. It is this allocation which was effected, or attempted to be
effected, by the provisions of s. 172, sub·s. (1 ),
paras, (a), (b) and (c)."
Section 172 which effected this distribution ran :
"172. (1) All lands and buildings which imme·
diately before the commencement of Part III
of this Act were vested in His Ma jcsty for the
purpose of the Government of India shall as
from that date-(a) in the case of lands and buildings which
are situate in a Province, \'est in His
Majesty for the purposes of the government
of that Province unless they were then
used, otherwise than under a tenancy
agreement between the Governor-General
in Council and the Gcivernment of that
Province, for purposes which thereafter
will be purposes of the Federal Government or of His :Majesty's Representative
for the exercise of the functions of the
Crown in its relations with Indian States,
or unless they are lands and buildings
formerly used for such purposes as aforesaid, or intended or formerly in tended to
be so used and ·are certified by the
Governor-General in Council or, as the
case may be, His Majesty's Representative,
to have been retained for future use for
such purposes, or to have been retained
temporarily for the purpose of more
1962
Stalt of H't.Jl
Bt1,gal
u.;..••ef bidia
suw., c. J.
422
1962
$141, of tt'tJ'
Btng"I
v.
( .'nion of lndin
Sinha, C J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
advantageous disposal by sale or otherwise;
..................................................."
Jmt like 3. 17'!. being the forerunner of Art. 294,
ss. 174 and 175 are phrased in terms similar and
correspond to Arts. 296 and 2!18.
The right of the States r.o property, which
d, volved upon them by Art. 294 (a) was therefore
no different ofrom the right they had in the after
acquired property: the Constitution docs not warrant
a distinction between the property acquired at the
inception of the Constitution, and in excrci~e of
executive authoritv. Article '.!!H does not contain
any prohibition against transfer of property of the
State and if the property is capable of being transferred by the State it i~ capable of being compulsorily
acquired.
A ttorney-C:enm,"/ for (/1wbec v. l\'ipissin.g
Central Railway Co. and A ltorney-GerMml f"'
Canada('), is in this context imtructive.
The Dominion legislation-the Railway Act,
1919 of Canada -made provi~ion for the expropriation of lands for the purpose of railways and for the
payment of compensation for the lands so taken and
under s. 189 of the enactment the raiiway company
was empowered wrth the consent of the GovemorGeneral-in-Council to take "Crown lands" for the
use of the railway.
Section 109 of the British North America Act
which corresponds to Art. 294 ran :
"109. All lands, mines, minerals: and royalties
belonging to the several Provinces of Canad;l,
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at the Union,
and all sums then due or payable for such
lands, mines, minerals, or royalties, shall belong
(t) (1926) A. C. 715,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec.
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in which the
same are situate or arise, subject to any trusts
existing in respect the~eof, and to any mtercst
other than that of the Province in the same."
The right of the Provinces to continue to retain and
enjoy their property so vested was further emphasized
by s. ll 7 which read :
"117. The several Provinces shall retain all
their respectiv.: public property not otherwise
disposed of in this Act, subject to the right of
Canada to assume any lands or public property
required for fortifications or for the defence of
the country."
The Governor-General of, Canada referred to the
Supreme Court questions as to the effect of these
provisions and its competence in relation to Provincial
Crown Lands.
It would be seen that the lands were not required either for fortifications for the defence of the
country within s. 117. The Supreme Court of Canada
held that the provision applied to the Provincial
lands and was competently enacted by the Dominion
Parliament, Sir John Simon appearing for the
appellant-Province made two submissions : (1) That
on a proper construction of the Railway Act, it
could be held applicable only to Crown Lands vested
in the Dominion and not to Provincial Crown Lands,
relying for this purpose largely on the provision in
s. 189 of the impugned Act for taking the consent
of the Governor-General-in-Council., (:t) By reason
of Provincial Crown Lands being vested in the
appellant by s. 109 of the Imperial Act, read with
s. 117, the Provinces were entitled to retain their
respective property not otherwise disposed of by the
Act; and that the purpose for which the Railwa~
St..il• of We.~t
Btngal
•..
Union ·of ln,in
Si.U..,C. J.
424
Ml
•t11te sf Wtt~
811Jzsl
••
Un;.. •/ lnii•
~i...V,
c. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!lU4] VOL.
Act made provision did not fall within the last limb
of s. 117 vesting in the Dominion Government a right
to take property for certain limited purposes. For
this reason, if the Act on its proper construction involved interference with Provincial Lands the same was
unconstitutional.
The agreement for the respon·
dent---the Dominion-was that whens. II i of the
British North America Act vested in the Dominion
the power to take DC>minion land for defence etc. it
was a reference Lo executive and not legislative action.
They submitted that the section was not intended to
ensure that the Provinces retain their public property
for all time but wa5 m~ant merely as a distribution of
public property on the date of the Confederation.
Viscount Cave, after disposing of the question relating to the con;truction of s. 18!1 in the following
terms :
"The section applies in terms to all lands of the
Crown lying on the route of the railway, no
distinction being made between Dominion and
Provincial Crown lands."
dismissed as not vcrv material the contention raised
that as reference had been made to the GovcmorGeneral-in.Council it indicated that it was onlv
Dominion property that was intended to be covered
by that provision.
Dealing with the main constitutional objection
to the validity of the taking of Provincial property,
Viscount Cave pointed out that it was not the first
occasion when the impact of Dominion legislative
power under s. !ll of the British Korth America Act
upon the property vested in the Provinces arose
before the Privy Council, for in At/rJrney-Geneml J()r
British Co/'ltTnbfo v. Cmuidian Pacific Uailway Co.
( 1906 A. C. 2M) the argument had been advanced
that the legislative power of the Dominion ought not
to.be construed so as to deprive the Provinces of their
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
proprietary interest in what had been vested in them
by the British North America Act.
Viscount Cave quoted the passage in the judg·
ment we have already extracted.and continued :
"It was argued that .the eff~ct of ss. 109 and
117 of the British North America Act was to
vest in each of the Provinces the beneficial
interest in the Crown land ·situate in the
Provine~. subject only to the right of Canada
under. the reservation contained in s. 117 to
assume land' required for purposes of defence.
But the reservation in queS!ion appears to refer
to executive, and not to legislative, action; and
while the proprietary right of each Province in
its own Crown lands is beyond dispute, that
right is sul-ijcct to be affected by legislation
pasied by the Parliament of Canada within
the limits of the authoritv conferred on that
Parliament ................. where the legislative
power cannot be effectually exercised without
affecting the proprietary rights both of indivi·
duals in a Province and of the Provincial
Government, the pow~r so to affect those rights
is necessarily involved in the legislative
power."
Re. (3).
Power to acquire land was vested under
the Government of India Act, 1935,
bv
Entry 9 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, exclusive·
ly in the Provinces. For any purpose connected with
a matter in respect of which the Central Legislature
was competent to enact law5, the Central Executive
could require the Province to acquire land on behalf
of and at the expense of the Union. This however
did not mean that incidental to the exercise of the
right to legislate in respect of Railways, Ports, Lighthouses, power to affect the right of the citizens and
1962
!tat1 of Wist
Bmtal
v.
U11ion of lrti'UJ
S1'nlta, C. J.
4'.!6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!Jtl4) VOL.
1962
SttJlt of W tn
llaogal
v.
rr,.u., o,.f tnJM
SinM, C. /,
corporations and of Provinces in land was not cxer·
cbable. As already observed even under Constitutions where a larger slice of sovereignty remains
effectively vested in the (component unity) such as
the United States of America power to legislate
vrsted in the Central or national subjects includes
the power to legislate so as to extinguish rights in
State property.
Under the Government of India Act, 1935 the
Central Government could require the Province to
acquire lands on behalf of the Union if >t wa• private
land, and to transfer it to the Union if it was the State
land. The Provincial Government had manifestly
no option to refuse to comply with the direction.
Provision for fixation of compensation did not affect
the nature of the right which the Central Govern·
ment could exercise.
In broad outline the governmental structure
under the Constitution vis·a-vis the Union and the
States is based on the relationship which existed
beiween the Central Government and the Provinces
under the Government of India Act, 1935, and that
in this respect the Constitution has borrowed largely
from the earlier constitutional document. But even
with the Provinces being autonomous within the
spheres allotted to them and there being a clistribu ·
t10n of property and assets between the Central
Government and the Provinces under !'art III of
Ch. VII in almost the same term, as is found in the
corrtsponding Arts. 294 and 298, it was not consi ·
dered an infraction of the autonomy of the Provinces
to vest such a power in the Central Govemmenl fur
s. 127 of the Government of India Act enacted :
"127. The Federation may, if it deems it
necessary to acquire any land situate in a Pro,
vince for. any purpose connected with a matter
with respect to which the 'Federal Legislature
1 S.C.R. SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS
427
has power to make laws, require the Province to
acquire the land on bf half, and at the expense,
of the Federation or, if the land belongs to the
Province, to transfer it to the Federation on
such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of
agreemcrJt, as may be determined by an arbi·
trator appointed by the Chief Justice of India."
and thus property vested in a Province under s. 172
could be required to be transferred to the Central
Government if it was needed for a central purpose,
It would therefore be manifest that the right
of the Centre to require the Province to part with
property for the effeccive perl;mnance of central fur.c·
tions was uot co!11idered as detracting from provincial
autonomy.
What however is of relevance is the presenc.e
of s. 127 in that enactment which empowered the
Central Government to require the Provinces to part
with property owned by them if the ~ame was needed
for the purposes of the Government of India. It was
however suggested that the compulsor\' acquisition of
provincial property hy the Central Government was
there specifically provided for and that the absence of
such a provision made all the difference. But this, in
our opinion, proceeds on merely a superficial view of
the matter. A closer examination of the scheme of
distribution of legislative power in regard to compulsory acquisition of property under the Government
of India Act diicloses that though the power to com·
pulsorily acquire property was exclusively vested in
the Provinces, the Central Government could satisfy
its requirements of ,property for Central purpose by
utilising provincial machinery, and that it was in that
context that a specific provision referring to the
Provinces having at the direction of the Central
Government to transfer provincial property was needed. It i~ therefore difficult to appreciate the ground
•
1962
Slatr rt/ U'1sl
Btrigal
v. '·
Unitm of lndi,1
s;,,;,n, c. J.
428 SUPRE.\'1E C..'OURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1961
..
Statt oj lVtJI
Bengal
,
UnW.. oj Indio
Sinha, C. /.
on which the existence of a provision in the Govern·
mcnt of India Act for assessment of compensation for
land which the Provinces were bound to transfer on
being so required by the Central Government and the
deletion of that prO\·ision in enacting the Constitution
may affect the exercise of the power vested in the
Union Parliament.
Re. (4):
The Australian Constitution contains an
express power authorising legislation by the Par·
liament of Australia for acquisition of State property.
But the Constitutions of the United States of America
and Canada contain no such express provision. The
power of the Union Parliament to enact legislation
affecting title of the constituent States to property
vested in them, is on that account not excluded. If
the other provisions of our Constitution in terms of
sufficient amplitude confer power for enacting legislation for acquiring State property, authority to
exercise that power cannot be defeated because the
express power to acquire property generally docs not
specifically and in terms refer to State property.
Re. (·i):
In the Constitution of India as originally
enacted there was an elaborate division of powers
by providing three entries relating to acquisition and
requisition of property. List I entry 33 "Acquisition
or requisitioning property for purposes of the Union".
List II Entry 36 "Acquisition or requisitioning of
property, except for the purpose of the Union, subject
to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III"; List Ill
Entry 42 ''principles on which compensation for
property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of
<he Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the man·
ner in which such compensation is to be given". By
the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 the
,,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
three Entries were repealed, and a single Entry 42 in
the Concurrent Li~t "Acquisition and Requisit10n of
property" was substituted. Power to acquire or
requisition property may since the amendment, be
exercised concurrently by the Union and the States.
But on that account conflicting exercise of the power
cannot be envisaged. Article 31 (2) which deals
with acquisition of all propert~•requires two conditions to be, fulfilled (l) acquisition or requisitioning
must be for a public purpose (2) the law under which
the property is acquired or requisitioned must provide
for payme1,1t of compensation either fixed thereby,
or on principles specified thereby. By cL (3) of Art.
31 no such law as is referred to in cl. (2) made by
the Legislature of a State shall have efficacy unless
such law has been reserved for the consideration of
the President and has received his assent. As the
President exercises his authority with the ad vice of
the Union Ministry, conflict by the effective exercise
of power of acquisition in respect of the same subjectmatter simultaneously by the Union, and the State,
or by the State following upon legislation by the
Uninn cannot in practice be envisaged even as a
possibility. Article 25.4 also negatives the possibility
of such conf1icting legislation. By cl. (1) of that
Article if a law made by the U:gislature of a State is
repugnant to any provision of a law competently
made by Parliamer.:. the State law is, subject tu
cl. (2), void, Clause 12) recognises limited validity of
a State law on matters in the Concurrent List if that
law is repugnant to an existing or earlier law made
by Parliament, only if such law has been reserved for
the consideration of the President, and has received
his assent. By the proviso authority is reserved to
the Parliament to repeal a law having even this limited validity. Assent of the President to State legislation intended to nullify a law enacted by P~rlia
ment for acquisition of State property for the purposes
of the Union lie5 outside the realm of practical
possibility.
1962
Stale of Jt',st
Bengal
v.
{ 'nion of India
Sinha, c·. J,
;
.
; '
,-
-
430
l
.')
19~~
_Bengal ,.
v.
!Inion of India
·---
. 3inha. c. J.
'
The submission_ that Art. 31 has no . applic~
tion to the acquisition or requisition of property
of a State is, based on no s'.Jlid foundation. This
argument was based on three' grounds:-·
r • ·•·
'
·.
.
{a)· Fundamental rights are declared in favour.·
, of j1f citizens and .others against.legislative or
. executive. action of the Government' and
the: Parliament of: ludia and the Govern-·
ment and the legislatures of the States· and
.'
all local or other authorities within the terri'iory of. India, or under· the 'control of the,
Government of· India arid not in-favour of
, the States against Union- action;' ·..
{b) Article 31 gives· protection to the rights of
· _persons,· and a State is not a person within
. .
the meaning o.f that ·Article. _. . .
'
{c) Entry 42 in the Concurrent· Lisi is by virtue
•
of Art. 13 and 245 subject. to Art. 31.
. Therefore private property .. ·may be
acquired consis.tently with the prohibitions
. ,in the. COnstitution, but State.· property
may. be acquired without a public purpose
_ : : and without paymen't of compensation. ·
" -'
..
SUPRE~IE' COURT:
REPORTS
Ll9G4J
VOL. . . - .
'
-. .
'
Re. (6):
·State of W1Jt
i ·
~I .
•
..
!t is difficult to agree with the vie~ that under the.
-·scheme 9f the Constitution fundamental rights may
be claimed by' individuals .,or' corporations only and
' ' ... · ·
·
.
·
never by the. State: ·
I'
!
By Art. 13 {I) all laws in force 'before the
C<institution : to the extent . of inconsistency "with
. , Ch. -III are declared void : and by cl. (2) the State ·
_'_)s prohibited from .making · any law which t:i.kes·
'away or abridges fundamental rights, and the laws
. · _-, · made in contravention of the __ prohibition are void.
'
..
.'
. I ,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
431
The fundamental rights are primarily for the protection of rights of indi v.iduals and corporations enforceable against executive or legislative action of a
Governmental agency, but it has to be remembered
that all laws pre-existing which are inconsistent with
and post constitutional laws which conuavcne the
prohibitions are to the extent of the inconsistency
or contravention void. Some of these rights are
declared in form positive but subjeci to the restrictions authorising the State to make laws derogating
from the fullness of the protection e. g. 15 (4),
16 (:i), 16 (4), 16 (5), ...... 19 (2), (3), (4), (ii), (G),
22 (3), 22 (6), 2:3 (2), 25 (2), 28 (2) & (3) : thero:
are certain articles which merely declared rights·e. g.
17, 25 (l), · 26, 29 (I) and 30, (l): and there are
others merely prohibitory without reference to the
right of any person. body or agency to enforce them
e.g. 18 (l), :!3 (l), 24 and 28 (!).
Prima j1Jcie, these declarations involve an
obligation imposed not merely upon the "State", but
upon all persons to respect the rights so declared, anJ
the rights are enforceable unless the context indicates
otherwise agaimt every person or agency seeking lu
infringe them. The rights declared in the form of
prohibition must have a concomittant positive
content; without rnch positive c@nlent they could be
worthless. Relief mav be claimed from the High
Court or from this Court, against infringement of
the prohibition, by any agency, unless the protection
is expressly restricted to State action.
There are still other Articles in the fonn not
of rights but fundamental disabilities e. g. 18 (2),
18 (3), 18 (4). Again there are certain Articles e.g.
19 (g). Part JI, 24 (2) which appear to recognise
affirmative rights of the States. Article 31 is cou·
ched in negative form, but recognises the existence
of at least one important power vested in enrv
sovereign State, not by virtue of its Constitution, but
State of f-Vor
En.gal
Y.
Union of India
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1046] VOL.
1961
Stolt of WrH
8tntd
..
l "t.ion of India
springing from its very existence as a State viz, the
power to acquire property for public purposes on
payment of compensation \\"hich the American
Jurists call 'eminent domain'. Article 31 (2) enun·
ciatcs the restriction subject to which this power of
eminent domain is to be exercised. For the purposes
of the present case it is unnecessary to consider
whether Art. 3 l ( l) recognises the existence of the
police power. Before Art. 31 was amended by the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment Act, l!liiii), there
was conflict of opinion in this Court as tu the inter·
relation of cl. (I) and (2). Some Judges held that
cl. ( 1) & (2) dealt with subject of eminent domain :
other Judges were of the opinion thar Art. 31 (I)
dealt with the police power and Art. 31 (2) with
eminent dcimain ; some .Judges did not express any
definite view. After the amendment by the Consti·
tution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, cl. (l), (2)
and (:?A) of :\rt. 31 rea<l as follows : ( l) No per.;on shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.
(:?) ~o property shall be compulsorily acquired
or requisitioned save for a public purpose
and save by authority of a law which
provides for compensation for the pro·
perty so acquired or requisitioned and
either lixes the amount of the compensa·
tion or specifies the principles on which,
and the manner in which the compensation
is to he determined and given; and no such
law shall be Cd!lcd in question in any
Court on the ground that the compensal ion provided by that law is not adequate.
( ~ .·\) Where a law does not provide for the
transfer of the ownership or right to
possession of any property to the State
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
433
or to a corporation owned or controlled by
the State, it shall not be deemed to provide
for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that
it deprived any person of his property".
1962
State of West
Bengal
v.
Union of India
Sinha, C. J,
In J\avr~lappam K ottarathi/ K ochuni v. Slate
of ,Alladras (1), it was held that els. (I) and (2) of
Art. 31 as amended grant a limited protection against
the exercise of different powers. By cl.(:!) of Art. 31
property is protected against compulsory acquisition
or requisition. The clause grants protcclion in terms
of widest amplitude against compulsory acquisition or
requisition of property, and there is nothing in the
Article which indicates that the proper!)' protected
is to be of individuals or corporations. Even the
expression 'person' which is used in cl. ( l) is not
used in els. (2) and (2A), and the context does not
warrant the interpretation that the protection is not
to be available against acquisition of State property.
Any other construction would mean that properties
of municipalities or other local authorities-which
would admittedly fall within the definition of State
in Part III either cannot be acquired at all or if
acquired may be taken without payment of compen·
sation. Entry 42 in List III and cl. (:.') of Art. 31,
operate in the same field of legislation : the former
enunciates the content of legislative power, and the
latter restraints upon the exercise of that power. For
ascertaining whether an impugned piece of legislation in relation to acquisition or requisition of pro·
perty is within legislative competence, the two
provisions must be read together. The two provisions
bcin~ parts of a single legislative pattern relating to
the exercise of the right which may for the sake of
convenience be called of eminent domain the expression 'property' in the two prov.isions must have the
same import in defining the extent of the power and
delineating restraints thereon. In other words
Art. 31\2) imposes restrictions on the exercise of
(I) [1960] S S.O.R. 887.
-,---,---,..,..-------------------.
--- - -------~-:,
,
.
.
-
-
, (
.,
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. 1962
Sltt1 ef W1JI
-. Btttgal
••
. Union a/ I11dia
Sin.ha, C. 1-
legislative power under E~try 42 of List UL Property
vested in the State may not therefore j:ie acquired
under a statute enacted in exercise of legidativepower under Entry. 42 -unless the Statute complies
with the requirement of the relevant· clauses of
Art. 31.
--- Ite. (7):
. In Director of Ratirming -and Distributirm v.
The Corporatirm of Calcutta ('), it was held by this
Court by a majority :
· ·
·
'
'
"The law applicable
_to ~ndia _before the
Constitution was as authoritatively. laid down
by the Privy Council in L. R. 73 I. A. 271. ·
.The Constitution_ has not made any change in
the_ legel positjon.-. On ·the other hand it has
clearly indicated that the laws in force before
January 2G, l !J50, shall continue to have vali"c
dity even _in the new set-up except in so far as·
they were in conflict with the express provisions'
-of the Constitution. The rule of interpretation· .
of statutes that the State is not bound by a;
statute unless it is so provided in express terms
or by necessary implication, is still good law". ·
•,
l. -
It was observed at p. 172 :
- "The immunity of Government from the opera•tion of certain statutes, and particularly statutes
creating . offences, is based -upon the fundamental concept that · the Government or its _
officers cannot be a party to committing ·a
crime-analogous to the 'prerogative of perfec;
tion' that the King can do- no wrong. \\That;
ever may have -been -the historical reason of
the rule, it has -been adopted in our country
on grounds of public policy as a rule of inter;
pretation of statutes. That this rule is not
_(tl [1961J 1s.c.R.158.
.'
·-
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
peculiar or• confined to a monarchical form of
Government."
The Court thereby approved the principle of exemption of the sovereign from the general words of a
Statute enunciated by the Judicial Committee in
Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of
Bombay (1 ), in the following terms :
"The general principle to be applied in con·
sidering whether or not the Crown is bound by
general words in a statute is not in doubt. The
maxim of the law in early times was that no
statute bound the Crown unless the crown was
expressly named therein, "Roy n'est lie par
ascun statute si il ne soit expressement nosme."
But the rule so laid down is subject to at least
one exception. The Crown may be bound, as
has often been said, "by necessary implication".
If, that is to say, it is manifest from the very
terms of the statute, that it was the intention of
the Legislature that the Crown should be bound,
then the result is the same as if the Crown had
been expressly named. It must then be inferred
that the Crown, by assenting to the law, agreed
to be bound by its provisions,''
But the rule that the State is not bound, unless
it is expressly named or by necessary implication in
the statute is one of interpretation. In considering
the true meaning of words or expression used by the
Legislature the Court must have regard to the aim,
object and scope of the statute to be read in its
entirety. The Court must ascertain the intention
of the Legislature by directing its attention not
merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire
Statute; it must compare the .clause with the other
parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause
to be interpreted occurs. Again in interpreting a
Constitutional' document provisions conferring legislative power must normally be interpreted liberally
(I) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A, 271, 27•.
IHI
S111te ~West
Btngal
.
UnUm of India
Si.i..,c. J.
43G SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!!JG!] VOL.
1962
Stat1 of WtJt
Rtngnl
v.
(],,ion of Itilia
SW... C.J.
and in their widest amplitude. Vide-Nnvinclwndru
Maf1itlnl v. 'l'hc Commissioner of /ncom.e-ta:r,
Bombay City('), E1.try .1:! in List III does not, pri111''
Jaci:e, contain any indication that the expression
"Property" therein is to be understood in any restricted
sense : nor do the other pruvisions of the Constitution
for reasons already stated suggest a restricted mraning.
The ground of absolute sovereignty <;>f the States
which may not be interfered with by taking property
vested in the States IJy Parliamentary legislation has
no legal basis. Again denial of power to the Union
Parliament to legislate on allotted topics of lcgis·
Lttion, in a manner ;tffccting the propcrt y vested in a
State, may render l'arliamcntary lcgislati1•n virt.ually
incfTcctivc.
No provision in the Constitution
sui;ge>ting a restricted meaning of the word 'property'
in the context of legislative power has been brought
to our notice.
Regard hcing had to the extensive
powers which the. Union Parliament and Executive
have for using State property, in the lan::rr pub1ic
interest, the restriet1011 suggested that the power docs
not extend to the acquisition of property of tlte States
docs not seem to be c.ontemplatecl. By making the
rcqui>ite declarations under Entries 51 of List I, the
Union Parliament assumed power to regulate mine>
and minerals and thereby to cleny to nil agencies not
under the control of the Union, authority to work the
mines. It could scarcely be imagined that the Constitution makers while intending to confer an exclusive
power to work mines ancl minerals under the control
of the Union, still prevented effective exercise of that
power by making it impossible compulsorily to
acquire the land vested in the States containing
minerals. The effective exercise of the power would
depend-if such an argument is accepted-not upon
the exercise of the power to undertake regulation and
control by issuing a notification under Entry f>I, but
uµJn the will of the State in the territory of which
mineral bearing land is situate. Power to lcgi>late
for reguTation and development of mines and minerals
(<) [1955] I S.C.R. 829.
1 S.C.R .• SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
under the control of the Union, would by necessary
implication include the power to acquire mines and
minerals. Pcwcr to legislate for acquisition of
property vested in the States cannut therefore ·be
denied to the Parliament if it be exercised consistently with the protection afforded by Art. 31.
The followiug findings will accordingly be
recorded on the issues:
Issue l
in the affirmative.
2
not such as to disentitle the
Union Parliament to exercise
its legislative power under
Entry 42 List III.
3
ans11·1·r coycred by answer on
issue 2-
4
in tl1c HC}~ativc.
5
in the negati1r:
Finding on additional
·· issue
in the affirmative.
The snit will therefore stand dismissed with
costs.
SuBBA R.rn, J.-·-1 regret my inability to agree.
The summary of the pleadings and the issues raised
thereon arc set out in the juclgmcut of the learned
Chief Justice and I need not restate them.
Learned Advocate.General of \-Vest Bengal
contended that the State of West Bengal and the
Union of India are sovereign authorities in their
respective spheres allotted to them by the Constitution, and therefore it would be inconceivable that
one sovereign authority could acquire the property o(
t)le other : they could do so only by mutual agreemc·nt.
1962
St,1le flj. IYtst
B1ng'll
••
lf11icn of India
Sfo.i'l, C. J.
438
1961
Sllltt •I Wut
Btntel
uw. •••f luia
E11bba Rao, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 964) VOL.
That apart, the argument proceeded, on a true
construction of the relevant entry, i. e., entry 42
of List II I, in the context of the scheme of the
Constitution and particularly of Art. 31 thereof, it
would be clear that the said entry could not be
invoked by the Cnion to acquire the land of the
State. Learned counsel appearing for the States of
~fadhya Pradesh, Orissa, Assam and Madras supported the Advocate-General of West Bengal. The
Advocate-General of Punjab, while supporting the
argument of the Advocate-General of West Bengal,
also raised an alternative contention, namely, that
if the acquisition of State property was necessarily
incidental to the effective exerci.~c of any of the
powers conferred on Parliament under Lists I and III
of the Seventh Schedule to the Conslitulion, it could
make a law. for acquiring such property, provided it
did not interfere with the exercise of the governmental functions of the State; and that the power to
acquire land of the Stat.c was not necessarily inci·
dental to the regulation of mines. Learned Govern·
ment pleader for the State of flihar supported the
Union of India in its contention that Parliament
can make a law providing for the acquisition of State
property by virtue of entry 42 of List III.
Learned Attorney-General, appearing for the
Union of India, argued that entry 42 of List III, on
its natural and grammatical construction, sustains
the impugned law; he would also seek to support it
on the basis of entries 52 and iH of I .ist I and entry
3:l of List Ill. In any event, he contended, the
impugned law could be made by Parliament by
virtue of Art. 148 of the Constitution and entry 97
of List I. He also questioned the correctness of the
proposition that the Cnion and the States arc
sovereign authorities in their respective fields and
advanced the theorv that under our Constitution the
States are subordinate to the Union.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
Before I attempt to construe the relevant provisions of the Constitution, it would be convenient to
have a conspectus of the Constitution as far as it is
material to the present enquiry, as the arguments,
to some extent, are linked with the scope and nature
of the powers of the Union and the States thereunder.
The Constitution purports to have been enacted by
the people of India who. have solemnly resolved to
constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic.
India is described as a Union of States. The preamble to the Constitution indicates that the political
sovereignty of the country rests in the people of India
and the legal sovereignty is divided between the
constitutional entities of the Republic of India,
namely, the Union and the different States. Part V
of the Constitution deals with the Union and the
instrumentalities through which it is authorized to
function, namely, the lc_:;!sLture, the executive and
the judiciary. Part VI provides for the States and
the organs through which they can function, namely,
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.
Part XI lays down the relation between the Union
and the States : it distributes the. legislative powers
and regulates the administrative relationship between
them; it devises various methods to resolve conflicts
that may arise in the exercise of their powers. Article
2-16 demarcates the legislative fields with precision
and emphasizes the exclusive power of the Union and
the States to make laws in respect of the matters
enumerated in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule :rnd
allotted to the Union or the States, as the case may be.
Even in regard to the executive power, Arts. 73
and 162 mark out the respective fields of the Union
and the States. ·Chapter II of Part XI provides for
the control of the Union over the States in certain
specified cases. Part XII deals with finance, property, contracts, rights, liabilities, obligations and
suits; it distributes the reve11ues between the Union
and the States, provides for the allocation between
them of certain taxes collected by the Union, creates
1962
Stat1 of U.-'vt
Bengal
••
Clnioa tif lndi•
Subba Rao, J.
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
Stott uf JVtst
BtnKal
v.
l:"nion of India
Subba Roo, J.
separate consolidated funds described as the consoli·
dated fund of India and the consolidated fund of the
State, aod euacts certain exemptions, among others,
of State properties from Union taxation and Union
properties from State taxation and authorizes the
Union as well as the States to borrow money on the
security of their respective properties subject to cer·
tain limitations. Chapter III of part XII deals with
acquisition of property, assets, rights, liabilities and
obligations in certain cases; under Art. 294,
"A:o from the commencement of this Consti·
tution(a) all property and assets which immediately
before such commencement were vested in
His Majesty for the purposes of the Government of the Dominion of India and all
property and assets which immediately
before such commencement were vested in
His Majesty for the purposes of the Government of each Governor's Province shall
vest respectively in the Union and the corresponding State, and
(b) all rights, liabilities and obligations of the
Government of the Dominion of India and
of the Government of each Governor's
Province, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise, shall be rights, liabilities
and oblig'ations respectively of the Government of India and the Government of each
corrcspon d mg.srate, ........................... ".
o
Under Art. 29fi, any property accruing by way of
escheat or lapse, or as bona ~·aC/.lntia, if it is property
situate in a State, shall vest in the State and in any
other case it sha II \'est in the lJ nion. Article 29i
vests all lands, minerals and other things of value
underlying the ocean within the territorial waters of
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS 441
India in the Union. Article 298, which was substituted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment)
Act, 1956, extends the executive power of the Union
and of each State to the carrying on of any trade or
business and to the acquisition, holding and di;posal
of property and the making of contracts for any purpose subject to the legislative powers of the Union,
or of the State, as the case may be. Article 300 says
that the Government of India . and the Govern'
ment of a State may sue or be sued by
the name of the Union of India or by the name
of the State, as the case may be, i.e., they:may be
sued as juristic personalities. Chapter I of Part XIV
provides for the mode of re<:ruitment and regulation
of conditions of service of different services in the
Union and the States. Part XV provides for an
independent machinery for elections to the Parliament
and the State Legislatures. Part XVIII deals with
emergency provisions whereunder the President, when
the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war, external aggression or internal
disturbances or when the constitutional machinery of
the States fails or when the financial stability or
credit of India or any part thereof is threatened, may,
by proclamation, declare·an emergency to that effect;
in those events, subject to certain safeguards, the
Centre is aut~orized to take over the administration
of the State in whole or in part for a specified period.
Article :l68 provides for the amendment of the Constitution; and in· regard to certain provisions thereof,
such as the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, the representation of the States in Parliament, the amendment
shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of
not less than one-half of the States by a resolution to
that effect passed by those Legislatures.
Under the scheme of our Constitution, sovereil\n powers are distributed between the Union and
the States within the spheres allotted to them. The
lJ nion exercises the sovereign powers within its sphere
1962
Stale of Wist
Bengal
v.
Union of India
Subb1 R~oJ J.
442
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
,
:__ _ _ _-7--- ...- - ·
· throughout the territories cifindia, and the States exercise their sovereign powers within their respective
·
Bengal
territories in . respect of their allotted . fields. The
v.
Legislatures of the' States as well as the Parliament
Unior1 of India
arc elected on adult franchise. The legislative field
Sub ha Raa, J.
of the Union is much wider than that of the States;
· and in case of conflict in the common field allotted to
. them, the Union law generally prevails over the State
law. In, regard to Bills passed by a Legislature of a
State; the· Governor may, and in the case of bills
derogating from the powers of the High Court shall,
reserve them for the consideration of the President:
though this is in theory a limitation on the legislative
•
. ·power of the State, in practice the Governor only acts
1
on the .advice of the ministry which has the confidence
. of the. Legislature. · Except in the case of· a.·bill
·. ·· derogating.from the powers of the High Court when
.the .Governor is . bound t!J refer it to the President, in
other .cases it is not likely that the Governor would
\
refer a bill to the President contrary to the advice . of ~
the ministry. · In a few cases of legislation where
inter-State element or conflict of laws are involved,
sanction of the. President, is ·made a condition precedent for their validity: see Arts. 200, 254, 304 etc.
:·stqt1 of West
''
'I
'i
'
'
\_ ',
'' .
~·
C~ming to the executive field, both the Uni~n
and. the State cxecutivts arc manned by ministers
responsible to. their respective Legislatures elected on
adult franchise. The executive powers of the Union
as wel! as of the States extend to matters in respect of
which they have. power to make laws, though the
executive of the Union can give directions to a State
. to ensure compliance· with the laws made by Parlia- ·
ment and any existing law which applies in that
State. The State. is also enjoined to exercis·e its
powers in such a \vay as not to impede or restrict the
• exercise ofthe power of the Union executive; and the
··~-- executive oC the U.nion is empowered to give
directions to the State · as may be necessary. for that'
purp0se, S9 Joo, the µnjon executiye ~ap. ~ivr:
•.
•
•
1 S.C.R.
SUFREME COURT REPORTS
443
1962
directions to a State as to the construction and maintenance of means of communications declared to be
Slate of Wtst
Bengal
of national importance. It is also authorised to '
v.
Un.ion of India
confer powers on States in respect of matters to which
the executive power of the Union extends. By and
Subba &a, J.
large, with minor exceptions, the Union as well as
the State executive functions in its exclusive field,
and the Union executive's directives arc intended to
facilitate the carrying out of the Union purposes.
Every State has its judiciary and the highest
court in a State !s the High Court of judicature.
The expenditure of the State judiciary is charged on
the consolidated fund of the State concerned but the
Judges of the High Court are appointed by the
President; and appeals lie to the Supreme Court of
India in certain matters and it has also extraordinary
powers to entertain appeals in other matters or to
issue writs to enforce fundamental rights. But both
the High Courts and the Supreme Court interpret the
State and the Union laws and resolve conflicts, if
any. An integrated system of judiciary has b~en
accepted by the Constitution and the judicial control
operates both ways, though the final word is with the
Supreme Court. That cannot by itself affect the
federal principle, as even in Australia an appeal lies
to the Privy Council, under certain circumstances,
from the decisions of the High Court of the Commonwealth of Australia.
In financial matters, though the States and the
Union have consolidated funds of their o\vn, the
sources allotted to the States are comparatively
meagre and those allotted to the· Union appear to be
perennial; the States also depend upon the Union
for allocation of funds from and out of the taxes
collected by it :md also for grants; though there is no
direct control bv the Union over the field of finance
of the States, tl{ere will always be indirect pressure on
the States in that field. The Union, being in charge
444 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS[l964] VOL.
1962
.
SJatt of U.'tJI
Btngal
l/,aio11 of ludia
.('ubba Rao, /,
of the purse strings, can always, to use an euphemistic
term, pursuade the States to take its advice. In case
of emergencies, such as, war, external aggression,
in:crnal disturbances, failure of the constitutional
machinery and financial instability, extraordinary
powers are conferred on the Union, subject to cercain
limitations, to interfere with the States' administration;
but the provisions relating to emergency situations
arc really in the nature of safety valves to protect the
country's future. Parliament has also the power to
change the boundaries of the territories or form new
territories, but that is also an extraordinary provision
to meet certain emergencies.
There is also another side of the picture.
Parliament shall consist of the President and two
IIQuses respectively kn<'wn as the Council of States
and the House of the People; the Council of States
sl•all consist, apart from the 12 nominated members,
not more than :!:ls representatives of the States and
the Union territories. /\ part of the Parliament is,
therefore, comprised of the representatives of the
State Legislatures. Though the powers of the Council
of States arc not co-equal with those of the House of
the People, to the extent it exercises its legislative
powers the States als'l h~vc control over the Cnion.
The States are also cntitk<l to be consulted in the
matter of th<: amendment of certain provisions of the
Constitution : vidc Art. 36~.
The foregoing resume of the provisions of the
Constitution reveals the following picture : The
political sov~rcigi:t '.s the p~ople of India a1J.d ~he _legal
sovereignty 1s d1v1dcd between the conslltutional
entities i. e., the Union and the States, who are
juristic pcrsonaltid l?°ssessing P;<;>periics and functioning through the rnstrumentahucs created by the
Constitution. Though the jurisdiction of the Union
is confined to some subjects, it extends throughout
Jndia, whereas that of the States is confined to their
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41:3
territorial limits.
Within their re1pective spheres
both in the legislativ~ and exewtive field; they arc
supreme; their. inter se relationship is regulated by
specific provisions. The relation between the Union
and the States cannot be found im the legislative
fiel<ls demarcated by the Lists, but can only be discovered in the specific constitutional provisions
forging links between them. The!~mergency powers
of the Union to meet extraordinary situations do not
affect its exclusive fields of operation in normal times.
On the basis of a comparison of the Indian
Constitution with that of America, it is argued that
none of the important criteria of a federation is
present in the Indian Constitution. "Federalism in
the United States embraces the following elements :
( l) as in all federatiom, the union of several autonomous political entities, or "States", for common
purposes; (2) the division of legislative powers
between a "National Government'', on the one hand
and constituent "States", on the other, which division
is governed by the rule that the formrr is "a government of enumerated powers" while the latter arc
governments of "residual powers"; (3) the direct
operation, for the most part, of each of Ihese centers
of Government, within its assigned sphere, upon
all persons and property within its territorial limits;
( 4) the pro.vision of each center with the complete
apparatus of law enforcement, both executive and
judicial; (5) the supremacy of the "National Government" within its assigned sphere over any conflicting
asserti.on of "state" power; (6) dual citizenship."
The aforesaid elements are no doubt present in the
American Constitution, but it is not possible to
contend that unless all the said criteria exist a
constitution cannot be described as a federal one.
Though on paper the American Constitution is a
typical federation, in practice the· Supreme Court of
the United States of America by evolving and developing many legal doctrines and implied powers has
1962
State of H"es f
Bengal
v.
Unio11 of India
S 1bho Rao, J.
, .
·
\~.-'/'-; .... :-- ~
446
\
'·, . 1952
:·-
.!tcte of JY1jl
;
•
81ngal
v.
{Jniot1 of India
Suhba Rao, J.
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1964]°VOL.
. invested the Federal Govemmen~·with"!arge powers to:
enable it to interfere · indirectly in the States field,·
Even . in regard· to judicial power, . though the
. American Supreme Court was originally conceived
· to be a Federal Court concerning itself with federal
laws, in fact it authoritatively interprets· the State
. laws when they come. into conflict with federal laws.
The point is that even in America· ·there is no federation in the orthodox sense of . the term.
·
·
I
•
.' .
!
- .
-- .
-
,
.
So too;· the Constitution of Australia clearly
demarcates the exclusive fields of the Commonwealth
·and the States and jealously. guards the State rights,·.
but in practice the States have been reduced to the ·
position of agencies of the Commonwealth Govern-.
ment. . This was brought about beca'use of the
financial grip the Centre has over the State : see .
· \Vheare on "Federal Government."
•
But in Canada · the position is the reverse.
Though the Centre and the Provinces have their
distinctive Lists of powers, the Central Government
has certain limited powers of control over the
governments of the ten Provinces of Canada; the
residuary powers are given to the Centre and not to
the States~ Though undoubtedly some elements of
unitary form of government are present,' the constitutional ct.istom evolved practically a· federal State·
and, as one author puts ·it, "no dominion govern-·
ment which attempts to stress the unitary elements in
the · Constitution . at. the expense of the .federal
elements would survive." It is, therefore, clear that
in ·every federal Constitution there are either textu- ·
ally or customarily some unitary elements. The real test to ascertain whether a particular Constitu- ·
tion has accepted the federal principle or; not ·is
whether the said · Constitution · provides» for the
division of powers in such a way that the general :tnd
regional governments are each within its sphere substantially independent of the other•.• The. reservation
?
' ; · ·.. ·.,..---
-~
,
•''
, '
1 S.C.R.
. ·- '\' ·.\
SUPREME COURT,REPORTS
'
447
'
',of the residue of power or the power to interfere with-- - 1961
· States',affairs in emergencies in the Union may affect
s if 1.. 1 ·
··f
·
r
d
·
b
d
·
·
"''
• "'
b
, t h e a Iance o power m a e erat10n, ut oes not·
·Bengal
destroy its . character•. ·Some Constitutions show a
v.
:·marked bias towards the ·Federation and the others
Clftion •f lnaia
towards the States, but notwithstanding the varying
Subba Rao; J.
emphasis they accept the federal principle as their
basis. Though some authors, accepting the American
Constitution as the yardstick for a federation, prefer
to describe Constitutions with a bias towards Union
as quasi-fed~rations,· I do not think it is inappropriate
to describe all Constitutions which substantially
accept the federal principle as Federations. ·Apply- ·
ing this test,• I have · no doubt that the Indian
. Constitution is a federation, as the units in normal
· times exercise exclusive sovereign powers within the
·fields allotted fo them. .
··
·
A further distinction is sought to be made between the American Constitution and the Indian Constitution on the basis of the historical evolution of the
two countries. \Vhile in America, the argument proceeds, the pre-existing sovereign States ·were brought
·together under ·a federation, in· India the Constitution conferred certain 'powers on the existing administrative units or such units newly constituted. The
status of a political entity under a particular constitu-·
tion does not depend upon its history but upon the provisions of the constitution. ·.The pre-existing independent States may not be given any appreciable power
under a constitution, while newly formed States may
enjoy larger. power under another ·constitution. A
federal structure· is mainly conceived to harmonize··
exhting conflicting interests and to provide against
future conflicts. India is a vast country: indeed, it
is described as a sub-continent. Historically, before
the advent of the Constitution, there were different
Provinces enjoying in practice a fair amount of autonomy and· there were innumerable States with vary-.
ing forms . of government
- ranging from pure autocracy.
.
-
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL
1962
Stait nf ll'tsl
Btr:;1l
v.
l.lnio11 of India
to guided democracy. There were also differences in language, race, religion etc. There were
also foreign pockets expected sooner or later to be
incorporated with the main 'country. In those circumstances our Constitution ;1dopted a federal structure with a strong bias towards the Centre. under
such a structure, while the Centre remains strong .to
prevent the development of fissiparous tendencies,
the States arc made practically autonomous in ordinary times within the spheres allotted to them.
With this backgruund I shall no~ proceed to
learned counsel.
I shall first take up the argument based upon entry
.J:,! of List Ill. i.e., acquisition and requisitioning of
property. The provisions relevant to the said question arc as follows:
cun~ider the aq~uments advanced by
Article :!Iii: (I) Subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, Parliarncnt ma,· make laws for the
whole or any part of the territory of India, and
the Legi,lature of a State may make laws for
the whole or any part of the State.
(2) No law made by Parliament shall he
deemed to be invalid on the ground that it
would have extra-territorial operation.
Article 21G: (I) Notwithstanding a11ythi11g in
clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive
power to make l:iws with respect to any of the
matrcrs enumerated in List I in the Seventh
Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the
"Union List").
(:!) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3),
Parliament and, subject to clause(!), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make
laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List Ill in the Seventh ScJ1cdule (in
1 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
449
this Constitution referred to as the "Concurrent
List").
1962
St1te of We.it
Bengal
(:1) Subject to clauses (1) and
(~),
the
Legislature of a State has exclusive power to
make laws for such State or any part thereof
with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the "State List"\.
The entries relevant to acquisition, as they stood before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, l\156,
read as follows:
Entry 33 of List I. Acquisition or requmtioning of property for the purpose of the Union.
Entry 36 of List 11. Acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of the
Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of
List III.
Hntry 12 of List Ill. Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned
for the purposes of the Union or of a State or
for any other public purpose is to be determined,
and the form and the manner in which such
compensation is to be given.
After the said amendment, entry 33 of List I and
entry 36 of List II were omitted; and entry 42 of
List III, as substituted by the Seventh Amendment
reads:
"Acquisition and reqms1t1oning of property".
Article 31. (1) No person shall be deprived of
his.property save by authority of law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose
and save by authority of a law which provides
v.
L'nion of India
S11b/,.a Ha1J, J.
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G4] VOL.
1952
Slalt of JV1st
B"'lal
v.
Un;.. of JnditJ
Subba Rao, J.
for compensation for the property so acquired
or requisitioned and either iixcs the amount of
the compensation or specifirs the principles on
which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no
such law shall be called in question in any
court on the ground that the compensation
provided by that is not adequate.
(2A) Where a law docs not provide for the
transfer of the ownership or right to possession
of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled bv the State, it shall
not be deemed to provide' for the compulsory
acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that 1t deprives any person of his
property.
(;J) \u such law as is rcfc11cd tu in clause
( ~) made by the Legislature of a State shall
have t:ffect unless such law, ha1 ing been reser1rd for the consideration of the Prcsidcllt, has
rc~eivcd his assent.
I have already held that the sovereign powers have
been distributed betweeu the constitutional entities,
namely, the Union and the States; one such sovereign
power is the power to acquire or requisition the property of a citizen for a public purpose. The doctrine
of "Eminent Domain" is defined by Willis as "the
legal capacity of sovereign, or one of its governmental
agents to take private property for a public use upon
the payment of just compensation". l\icholas in his
book on Eminent Domain, Vol. I, describes it as a
power of the sovereign to take a property for public
use without the owner's consent. In Chimnjit Lal
Ghou.Ylhri v. 'l'hc Union of hitlia ('), Mukherjca, .J.,
as he then was, accrptcd this definition when he said:
"It is a right inherent in every sovereign to take
and appropriate private
(t) [1~50] S.C.R. 869, 901·902.
property
belonging
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
451
to individual citizens for public use. This
right, which is described as eminmt domain in
American law, is like the power of taxation, an
offspring of political necessity, and it is supposed
to be based upon an implied reservation by
Government that private property acquired by
its citizens under its protection. may be taken
or its use controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner."
It is, therefore, clear that the power to acquire the
property of a citizen for a public purpose is one of
the implied powers of the sovereign. In our Constitution, before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, this power was divided and distributed between the Union and the States; the Union,
by virtue of entry :l3 of List I could acquire a property for Union purposes, and by virtue of entry :J(j
of List II a State could acquire a property for State
purposes: the result was that a State could not acquire
a property of a citihen for a Union purpose, and the
Union could not acquire a property of a citizen for
a ·State purpose. To avoid this difficulty entry
33 of List I and entry 36 of List II were omitted and
the present entry 42 of List III has been substituted
for the earlier entry 42 in the said List. Now
both Parliament and the Legislature of a State
can make a law providing for the acquisition and
requisitioning of property for Union or State purposes. But the crucial point that is implicit in the
power of acquisition by a sovereign is that it must
relate only to the property of the governed, for a
sovereign cannot obviously acquire its own property.
This sovereign power of Eminent Domain under our
Constitution is conferred on, or divided between, the
Union and the States. Prima Jacie, therefore, entry
42 of List III can only mean acquisition and requisitioning of private property by a State. It is also
implicit in the concept of acquisition or requisition·
ing that the acquisition or requisitioning shall be for
1962
Sla!t rrf li'es!
Bentnl
v.
L·11io11 rj India
.~1 bb · Raa,
J
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!!64] VOL.
/H'I
Slfd• •f lfot
B1ngal
v.
UlliMI 11f lnii~
Stai• R.,, J.
a public purpose on payment of just compensation.
The said concept has acquired a well defined conno·
tation not only in the foreign countries from which
it is borrowed, but also in the legislative history of
our country. That is why our Constitution laid
down in express terms that any law made shall not
violate the fundamental rights. One of the fundamental rights is that enshrined in Art. 31 (:!) and
it says that no property shall be complllsurily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and
save by authority of law, which provides for compensation fur the property so acquired or requisitioned.
The scope of entry 42 of List J II would be apparent
if it is read along with the said article. Unless it is
held that Art. :!I(:!) applies also to a law of acquisition of a State property by the Union, the result will
be that Parliament can make a law providing for the
acquisition of a property bf a State fur a purpose
which is not a pttbli1; purpose and witl1out payment
of compensation, while it cannot do so in the case of
acquisition l.f" privcitc property. If Art. 31, docs
not govern the L11v of acquisition of a State property,
it indicates that .entry -I'.! of List Ill docs not deal
with acquisition of a State property, for otherwise it
would lead to the anomaly of acquisition of a State
property by a law of Parliament without safeguards
inherent in the doctrine of Eminent Domain. That
is why the learned Attorney-General made an
attempt to persuade us to hold that Art. 31 (2) applies
also to a law providing for the acquisition of a State
property. He contended that after the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Art. 31(1) is separat·
ed from Art. 31(2) and that the phraseology of
Art. 31(2), if independently construed, is wide enough
to take in acquisition of a State property. And for
this position he relied upon the judgment. of this
Court in Kavalappam Kottarathil Kochuni v. The
Sf,a~ of lr/1Adras ('). There, this Court held that
after the Constitution (Fourth Amendmeut) Act,
1955, els. (1), (2) and (2A) of Art. 31 dealt with
(ncJ9601 3 s.c.R. 887.
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
different subjects-els. (2) and (2A) dealing with
acquisition and requisitioning, and cl. (1) with
deprivation of property with authority of law. That
decision has no bearing on the construction of cl. (2)
of the said Article vis-a-vis the question of acquisition of a State property. The fact that this Court
held that the two clauses of the Article deal with two
different subjects does not mean that cl. (1) has no
bearing on the interpretation of cl. (2) of the same
Article. Clause (2) of Art. :n reads :
"No property shall be compulsorily acquired
or requisitioned save for a public purpose and
save by authority of a law which provides for
compensation for the property so acquired or
requisitioned and either fixes the amount of
the compensation or specifies the 'principles on
which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such
law shall be called in question in any court on
the ground that the compensation provided by
that law is not adequate."
Clause (2A) thereof reads :
"Where a law does not provide for the transfer
of the ownership or right to possession of any
property to the State or to a corporation owned
or controlled by the State, it shall not be
deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwith-standing that it deprives any person of his
property."
It is true that cl. (1) opens out with the words "no
person" whereas cl. (2) does not repeat that expression; but in the context, I find it difficult to hold
that cl. (1) deals with property of a person aud
cl. (2) deals with property of persons and St.ites.
Article 31 deals with a fundamental right in regard
1962
Stille of West
Btngal
v.
Union of india
Subba _Ra~, J.
'
. \
. _,
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
---~~-------
'·.
1952
.
._.-.
--
to property-cl. (I) -with deprivation .of property,
State of ives:
and
cl. (2) with acquisition of ·property.
·
Bengal
As
cl.
(1)
makes it clear that property shall be of a
v.
linion oj India
person, it is not necessary to mention over again that
the property acquired should be of a person. The
Sulba Rao, J, ·
idea of compulsory acquisition and requisitioning in
cl. (2) indicates that the acquisition or requisitioning
is by a State of a person's property. That is made
clear by cl. (2A) which says that the law of acquisition shall provide for the transfer of ownership or right
to possession ·of any property to the State· or to a
corporation owned or controlled by the State. The
transfer of property is to the State and a fortiori
the transferor must be one· other than the State. In
the context it can only mean the person mentioned .
in cl. (1). The use of the definite article in the
expression "the State" is a further indication that
· transfer inter se between State and State or Union
and State is not contemplated by that clause. If
that was the intention it - would have provided ex· ·
pressly for a transfer between a State and a State.
Even so, the learned Attorney-General contends that
State is also a person. "Person" has not been defined in the Constitution; but a perusal of the various
provisions of Part III clearly shows that the expression "person" is used in - contradistinction to "State."
. Indeed, most of the f1;1ndamental rights are conferred
.on a person or a citizen against infringement· of his
rights by a State. The expression "person" in Arts.
14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25 and 27 does not and cannot
include a "State". Indeed, there is no other article
in this part wherein the expression "person" is used
in the sense of "State". Prima facie, therefore, the
- expression "person" in Art. 31 will not include
. "State". There is nothing in the said Article which
compels me to give a strained meaning particularly
when the Article ·is consistent with the recognized .
_concept of Eminent Domain and fits in squarely with
the scheme offundarriental rights. But it is said that-·
if a State cannot be a "person", a corporation or a
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
455
company will have to be excluded from its scope.
There is no definition of the expression "person" in
the Constitution; but it is defined in th~ General
Clauses ,\ct, 18!l7, as including any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated
or not. Though this definition is an enlargement of
the natural meaning of the expression "person'', even
the extended meaning does not include the State.
Anyhow the question whether the said eJtpression
takes in a corporation or not, does not call for a
decision in this case. In this context two decisions
of this Court may usefully be referred to. In Director
of /11itioni11y rmrl Distrilmtio1i v. The r!orpomtion of
Calru./ta ('),it was held that "the rule of interpretation of statutes that the State is not bound by a
statute unless it is so provided in express terms, or by
Though
necessary implication, is still good law".
that rule has been laid down in the context of a
statute, there is no reason why a differeut principle
should apply in the construction of the Articles of the
Constitution. If that rule of interpretation is applied
to Art. :H (~) of the Constitution, it will have to be
helJ that, as the said rule does not in terms or by
necessary imp! ication provide for the acquisition of
State property, a State property cannot be the
subject-matter of the said rule. Reliance is placed
upon another judgment of this Court in The State
of Hih·tr v. Hani 8onalxiti 1,·umnri ('),_in support of
the c.rntcntion that the expression "person" embraces
a State. There, the decision was that when the
State disobeyed the order of injunction issued by the
court, the said order could be enforced against the
State in the manner prescribed by 0. XXXIX,
r. ~ (3), (If the Code cf Civil Procedure. A plaintiff
mo y apply to the court for a temporary injunction to
restrain a defendant from committing the injury
complained of. Under 0. XXXIX, r. 2 (3) of
the code,
"In case· of disobedience, or of breach of any
Ol (1961] 1 s.c.R. 158.
(2) [1961] l s.c.R. 12s.
19~2
State of JVest
Brugal
v.
Union of India
Subha Rao, J.
456
/961
S1at1 of JYest
Btntai
v.
l./nicm of /,,,;,.
Sullha Raa, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
such terms, the Court granting an injunction
may order the property of the person guilty of
such disobedience or breach to be attached,
and may also order such person to be detained
in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six
months, unless in the meantime the Court
directs his release."
This Court, on a construction of els. (1) and (3) of
r. 2 of 0. XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure
held that the expression 'person' in r. 2 (3) has been
cmplo}ed compendiously to designate everyone in the
group "Defendant, his agents, servants and workmen"
and not for excluding any defrndant against whom
the order of injunction has primarily been passed.
But at the same time, this Court made it clear that
the provision for detention docs not apply to the
State; and this could only be because the State is not
a "person" who could be detained. The decision is
based upon the phraseology of the two clauses of
0. XXXIX, r. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure and
does not lay down as a general proposition that the
expression "person" wherever it appears shall include
a "State".
The historical background of Art. 31 and entry
42 of List III also docs not bear out the construction
that acquisition of a State property is contemplated
by the entry 42 of List III. In the Government of
India Act, 19:1ii, acquisition was a provincial subject,
being entry 9 of List I I, Section 2!J!J of the Government of India Act, 1!135, read :
(I) ::-\o person shall be deprived of his property
in British India save by authority of law.
(2) Neither the federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law
authorising the compulsory acquisition for
public purposes of any land, or any
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
commercial or industrial ·undertaking, or
any interest in, or in any company owning,
any commercial or industrial undertaking,
unless the law provides for the payment
of compensation for the property acquired
and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principle::; on which,
and the manner in which it is to be
determined."
. Broadly, els. (1) and (2) of s. 299 of the said Act
correspond respectively to els. (1) and (2) of Art. 31
of the Constitution, under the said Act, the Federal
Legislature could not make a law acquiring the land
of a Province for the simple reason that the subject
of acquisition of land was exclusively a Provincial
subject. But s. l :!7 provided for the contingency of
the Federation requiring the land belonging to a
Province. The section read :
"The Federation may, if it deems it necessary
to acquire any land situate in a Province for any
purpose connected with a matter with respect
to which the Federal Legislature has power
to make laws, require the Province to acquire
the land on behalf and at the expense, of the
Federation or, if the land belongs to the
Province, to transfer it to the Federation on such
terms as may be agreed or, in default of agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator
appointed by the Chief .Justice of India."
A combined reading of the said provisions indicates
that though under the Government of India Act the
federal Legislature could not make a law empowering
the Federation to acquire the land belonging to a
Province, the Federation may require the Province
to transfer to it the land owned by the Province on
terms agreed upon between them or, in default of
agreement, determined by an arbitrator: that is to
1962
Stat1 of w,,,
Bengal
v.
Uni.. ef Indio
Subba Rao, J.
458
1952
Statr of IVtJl
Bingal
v.
Union of India
Suhba Rao, I,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
say, under the Government of India Act transfrr
of lands owned by a Province to the Feclcration cou Id
be effected only under an agreemrnt or an award.
Under the Constiu1i:un, bdorc it was amended
in I !15li, Parliament as well as State Legislatures
were empowered to make laws for acquisition of
lands for their respective purposes-Parliament for
the Union purposes and a State Legislature for the
purposes of th.: State. Prima Jncie the relevant
entries, namely, entry :33 of List I and entry :lli of
List II, could have related 01ily to acquisition of
private lands for purposes of the Union or the State,
as the case mav be. But if the Union or the State
wanted the lar{d held by the other, it could secure
the same only under Art. 2!J8 (I). as it stood then.
The said article read :
"The cxec:utiw power of thr Union and of each
State shall extc~1tf, subjrcl to any law made by
the appropriate l.q.islaturc, to the grant, sale,
disposition or mortgage of any property held
for the purposes of the Union or of such State,
as the case may br, and to the purchase or
acquisition of property for those purposes
respectively, and to the making of contracts."
The phraseology used in this article clearly sho\\·s
that the land held' b\· the Union or the State for the
Union or the State' purp:Jses respectively, could be
transferred to the other only in the manner indicated
in Art. :!!18 (I). By the Constitution (S~vcnth
Amendment) Act, l!J5(i, the subject of acquisition
and requisitioning of land was placed in List III as
entry 42, and entry 33 of List I and entry :lti of
List II were deleted and Art. :l98 was substituted by
a new Article. The changes made in Art. 298 arc
not material for the present purposes. It is, therefore,
manifest that under the Government of India
Act, 1935, compulsory acquisition of land wa~ a
provincial subject, that under the Constitution, as it
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
originally stood, Parliament could make a law for
acquiring such a property for the Union purp0ses and
the State Legislature for the State purposes by
virtue of different entries and that, after the amend·
ment, both Parliament and State Legislatures could
make a law for the acquisition of such a property by
virtue of entry 42 of List III. But if the Federation
or a province under the Government of India Act,
or the Union or the State under the Constitution
wanted a property owned by the other, it could secure
it only under an agreement and not otherwise.
This scheme clearly demonstrates that a law whether
made by Parliament or by a State Legislature cannot
provide for the acquisition of property owned by the
other. I, therefore, hold that Parliament cannot
make a law by virtue of entry 4~ of List III for the
acquisition by the Union of the property owned by a
State.
Reliance is then placed upon Art. 248 of the
Constitution, read along with entry 97 of List I '.)f
the Seventh Schedule to sustain the wider power of
the Parliament. Article 248 reads :
(1) Parliament has exclusive power to make
any law with respect of any matter not
enumerated in the concurrPnt List or State
List.
(2) Such power shall include the power of
making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.
Entry 97 of List I. Any other matter not
enumeraled in List II or List III including any
tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.
It is contended that if acquisition of a State property
does not fall under entry 42 of List III it must fall
under entry 97 of List I. Emphasis is laid upon the
1962
Stlltt of IV tit
Bt11,(al
v.
i·nion of India
5i,bba Rii~. J.
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]. VOL.
1962
State of YYe.st
Bengal
,v.
Union of lndia
Subba Rao, J.
-words "any matter;' in Art. 248 and a contention i~
·advanced that the expression "any matter" haq the
widest connotation and, therefore, it empowers the
Parliament to make a law In rcgarJ to any subject,
including taking over of the property of a State.
There are two answers to this argument : firstly, a
residuary entry· cannot. travel beyond the scope of the
division of powers. The sovereign legislative power
is divid_ed between different entities. The entire
legislative 1ieldjs divided between the Union and the
States. The me1hod of allocation adopted is by
enumeration of subjects. 'Ihe residuary article apd
the entry are- , the devices . adopted to/ entrust to the
Union any subject omjttC'd by mistake or otherwise.
The residuary legisliHive fi>ld cannpt possib.ly .co>1er
inter-State relation; for that matter is not <listribtited
between the Union and the ?t~tes by way o( le1nsla·
I ive Lists. Tb at apart, whcri a specific provision is
111aclc for acquisition of a property, it would be
incongruous to confine thfit ei:it~y to prqpert'ies other
than those of the Sta\es and to. resqrt to the resid1Jary
p,0..yer (or acquiring tJ:ie properties of States. If the
power of aeq uisition can be construed to mean only
acquisition of properties in the States and not
p,roperties ,belonging to the States, it m11st be held
t!J.at tl]C power: of acqpisitio~ is limited to that extent.
Further if Art. ::JI (2) applied only to a law ef acquisition of a private property as I have alrea<ly held,
the anomaly that ;irises if the said clause does not
apply to entry +2 of List III will equally arise in
respect of entry 97 of List I-I would, therefore.
hold that Parliament· cannot maKe a law for the
acquisition of a Sta,te property by virtue of entry 97
of List I.
There would B~-mapy anomalies ln the working
bf the Constitution if the· contention of the Union
..yas accepted. As the subject of "acquisition arn;I
requisitionirg" is in the Concurrent List both Parliameni and a State Legislatm'e can make diffefeIJt
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME cou:R.t REPORTS
461
laws for acquiring the property of the State or of the
Union, as the case may be. Under the law made by
Parliament, the State property can' be acquired and
on acquisition it becomes the Union property; then
under the law made by the State, the same property
can be reacquired by the :::itate as the Union-property.
It is said that this vicious circle cannot arise under
the Constitution. Reliance is first placed upon
Art. 31(3) of the Constitution, which says :
"No such law as is referred to in clause (2)
made by the Legislature of a State shall have
effect unless such law, having been reserved
for the consideration of the President, has
received his assent."
But I have held that Art. 31 (2) has nu applir:ation
to a law providing for the acquisition of a State
property and if so, cl. (:3) thereof will also not apply
to such a law. Even if Art. :H(3) applies, there is
nothing which prevents the President from giving
his consent to a State to acquire the Union property,
though the Union executive may ordinarily be relied
upon not to do so. But we must test the validity of
a contention on the legal possibilities and not on
what a particular executive may or may not do. If
so, Art. <ll(:l) cannot always prevent the cunl1ict
indicated above. It is said that Art. 254(1) would
invariably resolve such conflicts in iavour of the law
made by the Parliament. But Alt. 254( 1) can come
in aid of the law made by Parliament only if there
is repugnancy between that law and that made by
the State Le~islature. But in the illustration given
there is no such repugnancy, for the law made by
Parliament provides for the acquisition of the property of the State, whereas the law made by the
State provides for the acquisition of the propaly
owned by the Union. The moment the State prc>pcrty is acquired by the Union it becomes the property of the Union. In such a context there is no
1962
Sttrtc of U'est
Bengal
v.
Union of InditJ
Subba Rao, J.
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19134] vot.
1162
Sllzt1 of WtJI
B'"l°'
••
U11itln 01· I11tli.
S116ba RaD, J.
repugnancy between the two laws though the
purpose of the Union law can be defeated by the
exercise of a power under a State law. Article 254(2)
also saves the laws of the States if the previous consent of the President has been taken; such a consent
is legally possible, though ordinarily the Central
Executive can be expected to withhold· it. The
Constitution could not have intended such an unresolved conflict between the Union and the
States. Secondly, if the contention of the Union be
correct, Parliament can make a law making a provision for acquiring the entire property of a State
without compensation. It can indirectly prevent the
State from functioning; it can acquire the buildings
owned by the State and used for its offices; it can
take away the substratum of the State's jurisdiction
by acquiring not only its offices bu, 'llso its buildings
and works, which arc maintained for the public
good. Though Parliament may not be expected to
create such a situation, nothing will prevent it from
doing so. A construction which may prevent the
State from functioning as visualized by the Constitution cannot easily be accepted unless it is clearly
expressed in the Constitution itself. It is said that
Parliament can destroy the State under Art. :~ of the
Constitution and, therefore, nothing more untoward
can happen to a State if this limited power is conceded, as a larger power has already vested in thr.
Parliament. Article 3 only enables the Parliament
to make a law for the formation of a new State,
alteration of boundaries of any State, increase or
decrease of the area of any State or alteration of
the name of any State. Such a power is expressly
given to the Parliament and, therefore, it can function under that Article. Bnt that has nothing to do
with a power to acquire the property of a State.
Thirdly, when the Constitution created legal entities
and distributed the sovereign powers between them,
it is unreasonable to construe the ambiguous provisions of the Constitution in such a way as to create
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
conflicts between them or to make .ine a creature
of the other. It is said that if such a power is not
conceded to the Union, the States may not cooperate
with the Union, in the implementation of the
policies conceived in the interest of the whole
country. This argument may have some relevance
in America or in Australia wher.i:: the States are
powerful under ·their respective Cfonstitutions, but
absolutely none under our Constitution whereunder
the States are practically beholden to the Union in
many ways. It was necessary in America to evolve
implied powers to implement national policies; in
India the Constitution has conferred on the Union
ample powers in that direction. In such a situation
this Court should be very reluctant to curtail the
already limited powers of the States and should not,
by construction, convert the federal structure into a
unitary form of government which the Constitution
has rejected.
At this stage another argument advanced by
learned Advocate-General for West Bengal may be
noticed. He contends that under Art. 294 of the
Constitution all the coal .mines vested in His l\1ajesty .
for the purposes of the Province vested in the State
of West Bengal as from the commencement of the
Constitution; and that, therefore, unless there is an
express constitutional provision for divesting them,
they could not be acquired by a law made by Parliament. I shall consider the decisions cited at the Bar
in this context at a later stage. If the argument
advanced on behalf of the Union is correct, viz., that
there is a legislative power in the Parliament to
acquire the property of a State, Art. 294 cannot be
in the way of the Union law providing for the acquisition of the State property. That apart, Art. 294
applies only to the property vested in the State at the
commencement of the Constitution anti not to
property that has been. subsequently acquired by it.
In this case, the zamindaries where the coal-mines are
-
1962
Sta11·0.f West
Bengal
v.
Union ef /ntli•
Subia Rao, J,
· 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
\
"
..
-~--~-
·.1962
situate vested in the State of \Vest Bengal subsequent
to the commencement of the Constitution by reason
of a State law. But itis contended that though the
••
surface soil of the zamindari was with the zamindars,
Union of India
the
coal·mines vested in His . Majesty before the
Subb~ Rao, J.
Constitution and that at the commencement cif the
. ~Constitution' continued to vest in the State. ·But this
argument is contrary to series of decisions given by
the Privy Council : see Harinarayan Singh Deo v.
&riram -Chakravarti ('); Durga Prasad Singh v.
Brajnath Bose (2); Bashi Bhushan llfisra v. Jyoti.
Prasad Singh Deo ('); Rajkumar Thakur Girdhari
Singh v. lllegh Lal Pandey ('); and Raghunath Roy
.. Maru:ari v. Durga Prasad Singh (5). Though these.
·. decisions were given in dispute between zamindars
and their tenants, the observations - in some of the
judgments run_ counter to the argument. of learned
Advocate~General. He has not placed. before us any
authority to support his contention; but he alternatively suggested that though the estates with the
coal·mines may have belonged to the zamindars, the .
reversion in the said estates was' with His l'vfajesty
and subsequently with the State. This is contrary fo
the principles of permanent settlement,· for under the
permanent settlement the British Government granted
to the zamindars a permanent hereditary property in
their lands for all times to come and fixed a moderate
asse5sment of public revenue on such lands, which
could not be increased under any circumstances. The
sannads granted under the permanent settlement regu·
Iaticms did not reserve_ any reversionary right to the
Government. As I have held that, even if any interest
had vested in the State, it could be divested by an
- Act-of an appropriate Legislature if the requisite .
. power was conferred on it by the Constitution, I do
not propose to express my final opinion on this
·
question.
: lil4luf IV1JI
Benztrl
The constitutional validity of the impugned
Act is next sought to be sustained on the basis of
(1) (1910) U.R. 37 Cal. 723.
(2) (1912) J.L.R. 39 Cal. 696.
(3) (1916) J.l.R. 44 CaL 585.
(4) (19171 J.L.R. 45 Cal. 87.
(5) (1919) J.L.R. 47 Cal, 95,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
entry 52 and entry 54 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. They read :
1962
~lalt1 of Wut
Bmzal
Entry 52 of List I : Industries, the control of
which by the Union is declared by Parliament
by law to be expedient in .the public interest.
Entry 54 of List I : Regulation of mines and
mineral development to the extent to which
such regulation and development under the
control of the Union is declared by Parliament
by law to be expedient in the public interest.
Before construing these two provisions, it would be
convenient to read entries 23 and 24 of List II, the
State List :
Entry 23 of List II : Regulation of mines and
mineral development subject to the provisions
of List I with respect to regulation and develop·
ment under the control of the Union.
Entry 24of List II: Industries subject to the
provisions of entries 7 and .52 of List I.
--
A combined reading of the fou.r entries shows that
ordinarily the industries and the regulation of mines
and mineral development are the State subjects. But
if Parliament makes a law declaring that any particular industry should be under the control of the
Union in public interests or the regulations of any
mines or mineral development should be under its
control, to that extent entries 24 and 23 of List II
shall yield to entries 52 and 54 of List I. Under the
Industries {Development and Regulation) Act. 1951
(65 of 1951), Parliament has declared that "it is
expedient in the public interest that the l 1nion should
·take under it~ control the industries specified in the
First Schedule", which include coal and, therefore,
it is argued, the subject of coal industry passed on to
arliament and the impugned Act made thereafter
Y,
Uniou of India
S1JlbCJ Rao, J.
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1961
SW1 of W11f
81~1al
••
traion of ltUlio
for acquisition of coal bearing lands was well within
its power. If I may say so, there is a fallacy in this'
argument. A declaration under entry 52 of List I
would no doubt enable Parliament to make a law in
respect of an industry, that is to say Parliament may
make a law in respect of an existing industry or an
industry that may be started subsequentjy. So too,
before the declaration a State Legislature could have
made a law in respect of an industry by virtue of
entry 24 of List II. But neither entry 24 of List II
nor entry 52 of List I empowers the State Legislature
before the said declaration or the Parliament after
such a declaration to make a law for acquisition of
lands. If the State Legislature before the declaration or
the Parliament after the declaration wanted lo acquire
the land it can only proceed to make a law hy virtue
of entry 42 of List III. As I have held that entry
42 of Li1t III does not enable Parliament to make a
law providing for the acquisition of a property of a
State, entry .52 of list I cannot be relied upon for
such a purpme. Reliance is also placed upon the
Coal ~lines (Comervation and Safety) Act, 1952
(Act XII of 1952) in support of the contention that
the declaration contained therein gave vitality to
entry 54 or List I and that the impugned Act could
be smtained under that entry. Section ~ of that
Act says :
"It is hereby de,lared that it is expedient in
the public interest that the Central Gqvernment
should take under its cJntrol the regulation of
coal mines to the extent hereinafter prov,ided."
The simple amwer. to this argument is that the decla·
ration was limited to the control and regulation of
coal mines to the extent provided by that Act, and
such a dedaration, with its limited scope, could not
be taken advantage of to sustain the impugned Act.
Further, under the entry "regulation of mines" ~law
cannot be made for the acquisition of coal bearin~
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
lands themselves, particularly when there is a specific entry for acquisition. Nor can the Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957
(Act 67 of 1957) be successfully invoked in this case,
for that Act, which contains a declaration that it is
expedicQt in the public interest that the Union should
take under its control the regulation of mines and the
development of minerals to the extent provided
therein, was passed on December 28, 1957, whereas
the impugned Act was passed on June 8, 1957. That
declaration was also confined to the extent of the
regulation provided thereunder and therefore could
not be relied upon for purposes other than those
comprehended by that Act. It follows that Parliament cannot rely upon the declaration in either of
the three Acts i.e., Act 65 of 1951, Act 12 of 1952,
and Act 67 of 1957, to sustain the impugned Jaw
which was solely made for the purpose of acquiring
the coal bearing areas.
Sustenance is sought to be drawn from American, Australian and Canadian decision in support of
the Union's contention that a federal law can provide
for the acquisition of a property owned by a State.
Before adverting to the decisions of a foreign court,
it would be necessary to know the relevant fundamental differences between the constitution of the said
country and our own. In America there is no express power conferred on the Congress enabling it to
make a law for the acquisition of any property for
public purposes. There is also no concurrent List
giving a common field of operation for the Federal
and the State units. The power of acquisition
was evolved by judicial decisions by invokmg the
doctrine of implied powers. The law of that country, therefore, may not be of much relevance in comtming the provisions conferring express powers on the
different units under our Constitution. Nor the decisions cited on behalf of the Union lend any support
1962
Stat• of Wut
Bm1al
••
u.;.. ef '"""
Subba Raa, J.
468
IJGZ
SU/1 of WI.II
B1n1d
v,
l!Non of /Mia
Ss.bbtJ Roo, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vor..
to the contention advanced. In State of Okla·
hoTrUJ Ex. Rel. Leon C. Philips v. Guy F. Atkinson
Campany (1 ), the Flood Control Act of 1938 autho·
rized the construction of the Denison Reservoir on
the Red River as part of a comprehensive scheme for
the control of floods in the Mississippi River and
its tributaries. That law was made by the Congress
in the exercise of its commerce power. The effect of
the construction of dam and reservoir for the pur·
pose of flood control on a stream running between
two States W3S to inundate lands in one State. The
Supreme Court held that the fact that the land was
owned by a State was not a barrier to its condemnation by the United States. It also observed that the
State Government could not prevent the exercise by
the Federal Government of its power of eminent
domain for flood control purposes. merely because
the State boundary would be obliterated by the flooding of the land taken. It was observed therein:
'·Since the construction of this dam and reservoir is a valid exercise by Congress of its commerce power, there is no interference with the
sovereignty of the State ........................ ..
The fact that land is owned by a ~late is no
harrier to its condemnation by the United
Sratcs ................... Nor can a state call a
halt to the exercise or the eminent domain
power of the federal government because the
su liseq ucnt flooding of the land taken will obi i tcrate its boundarv."
h docs not appear from the report, though the phraseology used is wide, that what had submerged or
obliterated w:ts State owned property or the State territory. Assuming that the StatP. property had submerged because of the operation of the Federal Jaw, thi,
decision can be understood to have laid down onlv
the limited proposition that the Congress in exercise
of its commerce power can make a !aw incidentally
<I) (IS40) 85 L. ed. 1487, l:i05.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4-69
encroaching upon the State property. The decision
in The Cherokee Nation v. The Southern Kans<U
Railway Company ('), does not carry the matter further. There it was held that the Congress had power
to authorize a corporati9n to construct a rail road
through the territory of Indian tribes. It was pointed
out that Cherokee Nation was not a ·sovereign nation
but was under the political control of the government
of 1he United States and, therefore, it could not be said
that the right of eminent domain within its territory
co.uld only be exercised by it and not by the United
States. It wa,s observed therein:
"The lands in the Cherokee territory, like the
lands held by private owners everywhere within
the geographical limits of the United States,
are held subject to the authority of the general
government to take them for such objects as are
germane to the execution of the powers granted
to it; provided only, that they are not taken
without just compensation being made to the
owner.''
•
This case, therefore proceeded on a different basis
altogether, namely, that the entire territory was directly under the Federal Government and that the Federal Government could exercise its power of eminent
domain in resprct of that territory. Nor doe1 the
decision in Kohl v. United States('), support the
defendant. There it was held that the United States
could acquire lands in Cincinnati for a post office and
other public buildings under the power of eminent
domain. The property sought to be acquired there
was the private property in the State and the decision
therein throws little light on the present q ucstion.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of America
are clear on the point viz., that in exercise of the
pow~r c?nferred on the Congress, expressly or by
1mphcat1on, a law can be made to acquire the
(I) (1889) 34 L. ed. 295. 502.
(2) (187;) 23 L. ed. 449.
1962
..
Stat~ ofWut
Bmgal
Unior~ of lntlia
.<ubbo Rao, J.
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1962
Sta" of Wm
s..,.i
••
Umoa of /NIU
SabH RM, J~
private property in a State for carrying out a federal
purpose. But they are not decisions on the question
whether the said law can provide for the condemnation of the property owned by the States.
In Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd edn., Vol.
I, at p. 169, the following passage appears:
"Despite the phraseology of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
to the effect that "private property" shall not
be taken for public use except upon payment
of just compensation, it has been held that there
is no implied limitation therefrom which inhibits the taking of public property by the federal
government and the latter may acquire the
property of a state or one of its agencies or
1ub-divisiomi."
"Although the federal government has the
power to acquire such property, the relative
positions of the federal and state governments
are such that it would seem that the United
States could not for the sake of mere convenience, take the property of a state which
was devoted to the public use the !oss of which
~ould s~ously cripple the state in carrying on
1t~ functions ............................................ .
In case of necessity, as distinguished from mere
convenience, the State would have to yield in
any event."
The said passage makes a distinction between a
State property and a property devoted by a State for
a public purpose-the former can be acquired and
the latter ordinarily cannot be acquired by the federal
government. These principles are not based upon
any particular power conferred upon.the Congress,
but appear to have been envolved on a pragmatic
approach to concrete problems arising in that country.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4'71
Such an approach cannot have any relevance to our
Constitution where the powers have been described
with particularity. The passage in "Willoughby on
the Constitution of the United States", Vol: 1, at
p. 180, namely, "that, in cases of conflict, the power
of eminent domain of the States must yield to the
con1titutionally superior power of eminent domain
of the United States is well settled", does not relate
to the acquisition of property owned by States but
&o the resolution of a conflict between the powers of
eminent domain of the Union-and the States when
both or them seek to acquire property within a State.
That doctrine is based upon the supremacy given by
&he comtitution to the Government of the United
State1 in all matters within the scope of its sovere·
ignty.
The said discussion shows that the law in
America on tk.e question raised in the present case is
not clear. In view of the admitted differences in the
comtitutional provisions, it would not be safe to rely
upon it in construing the provisions of our Constitu·
tion.
The Australian decisions also do not help us,
for s. 51 of the Australian Constitution expressly
provides that the Commonwealth can make a law for
the acquisition of property on just terms from any
State or person: see Wynes' Legislative, Executive
and judicial Powers in Australia, p. 441. If at all,
the said provision indicates that in a federal form
of government one sovereign unit cannot acquire the
property of another unless the Constitution expressly
provides for it.
In Canada this question was subject of judicial
scrutiny. It may be mentioned that in Canada there
is no concurrent List conferring the power of eminent
domain expressly on both the Union and the cons·
tituent States. Reliance is placed on behalf of the
Union on the decision of the Privy Council in
SW. of Wut
B,.,.I
••
U.U..oJW.
S.bha RM, /.
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1962
S1nt1 of lV1st
s,,,'gai
••
Unioo of Indio
Sublui Rao, J.
Attorney-General fur tlie Dominion of Car.ada v.
Attorney-General for the Provincl'.8 of Ontario,
Quebec and Nova Scotia (1). Sections 91 and 92 of
the British North America Act, 1867, distributed
legislative pow-:rs between the Dominion and the
Provinces of Canada. Under s. 108 rhereof certain
items of property were transferred to the Dominion,
one of them being "rivers and lake improvements,
and public harbours". The residue of proprietary
rights not transferred to the Dominion bys. 108 and
Schedule Ill remained vested in the provinces subject to ss. 109 and 117; and the residuum of legislative jurisdiction not comprised in ss. Ill and 92
vested in the Dominion. The questioru raised in
the appeal were whether under s. I 08 the river was
transferred to the Dominion, and whether the
Dominion could make a law under s. 91 affecting
fisheries and fishing rights in the river. The Privy
Council held that the proprietary rights in the river
vested in the Province on the date of the British
North America Act, 1867 and that s. 108 by transferring rivers and lake improvements did not transfer
the proprietary rights in the rivers. On the second
question, it held that s.·!JI empowered the Dominion
to make a law taxing the right to fish in the rivers.
Lord Herschell recognized a broad distinction between proprietar~· rights and legislative jurisdiction
and observed that the fact that such jurisdiction in
respect of a particular subject-matter was conferred
on the Dominion Legislature afforded uo evidence
that any proprietary rights with respect to it wne
transferred to the Dominion. It is observed at
p. 730:
"If, however, the Legislature purports to confer
upon other proprietary rights where it possesses
none itself, that in their Lordships' opinion is
not an exercise of the legislative jurisdi~tion
conferred bys. 91. If the contrary were held,
it would follow that the Dominion might
(l) (1898] A.C. 700.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4i3
practically transfer to itself property which has,
by the British North America Act, been left to
the provinces and not vested in it."
1961
Stat1 of West
Bengal.
v.
Union nf lndi•
This decision, therefore, is an authority for the position that when the constitution vests particular properties in one of the governing units, the other cannot by legislation take over those properties, for if
that is allowed one can destroy the other. This
decision supports the broad contention of the learned
Advocate-General of West Bengal that the propertie11
vested in a State cannot be taken over by the Union
in exercise of legislative power. The wide sweep
of this decision has been restricted to some extent,
by the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General for
British Columbia Canadian Pacific Railway
Company ('). There, the judicial Committee held
that ss. 91 and 92, read together, empowered the
Dominio!l to dispose of prnvincial Crown lands, and
therefore of a provincial. foreshore, for the purposes
of the respondent railway, which was a transcontinental railway connecting several provinces.,
In coming to that conclusion the Judicial Committee
relied upon its earlier decisions in Canadian Pacific
Railway Co. v. Corporation of the Pari8h of Notre
Dam~ De Bonsecours ('), and 1'oron to Corporation v.
Bell Telephone Co. of Canada ('). Though Crown
lands ve1ted in a province, the Constitution Act conferred an express power on the Dominion enabling
it to make a law for inter-State purposes affecting
the Crown lands. The same view was reiterated by
the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Quebec v.
Nipissing Central Railway Company an'd AttorneyGeneral for Canada (1). The Canadian cl~cision do
not support the wide contention of the learned
Attorney-Gene~al that properties vested in ~ State
can be acquired by Union law by virtue of either
entry 42 of List III or entry 52 of List I of our
Constitution. Apart from the fact that the relevant provisions of the other constitutions are not
a
(1) [190•[ A.C. 204.
(3) [1905) A.C, 52.
(2) [1899) A,C; 367.
(4) 1926) A.O. 715.
Subba RtJ1J, J.
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (196t] VOL.
1961
pari ma~ia with those of the Indian Corntitution,
Slo1, of Wut
Bmtal
the decisions cited do not constitute a clear authority
to support either of the two rival contentions, though
they contain some observations which may be relied
upon by either side. In these circumstances,· it would
not be proper for this Court to draw any inspiration
from the foreign constitutions or the decisions made
thereunder in construing the express · provisions of
our Constitution in the context of its different set-up.
I have referred to the decisions only out of respect
for the argument advanced.
••
l.'"iola of /111did
Su66a Ra., /.
To co11clude : The Indian Constitution accepl:I
the federal concept and distributes the sovereign
powers 1'etween the co-ordinate constitutional entities,
namely, the Union and the States. This concept
implies that one cannot encroach upon the governmental functions or instrumentalities of the other,
unless the Constitution expressly provides for such
interference. The legislative fields allotted to the
units cover subjects for legislation and they do not
deal with the relationship between the two co-ordinate
units functioning in their allotted fields : this is
regulated by other provisions of the Constitution and
there is no provision which enables one unit to take
away the property of another except by agreement.
The future stability of our vast country with its unity
in diversity depends upon the strict adherence of the
federal principle, which the fathers of our Constitution have so wisely and foresightedly incorporated
therein. This Court has the constitutional power and
the correlative duty-a difficult and delicate oneto prevent encroachment, either overtly or covert! y,
by the Union of State field or vice verna, and thus
maintain the balance of federation. The present is
a typical case where the Court should stop the Union
from overstepping its boundary and trespassing into
the State field. I would, therefore, hold that the
impugned Act, in so far as it confers a power on the
...
•.
1 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
Union to acquire the lands owned by the State, including coal mines and coa bearing lands, is u.ltra virea.
I find on issues l, 2 and 3 against the defendant, In
view of my findings on the said issue, I do not propose to express my opinion on the additional issue.
/962
S1at1 of Wist
B,.,111
v.
Uni.. of lit&
Subh&., J.
In the result, there will be a decree in favour
of the plaintiff in terms of els. (a), (c) and (d) of
paragraph 11 of the plaint. The plaintiff is entitled
to costs.
Br COURT: In view of the judgment of the
majority, the suit stands dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SHRI DURGA PRASAD & ANOTHER
196•
v.
D.....W,11.
THE BANARAS BANK LIMITED
(B. P. SINHA, C.J.,, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
S1<preme Court, ApptUatejuri$4iction of-Cerlifirme graxt"'1.
by High Court, if 0011tpetent-•Oourt immtdiately btlow'Meaning of-Constitution of India,, A.rt. 133 (1).
The Official Liquidator of the respondent Bank advertised
for sale, the two houses belonging to the Bank. These houses
were sold to the second appellant with the sanction of the court.
The second appellant thereafter transferred the houses to the
first appellant reciting in the deed that the latter was the real
owner and that the sale deed from the Official Liquidator was
obtained btnami for him. The Official Liquidator moved the
High Court at Allahabad foe an order declaring the sale null.and
void and for an.order re-transferring the houses to the Bank, A
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