LADLI PRASAD JAISWAL versus KARNAL DISTILLERY CO., LTD., & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 December 1962 | [1964] 1 S.C.R. 270 | 1962 INSC 387
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 December 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 535/1960
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1964] 1 S.C.R. 270
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 387
Text of the judgment
270
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
1962
LADLI PRASAD JAISWAL
D1ambtr, 11,
v.
KARNAL DISTILLERY CO., LTD., & ORS.
(B. P. SmHA, C. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADXAR,
K. N. WANCHOn, K. C. DAS GUPTA ·and
j. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Company-Managing Direclor appoinWl an ,.,.,.uiin Unn&Ruo/utian remooing Managing Direclor and appointing
anoth<r-Genera/ lrf eetiTUj-Suhsequent resolution paa•ed canctJl.
ing prwioUo! rt1olwian-8uit by th!, Direclor-FrauJ and undue
inftumce on the part of th!, appellant alleged-Whetli<r firit
appt/late court 1oent far beyond plP.adirigs-LeUera Patent
Appeal-Certifir.air. undu Art. 133 (1) (a) of lhe Cc>n.1titutianWhether
r.ompelent-"Courl
immediately
below"-Court•
aubordinate-Conatitution of India, Art. 133 (1) (a) and (b)Companies Act, 1956(1of1956) s. 155-Code o/Cioil Procedure,
1908 (Acl V of J.908), 88. 100,110,0.6, r. 4-Indian Contrad
Acl, 1872 (9 of 1872) •· 16.
The appellant filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate
Judge for a declaration that certain resolution. of the directors
and the shareholders in a private limited company passed on
March 3 and 28, 1946, and at the meetings of the Directors
held thereafter were illegal and void and for a declaration that
the reiolutions of October 16, 1945, were operative and in force.
' The respondents resisted the suit contesting that respondents
2 to 5 were coerced by the appellant who took advantage
of his dominating position, into passing the resolutions on
October 16, 1945, and those resolution. were not binding on
the company.
The Subordinate.Judge, held that the written statements
did not contain 'sufficient particulars of the pica of coercion
and undue influence' and that the respondents having failed to
give evidence in support of the plea of coercion and undue
influence, the burden of proving which lay upon them the
appellant's suit must be docrecd. In appeal the District Court
held that the appellant was in a position to dominate the will
of respondentlo 2 to 5 and he took advantage of that position
and on that account the resolutions relied upon by the appellant
dated October 16, 1945, were vitiated by coercion and undue
influence, and the appellant could not get a decree relying upon
those resolutions. The appellant appealed to the High Court.
A single Judge of the High Court found that the District Judge
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
271
1962
had 'travelled far beyond the pleadings' and therefore his find·
ing• on issue of coercion and fraud could not be upheld. In an
Jaiswal
appeal under cl. 10 of the Letters Pat<nt a Division 3ench of Wli Prasad
v.
the High Court found that the appellant was in a position to
Kmnol Distillt'Y
Co., Ltd.,
dominate and had obtained unconscionable advantage and it was
for him to prove that the resolutions of October 16,1945, were
not vitiated by coercion and fraud which burden he had failed
to discharge. They further held that later resolutions of the
company were not binding on the appellant because no notice
was issued to him of the meeting of the company; but no
decree could be granted to him since 'equity declines to lend
its aid to a person whose conduct has been inequitable', A
certificate of fitness was however granted to appeal to thi• Court
under Art. 133 (I} (a} of the Constitution.
Before this Court, it was urged that the appeal did not
involve any substantial quesion of law and the High Court was
not competent to grant the certificate under Art. 133 (l} (a} and
(b}. It was submitted that the expression •Court Immediately
lelow' in Art. i 33 meant a court subordinate to the High Court
and a single Judge not being subordinate to a Division Bench of
the High Court the •Court Immedj,ately below' was the District
Court.
Ii eld, that there is nothing in the phraseology used or the
context which justified the view that the expression •Court
immediately below' in Art. 133 (I) of the Constitution is used
in two different senses according as the High Court is trying an
appeal in a proceeding instituted in the High Court in exercise
of the Original Jurisdiction, and a proceeding instituted in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The test for determining
whether an aggrieved party has no right to appeal, other condition~being fulfilled is not whether the judgment is of a court
subordinate, but whether the judgment is of a court immediately below. The two expressions being different the same considerations do not apply in their interpretation. The certificate
granted by the High Court under Art. 133 (l) (a) and (b} was
competent because a single Judge of the High Court hearing
either a proceeding as a court of original jurisdiction or in exercise of appellate jurisdiction is a co'1!'t immediately below the
Division Bench which hears an appeal against bis judgment
under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent.
TooZ.ey Prasad Bhuckt v. Benayek M;.ser, (1896) L. R. 23
I. A. 102, referred to.
Wahid-wt-din v. Makhan Lal (1944) I. L. R. 26 Lah. 242,
and Debendra Nath Das v. Bibudhendra Mansingh, (1915)
I. L. R. 43 Cal. 90, disapproved.
272
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
Minna llemher/y v. B. G. Sen, A. I. R. 1927 Lah. 537
and Gopal Vil v. Bolki19an, (1931) I. L. R. 13 Lah. 338,
Ldli P.asad J.Uwol approved.
v.
Korul Dislilfny
Ki ..hanlal Nand/al v. T"ithal Nagayya, I. L. R. 19.55 Nag.
eo.,w.,
821, rlisapproved.
Held, that a finding that a particular transaction is vitiated
on the ground of undue influence is primarily a finding on a
question of fact.
·
Satg"r Prrui1d v.
I. A. 147 followed.
liar Narain Da., (1932) L. R. 59
The High Court ha. no jurisdktion to entertain a second
appeal "on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact however
gross or inexcusable the error JTlc1.Y seem to be."
M1wamf7lllt D,.rqa
GhowU.rain v.
Chowdhri, (1890) L. R. 17 r. A. 122, followed.
Jawahir Singh
But a decision of the first appellate court reached after
placing the onm wrongly resulting in a substanti•l error or
def.ct in the decision of the case on the merits or based on no
evidence is not conclusive and a second appeal lies to the High
Court against the decision.
A pica of undue influence must be precise and all ncce·
ssary particulars in support of that plea must be embodied in
the pleading; if the partir.ulars stated in the pleading arc not
sufficient and specific the court should, before proceeding with
the trial of the suit insist upon the particulars.
Bharat Dlumna Syndicate v. llarish Ch<inclra (1937)
L. R. 64 I. A. 143 dad Bi•ha.das Narain v. Seogeri Rai an'1
JaganiuJJh [1951] S. C.R. 548, followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuarsorcTION : Civil Appeal
No. 535 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
October 18, 1957 of the Punjab High Court in
Letters Patent Appeal No. 100 of 1954.
B. R. Tuli, S. K. Kapur and K. K. Jain, for
the appellent.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
273
M. 0. Setalvad, AttorruJy·General for India,
A. N. · Khanna and Harbans Singh!_ for _!he
respondents.
I 962. December 17.
Court was delivered by
The Judgment of the
SHAH, J.-One Kishori Lal Jaiswal started a
'distillery business' in the name of Kishori Lal &
Sons and set up a factory at Kamal in the Punjab
for manufacturing liquor. Kishori Lal died in 1928
leaving him surviving three sons, Durga Prasad, Ladli
Prasad and Shanti Prasad. Durga Prasad who was
the eldest "Surviving member became karta of the Joint
Hindu family, and continued the family business.
On the death of Durga Prasad in 1934 leaving him
surviving two sons Sajjan Lal and Madan Lal and
his wife Suraj Mukhi, Ladli Prasad became the
'karta' of the family and continued the business. By
mutual arrangement on November 5, 1940 the Joint
Hindu Family of three branches was disrupted ;md the
business of Kishori Lal & Sons was thereafter con·
ducted as a partnership concern each branch having
a third share therein. On March 23, 1941 a private
limited company called the Kamal Distillery Com·
pany Ltd. was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and the business of Kishori Lal &
Sons was taken over by that Company. Under the
final allotment of shares made by the Company
on August 1, 1941-1005 shares were allotted to the
branch ofDurga Prasad, 1503 shares to Ladli Prasad
and 1003 to Shanti Prasad. By the Articles of
Association the maximum number of Directors was
five and the minimum number was two. Ladli
Prasad, Shanti Prasad and Suraj Mukhi were
appointed as the first Directors of the Campany.
Every year one ·third of the Directors except the
Managing Directors were to retire by rotation. Ladli
Prasad was appointed Managing Director for ten
years with the right to continue for another ten years
1961
Lalllh-4I"'-·
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c..,w.
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·... 274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
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unless a notice of fifteen days-within · eight years
majority at a special·
general meeting held for the purpose of temiinating
his appointment as Managing Director, and that twothird of the total, .number of members could expel a
member of the Company. Ladli. Prasad as Managing Director of the Company drew an allowance of
Rs. 1,800/- per month, . a. ·commission of 7! per· cent
on net profits.of the Company, a motor-car allowance
of Rs. 350/- -per month with a right to be provided
a new motor-car every three years for personal use and
Rs. 30/· per day as travelling allowance .. The other
Directors of the Company · were. paid remuneration
at the •.trate . of Rs. 250/- per month, · and each
. Director who· ·attend ; the 'meeting of the Board of
Directors was allowed.in addition Rs:.25/-per day; ..
i.n; Prasad Jaiswal was · given by a two-third
Karnal Dis till"'
'
Co., Ltd. .
Sliah, J.
.·.., . '•
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· ; ; · Manifestly there 'was great disparity between
the remuneration received ·.by LadIi : Prasad and the
othei: . Directors, :and ·. this 'gave rise to quarrels
between the members of the family. At an e·xtraordinary ·general·; meeting ·.•of> the·, Company held ori
February 20, 1945 at which Shanti Prasad, Sajjan
Lal, Madan Lal and Suraj · Mukhi were present, : it
was resolved that Ladli Prasad'. be removed from his
office of Managing. Director and that Shanti Prasad
' · . be appointed Managing Director instead: . But Ladli
Prasad declined to -hand over charge of the Manag·
ing Director's office to Shanti 'Prasad. A suit was
thereupon filed by .Shanti Prasad· in the Court of the
SubordinateJudge;Karnal,·on :behalf of the Com·
pany against Ladli Prasad. on- April 10, 1945 for a
declaration that he was ]awfully appointed Manag.ing Director of the Company and for enforcing the·
resolution dated February 20, 19!5. Ladli Prasad in
his turn filed a. suit for a declaration that· Shanti
Prasad had ceased to be a· Director of the Company~
. . ____ In the suit filed by Shanti Prasad on behalf. of the ·
Company, the trial Court appointed Suraj Mukhi and
· Madan Lal as joint : rec:eivers. to manage the affairs, - -
•
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
275
1961
of the Company for the duration of the suit. Against
that order Ladli Prasad appealed to the High Court Ladli Prasad Jaiswal
v.
of Judicature at Lahore and obtained an order stayKamal Distillery
ing the operation of the order appointing receivers.
Co., ltd.
On October 16, 1945 at an extraordinary general
Shah, J.
meeting of the Company held at the residence of
Ladli Prasad at which all the members of the family
were present certain special resolutions were passed.
The effect of the resolutions was that :-
(1)
That each branch of the family should own
1170 shares and for this purpose Ladli
Prasad should transfer 167 shares to Shanti
Prasad and 1f)6 to the branch of Durga
Prasad.
(2)
Resolution dated February 20, 1945 pur·
porting to remove Ladli Prasad from the
Managing Directorship was cancelled.
(3) Resignation of Ladli Prasad of his post as
Managing Director was accepted, and he
was appointed permanent Director and
Chairman, and Madan Lal son of Durga
Prasad was appointed Director in place of
Suraj Mukhi who submitted her resig.
nation. Shanti Prasad continued to be a
Director of the Company.
(4) The maximum number of Directors was
fixed at three and the quorum of the
Directors' me~ting was also fixed at three.
(5) Every decision submitted to a meeting of
the Directors or members was to be deemed
to be passed only if the decision thereon be
unanimous, and the proceedings recorded
being signed by the Chairman of the
Company and all the Directors or the
mem hers, as the case may be, present at
the meeting.
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964] VOL.
1962
Lodli Prasod I aiswal
••
(6) Shanti Prasad was arpointed Manager for
five years under the control of the Board
of Directors .
Karnol Dist;u,,_,
c..,w.
(7)
Article 47 which gave power to a two·
third majority to expel a member of the
Company was deleted.
(8)
Each Director was to be paid Rs. 900/per month as remuneration and Rs. 25/for
each meeting of the Board of
Directors attended. No extra remuneration
to be paid to Shanti Prasad as Manager
or to Ladli Prasad as Chairman.
(9)
Ladli Prasad gave up the remuneration
which had been provided for him under
the Articles of Association as originally
framed and he was discharged in respect of
all previous accounts which were ratified
and confirmed.
>ltoh, I.
(10) All contracts executec, business done,
benefits derived by Ladli Prasad under the
facilities granted to him by resolution
dated April 30, 1941 of the Board of Directors were confirmed and ratified and all
transactions recorded in the accounts of the
Company for the period April l, 1941 till
the date of the resolution were ratified and
it was resolved that the accounts of each
of the four years ending March 31, 1942,
1943, 1944 and 1945 be confirmed.
(ll) Dividend at the rate of 65 per cent of the
face value of the share free of income-tax
was declared.
(12) While ratifying and confirming the contracts executed, business done, benefits
derived in the name, or from the Company
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
277
by any Director or the Managing Director
of the Company in the past, it was resolved that in future no Director of the Company will contract in the name of the
Company for his personal benefit.
(13) A large number of Articles of Association
of. the Company were amended in order
to make them consistent with the special
resolutions.
Effect was given to these resolutions. Shanti Prasad
assumed the office of Manager of the Company and
took charge of the Company's properties, assets and
business. Re-adjustment in share-holding of the
members was also effected, Ladli Prasad having
transferred the shares according to the terms of the
resolution. But disputes started afresh. In a meeting of the Board of Directors held on March 3, 1946,
at which Shanti Prasad and Madan Lal were present,
it was resolved to call an extraordinary general
meeting of the share-holders of the Company on
March 28, 1946 to consider a requisition received
from Suraj Mukhi and Madan Lal for cancelling
some of the special resolutions passed at the meeting
held on October 16, 1945. No notice of this meeting
was given to Ladli Prasad. At the meeting held on
March 28, 1946-in the absence of Ladli Prasadseveral resolutions were passed to the effect
that, all amendments made in the Articles of
Association by the resolutions dated October 16, 1945
do stand cancelled and the original Articles of
Association of the year 1941 (including Art. 47 which
authorised the Company by a 2/3rd majority to
expel any member) do stand restored. It was also
resolved that Ladli Prasad be removed from the directorate and Chairmanship of the Company, and in
his place Suraj Mukhi be appointed Director of the
Company at a ~emuneration of Rs. 900/- per month;
that Shanti Prasad be appointed Managing Director
1962
Ladli Prasad Jai~wal
v.
Karnol Distillery
Co,Ltd.
Shah, J.
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
1962
lAdJi 1-rOJad Jaiswal
v.
Kamal Distil/tr,,
Co., Lid.
Shnli, J.
for ten years, such appointment not being liable to
term.i..nation earlier by the members; and that Shanti
Prasad do receive in addition to his remuneration as
Director Rs. 1000/- per month as Managing Direct<•r,
a travelling allowance of Rs. 30/- per day and a
motor-car allowance of Rs. 200/- per month.
Coming to know about these amendments,
Ladli Prasad called upon Shanti Prasad and the other
members of the Company to rescind the resolutions,
and failing to induce them to comply with the requisition, he filed a petition on May 1, 1946 in the High
Court of Judicature at Lahore for an order for
winding up the Company. An order for winding
up the Company was passed by a single Judge, but
was set aside in appeal by the High Court of Lahore
by its order dated January 19, 1956.
On November 26, 1946, Ladli Prasad filed
a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge,
Karna! for a Jeclaration that the meeting and proceedings of the Board of Directors dated March 3, 1946,
and the extraordinary general meeting dated
March 28, l!J46, and all meetings of the Directors
held after March 28, Hl46 were illegal, ultra i·ires,
ineffective and operated as a fraud on the Company
and the interests of minority members of the Company and that the unanimous resolutions of the extraordinary general meeting dated October 16, 1945,
continued to remain in force and were still operative,
and a permanent injunction restraining the Company,
Shanti Prasad, 8uraj Mukhi, Sajjan Lal and
Madan Lal (who were impleaded re-spectively as defendants 1 to 5) from acting upon or carrying into
effect the resolutions passed in the meetings dated
March 3, 1946 and March 28, 1946 and all meetings
held after March'28, 19t6.
The defendants by separate written statements
resisted the suit contending inter alia that the defen-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
279
dants 2 to 5 were coerced by Ladli Prasad taking
advantage of his position, into passing the resolutions
in the extraordinary general meeting dated
October 16, 1945, and that the resolutions were not
binding upon the Company and the other defendants.
The Subordinate Judge raised a large number
of issues the first of which related to the challenge to
the validity of the resolution dated October 16, 1945,
raised by the defendants on the ground that it was
procured by coercion and undue influence. Even
though the burden of proving the first issue which
was substantially the central issue in the suit was laid
upon the defendants, they did not attend the Court
for examination as witnesses. By his Judgment dated
May 25, 1953, the Subordinate Judge observed that
the written statement did not contain any 'substantial
particulars of the plea of coercion or undue influence',
and that the defendants having failed to submit
themselves to give evidence in support of their plea
of coercion or undue influence despite several opportunities given in that connection, a strong presumption arose against the defendants; that viewed in the
context of the resolution dated February 20, 1945,
passed by the defendants, and the subsequent litigation which ensured between the parties, and the fact
that the resolutions dated October 16, 1945 were
acquiesced in by the defendants and were never attempted to be avoided by resort to a competent court, and
even the allegation that they were Jmproperly procured was made for the first time in the written statement in the suit before him, the plea of undue influence and coercion was not substantiated; and that
the resolutions dated October 16, 1945, were not
invalid. He further held that the resolutions passed
at the Directors' meeting dated March 3, 1946, and
at the extra-ordinary general meeting on March 21!,
1946, were unauthorised and invalid; that by holding
the meeting on March 28, 1946, in breach of the
Articles of Association and the resolutions dated
1952
Ladli Prasad Jaiswal
v.
Karnal Distillery
Co., Ltd.
Skah, J.
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
lf6Z
Lalli Pr&1.J Jaino.Z
Y.
K1UJtol Distil/try
Co., LJd.
SIWI, J.
'
October 16, 1945, it was intended to play a fraud on
Ladli Prasad by committing a clear breach of the
contract; and that the matter agitated by the plaint
did not relate to the internal management of the
Company. The learned Judge accordingly granted
the relief claimed by the plaintiff for declaration and
injunction.
In appeal by the defendants, the District Judge,
Karna! held that Ladli Prasad was in a position to
dominate the will of defendants 2 to 5 "who were
in a helpless position, being hard hit by the lack of"
adequate financial resources. that they were under
presst!re exercised by the plaintiff induced to give their
consent to the resolutions in the meeting held on
October 16, 1945, and on that account the resolu·
tions were ineffective. He observed that Ladli
Prasad took undue advantage of his dominating position qua the affairs of the Comi>any and compelled
the defendants :! to 5 to pass the resolutions and thereby obtained an unfair advantage in that he was absolved from all liability incurred by him in the course
of his management prior to the meeting held on
October 16, 10-15, and that he obtained 'a power of
veto over the affairs and smooth running of the business of the Company'. The DistrictJudge agre(d
with the trial Court that no proper notice was served
upon Ladli Prasad of the meetings held on
March 3, 1946, and March 28, 1946, and therefore
the resolutions at those meetings were not binding
upon Ladli Prasad and that in any event the resolutions of those dates were 'a fraud on the minority
rights' and were illegal and ultra vire8, but as the
plaintiff Ladli Prasad had filed his suit relying on the
rci:olution dated October 16, l 945;which was invalid,
no relief could be awarded to him.
In appeal against the decree of the District
Judge dismissing the suit filed by Ladli Prasad,
Bishan Narain, J., of the High Court of Punjab observed that the findings of the District Judge ''travellej
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
281
1962
for beyond the pleadings", and only two facts which
were pleaded were proved by the evidence viz. that the Ladli PrMad Jaiswa I
High Court of Lahore had stayed the order of the Sub- Kamal ••Distillery
ordinate Judge appointing Receivers of the affairs of
Co., Ltd.
the Company and that.Ladli Prasad was the eldest
Shali, J.
male member. The· learned Judge on a review of
the evidence found that Ladli Prasad was not in a
position to dominate the will of defendants 2 to 5
when the resolutions dated October 16, 1945, were
passed and they were the result of a compromise
unanimously accepted, and were binding on the
parties. He c_<1Ilfirmed the view of the trial Court
and the District Judge that the resolutions dated
March 3, 1946, and March 28, 1946, were invalid
because no notice was given to Ladli Prasad of the
proceedings, and in the light of his findings granted
a decree for declaration and injunction as prayed but
subject to the proviso that the decree shall not affect
the rights and liabilities of third parties who were
not members of the Company, unless thereby the
rights of the plaintiff Ladli Prasad, and the Company
were adversely affected.
Against this judgment an appeal was preferred
by the defendants with leave under cl. 10 of the
Letters Patent. In appeal the Division Bench of
the High Court reversed the decree passed by
'Bishan Narain, J., and dismissed the suit filed by
Ladli Prasad. In the view of the High Court
Ladli Prasad as the elder brother of Shanti Prasad
and uncle of Sajjan Lal and Madan Lal was in a
position to dominate their will and availing himself
of that position he obtained an unfair advantage
over them and that the failure of Shanti Prasad to
submit. himself to examination before the Court in
support of his case though improper could not be
considered as fatal to a decision m favour of the
defendants. They observed :
"I feel convinced that Ladli Prasad was throughout in a position of commanding influence
282
1962
L44Ji Prasad JoiSUJoJ
••
Kamal Di.rtilltry
ltd.
c...
Shtih, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
over his brother and younger nephews, and in
consequence thereof, he benefited himself very
substantially. This superiority and position
of vantage that he occupied continued up to
and even after the 16th October, 1945.
Under the circumstances, it was for him to
rebut the presumption that the benefits which
he had thus obtained did not stem from his
undue influence, but had been given by the
defendants freely and without any pressure,
or coercion."
They al~o observed that Ladli Prasad was in the
position to dominate the will of defendants 2 to 5
and had obtained unconscionable advantage over
them, and it was for Ladli Prasad to establish that
the resolution dated October 16, 1945 was not
vitiated on account of undue influence and this
Ladli Prasad has failed to establish. They summa·
rised their conclusions on the issue of undue influence
as follows :"To sum up, the conclusion of the District
Judge on the first issue to thi! effect that the
resolutions mentioned in para 6 of the plaint
and passed at the· Extraordinary General
Meeting. dated the 16th October, 1945 were
ineffective as having been passed under undue
influence, was a finding of fact; and this conclusion had been arrived at after a review of
the evidence placed on the record and after
having surveyed the facts and circumstances
of the case. This finding was not based either
on misconception of evidence or by adopting
a procedure contrary to law. Such evidence
as ther:· · is on the record, the history of the
business from its very inception till the final
disputes between the parties, their relationship
inter 8e, and the manner in which the plain·
tiff derived benefit for himself. and the circum-
..
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
283
stances of the case go to show :
1962
La4li Prasad Jaiswc/
(a) that the plaintiff was in a position to
dominate the will of the defendants
and used that position to obtain
unfair advantage for himself over
the other;
(b) that he held an authority over them
which was real and apparent by dint
of his being formerly a karta and
later on an elder brother in loco
parentis. He stood in a fiduciary
relation to the other standing in a
position of active confidence ;
(c) that the plaintiff in consequence of
the resolutions passed on the 16th
of October 1945 obtained for himself
unfair advantage to their serious
detriment by virtue of his position to
dominance and the transactions entered into on 16th October 1945
appear to be unconscionable ; and
(d) that the burden of proof that the
transactions were not induced by
undue influence was upon the plaintiff, he being in a position to dominate the will of others which he failed
to discharge."
On the other issues they held that the proceedings
of the resolutions in the meetings dated March 3,
1946 and March 28, 1946 were not binding upon
Ladli Prasad, but the claim made by Ladli Prasad
for a permanent injunction could not be entertained
because "equity declines to lend its aid to a person
whose conduct has been inequitable in relation to
the subject matter of the suit and that if the prayer
y,
/fant41 Distilley
Co., Lrd.
Sluih, J.
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Lt/Ii l'r-4 J.U111ol
••
K-1 DUlil/"7
eo.,w.
s"""· '·
of Ladli Prasad was granted, it would result in a
deadlock and the Company's working and affairs
would come to a stand still necessitating the winding
up of the Company." They suggested that it was
open to Ladli Prasad to seek relief available to him
under s. 155 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956
and it was open to Ladli Prasad to invoke the powen
of the Court or of the Central Government under the
Indian Companies Act, if so advised, but the High
Court would not, having regard to the apprehension
of an immediate deadlock, be justified in issuing a
pennanent injunction claimed by him in the suit.
With certificate of fitness granted by the High
Court under Art. 133 (l) (a) of the Constitution this
appeal is preferred. Two questions arise at the
threshold in this appeal :{l) Whether it was competent to the High
Court to grant a certificate
under
Art. 133 ( l) (a) or (b) of the Constitution;
and
(2) Whether in reversing the decree oC the
District Judge, Bishan Narain, J., transgressed the restrictions imposed upon the
powers of the High Court by s. 100 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Article 133 (1), in so far as it is material, provides
that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from
any j.1dgment, decree or final order in a civil
P.roceeding of a High Court in the territory of India
if the High Court certifies{a) that the amount or value of the subjectmatter of the dispute in the court of first
instance and still in dispu tc on appeal was
and is not less than twenty thousand
rupees or such other sum as may be
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
285
1962
specified in that behalf by Parliament by
law; or
Ladli PrOJad Jaiswal
(b) that the judgment, decree or final order Kan111I y,Dirtillery
Co,, Ltd.
involves directly or indirectly some claim
or question respecting property of the
Shah, J.
like amount or value ; or
(c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the
Supreme Court;
and, where the judgment, decree or final order
appealed from affirms the decision of the Court
immediately below in any case other than a case
referred to in sub-clause (c), if the High Court further
certified that the appeal involves some substantial
question of law.
The High Court has not certified the case under
sub-clause (c) of Art. 133(1). There is also no dispute that the judgment of the High Court involves
directly some claim or question respecting property
of the value exceeding twenty thousand rupees. The
Attorney-General, however, contended that the jud~
ment of the High Court against which this appeal is
preferred affirms the decision of the court immediately below and the appeal does not involve any
substantial question ·of law and therefore the
High Court was not competent to grant the certificate under Art. 133 (l)(a) & (b). It is urged that
an appeal against the judgment of a single Judge to
a Di vision Bench under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent
is a 'domestic appeal' within the High Court and in
deciding whether the decree of a Di vision Bench in
an appeal under the Letters Patent from a decision of
a single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction affirms
the decision of the Court immediately below, regard
must be had to the decree of the Court subordinate to
the High Court, against the decision of which appeal
was preferred to the High Court. In other words, it
is contended that in this case the decision of the Court
immediately below the Division Bench was the deci·
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1961
IAJJi Pros.ul Jaiswal
v.
Kamal Distilln,1
Co., Lid.
Shoh J.
sion of the District Judge and not of Bishan Narain,J.,
this it is contended is so, because the expression
'court immediately below' used in the Constitution
means 'court subordinate, 11nd a single Judge of the
High Court not being a court subordmate to the
Division Bench qua the Division Bench the District
Court was the court immediately below. But the
two expressions have not the same meaning. A court
subordinate to the High Court is a court subject to
the superintendence of the High Court. whereas a court
immediately below is the court from whose decision
the appeal has been filed. If the two expressions are
equated, the ri~ht of appeal against the decree of the
High Court sittmg in appeal over the decision of a
single Judge exercising original jurisdiction would be
severely restricted for in such an appeal whether the
judgment is of affinnance or reversal, the High Court
can certify a case under Art. 133 (1) els. (a) & (b)
only if the appeal involves a substantial question of
law. The Attomey-Genrral, however, concedes and
in our judgment properly that there has been a long
standing practice which has the approval of the
Privy Council (see Tulsi Prasad v. Renayak: L. R.
23 I. A. 102) that if the decree or order of the
Division Bench reverses the judgment of a single
Judge trying a suit or proceeding in exercise of origi ·
nal jurisdiction of the High Court and the condition
as to valuation is satisfied, an appeal lies as a matter
of course, i.e. without satisfying the condition that it
involves a substantial question of law. This view
can be justified only if a single Judge of a High
Court trying a suit or proceedin~ in exercise of the
original jurisdiction is a court immediately brlow
the Division Bench of the High Court which derides
an appeal from his decision. The right to ap pea 1
against the judgm'!nt of a single Judge whether
exercising original jurisdiction or exercising appellate jurisdiction to a Division Bench is governed
by the same clause of the Letters Patent. If for
certifying a case for appeal to this Court in a pro·
I S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
281
1962
ceeding tried in exercise of the original jurisdiction
the judgment of a single Judge is to be regarded as Ladli Pros•d JoiJ,,,.1
the decision of the court immediately below a Divi- Irarnal v.Distill1<J
sion Bench to which an appeal is filed under the
Co., Ltd.
Letters Patent, it is difficult to discover any logical
Slaah, J,
ground for holding that the judgment of a single
Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction is not such
a decision. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the
Lahore High Court (which continues to apply to
the Punjab High Court) provides, in so far as it is
material:"And we do further ordain that an appeal shall
lie to the said High Court of Judicature
from the
x
x
x
x
x
x
judgment (not being a judgment passed in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of
a decree or .order made in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the
superintendence of the said High Court
x
x
x
x
x) of one Judge of the said
x
x
x
x
x and
High Court
that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore
provided an appeal shall lie to the said High
Court from a judgment of one Judge of the
said High Court
x
x
x
x
x
in the exercise- of appell11te jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to
the superintendence of the said High Court,
where the Judge who passed the judgment
declares that the case is a fit one for appeal;
x
x
x
x."
Manifestly the clause confers an unqualified right of
appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a
single judge exercising original civil jurisdiction.
Similarly there is a right of appeal from a judgment of
a single Judge hearing a civil appeal where the judgment is not in an appeal from an appellate decree. But
against the judgment of a single judge exercising powers
288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
in appeal from an appellate decree, an appeal under
the Letters Patent only lies if the Judge declares that
Lolli Prasod Jaiswll
the case is a fit one for appeal, and not otherwise.
v.
KlllMI Distill"y
is no warrant for making a distinction between
There
Co., Ltd.
an appeal filed against the judgment of a single J uage
•/uJ/I, J.
exercising original jurisdiction and a judgment in
exercise of appellate jurisdiction. There is nothing
in the context to support the plea that the expression
'court immediately brlow' includes a Judge of the
ri.igh Court trying a proceeding in exercise of original
jurisdktlon, i. e. sittin1~ as a court of first instance,
but not a Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction.
The Constitution in cl. (1) (a) of Art. 133 hM
expressly referred to a 'court of first instance' in
prescribing the condition relating to the value of the
subject-matter and if it was intended that for the
purpose of deciding whether the judgment of the
High Court sought to be appealed against affirmed
the decision of the Court immediately below, the
decision of a single Judge was to be ignored, if it was
a judgment in exercise of appellate powers, but not
when he was exercising original jurisdiction, an
appropriate provision in that behalf would have been
enacted. In the absence of any such enactment,
the expression 'court immediately below' in Act. 133
(1) must mean the court from the decision of which
an appeal has been filed to the High Court, whether
such court is a single judge of the High Court or a
Court subject to the superintendence of the High
Court.
In Wahid-iul-din v. Makhan Lal (') a full
Bench of the Lahore High Court (Blacker, J., dissen ·
ting), held that for the purposes of s. 110 of the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908 (which is in material terms
identical with Art. 13:! of the Constitution) a Judge
of a High Court sitting to hear not an original proceeding, but as a court of appeal cannot be considered
a 'court immediately below' the Bench hearing
the Letters Patent appeal from his judgment,
(I) [1944] I.L.R. 26 Lah. 24.
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
289
'Din Mohammad, J., delivering the principal judgment of the Court observed at p. 24 7 :
"Wherever any provision is made for an appeal
to the High Court, it is the High Court as such
that is contemplated and not the Court or any
individual Judge or a combination of different
Judges. It is only for the sake of convenience
facility of disposal that some cases are required
to be heard by one Judge and some by more
Judges than one. The Court accordingly
continues to be the same even if by any domestic arrangement an appeal from one Judge lies
to a Bench of two Judges and must be taken
to be the High Court in either case.
x
x
x ·
x
x
x.
It is obvious
that the authorities dealing with a Judge of the
High Court in the exercise of his original juris·
diction can render no assistance in the disposal
of this matter and it was for this reason that
this distinction was emphasized when the
question was formulated. A Judge sitting on
the original side is merely discharging the func·
tions of a trial Court and to all intents and
purposes, therefore, he is a Court of first insta·
nee and when an appeal is lodged against his
order, as a Court he is immediately below the
Court which hears the appeal. Such an
appeal is provided for even in the Code of
Civil Procedure itself as an appeal from an
original decree. This, however, is not the case
when the same Judge sits on the appellate sicle
and for the purposes of that appeal is the High
Court in himself. Neither the Code of Civil
Procedure nor the Punjab Courts Act contemplates an appeal to another Court from ·an
order made in the High Court whether by one
Judge or more than one and consequently the
same analogy cannot apply."
1962
lAdJi Prasad Joiswol
"·
Earnol Dillillll'J
Crt. Lhl.
S/r4/J, /,
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
The learned Judge further observed :
"l cannot reconcile myself to the position th al
a Judge sitting alone can be characterised as
a tribunal inferior to the Letters Patent Bench,
merely because the Bench has power to modify
or reverse his judgment. It is not with an idea
of implying any subordination of the Court of
the Smgle Judge to the Letters Patent Bench
that such an appeal is provided for by Letters
Patent, it is merely with a view to provide a
further safeguard in the interests of the litigant
· that the domestic rules framed by the High
Court permit a case to be heard by a Judge
sitting alone."
Abdur Rahman, J ., agreeing with Din Mohammad,
J., observed :
"x
x
when a suit or proceeding is decided on the original side, it cannot but be held
to have been disposed of by the Court of first
instance and should be of the value of ten
thousand rupees or upwards before an appeal
can be taken to the Privy Council under the
first paragraph of section 110. It is this Court
of first instance which would usually be covered
by the expression "the Court immediately
below" used in the latter part of that section.
x
x
x
x
Different
considerations might prevail in construing the
expressions "the Court of first instance" and
"the Court immediately below" when "the
Court immediately below" does not happen to
be the Court of the first instance but as long as
thev arc the same the decision of the Court of
first instance whether it is by a Subordinate
.J•1dge, a District Judge or a Judge of the High
Court on its original side, where such a side
-----
--------·-----·-- --
1 S.C.R•. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
291
e~ts, must be held to have been give~-by --; 1902
Court immediately below the Court which · Ladii Puuad J•iswal
affirms or upsets . that decision on appeal. Eatnal Distill1ry
Viewed thus a Judge of a High Court sitting
ca., Ltd•
. on the original side will be the Court immeSW, J.
diately below the Court hearing an appeal from
his decision. But the same . cannot be said of
a Single Judge sitting on the appellate side who
is , never "a Court of first instance" and
cannot therefore be correctly described to have
been presiding over the Court immediately
. below the Court hearing an appeal from hiJ
judgment under th! Letters Patent."
We are unable to agree, for reasom already set out,
with the view expressed by the learned Judges of the
Lahore High Court~ There · is nothing in the
phraseology used or the context_ which justifies the
view that the expression 'the Court immediately
below' is used ins. UO of Code of Civil Procedure
. or in Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution in two-dffe- .
rent semes, according as the court is trying . a proi::ee"
ding in exercise of its original jurisdiction and in
. exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
There is a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Debendra Nath Das v. Bibudhendra Mansingh ('),
decided by Jenkins, C. J., and N. R. Chatterjee, J.,
which has expressed a similar. view. · The learned
Chief Justice in delivering the judgment of the Court
observed at p. 93 :
. "It only rem aim to be seen whether. as·_ regards
nature the r'quireinents of section 110 are fulfiU. ed. ·The Court of first instance as well as· the
lower Appellate Court decided adversely to the
present applicant. On appeal to the High Court,
a Single Judge reversed the decree of the lower
(I) (1915) I.LR. 43 Cal. 90.
..
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
J96Z
LadIi Prasad J .Uwa
••
""""'' Fmtilltr}
Co., Ltd.
Appellate Court. From this judgment of a
Single Judge there was an appeal to the High
Court under clause 15 of the Charter with the
result that the judgment of the Single Judge
was reversed by a Bench of two Judges. It will
thus be seen that the first judgment of the High
Court reversed the decree of the Court immediately below, but that this reversal was afterwards in effect cancelled with the res11lt that
the only effective judgment of the High Court
affirmed the decision of the Court immediately
below (section IIO, Civil Pn>cedure Code)."
The view appears prima facie to support the
contention that in considering whether within the
meaning of Art. l 33 (I) of the Constitution judgment
of the Court immediately below the High Court is
affirmed, the judgment of the Judge of the High Court
trying the procP.eding as a court of appellate jurisdiction must be ignored. Any expression of opinion
by the eminent Chief Jmtice wculd always be considered with the great deference and respect. It must,
however, be stated that the observations of the
learned Chief Justice were in the
nature
of obiter dicta, because in the view of the Court,
the test of pecuniary valuation was satisfied and in the
appeal a substantial question of law was involved,
and on that account the Court was bound to certify
the case. It was therefore strictly not necessary to
consider whether the judgment affirmed the decision
of the court immediately below. It must also be
observed that the learned Chief Justice equated the
expression "Court immediately below" with the expression "Court subordinate" used in s. ll 5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. That is clear from the observations made by him "that a Judge sitting alone is
not a Court subordinate tn the High Court, but
performs a function directed to be performed by
the High Court (clause 36, Letters Patent).
And thus no decision of a Single Judge can be revised
l S.C.R.
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS
293
1962
under section 115 of the Code." But as we have
already pointed out the test for determining the right Ladli p;;;;;;;JJaiswal
to appeal is not whether the judgment is of a.Oaurf Karn!ll v.Distillery
subordinate, but whether the judgment is of a Oourf
Co., Ltd.,
immediately below. The two expressions being diffe.
rent, the same considerations do not apply in their
interpretation. A similar view was also expressed
in a •very recent juqgment by the Andhra Pradesh
High Court decided on August 18, 1961: Vadiapatla
Marayya v. Vallabhaneni Buchiramayya (which has
not yet been officially reported). ·
There are however two earlier judgments of the
Lahore High Court which have expressed a contrary
view. Minna Heatherly v. B. 0. Sen (') and Gopal
Lal v. Balkissan ('). In these two cases it was hdd
that a Single Judge of the High Court hearing an
appeal is within the meaning of s. 110 of the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908 a court immediately below
the Division Bench of the High. Court hearing an
appeal under the Letters Patent. The High Court of
Nagpur in Kishanlal Nandlal v. Vithal Nagayya, ('),
has preferred the earlier view of the Lahore High
Court.
In our judgment the appeal with certificate
granted by the High Court under Art. 133 (1) (a)
and (b) is competent, because a Single Judge of the
High Court hearing either a proceeding as a Court
of original jurisdiction or in exercise of appellate
jurisdiction is a Court immediately below the Division Bench which hears an appeal against his judgment under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent.
Bishan Narain. J., was, it is true, hearing an
appeal from an appellate decree and his powers were
restricted, for a second appeal lies to the High Court
only on the following grounds, namely :(a) the decision being contrary to law or to
some usage having the force of law;
(I) A.l.R. (19271Lah.537.
(21 (1931) 1.L.R. IS Lah. 3~8.
(3) 1.L.R. (1955) Nag. 821.
294
1962
L4dJi I- rOSdd JaiswaJ
v.
Ktml4/ l!i•lillrry
Co., LUI.
Shah, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
(b) the decision having failed to determine
some material issue of law or usage having
the force of law;
(c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other
law for the time being in force, which may
possibly have produced error or defect in
the decision of the case upon the merits.
Whether a particular transaction was vitiated on the
ground of undue influence is primarily a decision
on a question of fact. In Salgur Prasad v. Har
Narain Das ('),the Privy Council held that in a suit
to set aside a deed on the ground that it was procured by undue influence and fraud, the finding that
it was so procured is a finding of fact and is not liable to be re-opened if fairly tried. Under the Civil
Procedure Code, a second appeal does not lie to the
High Court, except on the grounds specified in the
relevant provision of the Code, prescribing the right
to prefer a second appeal, and the High Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal "on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact however gross
or inexcusable the error may seem to be" ( Mussummant Durga Chou.dhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri (')). 'But the challenge before Bishan Narain, J.,
to the decision of the District Judge was founded not
on the plea that appreciation of evidence was erroneous, but that there were no adequate particulan
of the pica of undue influence, that the particulars of
facts on which undue influence was held established
by the District Judge were never set np, that there
was no evidence in support of the finding of the
District Judge and that burden of proof on a misconception of the real nature of the dispute was wrongly
placed on the plaintiff. A decision of the first appellate Court reached after placing the onus wrongly
or based on no evidence, or where there has been
substantial error or defect in the procedure, producing
(I) (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 147.
(2) (1890) L.R. 171.A. 122.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
295
error or defect in the decision of the case on the
merits, is not conclusive and a second appeal lies
to the High Court against that decision.
1962
Ladli Prasad Jaiswol
y,
KatnJJI Distill,,.
Co., Ltd. .
0. 6 r. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in all cases in which the party pleading
relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of
trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all
other cases in which particulars 'may be necessary
beyond such as are exemplified in the forms in the
Appendix, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading. The reason
of the rule is obvious. A plea that a transaction is
vitiated because of undue influence of the other party
thereto, gives notice merely that one or more of a
variety of insidious forms of influence were brought
to bear upon the party pleading undue influence, and
by exercising such influence, an unfair advantage
was obtained over him by the other. But the
object of a pleading is to bring the parties to a trial
by concentrating their attention on the matter in
dispute, so as to narrow the controversy to precise
issues, and to give notice to the parties of the nature
of testimony required on either side in support .of their
respective cases. A vague or general plea can never
serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore
be required to plead the precise nature of the influence
exercised, the manner of use of the influence, and
the unfair advantage obtained by the other. This
rule has been evolved with a view to narrow the
issue and protect the party charged with improper
conduct from being taken by surprise. A plea of
undue influence must, to serve that dual purpose, be
precise and all necessary particulars in su{lport of the
plea must be embodied in the pleading : if the particulars stated in the pleading are not sufficient and
specific the Court should, before proceeding with the
trial of the suit, insist upon the particulars, which
give adequate notice to the other side of the case
in tended to be set up.
Shah, J.
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
lAdli Prasad Jois1D1JI
••
K.,naJ Disti/lny
Co., lid.
Skah, J.
In Bluirat Dharma Syndicate v. Hari8h
Chandra ('), the Privy Council emphasized the nece·
ssity of particulars in the following terms :
"Their Lordships desire to call attention to the
great difficulty which is occasioned both to
persons charged with fraud or other improper
conduct, and to the tribunal which are called
upon to decide such issues, if the litigant who
prefers the charges is not compelled to place
on record precise and specific details of those
charges. In the present case, the petitioner
ought not to have been allowed to proct'ed with
his petition and seek to prove fraud, unless and
until he had, upon such terms as the Court
thought fit to impose, amended his petition by
including therein full particulars of the allegations which he intended to prove: Such cases
as the present will be much simplified if this
practice is strictly observed and insisted tipon
by the Court, even if, as in the present case, no
objection is taken on behalf of the parties who
are interested in disproving the accusations."
Similarly this Court in Bishnudeo Narain v. Seogeni
Rai and .Jagernath ('), in dealing with the practice to
be followed in a case where a plea of undue influence
and coercion is raised, observed at p. 656 :
"It is also to be observed that no proper parti·
culars have been furnished. Now if there is
one rule which is better established than any
other, it h that_in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must
set fonh full particulars and the ca!e can only
be decided on the particulars as laid. There
can be no departure from them in evidence.
General allegations are insufficient even to
amount to an averment of fraud of which any
court ought to take notice however strong the
(1) (1917) 64 l.A. U6.
(2) [1951) s.c.R. ~·a.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
297
language in which they are couched may be,
and the same applies to 'undue influence and
coercion."
962
Ladli Prasad Jaiswal
v.
Kamal Distillny
c•. , Ltd.
The plea of undue influence and coercion by
the Company and defendants 2 to 5 was raised in
terms which were identical. The plea analysed in its
component parts may be stated as follows :(1) Because of the resolution dated October 16,
1945 the plaintiff "succeeded in getting
dictatorial powers over the Company,
practically usurping all the p6wers of the
General body of the shareholders .and
thereby purporting to deprive them to
exercise even those rights which they" were
"legally entitled to exercise under the
law" ;
(2) "These resolutions which gave the plaintiff a complete veto over the affairs of the
Company (which is not permissible under
any valid constitution) were obtained by
the plaintiff at the point of a dagger" ;
(3) "That the plaintiff was refusing to hand
over charge of the inoneys, books and the
entire assets of the Company and using the
funds of the Company for ruinous litigation against the defendants who on the
other hand were having to prosecute their
c~es out of their meagre funds which too
were dwindling fast" ;
(4) "Taking foll advantage of his position
. and knowing fully well the resources of
the defendants, the plaintiff succeeded in
coercing the defendants in submitting to
his dictations and virtually compelled
Shah, J.
298
1962
LoJJi PTAJOJ J•isw.l
••
K.,,,.1 Distil/ey
CA.,W.
Shali, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
them to pass ,these unconstitutional resolutions."
It may be observed that though issue No. 1 raised a
plea both of coercion and undue influence as vitiating the ~resolutions, no attempt was made to rest
the right to relief on a case of coercion in the Courts
below and in this Court.
The first part of the case of the defendants
amounts to a plea that by the resolutinr:3 dated
October 16, 1945 that plaintiff acquin:d a position of
domination over the affairs of the Company and over
the defendants. What the second part means it is
difficult to appreciate. The language used is somewhat extravagant : it is not the case of the defendants
that they were compelled to agree to the resolutions
by threats of physical violence. By the third part it
is affirmed that the plaintiff unlawfully refused to part
with the moneys, books and the assets of the Company and commenced litigation with the aid of the
funds of the Company whereas the defendants had to
rely upon their own resources which were limited.
Presumably this has reference to the refusal of the
plaintiff to comply with the resolution of February 20,
1945 and to litigation which ensued between the
parties after the resolution was passed. It is difficult
to regard this as a plea' precisely expressing thac the
plaintiff was in a position to dominate the will of the
defendants. The last part of the plea is that taking
advantage of his position and knowing that the
position of the defendants was precarious he succeeded in compelling the defendants to su.bmit to his
dictation and compelled them to pass the resolutions.
'
The pleading which was regarded as one of
undue influence also suffers from a lack of particulars. How the plaintiff took advantage of his
position· as a person in possession of the assets of the
Company and by what device he compelled the
1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
-
196i
defendants to submit to his will has not been stated.
Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, which incor- lAdli l'raSid J.Uw•l
porates the law relating to undue influence in its Kamal ••Distilllr.1
application to contracts is but a particularisation
Co,, Ltd.
of a larger principle. All transactions procured in
Sluih, J.
the manner set out therein, are regarded as procured
by the exercise of undue influence. Section 16 of the
Contract Act provides :
" (1) A contract is said to be induced by
'undue influence' where the relations subsisting
between the parties are such that one of the
parties is in a position to dominate the will of
the other and, uses that po~ition to obtain an
unfair advantage over the other.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing principle, a person is
deemed to be in a position to dominate the will
of another(a)
where he holds a real or apparent
authority over the other, or where he
stands in a fiduciary relation to the
other; or
(b) where he makes a contract with a
person whose mental capacity is
temporarily or permanently affected
by reason of age, illness, or mental or
bodily distress.
(3) where a person who is in a position to
dominate the will of another, enters into a
contract with him, and the transaction
appears, on the face of it or on the
evidence adduced, to be unconscionable,'
the burden of proving that such contract
was not induced by undue jufluence shall
lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other.,
300 SU PRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1962
•.
lodli Prasdd JaisW1SI
Xat1141 Di1tilln,
Co., lid.
Shah, J.
Nothing in this sub-section shall affect the
provisions of section 111 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872."
The doctrine of undue influence under the
common law was evolved by the Courts in England
for granting protection against transactions procured
by the exercise of insidious forms of influence spiritual and temporal. The doctrine applies to acts of
bounty as well as to other transactions in which one
party exercising his position of dominance obtains an
unfair advantage over another. The Indian enactment is founded substantially on the rules of English
common law. The first sub-section of s. 16 lays
By sub·
down the principle in general terms.
s~ction (2) a presumption arises that a person shall
h~ deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of
another if the cnnditions set out therein arc fulfilled.
Sub·section (3) lays down the conditions for raising a
rebuttablc presumption that a transaction is procured
by the exercise of undue influence. The reason for
the rule in the third sub-section is that a person who
has obtained an advantage over another by domi[)at·
ing his will, may also remain in a position to suppress
the requisite evidence in support of the plea of undue
influence.
A transaction may be vitiated on account of
undue influence where the relations between the
parties are such that one of them is in a position
to dominate the will of the other and he uses his
pmition to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.
It is manifest that both the conditions have ordinarily
to be established by the person seeking to avoid the
transaction : he has to prove that the other party to a
transaction was in a position to dominate his will and
that the other party had obtained an unfair
advantage by usin~ that position. Clause (2) lays
down a sptcial presumption that a person is deemed
to be in a position to dominate the will of another
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
1962
where he holds a real or apparent authority over the
other. or where he stands in a fiducfary relation to Laili Prasad Jaiswal
the other or where he enters into a transaction with a Emal v.Distillery
person whose mental capacity is temporarily or
Co., ltd.
permanently affected by reason of age, illness or
Shah, J.
mental or bodily distress. Where it is proved that a
person is in a position to dominate the will of another
(such proof being furnished either by evidence. or by
the presumption arising under sub-section (2) and ·he
enters into a transaction with that other person, which
on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, appears
to be unconscionable the burden of proving that the
transaction was not induced by undue influence lies
upon the person in a position to dominate the will of
the other. But sub-section· (3) has manifestly a limited
application : the presumption will only arise if it is
established by evidence that the party who had
obtained the benefit of a transaction was in a position
to dominate the will of the other and that the trans·
action is shown ·to be unconscionable. If either of
these two conditions is not fulfilled the presumption
of undue influence will not arise and burden will not
shift.
.
Assuming that in this case a plea of undue
influence was attempted to be raised by para·
graph 4 of the Company's written statement and
paragraph 6 of the written statement of the other
defendants, defendants 2 to 5 have not submitted
themselves for examination before the Court. The
burden of proving undue influence primarily lay
upon the defendants who were setting up the plea.
The. manner in which the case on behalf of the
defendants was conducted reflects little credit upon
those in charge of the case. The primary issue on
which the defendants sought to defend the suit raised
the plea of undue influence and coercion in relation
to the resolution dated October 16, 1945, and we
should have expected the defendants to open the
case and lead evidence in suppor.t of their plea. But
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
na
lM1l " - ' Jl!bwl
y,
ll- Dillill"7
Co., UL
SW. J.
on December 11, 1950 after the second defendant
Shanti Prasad produced a number of documents
which he was summoned to produce, the plaintiff
for some reason not apparent on the record opened
the case. Counsel for the plaintiff stated that the
plaintiff was at that stage to be examined only on
the issue of which the onus lay upon the plaintiff
and that the plaintiff would be examined in rebuttal
after the defendants closed their case and that he
will examine the remaining witnesses mentioned in
his list in rebuttal. Manifestly at that stage the
evidence of the plaintiff led expressly on issues
other than the first issue of undue influence could
not be directed to rebutting any presumption of
undue influence, for there was before the Court no
evidence proving the facts on the proof of which
alone the presumption under sub-s. (3) of s. 16 may
arise and the burden of proof shift. After the
plalliciff concluded his evidence on the issues on
which the plaintiff offered to lead evidence, on behalf
of the defendents two witnesses Mohan Singh and
Raghu Nandan were examined. Mohan Singh
said nothing which might have a bearing on the
plea of undue influence. Raghu Nandan made
certain equivocal statements about examination of
accounts at the meeting of October 16, 1945 and
further stated that the compromise pursuant to
which the resolutions were passed was arrived at
about midnight of October 15, at the residence
of the plaintiff Ladli Prasad, and that to his
knowledge the defendants had no other source of
income except the director's remuneration. Beyond
this he appears to have said nothing which directly
supported the defendant's case of undue influence.
Thereafter followed a baffling series of applications
made with a view to _protract the procecdmg in the
suit, presumably to procure a situation in which the
principal defendant Shr,11ti Prasad may avoid going
mto the witness box. By diverse applications the
proceeding was protracted till May 1953, but neither
1 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT R,EPORTS
303
1962
Shanti Prasad nor the othel! memben of the family
appeared before the· Court for e.xamination as' ~; Pruu l.U.cl
witnesses in support of the defendants' case of undue
~"''
inflµence. An· application submitted on April 27,
c.., Ll'1953 after the case was set down for judgment for
sw, 1,
the · examination of Shanti Prasad was rightly
rejected by the Subordinate.Judge. · A bare perusal
of the statements and the cour.se which the procee·
dings have taken leads to the only conclusion that
the defendants did not desire to give evidence.in
support of their plea of undue influence and to
subject themselves to cross-examination. There
may arise cases in which even though the burden
lies on the defendants to prove their case of undue
influence they may establish it from admissions made
by the plaintiff or his witnesses· or from 6ther
evidence, and without giving their own testimony,
but this, in our judgment, is not such a case. ·
ir.,,..
Before directing our attention to the findings
of the District Judge from which undue influence
wu infeitred, it is. necesllary to reiterate certain
undisputed . facts. Ladli Prasad was the eldC9t male
member in the family but the family had severed
its joint status in 1940 and the business of the family
was taken over by a private limited company, in
which the three branches held'shares. Under the
Articles of Association as originally framed in 1941,
Ladli Prasad was dra\Ving from the Company an
allowance of Rs. 1800/- per mensem, a commission
of 7!% o~ the net profits of the Company and the
car allowance of Rs. 350/· per mensem and an
allowance of Rs. 30/· per day during tours together
with a new car every third year for use, whereas
the other directors were getting only Rs. 250/· per
mensem, and Rs. 25/- for every meeting of directors
attended. Defendants 2 to 5 revolted against this
disparity in the scale of remuneration and by
resolution
dated February 20, 1945 removed
Ladli Prasad from the Managing Directorship of
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
•.
Lldli Prasad JaisUJdl
Kanwl Di.rti/l<ry
Ca., Ltd.
Shah, J.
the Company. This step of the defendants led to
litigation. Shanti Prnsad claimed to enforce hiJ
rights under the resolution, and Ladli Prasad sought
to retain possession asserling that the resolution was
invalid. There were thereafter negotiations for
settlement of the disputes, at which several near
relations and employees of the Company were
present, and certain terms of compromise were
agreed upon pursuant to which in the meeting dated
October 16, 1945 held at the residence of Ladli
Prasad resolutions were passed, which had the effect
of equalising the share holding of the three branches,
and the remuneratioo drawn by them. Ladli Prasad
was also given complete discharge from liability for
his previous dealings, resolutions of February 20, 1945
were cancelled, and amendments were made in the
Articles of Association requiring that all decisions
of the Board of Directors shall be unanimous. Thereafter by the special resolution passed in the extraordinary General Meeting dated March 28, 1946, the
resolutions dated October 16, 19i5 were cancelled,
the plaintiff-Ladli Prasad-was removed from his
post of Chairman, and also of Director, and Shanti
Prasad was appointed Managing Director. The
resolutions dated October 16, 1945 were acted upon,
equalisation of share holding was effected by transfer
of shares, and Shanti Prasarl assumed the office of
Manager of the Company, and presumably dividend
declared at the meeting and remuneration settled were
accepted. The defendants did not institute any
proceeding to have the resolutions declared null and
void on the ground that they had been secured by
undue influence, and the plea that they were invalid
was set up for the first time in the suit instituted by
the plaintiff.
In support of his conclusion that undue influence was exercised by the plaintiff upon defendants 2,
4 and 5, the District Judge recorded the findings
that the plaintiff was the eldest male member of the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
305
1951
. family, and there was no one to look after the
interests of defendants 2 to 5; that the plaintiff had Ladli Prasad J aisu1a1
taken into his possession a!l the jewellery belonging E11rnal v.Distil/tr;·
Co., Ltd.
to defendants 2 to 5 and this jewellery was restored
to them after the compromise of October 16, 1945;
oh.Ji, I.
that after the joint family was dissolved and the
business of Kishori Lal & Sons was taken over by
the Company, plaintiff received as much as Rs.3000/·
per month as salary, daily allowance, motor-car
allowance and under other miscellaneous heads,
whereas the other Directors received only an allowance of Rs. 250/· per month and a fee of Rs 25/per day for attending the meetings of the Board of
Directors; that the plaintiff had started another
Company in the name of J agatjit Distilling and
Allied Industries, Hamira from which he made
large profits and had "become a business magnate";
that at the time of the compromise the financial
position of the defendants was "helpless and miserable" and they were not doing any other business
and had no other source of income. After the
operation of the order appointing Receiver passed
by the Subordinate Judge, Kamal was stayed by
'\he High Court of Lahore, defendants 2 to 5 were
not in a position to defend .. their Tights because of
lack of financial resources j!.nd the plaintiff took
advantage of their helplessness and dictated terms
which were not fair; and that the plaintiff was
interested in creating a deadlock and thereby to make
large profits from his separate concem,-the
Jagatjit Distilling and Allied Industries. The
District Judge inferred from these findings that the
plaintiff Ladli Prasad was in a position to dominate
the will of defendants 2 to 5, that he could exert
undue influence upon them because "they were in
a very wretched position being hard pressed by the
lack of money"; that the near relations of the family
were present at the meeting to protect the interests
of the family and they could not be expected to
safeguard the interest of defendants 2 to 5; and that
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
1961
L.Jli PrdSMI Jaisuud
v.
l\om•l Di.Jtilltt,J
ltd.
c..,
Shoh, I.
there was no evidence that defendants 2 to 5 received
advice from any one else, or that they gave their·
consent to the compromise with free exercise of their
volition. He held that the plaintiff got himself
absolved from all liability to account for his dealing
with the assets of the company since he commenced
management as a .Managing Director, and that he
'obtained by the resolution a powrr of ·veto' and
managed to get himself appointed a permanent
Director. The learned Judge, therefore, concluded
relying upon the "presumption of undue influence
on account of the above-mentioned facts" that the
defendants 2 to 5 were induced by the exercise of
undue influence and coercion to give their consent
to the minut~s of the meeting held on October 16,
l 945 and the plaintiff had failed to adduce any
satisfactory evidence to rehut the prfsumption.
In our view the conclusions of the District
Judge could not be regarded as binding upon the
High Court in second appeal, for he rai~ed the
inference of undue influence from facts which were
never pleaded and proved, and he relied upon the
presumption under s. 16 (3) without the conditions
prescribed therebv being fulfilled. The only facts on
which the defendants relied in support of their
pica in their written statement were that the
plaintiff was in posscision of the books, and assets
of the Company ; that he used the funds of the
Company for litigation, and that taking full advantage or his position the plaintiff succeeded in
coercing the defendants to submit to his dictation.
The first avcnncnt w:i.s admitted and the other two
were denied by the plaintiff. There is no pica and no
evidence on the r~cord to prove that there was no one
to look after the interest of defendant~ 2 to 5 that all
the jewellery of the defendants was prior to October· 16, 19!5 in the possession of the plaintiff; that
the plaintiff had made large profits from Ja~atjit
Distilling and Allied Industries; that the plaintiff
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
1962
was interested in creating a deadlock with a view to
securi: benefit for his concern J agatjit Distiller; that Ladli Pr.,ad Jaiswal
.the financial position of the defendants was "helpless Kamal ••
Distili,,.,
and miserable"; that the defendants were not in a
Co., Ltd.
position to de.fend their Tights because of lack of
Shah, J,
financial resources; and the plaintiff on that account
dictated terms of compromise which were not fair.
Again the presumption under s. 16 (3) could not
come to.the aid of the defendants. The two conditio!lS on the proof of which alone the presumption
arises are that the plaintiff was in a position to dominate· the will of the defendants, and the transaction
was unconscionable. It was not pleaded by the defendants that as the eldest male member of the family,
the plaintiff. was in position to dominate the will of
the defendants; nor was there evidence to show that
he h<lld any real or appare.nt authority over the
defendants. on that account.
Admittedly on
February 20, 1945 the defendants had by a resolution of the Company removed the plaintiff from the
post of Managing Director. · It is true that the plaintiff refused to accept the validity of that resolution,
and declined to hand over management of the affairs
of the Company to Shanti Prasad; but that does not
establish that he was in a position to dominate the
' will of the defendants. Again the transaction cannot
be called unconscionable. The Plaintiff Ladli Prasad
was under the original appointment drawing an allowance exceeding Rs. 3000/- per month and held the
largest single block .of shares and occupied the office
of Managing Director. By the resolution his remuneration was reduced to Rs, 900/-, he was deprived
. of his office of Managing Director and his share
holding was also reduced and made equal to that of
the other branches of the family. It is true tlrat he
became Chairman of the Board of Directors, but on
that account he acquired no superior rights. All
resolutions of the Board of Directors had under the
amended Articles to be unanimous and no member
co11ld be removed by the other;. These resolutions
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
operated as much to the benefit of the defendants 2
Lai/Ji hasod /lli11Hl to 5 as of the plaintiff. It is true that by the resoluv.
tions passed at the meeting all previous dealings of
Kamal Distill1r7
the plaintiff were validated and he was absolved
c..,1.Jd.
from liability in respect of those transactions. The
Shah, J.
plaintiff has affirmed on oath that this was so because
accounts were 'gone into' before the meeting, and
the defendants have not entered the witness box to
depose to the contrary, though the burden of proving
that unfair advantage was obtained by the plaintiff
lay upon the defendants. Undoubtedly a resolution
which absolved the plaintiff from liability for all his
past dealings, without settling accounts, may appear
prima f acie unfair, but the District J u<lge did not
hold that accounts were not scrutinised before the
resolutions of October 16, 1!145 were passed, In any
event there is no evidence on the record that accounts
were not scrutinised and accepted by the defendants
2 to 5 before the compromise which culminated in
the impugned re~olutions. The only evidence on
behalf of the defendants was of Raghu NandanWorks Manager of the Kamal Distillery. He stated
"the compromise was finalised at about 12 and
1 A. M. at night. I stayed outside for some time,
but at the time of finalising of the compromise, I
was prc~cnt at the place where the compromise had
taken place. The accounts were gone into at that
time. So far as I know accounts were never sent for
x
x
:s:
x
during the talk of compromise.
S. P. Jaiswal insisted on sreing the accounts, but
abruptly he signed the compromise." In crossexamination he stated "I do not know if parties had
been carrying on the negotiations about the compromise some 5 or 6 days before same was arrived at,
but I know that they were there on the 15th
:s:
x
:s:
x
I do not know when the compromise (talks) started. The compromise was finalised between the night of the 15th and I 6th, and on
the morning of the 16th, I was told to take office
records to Karna!." The plaintiff Ladli Prasad has
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
deposed that the accounts were scrutinised before the
resolutions. It has to be remembered that in pursuance of the resolutions dated October 16, 1945
Shanti Prasad assumed the office of Manager of the
Company, and it is common ground that the books
of account were in his possession since that date.
The books were originally under the control of the
plaintiff : since the resolutions they were with the
defendants and the defendants have not led any
evidence to show that in respect of his dealings for
the period he was in management the plaintiff Ladli
Prasad was liable to the Company.
It cannot in the circumstances be held that
the High Court was bound by the findings recorded
by the District Judge. .For reasons already mentioned the conclusion on the issue of undue influence was based on allegations which were never
pleaded and proved. Bish an Narain, J., was therefore
right in holding that the findings of the District Judge
travelled beyond the pleadings of the defendants, and
"that besides the facts that the plaintiff is the eldest
surviving brother and· the High Court stayed the
operation of the order appointing the Receivers, there
is no evidence in support of the findiags of the
District Judge."
On a review of the evidence, which Bishan
Narain, J., was entitled in the circumstances to embark upori, he came to the conclusion that the defendants had failed to establish the plea of undue influence. The Division Bench of the High Court in appeal under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent held on an
elaborate review of the evidence that the conclusion
of the District Judge on the issue of undue influence
was cor~ect. We must examine the findings recorded
by the Division Bench, because the decision that the
conclusions of the District Judge were not binding
upon Bishan Narain, J., does not effectively dispose
of the appeal. This Court must decide whether on
1962
LaJli Prasad Ja;sw:tl
y,
Kartllll Dittill"Y
Co., Ltd.
Shah, J.
310, SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS (1964] VOL.
1962
LUJi Prasad JllislMi
v.
Ka111al DiJtilltr)'
Co., Lui.,
Shah, J.
the pleading of the -defendants and tlie evidence on
the r~cord, the conclusion of the High Court may independently of the findings of the District Judg~ be
sustained. The High Court observed that as "the
karta and elder brother, the plaintiff Ladli Prasad
was in a position to dominate the will of the defendants and that he obtained an unfair advantage over
them. In coming to that conclusion the learned
Judges relied upon "the Hindu Shastric injunctions
and highly cherished Hindu sentiments that an elder
brother in relation to his younger brothers or an
uncle in relation to his fatherless nephews is placed on
a high. pedesta I next after parents" and inferred that
the plaintiff must be deemed to be in loco parentis
to tlle defendants and that he not only held an authority which is both real and apparent but he stood in a
fiduciary relationship and taking advantage of his
position he could and did dominate the will of the
defendants. The learned Judges 1ecognised that the
case of the defendants suffered from the infirmity
that they did not offer to be witnesses in the case, but
they observed that "the:r omission in that behalf
though improper could not be considered fatal because· having regard to the circumstances, undue influence could be inferred, the plaintiff Ladli Prasad
having been in a position of superiority and a position
of vantage which he continued to occupy till
October J 6, l!l45."
In our judgment, there is no evidence to support
the finding that Ladli Prasad was <JUa the other members in loco ])'.Jrenlis. The three branches of the family had separated in 1940, and were living apart.
It is true that Ladli Prasad was drawing remuneration which was many times the remuneration drawn
by the other branches but the validity of the resolutions under which he commenced drawing that remuneration has never been challenged. By February
1945 the disputes between Ladli Prasad on the one
hand, and the other members had come to a head,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS
311
and by the resolution dated February 20, 1945
Ladli Prasad was removed from his office of Managing Director. This was an "open revolt" against
whatever authority Ladli Prasad may have once possessed. Shanti Prasad filed a suit against Ladli Prasad
to secure custody of the assets of the Company as
Managing Director, and obtained an order for appointment of a Receiver of the assets. It would be a
complete perversion of the true situation to hold in
this case in the light of the Circumstances that merely
because Ladli Prasad was the eldest male member,
he was in 'loco parentis' qua defendants 2 to 5. It
may be noticed, that this ground that Ladli Prasad
stood in the relation similar to that of a parent qua
defendants 2, 4 and 5 was never pleaded by the defendants. The defendants were represented by their
Ir-~)'ers in the two suits which were filed since
February 20, 1945 ahd it is difficult ·to· accept that
though litigating in Court in assertion of the rights
claimed by them, they were so much under the influence of Ladli Prasad (who at the material time was
only about 27 years of age) that they could not secure independent advice. For reasons already mentioned the resolutions were, unless it was established
that the plaintiff Ladli Prasad was given a discharge
without scrutiny of aceounts, not uncon1cional:ile.
Negotiarions for a compromise were c;irried on for
more than five days and several relations of the parties
who were obviously interest.ed ih defendants 2 to 5
were present. If the plaintiff had attempted to .exercise his authority over the defendants some reliable
evidence should have.been forthcoming in' that behalf.
The circumstance·. that none of the defendants gave
evitience in support· qf their plea, even after protracting the proceedings for more than two years raises a
strong presumption against them that they realised
the infirmity of their case and were not willing to
submit themselves to cross-examination.
Raghu Nandan who was practically the ·only
witness examined by the defendant to depose to what
1962
Laili Prasad Jaiswa/
••
Kamal Distillery
c,,,, Lt«.
Shah, J.
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
Latlli PrOJ"JJ J.Ullldl
v.
K•11.t Distal/'?
c•. ,w.
Skalt, J.
transpired at the negotiations and the meeting which
culminated in the impugned resolutions has not 1aid
anything which may even indirectly support their
case. The case that the plaintiff refused to part with
the jewellery of the defendants, and on that account
was able to compel the defendants, to agree to the
reaolutiom was never pleaded and nq,evidence was
given by the defendants in that behalf. Ladli Pra.tad
deposed that he had some jewellery belonging to the
defendants 2 to 5, and that the defendanu were in
pcmcssion of his own j ewell.cry, and after the meeting of October 16, 1945 the jewellery was exchanged. There is again no evidence that the defendents were at the material time in financial difficulties. Admittedly partition of joint family assets had
taken place, and the different branchea had obtained
their shares in severalty except in the businCM. Defendants have also led no evidence as to what their
financial resources in 1945 were, and the assumption made by the High Court in that behalf are not
warranted. It is true that because of resolution
No. 12 requiring every decision of the Board of Directors to be unanimous, and deletion of Art. 4 7, if
the Directors quarrell«;d, creation of an impasse may
be visualised, but by the resolutions the plaintiff acquired no overriding privilege. J.fis right.s were the
same as of the other branches of the: family. On the
question as to what transpired at and before the
meeting dated October 16, 1945 there is the evidence
of Devi Prasad which may be briefly referred to.
He has deposed that he was present at the meeting
and that the compromise was arrived at by the free
consent of the parties and no undue influence was
exercised by any party on the other. The compromise talks had begun a week earlier,. and the account
books of the Karna! Distillery Company were produced at the time of the compromise, and the books
were examined by defendants 2 to 5 and some objections raised during the talks of compromise were
settled after seeing the books of account. The
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
1962
witness also produced a copy of the minutes of the
meeting which had taken place at 10-30 A.M. on Ladli Pro1t1i Jailwol
October 16, 1945 stating that the same were typed Kamal ••Distilll'.1
by him. There was substantially no cross-examinaCo., Lid.
tion of this witness on the evidence given by him that
SliaA, J.
the account books were examined during the negotiations for compromise. The finding of the High Court
that the books of account were never examined and
the plaintiff pursuaded the defendants to give him a
complete discharge in respect of the liabilities incurred
by him for his transactions was never pleaded in the
written statement, though it was an important parti·
cular which if true would have been pleaded. Even
assuming that on the general plea of undue influence
it was open to the defendants to lead evidence on this
matter, the defendants have not chosen to lead any
reliable evidence to show that that books of account
were not examined and entries were not verified, and
the equivocal evidence made by the witness Raghu
Nandan has no evidentiary value at all. It is true
that the plaintiff had started another Company in
the name of J agatjit Distilling and Allied Industries
but even if that circumstance has any bearing on the
issue of undue influence there is again little evidence
that he had made large profits and had acquired
influence and power thereby. The appointment of
receivers by the Court oC Subordinate Judge, Kamal
was stayed by the High Court, but that single circumstance will not justify an inference that the defendants
were effectively prevented . from prosecuting their
claim. There is no evidence to show that the
plaintiff was interested in creating a deadlock so as
to prevent the smooth and successful business of the
Company.
The only two facts viz. that the plaintiff was
the eldest member and that he was before the resolu tion dated February 20, 1945 receiving very much
larger sums of money from the Company as his remuneration in comparison with the remuneration
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vot.
1962
..
wi/1 "'""'' Jai1u·al
Con«al DiJlil/41}
Co., Lill.
Shalr, J.
received by the defendants, viewed in the light of the
other circumstances will not justify an inference that
the plaintiff was in a position to dominate the will of
the defendants. For reasons already stated the High
Court was in error in relying upon the presumption
antler sub-section (3) of s, 16, because in our view the
evidence does not justify the conclusion that the
plaintiff was in a position to dominate the will of the
defendants and that the resolutions gave an uncons·
cionablc advantage to the plaintiff. We must add
that the decisions of the District Court and Division
Bench of the High Court, suffered from serious
infirmities in that they wrongly placed the onns of
proof upon the plaintiff, and reached a conclusion
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the resolutions
were not obtained by the exercise of undue influence.
It was urged that in any event, at this late
stage-sixteen years after the date on which the resolutions were passed by the defendants at the meeting
dated March 28, 19,15-this Court would not be
justified in declaring the actions of the defendants in
pur>uance of the resolutions, invalid, for they would
affect third parti<lS who must have dealt with the
Company on the footing that the manangement of
the Company had authority to transact business. But
the plaintiff has unauthorisedly been dcpri vcd of
his rights by the arbitrary conduct of the defendants.
All the Courts below have held that the resolutions
dated .March 28, 1946 are invalid. The High Court
declined to grant relief to the p' :iintiff, for in their
view the plaintiff had disentitlcd himself to equitable
relief because of his previous .com;luct in exercising
undue influence, and thereby securing an unfair advantage to which hew.as not lawfully entitled. It is
unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the question
whether in the circumstances it was a sufficient
gtound for depriving the plaintiff of relief, for we are
of opinion that subject to the reservations made by
Bishan Narain, J., which fully protect third parties,
I
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i s.c.R.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3i5
relief should be awarded. Before the learned Judge,
counsel for the plaintiff gave an undertaking that he
will not question the dealings of the defendants qiw
third parties, and requested expressly that the prayer
for declaration that all acts of the Company and the
defendants which affected him personally qua the
members of the Company may alone be declared
invalid. That, in .our judgment, should be sufficient
to meet any objection which may be raised by the
defendants on the score of delay.
It was also submitted that the plaintiff has lost
his right to the shares since the suit was instituted
because the Company had enforced its lien and had
sold the shares of the plaintiff in enforcement of the
lien. The validity of that action of the Company
has been challenged in a separate proceeding, and
we need express no opinion on that question. All
the Courts have come to the conclusion that the reso·
lutions dated March 3, 1946 and Ivfarch 28, l!lt6
were invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. Therefore, any action taken by the defendants pursuant to
those resolutions may prima facie be regarded as
ineffective.
·
. On that view of the case, this appeal must be
allowed and the decree passed by Bishan Narain, J.,
must be restored with costs in this Court and before
the Division Bench. ·
Appeal allowcrl .
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. ,,
1962
Ladli Prasad Jai5wal
v.
Karnal J)islil/ery
Co., Ltd.
Shah, J.
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