THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX BOMBAY versus E. D. SHEPPARD
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 December 1962 | [1964] 1 S.C.R. 163 | 1962 INSC 379
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 December 1962
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR*, A.K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 527/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1964] 1 S.C.R. 163
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 379
Text of the judgment
I S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
16:J
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME·TAX
BOMBAY
v.
E. D. SHEPPARD
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Income Tax-Partnership terminating service• of employ••
by notice-Transfer of assets of partnership to new compani..Firm giving shares of new company to employee-Such shar.., if
compensation for loss of employment-Employee, if liable to
tax-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), •· 7 (1)
Explanation 2.
In 1930 the respondent assessee was employed as an officer·assistant in a partnership concern on the basis of a contract
fo,· three years. The agreement provided that the firm might
terminate the contract after giving the assessee one calendar
month's notice of its intention to do so. Subject to his work
being satisfactory. the assessee, like other aasistants employed in
the firm, expected to become a partner of the firm one day. The
assessee continued in the employment of the firm and his contract of service was renewed from time to time.
In I 94 7 the
firm decided to re-organise its business and with that end in
view two limited companies were floated, Killick Industries
Ltd. which was a public iimited company, and Killick Nixon
and Company, a private limited company, which was to take
over the business previously carried on by the partnership. On
December 29,1947, the respondent received a notke from the
firm stating that in view of the changes proposed the assessee'•
employment with the firm would terminate as fromJanuary 31,
I 948. The new company Killick Industries Ltd., agreed to
take over the services of the assessee an:l on February 1,1948,
he entered their employment. The partnership firm transferred
their assets to the new companies and received shares of the new
companies in lieu thereof. All the members of the covenanted
staff in the partnership firm were given shares of Killick Industries Ltd., free of payment, and the assessee received an
allotment of I, 700 shares of the fase value __ of Rs. 2 ,21,000j-.
The assessee's case was that the shares were given by the partner..
ship to the members of the staff as co-npensation for loss of
employment resulting from premature termination of their
services. The Income-tax Officer, however, sought to bring
the shares of the value of Rs. 2,21,000 1- to tax on the footing
1901
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
that the shares were allotted to the assessec in consideration of
T Iii Ccmmissionn of past services. The Appellate Tribunal held on the evidence
lnc"1Tl1·ta:c, Bctdqf before it that the payment was made solely as compensation
for loss of employment, and was not liable to tax in view of
I:.' D. Sl.1pprnd
Explanation 2 to s. 7 (I) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
It was contended for the Commissioner of Income-tax that
under the Explanation, the word "compensation" meant what
wM payable or compellable at law as compen«1tion, and any
payment received by an assessec from his employer or former
employer was profit received in lieu of salary, and that judged
from that point of view, the payment of Rs. 2,21,000/- to the
assessee was not compensation solely for loss of employment.
••
•
Held (Raghubar Dayal,]., di..w1ling), that the expression
ucompensation for loss of employment" in Explanation 2 to
•· 7 (I) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, referred to any
payment made, whether under a legal liability or voluntarily,
to compensate or act as a Solatium for the lo" of employment
suffered by the employee, and was not restricted to compensation which was payable or compellable at law; and that the
payment of Rs. 2,21,000/ ., found by the Tribunal to be a
payment made solely a> compensation for lo<S of employment
was not liable to tax, because the Explanation excepted such
payment from being treated as a profit received In lieu
of salary.
Chibbet v. JoReph Robinaon & So118, (1924) 9 Tax Cas. 49,
Commis8ioner of Inwme-tax v. Shaw Wallau and Company,
(193~) L. R. 59 I. A. ?.06, W. A. Guff v. Commi•.ioner of
Income-tax, Bombay City, (19571 31 I. T. R. 826, Commissioner
of Income-tax Hyderabad v. Va:ir Sultan and Sona, [1959]
Supp. 2 S. C. R. 375 and Mahesh Ananlrai Pattani v. Th•
Commisaioner of Income-tax, Bomhay North, Ahmedabcul,
[1961] 2 S. C.R. 742, relied on.
Per Das, Kapur and Sarkar, JJ.-No distinction could be
made between compensation for lo's of employment and
compensation for loss of prospects rooted in that employment.
If the object of the payments was unrelated to the relation
between the employer and employee, it would not fall within the
expression "profit recei•1ed in lieu of salary" in Explanation 2.
Per Raghubar Dayal, .J.-( I) Any sum paid by an empthe termination of
his services would be a "payment made solely as rompcnsation
for loss of employment" only when it was made in consideration
of what the tmployec could claim " such compensation under
law or the terms of the contract of service. In the prC1Cnt
l~yer or former employer to an employee at
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1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Hi5
case, the assessee's services were terminated by giving one
months's notice in accordance with the service contract. IIe
had no claim for compensation. The payment of Rs. 2,21 ,000/by his employer firm could not therefore be said to have been
made as compensation for loss of employment.
1962
T™ Commission1r 'J
'1rco·n1~tox, Bombf:!V
v.
E.D. Sl,8/f/rrl
(2) The payment was made by the firm as employer to the
assessee as employee and was received by the latter a day before
termination of his srrvices. The sum therefore came within
the language of the first p>rt of Explanation 2 to s. 7 (1) and
amounted to "profits in lieu. of service."
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 527 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
July 6, 1959, of the High Court at Bombay in
Income Tax Reference No. 64 of 1958.
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. 81whthey,
for the appellant.
N. A. Palkhivala, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. G.
1]1fothur and Ravinder Narian, for the respondent.
1962. December 12.-The followin;; judgments
were delivered. The judgment of S. K. Das, J. L.
Kapur and A. K. Sarkar, JJ., was delivered by
S. K. Das, J., Raghubar Dayal, J., delivered a separate
judgment.
S. K. DAs, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Bombay under s. 66·A (2) of the Indian Income-tax
Act, 1922.
The relevant facts lie within a narrow compass.
The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, is the
appellant before us and the assessee, E. D. Sheppard,
is the respondent. Killick Nixon & Company was a
partnership concern carrying on business on a fairly
large scale in India. It owned various mills and
managing agencies of a number of limited companies.
This partnership firm used to employ officer-assistant
D111, 1.
166
1962
Tiu CommU1i011tr of
lt1com1·tax. 8tm1bay
v.
E.D. S/r,pp<nd
DoJ, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL
mostly Europeans, on the basis of a contract
for three years; if the sci vices of the assistants, so
employed were found satisfactory, extensions were
invariably given after every three years on increased
salary. Subject to their work being satisfactory, the
assistants so employed expected to become partntrs of
the firm one day. The assessee was one of such assistants who joined the firm in 1o:m. The original
contract relating to the assessee's employment was
not placed on record. What was placed on record
as a specimen copy of the initial agreement, was the
contract with one W. J. Heygate. It was undisputed
that the terms of employment rcga~ding the assessee
· were the same as those of the contract with W . .J.
Heygate. Clause l 0 of the said agreement provided
that notwithstanding anything contained in it, the
firm might terminate the agreement without assigning
any reasons after giving the asscssce one calendar
month's previous notice of its intention so to do. The
assessce continued in the employment of the firm and
his contract of service was renewed from time to time.
On November I, I !lli, was made the last renewal.
The terms of this last renewal were the same as those
of J. G. Milne, a copy of whose renewed contract was
placed on record. This renewal provided for a contract of service from :'\ovcmber I,
l!Hi to
October 31, 1950. Under this contract the assessee
was to receive a salary of Rs. 1,200/- per month plus
a commission of 2! per cent on the net profits of the
partnership. The Appellate Tribunal found that if
the partnership had continued to do business, the
assessee would have got approximately Rs. 50,000/per annum. Sometime about the last quarter of the
year l!l4 7 the firm decided to re-organise its business
and with that end in view two limited companies
were floated: one was called the Killick Industri~s
Ltd., which was a public limited company, and the
other was called Killick Nixon and Company which
was a private limited company. This private limited
company was to take ovrr the business previously
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1 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I6i
1962
carried on by the partnership. This arrangement
necessitated the ·termination of the services of the The Cnmmissinnu of
firm's employees and the assessec received a notice ln:ome-tov.\', Bombay
from the firm dated December 29, 1947. This notice
E.n. Si11ppaid
stated that in view of the changes proposed, the asseDar, /.
ssee's employment with the firm would terminate as
from January 31, 1948 .. The assessee was then about
38 years old. There were in all sixteen officers including the assessee who were employed with the firm
on "contract terms''. With the exception of one, all
these sixteen officers were Europeans. The three
years' contracts expired on different dates depending
upon the original date of employment in respect of
these sixteen officers. So far as the assessee was concerned, it appears that the new company styled
Killick Industries Ltd., agreed to take over the services of the assessee on new terms under which his
salary was increased but the commission was disallowed. but he was left in more or less the same position
financially. The assessee entered the employment of
Killick Industries Ltd. on these new terms on
February 1, 1948. Killick Nixon and Company
transferred their assets to the new companies and
received shares of the new companies in lieu thereof.
A large number of shares of Killick Industries Ltd.
were put on the Indian market. The shares were of
the face value of Rs. 100/- only but were quoted in
market at Rs. 130/- per share. Some of these shares
were kept by the partners of Killick Nixon and Company. All the members of the covenanted staff in
the partnership firm (who were officers), were given
shares of Killick Industries Ltd. free of payment.
The assessee received an allotment of 1, 700 shares of
the face value of Rs. 2,21,000/-. The assessee's case
was that the shares were given by the partnership to
the members of the staff as compensation for loss of
employment resulting from premature termination of
their services. The Income-tax Officer, however,
sought to bring the shares of the value of
Rs. 2,21,000/- to tax on the footing that the shares
)
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1961
were allotted to the assessee in consideration of past
The assessee produced before the IncomeTl·t QJmmiSJiontr of services.
lncorM-!ffx, Bomba, tax Officer a let~er purporting to be written by one
Y.
D.R.C. Hartley on October I, 1952, on behalf of
E. D. Sluf'P"'d
the firm, in which the asscssee was informed that the
04". J.
firm had caused 1, 700 shares in Killick Industries
Ltd. to be allotted as "compensation for loss of employment". In appeal to the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, the order passed by the Income-tax
Officer bringing to tax the amount of Rs. 2,21,000/was confirmed. Before the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal the asscssee produced an affidavit dated
February 22, l!J54, sworn by five out of the six partners who constituted the firm in the month of
Jar.uary W48, (the sixth partner having died in the
meanwhile) which affirmed the terms of a memoran·
dum submitted to the Income-tax Officer by Messrs
Crawford Baylc:y & Co., on behalf of the asscssce.
It was recited in paragraph 8 of the affidavit that
the partners had decided to discontinue the firm and
prior to such discontinuance and on December 27, 1!)47, they wrote to each assistant who was
then employed by the firm terminating his services
from January :ll, I!J48, and stating that a further
communication would be addressed to him regarding
"the question of compensation for loss of rmploy·
ment". It was furthfl" recited in paragraph 8 that
the intention of the partnc1 s on the discontinuance
of the firm in causing allotments of certain shares
to be made to the assistants was to compensate them
for loss of employment and it was ''in no sense a reward for past services". It was then recited that all
the assistants had accepted the allotment as ''compensation for the loss of employment in terms of the
letter of December 27, I !J4 7, and in view of such
allotment no claim was made by any assistant against
the firm" and that a confirmatory letter from the
partnership to the assistants was some time thereaft~r
written "for purposes of record."
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
11162
The two members of the Tribunal differed in
thei~ views as to the true character of the payment . Th• co-:.issiomr •f
received by the assessee. The accountant member Income-tax, Bomb~•
was of the view that the assessee suffered no loss as
ED si.,pp rd
a result of the termination of his employment with
· ·
•
the partnership firm, because from February 1, 1948,
Das, J.
the day after the termination of his employment with
the partnership, he was employed by Killick Industries, Ltd., which gave him almost the same emoh.1 ·
ments; and furthermore, the payment was not made
"solely for loss of employment" because the compen·
sation was paid partly for loss of expectations and
future prospects which the assessee had in the part·
nership firm. Lastly, the accountant member held
that the employment of the assessce was terminable
on one month's notice and in any event the unexpired portion of his employment would not have
amounted to Rs. 2,21,000/ -; therefore, the payment
could not be treated as compensatio~ for loss of
employment, and at best it was a payment "under
the contract" and not for "loss of the contract''. The
Judicial member disagreed, and expressed the view
that the assessee's services were determined by the
firm which was ultimately dissolved and the allot·
ment of shares was made to the assessee "at or in
connection with the termination 0f his employment
and solely as compensation for loss of employment"
and there was no material in the record to support
the view that the payment was in lieu of past services.
On a difference between the two members of the
Tribunal, the question was referred to the President
who agreed with the Judicial member and expressed
the view that the payment was made to tht assessee
solely for loss of employment and it was immaterial
that the assessee secured another employment, equally
advantageous, under ~.nother employer on the next
day after the termination of his employment with the
partnership firm. Referring to the evidence adduced
on behalf of the assessee, namely the affidavit filed by
the partners, the President said that there was no
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1!164] VOL
I iO
1961
camouflaging as suggested by the department, and
Tlt1 Commi•·iovr 'f both the .Judicial member and the President accepted
/ntOtM•ta IJ'lmbn;r
the evidence given in support of his claim by the
v.
assessee.
r: D ..\hrppa• d
1.
}),,.. J
The present appellant then moved the Tribunal
to refer the following question of law to the High
Court:
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the
case, the sum of Rs. 2,21,000/-, being the value
of the shares received by the asscssee free of
paymeut, is income of the assessee and assessable under section 7 of the Income-tax Act ?
The Tribunal made a reference under s. 6(i of
the Income-tax Act, UJ22. The reference was heard
by Shah and Desai, JJ., of the Bombay High Court.
The High Court referred to Explanation 2 to s. 7 (I)
of the Income-tax Act, as it stood at the relevant
time, and held that if by an agreement between the
assessee and his employer, a certain amount was
estimated as compensation for the loss likely to be
suffered by the assessee by reason of termination of
his employment with the firm and was paid to him,
the circumstance that the asscssee did not in fact
suffer any loss by reason of securing another employment would not, for income· tax purposes, alter the
nature of the payr.1ent made. The High Court
painted out that the evidence given by the assessee
m support of his claim having been accepted by the
Tribunal, could not be questioned in the High Court
on a reference under s. 66, such a reference being
confined to the question of law arising out of the
order of the Tribunal. The High Court said that
the sole question which fell to be determined was
whether the compensation paid to the assessee was
to be regarded as an income receipt or a capital
receipt in the hands of the assessee. With reference
to Explanation 2 of mb·s. (I) of s. 7 an argument
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1 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
was advanced before the High Court to the effect
that the payment made to the assessee was not stated
to have been made solely for loss of employment but
as inclusive of compensation for lo~s of future
prospects. The High Court met this argument by
stating that the expectations or prospects were rooted
in the employment and it would be difficult to
distinguish between compensation for loss of employ·
ment and compensation for loss of prospects in that
employment. The High Court then said :
"It is true that by the Explanation a payment
which is due to or received by an assessee from
an employer or a former employer is to be
regarded as profit received in lieu of salary
for ·the purposes of sub- section ( 1) of Section
7 ; but in our judgment the payment must
be made because of the relation between
the employee and the employer. If the
object of the payment is unrelate:l to the
relation between the employer and the
employee, it will not fall within the expression
"profit received in lieu of salary" in Explanation
2 to Section ~ (1). Assuming, therefore,
that a part of the compensation paid to
the assessee was not solely for loss of
employment but was attributable to the loss
of future prospects which the assessee had
of becoming a partner in future in the firm,
that will not, in our judgment, be regarded
as "profit received in lieu of salary" within
the meaning of Section 7 (1) or the Expla·
nation thereto : and if such payment is not
regarded as salary or profits in lieu of salary,
there is no other head of income, profits or
gains under which it will fall so as to make
it taxable. In _ the ultimate analysis, we
have to decide in this reference whether
the payment can be regarded as a capital
receipt or a revenue receipt in the hands of
11161
n.~~
/rteomt-W,
y,
B••
E.D. SfwH<ml
172
1961
n, CcmmW;..,, .of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [HHH] VOL.
the assessec; and if, on the view we have taken,
it is not ·a revenue receipt, then it must be
regarded as not liable to tax."
•..
f,.eorrw-ltsx, Bomt4_1
E.D. Shtppa•J
DM, J
We ~shall presently consider the contentions
Urt!;ed before us on. behalf of the appellant. But
before we do so, fit is necessary to say that s. 7 of
the Incom"<!-tax' Act, 1922, was completely recast by
the Finance' Act, 1955, and we arc concerned with
the section as it stood prior. to its amendment
in 1955. We may now read s. 7 (1) and Explanation
2 thereto (so· far as it is material for our purpose)
as they sto~d at the relevant time.:_
.• "S. ·7'.(l) The tax shall be payable by an
assessee under the head "Salaries" in respect
of any salary or wages, any annuity, pension or
grat~ity, and any fees, commissions, perquisites
or profits in lieu of, or in addition to, any
salary or wages, which are due to him from,
whether paid or not, or are paid by or on
behalf of the Government, a local authority,
a company, or any other public body or
associat10n, or any private employer ; and for
the purposes of this sub-section advances by
way of loan or otherwise of income chargeable
under this head shall be deemed to be salary
due on the date when the advance is received :
·• . '
,
x
x
x
x
Explanation 2.-A payment due to or
received by an assessee from an employer or
former employer or from a provident or other
fund, is to the extent to which it does not consist of contributions by the assessee or interest
on such contributions a profit received in lieu
of salary• for the purposes of this sub-section,
•
I S.C.R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
173
unless the payment is made solely as compensation for loss of employment and not by way
of remuneration for past services :
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx "
Now, learned counsel for the clepartment has
urged two main contentions before us. His first con·
tention is that the word 'compensation' in Explanation 2 means what i~ payable or compellable at law
as compensation, that is, monetary equivalent of the
damage suffered consequent on the injury caused.
He has submitted that the assessee in this case suffered
no injury for which the partnership was compellable
at law to pay any damages. According to learned
counsel for the department, compensation for loss of
employment means the monetary equivalent for the
loss of earnings under the existing contract without
reckoning the loss of future prospects, and such loss
must also be mitigated in the way known to law.
His argument is that judged from that standpoint,
the payment of Rs. 2,21,000/- to the assessee was
not compensation solely for loss of employment within
the meaning of Explanation 2. His second contention is that under the Explanation any payment
received by an assessee from his employer or former
employer (save payment from a provident or other
fund mentioned therein) is profit received in lieu of
salary for the purpose of sub·s. (I) of s. i unless the
payment is made solely as compensation for loss of
employment. He has submitted that the Explana·
tion creates as it were an artificial definition of
'profits in lieu of salary' and if the payment is not
compensation in the sense of payment compellable at
law, no further question arises as to whether the
payment is related or unrelated to employment, or
whether it is capital or revenue in the hands of the
assessee. The agrument of learned counsel is that
the High Court was in error with regard to both the
points stated above and therefore its answer to the
question referred was not correct.
1962
Thi CommissitWT of
lnc6m1-ta:<, Bombay
•.
E.IJ. Sh,ppard
Das, J.
174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
1961
We consider that both the points urged on
of the department are without substance and
behalf
n. C..r•lll11U..1f' ".{
'-"""'• Bomlo.l are not supported by decisions including decisions of
••
this Court. Let us first examine the first point. As
E.D.SM/IFI
Romer, L.J., said in Henry v. Arthur Foster ('),
Dlu, /.
compensation for loss of office or employment is a
well-known term; it means a payment to the holder
of an office as compensation for being deprived of
profits to which as between himself and his employer
he would, but for an act of deprivation by his employer or some third party such as the Legislature,
have been entitled. It should be obvious that when
the deprivation is by the Legislature, there can be
no question of liability or compellability to pay
damages at law. The emphasis is on the act of
deprivation ............... which may or may not give
rise to any liability at law. In Chibbetl v. Joseph
RobiMon &: Sons (') the assessees were employed by a
certain steamship company as ship managers and
their remuneration was fixed at a percentage of the
company's annual profits. The company went into
liquidation and the general meeting of the company
authorised the liquidators to transfer to the ass~ee a
sum of £ 50,000 which was in certain bonds as
compensation for loss of office. The question that
arose before Rowlatt, J., was whether the sum of
£50,000 received by the assessees was capital or
income. At p. 60 of the judgment the learned Judge
said :
"As Sir Richard Henn Collins said, you must
not look at the point of view of the per3on who
pays and see whether he is compellable to pay
or not; you have to look at the point of view
of the person who receives, to see whether he
receives it in rC!lpect of his services, if it is a
question of an office, and in respect of his trade,
if it is a question of trade, and so on. You
have to look at this point of view to see whether
he receives it in respect of those considerations.
(I) (1991) 6 Tn Cai. 605. 634.
(2) (1921) 9 Tax Cu. 48•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
175
That is perfectly true. But when you look at
that question from what is described as the
point of view of the recipient, that sends you
back again, looking, for that purpose, to the
point of view of the payer : not from the point
of view of compellability or liability, but from
the point of view of a person inquiring what
is this payment for."
It is worthy of note that on the question of whether a
receipt is capital or income in the hands of the
assessee, the learned Judge made no distinction
between office or trade. The income arising from
an employment is taxable as "salaries" under s. 7;
the profits of a business are taxable under s. 10;
while the income arising from an office which does
not involve employment would be taxable under s. 10
as business profits, e. g. in the ordinary case of
managing agents or selling agents, where the activities
amount to the carrying on of a business, and in other
cases, e. g. an ordinary director of a company, it
would be taxable under s. 12 as income from other
sources. The question whether compensation receiv·
ed for loss of employment or office or for cessation of
business is taxable under any of the three sections
will fall to be considered, prior to the amendments
of 1955, with reference to the general principle of
income-tax law, which is to tax income. In other
words, the question would be whether it is income or
·
capital in the hands of the assessee.
The same view was expressed by the Privy
Council in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw,
Wallace and Company ('), where it held that a sum
of money received as compensation for loss or cessation of oil distributing agencies was not income,
profits or gains within the meaning of the Indian
Income-tax Act. There is nothing in the judgment
of the Privy Council which suggests that the compensation that was received by the assessee was a
compensation which was compellable at law. It
(I) (IP32J L.R. 59 J. A. 206.
n1Cootmiui-of
1_,,,.,.., Bordo7
v.
E.D. Sli#<J'd
Das, J.
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
1962.
TM Commissi:nur uf
/n,()1Tlt- 1ax, 8omh~-,i
••
E.D. Shtf>P!Ud
Dru, J.
was pointed out that the object of the Inctian Incometax Act was to tax "income" a term which it did not
define. Income however connoted a periodical
monetary return ''coming in" with some sort of
regularity, or expected regularity, from definite
sources. The ratio of the decision was thus stated
in the judgment :
"But when once it is admitted that they were
sums received, not for carrying on this business,
but as some sort af solatium for its compulsory
cessation, the answer seems fairly plain."
The same q ucstion arose before the Bombay
High Court in W. A. Guff v. Commissioner of lnr,ometax, Bombay City('). There the assessce joined in the
service of a company on May 27, HJ!(), as an executive in charge of a new department of the company
under an agreement which provided that his services
could be terminated by giving six months' time. On
.l\farch 2~l, Hl-!8 he received the communication from
the compauy that the department could not funct.on
any more, but the asscsscc continued to serve un1 til
November IO, HHS, for winding up the department.
On ~ovcmber 30, Hll8, the company paid the
assessee a sum of Rs. I ~,000/ ·as compensation equivalent to six months' salary for the termination of
his employment owing to the closure of th~ department. The question was whether the amount of
Rs. 12,000/· received by the assessee was a capital
receipt or a revenue receipt taxable as salary under
s. 7 of the Income tax Act. It was argued before
tbc Bombay High Court that if there was'no legal
liability to pay the compensation, then any payment
made by the employer would not come within the
expression 'compensation' used in Explanation 2;
because if a proper notice was given to the assessee
as found by the Tribunal in that case, he was not
entitled to any compensation when his services were
terminated after the lapse of six months from the
ctl [t957J 311.T.R azr..
..
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
date when the notice was given. The High Court
dealt with this argument a.nd repelled it. Chagla,
C. J., who delivered the judgment of the court
referred to the decisions in Shaw, Wallace and Company v. Commissioner of Jncom~-tax (') and Chfbbett
v. Joseph Robinson & Sons (')and then said :
"We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
expression "compensation for loss of employment" used in explanation 2 to section 7 refers
to any payment made, whether under a legal_
liability or voluntarily, to compensate or· act as
a solatium for the loss ofcmployment suffered
" ·
by the employee."
.
..
Now, we come to a decision of this Court, Com·
missioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad v. Vazir Sultan
and 8ons ('). The assessee there, a registered firm, was
appointed the sole selling agent and sole distributor
for the Hyderabad State for the cigarettes. manufac.tured by the company. The assessee was allowed
a discount on the gross selling price. In 1939
another arrangement was arrived at between the
assessee and the company whereby the assessee
was given a discount not only on the goods sold in
the Hyderabad· State but on all goods sold outside
the Hyderabad State. In 1950 the assessee and the
company reverted to the old arrangement. confining
the sole agency of the assessee to the Hyderabad
State and the.assessee was paid a sum of Rs. 2,19,343/·
by way of compensation for the loss of the agency
outside the Hyderabad State. The question was
whether the money received by the assessee was a
revenue receipt assessable to income-fax or a capital
receipt not so assessable. One of the points canvassed
before this Court with some force was that there was
no enforceable agreement as 'between the assessee
and the company which could be made the subject
matter of a legal claim for damages for compensation
at his instance in the event of its termination or
(I) \1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206.
(2 1 (1924) 9 Tax Cas, 48.
(SJ [1959] Supp. 2 s.c.R. 375.
1961
Th• Gammill- •!
Jmam•-taJ<, S-N,
v.
E.D. S""""d
Dos, I.
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[I964] VOL.
cancellation by the company. The agency agreenr c. ',rl r •/ ment in that case was terminable at the will of the
,..., ... s.u., company and if the company chose to do so, the
••
E.D.~d
assessee had no remedy at law in regard to the same.
The
argument was that therefore there was no
!Mi, /.
enforceable agreement between the assessee and the
company which could be made the subject matter
of a legal claim for compensation. This argument
was repelled and this Court said that in all such
cases one has really to look to the nature of the
receipt in· the hands of the asscssee irrespective of
any consideration as to what was actuating the mind
of the other party. This Court refrrrcd with
approval to the observations made by Rowlatt, J..
in Chtbbetl 11. Joaeph Robinsan and Sons ('), which
we have calitr quoted. This Court also referred with
approval to the decision of W. A. Guf! v. Commiarioner of Income-lax ('), and said that 11 was immattrial whether the amount paid was compensation for
which the employer was liable at law or was a
payment made u gmlia.
-
In view of these decisions we must over-rule
the fint contention urged on behalf of the appellant
that compensation in Explanation 2 to s. 7 (1) means
compensation which is payable or compellable at law.
We now tum to the second contention. Prior
the amendments introduced by the Finance
Act, 1955, Expla!'lation 2 to s. 7 (1) made it clear that
a payment which was made solely as compensation
for loss of employment was not assessable, while a
payment which was made as remuneration for past
services was taxable as income. The principle was
that compensation for wrongful repudiation of a
service agreement or for loss of office or employment or
cessation of business was a capital receipt, though
the payment might be entirely voluntary and the
recipient might have no legal right to any compensation at all. In such cases the compensation was
(I) (1924) 9 Tu Ou. 4i.'
\2) [11157) SI J.T.R. 828.
to
.t
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
1962
deemed to be a capital receipt because it was in
respect of the source of income. The argument of Thi C.mmissioRlf' of
learned counsel for the department however is that lncwu-tax, B1mba,1
Explanation 2 treated any payment received by an
E.D. Sheppard
assessee from an employer or former employer as
Las, J.
a profit in lieu of salary (except where the payment
was from a provident or other fund mentioned
therein) ; therefore, the explanation was an artificial
definition which treated any payment received' by an
a&Sessee from his employer or former employer as
income and no consideration as to whether the
payment related to employment or not or whether
it was capital or income need be considered.
though learned counsel for the department concedes
that a payment made solely as compensation
for loss of employment does not come within the
artificial definition of the Explanation. We do not
think that the proposition put in the very wide form
in which learned counsel for the department has put
it, can be accepted as correct. In Mahesh Anantrai
Patlani v. The Commissioner of Income.tax,
Bomhay North, Ahmedabad ('), this Court had
to considers. 7 (1) of the Act and Explanation 2
thereto, as they stood prior to the amendments
in 1955. The facts of that case were these. M. A.
Pattani who was Dewan of the State of Bhavnagar
was granted a monthly pension of Rs. 2,000/· by the
Maharajah of the State by an order dated
January 15, 1948. On March 1, 1948, the State
of Bhavnagar merged in the United States of
Saurashtra and the Maharajah ceased to be the
ruler of the State. Subsequently on May 31, 1950,
the Maharajah directed his banker in Bombay to
pay · Pattani a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- and said that
the payment was made in consideration of the
loyal and meritorious services which Pattani had
rendered to the State. The question which arose for
dedsion was whether the aforesaid payment of
Rs. fi,00,000/- was liable to tax under s. 7 (1) read
with Explanation 2. This Court held that the sum
<•> [19GIJ 2 s.c.R. 742.
•.
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
/962
of Rs. 5,00,000/· was given to Pattani r:ot as a
payment in consideration of the services already
Tiu CommiJsiontr ef
rendered bv Pattani as the Dewan of the State but
lruomt·ltl.t, Bomba)
v.
merely as ·a gift in token of the \faharajah's
f.'. D. ShtpparJ
affection and regard for the assessee. Therefore, it
/Jai, J.
was held the payment was not liable to be assessed
to tax under s. 7 (!), Explanation 2. The ratio of
the decision was that the payment was a capital
receipt! and not income assessable to income-tax, in
the hands of the assessee. AppJrently, this Court
did not accept the proposition that every payment to
an assessee by his employer or former employer was
income and no question of treating such payment as
capital in the hands of the asscssee need be considered.
Once it is held that the payment in the present
case was a payment made solely as compensation for
loss of employment, there is an end of the appeal;
because Explanation 2 in clear terms excepts such
payment from being treated as a profit received in
lieu of salary. The Tribunal held on the evidence
before it that the payment was made solely as com·
pcnsation for loss of employment. The High Court
rightly took the view that no distinction could be
made between compensation for loss of employment
and compensation for loss of prospects rooted in that
employment. The High Court also rightly pointed
out that if the object of the payment was unrelated
to the relation between the employer and the emplo·
yee, it would not fall within the expression ''profit
received in lieu of salary" in Explanation 2. We
think that the High Court committed no error in
answering the question referred to it.
For the reasons given above, we have come
to the conclusion that there is no substance in this
appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with
costs.
&,hobar DaJal, J.
RAGIIUBAR DAYAL, j.-1 have had the advan·
tage of perusing the majority judgment of my learned
l S.C.R.
SUPRE:'v1E COURT REPORTS
181
brother S. K. Das, J., but regret that I am unable to
agree that the sum of Rs. 2,21,000/- was paid solely
as compensation for loss of employment and did not
amount to 'profit in lieu of salary'.
Mr. Rajagopal Sastri, for the appellant, concedes that the impugned sum received by the assesseerespondent, is not liable to income-tax unless it can
be considered to be profit received in lieu of salary,
in view of Expl~.nation :l to s. 7 ( l) of the Incometax Act, as it stood prior to the amendment in 191\.~.
Section 7 deals with the tax payable by an assessee
under the head 'salaries'. It is not necessary to read
the entire section. The relevant portion of Explanation 2 to s. 7(1) reads:
"A payment due to or received by an assesscc
from an employer or former employ1,r ...... is ......
a profit received in lieu of salary for the purposes of this sub-section, unle's the payment
is made solely as compensation for loss of
employment and not by way of remuneration
for past services."
Mr. Sastri contends that the sum of Rs. :l,21,000/was received by the assessee from his employer
Killick Nixon & Co., on Jauuary 30, a day before
the termination of his services by that company, that
it will be deemed to be profit received in lieu of
salary unless the payment can be said to be made by
the employer solely as compensation for loss of
employment and not by way of remuneration for
past services and that the amount was not paid
solely as compensation for loss of employment. He
has submitted that the expression 'compensation'
means what is legal! y payable as a monetary equivalent of the damage suffered by the wrongful termination of service, that the amount of compensation
is usually equivalent to the loss of earnings under the
contract which had come to an end minus the expected reimbursement from any fresh employment.
/962
The C:ommissirmer rJ.f
Income-fax, Bombay
v.
E.D. lluppa<d
Ra"'hubar Dayal, J.
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
1962
Mr. Palkhivala, for the assessee, has urged that
the intention of the parties is the main thing for
Tiu CommUJiorur q/
l11tam1·/a:r, Bombay determining the nature of the amount paid by the
v.
employer to the employee at the termination of the
F..D. Shtf>la'd
service and that compensation, for the purpose.of
Iiaghubnr Dayal, J.
thi~ provision of the Income-tax Act, need not be
equivalent to what Courts of law would allow as
damages for injury caused to the person claiming
compensation. It is urged that the word 'compcn·
sation' has got a well-established meaning for the
purpose of the Act, the meaning being as stated by
Romer, L. .J., in Henry (II. 1lf. ln3pector of Taxea)
v. Arthur Foster; Henry (H. JI. Inspector of Taus)
v. Jo.~eph Foster('),
It has not been disputed that by virtue of the
contract between the asscssee and the company the
services of the assessee could have been terminated
by giving him one calendar month's notice. It
follows that on such termination of service lhe
assessee could not have claimed any compensation,
as the termination of service would not have been
wrongful and would have been under the terms of
the contract.
The a>sessee could have normally expected
renewal of his contract at the expiry of the term, just
as there had been renewal of the previous contracts
and he could also have expected to become, eventu·
ally, a partner in the firm a~ other assistants had
become, in the past. The firm purported to allot
the shares to the assessee as compensation for the loss
of employment and the assessee accepted the same as
such compensation. What the parties intended the
sum to represent is immaterial and has no bearini;
on the determination of the true nature of the payment. Of course, it can be a factor which can be
taken into consideration in arriving at the proper
conclusion. The question, however, is whether in
its real nature the sum received by the a=see does
(1) (1931) 16 Tax. Cu. GCS, 634.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
come within the expression 'compensation for loss of
employment'. If it comes within that expression, it
would not be taxable under s. 7, as in that case, it
would not be deemed to be 'profit in lieu of salary'.
If it does not come under that expression, it would
be taken to be 'profit in lieu of salary'. If it comes
within the scope of the first part of Explanation 2
to sub-s. (1) of s. 7 it would then be assessable to
tax under the provi~ions of s. 7 and other relevant
sections of the Act. We have therefore to determine whether the sum received is compensation and
whether it is compensation for loss of employment.
We have been referred to a number of cases by
learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the
proposition that one can get compensation only when
one is entitled to it and, even then, the amount of
compensation is not to deviate much from the
damages he is likely to get, on account of any injury
to his right. The contention for the respondent is
that, for the purposes of the Act, it is not necessary
for a payment to amount to compensation that the
recipient be entitled to it under the law and that the
principles applying for the determination of the
amount of damages in civil suits will not apply to
the determination of the compensation for loss of
office. It may be assumed, without deciding, that
the contention for the respondent is correct. This
by itself, does not solve the problem.
The expression 'compensation' by itself connotes
some payment to make up certain loss suffered by the
person getting the compensation. If no loss is
suffered, no occasions for getting compensation arises.
It follows that if an employee, by the terms of his
employment, is not entitled to any relief on the termination of his service in accordance with the terms
of the contract, there can arise no occasion for his
claiming any compensation for the loss of employment
or his being paid any compensation for any loss of
employment.
1962
Tiu Commiuiontr of
Income-fax, Bomb'y
v.
E.D. Sheppard
R.,hubar Dayal, J.
184
/962
Tht CornmU1i11•o11 if
..
[,,rmu-!11.r, P,11,.1bay
l!.D. Sh-/1fH1•rl
Rotlttt611r /)11 1 :1l, J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!l64) VOL.
It is contended for the respondent that it is not
necessary for a sum, paid to .an employee on the occa·
sion of the l<'rmination of his services, to amount to a
compensation that the employee should have a legal
claim to it. It is urge,! that any voluntary payment
on such occasion by way of gift or solatium will
amount to compensation for loss of employment.
Reliance is placed, in this connection, to what
Romer L.J .. said in Henry (fl.Jr. lnspqctotof Tn:res)
v. Artfmr Fnsta etc.(') :
" "Compensation for loss of office"' is a well·
known term, and, as I understand it, it means
a payment to the holder of an office as compen·
sation for being deprived of profits to which as
between himself and his employer he would,
but for an act of deprivation by his employer
or some third party such as the Legislature.
have entitled . .,
The expression 'deprived' connotes some idea of
the holder of Ll1e office not getting the profits due to
some unjustified act of the employer, as 'depriving'
is a coercive m~asurc (Law Lexicon of Briti•h India
by P. Ramanatha Aiyar).
The word 'rntitled'
cr,nnotcs that the employee should have a legal claim
to the profits of which he is deprived and for which
Neither of
deprivation he gets the compensation.
these two words would be properly applicable to the
case of the person whose tenure of office is cut short
by the employer in exercise of his right under the
contract in S•Jch circumstances which do not give the
employee right to any rrliel on account of such
termination of his service.
Romer, L.J., said further in llen1 y
(/J.M. Inspect-0r of Taxes v. Arthur Po8ter. ef{;.) (')
explains what he meant by the aforesaid meaning of
the expression 'compcnsalion' and that is consistent
Whal
(I) (l93l) t6 L• c,,. 60S, 63~.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
with the view I have expressed.
185
He said at p. 634 :
"In the present case, the payments are to be
made on the death or resignation or cesser of
office on any ground other than those specially
excepted in the article, events, be it observed,
on which in the very terms of the man's
employment, his office, and therefore his
emolument, would come to an end. It is
impossible, therefore, in such a case, to say
that when he dies or resigns or his office otherwise comes to an end he has lost any salary or
any profits at all. The word 'compensation for
loss of office' in such a case seem to me to be
wholly misleading."
It is obvious from these observations that when
under a contract the employee has no further
claim to salary or profits on the termination
of his service in terms of the contract, any
payment made to him cannot be a payment as com·
pensation for loss of office and that therefore what
Romer, L. J., meant by the meaning given to the
expression 'compensation for loss of office' was that
that expression meant such payment which the holder
of the office was entitled in law to get on account of
his being, against his will, deprived of the profits to
which as between himself and his employer he was
entitled. If he was not entitled to any such profits
on the cessation of office, any payment to him could
not be compensation for loss of office.
We have been referred, for the respondent, to a
number of cases in support of the contention that
the amount received by the assessee is covered by the
expression 'compensation for loss of office' which may
be taken to be synonymous with 'compensation for
loss of employment.' I may now deal with those
cases.
The case reported as Cominissioner of lncoine·
tax v. Shaw, Wallace & Oo( 1), dealt with the question
(I) (1932) L.R. 591.A. 206.
1962
The Commissiontr of
Income-tax, Bombay
v.
E.D. S~e#ard
Raghub«r D«yal, J.
186
1962
TJ., Commi.uion1r of
lncom1·l4Jt, Bmnbay
v.
E.D. Sluppa.d
Razlwhar Dayal, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL.
as to whether a certain sum received by a firm as
compensation for the termination of certain agencies
was assessable income or not, under ss. IO and 12 of
the Income-tax Act. Section IO dealt with income,
profits and gains from business and s. 12 dealt with
income from other sources in respect of income,
profits and gain of every kind which might be
included in the assessee's total income if not already
included under other preceding heads. [t was held
that that sum was not taxable as income from business because, under s. IO, the tax is to be payable by
an assessee under the head 'business' in respect of the
profits or gains of any business carried on by him,
and that the sums were not received for carrying on
business, but as some sort of solatium for its compulsory cessation. This reason for the decision does
not help us in construing whether the sum received
by the assessee in the present case amouuts to 'compensation for loss of employment.' It was not considered in the case whether the sum received did
amount to 'compensation' as there was no dispute
about it. The ca~es dealing with payments in connection with cessation of agencies arc therefore not of
any help in determining the question before us I
however refer to them as much reliance has been
placed on them for the respondent.
Anglo-French Exploration Co. Ltd., v. C/,ayson
(H.JJ!. Inspector of Taxes) ('), wa~ a case with respect
to assessment of Income-tax under Schedule D of the
English Income Tax Act and the question was
whether the sum sought to be assessed, amounted to
annual profits arising or accuring from any trade
exercised within the United Kingdom. The sum to
be assessed was paid to the assessce for its resigning as
agents of another company. It was remarked at
p. 557, by LorJ Evershed, M.R. :
"But the question remains, not whether that Rum
in some senses or in some contexts as a payment
(I) (1956) 36 Taz Oas, 545.
•
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
might sensibly be called a 'capital' payment,
but whether within the terms of Schedule D it
is a profit or gain arising from the trade of the
recipient."
Similarly, it can be said, in the pre~.cnt case, that the
question is not whether the sum of Rs. 2,21,000/can be called. in any sense, a capital receipt, but is
whether it can be said to be a payment to the assessee
as compensation for the loss of his employment with
Killick Nixon & Co.
In 'l.'ht Oommi1111ioner of Income-tax, HyderabadDeccan v. Me11&r11. Vaz•r Sullan "1 Sona (1), the
assessee received certain amount as compensation
for the termination of his agency over a certain
area, even though it continued over other areas. It
was held that the 1um sought to be taxed was a capital
receipt in the hands of the assessee and was not income from business which was to be taxed under
s. 10 of the Income-tax Act. We are not really concerned with the question whether the amount of
&. 2,21,000/- is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt
in the hands of the respondent. In view of Explanation 2, it would be a revenue receipt in the sense that
it would be deemed to be 'profit in lieu of salary', it
being a payment by the employer to the employee in
Calle it be not a payment as compensation for loss of
employment.
In connection with the question whether the
sum sought to be taxed was capital receipt or revenue receipt, in Vazir Sultan's Case (') it was canvassed that:
"there was no enforceable agreement as between
the assessee and the Company which could be
made the subject-matter of a legal claim for
damages or compensation at his instance in the
event of its termination or cancellation by the
(I) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 375.
1962
Thi Commissiontr ef
Incorru-lax, Bomba;
v.
E.D. Shlppar~
R"lhdar D/flal, J.
188
11161
- .... v
n.<A..w
.
/_.,_, B...&q
E.D. Sh<Har'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Company. The agency agreement was terminable at the will of the_ Company and if the
Company chose to do so the assessee had no
remady at law in regard to the same."
•
R.,w.r D"'°'' J. Bhagwati, J., said at p. 392:
"It is, however, to be remembered that in all
these cases one has really got to look to the nature of the receipt in the hands of the assessee
irrespective of any consideration as to what was
actuating the mind of the other party."
It may now be pointed out that for the purposes
of Explanation 2 to sub-s. (1) of s. 7 one has to look
to the point of view of the employer who makes the
payment and not of the recipient who receives it.
The payment excepted from the purview of the first
part of the Explanation is 'the payment made solely
as compensation for loss of employment'. The
exception is not for the payment received by the employee. The employer is to make the payment as
compensation only when he be compellable or liable
to pay compensation and therefore the observations of
this Court do not go against what I have said about
the meaning of the word 'compensation'.
There are, however, certain other cases which
deal with payments made to employees at the termination of their services. The English cases are not
much in point for the simple reason that there such
payments were sought to be taxed under Schedule E
of the Income-tax Act which related to assessment
of income-tax· on persons having or exercising an
office or employment or profit mentioned in that
schedule. It was held that such payments did not
accrue to a person by reason· of his office which had
really come to an end and were in the nature of testimonials, solatium or gift and so were not taxable.
Explanation 2 to sub-s. (1) of s. 7 of the Indian
•
1 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
189
Income-tax Act provides for assessment of the sum
to income-tax on a different basis and therefore what
has been held not assessable to tax u11der Schedule E
of the English Act is no guide for our determining
· whether a certain sum does or does not amount to
compensation for loss of employment.
In Cowan v. Seymour('), payments made to
one who had been Secretary of the Company by the
share-holders out of the profit payable to them was
held not to accrue to him in respect of an office or
employment of profit and was therefore not chargeable under Schedule E. It was, however, said at
p. 378:
"It is now well settled, whatever might have
been considered before, that a voluntary payment, if it accrues by reason of an office or employment, is a profit under this Section... .. ...
it has been quite clearly decided that a voluntary payment or a gift, call it which you like,
can be a profit and is a profit if it accrues by
reason of the office."
It was held that the amount was paid to him as a
testimonial for what he had done in the past while
in office, which had then terminated and not as payment for those services. The factors leading to such
a view were that the payment was made after
the office had terminated and was not made by the
employer, but by others.
In Ohibbett v. Joseph Robinson & Sons ('). the
assessee was taxed under Schedule D of the English
Income-tax Act. The assessees were a firm of shipmanagers and were employed in that capacity by a
certain steam-ship company. The company went into liquidation and the liquidator transferred £50,000/of 5% National War Bonds to the assessees as compensation for loss of office. Subsequently, in pursuance
(I) (1919) 7 Tax Caa. S72.
(2) (19M) 9 Tax Cai. 48.
1912
Tiu c_n,.,, of
..
/neoml'ta, B11111/Jo7 ·
E.D. SfwHard
&1/mbM Dq,al, J.
190
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1962
of the arrangements already made, the undertaking
TIN Ccmmission.r of of the company including two ships and its remain·
Imome-tax, Bombay ing assets were transferred to a new company of the
v.
same name consisting of the sarr.e shareholders.
E.D.Slu#MJ
The assessee firm was appointed the first manager of
Ra1Ja.b"' VaJ<ll, J.
the new company and its remuneration was fixed on
similar lines. It was held that the nature of the payment of £50,000/· Wa! not a profit liable to incomctax or excess profits tax duty. Rowlatt, J., finally
said at p. 61:
"But at any rate it does seem to me that compensation for loss of an employment which need
not continue, but which was likely to continue,
is not an annual profit within the scope of the
Income Tax at all."
These observations were with reference to the terms
of the provisions relating to income-tax there. These
observations did not meet with full approval in
Henry (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Arthur Jt'oster
Elc., (') in which case the amount paid to Dewhunt,
whose nature was under consideration, was a payment
to him with reference to an article of association
which governed his remuneration for services as a
director of the company. Lord Macmillan said, at
p. 653:
"I am disposed to regard them as too widely
expressed, for remuneration for services may
take, in part. the from of a payment at the end
of the employment, and a payment docs not ne ·
cessarily cease to be remuneration for services
becau1e it is payable when the services come
to an end."
Further, in Chib/Jett's Cr111e (') Rowlatt, J., himself
observed at p. 61:
"The company as th~n constituted certainly
came to an end, and when it came to an end
(1) (1931) 16 Tax f:u GOS, 631 •
..
(2) (1924) 9 T•x Cas. 411.
-
-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
191
they gave this solatium to this firm out of their
abundant prosperity, once for all, not because
of anything they were doing, but really very
much, I think, as the Master of the Rolls puts
it, as a testimonial for what they had done in
the past in their office which had now terminated.
1962
Tiu Commissioner oj
Income-tax, Bomia,
v.
E.D. Sb1ppard
Of course it is true that it is a trade receipt in
this sense, that if these people had not been
managers they never would have got it. It
was not a gift to them as individuals or anything
of that sort; it was because they were people
of this kind ...... after all, the old arrangement
has come to an end and he gets this lump sum
given him as compensation for loss of office, if
you like to put it that way, or if you like to put
it as a testimonial because of the work he had
done in the past, work which was now at an
end.,,
The main point for consideration in the case was
whether the amount in dispute amounted to profits
within the meaning of Schedule D. What its true
nature was, it was not necessary to determine, so long
as it was not held to be profits. It was therefore
that alternative opinion was expressed by Rowlatt, J.,
about its nature which could be either compensation
for loss of office or a testimonal on account of the
past work rendered by the assessee. I do not think
that this case really helps the respondent in his contention that the sum of Rs. 2,21,000/- amounts to compensation for loss of employment.
In Du!f (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Barlow (1),
the assessee, the Managing Director of a company,
was paid £4,000/- for the loss of his right to further
remuneration which he was entitled to get under the
terms of an earlier agreement. He continued to be
the Managing Director. It was held that the sum
(1) (1941) 23 Tax Cai. 633.
...
192
IHI
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964] VOL.
of £4,000/· received by the asses.9ee was not under the
n.c-wi..r.t contract of employment nor as remuneration for ser,_..,.,,.~
••
B.D.Slu#ft
...... ll9ol.1
vices rendered or to be rendered, but was compensation for giving up a right to remuneration. There
is nothing in this case which can be of any guidance
in determining the question before us.
In Ho8e v. Warwick (H. M. Inspector of
Tazea) ('), a certain sum paid to the assessee was
considered to be compensation for the relinquishmrnt
by the assessee of his rights under his previous agreement for service with the company and his personal
connection.
In both the last two cases, it is to be noticed
that the payment was for the loss of something to
which the recipient was entitled under his agreement
with the person paying the amount. The decisions
in these cases therefore do not help the respondent
who had no right to any emoluments after the cessation of the service on one month's notice in view
of the original agreement.
Reference has been made to some cases decided
by this Court and the High Courts of this country.
The only case of this Court dealing with an ~ess
ment under Explanation 2 to sub-s. (1) of s. 7 of the
Act is Mahesh Aoontrai Pattani v. The Commi88ioner
of Income-tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad ('). The
assessee in that case served as Dewan of the State of
Bhavnagar and, on retirement, was sanctioned a
monthly pension of Rs. 2,000/-. Later on, after the
State had merged in the United States of Saurashtra
on March l, 1950, and the Maharajah ceased to he
the ruler of the State, he order~d, on May 31, 1950,
the payment of Rs. 5,00,000/- t.o the asse~ee. In his
letter dated March 10, 1953, the Maharajah stated
that this amount was paid as a gift in token of his
affection and regax:d for the assessee and his family,
though, earlier, in his letter dated December 27, 1950,
(1) (1946) 27 Tax Cao. +59.
(2) (1961) 2 S.C.Jl. 7+2.
1 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i93
19'2
the Ma)larajah had said that this amount was riven
as gift in consideration of the assessee, the ex-Dewan n..c.,.,,,un-oJ
of the State, having rendered meritorbus and loyal ln-e-1.L<
• .8em•l1
v.
services. This Court, by majority, held that the
E.D. S1";,.•d
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal should have relied
on the letter dated March 10, 1953, and held that R•:hul.,. Dtg<l, J.
the payment was as a personal gift for the personal
qualities of the assessee and as a token of personal
esteem and was not in token of appreciation for
the services rendered as a Dewan of the Bhavnagar
State. This Court accepted the contention for the
assessee that the payment did not fall within Explanation 2 to sub-s. (1) of s. 7 because it was neither
made by the Maharajah for services rendered to him
nor was rel'!-table to the office of the Dewan held by
the assessee, he having already been compensated for
his services to the Maharajah personally and to the
State. Kapur, J., said at p. 749 :
-
"There is no mention in the document of
December, 1950, of any services rendered
to the Maharaja and it does not seem t0 have
been considered by the Tribunal as to why the
l\faharaja should. make out of his personal
account the gift of such a large amount for
something which was not done for the
l\faharaja specifically, particularly when the
services to the State and to the Maharaj a and
his family had already been well compensated.
This lends support to the submission of the
appellants that the amount was paid merely
as a gift in token of Maharaja's affection and
regard for the assessee."
And again, at p. 752 :
" ...... that the gift was voluntary is clear but
it is not quite clear how the amount can be
said to <be relatable to the office held by the
recipient. Even according to the case of the
194
1962
Thi Comtnissio111T 01
ft1Ntt111·l6X
Bomh1J_1
v.
E.D Sheppard
1141/rul# D-,yol, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964J VOL.
respondent the amount was paid about two
years after the <issessee had ceased to be an
employee of the :llah;1raja or the Statr and
immediately 011 his ceasing to be the
Dewan of Bhavnagar ~talc, the l\faharaja
had granted him a pension fro!l1 out of the
public funds for his services to the State as
Dewan and for services rendered to the
l\laharaja and his family a handsome and a
generous monthly pension of Rs. 2,000 per
mens em."
Explanation 2 to sub-s. (I) of s. i of the Act was 11ot
held applicable to the sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, in my
opinion, as that sum was not paid by the State, the
former employer, to the Dew.ill, its employee out
of the public funds for services rendered, but was
paid by the Maharaja personally from his personal
funds to the assessee in token of affection and regard
to him and his family :;nd not with reference to any
services rendered to him.
The facts of the present case arc different from
Paltani's Ca.se ('). It cannot be said, in the present
case, and is not the contention either for the respondent, that the sum of Rs. 2,21.000/ · was paid to him
as a personal gift for the personal qualities of the
assessee and as a token of personal esteem. Similar
payment was made to all the employees of the
company. Payment was certainly related to past
services. It was made a day before the termination of
services. The case therefore docs not help the
respondent.
In several cases the High Courts had to consider whether a certain sum was taxable or not under
Explanation 2 to sub·s. (I) of s. 7 of the Act. In
most of the cases, in which f he sum w«s held to be
paid as compensation fur loss of cmploymcut, the
recipient was entitled to compensation under law
(1) [1961] 2 S.C,R. 742.
..
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
195
These cases are P. D. Khalsa, In re ('); H. S.
Captain v. Commissioner of Income-ta:r (');
Agrawala v. Commissioner of Jnco1w-f1t.r ('). Only
in one case, he was not so entitled, and it was held
that a wider meaning be given to the expression
'compensation for loss of employment.' I do not
consider this to be the correct view.
1962
The Cgmmissfon1r of
lncome·ltlx, Bombsy
v.
E.D. Sh,pp.,d
Ra:hu!Jar Dayal, J.
In W. A. Guff v. Commissioner of Income-tai; ('),
strongly relied on by the respondent, the assessce had
joined the service of the company as an executive
in charge of the new department under an agreement
which provided that his services could be terminated
by giving him six months' notice. On March 2:~,
1948, he received communication from the company
that the department could not function any more.
He, however, continued to serve until November 10,
1948, for winding up the department. On November 13, 1948, the company paid him a sum of
Rs. 12,000/- as compensation, equivalent to six
months' salary for the termination of his employment
owing to the closure of the department. It was held
that the communication of March 23, l!J48,
constituted a notice terminating the services of the
assessee as required by the contract of service and
that the payment of Rs. 12,000/- was made not for
past services, but as compensation or solatium for
termination of his office and as compensation was
a capital receipt and exempt from tax. Chagla,
C. J., rightly said at p. 831 :
"Therefore, in order that the assessee should
succeed, he must establish that this payment
which he has received from his employer is
a payment made solely as compensation for
loss of employment. Now the difficulty is
caused by the
expression 'compensation for
loss of employment'. Two views are possible.
One view is that the compensation contemplated by the Legislature is a compensation which
(I) [l945] 13 J.T.R. 43fi.
(S) [1960] 38 I.T.R. 67.
12) [l95<JJ 36 I.TR. 84.
(4J [1957] 31 I.T.R. 826.
.
-,--;
.--;-. '....---- ';... •\
196 SUPREK:lE COURT R.EPORT&[l96!] VOL.
'
J
1962
-
•
.
-- --
--
.
---
' the employer. was liable _in law to pay to the
employee.: in, other words, the loss suffered by ·
: , . the employ~e: ·must be such as, would render the
em2loyer liable . to , make good that loss. Ori
this view,_if -there. is no legal liab~lity to pay
compensation,. then any. payment.made by the
employer would .. not • come .. within
this .
expression used in Explanation.2".· .... '
Tiu Commissioner of
lncomt-tax, Bt711l~fl.T
...
E.V. Sluppord
Raghu6ar DaJal, J.
.
. .'
'...
'.
~-
. "'" ' \
..
'
,
.
'
.
.
He, however, further posed
.a . question
this form : .,
·;
.
··- in
-·-· - '
'
'
. . • ;,:Bui' the· question'. that''. we hav~· ·to consider is
\vhether' the expres~iciii used' iri 'Explanaticiri 2
· ·~~-~sed,'tiri thiS'n~rrow.·senseor it is used in.the
wider: sense ·as meamrig · a solatium for the
' . deprivation by the employer of his employment.
,, : . In either '.w'~rds; ~id, the·'. Legislature· mer~ly
cont.e!llplate, ,th~ fa~tual lo~s of employment and
any amount : paid for· that loss, whether that
,.paymerit.wa5under a'legal 'liability or not t··.
•
. ,,
.
!'"
,
-
.• '
.•
He'. then
expressed his opini_on thus :
,
,I
.
.., . . " "'· , '"', : . . ' .
i -
.
-
". .
-
.
.
' · "It also seems to us; apart from the authorities,
that it is the better view to take of this expres, ·" · ·sion, .because. if an employee ;loses his employ" '"' ment. which is•the isource of his inc<;>me, any
payment made :by his employer-for that loss
should ':.not •be: : looked . upon as . income ·
· ·.. ':liable to tax; as·in its :very nature the payment
is to compensate for :·or. to act as a solatium for.
that very· source which' produced the income
arid
in "respect of which the ·employee is liable
..
totiX'' . . · : ,,_,.,_-·- :-· · _-. ·:
.
-
·;
.,
:
!
'Solatium' is not a .synonym for.!compensation'. It
is 'compensation for , loss ; of., employment' .which is
not considered · to · be· 'profit in .lieu of salary' in
Explanation 2 to sub:s. (1) of s. 7, and not 'solatium' ·
in the sense of a 'gift~ or any. payment distinguished
from compensation. ; · ..· .. : .
..
.[
.. ,.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
1962
In support' of his view, Chagla, C. J., placed
.reliance on Oommi8sioner of Income-tax v. Shaw, Thi Cammission1r of
Bomhqy
Wallace & Oo. (1). I have already considered that Income-tax,
v.
case and have stated that it has no bearing on cort·
E.D. Sh.pp"d
struing Explanation 2 to sub-s. (1) of s. 7 of the Act. Raghubar Dayal, J.
The definite opinion of the Privy Council was that
the sums received in that case were not for carrying
on business and therefore not asse!sable to tax. It
was of course stated that they were received as some
sort of solatium for the compulsory cessation of the
agencies. It was neither necessary to state, nor was
it stated, what the actual nature of that solatium
was. I am of opinion that the compu~sory ccssatfon
of employment is not equivalent to the compulsory
cessation of an agency for the purpose of considering
whether any voluntary amount paid at the cessation
of the employment or the cessation of an agency is
assessable to tax or not as the two amounts are assess·
able under different provisions of the Act. The
nature of the amount has to be considered from the
point of view of explanation 2 to sub-s. (1) of s. 7 of
the Act in one case and from the point of view of
s. IO in the other.
In Guff's Gase (') Chagla, C. J., also relied on
Ohibbett's Case (8 ), and on the observation of
Romer, L. J., in Henry (II. JI. Inspector vf 'J'a,res) v.
Arthur 11'.aster Etc. (' ). I have already considered
that observation along with what Romer, L. J., said
in that very case about tbe nature of the payment
in dispute and have also dealt with Ohibbett' s 0<6se (')
and need say nothing more about them.
I am therefore of opinion that any sum paid by
an employer or former employer to an employee at
the termination of his services will be a 'payment
made solely as compensation for loss of employment'
only when it is made in consideration of what the
employee can claim as such compensation under law
or the terms of the contract of service. If he cannot
(I) (1932[L.R. 59 I.A. 206,
{S) { 1924) 9 Tas Cu, 48.
(2) [1957l 31 I.T.R. 826.
(4) (1831 16 Tu: Cao, 611-', tiS41
198 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [196-i] VOL.
1962
claim such compcn.~ation, the sum paid. to the
'f ht Com111isJi1intr of
employee will not be by way of compensation for
loss of employment. lt is immaterial that the
employer pays it or the emplovee receives it as compensation for lo>s of employn;ent. The true nature
of the sum receivrd is to be determined in accordance with what has been stated above.
/n111111t·lr1>., Bt11111'11_1
v.
E.D. Slvp;,,,d
Raghubar LaJ•I, J.
In the present case, the assessec"s scn·ices ll"cre
terminated by giving one month's notice in accordance with the service contract. He h:tcl no
of
claim for
compensation. The payment
Rs. 2,21,000/- by his employer firm cannot thercf"rc
be said to have been made as compensation for loss
of employment.
The question then arises whether this payment
comes within the first part of Explanation 2 to
sub-s. ( 1) of" s. i and thus amounts to 'profits in lieu
of sabn·· _ This sum was received b,· the assessee
frum his employer a day before the t~rmination of
his services. The payment was made by the firm as
employer to the :1sscsscc as employee and therefore
rnmrs within the purview of the Explanation. The
sum comes within the language of the first part of
the aforesaid Explanation and will be treated as
'profit in lieu of salary', for the purposes of sub-s. (I)
of s. 7. It follows that tax will be payable by the
asscssee under the head 'salaries' in respect of this
sum, in view of the provisions of s. 7 of the Act. It
is not necessary, in my opinion, to determine whether
the sum was received by the assessec as capital
receipt or revenue receipt In fact, it will be deemed
to be revenue receipt a> 'profit in lieu of salary'
must be ckemed to be 'income' for the purposes of
the Act.
It has, however, been argued for the respondent
that the language of the first part of the explanation
should not be given a wide meaning and should be
given a restricted meaning so that it be taken to
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Hl9
1952
refer to such payment as is made because of lhe
relation between the r.mployer and his employee; and The Commissi~ntr of
that the object of the payment of the sum of Income-tax, Bombay
v.
Rs. 2,21,000/- being unrelated to the relation betE,D, Sheppard
ween the firm and the assessee, it cannot be deemed
to be 'profit in lieu of salary'. Even if such a res- Raghuhar Dayal, J
tricted construction be put on the language of the
aforesaid Explanation, that will not take the sum of
Rs. 2,21,000/- out of its scope. This sum was paid
to the assessee because of th~ relation between the
employer and him. It was related to the service of
the assessee with the firm. It was made because he
was an employee whose service was to cease in
accordance with the terms of the contract. It was
not paid for any extraneous consideration. It was
also not paid for any personal relations between the
partners of the firm and the assessce or for any particular affection or esteem they held for him or for any
particular personal qualities of his. The payment
was made in view of the past service of the assesser
which it may be granted, was appreciated.
In view of what has been stated a bovc, I am
of opinion that the sum of Rs. 2,21,000/- received
by the respondent as employee from Killick Nixon &
Co., his employers, on the occasion of the termination
of his services after appropriate notice of one month,
was not a payment made as compemation for loss of
employment and therefore amounted to 'profit in
lieu of salary' in view of explanation 2 to s. 7( I J of
the Act and was, as such, taxable to income-tax.
The High Court was therefore in error in holding
otherwise. I would accordingly allow the appeal
with costs and my answer to the question referred
would be that the sum of Rs. 2,21,000/- received by
the respondent is taxable to income-tax as 'profit in
lieu of salary' under sub-s. (I) of s. 7 of the Act.
BY COURT : In view of the majority jwlgment
t.he appeal is dismissed with costs.
·
Appeal dismissed.
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