AKADASI PADHAN versus STATE OF ORISSA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 December 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 691 | 1962 INSC 356
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 December 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 73/1962
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 691
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 356
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
AKADASI PADHAN
1962
December 5.
f},
STATE OF ORISSA
(B. P. SINHA., c. J.. P. B. GAJENDRA.GADKAR,
K. N. WANOHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
j. C. SHAH, jj.)
&ale Monopoly-Ktndu Lt.av...-Appoinlment of agemaAgreement toith agents-Validity of-Article 19 (6) (ii)-Scope
and effect of-Rule 7 (6)-Validity of Act and••· 3, 4, 8,-0ris8a
KenJu Leavea (Oontrol of Trade) Act, 1961 (Orisaa 28 of ,961),
••· 3, 4, 8-0onstitution of India, Arts. 19 (1) (/) and (g),
19 (6).
Prior to 1961, the petitioner used to carry on extensive
trade in the sale of Kendu leaves. In 1962, the State of Orissa
acquired a monopoly in the trade of Kendu leaves and put
restrictions on the fundamental rights of. the petitioner. Three
notifications were issued by the State on January 8, 1962,
January 25, 1962 and March 10, 1962 for that purpose. Jn
.bis petition under Art. 32, the petitioner challenged the
validity of the notifications and also the validity of the whole
Act, particularly ss. 3 and 4, on the ~ound that they violated
Art. 19 (I) (f) and (g). The petitioner prayed for a decla•
ration that the whole act was ultra vires and also an order
restraining ihe State from giving eft'ect. to the notification and
the Act.
Held, that the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade)
Act, 1961, is a valid piece of legislation. The creation of State
monopoly in Kendu Leaves is within the scope of Art. 19 (6)
of the Constitution as amended by the constitution (First
amendmtnt) Act, 1951. A law creating a State monopoly in
the narrow and limited sense is valid under the latter part of
Art. 19 (6). ff it indirectly impinges on any other right, its
validity cannot he challenged on that ground. If the sa\d
law contains other incidental provisions which are not essential
and do not constitute an integral part of .the monopoly created hy
it, the validity of those provisions has to be tested under the
ti.St part .of Art. 19 (6). If they directly impinge on any
other fundamental right granted by Art; 19 (I), the validity of
the said clauses has to be tested by reference to the correspon·
ding clauses of Art. 19;
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Akadasi Ptuilum
••
Stale of Ori11a
• The essential atrributes of the law creating a monopoly
will vary with the nature of the trade or busines1 in which the
monopoly is created. They will depend u1ron the nature of
the commodity, the nature of commerce in which it is involved
and several other circumstances.
A law relating to State monopoly in respect of road
transport or air transport would not normally infringe the
citizen's fundamental right under Art. 19 (1) (f). Likewise,
a State monopoly to manufacture steel, armaments, transport
vehicles or railway engines and coaches can be provided for
by law and that would not normally impinge on Art. 19 (I} (f).
However, if the law creating such monopolies makes incidental
provisions directly impinging on the citizens' right under
Art. 19 (I) (f}, the case would be different.
Having regard to the scheme of the State monopoly
envisaged by the Act, s. 4 cannot be said to be such an essential part of the said monopoly as to fall within the expression
"law relatilll{ to" under Art. 19 (6). The validity of s. 4 has
to be tested in the light of the first part of Art. 19 (6) so far as
the petitioner's rights under Art. 19 ( 1) (g} are concerned and
under Art. 19 (5) so far as his rights under Art. 19 (I) (f) arc
concerned. So tested, the restrictions regarding the fixation of
prices .prel<'.ribcd bys. 4 are reasonable and in the interc.t of
the general public both under Art. 19 (5) and Art. 19 (6).
Hence s. 4 is valid.
·
Section 3 of the Act is also not open to any challenge.
This section allows either the Government or an officer of the
Government authorised in that beha,lf or an agent in respcr.t of
the unit in which the leaves have grown, to purchase or
transport Kcndu leaves. The Court was satisfied that the two
categories of persons specffied in els. (b) and (c) are intended to
work as agents of the Government and all their actions and
dealings in pursuance of the provisions of the Act would be
actions and dealings on behalf of the Government and for the
benefit of the Government. Ifs. 3 is valid, s. 8 which authorises ihe appointment of agents, must also be held valid.
When the State carries on any trade, business or industry
it must inevitably carry it on either departmentally or through
its ofl'iccrs appointed for that purpose. In the very nature of
things, the State cannot function without the help of its servants
or employees and that inevitably introduces the concept of
agency in a narrow and limited sense. There are some trades or
businesses in which it may be inexpedient to undertake the
work of trade or business departmentally or with the assistance
·-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
of State servants. In such cases, it is open to the State to
employ the services of agents, provided the agents work on
behalf of the State and not for themselves.
Rule 7 (5} provides that on appointment as agent the
person appointed shall execute an agreement in such form as
Government may direct. This rule is bad because it leaves it
to the sweet will and pleasure of the offi= concerned to fix
any terms and conditions on an ad hoc basis. This is beyond
the competence of the State Government. The terms and
conditions of the agreement must be prescribed by rules.
When the agreement actually made in this case is considered, it leaves no room for doubt that the person appointed
under the agreement to work the monopoly of the State is not
an agent in the strict and narrow sense of the term con ..
templated by Art. 19 (6) (ii). The agent appointed under this
agreement seems to carry on the trade substantjally on his own
account. If he makes any profit after paying the amount
specified in the contract,. that profit is his. If he incurs any
loss, that loss is his. He is not made accountable to the State
Govcrnm'.:nt and the State Government is not resp.)nsible for
his actions. It is impo3Sible to hold that the agreement is consistent with the terms of s. 3 of the Act. Hence, the agreement is
invalid. The State Government cannot implement the
provisions of the Act with the assistance of agents appointed
under the said invalid agreement.
Motilal v. Tho Government of the State of U.P. l.L.R.
All. 269, A. K. Gopalan v. Stat,e of Madras, [1950]
S. C. R. 88, Ram Sin~h v. Tile Stato of Delhi, [1951] S. C.R.
451, Express Newspapers (P} Ltd. v. Union of India, (1959]
S:C. R. 12, State of Bom.bay v. R. M. D. Ghamarbaugwala,
[1957) S. C. R. 874. lilz parte Bright in Resmith, [1879]
10 L R. Ch. D. 566 and Weiner Barria, (1910] l K. B. 285,
referred to.
~1951] l
Saghir Ahmed v. State of U. P. [19551 1 S. C. R. 707,
Parbhani Transport Go-operatiiM Society Ltd. v. The Regional
Tra"'Port Authority, Aurangabad, [1960] 3 S. C. R. 177,
Dosa Satyanarayanamurty v. The Andhra Pradesh State Road
Transport Oorporatian, [1961] l S. C.R. 642 and H. G.
Narayanappa v. State of. J4ysore, [1960] 3 S. C. R. 742,
relied upon.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 73 of
1962.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
1962
Akadasi Padhan
v.
Stat1 of Ofissa
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J631 SUPP.
1962
AJailr1.J'i Padhtm
v.
Slate uj Orissa
Gaj1nJrag11dkar, J.
G. 8. Pathak and G. P. Lal, for the petitioner.
M. G. Betalcarl, Attorney-General of lndfo,
Dinabanrlhu Sahu, Advocate-General for the Btcite of
Orissa, G. B. Agarwala, R.H. Dhebar, and R. N.
Sachtkey, for respondent No. 1.
1962. December 5. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
·
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-In
challengiug the
validity of the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of
Trade) Act, 1961 (No. 28 of 1961) (hereinafter called
the Act), this petition under Art. 32 of the Consti·
tution raises an important question about the scope
aod effect of the provisions of Art. 19 (6). The
petitioner Akadasi Pradhan owns about 130 acres of
land in village Bettagada, Sub-division Rairakhel in
the District of Sambalpur, and in about 80 acres of
the said land he grows Kendu leaves. Kendu leaves
are used in the manufacture of Bidis; and so, prior to
1961, the petitioner used to carry on extensive trade
in the sale of Kendu leaves by transporting them to
various places io and outside the District of
Sambalpur. But since the Act was pa;sed in HJ61
and it came into force on the 3rd of January, 1962,
the Sta(e has acquired a monopoly in the trade of
Keodu leaves, and that ha~ put severe restrictions on
the fundamental rights .of the petitioner under
Articles 19 (1) (f) and (g). That, in substance, is the
basis of the present petition.
The petition alleges that, in substance, the Act
creates a monopoly in favour of certain individuals
described as Agents by the relevant provisions of the
Act, and in that sense, it is a colourable piece of
legislation: Under the relevant provisions of the Act,
three notifications have been is5ued, and the validity
of these notifications is al~o challenged by the
petition. The first notification published on the
8th of January, 1962 under section 5 of the Act,
gives a schedule of the Districts, the number of units
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
in which the districts are divided and the local areas
covered by the said units. The District of Sambalpur
in which the petitioner resides has been divided into
five units and the petitioner's lands fall under
units 2 and 5. On .January 10, 1962, applications were called from persons who desired to be
appointed as Agents of the Government of Orissa
for purchase of and trade in Kendu leaves, and the
notification by which these applications were called
for made it clear that the Government reserved to
itself the right to reject any or all applications in
respect of any unit without assigning any reason
whatsoever. Then followed the notification of the
25thjanuary, 1962, which prescribed the price for
the Kendu leaves @ 50 leaves per naya paisa. This
notification stated that the said price had b~en fixed
by the State Government in consultation with the
Advisory Committee appointed under s. 4 of the Act.
The la~t notification to which reference must be made
is the notification
which
was issued on
March 10, 1962, making certain corrections in the
units of the loci.I areas notified by the notification of
the January 8, 1962. The validity of these
notifications is challenged by the petitioner on the
ground that the relevant provisions under which the
said notifications are issued are invalid, .and also on
the general ground that the Act in its entirety is
ultra virea.
The petition has averred that sections 3, 5, 6
and 16 of the Act are invalid because they contravene
Art. 14, but this part of the case has not been argued
before us. The main attack has been directed
generally against the validity of the whole Act and
sections 3 and 4 in particular on the ground that they
violate Art. 19 ( l) (f) and (g). The relief claimed
by the petitioner is· that this Court may declare that
the whole Act is ultra vires and restrain respondent
No. l, the State of Orissa, from giving effect either
to the provisions of the impugned notifications or to
1962
Akad(lj·i Padha11
...
State of Orissa
Gajendragadkar, J,
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Al.:adiui Ptidhan
v.
Stl.llt (if Orissa
G'ajcw/ragadkar, J.
the provisions of the impugned Act.
The challenge made by the petitioner to the
validity of the Act and the relevant notifications
is met by respondent No. 1 mainly on the ground
that the Orissa Legislature was competent to pass
the Act and that its provisions do not contravene
Art. 19 (1) (f) or (g). It is urged that under
Art. 19 ,(6), the State Legislature is empowered
to create a State monopoly in any trade or
business and a monopoly thus created cannot be
successfully challenged either under Art. 19(1) (f) or
under Art. 19 (1) (g). In support of its case that
the prices fixed under the Act and the scheme of
enforcing the State monopoly adopted by the Act
arc reasonable, respondent No. 1 has referred to the
previous legislative history in respect of Kendu
leaves, and has pointed out that the Act was passed
in pursuance of the recommendations made by a
Taxation Enquiry Committee appointed by the
State Government in 1959. Besides, it has emphasised that 75% of the Kendu leaves produced
in the State of Orissa grow in Government lands, and
the monopoly created by the Act affects only 25%
of the total produce of Kendu leaves in the State.
The affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 also shows
that the price fixed in consultation with the Advisory Committee is fair and reasonable and would
leave a fair margin of profit to the grower of kendu
leaves. It is on ·these rival contentions that the
validity· of the Act as well as the notifications has
to be considered in the present petition.
Before referring to the relevant provisions of
the Act, it would be relevant to refer to the legislative background in respect of Kendu leaves. In
1949, the Government of Orissa had passed an
order in exercise of its powers conferred on it by subsection (1) of s. 3 of the Orissa Essential Articles
Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
1947. This Order was called the Orissa Kcndu
Leaves (Control and Distribution) Order, 1949.
The broad scheme of this Order was that the area
in the State was divided into units, and licences
were issued to persons who were entitled to trade in
Kendu leaves. The District Magistrate fixed the
minimum rate from time to time and the Order provided that the licensees were bound to purchase
Kendu leaves from the pluckers or owners of private
trees and forests at rates not below the minimum
prescribed. In other words, the trade of Kendu
leaves was entrusted to the licensees who were under
an obligation to purchase Kendu leaves offered to
them at prices not below the minimum prescribed
by the Order.
This Order was followed by the Orissa Kendu
Leaves Control Order, 1960, passed under the same
provision of the Orissa Act of 1947. The licensees
were continued under this Order, but some other
provisions were made, such as the appointment of a
Committee for each District to fix the minimum
price. In other words, the licensing system continued even under this latter Order.
It appears that when there was a change
in the Government of Orissa, the monopoly created
in favour of the licensees was changed over to controlled competition, and when the Congress Government, came back to power, it was faced with the problem that the controlled competition introduced by its
predecessor had led to a loss in Government revenue.
That is why, in pursuance of the recommendations
made by the Taxation Enquiry Committee, the
present Act .has been passed with the object of
creating a State monopoly in the trade of Kendu
leaves. It would thus be seen that though the Act
creates a State monopoly in the trade of Kendu leaves,
a kind of monopoly in favour of the licensees
had been in operation in the State since 1949,
1962
Akada~·i Padhart
v.
Stat1 of Oris.fa
Gajtmfragadkar, J.
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
--A karlas i padhan
v.
Stale of Orissa
Glljendragadkar, J,
except for a short period when the experiment of
controlled competition was tried by the Coalition
Government which was then in power.
Let us now examine the broad features of the
Act. The Act consists of 20 sections, and as its
preamble indicates, it was passed because the Legislature thought that it was expedient to provide for
regulation of trade in Kendu leaves by creation of
State monopoly in such trade. Section 2 of the Act
definrs "agent" as meaning an agent appointed
under section 8, and "unit" as a unit constituted
under section 5; "grower of Kendu leaves" means
any person who owns lands on which Kendu plants
grow or who is in possession of such lands under a
lease or otherwise; and "permit" means a permit
issued under section 3. Section 3( 1) provides that
no person other than {a) the Government; (b) an
officer of Government authorised in that behalf; or
(c) an agent in respect of the unit in which the leaves
have grown; shall purchase or transport Kendu
leaves. It is thus clear that by imposing restrictions
on the purchase or transport of Kendu leaves,
section 3 has created a monopoly. There are two
explanations to s. 3(1) and two sub-sections to the
said section, but it is unnecessary to refer to them.
Section 4 deals with the fixation of sale price.
Section 4( 1) lays down that the price at which
Kendu leaves shall be purchased shall be fixed by
the State Government after consultation with the
Advisory Committee constituted under s. 4(2). After
the price is thus fixed, it has to be published in the
Gazette in the manner prescribed not later than the
31st day of January, and after it is published, the
price would prevail for the whole of the year and
shall not be altered during that period. The proviso
to s. 4(1) permits different prices to be fixed for diffcrrent units, having regard to the five factors specified
in clauses (a) to (e). Clause {a) has reference to the
prices fixed under any law during the preceding three
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
years in respect of the area in question; cl. (b) refers
to the quality of the leaves grown in the unit; cl. (c)
to the transport facilities available in the unit; cl. (d)
to the cost of transport; and cl. (e) to the general
level of wa~es for unskilled labour prevalent in the
unit. Section 4(2) provides that the Advisory committee to be constituted by the Government shall con, sist of not less than six members as will be notified
from time to time; and the proviso to it lays down
that not more than one-third of such members shall
be from amongst persons who are growers of Kendu
leaves. Under sub-section (3), it is provided that it
shall be the duty of the Committee to advise Government on such matters as may be referred to it by
Government; and sub-section (4) prescribes that the
business of the Committee shall be conducted in such
manner and the members shall be entitled to such
allowances, if any, as may be prescribed. Se:tion 5
allows the constitution of units, and s. 6 provides for
the opening of depots, publication of price list and
the hours of business etc. Section 7( 1) imposes an
obligation on the Government and the authorised
officer or agent to purchase Kendu leaves offered at
the price fixed under s. 4 in the manner specified by
it; under the proviso, option is left to the Government or any officer or agent not to purchase any leaves
which in their opinion are not fit for "the purpose of
manufacture of bidis. Section 7(2) provides for a
remedy to a person aggrieved by the refusal of the
Government to purchase the Ken Ju leaves. Section
7(3) deals with cases where leaves offered are suspected to be leaves from the Government forests and it
lays down the manner in which such a case should
be dealt with. Section 8 deals with the appointment
of agen(s in respect of different units and it allows
one person to be appointed for more than one unit.
Under s. 9, every grower ofKendu leaves has to get
himself registered in the prescribed manner if the
quantity of leaves grown by him during the year is
likely to exceed ten standard maunds. Section 10
1962
Akadasi Padhan
v.
State of Ori.ssa
Gajendragadkar, J.
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
.4.kada~i Padha11
v.
State of Orissa
Gaje11dragndkar, J,
authorises the Government or its officer or agent to
sell or otherwise dispose of Kendu leaves purchased
by them. ·Section 11 provides for the application of
net profits which the State Government may make as
a result of the operation of this Act; this profit has
to be divided between the different Samitis and Gram
Pancha) ats as prescribed by the said section.
Section 12 deals with delegation of powers; s. 13
confers power of entry, search and seizure; s. 14 deals
with penalty; s. 15 deah with offences and s. 16 makes
the offences cognizable; Section 17 makes savings in
respect of acts done in good faith; by section 18,
Government is given power to make rules; by section 19, the Orissa Essential Articles Control and
Requisitionin~ (Temporary Powers) Act, 1955 is
repealed in so far as it relates to kendu leaves; and
s. 20 gives the power to the State Government to
remove doubts and difficulties. These are the broad
features of the Act.
The first contention which has been raised by
Mr. Pathak on behalf ot the petitioner is that the
creation of State monopoly in respect of the trade
of purchase of kendu leaves contravenes the petitioner's fundamental rights under Art. 19(1) (f) and
(g). There has been some controversy before us as
to whether the petitioner can claim any fundamental
right under Art. 19(1) (g). The learned AttorneyGcneral contended that the petitioner is merely a
grower of kendu leaves and as such, though he may
be entitled to say that the restrictions imposed by
the Act affect his right to dispose of his property
under article 19(1) (f), he cannot claim to be a person
whose occupation, trade or business has been affected. For the purpose of the present petition, we
have, however, decided to proceed on the basis that
the petitioner is entitled to challenge the validity of
the Act both under Art. l!l (1) (f) and Art. 19(1) (g);
and that makes it necessary to examine the argument
raised by Mr. Pathak that the creation of the State
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
monopoly contravenes Art. 19 (1) (g).
Mr. Pathak suggests that the effect of the
amendment made by the Constitution (first Amendment) Act, 1951 in Art. 19(6) is not to exempt the
law passed for creating a Stage monopoly from the
application of the rule pre.cribed by the first part
of Art. 19(6). In other words, he suggests that the
effect of the amendment is merely to enable the State
legislature to pass a law creating a State monopoly,
but that does not mean that the said law Will still
not have to be justified on the ground that the restrictions imposed by it are reasonable and are in the
interests of the g~neral public. On the other hand,
the learned Attorney-General contends that the
object of the amendment was to put the monopoly
laws beyond the pale of challenge under Art. 19(1)
(f) and (g). It would thus be noticed that the two
rival contentions take two extreme positions. The
petitioner's argument is that the monopoly law has
to be tested in the light of Art. 19(6) : if the test is
satisfied, then the contravention of Art. 19(1) (g)
will not invalidate the law. On the other hand, the
State contends that the monopoly law must be deemed to be valid in all its aspects because that was the
very purpose of making the amendment in Art.
19(6).
Before proceeding tu examine the merits of
these contentions, it is relevant to recall the genesis
of the amendment introduced by the Constitution
(First Amendment) Act, 1951. Soon after the Constitution came into force, the impact of socio-economic legislation, passed by the legislature in the
country in pursuance of their welfare policies, on the
fundamental rights of the citizens _in respect of property came to be examined by 'Courts, and the
Articles on which the citizens relied were 19(1) (f)
and (g) and 31 respectively. In regard to State
monopolies, there never was any doubt that as a
1962
Akadasi Padhan
v.
State of Ori.tsa
Gajendragadkar, J.
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
.A.kadasi Padhan
v.
Stat1 of Orissa
Gajendragadkar, J.
result of Entry 21 in List III both the State and the
Union Legislatures were competent to· pass laws in
regard to commercial and mdustrial monopolies,
combines and trusts, so that the legislative competence of the Legislatures to create monopolies by
legislation could not be questioned. But the validity
of such legislation came to be challenged on the ground
that it contravened the citizen's rights under Art.
19(1) {f) and (g). As a typical case on the point,
we may refer to the decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Moti Lal v. The Government
of the State of Uttar Pradesh('). The result
of this decision was that a monopoly of transport
sought to be created by the U.P. Government in
favour of the State operated Bus Service, known as
the Government Roadways, was struck down as
unconstitutional, because it was held that such a
monopoly totally deprived the citizens of their rights
under Art. 19(1) (g). As a result of this decision it
was realised by the Legislature that the legislative
competence to create monopolies would not necessarily make monopoly laws valid if they contravened
Art. 19(1). That is why Art. 19t6) came to be
amended. Incidentally, it may be of interest to
note that about the same time, the impact of legislative enactments in regard to acquisition of property
on the citizens' fundamental rights to property under
Art. 19(1) (f) also came for judicial review and the
decisions of Courts in respect of the acquisition laws
in turn led to the amendment of Art. 31 on two
occasions; firstly, when the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act was passed in 1951 and secondly,
when the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act was
passed in 1955. ·
Article 19(6) as amended reads thus :
"Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause
shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State
(1) l.L.R.. (1951) 1 AU. 269.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
\
703
from making any law imposing, in the interests
of the general public, rea5onable restrictions
on the exercise of the right conferred by the
said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in
the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of
any existing law in so far as it relates to, or
t>revent the State from· making any law relating
to,(i)
the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii)
the carrying on by the State or by
corporation owned or controlled by
the State, of any trade, business,
industry or service, whether to the
exclusion, complete or partial, of
citizens or otherwise."
It would be noticed that the amendment provides,
inter alia, that nothing contained in Art. 19(1) (g)
will prevent the State from making any Jaw refating
to the carrying on by the State of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, ·
complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise ; and
this clearly means that the State may make a law in
respect of any trade, business, industry or service
whereby complete monopoly could be created by
which citizens are wholly excluded from the trade,
business, industry or service in question; or a }aw
may be passed whereby citizens are partially excluded from such trade, business, industry or service ;
and a law relating to the carrying on of the business
either to the complete or partial exclusion of citizens
will not be affected because it contravenes Art. 19
(1) (g). The question which arises for our decision
is : what exactly is the scope and .effect of this
provision ?
1962
Akmlasi Patlhan
v.
State of Orissa
Gojendragadkar, J.
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Akat!asi Padhan
v.
State of Orissa
Gajendragadkar, J,
In attempting to construe Art. 19(6), it must
be borne in mind that a literal construction may not
be quite appropriate. The task of construing important Constitutional provisions like Art. 19(6) cannot
always be accomplished by treating the said problem
as a mere exercise in grammar. In interpreting such
a provision, it is essential to bear in mind the political or the economic philosophy underlying the provisions in question, and that would necessarily
involve the adoption of a liberal and not a literal
and mechanical approach to the problem. With
the rise of the philosophy of Socialism, the doctrine
of State ownership has been often discussed by political and economic thinkers. Broadly speaking, this
discussion discloses a difference in approach. To
the socialist, nationalisation or State ownership is a
matter of principle and its justification is the general
notion of social welfare. To the rationalist, nationalisation or State ownership is a matter of expediency
dominated by considerations of economic efficiency
and increased output of production. This latter
view supported nationalisation only when it appeared
clear that State ownership would be more efficient,
more economical and more productive. The former
approach was not very much influenced by these
considerations, and treated it a matter of principle
that all important and nation-building industries
should come under State control. The first approach
is doctrinaire, while the second is pragmatic. The
first proceeds on the general ground that all national
wealth and means of producing it should come under
national control, whilst the second supports nationalisation only on grounds of efficiency and increased
output.
The amendment made by the Legislature in
Art. 19 (6) shows that according to the Legislature,
a law relating to the creation of State monopoly
should be presumed to be in the interests of the
general public. Art. Ul (6) (ii) clearly shows that
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
there is no limit placed on the power of the State
in respect of the creation of State monopoly. The
width of the p'lwer conferred on the State can be
easily assessed if we look at the words used in the
clauses which cover trade, business, industry or service. It is true that the State may, according to the
exigencies of the case and consistently with the
requirements of any trade, business, industry or
service, exclude the citizens either wholly or partially. In other words, the theory underlying the
amendment in so far as it relates to the concept of
State monopoly, does not appear to be based on the
pragmatic approach, but on the doctrinaire approach
which socialism accepts. That· is why we feel no
difficulty in rejecting Mr. Pathak's argument that
the creation of a State monopoly must be justified
by showing that the restrictions imposed by it arc
reasonable and arc in the interests of the general
public. In our opinion, the amendment clearly
indicates that State monopoly in respect of anv
trade or business must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interests of general public, so far
as Art. W(l) (g) is C!)ncerned.
The amendment made in Arl. HI {l.i) shows
that it is open to the Stale to make laws for creating
State monopolies, either partial or complete, in respect
of any trade, business, industry or service.
The State may enter trade as a monopolist either for
administrative reasons, or with the object of mitigating the evils flowing from competition, or with a
view to regulate prices, or improve the quality of
goods, or even for the purpose of making profits in
order to enrich the State exchequer. The Constitution-makers had apparently assumed that the State
rponopolics or schemes of nationalisation would fall
under, and he protected by Art. l!l {ll) as it orig-inally stood; but when judicial decisions rendered
the said a~umption invalid, it was thought nece1sm'y
to cbrify the intention of the Constitution by maki~g
IJ6l
Akt!dtni Pfflum
••
Slate q/ Oriss•
Cnjr.ndrn.~~Jl.:.r, J,
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
Jg(j2
.4.Wasi PadMn
••
Slate of Orissa
Gojendragadkar, J.
the amendment. It is because the amendment was
thus made for purposes of clarification that it begins
with the words "in particular". These words in·
dicate that restrictions imposed 011 the fundamental
rights guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) which are re·
asonable and which are in the interests of the general
public, are saved by Art. 19(6) as il originally
stood; the subject-matter' covered by the said pro·
vision being justiciable, and the amendment adds
that the State monopolies or nationalisation Schemes
which may be introduced by legislation, are an
illustration of reasonable restrictions imposed in. the
interests of the general public an.d must be treated
as such. That i~ why the question about the validity of the laws covered by the amendment is no
longer left to be tried in Courts. This brings out the
doctrinaire approach adopted by the amendment in
respect of a State monopoly as such.
This conclusion, however, still leaves two
somewhat difficult questions to be decided; what
docs "a law relating to" a monopoly used in the
amendment mean ? And what is the effect of the
amendment on the other provisions of Art. rn (I) ?
The Attorney·Gencral contends that the effect of
the amendment is that whenever any law is passed
creating a State monopoly, it will not have to stand
the test of reasonableness prescribed by the first
part of Art. 19(6) and its reasonableness or validity
cannot be examined under any other provision of
Art. 19 (1). Taking the present Act, he urges that
if the State monopoly is protected by .the amendment of Art. 19 (6), all the relevant provisions made
by the Act in giving effect to the said monopoly
are also equally protected and the petitionefil cannot
be heard to challenge their validity on any ground.
What is protected by the amendment must be held
to be constitutionally valid without being tested by
any other provisions of Art. 19 (1). That, in sub·
stance, is the position taken by the learned Attorney.
General.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS
707
In dealing with the question about the precise
denotation of the clause "a law relating to", it is
necessarv to bear in mind that this clause occurs in
Art. l!l(6) which is, in a sense, an exception to the
main provision of Art. l 9( l )(g). Laws protected by
Art. l!J (6) a re regarded as valid even though they
impinge upon the fundamental right guaranteed
under Art. l!l( I ){g ). That is the effect of' the scheme
contained in Art. l!l(l) read with clauses (2) to (6)
of the said Article. That being so, it would be unreasonable to place upon the relevant clause an
unduly wide and liberal comtruction. "A law
relating to" a State monopoly cannot, in the context,
include all the provisions contained in the said law
whether they have direct relation with the creation
of the monopoly or not. In our opinion, the said
expression shou Id be construed to mean the law
relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential
featurt'S. If a law is passed creating a State monopoly,
the Court should enquire what are the provisions of
the said law which are basically and essentially
necessary for creating the State monopoly. It is only
those csscntia 1 and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Art., 19(6). If there are
other provisions made by the Act which are subsi·
diary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the
monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and
their validity must be judged under the first part of
Art. 19(6). In other words, the effect of the amendment made in Art. 19(6) is to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly and that means that
it is only the provisions of the law which are integrally and essentially connected with the creation of
the monopoly that are protected. The rest of the
provisions which may by incidental do not fall
under the latter part of Art. 19(6) and would inevitably have tu satisfy the test of the first part of
Art. 19(6).
The next question to consider is: what is the
19'2
Akcd11Ji P•ihcn
v.
State nJ Ori.is•
Gajtttdragatlkar, J.
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Akadasi Padhan
v.
State of Oris.ra
GajendragaJkar, J,
effect of the amendment on the other fundamental
rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1) ? It is likely that a
law creating a State monopoly may, in some cases,
affect a citizens' rights under Art. 19(l)(f) because
such a law may impinge upon the citizens' right to
dispose of property. Is the learned Attorney-General
right when he contends that laws protected by the
latter part of Art. 19(6) cannot be tested in the light
of the other fundamental rights guaranteed by
Art. 19( 1) ? The answer to this question would
depend upon the nature of the law under scrutiny.
There is no doubt that the several rights guaranteed
by the 7 sub-clauses of Art. 19(1) are separate and
distinct fundamental rights and they can be regulated only if the provisions contained in clauses (:l) to
(6) arc respectively Satisfied. But in dealing with
the question as to the effect of a law which seeks to
regulate the fundamental right guaranteed by
Art. Hl(l)(g) on the citizen's right guaranteed by
Art. 19(l)(f), it will be necessary to distinguish
between the direct purpose of the Act and its indirect
or incidental effect. If the legislation seeks directly
to control the citizens' right under Art. l\J(l)(g),
its validity has to be tested in the light of <the provisions contained in Art. l!J(6), and if such a legislation, as fur instance, a law creating a State
monopoly, indirectly or incidentally affects a citizen's
right under any other clause of Art. 10(1) as for
instance, Art. 19(l)(f), that will not introduce
any infirmity in the Act itself. As was observed by
Kania, C. J., in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of
JJfadraB ('), if there is a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without
arms etc., the question whether that legislation
is saved by the relevant clause of Art. 19 will arise.
If however, the legislation is nut directly in respect
of any uf tl1csc subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive or
preventive detention, his right under any of these
\I} ( 1950] s.c.R. 88, IOI.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
sub-clauses is abridged, the question of the application of Art. 19 does not arise. The true approach
is only to consider the directness of the legislation
and not what will be the result of the detention
otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenue'sJifc.
These ob~ervations were subsequently adopted
by Patanjali Sastri, J., in Rrmi Singh. v. '/_'he State of
Delhi(') who added that in Gopalan's case the
majority view was that a law which authorises
deprivation of personal liberty did not fall within
the purview of Art. HJ and its validity was not to be
judged by the criteria indicated in that Article but
depended on its compliance with the requirements of
Articles 21 and 22, and since s. 3 satisfied those
requirement~, it was constitutional.
--
The same view has been accepted by this Court
in Express Newpapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union
of India(') as-well as in ~'lie State of Bombay v.
Ji. M. D. C/i.arnarbaugwala. (1 ) Therefore, in dealing
with the attack against the validity of a law creating
state monopoly on the ground that its provisions
impinge upon the other fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 (1), it would be necessary to decide
what is the purpose of the Act and its direct effect.
If the direct effect of the Act h to impinge upon
any other right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1), its validity
will have to be tested in the light of the corresponding
clauses in Art. 19; if the effect on the said right is
indirect or remote, then its validity cannot be successfully challenged.
It will be recalled that clause ( 6) is co-related
to the fundamental right
guaranteed under
Art. 19 (1) (g) as other clauses are co-related to the
. other fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 ( 1) (a)
to (f), and so, the protection afforded by the said
clause would be available to the impugned statute
only in resisting the contention that it violates the
(1) [1951] s.c.R. 451. 456.
(2) (l!ll9] S.C.R. 12, 128·130.
ts) 11vs11 s.c.11.. 874, 921.
1962
Akadasi Padhan
v.
State of Orissa
Gajendragidkar, /.
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1§62
Akn6fUi Ped/um
v.
State fJj Orissa
Gajtndra:odlrar, J.
fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19 (l} (g).
If the statutr, in substance, affects any other right
not indirectly but directly, the protection of clause
19 (6) will not avail and it will have to be sustained
by reference to the requirements of the corresponding clauses in Art. 19. The position, therefore, is
that a law creating a state monopoly in the narrow and
limited sense to which we have already referred would
be valid under the latter part of Art. 19 (6), and if it
indirectly impinges on any other right, its validity
cannot be challenged on that ground. If the said
law contains other incidental proviiions which are not
essential and do not constitute an integral part of the
monopoly created by it, the validity of those provisions will have to be tested under the first part of
Art. 19 (6), and if they directly impinge on any
other fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1),
the validity of the said clausrs will have to be tested
by reference to the corresponding clauses of Art. 19.
It is obvious that if the validity of the said provisions
has to be tested under the first part of Art. 19 (6) as
well as· Art. 19 t5), the position would be the same
because for an practical purposes, the tests prescribed
by the said two clauses are the same. In our
opinion, this approach introduces a harmony in
respect of the several provisions of Art. 19 and avoids
a conflict between them.
In this connection, it is necessary to add that in
a large majority ·of ca~es where State monopoly is
created by statute, no conflict would really arise, e.g.,
where under State monopoly, the State purchases
raw material in the open market and manufactures
finished goods, there would hardly be an occasion for
the infringement of the citizens' right under
Art. 19 (l)(f). Take, for instance, the State monopoly
in respect of road transport or air transport; a law
relating to such a monopoly would not normally
infringe the citizen's fundamental right under
Art. 19 (1) (f). Similarly, a State monopoly to
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
manufacture steel, armaments, or transport vehicles,
or railway engines and coaches, may be provided
for by law which would normally not impinge on
Art. 19(1) (f). If the law creating such monopolies
were, however, to make incidental provisions directly
impinging on the citizens' rights under Art. 19(l)(f),
that would be another matter.
What provisions of the impugned statute are
essential for the creation of the monopoly, would always be a question of fact. The essential attributes
of the law creating a monopoly will vary with the
nature of the trade or business in which the monopoly is created; they will depend upon the natllrc
of the commodity, the nature of commerce in which
it is involved and several other circumstances. In the
present case, the State monopoly has been created in
respect of Kendu leaves, and the main point of dis
putc between the parties is about the fixation ot
purchase price which has been provided for by s. 4.
Mr. Pathak contends that the fixation· of purchase
price is not essential for the creation of monopoly,
whereas the learned Attorney-General argues that
monopoly could not have functioned without the
fixation of such price. We are not prepared to
accept the argument that the fixation of ,purchase
price in the context of the present Act. was an
es~ential feature of the monopoly. It may be that
the fixing of the said price has been provided for by'
s. 4 in the interests of growers of Kendu leaves themselves, but that is a matter which would be relevant
in considering the reasonableness of the restriction
imposed by the section. But take a hypothetical
case where in creating a State monopoly for purchasing a commodity like Kendu leaves, the law prescribes
a purchase price at an unreasonably low rate, that
cannot be said to be an essential part of the State
monopoly as such, and its reasonableness will have
to be tested under Art. 19(l)(g). On the facts of
this case and in the light of the commodity in respect
1962
Akodasi Pod,,..
v.
Stat• of Orissa
-
Gajendra1tUIJ;ar, J.
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1§62
Aktdtui P"ihan
v.
State of Ori.Ha
CJaj1nJro1adk•r, J.
'
of which monopoly is created, it seems difficult to
hold that the State monopoly could not have functioned without fixing the purchase price. We are
not suggesting that fixing prices would never be an
essential part of the creation of State monopoly
though, prima facie, it seems doubtful whether fixing
purchase price can properly form an integral part of
State monopoly; what we are holding in the present
case is that having regard to the scheme of the State
monopoly envisaged by the Act, s. 4 cannot be said
to be such an essential part of the said monopoly as
to fall within the expression "law relating to" tmder
Art. 19(6). Therefore, we are satisfied that the
validity of s. 4 must be tested in the light of the first
part of Art. l!l(fi) so far as the petitioner's rights
under Art. Hl(l )(g) are concerned, and under
Art. l!l(5) so far as his rights under Art. l!l(I )(f) are
concerned.
Thus considered, there can be no difficulty in
upholding the validity of section 4. As we have just
indicated, if the legislature had allowed the State
monopoly to operate without fixing the prices, it
would have meant hardship to the growers and undue
advantage to the State. If the ordinary Jaw of
demand and supply was allowed to govern the
prices, in all probability the said prices would have
worked advcr~cly to the interests of the growers
and to the benefit of the State in the case of perishable commodities like Kendu leaves. That is why the
legislature has deliberately provided for the fixation
of prices and prescribed the machinery in tbat
behalf. It is true that the prices fixed are not the
minimum prices; but the fixing of minimum prices
would have scrvc<l no useful purpose when a State
monopoly was being created, and so, prices which
can be regarded as fair are intended to be fixed by
s. 4. A representative advisory Committee has to
be appointed and it is in consultatio11 with the advice
of the said Committee that prices have to be
2 S.CR.
l'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
fixed. In fact, the· present prices have been fixed
according to the recommendations made by the said
Committee. Thus, it is clear that the object of
fixing the prices was to help the growers to realise a
fair price. It is nobody's case that the prices are
tmduly low or compare unfavourably with the prices
prevailing in the locality in the previous years.
Therefore, we feel no hesitation in holding that restrictions in regard to the fixing of price prescribed
by s. 4 are reasonable and in the interests of the
general puQlic both under Art. Hl(ii) and Art. 19(6).
The result is that the challenge to the validity of
section 4 fails.
At this stage, we may refer to four decisions of
this Court in which the question about the construe·
tion of Art. 19(6) has been incidentally considered-.
In S1tghir Ahmad v. 1'he: State of U. P. (1 ), this
Court was called upon to consider the validity of the
relevant provisions of the U. P. Road Transport
Act (No. II of 1951) and the question had to be
decided in the light of Art 19(6) as it stood before
the amendment. But at the time when the
judgment
of this Court was pronounced,
the Amendment Act had been passed, and
Mukherjca, .J., who spoke for the Court, referred
to this amendment incidentally. "The result of the
amendment", observed the le trned Judge, "is that
the State would not have to justify such action as
reasonable at all in a Court of law and no objection
could be taken to it on the ground that it is an
infringement of the right guaranteed under
Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. It is quite true
that if the prescn' statute was passed after the coming
into force of the new clause in Art. 19(6) of the
Constitution. the question of reaso11ablcncss would
not have arisen at all and the appellants' case on
this point, at any rate, would have been unargu·
abie.." While appreciating the effect of these obser·
vations, however, we have to bear in mind the fact
(IJ !1955) I S.C, ~. 707. 727,
1962
A.hdasi P•dha•
v.
Slate nf Ori.sst1.
G1jentlra1adkar, J.
714
1962
AAad•ui PadAan
v.
State of Orissa
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
that the effect of the amendment did not really fall
to be considered and the impart of the amendment
in Art. 19(tl) on the right under Art. l!J{l)(f) has not
been noticed.
':ajtnd"'azt1dkar, J.
In The P<irbhani 'l'ransport Co-ope.ra tivr. Rociety Ltd. v. The Re11ional 'l'ransport Authority Aurangabad, (') this Court has observed that Art. 19 (6)
by providing that nothing in Art. 19(1)(g) shall affect
the application of any existing law in so far as it
relates to, or prevents the State from making any law
relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade,
business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise, would
seem to inrlicate that the State may carry on any
business either as a monopoly, complete or partial, or
in competition with any citizen and that would not
have the effect of infringing any fundamental rights
of such citizen. It is true that the last part of the
statement refers to any fundamental right~ of the
citizen, but that, in the context, cannot be taken to
mean a decision that a right under Art. 19( l)(f) would
necessarily fall within the scope of the said observation.
In Dosa
Satyanarayanamurty
v. The
Andhra Pradesh Rtate Road Transport Corporation, (') this Court has observed that su b-cluase
(ii) of Art. 19 (6) is couched in very wide terms.
Under it, the State can make law for carrying on a
business or service to the exclusion, complete or
partial, of citizens or otherwise ................. There
are, therefore, no limitations on the State's power to
make laws conferring monopoly on it in respect of
an area, and person or persons to be excluded.
(p. 649).
To the same effect are the relevant observations
made by this Court in the case of H. C. Narayana·
ppa v. The State of Mysore (1).
(I) [1960] 3 s.c,R. 177, 187.
(2) [1961] I S.C.R. M2.
(») (1960) 3 S.C.R, 742, 752.
.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7i5
1962
We must now examine the validity of the
argument urged hy Mr. Pathak that the Act i$ had Ak«d.Jsj P~aha
v.
because it seeks to crcalc a monopoly in favour of
State 1/ Orissa
individual citizens described by the Act as 'agents'.
For deciding this question, we must revert once G1jenJra1adkar, J
again to the amendment made in Art. l!l(G). The
argument is that though the State is empowered to
create State monopoly by law, the trade in respect
of which the monopoly is sought to be created must
be carried on by the State or by a corporation owned
or controlled by the State. There can be no doubt
that though the power to create monopoly is conferred on the legislatures in very wide terms and it
can be created in respect of any trade, business, in·
dustry or service, there is a limitation imposed at
the same time and that limitation is implicit in the
concept of Stale monopoly itself. If a State mono·
poly is created, the State must carry on the trade,
or the State may carry it on by a corporation owned
or controlled by it. Thus far, there is no difficulty.
Mr. Pathak, however, contends that the State cannot
appoint any agents in carrying on the State mono·
poly, whereas the learned Attorney-General urges that
the State is entitled not only to carry on the trade
by itself or by its officers serving in its departments,
but also by agents appointed by it in that behalf;
and in support of his argum~nt that agents can be
appointed, the lcarnerl Attorney-General suggests that
persons who can be treated as agents in ,a commercial
sense can be validly appointed by the State in working
out its monopoly. We are not inclined to accept
either the narrow construction pressed by Mr. Pathak,
or the broad construction suggested by the learned
Attorney-General. It seems to us that when the
State carries on any trade, business or industry, it
must inevitably carry it on either departmentally or
through its officers appointed in that behalf. In the
very nature of things, the State as such, cannot
function without the help of its servants or employees
and that inevitably introd11ces the concept of agency
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19113] SUPP.
1961
Afod4<i P4dhan
v.
.ftat1 of Orissa
GajtnJragadkar, J.
in a narrow and limited sense1 If the State cannot
act without the aid and assistance of its employees
or servants, it would be difficult to exclude the concept of agency altogether. Just as the State caR
appoint a public officer to carry on the trade or its
business, so can it appoint an agent to carry on the
trade on its behalf. Normally and ordinarily, the
trade sbould be carried on departmentally or with
the assistance of public servants appointed in that
behalf. But there may be some trades or businesses
ifl which it would ue inexpedient to undertake the
work of trade or business dcpartmcntall)' or with
the assistance of State servants. In such cases, it
would be open to the State to employ the s«rvices of
agent~, provided the agents work on behalf of the
State and not for themselves. Take the case of
Kendu leaves with which we arc concerned in the
present proceedings. These leaves arc not cultivated but gro\i.· in forests and they arc plucked during
3 to 4 months every year, so that the trade of purchasing and selling them is confined generally to the
said period. In such a case, it may not be expedient
for the State always to appoint Government servants
to operate the State monopoly, and agency would be
more convenient, appropriate and expedient. Thus
considered, it is only persons who can be called agents
in the strict and narrow sense to whom the working
of the State monopoly can be legitimately left by
the State. If the agent acquires a personal interest
in the working of the monopoly, ceases to be accountable to the principal at every stage, is not able to bind
the principal by his acts, or if there are any othe-r terms
of the agency which indicate that the trade or business is not carried on solely on behalf of the State
but at least partially on behalf of the individual
concerned, that would fall outside Art. 19(6) (ii).
Therefore, in our opinion, if a law is passed creating
a State monopoly and the working of the monopoly
is left either to the State or to the officers of the
State appointed in th<1t behalf, or to the dcpartmeot
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
of the State, or to persons appointed as agents to
carry on the work of the monopoly strictly on behalf
of the ,State-, that would satisfy the requirements of
Art. l!J (li) (ii). In other words, the limitations
imposed by the requirement that the trade
must be cafricd on by the Si ate or by a corpo·
ration owned or controlled, by the State cannot
be widened and must be strictly construed and
agency can be permitted only in respect of trades or
businesses where it appears to be inevitable and
where it works within the well recognised limits of
agency. Whether or not the operation of Stace
monopoly has been entrusted to an agent of this
type, will have, to be tried as a question of fact in
each case. The relationship of agency must be
proved in substance, and in deciding the question,
the nature of the agreement, the circumstances
under which the 1agrecmcnt was made and the terms
of the agreement will have to be carefully examined.
lt is not the form, but the substance that will decide
the is5ue. Thus considered, we do not think that
s. 3 is open to any challenge. Section 3 allows
either the Government or an officer of the Govcri1mcnt ,authori~cd in that behalf or an agent in res·
peel of the unit in which the leaves have grown, to
purchase or transport Kcndu leaves. We arc satisfied
that the two categories of persons specifi~d in clauses
(b) and (c) are intended to work as agents of the
Government and all their actions and their dealings
in pursuance of the proyisions of the Act wou Id
be ·actions and , dealings on behalf of the
Government and for the benefit of the Government.
Mr. l'athak's contention that the persons specified
in 'clauses (b) and (c) arc intended by the Act to
work on their own account seems to us to be incon·
sistcnt with the object of the section and the plain
meaning of the words used in the relevant clauses.
We wish to make it dear that we uphold the validity
of section 3 because we are satisfied that clauses (b)
and (c) of the said section have been added merely
1962
dkadosi Pad/um
••
State of Ori.ssa
Gajenirazadk1r; J,
718 St,JPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
A.kaiasi Padhan
••
State of Orissa
for clarification and are not intended to and do not
include any forms of agency which would have been
outside the provision of s. 3 if the said two clauses
had not been enacted. If section 3 is valid, then
s. 8 which authorises the appointment uf agcuts
must also b~ held tu be valid.
Jn the petition, the validity of sections G, 6 and
9 was challenged on the ground that they contra·
venc Art. 14. llut as we have alrcad y mcntionc<l,
no contention has been urged before us in support
of the plea that Art. 14 has been contravened by any
section of tl1e Act. The petition further avers that
the Act was a colourable piece of legislation, but that
argument really proceeded on the basis whether the
agreement entered into by the State Government with
the agents to which we shall presently refer correctly
represents the effect of ss. 3 and 8 of the Act. So far
as the Act is concerned, the two sections which were
seriously challenged were sections :l and 4 and as we
have already held, the provisions in these two sections
are not shown to be invalid; and so, the argument
that the Act is colourablc, has no substance. The
notifications which were impugned have also been
issued under the relevant provisioas of the Act and
their validity also cannot be effectively d1allenged
once we reach the conclusion that the Act is good and
valid. \Ve have already observed that the petitioner
has not specifically and clearly alleged that the price
actually fixed under s. 4 is grossly unfair and as such,
contravenes his rights · under Art. 19(1)(f). No
evidence has been adduced before us to show that the
price is even unreasonable. On the other hand, the
counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 2 would
seem to show that the price has been fixed in accordance with the recommendations made by the
Advisory Committee and it docs nol compare unfavourably with the prices prevailing in the past in
this locality in respect of Kendu leaves. Therefore,
the main grounds on which the petitioner came to
2 S.C.R.
this Court
Act fail.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
to
challenge the
719
validity of the
1962
.4kad&ri Padlum
v.
There arc, however, two other points which have
been urged before us and on which the petitioner is
entitled to succeed. The first, ~round relates to the
agreement actually entered int'Q' 11etween respondent
No. l and the agents. This agre~inent consists of ten
clauses and it has apparently been drawn in accordance with Rule 7(5) of the Rules framed under the
Act. It appears that on January 9, l!Ju2, the Rules
framed by the State Government by virtue of the
power conferred on it by s. 18 of the Act were
published. Rule 7 deals with appointment of Agent.
Ruic 7(2) prescribes the form in which an application
for appoin_tment as agent has to be made. Rule
7(5) provides that on appointment as agent the
agreeperson appointed
shall execute an
ment in such fonn as Government may direct within
ten days of the date of receipt of the order of appointment failing which the appointment shall be liable
to cancellation and the amount deposited as earnest
money shall be liable to forfeiture. It is significant
that though the Form for an application which ha~
to be made by a person applying Sor agency is prescribed, no form has been prescribed for the agreement which the State Government enters into with
the agent. The agreement is apparently entered
into on an ad hoe basis and that clearly is unreasonable. In our opinion, if the State Government
intends that for carrying on the State monopoly
authorised by the Act agents must be appointed, it
must take care to appoint_ agents on such terms and
conditions as would justify the conclusion that the
relationship between them and the State Government
is that of agents and principal; and if such a result
is intended to be achieved, it is necessary that the
principal terms· and conditions ofthe agency agreement must be prescribed by the rules. Then it would
be open to the citizens to examine the said terms and
State of Oriua
Gqjeniragadklr, J,
720 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [i963] SUPP.
1162
dl.aatUi Podh•n
v•
.Stale ef Orisso
GajendrtJ8adkar, J.
conditions and challenge their validity if they contravene any provisions of the Constitution, or are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act itself.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to contend that Rule 7(5) is bad in that it leaves it
to the sweet will and pleasure of the officer concerned
to fix any terms and conditions on an ad hoc basis;
that is beyond the competence of the State Government and such terms and conditions must be
prescribed by the rules made under section 18 of the
Act.
That takes us to the terms and conditions of
the agreement which has been produced before us.
These terms indicate a complete confusion in the
mind of the person who drafted them. Some of them
are terms which would be relevant in the case of
agency, while others would be relevant and material
if a contract of Government forest was made in
favour of the party signing those conditions; and
some others would indicate that the person appointed
as an agent is not an agent at all !mt is a person in
whom penmnal interest is creatC"d in can'ying on the
so called agency work. Clause 4 of the agreement
provides for the payment which the agent has tu
make iu respect of the Kendu leaves from private
lands as well as from Government lands. It is nut
easy to appreciate the precise scope of the provisions
of the respective sub-clauses of cl. 4 and their validity.
llut, on the whole, it does appear that after the
agent makes the payment prescribed by the relevant
clauses to the Government, he is likely to keep some
profit to himself; and that would clearly show that the
relationship is not of the type which is permissible
under Art. 19 (6) (ii), Under clause 4 (iii), the agent
has to pay a sum of Rs. 5/- per bag to the Government as consideration for being permitted by
Govenunent to enter into and collect 'leaves from
Government lands and forests. It is remarkable
. (hat in the absence of any specific rule, the amount
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
to be paid per bag can be determined differently
from place to place and that is a serious anomaly.
It is also not clear how this amount of Rs. ti/- per bag
has been determined, and in the absence of any
explanation it would be difficult to accept the plea of
the learnl'd Attorney-General that this amount has
been fixed after making calculations about the profits
which the agent was likely to secure and the price
which the total produce of the forest was likely to
acquire on an average basis. Under clause 4 (v), it
is conceded that the agent would be entitled to make
some profits in some cases. Clause 4 (vi) en ti tics the
agent to claim deductions for the expenses and commi·
ssion that he may be entitled to in respect of the number of bags of processed leaves; and it requires him to
pay to Government the profits accruing from the
trading in the leaves collected in four equal instalments in the manner specified. Under clause 4 (ix)
the agent has to finance all transactions involved in
purchase, collections, storage, processing, transport
and disposal of the Kendu leaves purchased or
collected in the Unit. Then there are certain sub·
clauses under this clause which would be appropriate
if it was a matter of a contract between the Government and a forest contractor. Clause 4 (ix) (i)
requires the agent to keep a register of daily accounts.
Under cl. 4(ix) (p) during the subsistence of the
agreement, the agent is responsible for the disposal
of the Kendu leaves collected or purchased by him
and the Government shall not bear any liability
whatsoever, except as indicated in sub-clause (vii)' of
cl. 4 (ix).
Clause 6 provides that subject to other terms
and conditions, all charges and outgoings sha II be
paid by the agent and he shall not be entitled to any
compensation whatsoever for any loss that may be
sustained by reasons of fire, tempest, disease, pest,
flood, draught or other natural calamity, or by any
wrongful act committed by any third party or for
1962
Akad1Ui Padhan
•• Orisso
St•teoj
Gaj111dragaik.,., J,
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP·
1962
Akadasi Padhan
v.
Stat1 of Orissa
Gajendragcdkar, J.
any loss sustained by him through any operation
undertaken in the interest of fire conservancy. This
clause clearly shows that the agent becomes personally
liable to bear the loss which, under the normal rules
of agency, the principal would have to bear. We
have not thought it necessary to refer to all the
clauses in detail because we are satisfied that even if
the agreement is broadly considered, it leaves no
room for doubt that the person appointed under the
agreement to work the monopoly of the State is not
an agent in the strict and narrow sense of the term
contemplated by Art. 19 (6) (ii). The agent appointed under this agreement seems to carry on the trade
substantially on his own account, subject, of course,
to the payment of the amount specified in the
contract. If he makes any profit after complying
with the said terms, the profit is his; if he incurs any
loss owing to circumstances specified in clause 6, the
loss is his. In terms, he is not made accountable
to the State Government ; and in terms, the State
Government is not responsible for his actions. In
such a case, it is impossible to hold that the agreement in question is consistent with the terms of s. 3
of the Act. No doubt, the learned Attorney-General
contended that in commercial transactions, the
agreement in question may be treated as an agreement of agency, and in support of this argument he
referred us to the decision in Ex parte Bright In re
Smith, (')and Weiner v. Harris. (') It is true that an
agent is entitled to commission in commercial
transactions, and so, the fact that a person earns
commission in transactions carried on by him on
behalf of another would not destroy his character
as that other person's agent. Cases of Delcredere
agents are not unknown to commercial law. But
we must not forget that we are dealing with agency
which is permissible under Art. 19 (6) (ii), and as
we have already observed, agency which can be
legitimately allowed under Ar.t. 19 (6) {ii) is agency
in the strict and narrow sense of the term; it includes
(I) (1879) 10 L, R. Cb. D. 566.
(2) [IUIO] I K. J!, a~5,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
only agents who can be said to carry on the monopoly
at every stage on behalf of the State for its benefit
and not for their own benefit at all. All that such
agents would be entitled to would be remuneration
for their work as agents. That being so, the extended
meaning of the word "agent" in a commercial sense
on which the learned Attorney-General relies is
wholly inapplicable in the.context of Art. 19 (6) (ii).
Therefore, we must hold that the agreement which
has been produced before us is invalid inasmuch as
it is wholly inconsistent with the requirements of
s. 3 (1) (c).
The result is, the petitioner succeeds only
partially inasmuch as we have held that Rule 7 (5)
is bad and the agreement is invalid, and that means
that the State Government cannot implement the
provisions of the Act with the assistance of agents
appointed llnder the said invalid agreement. w~
accordingly direct that a direction or order to that
effect should be issued against the State Government.
The main contentions raised by the petitioner
against the validity of the Act and its relevant
provisions on which specific reliefs were claimed,
however, fail- The petition is accordingly partially
allowed. There would be no order as to costs.
Petition allou·ed in part.
1962
Akadasi Par/hon
v.
State of Orissa
Gajendragadkar, J.
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