MAHARAJA SHREE UMAID MILLS LTD. versus UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 November 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 515 | 1962 INSC 345
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 November 1962
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR, A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 214/1956
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 515
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 345
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
515
MAHARAJA SHREE UMAID MIT~LS LTD.
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(S. K.
DAS,
J. L. KAPUR,
M. HIDAYATULLAH and
A. K. SARKAR,
RAGHUBAR DAYAL,
JJ.)
Euiae Duty-Agret111ef1J with Rukr-Exempting payment
of duty-If amount• to law-Whether ag1·eem•nl binding on
Government of India-Power of Parliament to alte1' ll!JreementConstitulion of India, Art. 295.
A formal agreement executed in 1941, between the Ruler
ofjodhpur and the appellant provided that the State would
exempt the appellant from State or Federal excise duty and
income-tax, super-tax, surcharge or any other tax on income
and that if the appellant had to pay any such duty or tax,
the State would refund the same to the appellant. After India
had attained independence, Jodhpur joined the United State
of Rajasthan on April 7, 1949. On January 26, 1950,
Rajasthan became a Part B State. The Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944, was extended to Rajasthan from April 1, 1950,
and the Union of India recovered excise duty from the appellant for the period 1-4-1950 to 31-3-1952. Similarly, the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was extended to Rajasthan and
the Union sought to assess and recover inr:-01ne~tax from the
appellant. The appellant contended that it was not liable to
pay any exci!e duty or income-tax on the grounds that the
agreement of 1941 with the Ruler ofjodhpurunder which the
exemptions were granted was law which continued in force
and that even if the agreement was purely contractual, the
rights and obligations thereunder were accepted by each succeeding Sovereign and under Art. 295 (1) (b) of the Constitution
they became the rights and obligations of the Government of
India which could not be abrogated by any law. The appellant further contended that under the agreement it was entitl·
ed to a refund from the State of Rajasthan of the excise duly
paid by it.
Held, that the appellant was liable to pay the excise
duty and income-tax.
The 1941 agreement was not law and did not have the
force of law. Every order of a Sovereig;1 Ruler cannot be
treated as law irrespective o! the m1tl1fc or character thereof.
1962
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1961
Md.r•jo Shm
...
UllllJll MUls Ltd,
Uni.. If Illdia
The true nature of the or<ler has to be considered and the order to
be Jaw must have the characteristics of law, that is, of a
binding rule of conduct as the exprCision of the will of the
Sovereign, which does not derive its authority from a mere
contract. An agreement which is based solely on the consent
of the parties is different from a law which derives its sanction
from the will of the Sovereign. The 1941 agreement was
entirely contractual in nature and was not law, as it had none
of the characteristics of law.
Ameer-un-niasa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, A. I. R.
(1955) S. C. 352, Director of Endowmenls, Government of
Hyderabad v. Akram Ali, A. I. R. (1956) S. C. 60, Madliarao
Phallce v. Tiu State of Madhya Praduh, [1961] IS. C. R. 957
and Promode Ohandra Dev v. State of Ori&.•a, [1962) Supp.
I S. C. R. 4-05, referred to.
The 1941 agreement contained no term and no undertaking as to exemption from excise duty or income-tax to be
imposed by the Union Legislature in future. As such the
question of succeeding Sovereigns accepting such a term and
an obligation arising therefrom under Art. 295 (I) (b) did not
arise. Apart from this, the correspondents showed that neither
the United State of Rajasthan nor the Part B State of Rajasthan
affirmed this agreement. Even if the obligation under the
agreement continued and Art. 295 (I) (b) was applicable to
it, there was nothing in Art. 295 which prohibited Parliament
from enacting a law as to excise duty or income-tax altering
the terms of the agreement.
Maharaj Umeg Singk v. Blau of Bombay, A. I. R. (1955)
s. a. 540, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 214/56.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
October 19, 1953 of the Rajasthan High Court in
D. B. Civil Misc. Writ No. 47of1953.
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 399 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
May 7, 1959, of the Rajasthan High Court in
D. B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. JO of J955,
---~---.---
2 s.t:.R.
SUPREME;couRT REPORTS . li17
G. S. Pathak, -Rameshu·ar Nath, · S. N.
Andley and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants•.
I.
JI. C. Setalvad, · Attorney-General for India,
II. N. Sa-1iyal, ··Additional Solicitor General of India,
K. N. Rajayopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the
1962
Maharsj• Skri1
UmaiJ Mills LU.
vc
Union of l11iia
respondents. (in C. A. No; 214/56) and respondents
·Nos. 1, 3 and .4 (in C. A.· No. 399/60).
. G. C. Kasliwal, . Advocate-General, · Rajasthan,
M. M. Tiwari, S. ](.'Kapur, Kan Singh, S. Venkatakrishnan and K; K. Jain, for respondent No. 2 (in
C. A. No. 399/60.) · ' '
• ,·· ..· ·· ..
..
. , 1962. November 27. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
. S. K. DAS, J.-·'These ·two appeals on certificates granted by the 'High Court ofRajasthan have
been heard together, because they raise common
questions of law and. ·fact,• and• this judgment will
.
govern them both. · ' ' · · .· .
.'
Shortly put, . the, main question in C. A.
No. 3()!) of 1960 is whether the appellant, the Maharaj a Shree Umaid 'Mills Ltd.; ·is liable to pay excise
duty on.the cloth and yam manufactured and produced by it, in ·accordance with'the provisions of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which provisions
were extended to the territory of the State of
Rajasthan on April I, 1950. The main question in
C. A. No. 214il956 is whether the same appellant
is liable . to pay income· tax in accordance with the
provisions of the Indian ·Income-tax Act, 1922
from the date on which those provisions were extended to the territory of the State of Rajasthan. C. A.
No. 3!J!J ofl960 arises out of a suit which the appe·
llant had filed in the court of the District Judge,
Jodhpur; That suit was. dismissed ·by the learned·
District.Judge. Then there was an appeal to the High
D.,, J,
5is
. 1962
lr!ah•r•ia Shr11 ·
Um aid Mills Lid.
v.
Uniora of India ·
DaJ,, J.·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP•
Court of Rajasthan. The High Court ciL Rajasthan
dismissed the appeal. The High Court was then
moved for a certificate under Arts.132 (1) and 133(1)
of the Constitution. Such certificate having been
- granted by the !ligh . Court, the appeal has . been
preferred to this coµrt. _ C._ A. -. No: 214 of l!J56
arises out of a_writ petition which the appellant had
filed for the issue- of writ of _mandamus or any other
appropriate writ restraining the respondents from
assessing or recovering income' tax . from the appe· Hant. This writ petition was dismissed by the High
Court on the preliminary ground that . the appellant
had another remedy open to it under.·the provisions•
of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The apP.ellant moved
the High Court and obtained a certificate·- in pur·
suance of which it has filed C. A. No. 214of1956;
As we are deciding both the appeals on merits, it is
unnecessary to deal with. the preliminary ground on
which the High Court dismissed the writ petition.
'
-
. _ We have already stated that in both the appeals
the l\faharaja Shree Umaid l\fills .Ltd.~· Pali, is the
-appellant. In C. A. No. 399 of l!J60 the re8pondents
are the Union of India, the State of Rajasthan, the
Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi ' and the
Superintendent, Central Excise, Jodhpur. : In C. A.
No. 214 of 1956 the respondents are. the Union of
India, the State of Rajasthan, the-Commissioner of
Income-tax, Delhi and the·· Income-tax •Officer,Jodhpur.
. We may now state the facts which are relevant
to these iwo appeals. The appellant was incorpora·
ted under the Marwar Companies Act, 1923 and has
its registered office· at. Pali ·in the -present S tate of Rajasthan. It has been manufacturing cloth and
yarn since l!J41. · The case of the appellant was
that the then Ruler of the State of Jodhpur .was
· earnestly desirous of having a cotton mill started at
Pali and for that llurpose agreed to give_certain
,
,,.-'
'
2 S.C.R.
'
,
·,
';
,
•
'
,.
,,
T
•
',
•
•
> ,,·1
(.''
•l""
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 519 .
1962
concessions by way of immunity from parrnent of'.
taxes and duties_ then .in force in the Jodhptir State · Maharaj• sh;,, •
or likely to come into force in view of the con.'.' Umaid Mills Lia.
templated. · federation· . of '.the__ · ·Indian ' States. 1 Unidn 'if. India
and Provinces under the Government of India Act,
-·
1
l!J35. · There were· negotiations and correspondence '
Dai, '
about the concessions which were to be granted and ' .
finally a formal deed of agreement .incorporating. ,·
the concessions an~ immunities granted was executed ..·.
between the Government of His Highness the .'
Maharaja of Jodhpur on one side and the.'appellant"'
on the other on April 17, 194L . Clause !3 ofthis"'
agreement, ·in so far as it is relevant for our purpose;··
said':
· ·
·
:,;
_..
·
"The State will exempt or remit .·the
· - following duties and royalties : .
, ·· ; ·
J . - •
(a) xx
'(b) xx
xx
xx
xx'
(d) xx
xx
(c)
xx.
. .._,
.
.
. ,·
.\,:
.
. 'i
· (c) State or Federal Excise duty on goods ·
manufactured in 'the mill premises. If any ,
such duty has to be paid by the Company the· '
State will refund the same wholly to the;
Company.
"
-- -.- . . (f) . State or Federal Income T~x or.Super ':
Tax or surcharge or any other tax on income.::.. :
If any such tax has to be paid by the company ''.
the State will refund the· same wholly to 'the: ·
company.
· · ' · ·· ·
·
(g)
xx '
xX._ ''
'j.,
. ;
·.:
)
. .
In consideration of the concessionsgiven t~e· appel:
lant agreed to pay to the State of Jodhpur, a royalty
,
..
'
'
:
'
t
•
l
:-
•
• .
'
'"'
---
•
'
•-<-----0~-
. . -
~
.
•
••
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[~963] SUPP•
. 1962
}.fd&raja Slzre1 .
Um•id .Milu L14.
- v.
_ U11lo• 11/ India
Das. J.
of 7! per cent on the net profits of the company in
each of its financial years, such payments to be made· ·
within three months after the close of each financial
year. This agreement, it was stated, was acted up.on
by the State of Jodhpur and the appellant enjoyed
an immunity from excise duty and inccime·tax. The
_Indian Independence Act, 1947 brought into exis·
tence as from August 15, 194 7, a Dominion of India.
The Ruler ofJodhpur acceded to the Dominion of
India by means of an Instrument of Accession in.the
form referred to in Appendix VII at pages 165 to
168 ofthe White Paper on Indian States. Jodhpur
was one of the Rajputana States .. _The integration
of these States was completed ·in three stages.
Firstly, a Rajasthan Union- was formed by a number_
of smaller Rajaputana States situated in the southeast of .that region. Later, there was formed the
United State of Rajasthan. The Ruler of Jodhpur
joined the United State _of Rajasthan and on
April 7, 1949, made over the administration of his
State to the Rajpramukh of the United State· of
Rajasthan. The Covenant by which this was done
is Appendix XL at pages 274 to 282 of the \Vhite
Paper. On the same day was promulgated the
Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, 194!) (Ordi-.
nance No. I of l!l49), s. 3 whereof continued all the
laws in force in any Covenanting· State until altered
or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or
· -other competent authority, etc. There was a fresh
Instrument of Accession on April 15, 1949, on behalf
of the United State ofRajasthan by which the United
State _of Rajasthan accepted all matters enumerated
in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the
Government of India Act, 1935 a~ matters in respect
of which the Dominion Legislature might make laws
for the United State of Rajasthan, there was a
proviso, however, which· said that nothing _in the
said Lists shall be deemed to empower the Dominion
Legislature to impose any tax.or duty in the territor- .
ies of the United .State of Rajasthan or to prohibit
.
.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
.
.
52i
1962
the imposition of any duty or tax by the legislature
of the United State of Rajasthan in the said terri- J.!ahaiOJ~ Shr1'
Lii.
tories. On September 5, l!J4!), was. promulgated the Umaid Mills
v.
Rajasthan Excise Duties Ordinance, 1!)4!) (Ordinance
Union o/ l"dia
No. XXV of 1!)4!:1). This Ordinance was published
Das, J.
on September ID; 1!)4!), and s. 30 thereof said that.
all laws dealing _with .. matters covered by . the
Ordinance in force at its commencement in any part
of Rajasthan were repealed. Orie of the questions
before us is whether this section had the effect of
abrogating the· agreement dated April 17, 1!)41, in.
case that agreement had the force of law in the State
of JodhJ>ur. On November 23,. 1!:149, the United
State of Rajasthan made a prodamation to the effect:
that the Constitution of India. shortly to be adopted
by the Constituent Assembly of India shall be the
Constitution for the Rajasthan State. The Constitu·
tion of India came into force on January 26, 1!)50,
and as from that date Rajasthan became: a Part B
State.
. For the purpose of these two appeals, we have
to notice the three stages ·of evolution in the constitu·
tional position. First, we have the State of Jodhpur
whose Ruler had full sovereignty and combined in'
himself all functions, legislative, executive and
judicial. Then we have the United State of
Rajasthan into whichJodhpur was integrated as from
April 7, 1949, by the Covenant, Appendix XL at
pages 274 to 282 of the White Paper. Lastly, we
have the Bart B State of Rajasthan within the
framework of the Constitution of India which came·
into force on January 26, · 1950. Jodhpur then
became a part of the Part B State of Rajasthan.
Both duties of excise (except alcoholic liquors
etc.) and taxes on income other than agricultural
income fall. within List I of the Seventh Schedule
of the_Constitution of India. By s. 11 of the Finance
Act 1950, the provisions ·of. the Central Excises and
•
'.'i.
1952
A!ah3rafa Shrt1
Umaid 4\fills LIJ.
v.
Uniun '1f India
Das.J.
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1063] SUPP.
Salt Act, 1944 : and all rule3 and orders rriadethere' :
under were extended to the territory of Rajasthan as·.
from April 1, 1950. The Excise officers of the Union .
of India recovered a sum of Rs. 4,05,014-12·0 as'
excise .duty for the goods manufactured and produced
by the appellant, for the period from April 1, 1950, ·
to !\farch 31, 1952, ·from the appellant. The appel-..
lant said that it paid the amount under protest. ·. Ori .
April 16, 1952, the· appellant ii:istituted a suit by :
means of a plaint filed in the court.of the District ·
Judge, Jodhpur. In the plaint the appellant made
several averments on the basis of which it claimed
that the respondents· were not· ·entitled to · realise
excise duty from the appellant by reason of the agree:
ment dated April 17, 1941.. The appellant asked for
the following reliefs : •. · . .. . • .
.·
'
'
(a) a declaration that the agreement dated ·
April 17, 1941, is binding on all the respon; ,
dents· ·
·
"
(b) that the amount of exdse duty already
· · ·· realised be refunded with interest at 6% per.
annum;:--·
-·
',
· (c) that the Union of India and the State •
of Rajasthan and their· servants, agents and :
. officers be permanently restrained by means o(
an injunction from realising any excise duty .
fro~ the appellant;· and ·
.·
· ·
(d) that the State of Rajasthan be directed .
.to refund from time to time as and when the
appellant is to pay excise duty to the Uriion ~
of India, by reason .of the indemnity clause in
the
agreement of April 17, :1941.
·
.
..
' .,.
-
-
Several· issues were framed by the learned
District Judge who on a trial of those iss'ues substan: ·
tially held that the agreement of April 17, 1941; wa.oi
2 s.a.R.. ' SUPREME COURT REPORtS
523 .
··-
1962
not binding on the respondents. He further held that
the agreement itself stood frustrated by reason of 1.\liharaja Shr1i
Ltd.
subsequent events which happened and. was therefore Umaid .Mills
v.
unenforceable. ·There. was an appeal to the High
Union of l•dia
Court which affirmed the · main . findings of the
Dtz3, J.
learned District Judge.
·
. , .. ·:. . . ·- -···
The facts in C.A. No. 214 of 1956 are the same
as those given ·above, ·the . only· point of distinction
being that this appeal relates to income:tax while the
other relates to excise duty. Here again the appellant bases . its claim on the · agreement dated
April 17, 1941, and contends that the agreement is
binding on the respondents and the appellant cannot
·be .. asked to pay· incomectax ·by. reason of the
provisions of the Indian lncome·tax Act, 1922 which .
were extended· to the whole· of India · except the
State of Jammu and Kashmir as a result of certain
amendments inserted in the said Act by the Finance
Act, 1950.
----
~;
--
· On ·behalf of the appellant two main lines of
argument have been· presented before us in support
of the ·contention . ,that the agreement dated
Aprill7, 1941, is binding on the respondents and the
finding to the contrary by the courts below is incorrect.
The ·first . line of argument is that agreement of
April 17, 1941, is itself law, being the command of
the Ruler of Jodhpur who was a sovereign Ruler at
that time . and combined in himself all legislative,
executive and judicial functions. This law, or legisJative contract as learned counsel for the appellant
has put it,i continued in· force whenJodhpur merged
into the United. State of Rajasthan, · by reason of
s. 3 of the Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, 1949
which continued all existing laws in any covenanting
State in force.immediately before the commencement
of the . Ordinance. It is pointed out tliat for the
purpose of s. 3 aforesaid, "law" means any rule,
order or bye-law which having been made by a
----~--
•\
· 1962
..
~faM-raja Slirte
Umaid llJills Lid.
Unfun of lndi:J
.f!as, J.
524 SUPREME: COURT REl>ORtS [i963]SlJPi>.
competent authority in a covenanting State has the·.
force of law in that State. The agreement of
April 17, I !J41, it is argued, was sanctioned by the
Ruler and was his order; therefore, it had the force
of a special law in Jodhpur and this law continued
to be in force by reason of s. 3 of the Ordinance
referred to above. When the Rajpramukh of the
United State ofRajasthan promulgated the Rajasthan
Excise Duties
Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance
No. XXV of 1949), s. 30 thereof did not abrogate
the special"law embodied in the agreement. On the
coming into force ·or the Constitution on January 26,
1950, when Rajasthan became·. a . Part B State,
Art. 372 of the Constitution applied and the special
law continued in force. The finance Act, 1950 did
not abrogate the special law. · Therefore, the special
law still continues in force and binds the respondents.
This is the first line of argument.
The second line of argument proceeds on the
footing that the agreement of April 17, 1941, is
purely contractual in nature and is not law. Even
on that . footing, learned. counsel for the appellant
argues, the contract in question gives rise to rights in
one party and obligations on the other. These rights
and obligations, it is stated, were accepted by
each succeeding sovereign, (1) Jodhpur State
(2) United State of Rajasthan and (3) the Part B
State of Rajasthan. It is contended that the finding
to the contrary by the courts below is wrong. As the
rights and obligations were accepted by each succeeding Sovereign, Art. 295 (i) (b) of the Constitution
came into play as from January 26, 1950, and the
rights and liabilities of the Jodhpur State or of the -United State of Rajasthan became the rights and
liabilities of the Government of India in so far as
these rights and liabilities were for the pur:poses of the Government of India relating 'to any
of the matters enumerated in the Union List.·
Learned counsel for the appellant argues that Art.295
\
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . ~§2_5_
is of the nature of a constitutional gnarantee and any
law made in violation thereof must be void to the
extent that it violates the Article.
1962
Mahaiaja Shf11
Umaid Mills Ltd •
v.
Union of lntlia
Apart from the aforesaid two main lines of
argument, learned counsel for the appellant has also
submitted that the contract in question being a right
to property, the appellant could not be deprived of it
in violation of its guaranteed rights under Arts. 19
and 31 of the Constitution; that there was no frustration of the contract as found by the learned Distric:t
Judge; and that in any view the appellant is entitled
to a refund of the duty or tax paid by it to the Union
Government from the State of Rajasthan by reason
of clause 6 of the agreement.
· - - ~ ·· · -- . . .
\Ve proceed now to deal with these_ arguments
in the order in which we have stated them. As to
the first line of argument we have come to the conclusion that the agreement of April 17, 1941, rests
solely on. the consent of the parties; it is entirely contractual in nature and is not law, because it has none
of the characteristics of law. Learned counsel for
the appellant has relied on the decisions of this court
in Ameer-un-nissa Begum v. JJIahboob Begum ('),
Director of Endowments, Govt. of Hyderabad v.
Akram AU ('), .~Iadhaorao Phalke v. The State of
JJ!adhya Bharat (') and Promod Chandra Deb v. The
State of Orissa ('). \Ve do not think that these desisions help the appellant. It was pointed out in·
1lladhaorao Phalke's case (3 ) that in determining the
question whether a particular order of a sovereign
Ruler in whom was combined all legislative, executive and judicial functions, it would be necessary to
consider the character of the orders passed. Their
Lordships then examined the Kalambandi under
consideration before them and pointed out that "the
nature of the provisions contained in this document
unambiguously impresses upon it the character of a
statute or a regulation having the force of a statute."
(I) A.t.R. (1955) S.C. 352.
'(3l 0961/ l.S.C.R. 95!•
(2) A.I.R. (1936) S.C. GO;
(4) [1962) Sapp- 1.s.9.a.,
~'
Das. ·1.
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
-
1962
Md,,raja SAm
Umai4 Mills Lii.
v.
Union •f lndi•
Das, J.
Same was the position in Ameer-un-niaaa's case (')
and the case of the Director of Endowments, Govt.
of Hyderabad (') where this court had to deal with
the effect of Firmans issued by the Nizam who was
at the time an absolute Ruler. It was held that such
Firmans had the effect of law because in all
domestic matters, the Nizam issued Firmans to determine the rights of his subjects. The Firmans were
not based on consent, but derived their authority
from the command of the Sovereign viz., the Nizam,
expressing his sovereign will. For example, in
Ameer-un-nissa's c.ase, (') the Firman set aside the
decision of a Special Commission in respect of certain
claimants and though a subsequent Firman revoked
the earlier Firman, it did not restore the decision of
the Special Commission. It was in these circumstances that this· court observed :
"The determination of all these questions
depends primarily upon the meaning and effect
to be given to the various 'Firmans' of the
Nizam which we have set out already. It
cannot be disputed that prior to the integration
of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and
the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed
uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the
supreme lt-gislature, the supreme judiciary and
the supreme head of the executive, and there
were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. The
'Firmans' were expressions of the sovereign
will of the Nizam and they were binding in the
same way as a11y other law; ...... nay, they
would override all other laws which were in
conflict with them. So long as a particular
'Firman' held the field, that alone would
govern or regulate the rights of the parties
concerned, though it could be annulled or
(I) A.I.Ro !1955) S,C, 952.
(2) A.I.R; (1"6) S.C. 601
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME GOU.RT
REPORTS
J\ J '
--.
.
'
;
527
Jt
modified by a later 'Firman' at any time that
the Nizam willed." · .
·
1952
'"' Maliaraja Sii.rte
Umaid Mills Ltd.
These observations do not support the extreme view
that any_ and every order of.a sovereign Ruler is law.
In Pronwa Ghanara Deb's. case (1) the Khorposh
grants ·were considered in the context of the rules
laid down in Order 31 of the Rules, Regulations and
Privileges ofKhajnadars which were accepted by the
Ruler of the State as the law governing the rights of
Khorposhdars. It was Jn these circumstances held
· that the rules continued in force till they were
changed by a competent authority, and the grants
made in accordance with those rules continued to be
~hl.
.
•
In our view, ·none of the· aforesaid decisions go
the extent of laying down that any and every order
of a Sovereign Ruler who combines in himself all
functions must be treated as law irrespective of the
nature or character of the order passed. -We think
that the true nature of the order must be taken into
consideration, and the order to be law must have the
characteristics of law, that is, of a binding rule of
conduct as the expression of the will of the sovereign, ·
which does not derive its authority from mere consensus of mind of two parties entering into a bargain. ·
It is not necessary for this purpose to go into theories
of legal philosophy or to define law. However law
may be defined, be it the command of the supreme
legislature as some jurists have put it or be it a "body
of rules laid down for the determination of . legal
rights and duties which courts recognise", there is an
appreciable distinction between an agreement which
is based solely on consent of parties and a law which
derives its sanction from the will of the Sovereign .
A contract is essentially a compact between two
or more · parties; a law is not an agreement between
parties but is a binding rule of conduct deriving its '
sanction . from the sovereign authority.· Frorp. th~
pl [1962) Supp• I S,C,R, 40?,
•
.
. .
v.
Union of India
_D . :11 !.
528 ,SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
-
1962 \ •
AfahtVaja Sh"'
Umaid Mi//1 Lti.
v.
Union of India
Das, J.
-
point of ~iew, there is a valid distinction between a
particular agreement between two or more parties
even if one of the parties is the sovereign Ruler, and
the law relating generally to agreements. The former
rests on consensus of mind, and the latter expresses
the will of the Sovereign. If one bears in mind this
distinction, it seems clear enough that the agreement
of April 17, 1941, even though sanctioned . by the
Ruler and-purporting to be on his behalf, rests really
on consent. \Ve have been taken through the correspondence which resulted in the agreement and our
attention was particularly drawn to a letter dated
April 22, 1938, in which the Ruler was stated to have
sanctioned the terms and concessions decided upon
by his Ministers in their meeting of February 25,
1938. \Ve do not think that the correspondence to
which we have been referred advances the case of the
appellant. On the contrary, the correspondence
shows that there were prolonged negotiations, proposals and counter-proposals, offer and acceptance of
.terms ... all indicating that the matter-was treated even
by the ·Ruler as a contract between his Government
and the appellant. That is why in the letter dated
April 22, 1938, it was stated that Messrs Crawford
Bailey & Co. Solicitors, would draw up a formal agreement embodying the terms agreed to by the parties.
This resulted ultimately in the execution of the agreement dated April 17, 1941. To call such an agreement
as law is in our opinion to misuse the term 'law'. .
It is also worthy of note in this connection that
clause 6 of the agreement purports to give the appellant exemption not only from State Excise duty, but
also. from Federal Excise duty; similarly not only
from State Income-tax, but from Federal Income-tax •
or Super-tax or Surcharge. It is difficult to see what ·
authority theJodhpur Ruler had to give exemption
from Federal Excise duty or Federal Income·tax.
Such an exemption, if it were to be treated as law,
would be beyond the competence of the Rul~r! · !1t
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
Ruler can make a law within his own competence
and jurisdiction. He cannot make a law for some
other sovereign. Such an exemption would be a dead
letter and cannot have the force of law. Learned
counsel for the appellant suggested somewhat naively
that the Ruler might . exercise his influence on the
other Sovereign (if and when Federation came into
existence) so as to secure an exemption from Federal
tax for the appellant. Surely, an assurance of this
kind to exercise influence on another sovereign
authority, assuming that the effect of the relevant
clause is what learned counsel has submitted, as to
which we have great doubt, will at once show that it
has not the characteristics of a binding ·rule of con·
duct. It is doubtful if such an assurance to exercise
influence on another sovereign authority can be
enforced even as a contract not to speak of law.
Learned counsel for the respondents referred us
to several other clauses of the agreement which in his
opinion showed that the agreement read as a whole
could not be treated as law, because some of the
clauses merely gave an assurance that the State would
take some action in future; as for example, clause 8
which gave an assurance to amend the law in future.
He contended that an assurance to amend the law in
future cannot be treated as present law .. There is,
we think, much force in this contention. When these
difficulties were pointed out to learned counsel for
the appellant, he suggested that we should separate
the various clauses of the agreement and treat only
those clauses as law which gave the appellant a
present right. We do not see how we can dissect
the agreement in the manner suggested and treat
as law one part of a clause and treat the rest as an
agreement only.
We should notice here that clause 6 of the.agreement does not refer to excise duty qr income-tax to
be imposed by the Union of I11dia. A• a matter of
1961
Maharaj• Sh,,,
Umoid Milli Lid.
y,
Unimi of. Indio
Da1, I.
--.:-"ri ·,..,---.~ ·_-.., .
~·
\ '.
<.
1962
530: SUPREl\1E COURT REPORTS [l!l63] SUPP.
fact, nobody could envisage in 1941 the constitutional developments which took place in 1947·1950,
Um•ii Mills Ltd.
and when the parties talked of Federal excise duty
v.
·and Federal income·tax, they had in mind the scheme
Union of l11di2
of Federation envisaged by the Government of India
Das, J. -· Act,-1935 ... which scheme never came into operation.
It is difficult to see how the ·agreement in any view
of the matter .. can be treated as law in respect of a
tax or duty imposed by the Union Government when
there is no mention of it therein.
A!~h•raj• Shrt•
The argument if carried to a reductio ad
nbsurdum would come to · this that every order of the
Ruler would have to be carried out by the succeeding
Sovereign. That order may be almost of any kind,
as for example, an order to thrash a servant. \Ve
have no doubt in our minds that the nature of the
order must be considered for determining whether it
has the force of law. Art. 372 of the Constitution
which continues existing law must be construed as
embracing those orders only which have the force of
Jaw .. .law as understood
at the time.
,.
There .has been a lot of argument before us as
to what learned_' counsel for the appellant has
characterised as 'legislative contracts,' an expression
med mostly in American decisions relating ·to the
limitation placed by the 'contract clause' in the
American Constitution upon action taken by the
State legislature in respect of pre-existing contracts
(see l'iljUU Eranch of the ·Slate Bani~ of Ohio v.
Jncob Knoop (')).' \Ve do not think those decisions
have any bearing· on the· question before us, which
is simply this : does a compact between two or more
parties, purely contractual in nature, become law
because one of the parties to the contract is the
Sovereign Ruler ? The American decisions throw no .
light on this que$tion. Learned counsel also referred
us to the statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol.8, Third Edition,· paragraph 252 at
~I) (1853) 14 L. Ed.
977,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
page I Hi relating to statutory confirmation of void
contracts by means of a local and personal Act of
Parliament : the effect of such a statute is to make
the agreement valid in toto. The principle is that
where an Act of Parliament confirms a scheduled
agreement, the agreement becomes a statutory obligation and is to be read as if its provisions were contained in a section of the Act (see lntrrnatioruil Railway
Company v. N. 1'. C'omm·i88ion (')). We fail to see
how this principle has any application in the present
case. There is nothing to show that the agreement
in the present case was confirmed as a law by the
R11ler; on the contrary, we have shown earlier that
it was always treated as a contract between two
parties. There is no magic in the expression 'legislative contract'. A contract is a compact between
two or more parties and is either executory or cxecutr'.d. If a statute adopts or conlirms it, it becomes law
and is no longer a mere contract. That is all that
a 'legislative contract' means. In the_ rases before
us there is no 'legislative contract".
In view of our conclusion that the agreement
of April l 7, 1941, is not law, it is perhaps unnecessary
to decide the further question as to whether s.3 of
the Rajasthan Ordinance, 1!i+!J (Ordinance I of 1949)
wminuec\ it or whet her s.:IO of the Rajasthan Excise
Duties Ordinan< e, I !l+!I (Ordinance XXV ·of I !H!I)
repealed it. We may merely say that with regard
1.0 the dTect of s.:111, learned coumcl for the appellant
relied on the principle that. the prcsurnptiou is that a
subsequent enactment of a purely general character
is not intended to interfere with an earlier special
provision for a particular case, unless it appears
from a consideration of the general enactment that
the intention of 1he legislature was to establish a r~le
of univcroal application in which case the special
provision must give way to the general (see paragraph
711, page 4117 of Vol. 31l, Halsbury's Laws of
England, Third Edition, and Williams v. Pritchard(');
Eddington v. Borman (1)).
(!) A.J.R. (1937) P.C. 21+.
(2) (1790) Jl.a, 862,
(3) (1790) 100 E.R. 1189.
1962
Mallaraja Shr1•
Umaid Mills Ltd.
y,
Union of lttdia
Das, J.
532 SUPRE.ll.IE COURT REPORTS [19G3] SUPP.
1962
On behalf of the respondents it was submitted
that s. 30 of the Rajasthan Excise Duties Ordinance, l!J49, in -express terms, repealed all laws dealing
v.
with matters covered by the ordinance, and s. 3 thereof
Union of India
dealt
with . excise
duties on goods produced or
Das, J.
-- manufactured in Rajasthan ; therefore, there was no
room for the application of the maxim yenernli11
specialibiis non deroyant and · s. 30 clearly repealed
all earlier -l:iws -.in the matter of excise duties or
exemption therefrom. It is perhaps unnecessary
to decide this question ; because ·we have already
held that the agreement of April 17, 1941, was
neither law nor had the force of!aw. We may
merely point out that the-question is really one of
finding out the intention · of the legislature, and in·
view of the very dear words of s. 30 of the Rajasthan
Excise Duties Ordinance, 1949 and of the repealing
provisions in the Finance Act, 1950 it would be
difficult to hold that the earlier special law on the
··
.
\ subject still continued in force. .
Afllharaja Sh111
Umaid Mills Ltd•.
\Ve proceed now to consider the second line
of argument pressed on behalf of the appellant. So
far as the Union Government and its officers are
concerned, there is, we think, a very short but
convincing answer to the argument. The agreement
in question contains no term and no undertaking as
to exemption from excise duty or income-tax to be
imposed by the Union Legislature in future. \Ve
have pointed out earlier that the undertaking, such
as it was, referred to Federal excise duty and Federal
income-tax . and . we have further stated that the
Federation contemplated by the Government of
India Act, . 1935 never came into existence. The
Union which came into existence under the Constitution of 1950 is fundamentallv different from the
Federation contemplated under ·the Government of .
India Act, 1935, Therefore, in the absence of any term as to exemption from excise duty or income-tax
· to be imposed by the Union Legislature, the questiOn -
2 s.c.R.
SUPRE.ME COURT REl'ORTS
533
of succeeding sovereigns accepting such a term and
. an obligation arising therefrom on January 26, 1950,
by means of Art. 295 (i) (b) of the Constitution
cannot at all arise. Surely, a term or undertaking
which is non-existent cannot give rise to a right or obli·
gation in favour of or against any party. On this
short ground_ only, the claim of the appellant should
be rejected· against ·-the respondents in so far as the
levy of excise duty or tax by the Union· is concerned,
apart altogether from any question whether the
Ruler . of Jodhpur or even the United State of
Raj asthan could legally bind the future. action of the
Union Legislature.
- --
It is now well . settled by a number of decisions
of this court that an act of State is the taking over_
of sovereign powers by a State in respect of territory ·
which was not till then a part of it, by conquest,
treaty, cession or otherwisr, and the municipal courts
recognised by the new Sovereign have the power and
jurisdiction to investigate . and ascertain only such
rights as the new sovereign has chosen to recognise
or acknowledge by legislation, agreement or otherwise ; and that such recognition may be express or
may be implied from circumstances. The right which
the appellant claim5 stem5 from the agreement
entered into by the Ruler of Jodhpur. The first
question is, did the succeeding sovereign, the United
State of Rajasthan, recognise the right which the
appellant is now claiming? The ·.second question
is, did -the next succeeding sovereign, the State of
Rajasthan, recognise the right ? As against the State
of Rajasthan the main claim of the appellant is
based on that part of cl. 0 which says that if any
such duty (or tax) has to be paid by the company,.
the state will refund the same to tl1e company. The
appellant claims as against respondent Nu. 2 a refund
of the duty or tax as and when it is paid to the.Union·
Government by the appellant.
. 1962
Ma llarojll Shrtt
Um1.itl Al1l.s Lt/.
v.
Union of India
Das J.
534; st.Ji>REl\1E COURT REPORTS[l!lu3}SUPP.
1962
Maharaj• Shr11
Um•id Mills Ltd.
Unio.V;, tnJia
Das, J.
The learned District Judge found that the_
Ruler of Jodhpur acted upon the agreement in the
matter of c!lstoms concessions granted to the appellant
and accepted the royalty as per cl. 12 of the
. ~ agreement ; but the question relating to excise duty
never came before theJodhpur State as nn such·duty
·was leviable in the State. In the High Court Jagat
· Narayan; j;; dealt. with the evidence on die point
and gave. a list of documents bearing on it.. He
pointed out that the Director of Industries of the
United State of Rajasthan no doubt made dr.mands for
the payment of royalty not only for the period since
·the formation of the United State of Rajasthan, but
also for arrears of royalty for the period prior to the
formation of that State. He found however that as to
exemption from excise duty or the claim of refund,
the United State of Rajasthan had in no way affirmed·
the agreement. ·The learned .Judge said :
·
"What has to be determined is whether on the
facts and circumstances appearing from the
evidence .on record it can be said that the
United. State of Rajasthan affirmed the agreement:/ I am firinly of the opinion that no such
inference can be . drawn. . The state did not
make up its mind whether or not to abide by
the agreement . and pending final decision the
agreement was.acted upon provisiOnal\y."
So far as the Part B State of Rajasthan is concerned,
there is nothing in the record to show that it had
affirmed the agreement. l\Ir. JustiCe Bapna agreed
with his learned colleague on the Bench and referred
specially to a letter dated January 20, 1950, which
was a letter from · the, Commissioner of Excise
Jodhpur, to the appellant. In that letter the appellant was informed that it was liable to pay excise ·
duty in accordance. with the Rajasthan Excise· Duties
Ordinance, I !J49. · The appellant sent a reply in
which it stated that excise duty was not Ieviable Ly
2 S.C.it.
SUPREME
cotJ1t1'
'. - ...-· __ - - ..illil'ORTS __ 535 __
;.
~
~
reason of the agreement dated April 17, 1941.
Further correspondence followed and finally a reply
was given on May 10, .1952, in which the Government of the State of Rajasthan said that
•
"the rights and concessions granted. to the
company and the liabilities and obligations
accepted by the former Jodhpur State under
the agreement· are extraordinary, unconscionable and disproportionate to the public
interest."
'
_The letter ended by saying that the claim of the
appellant , to exemption . could not be accepted.
Another letter on which the appellant ··relied was·dated May 1, 1950.. In this letter the Government
of Rajasthan said that the burden of exdse duty on
cloth produced by the appellant fell on the consumers
who purchased the cloth; therefore the Government
of Rajasthan did not consider it necessary to exempt
the appellant from payment of excise·· duty. - It is
worthy of note that all this correspondence started
within a very short time· of the promulgation of the
Rajasthan Excise Duties Ordinance, 1949. From
this correspondence Bapna, J ., came to the conclusion
that neither the United State of Rajasthan nor the
State of Rajasthan affirmed the agreement. We see
no reasons to take a different view of the correspondence to.which our attention has been drawn.
'Vhat then is the position ? ·If the new Sovereign, namely, the United State of Rajasthan or the
Part B State of Rajasthan, did not affirm ihe agreement so far as exemption from excise duty or incometax was concerned, the appellant is clearly · out of
court. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied·
on Art. 295 (1) (b) of the Constitution. That Article
is in these terms : - .
··
"2!l5_. (1)
•
As from the commencement of this
Alahar11j• Shrt•
Um•ii Milu Lld.
v.
. U11io• of lndi~
Das, J.
r~;.f-i'./~';,. ',\,
,_.
. \
..
I
• -
l <
'
•
'
'
•
'•
'
"
1 ''' "
· 536 SUP~1'IE COURT REPORTS [l!J63] SUPP.
Alaluuoj!J Shr1• .
Umaid_ Mills Lld,.
v.
Union of India ·
Das, J.
Constitution : (a) all property and assets which immediately before such commencement were vested
· in any Indian State corresponding to a State
specified in · Part B of the First Schedule shall
vest in the Union, if the purposes for which
such property and assets were held immediateI y
before such- commencement will thereafter be
purposes of the Union relating· to any of the
matters enumerated in the. Union List, and
(b) all rights, liabilities and obligations
of the Government of any Indian State corresponding to a State specified in Part B of the
First Schedule, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise, shall be the rights, liabilities
and obligations of the Government of India,
if the purposes for which such rights were
acquired or liabilities or obligations were
incurred before such commencement will thereafter be purposes of the Government of India
relating to any of the matters enumerated in
the Union List,
subject to any agreement entered into in that behalf
by the Government of India with the Government
of that State.
·
(2) . Subject as aforesaid, the Government of
each State specified· in Part B of the First Schedule
shall, as from the commencement of this Constitution, be . the successor of the Government · of the
corresponding . Indian State as regards all property
and assets and all ............... rights, liabilities and
obligations, whether arising out of any contract or
otherwise, other than those referred to in clause (1)."_
·The argument is that the Article provides a
constitutional guarantee in the matter of rights,
liabilities and obligations referred to iu cl. (b) and
no law can be made altering· those rights, liabilities
2 s.c.R.. SUPREME couR.i" REPORTs-~537-and obligations. In support of this argument our
attention has been drawn to Art. 245 which says
that subject to ·the provisions of the Constitution
Parliament may make laws for the whole or any
part of the territory of India etc. The· contention
is that the power of Parliament to make laws being
subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Art. 295
which is one of the provisions of the Constitution
controls the power .· of Parliament to make laws in
respect of rights, liabilities, obligations etc. referred
to in Art. 205 (1). (b), and therefore Parliament
cannot pass any law altering those rights, liabilities
·
·
. ·
and obligations. . ·
\Ve do not think that this is a correct inter~ ·
pretation of Art. 205 of the Constitution. But before
going into the question of interpretation of Art. 295
it may be pointed out that if the United State of
Rajasthan did not affirm the agreement, then the
appellant had no enforceable right against either the
United State of Rajasthan or the Part B State of
Rajasthan. Under Art. 295 (1) (b) there must be a
· right or liability on an Indian State corresponding
to a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule
which can become the . right or liability of the
Government of India etc. If the right itself did
not exist before the commencement of the Con·
stitution and could not be enforced against any
Government, the question of its vesting in another
Government under Art. 205(1) (b) can hardly arise.
· The scheme of Art. 205 appears to be this, It
relates to succession to property, assets, rights,
liabilities and obligations. Clause {a) states that
. from the commencement of the Constitution all
property and assets which immediately before such
commencement were vested in an Indian State corres·
ponding to a State specified in Part B of the First
::ichedule shall vest in the Union, if the purposes for
which such property and assets were held_be· purposes
•
•
-
1962
AfJharqja Shr11
u,,,.;d Mills Lid.
v.
Unim of lntiia
538: Sl!Pl{EivIE COURT. REPORTS
[1003] SlJPi'.
'
-
-
<
1962
A!Ah.i•ja Shre1
UmtJii Jifills Lit!.
v.
~nio1f. of India
-na.s. J.
of the Union. Clause (b) states that all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Govemmenf of any Indian
State corresponding to a State speCified i!I Part B of
the First Schedule, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise shall be the rights, liabilities ·anCI
obligations 'of the Government of India if the purposes
for which such rights were acquired or liabilities and
obligations were incurred be purposes of the Government of India.- There is nothing in the Article to ·
show that it fetters for all time to come, the power of
the Union Legislature to make modifications . or
c]langes in the rights, liabilities etc. which have vested
in the Government of India. The express provisions
of Art. 295 (10) deal . with_ only two matters,
.namely, (1) vesting . of certain ·property and assets in
_the. Government of India, and (2) . the arising of
certain rights, liabilities and obligations on the
Government of India. Any legislation altering the
course of vesting. or succession as laid down. in
Art. 295 will no doubt be bad on the ground that it
conflicts with Article. But there is nothing in the
Article which prohibits Parliament from enacting
a law altering the terms and conditions of a contract
-or of a-· grant . under which the liability of the
Government of India arises. The legislative compc. tence of the Union Legislature. or even of the State
Legislature can only be circumscribed by. express
prohibition contained in the Constitution itself and
unless and until there is any provision in the Consti·
tion expressly prohibiting legislation on the subject
either absolutely or conditionally, there is no fetter or
limitation on the plenary powers which the legislature
enjoys to legislate on the topics enumerated in the
. relevant Lists lJiaharaj Umeg Singh v. State. of
Bombay (1). In our opinion, there is nothing in
: A.rt. 295 which expressly prohibits Parliament from
enacting a law as to incorile-tax or excise duty· in
territories
which . became .. Part B. States, and .which were . formerly· India'n _States,' and . such 'a
prohibition
cannot be' read into Art. 205' by viriue of
.
-
(I) A.I.R, (1955) S,C. 540.
'
2 s.c.:R.
st.H:>REME COURT REPORTS- : 539 ~
-
·-· -
some contract that might have been made by the
-IP52
then Ruler of an Indian State_with any person: --_ - _ Maharaj•Shree
'
· Umaid l\liU1 Lid.
There is another aspect of this question. The
· v.
rights, liabilities and- obligations- referred to in
Union_•/ 1•.4i•
Art. 295 (1) (b) are, by the express language of the
_D,,,J.
Article, subject to any agreement entered into in that
behalf by the Government of India and the Government of the State.- , Such an agreement was entered
·into· between the President of India and Rajpramukh
of Rajasthan on February 25, 1950. It is
necessary to explain
how this agreement came
into existence. A committee known as the Indian
States Finances Enquiry Committee was appointed
by a resolution of the . Government of India -·dated
October 22, 1948, to examine and report upon,
among other things, the present structure. of public
-finance in Indian States and the desirability and
feasibility of integrating _Federal Finance in Indian
·States. This committee submitted its report on
October 22, 1949. The agreement between the
President of India and the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan
said:
"The recommendatiorn of the Indian States
Finance Enquiry Committee, 1948-49 (here·
after referred to as the Committee) contained
in Part I of its Report read with Chapters I,
II and III of Part II of its Report, in so far
as they apply to the State of Rajasthan (hereafter referred to as the State) together with the
-recommendations contained in Chapter VIII
of Part II of the report, are accepted by the
parties hereto, subject to the following modifi·
cations."
_
It - is not necessary for our purpose to set -out
the modifications in detail. It is enough to say that
there is nothing in the modifications which in ariy
_way benefits the appellant. One of the modifica·
tions relates to State-owned and State-operated enterprises which are to be exempt from income-tax etc •
•
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Maltarai- Shrtr
Umolll Mills Ltd.
v.
Unim •/ India
Das, J.
The appellant is neither a State-owned nor a Stateoperated enterprise. Another· modiffcation states"State-sponsored Banks or. similar Stateponsored enterprises in the State now enjoying
any explicit tax exemptions shall be treated as
"Industrial Corporations" for purposes of the
continuance of the Income tax concessions now
enjoyed by them in accordance
with
paragraph 11 (3) (b) of the Annexure to Part I
of the Committee's Report."
Now the appellant is neither a State-sponsored
bank nor a State-sponsored enterprise. So far as the
appellant is concerned the recommendations of the
committee which were accepted in the agreement
inter alia said :
"Any special financial privileges and imnmnities (affecting "federal" revenues) conferred
by the State upon other individuals and corporations should ordinarily be continued on the
same terms by the Centre, subject to a
maximum period of ten (or fifteen) years, and
subject also to limiting in other ways any such
concessions as may be extravagant against the
public interest."
The
recommendation quoted above
clearly
shows that it was open 1!1 the Union to limit in any
way it thought fit any concessions as appear to the
Union Government to be extravagant and against
the public interest. In view of this recommendation
which was part of the agreement entered into
between the President of India and the Rajpramukh
of Rajasthan on February 25, l!l50, the appellant
can hardly plead it has a conslitulional guarantee tu
claim exemption from excise duty or income-tax.
This finishes the second line of argument urged
on behalf of the appellant. As to ·the pleas based on
Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution, it is enough to
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
.;say that on our findings the appellant had. no
· enforceable right either against the State Government
of Rajasthan or the Union Government on
January 26, 1950. It is obvious, therefore, that . the
appellant cannot invoke to its aid either Art. 19 or
Art. 31 of the Constitution. As to the claim of
refund which the appellant preferred against the
State of Rajasthan, the appellant's position is no
better. If neither the United State of Rajasthan nor
the Part B State of Rajasthan affirmed the agreement
of April 17, 1941, the appellant cannot enforce any
right against respondent No. 2 on the basis of that
agreement.
In the trial court as also in the High Court the
question of frustration of the contract was canvassed
and gone into. The courts found that the contract
was frustrated. In view of the findings at which we
ha vc arrived. It is now unnecessary to consider that
question. Therefore we do not propose to deal with it.
For the reasons given above, we have come to
. the conclusion that the appeals are without any
'merits. We accordingly dismiss them with costs, one
hearing fre.
Appeal dismissed.
1962
M•Mrajo Sllt11
Umaid Mills Lti.
v.
U.Un •f lndi•
Das, J.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org