M/S NEW INDIA SUGAR MILLS LTD. versus COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, BIHAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 November 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 459 | 1962 INSC 344
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 November 1962
- Bench
- J.L. KAPUR*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 237/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 459
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 344
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
M/S NEW INDIA SUGAR MILLS LTD.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, BIHAR
(J. L. K.APtra, M. HIDAYATULLAH and
SHAH, JJ.)
Sales Taz-Sugar Control-Allotment by OontrolkrSupply of Sugar under al/olment order-If amounts to eakBihar Sales Taa; Act 1947 (Bihar 19 of 1947), s. 2 (g)-Sugar
and Sugar Product. Oonlrol Order 1946-Sak of Goods Acl, 1930
(3 of 1930), a. ~Governmem of India Acl, 1935 (26. Geo. 5
Oh. 2), Seven/Ji Schedule, !Mt II, Entry 48.
Under the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1946,
the consuming States intimated to the Sugar Controller of India
their requirements of sugar and the factory owners sent state·
ments of stocks of sugar hdd by them. The Controller made
allotments to various States and addressed orders to the
factory owners directing them to supply sugar to the States in
question in accordance with the despatch instructions from the
State Governments. Under such allotment orders, the assesses,
a sugar factory in Bihar, despatched sugar to the State of
Madras. The State of Bihar treated these transactions as sales
and levied sales tax thereon, under the Bihar Sales Act, 1947.
The assesses contended that the despatches of the sugar pursuant
to the directions of the Controller did not amount to sales and
that no sales tax was exigible on such transactions.
Held (per Kapur and Shah,,U, Hidayatullah,J., dissenting),
that the transactions did not amount to sales and were not liable
to sales tax. .Under Entry 48, List II of Government of India
Act, 1935, the Provincial Legislature had no power to levy
sales taxes on a transaction which was not of the nature of a
sale of goods, as understood in the Sale of Goods Act. To
constitute a sale of goods, property in the goods must be
transferred from the seller to the buyer under a contract of sale.
A contract of ,sale between the sdler and the buyer is a pre·
requisite to a sale. Despatches of sugar under the directions of the
Controller were not the result of any such contract of sak.
There was no offer by the assesses to the State of Madras and no
acceptance by the latter; the asse= was, under the Control
Order, compelled to carry out the directions of the Controller
and it had no volition in the matter. Intimation by the State
1962
NawmlHr, 26.
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/sNew India
Sugar Mills Ltd.
v.
Commission1r of
Sales Tax, Bi/uu
of its requirement of sugar to the controller or communication of the allotment order to the assesses did not amount to
an offer. Nor did the mere compliance with despatch instructions issued by the Controller, which the assessee could not
decline to carry out, amount to acceptance of an offer or to
making of an offer. A contract of sale postulates exercise of
volition on the part of the contracting parties.
State of MadMB v. Gannon
Dunkerley &: Oo., [1959]
S. C. R. 379, relied on.
The ToJa Iron &: Steel Oo. Lt,d. v. The State of Bihar,
[1958] S. C. R. 1355, explained.
Per Hidayatullah, J.-In these transactions there was a
sale of sugar for a price and sales tax was payable in respect
thereof. Though consent is necessary for a sale, it may be express or implied, and it cannot be said that unless the offer and
acceptance are in an elementary direct form there can be no
taxable sale. The controller permitted the as•esses to supply
sugar of a stated quality and quantity to the State of Madras;
thereafter the two parties agreed to "sell" and "purchase" the
sugar. So long as the parties trade under controls at fixed price
they must be deemed to have agreed to such a price; there was
an implied contract with an implied offer and an implied acceptance. The same is the position with respect to the quality and
quantity fixed by the Controller. When the State, after receiving the permit., sent instructions to the assesses to despatch sugar
and the assesses despatched it, a contract emerged and consent
must he implied on both sides though not expressed antecedently
to the permit.
State of MadrlJ8 v. Gannon Dunkerley Oo., [1959]
S.C.R. 379 and The Toia Iron and Steel Oo. Ltd. v. The State of
Bihar,. [ 1958] S. C. R. 1355, explained.
CIVIL APPELLATE jURISDIOTION : Civil Ap}>f'al
No. 237 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 30, 1958, of the Patna High
Court in M.J.C. No. 5 of 1956.
B. T. Desa·i and B. P. Mahesllwari, for the
appellant.
S. P. Varma, for the respondent.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
1962. November 26. The Judgment of Kapur
and Shah, JJ., was delivered by Shah, J.
Hidayatullah, J., delivered a separate judgment.
SHAll,J.-M/S. New India Sugar Mills Ltd.hereinafter called 'the assessees'--own a factory at
Hasanpur in the State of Bihar. During the assessment period April 1, 1947, to March 31, 1948, the
assessees who were registered as dealers under the
relevant Sales Tax Acts despatched sugar valued at
R~. 6,89,482/- to the authorised agents of the State of
Madras in compliance with the directions issued by
the Controller exercising powers under the Sugar and
Sugar Products Control Order, 1946. The Sales Tax
Officer, Darbhanga rejected the plea of the assessees
that despatches of sugar to the Province of Madras
in compliance with the instructions of the Controller
were not liable to be included in the taxable turnover,
and ordered the assessees to pay sales tax on a taxable turnover of Rs. 27, 62,226/. The order of
assessment was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, but the Board of Revenue exercising jurisdiction in revision set aside the order, in so far as it
related to the inclusion into the taxable turnover the
value of sugar despatched to the Province of Madras.
The Board of Revenue observed that the "Controller
passed orders in exercise of statutory powers, which,
as a result of mere compliance, could not create a
contract in law," and there was no evidence justifying the view that there could "possibly be any contract between the assessees and some dealers in Madras
or between the assessees" and the Sugar Controller.
The Board of Revenue under the direction of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna submitted under
s. 25(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, the following question for the opinion of the High Court :
"Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the disposal of sugar to the Province of
Madras is liable to be taxed."
1962
M/1 Ntw lnd/4
Sutar MU/s Ltd,
v.
Commis.tiotrn' of
Salts T~. Bihar
Shah, J,
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/1N1W India
Su1ar Milli Ltd.
v.
Comm is siDlllr of
Sales TtJx, Bihar
Shah, J.
The High Court answered the question in the affirmative observing that the sugar despatched by the
assessees to different Provinces including the Province
of Madras under orders of the Controller was liable
to be taxed under the provisions of the Bihar Sales
Tax Act, 194 7. With special leave the assessees have
appealed to this Court against the judgment of the
High Court.
The only question ansmg in the appeal is
whether there was a sale by the assessees of sugar
despatched by them to the Provincial Government
of Madras in compliance with the directioru issued by
the Controller in exercise of authority under the Sugar
and Sugar Products Control Order, promulgated on
February 18, 1946, by the Central Government under
powers conferred by sub-rule (2) of r. 81 of the
Defence of India Rules. The material clauses of the
Order concerning sugar are these. By cl 3 of the
Order producers of sugar were prohibited from
dis?05ing of or agreeing to dispose of or making
delivery of any sugar !xcept to or through a recognised dealer or persons specially authorised in that
behalf by the Controller to acquire sugar on behalf
of the Central Government or of a Provincial Govern·
ment or of an Indian State. Clause 5 enjoined upon
every producer or dealer duty to comply with such
directions regarding production, sales, stocks or dis·
tribution of sugar as may from time to time be issued
by the Controller. By cl. 6 the Controller was
authorised to fix the price at which sugar may be
sold or delivered, and upon fixation of the price all
persons were prohibited from selling or purchasing or
agreeing to sell or purchase sugar at a price higher
than the fixed price. By sub-clause (1) of cl. 7 the
Controller was authorised, inter alia, to allot quotas
of sugar for any specified province, or area or
market and to issue directions to any producer or
dealer to supply sugar to such provinces, areas or
markets or such persons or organisations, in such
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
quantities, of such types or grades, at su :h time, at
such prices and in such manner as may be specified by
the Controller, an I sub-clause (2) provided that every
producer shall, notwithstanding any existing agreement with any other person, give priority to, and
comply with directions issued to him under subclause (I). Clause 11 provided that against a person
contravening the provisions of the Order without
prejudice to any other punishment to which he may
be liable, an order of forfeiture of any stocks of sugar
in respect of which the Court trying the offence was
satisfied that the offence was committed may be
passed. By sub-rule (4) of Rule 81 of the Defence
of llidia Rules, 1939, contravention of orders made
under the Rule was liable to be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years or with fine or with both.
The course of dealings between the assessees
and the State of Madras to which sugar was, under
the directions of the Controller, supplied by the
assessees is stated by the High Court as follows :"The admitted course of dealing between the
parties was that the Government of various
consuming States used to intimate to the Sugar
Controller of India from time to' time their
requirement of sugar, and similarly the factory
owners used to send to the Sugar Controller of
India statements of stock of sugar held by them.
On a consideration of the requisitions received
from the various State Governments and also
the statements of stock received from the various
factories, the Sugar Controller u~ed to make
allotments. The allotment order was addressed
by the Sugar Controller to the factory owner,
directing him to supply sugar to the State Government in question in accordance with the
despatch instructions received from the competent officer of the State Government. A copy
1962
I•'"'
M/1 NIW
Supt MiU. Lid.
v.
Commission1r of
_Salis I ox, Bilwr
Shull, J.
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M /s N1w Intli•
Suga1 Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Salis Tax, Bihar
Shah, J.
of the allotment order was simultaneously sent
to the State Government concerned, on receipt
of which the competent authority of the State
Government sent to the factory concerned
detailed instructions about the destinations to
which the sugar was to be despatched as also
the quantities of sugar to be despatched to each
place. In the case of the Madras Government
it is admitted that it also laid down the proce·
dure of payment, and the direction was that
the draft should be sent to the State Bank and
it should be drawn on Parry and Company or
any other party which had been appointed as
stockist importer on behalf of the Madras
Government."
The assessees contend that sugar despatched pursuant
to the directions of the Controller was not soU by
them to the Government of Madras, and sales-tax
was therefore not exigible in respect of those dispatches under the relevant Sales Tax Acts of the
province of Bihar. The assessment period in respect
of which the dispute is raised is one year-April 1,
1947, to March 31, 1948-for the first three months
the relevant law imposing liability to pay tax was
Bihar Act 6 of 1944 and from July 1, 1947, to March
31, 1948, liability to pay tax had to be determined
under Bihar Act 19 of 1947. It is common ground that
the scheme of the two . Acts for levy of tax was
similar and the definition of "sale" on which
primarily the dispute centred under the two Acts was
identical. We will therefore refer in dealing with
this appeal as if the liability arose under Act XIX
of 1947. The expression "sale" as defined under
s. 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, at the material
time stood as follows :"Sale means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of
property in goods for cash or deferred payment
2 s.c.k.
SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S
;tu5
or other valuable consideration, including a transfor of property in goods involved
in the execution of contract J,ut docs not include a mortgage, hypothccatiou, charge or
pledge :
l'rovid.cd that a .. tra11sfer of goods on hire
purchase or other instalment system of payment
shall, notwithstanding ·the fact that the seller
retains a title to any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale :
l'rovided . further that notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of
Goods Act, .I fJ30 (III of 1930), the sale of any
goods which arc actually in Bihar at the time
when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale
as defined in section 4 of that Act is made,
shall, wherever the said contract of sale is
made, be deemed for the purpose of this Act
to have been made in Bihar."
....•
Apparently in the first paragraph of the definition a
transaction (other than a transaction expressly
specified) in which there is a transfer of property
in goods for valuable consideration, was includccl as
a sale within the meaning of the Act. By' the first
proviso transfer of goods on hire purchase or other
instalment system of payment arc to be deemed sales.
The second proviso (which has since been repealed)
dealt with the 8itu.s of the sale and was not in truth
a part of the cldinition of sale. What constituted a
sale, the second proviso did not purport to say : it
merely fixed for the purpose of the Bihar Sales Tax
Act the pl;Kc of sale, in the circttnistauccs mcutiouctl
therein.
Tax is leviablc under the Hihar Sales Tax Act
on the gross turnover (exceeding a prescribed
minimum) on sales "which have taken place in
M/s. Ntw lnii•
Sut•' Mill1 lttl.
v.
Commissioner •J
S11l1s Tax, Bi/tar
.\Jwl1, J.
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963} SUPP.
1962
Af/1 J{1w lniia
Su1or Mills Lid.
v.
Commissi11n1r of
Sales i"'ax, Billar
Slwh, J.
Bihar". Counsel for the assessees says that the
value of sugar despatched in compliance with the
directions of the Controller is not liable to be included in the taxable turnover, for there was 110 sale
uf sugar, despatched by the asscssees, and that in
auy cvcut the sale did nut. take place in Bihar. In
elaburatiug his submission counsel says : Unucr the
Government of India Act, l!J35 the Provincial
Legislature had power to legislate for levy of tax on
"sale of goods" under Entry 48 of List 11 of the
Seventh Schedule; that the expression "sale of goods"
in the Entry was used not in the popular but in the
naITow and technical sense in which it is used in the
Indian Sale of Goods Act, l 930; that power uudcr
the entry could be exercised for taxing only those
transactions in which by mutual assent between
parties competent to contract property in goods was
transferred absolutely from one person to another,
in consideration of price paid or promised, and the
transactions in which there was no mutual assent as
a result of negotiations express or implied arc not
sales within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act
and therefore not sales within the meaning of the
Bihar Sales Tax Act. Counsel alternatively submits
that even if the despatches resulted in sales, as the
sales did not take place in Bihar, the same were not
liable to be taxed under the Bihar Sales Tax Act.
In popular parlance 'sale' means transfer of
property from one person to another in consideration
of price paid or promised or other valuable consideration. But that is not the meaning of 'sale' in
the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Section 4 of the Sale of
Goods Act provides by its first sub-section that a
contract of sale of goods is a contract where the
seller agrees to transfer the property in goods to the
lmycr for a price. "Price'' by cl. ( l 0) of s. 2 means
the money cousiucratiou for sale goutls, auu
"where uuder a contract of sale property in the
goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
467
the contract is called a sale, but where the transfer
of the property in the goods is to take place at-a
future time or subject to some condition thereafter
to be fulk<l, the contract is called an agreement to
sell" (sub-section (3) s. 4). It is manifest that under
the Sales ofGoods Act a transaction is called sale
only where for money consideration property in goods
is transferred under a contract of sale. Section 4 of
the Sale of Goods Act was borrowed almost verbatim
from s. 1 of the English Sale of Goods Act 56 & 57
Viet. c. 71. As observed by Benjamin in the 8th
Edn. of his work on 'sale', "to constitute a valid sale
there must be a concurrence of the following elements
viz. (1) Parties competent to contract; (2) mutual
assent; (3) a thing, the absolute or general property
in which is transferred from the seller to the buyer;
and (4) a price in money paid or promised".
The Provincial Legislature by Entry 43 List
II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of
India Act, 19:l5 was invested with power to legislate
in respect of "Taxes on sale of goods". The expression "sale of g09ds" was not defined in the
Government of India Act, but it is now settled
law that the expression has to be understood in the
sense in which it is used in the Sale of Goods Act,
1930. In the State of Jlfadras v. Gannon Dunkerley
& Co. (') this Court in considering whether s. 2 (i)
Explanation I (i) of the Madras General Sales
Tax Act IX of W39 as amended by the Madras
General Sales Tax Amendment Act XXV of 19.J-7
was intra vires the Provincial Legislature, has decided
that the expression 'sale of goods' in Entry 48, List
II, is used not in the popular but in the restricted
sense of the Sale uf Goods Act, rn:;o. The· µrimary
question which fell tu be determined in that case
was whether in a "building contract which was one,
entire and indivisible" there was sale of goods of the
building materials used in the execution, liable to
be taxed under the Madras General Sall'~ Tax Act
(I) (19591
s.c.a. 579,
1962
M/1 x,,. l•ii•
Su111r MiU1 Ltd.
v.
CmmiJsl"'" •}
S.lts T.x, Bih•r
Shah, J.
468 SUPREl\lE COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
/962
M /s .New lridia
Sugar Mills Ltd.
v.
Commi.t1ion1r of
Salts Tax, Bi/Jar
SM.Ir, J.
which by s. 2 (c) defined 'goods' as meaning all
kinds of movable property (except certain kinds
which arc not material in this case) and included
all materials, commodities and articles including
those to be used in the construction, fitting out,
improvement or repair of immovable property, and
by s. 2 (h) defined the expression 'sale' as meaning
every transfer of property in goods by one person to
another in the course of trade or business for cash
or for deferred payment or other valuable con·
sideration and includes also a transfer of property
in good' involvec1 in the execution of a works contract. Power of the Provincial Legislature of :Madras
to legislate in respect of a levy of tax on the value
of goods used in the execution of a works contract
was challenged by a firm of building contractors,
and this Court held that the power under Entry
48, List II, Seventh Schedule, did not include power
to legislate for levying tax on the value of goods
used "in the course of a building contract which
was one, entire and indivisible". The Court held
that the expression "sale of goods" in Entry 48 List
II was used not in the popular sense but in the
strictly limited sense in which it was defined' in the
Sale of Goods Act and that the Madras Provincial
Legislature had no power to legislate· under the
power derived under Entry 48 in List II for taxing
transactions other than those of sales strictly so called
under the Sale of Goods Act. It was observed "the
expression 'sale of goods' in Entry 48 is a nomen
juri8, its essential ingredients being an agreement
to sell movables for a price and property passing
therein pursuant to that agreement. In a building
contract which is, as in the present case, one, entire
and indivisible and that is its norm, there is no sale
of goods, and it is not within the competence of the
Provincial ],egislature under Entry 48 to impose a
tax 011 the supply of the materials used i11 such
a contract treating it as a sale." In (Jannan
Dunkerley & Company's case (') the Court was
(I) (1959) S.C.R, 5711,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREJ\fE COURT REPORTS
46!:1
1952
concerned to adjudicate upon the validity of the
provisions enacted in , acts of Provincial Legislatures ~\Ifs New India
imposing'liability to pay sales tax-on the value of Sugar A!ills Ltd.
' v.'
goods used in the execution. of building contracts, Commhsiontr
of
and the-judgment of the Court proceeded on the Salts Tax, Bihar
ground that power conferred by Entry 48 List II
Shah,. J.
was restricted to enacting legislation imposing tax .
liability in respect of sale of goods as understood in
the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and that the Provincial
Legislature under the Government of India Act,
· 1!:135 had no power to tax a transaction which was not
.. a sale of goods, as understood in the Sale of Goods Act.
The ratio decidendi of that decision must govern this
case. According to s. 4 of the Sale of· Goods-- Act to ·
constitute a sale of goods, property in goods must, be
transferred from the seller to the buyer. under ·_a
contract of sale. ·A contract of sale between the
parties is therefore a pre-requisite to a sale. . The
transactions of despatches of sugar by the assessees
pursuant to the directions of the Controller were not
the result of any such contract of sale. It is common
ground that the Province of !\ladras intimated its
requirements of sugar to the Controller, and _the
Controller called upon the manufacturing units to
supply the whole or part of the requirement to the
Province. In calling upon the manufacturing units
to supply sugar, the Contr~ller did not act as an ,...
agent of the State to purchase goods : he acted in
exercise of his statutory authority. There was
manifestly no offer to purchase sugar by the Pro_vin_ce, and no acceptance of any offer by the .
manufacturer. The manufacturer was under the
control Order left no volition : he could not decline
to carry out ·the order; if he did so he was liable
to be punished for breach of the order and his goods
were -liable -to be forfeited. The Government· of
the Province and the manufacturer had no
opportunity to negotiate, and sugar was despatched
pursuant to the direction of the Controller and not
in. acceptance of any offer by the G9vern.menh
'
'
'
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/s N111 lnii•
Sutar Mills Lli.
v.
Cntmilsio11,1r 1/
S•ln Ta:'<. Bihar
The High Court observed "as soon as an
application for allotment is made, there is an
implication of an offer to purchase the quantity of
sugar at the price fixed by the Controller from the
producer to whom the allotI!lent order is to be made
by the Controller. It is also clear that if the allotment order is communicated by the Controller to
the assessee and the latter appropriates the sugar
in accordance with the allotment order and in accordance with the despatch instructions of the competent
officer appointed by the Madras Government, there is
in the eye of law an acceptance of the offer by the
assessee and a contract is immediately brought into
existence between the parties". We arc with respl'ct
unable to hold that this view is correct. The
Provincial Government of Madras gave intimation
of its requirements of sugar to the Controller and
applied for allotment of sugar : thereby the Government was not making any offer to purchase sugar.
Evidently the offer could not be. made to the Controller because the Controller was not a manufacturer
of sugar or his agent. The communication of the
allotment order to the assessces was again not of any
offer made by the State which it was open to the
asscssccs lo accept or decline. Mere compliance
with the dispatch instructions issued by the Controller,
which in law the asscssecs could not decline to carry
out, did not amount to acceptance of an offer. A
contract of sale postulate~ exercise of volition on
the part or the contracting parties and there was in
complyi11g with the orders passed by the Controller
no such exercise of volition by the assessees. By the
Indian Omtract Act 9 of 1872 a proposal or an
offer is defined as signification by one person to
another of his willingness to do or to abstain from
doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent
of that other to such act or abstinence. ·when the
person to whom the proposal is mudc or signified
assents thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted.
The person making the proposal is called the
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
471
promisor and the person accepting the proposal is
called the promisee, and every promise or every
set of promises, forming the consideration for each
other is an agreement. These provisions of the
Contract Act are by s. 2 (15) of the Sale of
Goods Act, incorporated therein. There was on the
part of the Province of Madras no signification to
the assessees of their willingness to do or to abstain
from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the
assent of the assessees · to such aci or abstinence, and
the Controller did not invite any signification of
assent of the asscssees to the intimation received by
them. He did not negotiate a sale of sugar : he in
exercise of his statutory authority, ordered the assessces to supply sugar to the Government of Madras.
Wc are unable to hold that from the intimation of
order of the Controller, and compliance therewith
by the asscssccs .any sale of goods resulted in favour
of the State of Madras .
.Mr. Varma appearing for the State of Bihar
contended that even if there was no offer and no
acceptance when intimation was sent by the Government of i\fadr~s to the Controller, and the Controller
directed the asscssccs to deliver specified quantities
of sugar, still by the conduct of the assessees in
despatching sugar to Madras in pursuance of the
directions of the Controller and acceptance of price
by them, a contract of sale resulted. But the action
on the part of the assessct·s in dcspatd1ing the goods
was not voluntary : they were compelled to; send
the goods. They could not be deemed by despatching sugar to have made any offer to supply goods and
in the absence of any offer, no contract resulted by
the acceptance of goods by the Provincial Government. To infer a contract from the compulsory
delivery of sugar and acceptance thereof would be
to ignore the true position of the parties, and the
circumstances in which goods were delivered.
Mr. Varma contended that in any event the
1962
M/1 N1w lniia
su1ar Mills Lto.
v.
Commissiontr of
Salu Tax, Bihar
Shah, J.
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP.
JS62
M/s Ntw lnii•
Su1., Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissiontr 1{
~alts Tax, Riha1
Sh•h, J.
Legislature had by the definition included in the
expression 'sale of goods' all i.ransfers of property in
_goods for consideration and the transaction~ which
are sought to be taxed by the State of Bihar fell
within that definition. Counsel submitted that a
literal meaning should be given to the words of the
Act without any pre·disposi1ion as to what the
expression 'sale' means under the Sale of Goods Act.
But if the Bihar Legislature had under the Government of India Act, 1935 no _power to legislate in
respect of taxation of transactions other than those
of sale of goods as understood in the Sale of Goods
Act, a transaction to be liable to pay salcs·tax, had
to conform to the requirements of the Sale of Goods
Act, l!l:JO. _ Attributing a literal meaning to the
words used would amount to imputing to the
Legislature an intention deliberately to transgress
the rrstrictions imposed by the Constitution Act upon
the Provincial Legislative authority. It is a recognised
rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions
used therein should ordinarily be understood in a
sense in which they best harmoni~c with the object
of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the
Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a
narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular
meaning, the Court would be justified in assuming
that the Legislature used the expression in the sense
which would carry out its object and reject that
which renders the exercise of its power invalid. If
the narrow and technical concept of sale is discarded
and it uc assumed that the Legislature sought to use
the expression sale in a wider sense as including
transactions in which property was transferred for
consideration from one person to another without
any previous contract of sale, it would be attributing
to the Legislature an intention to enact legis.lation
beyond its competence. In interpreting a statute
the Court caqnot ignore its aim and object. It is
manifest that the Bihar L!':gislaturc intended to erect
machinery within the frame-work of the Art for
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
levying sales tax on transactions of sale and the
power of the Legislature being restricted to imposing
tax on sales in the limited sense, it could not be
presumed to have deliberately legislated outside its
competence. In the definition of the expression 'sale'
in s. 2 (g} of the Bihar Sales Tax Act it must be
regarded as implicit that the tramaction was to have
all the elements which constitute a sale within the
meaning of the Sale of Goods Act. Use of the
expression "including a transfer of proper! y in goods
involved in the execution of the contract" in the fir~t
paragraph of the definition also does not justify the
inference that the transfers of property in goods nuder
the earlier part of the definition were not to be the
result of a contract of sale. If any such intention was
attributed to the Legislature. the legislation may, for
the reasons already stated, be heyond the competence
of the Legislature. The non-obstantP- clause in the
second proviso is in truth in the nature of an explanation to the charging section : it mere! y fixes the
sit-us of sale. Ir there is no sale the second proviso
will have no application.
Mr. Varma finally contended that in the Tata
Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar (') by
implication it was decided that the definition of 'sale'
in s. 2(g-) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act included transactions in which good' were supplied in compliance
v ith directions which left no volition to the manufacturers. But this arg-umrnt is not borne out by
what was actuallv decided in that case. Th·~ Tata
Iron & Steel Coinpany Ltd ... which carried on the
business of manufacturing iron and steel in its factory
at Jamshfdpur in Bihar was assessed to sales tax
under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The company
sent its goods from its factory to different Provinces
and Indian Statc3 by rai I, the railway receipts being
obtained hY the company in its own name as consigThe Branch Offices of the
nor and consignee.
l'omnanv or its Rankers at the destination handed
'
'
(I) f!G'iBJ S.C1.K. 1S5j,
1962
Alfs JV1n• lndita
Sutor Mills Lttl.
••
CmnmiuiMllT of
Salts Ta. Bihar
Soah, J.
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP.
1962
At /1 N110 India
Sugcr Mill• Ltd,
v.
CommWion1r of
Sala Ta, Bihar
SMJr, J,
over the railway receipts to the purchasers against
payment of the price. The Sales Tax Officer of the
State of Bihar included in the gross turnover of the
Company the value of goods manufactured in Bihar
but delivered and consumed outside the State of
Bihar in the manner already stated. The contention
of the company that the goods delivered were not
liable to be included in the taxable turnover was
negatived by the taxing authorities and the High
Court of Patna. The matter was then carried in
appeal to this Court, and it was held that the provisions of s. 4(1) read withs. 2.(gl proviso 2 of the
Bihar Sales Tax Act was within the legislative com·
petence of the Province of Bihar. It was pointed
out that the second proviso to the definition of sale
in s. 2(g) of the Act did not extend the meaning of
sale so as to include therein a contract of sale: what
it actually did was to lay down certain circumstances
in which a sale, although completed elsewhere, was
to be deemed to have taken place in Bihar. Those
circumstances did not constitute a sale, but only
located the sit·u.9 of such sale. The Court in that
case was not called upon to consider whether a
transaction to be a sale must be preceded by a con·
tract of sak : the Court was merely considering the
1;ires of the second proviso to s. 2(g) of the Bihar
Sales Tax Act. Das, C. ]., in delivering the judgment
of the majority of the Court observed "the basis of
liability under s. 4( 1) rcmaineu as before, namely, to
pay tax on 'sale'. The fact of the goods being in
Bihar at the time of the contract of sale or the production or manufacture of goods in Bihar did not by
itself comtitute a 'sale' and did not by itself attract
the tax. The taxable event still remained the 'sale'
resulting in the transfer of ownership in the thing sold
from the seller to the buyer. No tax liability actually
accrued until there was a concluded sale in the sense
of transfer of title. It was only when the property
passed and the 'sale' took place that the liability for
paying t4e sales tax under the l!l4 7 Act arose. There
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
was no enlargement of the meaning of 'sale' but the
proviso only raised a fiction on the strength of the
facts mentioned therein and deemed the 'sale' to have
taken place in Bihar. Those facts did not by them·
selves constitute a 'sale' but those facts were used for
locating the situs of the sale in Bihar. It follows,
therefore, that the provisions of s. 4( 1) read with
s. 2(g), second proviso, . were well within the legislative competency of the Legislature of the Province
of Bihar". In Tata Iron d: 8teel Comp1my Ltd's
case (1 ) the question as to the true content of the
expression 'sale' in the Bihar Sales Tax Act did not
fall to be determined, and the principle of the case
can have no application in deciding the present case.
It would he fruitless to, enter upon a dctailccl
discussion of the two decisions of the House of Lords
cited at the Har : 1'he Oonnnissianer of Inlllnd
llevenue v. Nen· C'n8tle Bre?l'eries Ltd.(') and Kirkness
(Inspector of 'J'a:res) v. .John H'ltdscm & Company
Ltd. ('). It may he sufficient to observe that in the first
of thfSC cases goods belonging to the assessee were
taken over by order of the Admiralty, acting under
the relevant regulations, and in compliance with the
order of a Compensation Court, the assessce was paid
an amount exceeding £5000/- being the difference
between the amount originally paid and the amount
settled as due under the ord<T of the Compensation
Court. Tbe House of Lords ht'ld that the transac·
tion undl'r which the Admiralty took over the goods
was a sale in the business, and although no doubt it
affectl'd the circulating capital of the assessee it was
none the less proper to be brought into the profit and
loss account arisiug from the assessee's trade for the
purpose of computation of 1iability to pay Excess
Profits duty. In Kir!.·ne,ss (ln.s1lector of 'l'ax1s) v.
John trudson's c11se (') it was held by the House of
Lords that the vesting of~ company's railway wagons·
in the Tramport Commission under s. 29 of the
Transport Act, HJ47, with compensation fixed in
c21 (19271 12 T.c. 927.
(3) (1955] A.O. 696.
. .
m 119ss1s.c.a. 1351.
1962
M/J Ntw India
Suiar Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Sales Tax, Bihar
Shah, J,
476
196'2
M/s N1w India
S11tar Mills ltd.
v.
Commis1ian1r of
Salis Tax, Bihar
Shah, J.
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [l!J63]SUPP.
the form of transport stock under the relevant sections
of that Act did not constitute a sale for the purpose
of s. 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1945 so as to render
the company liable to a balancing charge under that
section. The cases turned upon the meaning of
'sale' for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax
legislation and the Income-tax Act, 1945 (8 & !J
Geo. 6, c. 32) and observations made therein have
little relevance in determining the limits of the
legislative power of the Provincial legislature under
the Government of India Act, 1935, and the interpretation of statutes enacted in exercise of that
power.
The second contention raised by counsel for
the assessees requires no elaborate mnsideration. If
it be assumed that the intimation of the requirement
by the State of Madras to the Controller amounted
to an offer, delivery of sugar by the assessce pursuant
to such an order would constitute a sale within the .
meaning of s. 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax: Act, by
the second proviso which has ·been held intra vires
by this Court in Ta.ta Iron & Steel Cornpany Ltd.'s
case (1) the assessees would be liable to pay sales tax,
for it is not in dispute that at the time when the
orders were received from the Controller the goods
were within the State of Bihar and the condition
prescribed by s. 2(g) second· proviso for locating the
situs ~f the sale is fulfilled.
But the intimation by the Province of Madras
of its requirements did not amount to an offer, and
the supply of goods pursuant thereto could not
amount to a sale; consequently liability to pay sales
tax under the Bihar Sales Tax Act on the amounts
received by the assessees from the Government of
l\fadras for sugar supplied did not arise.
J.-1 regret my inability to
that Grmnon Dunkerley's case (') can be
HrnAYA'ruJ,LAII,
agree
(I) (19~J S,C,I!,, 1155.
(2) (19511] S.Cl,R1 3791
2 S.C.R.
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
477
extended to cover the facts here. I would confirm
the dcci~.ion of the High Court aml dismiss these
appeals for the reasons I proceed to give. These
reasons arc applicable to all the appeals in today's
group.
This case is concerned with the levy of sales tax
under the Bihar Sales Tax Act 1944 (VI of 1944) for
a period of three monthi-April 1, 1947, to
June 30, 1!)47, and another of the nine months
following, under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947
(XIX of 1947). The assessee companies in all these
appeals run sugar mills and are admittedly dealers
under these Acts and the commodity on the sale of
which tax was sought to be levied was sugar. The
disputed tax relates to supplies of sugar made by the
assessee companies under the orders of the Sugar
Controller of India to certain Provincial Governments
in the relevant periods. There is only one conten·
tion of the assessee companies in these appeals and
it is that in the circumstances of the case there was
no 'sale' of sugar, regard being had to the decision
of this Court in Gannon 1>1tnkerley'8 case (1) and
the amounts received from the Provincial Govern·
ments should not be included in the taxable turnover.
I have already mentioned that the assessment
period in this case is one whole year-April I, 1947 to
l\1arch 31, 1948, and that it is divided into two p.arts
of three months and nine months respectively
governed by the Acts. There w:as however no
difference in the mode of dealing in this case in the
two periods. In the other cases the assessment periods
were different but there was no other difference.
The transactions were stereotyped being under the
Sugar and Sugar Products Order, I !Hfl, which was
passed by the Government of India on February 18,
194,6, in the exercise of powers conferred by
sub.rule (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India
Rules. The mode, which has been accepted by the
111 (1959) s.c.R. s1s.
1962
M/s N<W f•di•
S111u Mills Ltd,
v.
ClfJIJ11issi1111r of
S•le1 Tu, B ltar
-i
Hii•J•tullllA. J.
·., '
\
',·
1962
M/1 Ntw India 1
Sutar }.fills. Ltd~ ·
v.
Commissiann of
Sales Ta~J Bihar.
IIiJayatu/lah. J.
'
478: SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i!J63] SUPP.
•
•
<
'
partie8; as correctly summarised was as follows : -
, ,·
'
"Th~ ·admitted cours~ of dealing. betwcLn the
· · parti-::s. was 'that · the. Governments of various
consuming States used to intimate to the Sugar
··Controller of India from time to time, their
requirement of Sugar, and similarly the factory
owners . used to send tc the Sugar Controller
of India statements of stock of sugar held by ·
them. ' On a consideration of the requisitions,
· received from ·the various State Governments
and also' 'the statements of stock received from
the various·· factories, the Sugar Controller used ·
to make allotments. .The· allotment order was
addressed by the Sugar .Controller to the· factory
owner;· directing him.: to. supply' sugar to the
State Government in ·question in accordance .
with the despatch . intructions received from the ·
competent ·office of the State Government. A
copy of the allotment order was simultaneously
sent- to the State, 'Government concerned,
on receipt of which the competent' authority
of the State Government sent to the factory.
concerned 'detailed instructions about the
destinations to which the sugar ·was to be
despatched ;,as , also the quantities . of sugar
to be : despatched • to each· place. , In· the,.
case of the Madras Government itis admitted·
that it· 'also faid down the procedure of payment, and .the ',direction was , that the draft
should be sent to the State Bank and it should .
be drawn on Party and Company or any other
party which had been appointed as . stockist
importer on behalf of the Madras. Government.
It sl10tild , be,:' added . that in this case the .
. , assessee, was · called upon to prod uc.! r-:cessary
documents relating • to the transactit,ns · in ,
question, .but 'the assessee tlid: not produc~ the
·documents. , The :issessee; . however,., admitted
- ·-~
..
- .
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
that general arrangement between the parties
was the one set out in this paragraph."
Two typical documents iu this couucction may
be read and they arc the permit by the Controller
and the despatch order sent by the Provincial
Government. They were not produced in this case
but can be seen in the record of C.A. No. 633of1961
at pages Hi, 16. First the permit :
No. 78 p (l)/46/7132
0 ffice of the Sugar Controller for India
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Department ofFood.
Dated Simla, the 12-11-56
ORDER
In exercise of the power conferred by clause· 7
of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1943.
l. Shashi Kiran, Assistant Sugar Controller
for India, having been duly authorised in this regard
under clause 2 of the said order by the Sugar Controller for India hereby direct you to supply 1200
tons/maunds of Sugar by 31-1-47 to Bengal in accordance with the despatching instructions of the Director
of Civil Supplies Bengal, Calcutta.
:l. A permit No. H.188 to enable you to despatch sugar in compliance with this order is attached.
(Sd.) Shashi Kiran,
Asstt. Sugar Controller for India.
1961
M/1 N1t11 lndill
Supr Mil/1 Lti.
v.
°""1nissi0111r of
Salts Tu, Bi!ar
Hida,.tulld, J,
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/1 Ntrl! lniin
Su1• Mills Ltd.
v.
Cn11unissNn1r of
So.tu T.x, Bi!Nr
Hitl•Jdtvllah, /,
To the Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.,
Majhawlia, District Champaran.
And now the despatch order : STATE
EXl'RESS
MO TIP AT
MAJHOWALIA
UNDERSTAND SUGAR CONTROLLER
ISSUED PERMIT FOR 600 TONS SUGAR
THIS PROVINCE FULLSTOP DESPATCH
IMMEDIATELY 300 TONS l\lANGALORE
DRAFTS ON ME THROUGH CENTRAL
BANK CALICUT 300 TONS COIMBATORE
DRAFTS OF ME THROUGH CENTRAL
BANK MADRAS FULLSTOP SEND RAIL
RECEIPTS FOR EACH 'vV AGON LOAD OR
100 BAGS LOAD WAGONS FULL CAPACITY FULLSTOPBOOK AT RAILWAY RISK
IF NO SPECIAL RATES IN FORCE.
PRICES
T.R.L. Narsimnhan,
Assistant Secretary.
Post copy in confirmation to :Motilal Padampat
Sugar Mills Ltd. Majhowlia, Champaran District.
Forwarded/By Order,
(Sd.) Illegible,
Supdt. Board of Revenue,
(Civil Supplies) Chepauk, Madras.
Kitta 10-5-47.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
These documents between them disclose .that
free trading in sugar was not possible. All Provinces
intimated their requirements to the Controller who
was kept informed by the Mills about the supplies
available. The price was controlled and the Controller directed the supply of a certain quantity from
a particular Mill to an indenting Province. After
giving his pennit and sending a copy of this permit
to each party, the Controller passed out of the picture and the Mill supplying and the Province receiving
the supply (I am avoiding the words seller & buyer
since that is the point to decide) arranged the rest of
the affair including the issue of despatch instructiom regarding the quantity and the quality to be
sent to different areas and the payment of price.
The question is whether there was a 'sale' in
the circumstances and the price should be included
in the turnover for purposes of Sales tax under the
Bihar Sales Tax Act for the time being in force. The
definition of sale in the two Bihar Acts at all material
times was:"2(g) "sale" means, with all its grammatical
variations and cognate expressions, and transfer
of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including
a transfer of property in goods involved in the
execution of contract but does not include a
mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge;
Provided that a transfer of goods on hirepurchase or other instalment system of payment
shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller
retains a title to any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale :
Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sales of
Gooch Act, 1930 the sale of any good which
1962
M11. NIW lniio
Sui•• MUii Lti.
y,
c...n;,,;..,, of
S.W Ta, Billa•
lli~a"'11u. J.
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1961
M/1 N"" l•dio
...
S.t•' Mills Ltd.
c.nmusion• -.!
S.lu T.,,, Blfiar
HidoJalullali, J.
are actually in Bihar at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined
in section 4 of that Act is made, shall wherever
the said contract of sale is made, be deemed
for the purposes of this Act to have taken place
ir1 Bihar."
In the present case, we are required only to
decide whether, regard being had to the decisions of
this Court expounding the ambit of entry No. 48 of
List II. Seventh Schedule of the Government of
India Act 1936, the tax could not be demanded as
there was no sale of sugar at all. The entry in
question is "48. Taxes on the sale of goods ,tnd on advertisement."
"Goods" was defined in section 311 as follows :
"Goods" include all materials, commodities and
articles."
The white Paper had the entry "taxes on the
sale of commodities and on the turnover". It was
altered to "taxes on the sale of goods" and as pointed out by Gwyer, C. ]., In re The Oentral Province
&: Bemr Act No. XIV of 1938, (1) it is idle to speculate what the reason was. The expression "sale of
commodities" would not have taken the mind to the
Sale of Goods Act as the redrafted entry does.
There is no provision in the whole of the
Government of India Act 1935 which expressly seeks
to limit the meaning of the plain words "taxes on the
sale of goods" which include all materials, commodities and articles. Such a limitation could of course
arise from a competing entry in List No. I. Otherwise the entry conferred powers as large and plenary
as those of any sovereign legislature. The ambit of
(I) (1939] F.C.R. 18.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
483
the entry, prior to the inauguration of the Constitution, was the subject of three leading decisions by the
Federal Court, in one of which there was also an
appeal to the Privy Council. The first case was In
re The Central Provinces and Berar Aet No. XIV of
1938, (1) a reference under section 213 of the Constitutir n of 1936. In that case the imposition of sales
tax on retail sales of motor spirit and lubricants was
questioned on the ground that though described as tax
on the sale of motor spirit etc., the tax was, in effect,
a duty of excise under entry 45 of List I and there
being an overlap between the two entries that in List
I must prevail. Legislative practice in respect of
Excise Duty was invoked but as sales-tax legislation
did not exist in India before 1938 there was no
legislative practice to consider on the meaning of the
express "tax on sale of goods". The Government of
India claimed that the entry 48 List II must be limited to a direct tax like a turnover tax which is not
identifiable in the price. Taxes on retail sales, it
was argued, being indirect and identifiable in the
price, were more of the nature of an excise duty and
the pith and substance of the Act being this the impugned Act was bad.
-
The main argument on behalf of the p_rovinccs,
which was accepted, was that the Constitution Act
must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic
sense. Gwyer, C.J., expressed himself forcefiilly on
this point in the following words :·
" I conceive that a broad and liberal spirit
should inspire those whme duty it is to interpret
it ............... ,,
The essence of the argument on the part of the
Provinces was that if only a turnover tax {which was
a species of sales-tax) was meant why was a wider
expression used in the entry ? It was, therefore, contended that the entry should not be truncated and the
(I) (1959] F.C.R. 18.
1962
MJsN,,,,/•&
Sugar Milli Lid•
••
Comm;ssionlr OJ
s.Ju Ta, Bill•
-,,Hiiaµtalld, J,
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
J96Z
M/1.Ntw !Mia
S•101 Mills Lii.
v.
C0ntntissionl" of
&h8 Ta, Bi!Mr
Hithyatullali, J,
plain words of the entry shou Id be given their normal
and ordinary meaning. The contention of the
Provinces prevailed. Though the learned judges
pointed out that the words were "taxes on the sale of
goods" and not "sales tax" simpliciter, thereby excluding taxes on services which in some systems
are regarded also as sales-tax, the words were wide
enough to include more than a mere turnover tax.
It was held that the power included a power to levy
a tax ,ir duty on the retail sale of goods and this did
not impinge upon the power of the Legislative
Assembly to make laws "with respect to" duties of
excise.
In the next case the Province of Madras v.
Boddu Paidanna &: Sons (1). Government of India
reversed its stand and contended that the power of the
Provincial Legislatures did not extend to levying
sales-tax on first sales but only after the goods were
released by the producer or manufacturer. The
argument of the Government of India was not accepted and it was declared that the power of a Provin·
cial Legislature to levy a tax on the sale of goods
extended to sales of every kind and at all stages
between a producer or manufacturer and a consumer.
The Central Government had filed a suit and the third
case before the Federal Court was an appeal from
that decision. The Federal Court followed its own
decision fo Boddu Paidanna's case. (1) The Central
Government appealed to the Judicial Committee and
the judgment is to be found in Governor-General in
Council v. Province of Madras. (') The Judicial
Committee examined in detail the provisions of the
Madras General Sales Tax Act 1938 to emphasize its
essential character and observed that"Its real nature, its "pith and substance," is
that it imposes a tax on the sale of goods. No
other succinct description could be given of it
(2) [1945] F.C.R. 179 P.C.
(11(1942) F.C.R. go.
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
485
except that it)s a "tax on the sale of 'goods.'
It is, in fact, a tax which according to the ordinary canons of interpretation appears to fall
precise! y within entry No. 48 of the Provincial
Legislative List.''
1962
M/s New ln{ia
Sugar Mills Ltd•
••
CommifJiorur of
SalR Tu, Bihar
Hilll1atullali, J.
In repelling the contentiou that first sales were
not included in the entry their Lordships observed
that it did violence to the plain languages and implied the addition of the words "other than first sale
of goods manufactured or produced in India.'' The
Judicial Committee expressed itself in complete agreement with the two decisions of the Federal Court.
The ambit of the entry was thus settled to be
that it included all 'sales of goods' though not 'services' from the first sale by the producer or manufacturer to the last sale to the consumer and that the
tax could be collected on wholesales or retail sales as
well as on the tumover. It was however pointed out
that the expressions "sales-tax" and "taxes on the sale
of goods" were not the same, the first including sales
other than those of goods. No definition of what is
"sale" was attempted in these cases either with or
without reference to the Sale of Goods Act.
-
Thus it was firmly established that the entry
"taxes on the sale of goods" authorised the making
of laws for the imposition of tax on all transactions
of sale of goods from the manufacturer or producer to
consumer. It also could be imposed on the turnover
which meant the sum total of prices for which taxable
goods were sold in a particular period. The definition of "goods" was enlarged to include "commodities, materials and articles.'' The word '·commodities" indicated "articles of trade", the word
"materials" indicated "matter from which things arc
made". (the use of the word being th<' same as iu the
expression 'raw materials') and by "articles" was
meant "any particular thing.'' In this way it was
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/1 Nm l•di•
SugM Mill• Lid•
••
Commiuiort•r of
Salu Ta, Bihdr
Hida;1altlllah, J.
cleaJly indicated that articles sold by way of a trade
or otherwise were equally within the expression
'goods' and also finished articles and raw materials
from which finished articles are made.
The entry was framed in 1935 in the form with
which we are concerned. Previously it read in the
white paper "taxes on sale of commodities and turn·
over." The reframed entry was wider in one
respect (it included materials and articles in 'the sense
explained) and apparently narrower in another (by
omitting 'turnover') than the original entry. There
was no occasion to expound the meaning of 'goods'
in the two Federal Court decisions but the decisions
laid-down that 'turnover' was included even though
not expressly mentioned.
I have already said above that prior to 1938
a tax on the sale of goods was not imposed in India.
It is claimed that in ancient times sales-ta.1: was
levied in India but we do not have to delve into
these matters. The tax, as it is known today, is of
comparatively modern growth though economists
have traced it to Ptolemies, Greeks and Romans.
Findlay Shirras and other writers give us the history
of the tax. It was imposed in a recognisable form
in Spain in 1342 and was known as the skabal.a.
This notorious tax continued for five hundred years.
In France it was also imposed in the fourteenth
century but was soon given up. We are not concerned with these ancient progenitors of the modern
tax. They could not have influenced the selection
of the tax or its form. The modern tax was the
result of the First World War. Germany imposed in
1916 a turnover tax called 'die Umsatzste:uer' and
tl1at is the form in which the tax is collected there.
France followed a year later but with a transaction
tax which was known as 'L' impot sur le ohiffre
d'affaires'. Soon other countries followed as it was
almost as productive as Customs and income-tax.
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
By the time the Government of India Act 1935 was
passed, no less than thirty countries had imposed
this tax in different forms. India, however, was not
one of them.
The period in India following the First World
War opened with the Government of India Act with
its Devolution Rules and the allocation of taxes by
the Scheduled-tax Rules, to the Provinces framed in
1920. The latter Rules contained only octroi and
taxes on markets and trades, professions and callings
which resembled very distantly, the modern sales-tax.
Indeed, sales-tax was first visualized in the Report
of the Taxation Enquiry Committee (1924-25) but
only as a modification of the octroi through the
intermediate steps of taxing markets and slaughterhouses. It was hoped that price competition would
stop inclusion of the tax in the price. It would have
been a vain attempt to convert an indirect tax into a
direct one. The Committee visulised it as a composition tax from traders but it was realised that the tax
would soon get converted into a tax on sales of goods,
or, of services like those of a doctor or goldsmith and
that it would be difficult to separate services from
goods in case where the two were combined. It was
also recognised that turnover taxes imposed on persons in respect of raw materials and finished goods
tended to be cumulative, but taxes imposed at one
point did not have that vicious tendency. The difficulty of entrepot trade in octroi, where goods bore the
tax whether or not consumed, sold or used was avoided
because the tax under retail sales-tax scheme was
payable only when the goods were actually sold and
being ad valorem bore lightly on cheap goods. The
suggestions were-·
(1) A turnover tax on retail merchants;
(2)' registration of such dealers;
(3) collection of taxes quarterly;
1962
M/s. JV..,, l•dia
Su1or Mills Lli.
v.
Commission1r of
Salu T ..._ Bih•r
Hida.1"11<1Wa, J,
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SUPP.
1962
M/1. N.w l•dia
S•I"' Mills f.td .
••
Commissiorur of
Salts Tax. Bihar
Hii•7atuJlah, /.
{4) licensing of and charging of fees from
petty traders and hawkers whose turnovers
were uncertain as no accounts were main·
tained by them.
Sales·tax particularly that imposed on goods
ass urned by 1935 different forms in different countries.
Its incidence was sometimes the turnover, sometimes
wholesale and sometimes the retail sale. In Canada
and Australia it was a producers' or manufacturers'
tax almost of the nature of excise. In . France the
excise and sales-tax were interchangeable, the former
being a replacement tax on the turnover of the
manufacturer. In Germany the tax included both
goods and services, in France services were excluded
unless there was a commercial element. In England,
it took the form of a purchase tax. France also
devised a simpler method by imposing a farfait a
lump sum which represented, so to speak, a quit tax.
In Belgium it was collected by stamps from both the
seller and the buyer according to their respective
invoices. In America the position was unique. It
can be stated from a passage from Beuhler's Public
Finance (3rd Edo.) page 410" A sale tax is an excise in so far as it is imposed
upon domestic transaction of commodities, and
it may also have some of the aspects of customs
duties because national sales taxes commonly
fall upon importing and sometimes upon exporting. The popular name for American excises
is sales taxes. Not all excises arc imposed upon
sales or the privilege of selling, however, for
they may be placed upon the purchase or use
of commodities, including services."
The varieties this elastic tax took in that
country is illustrated from the following passage from
the same author"Here, again, there is no standard usage, for
selected sales taxes are often called sales taxes,
i
)I
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
489
limited sales taxes, selective sales taxes, and
special sales taxes, while general sales taxes
may be called sales taxes, turnover taxes,
manufacturers' sales-taxes, retails sales-taxes
and gross receipts or gross income-taxes."
It was in the background of these laws of foreign
countries and the recommendations of the Taxation
Inquiry Committee that the entry in the Government
of India Act 1935 was framed. Taxes on the sale of
goods being a kind of commodity taxes had to be
demarcated from other commodity taxes like excise,
octroi, terminal tax, market dues etc. The difficulty
was solved by viewing the goods as the subject of
taxation in different stages. These stages were production, movement sale and consumption. Taxes on
production of goods which were excise proper were
given to the centre with certain exceptions (Entry 45
list I and Entry 40 of list II), taxes on sale of goods
were given to the Provinces (Entry 48 List II), while
taxes on movement of goods were divided-those
carried by railway and air being allotted to the centre
as terminal taxes {Entry 58 List I) and those carried
by inland waterways being allotted to the Provinces
(Entry 52 List II). Taxes on the entry of goods in
a local area for consumption, use or sale (octrois) were
allotted to the Provinces {Entry 49 List II). This
was the demacation of commodity taxes in addition
to local taxes for local purposes.
The two cases of the Federal Court to which
detailed reference has been made above outlined
the scope of competing entries relating to dutii;s of
excise and taxes on the sale of goods. It was pointed out that though there was an overlap the taxes
were different. In the recent case of The Automobile
Stare of
Transport (Rajasthan.) Ltd. v. The
Rajasthan ('). I have given the history of the distribution of the heads of revenue on the eve of the
Government of India Act 1935 and have there
(I) [1963] I s.c.R. 491.
1962
M/s. New India
Sugar Mills lid.
v.
Commissioner of
Salu Tu, Bihar
Hida,.i.llah, J.
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Ml'· Nno Indra
Sugar Mills ltd .
••
Commi11io111r of
Sal~s Tax, Bihar
Hida101uliah 1 J.
pointed out that the attempt was to give adequate
resources to the Provinces to enable Provincial
Governments to undertake nation-building activities.
It was there pointed out by me that expert:; at that
time were in favour of alloting an elastic tax like
sales-tax to the Provinces as the main source of
revenue and abolish altogether the category of
deficit Provinces and the subventions. It was ex·
pected that land revenue would have to be reduced
and income-tax could not be increased beyond
a point. The only tax that was new and fell im·
perceptibly upon consumers was the sales-tax and
it was allotted to the Provinces. It was expected
to be a very productive tax, an expectation which
has been amply fulfilled. In 1954-55, this tax alone
yielded about 60 crores and it has been even more
productive since.
The inroads upon the tax were many but
they were resisted in the pre-Constitution period
by the Provinces both in Courts and in administra·
tion. Indeed, appeals were made in cases before
the Federal Court, not to cut down unduly the
ambit of the natural words and Mr. Justice Jayakar
mentioned them in his judgment with sympathy.
I feel that what he said will bear repetition here : "A powerful appeal was made to us by the
Advocates-General of the Provinces that,
consistently with its terminology, we should
so interpret entry No.41 (List II) as to give
it a content sufficiently extensive for the grow·
ing needs of the Provinces. It was argued
that the provincial autonomy granted by the
new scheme of government would be unmeaning and empty, unless it was fortified by ade·
quatc sources of revenue. Whatever value such
an appeal may have in a judicial decision, I
personally appreciate it, and I feel no doubt
that the interpretation that I am placing on
I·
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
491
entry No. 48 (list II) is sufficiently practical
to leave an adequate source of revenue in the
hands of the Provinces without making inroads
on Central preserves. I may add here that
the several authors I have been able to consult
on this point agree in their opinion that, since
the War. a tax on the sale of goods has proved
to be both productive and practicable in many
countries, under circumstances not very different from those prevailing in the Provinces of
India. The yield naturally varies with the
scope and rates of the tax, business conditions
and administrative efficiency, but it is stated
that the tax itself has become a major source
of revenue in a number of countries, yielding
,, more than the income-tax in a few instances,
and nearly as much as other sources of revenue
in others." In re The , Central Provinces &:
Berar Act No. XIV of 1938 (').
The two cases of the Federal Court having
established the area of operation of entry No. 48 List
II in relation to the competing entry relating to
excise, the Provinces attempted to extend -the tax to
cover all situations. This was done by incorporating definitions of 'sale' which in some respects
were inconsistent with the definition in the Indian
Sale of Goods Act. The Taxation Enquiry
Commission (1953-54) gave in its
report an
analyses of how these definitions ran and I find
it convenient to quote from the report (page
10, para 24 Vol. III) :"In Madras, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin and
Hyderabad, sale means transfer of property
in the course of trade or business. By implecation, all other sales are excluded. Casual
sales by individuals, sales of food by hotles
attached educational institutions, sales of old
furniture, for example, by firms not dealing
(I) [1939] F .C.R, 19 ~t P• 119.
1962
M/s N1w Indio
Sugar Mills Ud.
y,
Commission1r of
Salu Ta.t, BU.•r
HidoJatullah, J.
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/s. N~w India
Sugar Miiis Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Soles Tax, Bihar
Hidayatollah. J.
in fumiture and so on are, therefore, not liable
for the tax in these States. The States of
Bengal and Delhi define sale as transfer of
property in goods for money consideration,
which accordingly excludes transfers for other
consideration like exchange or barter. According to the Acts of certain States, the Sale is
deemed to have taken place in the territory
of the State, if at the time when the contract
of sale or purchase was made, the goods were
actually in those States. In certain States,
the transfer of property in goods supplied in
the execution of.a contract is also included in
the definition of sale."
The definitions led to a variety of decisions on
the meaning of the word "sale" which were likely
to bewilder the common man. The Taxation Inquiry Commission summed up the situation in the
following words :"The layman who asks : "What is a sale"
would not have to go without an answer,
he would find plenty of replies in the reported
judgments of courts of law; and he would not
be a layman if, piecing them together, he was
able to say when, where and how a sale because
a sale which a sales tax may tax."
From the earliest times the extension of the
word "sale" was in three recognisable directions.
Firstly, the definition by a fiction took in transactions of sale in which the goods were produced in
the Provinces or were in the Province at the time
the contract of sale took place, no matter where
the contract could, in law, be said to have taken
place. In other words, by a fiction incorporated in
the definition of sale, the situs of sale could be
established in the Province. Secondly, forward
transactions in whid1 the pa~sing of property was
postponed to a future date, if at all it took place,
were included in the definition of "sale". Thirdly,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
493
materials in a works contract, where the bargain was
for a finished thing, were treated as the subject
matter of sale.
Laws in which transactions of sale were sought
to be taxed on the ground that goods were in the province or some part of the component elements of a
contract of sale took place in the
Province
were generally upheld by the High Courts. In
these cases the doctrine of nexus was extended to salestax legislation following the analogy of the
decision of the Privy Council in Wallace Brothers
etc. & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay. (1)
The cases recognised the sovereignty of Provincial
Legislatures which were erected by the British Parliament in its own image and which within the jurisdiction conferred by a legislative entry enjoyed powers
as large and ample as those of the British Parliament.
It was generally held that in the Plenitude of that
power it was open to the Provincial Legislatures to
tax transactions of sale in which there was a sufficient
nexus between the Province and the taxable event
namely the sale, and that the Provincial law could
by a finction bring the whole transaction into the
Province for purposes of tax.
The Supreme Court also took substantially the
same view in the State of Bombay v. The United
:Motors Ltd.,('); Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State
of Bihar {8 ); Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bihar (') and Commissioner of Sales-tax v.
Husenali (').
The meaning of the world 'sale' in the Entry
was laid down in several cases but I shall refer to
In Poppatlal v. State of
only one of them.
j)fadras, {6) Venkatarama Ayyar, J., (Rajamannar,
C. J. concurring) observed as follows :
"The word 'sale' has both a legal and a
popular sense. In the legal sense it imports
(I) [\9481 F.C.R. I P.C.
•31 (1952] 2 S.C·R. 603.
(5) [1959J Supp. 2 s.c.R. 102.
(2) [1953) S.C.R. 1069.
(4' [19581 s.c.R. 1355.
(6) A.I.R. (1953) Mad. 91.
1961
M/t. New India
Sugar Af;/ls Ltd.
v.
Grimm in iontr of
Salu Tax, Bihar
l/i,/avatullah, J,
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M fs N~w India
Sugar Mills Ltd.
v.
CommisJion1r of
Salts Ta, Bihar
HidaJotullah, J.
passing of property in the goods.
In its
popular sense it signifies the transactions which
results in the passing of property. To a lawyer
the legal sense would appear to be the correct
one to be given to the word in the Sales Tax ·
Act. That is the conception which is familiarised in the provisions of Sale of Goods Act.
If one leaves out of account sales tax legislation
which is of. comparatively recent origin, questions relating to sale of goods usually come up
before the Courts only in connection with disputes between the sellers and purchasers. If the
goods perish, on whom is the loss to fall ? If
the purchaser becomes insolvent before payment of price can the goods be claimed by the
trustee in bankruptcy?
For deciding these and similar questions
it is necessary to determine at what point of
time the property in goods passed to the
purchaser. Sometimes when the point for
determination is as to jurisdiction of Courts to
entertain suits based on contract, it may be
material to consider where property in the goods
passed, that being part of the cause of action.
These being the questions which arc accustomed to be debated in connection with sale of
goods, it is natural that· a lawyer should, as a
matter of first impression approach the question
of sale under the Sales Tax Act with the same
concept of a sale. But if the matter is further
considered it will be seen that considerations
which arise under the Sales Tax.Act are altogether different from those which arise under
the Sale of Goods Act.
The object of the Sales Tax Act is to
impose a tax on all sales and it is a tax imposed on the occasion of sale ............ So far as
the Government is concerned, it would be
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
immaterial at which point of time property in
the goods actually passed from the se lier to the
buyer. Of course, there must be a completed
sale before tax can be levied and there would
be a completed sale when property passes.
That is the scope of the definit10n of 'sale· in
section 2 (h). But when once there is a completed sale, the question when property passed
in the goods would be a matter of no concern
or consequence for purposes of the Sales Tax
Act. The Government is interested only in
collecting tax due in respect of the sale and the
only fact about which it has to satisfy itself is
whether the sale took place within the
Province of Madras. In this context the popular meaning of the word is the more natural
and there is good reason for adopting it ........ .
Our conclusion accordingly is that the word
'sale' in the Madras General Sales Tax Act
must be understood in a popular sense and
sales tax can be levied under the Act if the
transaction substantially takes place within this
Province, notwithstanding that the property in
the goods does not pass within the State."
Against the decision of the High Court of
l\fadras an appeal was filed in this Court and the
judgment of this Court is reported in [1953]
S.C.R. 677. The appeal was allowed. On the
question of territorial nexus this Court agreed with
the Madras High Court but on the question of the
meaning of the word 'sale' it expressed itself differently. In an earlier case (State of Travancore Cochin
v. The Bombay Co. Ltd. (')), this Court had reserved
the question whether the word 'sale' had the same
meaning as in the law relating to the sale of goods or
a wider meaning. In Poppatlal Shah's case (') the
Supreme Court, referred to the decision of the
Madras High Court that the word was used in a
popular sense and without any expression of
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 1112.
(2) A.I.R. (1953) Mad. 91.
1962
M / s N1rn Tntli11
Su1ar Mills Ltd.
v.
Commission1r of
Salis Tax, Bihar
Hidayalullah, J.
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/s N!w lnrlia
Suga' Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissio1. tr of
Salts T t.JX, Bihar
lliJayal11llah, J,
disapproval held that there was no indication of the
popular meaning of sale in the definition in the
Madras General Sales Tax Act where unmistakably
stress was laid 'on the element of transfer of property
in a sale and no other.' The Bench held that the
presence of goods within the province at the time of
the contract would have made the sale, if subsequently
completed, a sale within the province by reason of
the Explanation added by Act XXV of 1947 but as
the Explanation was not in operation during the relevant period the assessment of sale tax was held to be
illegal and unwarranted by the law as it then stood.
It would appear from this that this Court took
the view that the word 'sale' in the entry "Taxes on
the sale of goods" was used in a sense wider than
that commonly accepted in the law relating to sale of
goods, and the judgment ofVenkatarama Ayyar, J.,
in the Madras High Court on this part was not
questioned. Then came a decision of the Allahabad
High Court from which an appeal was brought 10
this Court. The judgment of this Court is reported in
the Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs Budh
Prakash Jai Prakash (1). The definition of the word
'sale' in the U.P. Sales Tax Act (XV of 1948) inclu·
ded 'forward contracts', and this part of the definition
was declared nltra vires entry 48 in List I of the
Government of India Act 1935 and Explanation Ill to
section 2 (h) of that Act which provided that forward
contract "shall be deemed to have been completed
on the date originally agreed upon for delivery and
also section 3-B taxing turnover of dealers in respect
of transactions of forward contracts were also declared
ultra vires. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., speaking for
this Court held that under the statute law of England
and also of India there was a well-recognised distinction between "sales" and "agreement to sell" though
they were grouped under the generic name of
"contract of sale." The distinction, it wa~ pointed out,
lay in the tramfer of property which, if simultaneous
UJ [t955J t s.c.R. 2f3.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
with agreement, made for a sale, but if in the
future, operated only for an agreement to sell. In
the latter case property could only pass as required
by section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act. Relying on
the obsrrvation of Benjamin on Sale that-
"ln order to constitute a 8ale there must be :
(I) An agreement to sell, by which alone
the property does not pass; and
(2) an actual 8ale, by which the property
passes,"
the learned judge observed that though the definition
of a contract of sale included a mere agreement to
sell as well as an actual sale, there was a distinction
between the two which led to different remedies and
entry No. 48 when it spoke of'sale' meant a completed
sale involving transfer of title. The question whether
the legislature in the exercise of its sovereign powers
for purposes of taxing the event of sale could treat a
sale as complete when there was a final agreement
for purchase and sale even though price was not paid
was apparently not mooted before this Court.
Emphasis was laid on the definition of 'turnover' as
'the aggregate of the proceeds of sale by a dealer' and
it was pointed out that there could be no aggregate
of prices unless the stage had been reached when the
selfer could recover the price under the contract, it
being well-settled in the law under the sale of goods
that "an action for price is maintainable only when
there is a sale involving transfer of the property in
the goods to the purchaser" and that "where there is
only an agreement to sell, then the remedy of the
seller is to sue for damages for breach of contract and
not for the price of the goods". The exceptional
circumstance when under an agreement between the
parties the price is payable on a day certain irrespective of deli very was considered not material for the
purpose of the discumon.
1962
M11. N1w /•dill
Su1•r MUl1 Lid.
••
C-miaiore1r of
Sclu T ... Bi/uw
llid.yolallo!t, J.
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP.
1962
M/t N<w Ind;a
Sugar Mills Ud.
v.
CommUsioner of
Salis Tax. Bihar
Hiday•tulloh, J.
In these cases by the application of the legislative practice relating to sale of goods the meaning of
the expression "taxes on sale of goods" was determined and future contracts in which delivery and
payment of price were deferred were held to be outside the purview of the Entry. There can hardly be
any doubt that the entry is concerned with a completed sale because it is only a 'sale' which can be
taxed and not anything which is short of a sale and
if a transaction which is sought to be taxed .is merely
in the region of an agreement de futuro there is no
taxable event. The opinion that if there be a completed sale then the law dealing with taxation would
be indifferent whether price was paid or not expressed by Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in PoppaUal Shah's
case(') of the Madras High Court was not accepted.
Then came the third batch of cases. This
batch was concerned with the taxing of materials
which were supplied and used as part of building or
repair operations, like bricks, timber and fittings in
buildings girders, beams, rails etc. in bridges, spare
parts in repair of motar -vehicles etc. Two distinct
views were held by the High Courts. The Madras
High Court in sub nom Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v.
State of Madras (') held that such transactions did
not involve a sale of goods and there could be no tax.
A contrary view was expressed in Pandit Banarsidas
v. State of ~Madhya Pradesh (1 ) where it was held
that such contract~ involved both labour as well as
materials and in as much a;; materials were goods
and property in them passed, it was within the competence of the Provincial legislatures to separate the .
sale of goods from the composite and entire transac·tions and to tax them. It was pointed out that
legislative practice in relation to the Sale of Goods
Act was not conclusive, and though it could not be
doubted that a limited legislature could not create a
power for itself which did not flow from an entry,
the entry itself must be given the widest amplitude
(1) A.I.R. (1953) Mad 91.
(2) (1954) 5 S.T.C. 216.
(S) (1955) 6 S.T .C. 93.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
possible and its scope shl)u)d not be cut down by anything not found in the Constitution Act l 935. It
was, therefore, concluded :--
...
"The text being explicit, the text is conclusive
alike in what it directs and what it prohibits.
The necessary conditions for the impost, however, were that there should be a sale of goods.
The selection of the taxable event and the
severance of transactions of sale from other
transactions in which they might be embedded
was a necessary part of the power. The legislature could not say that a contract of service
amounted to a sale of services (goods) but it
could tax a genuine transaction of sale of goods
whatever form it took."
x
x
x
x
x
"If a building contract was not split up into
its component parts, that is to say, material
and labour, in legislative practice relating to
the ordinary regulation of sale of goods there
is no warrant for holding that it could not be so
split up even for purposes of taxation."
S:ime High Courts accepted the decisi0n in
Gannon Dunkerley's ca,~e and some others the decision
in Pandit Banarsidas's case.('), In all these cases
there were appeals to this Court. All these apeals
were heard together. The leading judgment was
delivered in Gannon Dunkerley's case. The Madras
view was accepted and the view expressed in Pandit
Banarsidas's case(') was not accepted. It is contended for the appellants that this view of the
Supreme Court controls the present case and it is,
therefore, necessary to follow the reasoning in some
detail. Before I do so I shall refer to a case of the
House of Lords which influenced in no small measure
the decision of this Court. That case is Kirkness v.
John Hudson&: Co. Ltd. (').
i 1) (,•955) 6 S.T.C. 93.
f2) (1955) A.O. 696.
1962
M/r. New India
SugaT Mills ltd.
••
Commirsim11 o,f
Soles TQJ(, Bihor
Hid•yalul/ah, J.
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/1 .Ntw Indio
Sugar Mills Ltd.
v.
Commission1r of
Salis Tox, Bilutr
Hit/9atullah, J.
Under section 29 of the Transport Act 1947
(10 & 11 Geo. C.49) the company's railway wagons
were vested on January 1, 1948, in the British
Transport Commission. These wagons were already
under requisition to the "Ministry of Transport under
the powers contained in Regulation 53 of the Defence
\General) Regulations, 1939. Later the company
received compensation. This amount was higher
than the written down value. A balancing charge
of £ 29,021 was made under section 17 of the
Income-tax Act, 1945 (8 & 9 Geo. 6 C. 32) in an
assessment under clause I of schedule D to the
Income-tax Act, 1918. The company appealed
against the balancing charge and sncceeded.
Section 17 (l} of the Income-tax Act 1915 (which
in its purport resembled section 10 (2) (vii) of the
Indian Income-tax Act (1922) ordained that a
balancing charge or allowance should be made if
certain events occured, one such event being "(a) the
machinery or plant is sold, whether still in use or
not". The question was whether there was such a
'sale' justifying a balancing charge. It was contended
for the Revenue that the word sale had a wider
meaninP; than a contract and a conveyance of property and that in its legal meaning it did not involve
a contract at all but just the transfer of the property
in or ownership of something from A to B for a
money price, whether voluntary or affected by
operation of law or compulsory. Passages were
cited from Benjamin on sale (2nd Edn. p. 1),
Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd Edn. vol. xxi p.5),
Blackstones Commentaries 19th Edn. (1836) vol. II
p. 446, and Chalmer's Sale of Goods( 11th Edn. p. 161)
to ·show that a bargain only shows a mutual assent
but it is the transfer of pnperty which is the actual
sale. Analogy of Lands Clauses Consolidation
Act 1845, Stamp Act and other Acts was invoked and
later Finance Acts were also called in aid where
such compulsory transactions were described as sale
or purchase. The House of Lords by a majority of
-
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
4 to 1 overruled these contentions. It was held that
the vesting of the wagons in the Transport Commission by operation of section 29 of the Transport
Act and the payment of compensation in the shape
of transport stock did not constitute a sale and the
analogy of compulsory . acquisition of land did not
apply, since the procedure there was entirely different.
The word 'sale' ins. 17 of the Income-tax Act 1945,
it was held, imported a consensual relation and the
meaning of the section being plain, it was not possible
to go to later Acts to construe the section. I shall
quote a few passages from the speeches to show how
this conclusion was reached so as to be able to show
how the same reasoning was used in connection with
the building CPntracts.
Viscount Simonds pointed out that what was
to be construed were the two words 'is sold' in
section 17 (1) (a) of the Income-tax Act 1945, that
there was nothing in the Act to give a special colour
or meaning to the words and that analogous transactions could net help ·to decide that should be the
meaning. Agreeing with Singleton L. J. where he
said-"what would anyone accustomed to the use of
the words 'sale' or 'sold' answer ? It seems to me
that everyone must say "Hudsons di~ not sell,"
Viscount Simonds went on to say : "When Benjamin said in the passa~e quoted
by Singleton and Birkett. JJ., from his wellknown book on sale, 2nd. ed.p.l, that by the
common law a sale of personal property was
·usually termed a 'bargain and sale of goods'
he was by the use of the word 'bargain'
perhaps unconsciously emphasizing that the
consensual relation which the word 'bargain'
imports is a necessary element in the concept.
In this there is nothing new, the same principle
·is exhibited in the. Roman Law, for the opening
words of Title 23 .of the third book ·of the
1962
M /s. N1w India
Suga•· Mill.s Ud.
••
Commissitnur of
Saks Tu, Bihur
Hidayotu'lah,J.
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP.
1962
M/s. New India
Sugur Mills lAd.
v.
Commissi,mer of
Sales Tax, Bihar
Hid«yatullah, J.
Institutes of Justinian "De Emptione et
venditione" are "emptio et venditio contrahitur
simulatque de pretio convenerit" ......sometimf's
the contract for sale is itself the sale, as so
often in the sale of goods : sometimes, and
particularly in the sale of land, it is regarded
as a part of the sale as, for example, when it is
said by a modern writer that "the first step
in the sale of land is the contract for sale (see
Cheshire, Modern Real Property 7th Ed.p.631).
But it is immaterial whether the contract is
regarded as the sale itself, or as a part of it, or
a step in, the sale or as a prelude to the sale :
t!1ere is for the present purpose no substance in
any such distinction. The core of it is that the
consensual relation is connoted by the simple
word 'sale' ".
Lord Reid also emphasised the consensual
relation in 'sale' as it~ vital element and observed :" 'Sale' is, in my opinion, a uomen juris, it is
the name of a particular consensual contract.
The law with regard to sale of chattels or
corporeal movables is now embodied in· the
Sale of Goods Act, 1893. By section 1 (I)
"A contract of sale of Goods is a contract
whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer
the property in goods to the buyer for money
consideration, called the price," and by
section 1 (3) : "where under a contract of sale
the property in the goods is transferred from the
seller to the buyer the contract is called a sale;
but where the transfer of the property in the
goods is to take place at a future time or subject
to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled the
contract is called an agreement to sell." As
a contract of sale, as distinct from an agreement to sell and unlike other contracts,
operates by itself and without delivery to
transfer the property in the thing sold, the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREMECOURT REPORTS
503
word "sale" connotes both a contract and a
conveyance or transfer of property."
Lord Reid agreed "that 'sale' is a word which
has become capable in an appropriate context of
having a meaning wider than its ordinary and r,orrect
meaning. But it is only permissible to give to a
word some meaning other than its ordinary meaning
if the context so requires". Lord Tucker in agreeing
observed:"I feel that the answers must be that the word
is unambiguous and denotes a transfer of property in the chattel in question by one person
to another for a price in money as the result
of a contract express or implied. This is in
substance the definition of "sale" given in the
second edition ·of Benjamin on sale, but for
present purposes it is sufficient to emphasize
that natural assent is an essential element in
the transaction. It is no doubt true that the
contract or agreement to sell may precede the
formal instrument or act of delivery under
which the property passes but to describe a
transfer of property in a chattel which takes
place without the consent of transferor and
transfer as a sale wou Id seem to me a misuse
of language. By express enactment or by necessary implication from the context any word
may be given a meaning different from or
wider than that which it ordinarily bears, and
this may apply to the word "sale" where it
appears in a context relating to the process of
• . • ofl and ........ . "
compuIsory acqms1tion
I do not find it necessary to quote from the
minority view of Lord Morton of Henryton but he
did point out that the word 'sale' for 100 years was
being used in connection with transactions by which
the property of A had been transferred to B, on
payment of compensation to the owner but without
1962
M/s. N1w India
Sugar .\!ills Ltd.
v •.
Commission1r of
Salts T aJt, Bihar
Hid<!Jalullali, J.
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1961
M/1. Ntw lntlia
Su1ar Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissionlf of
&111 Tu, BiMr
Hid•JOtult.h, J,
the consent of the owner and said of the question
posed by Singleton L. J. that if it were put to ten
persons unconnected with the company, five of them
might say "No, the wagons were taken over under
the Transport Act" and the other five might say,
"yes", adding, possibly, "but it was a compulsory
sale" or "because they had to do it".
I have paused long over this case but only
because the line of rea8oning of this case has been
closely followed in Gannon Dunkerley's case. The
decision of the Court of Appeal, later approved by
the House of Lords, had also influenced in a large
measure the decision of the Madras High Court
earlier in the same case.
In Ganncm Dunkerley's case Venkatarama
Aiyar, J., posed the question thus :-
"The sole question for determination in this
appeal is whether the provisions of the Madras
General Sales Tax Act are ultra vires, in so far
as t.hey seek to impose a tax on the supply of
materials in execution of work$ contract,
treating it as a sale of goods by the contractor
and the answer to it must depend on the meaning to be given to the words "sale of goods" in
Entry 48 in List II of Sch. VII of the Government of India Act, 1935."
His Lordship accepted that building materials
were 'goods' in view of the definition and narrowed
the inquiry to whether there was "a sale of those
materials within the meaning of that word in Entry
48." The learned judge then pointed out that in
interpreting a Constitution a liberal spirit should
inspire courts and the widest amplitude must be
given to the legislative entries and they should not
be cut down by resort to legislative practice and
that subjects of taxation in particular should be
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
taken in rerum natura irrespective of previous laws
on the subject. The learned judge next asked the
question in what sense the words 'sale of goods'
were used, ''Whether popular or legal, and what its
connotation is either io the one sense or the other."
After noticing meanings of "sale" as given by divars
authors, it was laid. down that it meant transfer of
property in a thing from one person to another for
a money price. It was next pointed out that in
popular sense a sale "is said to take place when the
bargain is settled between the parties, though property in the goods may not pass at that stage" and
the observations of Sankey, J., (later Viscount Sankey
L. C.) . in. Nevile Riid. & Oo. Ltd. v. 0. I. R. {')
that the words 'sale' in. the British Finance Act, 1918,
should not be construed in the light of the Sale
of Goods Act, ..1893 but in a commercial and business
~=io:r:{~~ecq,~aS~oc;:paa:z~l axe~: c:e ~·)
and . Budh '''P,rolca'fh'8 ,. ca8e {1) where "executory
agreements" were .ri&t : held to be sales within the
Entry. It
obsifved-1'We must . accordingly
hole that the expfys8fon 'sale of goods' in Entry 48
cannot be. consUV:ed. . ·~·· ~ts popular sense and that. it
must be mterpreted m 1ts' legal sense. What its
connotation in ·that' sense is must now be ascertained.
For a correct deterinination .it is necessary to digress
somewhat into the evolution of the law relating to
sale of goods".
was
The learned judge next referred to Roman Law
of emptio venditio and pointed out that the consideration of sale could not be anything but only money
or something valuable and that it was so recorded in
the Institutes of Justinian Title XXIII and that
Emptio Ve'llllitio was a consensual contract. The
learned judge next referred to Benjamin on sale and
observed that according to that learned author to
constitute a valid sale there must be a concurrence
(I) (1927) 12 T.x. Cas. 545.
(2) A.I.R. (1953) Mad. 93,
csJ (1955) 1 s.c.R. 243.
1962
M /s N1w lodia
Su1•r Milli Ltd.
••
Commi1riolur of
Yalu Ta, Biluu
Hidayawl/al, J.
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
M/1 Ntm India
Sugar Mills Ltd
v.
Commissiontr of
Salis Tu, Bihar
Hidayatullah, J.
of the following elements vis : "( l) Parties competent to contract; (2) mutual
assent; (3) a thing, the absolute or general
property in which is transferred from the seller
to the buyer; and (4) a price in money paid or
promised." (Vide 8th edn. p. 2)
"In 1893 the Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57
Viet. c. 71 codified the law on the subject, and
s. 1 of the Act which embodied the rules
of the common law runs as follows :
1.-(1) "A contract of sale of goods is a
contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees
to transfer the property in goods to the buyer
for a money consideration, called the price.
There may be a contract of sale between one
part owner and another.
(2) A contract of sale may be absolute
or .conditional.
(3) Where under a contract of sale the
property in the goods is transferred from the
seller to the buyer the contract is called a
sale; but where the transfer of the property in
the goods is to take place at a future time
or subject to some condition thereafter to be
fulfilled the contract is called an agreement
to sell.
(4) An agreement to sell becomes a
sale when the time elapses or the conditions
are fulfilled subject to which the property in
the goods is to be transferred."
It was then pointed out that in section 77 of
the Indian Contract Act 1872 sale was defined as
"the exchange of property for a price involving the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
transfer of ownership of the thing sold from seller
to buyer". It was then held that in view of the
scheme of the Indian Contract Act sections 1-75
a bargain was an essential element and that even
after the Indian Sale of Goods Act the position had
not changed. It was next pointed out that "Thus,
if merely title to the goods passed but not as a result
of any contract between the parties, express or
implied, there is no sale. So also if the consideration for transfer was not money !:mt other valuable
consideration, it may then be exchange or barter
but not sale. And if under the contract of sale,
title to the -goods has not passed, then there is an
agreement to sell and not a completed sale". The
State in the case urged four points to resist the conclusion that the words "sale of goods" in Entry 48
must be interpreted in the sense which they bear in
the Indian Sale of Goods Act 1930. These contentions were examined seriatum and rejected and it
was concluded thus :"To sum up, the expression "sale of
goods" in Entry 48 is a nomen juris, its essential
ingredients being an agreement to sell
movables for a price and property passing
therein pursuant to that agreement. In a
building contract which is, as in the present
case, one entire and indivisible-and that is
its norm, there is no sale of goods, and it is
not within the competence of the Provincial
Legislature under Entry 48 to impose a tax on
the supply of the materials used in such a con·
tract treating it as a sale."
In so far as building contracts were concerned
two reasons why there could not be a sale of goods
were mentioned. The first was that there was no
agreement express or implied to sell 'goods'. It was
observed:" ............••.We are concerned here with a
building contract, and in the case of such a
1962
M/s. Ntw India
SugM Mills Ltd.
v.
Commi.uio•1r of
Salis Tex_ Bihar
Hila:rJtullalo, J.
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1961
M/1. Ntw India
Sugor Mills ltd.
v.
ConemW iOlllf of
Salu Ta.-, Bihar
Hidar•tulloli, J,
contract, the theory that it can be broken up
into its component parts and as regards one of
them it can be said that there is a sale must
fail both on the grounds that there is no agreement to sell materials as such, and that property in them does not pass as movables."
The second reason was that the property in the
building materials does not pass in the materials
regarded as 'goods' but as part of immovable property. It was observed :"When the work to be executed is, as in the
present case, a house, the construction imbedded on the land becomes an accretion to it on
the principle quicquid Planwtur solo, solo cedit
and it vests in the other party not as a result
of the contract but as the owner of the land."
I shall refer to two other cases which were
decided with Gannon Dunkerley's case. In Pandit
Banarasi Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1) it was
observed at page 437.
"It should be made clear, however, in accorc' ance with what we have already stated, that
the prohibition against imposition of tax is only
in respect of contracts which are single and
indivisible and not of contracts which are a
combination of distinct contracts for sale of
materials and for work, and that nothing that
we have said in this judgment shall bar the
sales tax authorities from deciding whether a
particular contract falls within one category or
the other and imposing a tax on the agreement
of sale of materials, where the contract belongs
to the latter category."
In lliithanlal v. Sf-ate of Delhi(') from a composite transaction involving work and materials, the
(I) [19591 s.c.R. 427.
(2) [1959] s.c.R. ff5.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
materials were held liable to sales tax under a law
made by Parliament for a Part C State. This was
held to fall within the residuary powers of Parliament without any specific reference to any particul:i.r
entry or entries in Legislative Lists. I shall now
proceed to discuss the facts of the present case in
relation to the decisions on Entry 48 of List II,
Seventh Schedule of the Government of India
Act 1935.
Before considering the facts of this case in the
light of the Sugar and Sugar Products Order 1946,
I shall summarise what I have said so far. Sales tax
is a tax which may be laid on goods or services. It
assumes numerous shapes and forms. It is a modern
tax being the product of the First World War. The
concept of 'sale' is of course much older and even the
English Sale of Goods Act 1893 on which our own
statute is based, was prior to the first imposition of
tax in modem times. In India, the tal!'. was first
levied in 1937 under laws made under entry No. 48
which read-"Taxes on the sale of goods". It was
introduced as the main source of revenue to the
Provinces under a scheme of Provincial Autonomy.
Being a commodity tax it came into competition with
other commodity taxes like excise but it was hdd
that the entry comprised, wholesale, retail and turnover taxes from the stage of manufacture or production to consumption. Later textual interpretation
based on statutes relating to sale of goods and books
on the subject of sale, pointed out intrinsic limitations.
One such limitation was that the term 'sale' was
used in the limited sense it bears in that part of the
law of contract which is now incorporated in the S?le
of Goods Act. As a result of this fundamental consideration 'forward contracts' were held to be outside
the scope of the Entry. The sale, it was held, had
to be a completed sale with passing of property before
the tax could become payable. A further limitation
was pointed out in certain cases relating to building
1962
M/• 11,.. frttlio
..
~"I'" Mills Ltd.
CommissioMr of
Sain Tu, Bihar
Hitlo1ot111loli, J.
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
M /s NIW l•dio
Mills Lid.
v.
s.,.,
Commiuion11 of
Salis Ta, Bih4r
Hiday•tull.Ii, J,
contracts in which it was held that though property
in materials passed, it did so without an agreement,
express or implied, in that behalf, and only when the
materials ceased to be goods and became immovable
property. It was held that the supremacy of the
Provincial Legislatures did not extend to levying a
tax on sales in these circumstances by modifying the
definition of sale. It was however held that if the
parties agreed to divide a works contract into labour
plus materials, the tax might be leviable. It was
also held that a tax on building materials was
leviable by the legislature having power to levy a
tax not expressly mentioned. It was, however, held
that if the taxing Province had the goods at the time
of the contract or there was other substantial connection with the contract by reason of some element
having taken place there, the Legislature could
validly make a law which treated the whole transaction as having taken place in the Province.
The argument in this case is that the tax can
only be placed upon a transaction of sale which is
the result of mutual assent between the buyer and
seller and observations in Gannon Dunkerley' s case
where stress is laid upon the consensual aspect of
'sale' are relied upon. It is true that consent makes
a contract of sale because sale is one of the four
consensual contracts recognised from early times.
"Consensu fiunt oblig::itiones in emptionibua
venditionibus" and "ldeo autem istis modis consensu
dicimus obligationes contrahi". But consent may be
express or implied and it cannot be said that unless
the offer and acceptance are there in an elementary
form there can be no taxable sale. The observations
in Gannan Dvnkerley's case were made in connection
with materials utilised in the construction of buildings, roads, bridges etc. It was there pointed out
that there must at least be an agreement between the
parties, express or implied, in respect of some 'goods'
as 'goods' and the levy of the tax on building
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
materials was struck down because "there is no agreement to sell materials as such, and that property in
them does not pass as movables."
The commodity with which we are concerned
is sugar and it is delivered as sugar. Thus one part
of the reasoning from Gannon Diinkerley's case
which rested on the passing of property in building
materials as a part of realty does not apply. It is
also quite clear that the tax is being demanded afcer
the sugar has changed hands or expressing it in legal
phrase when property in it has passed. It is argued
that by reason of the Control Order there was no
bargaining. It is polnted out that the control of
sugar operated to fix ex-factory price, to determine
who should be the supplier and who should receive
the supply, to fix the quantity, quality and the time
of delivery. The question which we are deciding i•
not a question arising under the Sale of Goods Act
but under a taxing entry in a Constitution. The
entry described a source of revenue to the Provinces.
The Provincial Legislature made its laws taxing sales
of commodities like sugar. In a period of emergency
the Federal Government imposed certain controls to
regulate prices and supplies. This control involved
a permit system under which every Province had to
indent its requirements to the Controller and every
sugar mill had to inform the Controller of the existing and future stocks. What the Controller did was
to permit a particular mill to supply sugar of a stated
quality and quantity to a named Province. The
mill then had to send the sugar on pain of prosecution and forfeiture and receive price according to the
fixed rates. Bargaining, it is said, was not possible
but bargaining in the sense of offer and acceptance
may be express or implied. That after the permit
was obtained the two parties agreed to 'sell' and
'purchase' sugar admits of no doubt.
I shall now analyse the whole transaction and
see how the element of compulsion and control affect
1962
Mf1. Ntw /111/UJ
Sugar Mills Ltd.
v.
Commiuion•r of
Salts Tll.l', Bihar
Hitloro1ullah, J.
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP.
1962
M/s Ntw Indio
Sugar Mills Lid.
v.
Commissionir of
Salu Tax, Bihar
HidaJotulloh, J.
the existence of a sale. First there is the fixation of
price by the Controller. Can it be said that there is
no sale because the price is fixed by a third person
and not by the buyer and seller. This is the old contro·
versy between Labeo and Proculus that if price is
fixed by a third person a contract of sale results or
not. Labeo with whom Cassius agreed, held that
there was not, while Proculus was of the contrary
opinion:
"Pretium autem certum esse debet. nam
alioquin si its inter nos convenerit, ut quanti
Titius rem aestemasuerit, tanti sit empta, Labeo
negavit ullam uim hoc negotium habere, cuius
opinionem Cassius probat. Ofilius et earn emptionem et uenditionem cuius opinionem
(Gaius III, 140).
Proculus secutus est."
This was solved by.Justinian holding that there
was:
"Sed nostra decisio its hoc constituit."
(Inst. III, 23, 1)
I do not think the modern law is any different.
So long as the parties trade under controls at fixed
price and accept these as any other law of the realm
because they must, the contract is at the fixed price
both sides having or deemed to have agreed to such a
price. Consent under the law of contract need not
be expres! it can be implied. The-re are cases in
which a sale takes place by the operation of law
rather than by mutual agreement express or implied.
See Benjamin on Sale (8th Edn. p. 91). The present
is just another example of an implied contract with
an implied offer and implied acceptance by the
parties. What I have said about price applies also
10 quantity and quality. The entry in No. 48 of
List II Seventh Schedule dealt with sale of goods in
all its forms. We have seen above how numerous
are these forms. · The entry was expressed in six
simple words but was meant to include a power to
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
tax sale of goods in all its forms. It was not meant
to operate only in those elementary cases where there
is i:.n offer by A and an acceptance by B with the
price as consideration. The concept of taxes on sale
of goods is more complicated and the relations of
people do not always take elementary forms. When
the Province after receiving the permit telegraphed
intructions to despatch sugar and the mill desJ?atched
it, a contract emerged and consent must be implied
on both side's though not expressed antecedently to
the permit. The indent of the Province was the offer
to purchase sugar of such and such quality and
quantity. The mills by quoting their stocks offered
to sell sugar. The controller brought the seller and
purchaser together and gave them his permission
with respect to a particular quantity aud quality.
There was thus an implied contract of sale in the
words of the Digest (XII, 1, IX, 4)
"Si cui libera universorum negotiorum adminis·
tratio a domino permissa fuerit, isque ex hie
negotiis rem vendiderit et tradiderit facit earn
accipicntis."
No doubt, there is compulsion in both selling
and buying, perhaps more for the milJs than for the
Provinces. But a compelled sale is nevertheless a sale
as was held by the House of Lords in New Castle
Breweries v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (1927)
96 L.J.K.B. 735. The case in Kirkness v. John
lludson ,(:Go . .T;v.t, was different because the section
there interpreted required a 'sale' and there was 110
sale express or implied when the wagons were taken
away and compensation was paid in the shape of
transport stock. There a sale in its ordinary forms
was obviously meant though it was recognised that
'sale' in other context has other meanings.
It was argued that there must be mutuality.
That one party must be free to offer and must offer
and the other side must be free to accept and must
1962
M /s N1w Indio
Sugar Mills Lid.
v.
CnmmUsion1r of
Solis Tax, Bihar
Hidapatul/ah, J.
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M/1N,,,, lniia
s,,,ar Millt Lttl.
...
OontmissiM1r of
Sdl1s Tcu, Bilr2r
Hiday.,ult.h, J.
accept the offer before a sale can be said to arise.
But sales often take place without volition of a party.
A sick man is given medicines under the orders of his
doctor and pays for them to the chemist with tax on
the price. He does not even know the names of the
medicines. Did he make an offer to the chemist from
his sick bed ? The affairs of the world are very com·
plicated and sales are not always in their elementary
forms. Due .to short supply or maldistribution of
goods, controls have to be imposed. There are permits,
price controls, rationing and shops which are licensed.
Can it be said that there is no sale because mutuality is lost on one account or another ? It was not
said in the Tata Iron and Steel case (1) which was a
case of control, that there was no sale. The entry
should be interpreted in a liberal spirit and not cut
down by narrow technical considerations. The entry
in other words should not be shorn of all its content
to leave a mere husk of legislative power. For the
purposes of legislation such as on sales tax it is only
necessary to see whether there is a sale express or
implied. Such a sale was not found in "forward
contracts" and in respect of materials used in building
contracts. But the same cannot be said of all situa·
tions. I for one would not curtail the entry any
further. The entry has its meaning and within its
meaning there is a plenary power. If a sale express
or implied is found to exist then the tax must follow.
I am of the opinion that in these transactions there
was a sale of sugar for a price and the tax was payable. I would, therefore, dismiss these appeals with
costs.
BY Cou&T: Having regard to the judgment of
the majority, all these appeals(Nos. 237 and 633-636
of 1961) would be allowed with costs-one hearing
fee.
(I) (1958] S.O.R; 1355,
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