MUNICIPAL BOARD, PUSHKAR versus STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, RAJASTHAN AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 November 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 373 | 1962 INSC 338
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 November 1962
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 332/1962
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 373
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 338
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
373
MUNICIPAL BOARD, PUSHKAR
1962
H...,.btr, 21.
v.
STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
RAJASTHAN AND ORS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS Gul"l.'A and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, lJ.)
Mawr Vehicles-Order of Regional TraMporl Aulliority
shifting bus st.and-Ret•ision-Limitation-Mott>r Vehi<le& Act,
1939 (4 of 11139), s.•. 64A, 68, 76, !ll(Z)-Rajasthan Motor
Vekic!P.s Rules, 1955, r. 134-Constitution of India, Art. 142.
The Municipal Board of Pushkar paS!Cd a resolution on
May 24, 1948, for the shifting of the bus stand on the sacred
lake to another site near the Police Station where it resolved to
construct a passenger shed and provide other facilities for the
pilgrims. The Regional Transport Authority by a resolution
dated December 3/4, 1959, accrpted the suggestion and issued
a public notification to that effect on June 28, 1960. Long
before the notification, two residents of Pushkar moved the
State Transport Authority under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles
Act for revision of the decision of the Regional Transport
Authority dated December 3/4, 1959, changing the bus stand
but that application was rejected on February 18, 1960. Another
petition for the revision of the same orders under the same
section was moved by certain bus operaton on April 13, 1960.
The State Transport Authority on January 6, 1961, allowed
that application, reversed the decision of the Regional Transport Authority of December 3/~, 1959, and directed that the
old bus stand should continue. The Municipal Board moved
the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution against this
order of State Transport Authority. The High Court rejected
the application. The Board appealed to this f'..ourt by special
leave. I ts case was that the order of the Regional Transport
Authority changing the bus stand wa• made under 1. 76 of the
Motor Vehicles/Act and, therefore, was not open to revision,
that the revision applicatfon was barred by limitation and that
the first revision application having been rejected the second did
not lie inasmuch as on the rejection of the first, the Regional
Transport Authority's order ceased to exist having merged itJ
the State Transport Authority's order.
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
MunUi~l ...,,,
l'ush#.:ar
v.
Sl•I• TrlfM/WI
.4.uthorih,
R•jatho11
Held (per curiam), that it was well settled that equitable
considerations have no place in interpreting provision. of limitation and their strict grammatical meaning bas to be adhered
to. The expression "date of the order" in the first proviJo to
s. 6M of the Act, therefore, could not mean the date of the
knowledge of the order.
p.,. Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Ayyangar,
The order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the
new bus stand and di.continuing the old was one m'lde not
under s. 76 of the Act, which had no application, but under
r. 134 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1955, made in
exercise of the powers ronferred by s. 68 (2) (r) the Motor
Vchicles Act. 11te order was, therefure, open to revision under
s. 64A by the State Transport Authority.
lJ.
T. R. lbraliim v. &gional Trmuporl Atdlwmy, Ta,.jore,
[1953] S.C.R. 290, applied.
Section 76 had nothing to do with the fixation or alteration of a bus stand. Although the word 'bus stand' had not
been defined in the Act, it was clear that a bus stand meant a
place where bus services commenced or tcnninated. Section 76,
properly construed, dealt with the detennination of parking
places referred to bys. 91(2l(e) of the Act. The fixation of
bus stands was withins. 68(2)(r) of the Act and the power to
issue the necessary notification was implied in that clause.
Nagmdraflllll v. BvuA, A.I.R. (1932) P.C. 165, <hmral
Accidetst J'ir< a"4 Li/• ~ Ourpuralimt Ltd. v.
Ja,."""""-.J Abdtll RaAi11&, A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 6 and Boota Mal
v. u,.fo,. of India, [1963) I S.C.R. 70, referred to.
In the instant cue the cft'ective order fixing the new bus
stand was made not by the declaration of intention in the
resolution of December 3/4, 1959, but by the publication of
the notification on June 28, ·1960, and the impugned application
for revision under s. 64A of the Act having been made before
that date, no question of limitation rould arise.
The1e was no scope for the application of the principle of
merger in the present cue since the State Transport Authority's
order rejecting the first revision application had been made
before the cflCctive and lawful order fixing the new bus stand
was made by the notification
OolluJor of 0..W-, Oalt;vtta v. Jfaat India Oom.....-cial
Oo. Ltd. [1963] 3 S.C.R. 338 and Jladm& Gopal Rvt1gla v.
Sllf'Olary to 1Ae a.-,._, o/Ori#a, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
906, distinguilhl'd.
'•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
Since the notice obligatory under the second proviso to
s. 64A was not admittedly given by the State Transport Auth<r
rity before it passed its order datedJanuary 6, 1961, this Court
should, in the ends of justice, exercise its powers under Art. 142
of the Constitution and send the matter back to the revisional
authority for disposal according to law.
Per Sarkar,J.-The State Transport Authority's order of
January 6, 1961 was patently erroneous and should have been
set aside as it was passed under s. 64A on an application made
set aside an order of the Regional Transport Authority, passed
on December 3i4, 1959, after the period of 30 days prescribed
for such application under that section had expired.
Assuming that the Regional Transport Authority's order
which could be set aside under s. 64!\ was the one made on
June 28, 1960. The State Transport Authority's order of
.January 6, 1961, would still be patently wrong for it set aside
not that order but the order of December 3/4, 1959, which
the State Transport Authority had no power under s. 64A to set
aside.
The State Transport Authority had no power suo motu
to treat the application to set aside the order of December 3/4,
1959, as an application to set aside the order of June 28, 1960.
It had never been moved to do so nor had it in fact auo motu
treated the application as . one to set aside the order of
June 28, 1960, for it expressly set aside only the Regional
Transport Authority's order of December 3/4, 1959.
The High Court was in error in holding that as the
Notification of June 28, 1960, contained the order which could
be set aside under s. 64A, the application under· that section
which had been made before that date was not beyond time,
for it omitted to notice that that application asked nothing con·
cerning that order.
The applkation for setting aside the order of December
3/4, 1959, could not by amendment be turned into an applica·
tion to set aside an order of June 28, 1960, after thirty days
from the last mentioned day had expired.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 332 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August _31, 1961, of the Rajasthan High
Court in D.B. Civil Writ No. 76of1961.
1962
Mun"i,.l Board,
p.,bk.,
v.
St.U Tt11Uport
Autluri(1,
Rqut"""
,.
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Municipal Boar« 1
Pushkar
v.
St1fe Tra'llSJorl
AuthorilJ,
R:1jasthati
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney General oj India,
N. 0. Chatterjee, L. L. Sharma, JI. K. Ramamurthi.
R. K. Garg, S. 0. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the
appellant.
P. D. Jfenon, for respondents Nos. I and 7.
11
•
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India,
Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vohra, for
the respondents Nos. 2-6.
1962. November 21. The Judgment of
Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Ayyangar,
JJ., was delivered by Das Gupta, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
Dill Gupla, J.
DAs GUPTA, J.-At Pushkar in Rajasthan
exists a tank which has long been considered one of
the holiest places of the Hindus and a well known
place of pilgrimage. By the east of the lake runs a
road approximately north to south. The Ghats for
getting into the lake are situated contiguous west of
this road. Several Dharmshalas and at least one
Gurudwara have been established by the side of this
road not far from the lake. A temple of Hanumanji
stands east of the road, a short distance from the
southern edge of the lake. Another temple close to
the road is the temple of Rangji. This is situated
ven• near the Ghats and to the east of the road.
There is also a temple of Brahamaji further away
towards the north but on this very road
a little away from where the road further north
cast from the edge of the lake meets, another Road
Ganera Deedwana Nagar. Towards the south of the
Dharamashalas the road goes on to Ajmer. The
police station of Pushkar is situated at some distance
from the Pushkar lake. The police station stands on
a road which goes on towards Ganera Deedwana
Nagar to the north; and on the south joins the road
II
-,
I
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
to Ajmer, Thus the road running north to south by
the side of the police station and the road running by
the east of the Ghats of the lake meet a short distance
north of the police station and a greater distance
towards the south. In this way the two roads form
a somewhat irregular figure almost like a triangle.
The pilgrims use this road.in coming to the lake and
for this purpose can avail of a number of motor
transport services. The dispute which is the subject·
matter of the ~ent appeal is as regards the location
of the bus stand at Pushkar for these numerous motor
transport services.
For many years the bus stand was located by
the side of the road which runs east of the lake, a
little away to the north of Hanumanji's temple and
very near the Dharamashalas. On May 24, 1948, the
Municipal Board of Pushkar passed a resolution that
the Bus stand should be shifted to another site by the
side of the road which passes by the police station.
By the same resolution it was resolved to oonstruct a
passenger shed; piyaoo, baths, latrines, urinals and
other facilities for the convenience of the passengers
at the new bus stand as proposed. The Regio·
nal · Transport Aurhority in its meeting held on
December 3 &: 4, 1959, considered this-proposal
and passed a resolution in the following words:"The Bus stand for Pushkar will be the plot of
land at the junction of the Hallows Road with
Ganera Road near the Police Station and
Kalkaji's Temple. The present bus stand on
the northern Patri between Hanumangarhi
Temple and Brahmannandji's Baghichi will
cease to be a bus stand and will be a bus stop
only. The buses will not pass through the city.
They will go back from the bus stop to the new
bus stand. The Municipal Board will provide
the necessary facilities. The buses will shif~,to
1962
Munici)al Bo•rtl,
PwMor
v.
Slot1 Tro.nspott
A1dltori41,
RojClllN,.
Du a.11.,1.
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Municipal Board,
Pruhkar
v.
SraU Transport
.4.uthority,
R•jastha"
Dai ·":,,pta, J.
the new bus stand after such facilities are provided."
It was not however until June 28, 1961), that a public
notification was issued in pursuance of the resolution.
On that date a notification was issued notifying the
public of the resolution of the Regional Transport
Authority fixing the new stand for buses at Pushkar
and discontinuing the old stand but directing that it
will be used as a bus stop. The notification further
stated that the buses shall not pass through the city
but will proceed to the new stand back from the bus
stop and that except the above-mentioned bus stand
no other place shall be used as a bus stand in Pushkar.
It was after this notification was issued, that the new
arrangement came into force.
Long before this notification was made. two
residents of Pushkar, Jai Narain ond Madan Mohan
moved before the State Transport Authority an
application for revision of the decision of the Regional
Transport Authority changing the bus stand. This
application purported to be under s. G4A of the
Motor Vehicles Act. It was heard by the State
Transport Authority on F~bruary 18, ]!)60, and was
rejected th<' same day. On April 13, ]!)60, five bus
operators of the Ajmer Pushkar route moved a fresh
application for revision under s. 6-L\ of the l\fotor
Vehicks Act against the Regional Transport Authority's decision to change the stand. This application was decided by an order dated January 6,
1961. The State Transport Authority rejected the
preliminary objection raised by the respondent's
counsel that no revision lay against the Regional
Transport Authority's order and also the objection
that the matter in dispute had already been heard and
decided on February 18, i 960 and the State Transport Authority had no right to review its own order.
It also rejected the contention that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Coming to the merits
of the case the State Transport Authority was of
l"
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
opinion that the proposed new bus stand was likely
to be a source of inconvenience to women pilgrims
and children and that the old bus stand should be
retained from the point of view of both public utility
and convenience. Accordingly, the State Transport
Authority allowed the application for revision
and reversed the decision of the Regional Transport
Authority and directed that the old bus sta11d
should continue to be recognised as the official bus
stand for the Pushkar town.
Against this order of the State Transport
Authority the Municipal Board of Pushkar moved
the High Court of Raj asthan under Art. 226 of the
Constitution and prayed for appropriate writs or
directions, setting aside the State Transport Authority's
order of January 6, 1961. .The main grounds on
which thisreliefwas sought were: (I) that the order
of the Regional Transport Authority had been made
under s. 76 of. the Motor Vehicles Act and was therefore not liable to revision; (2) that, in any case, the
application was barred by limitation; and (3) that
the State Transport Authority having already rejected one application in· revision against the Regional
Transport Authority's order changing the bus stand
could not entertain another application on absolutely
the same grounds. The High Court came to the
conclusion that there was no substance in any of
these contentions and rejected the application.
It is against this decision of the High Court
that the present appeal has been filed ·by the
Municipal Board, Pushkar, with special leave.
In support of the appeal the learned Attorney-General has contended that the High Court's
decision on all these three points was incorrect.
He has reiterated before us that the order of the
Regional Transport Authority changing the bus
stand must be held to have been made under s. 76
of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore not lial/le
1962
Mun ieipal Bo•r',
Pushkar
v.
Stat1 TrdlU/wf
A.ulhtrilJ,
Roj1slhan
Das Gvpta 1 J.
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M111tkiptd Board,
Pushior
v.
Stal1 TronsJoti
AutMril,1,
Rajotthota
to revision, that the application for revision was
barred by limitation and thirdly, that in any case,
the first revision application having been rejected,
a second revision application did not lie inasmuch
as on the rejection of the first revision application
the Regional Transport Authority's order had ceased
to exist having merged in the State Transport
Authority's order.
The first question that arises for decision therefore is whether the Regional Transport Authority's
order has been made under s. 7(i of the Motor Vehicles Act or, as urged on behalf of the respondents, it
was made under s. 68 of the Act. Section 7H, it has
to be noticed, is in Chapter VI of the Motor
Vehicles Act which deals with the control of traffic.
Section 68 is in Chapter IV which deals'with the
control of transport vehicles. Section 7fl gives power to the State Government or any authority
authorised in this behalf ·by the State Government
"to determine places at which motor vehicles may
stand either indefinitely or for a specified period
of time" and also to· determine the places at which
public service vehicles may stop for a longer time
than is necessary for the taking up and setting down
of passengers. According to• the learned AttorneyGeneral it is ut1der ··this power to determine a place
at which motor vehicles may Stand indefinitely or
for a specified period of time that the location of a
bus stand is and can be determined by the State
Government or any other authority authorised by
it in this behalf.
The rival contention on behalf of the respondent is that the determination of places at which
motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a
specified period of time means the determination of
parking place while the determination of places at
which public service vehicles may stop for a longer
time than is necessary for the taking up and settin~
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
down of passengers, contained in the latter portion
of s. 76 means the determination of halting stations.
Neither of these, it is urged, has anything to do with
the provision of a bus stand. A bus stand, it is argued
on behalf of the respondents, means the plac~ where
a bus service either commences or terminates. This
according to the learned Solicitor-General, who
appeared for the respondents, has to be done under
a rule made under s. 68(2) (r) of the Act, giving
power to the Regional Transport Authority to fix bus
stands. Section 68 empowers the State Government
to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect
the provisions of Chapter IV. The second subsection provides that without prejudice to the generality of the power just mentioned rules under this
section may be made with respect to all or any of the
matters mentioned in the clause set out in the subsection. Of these cl. (r) is in these words :Section 68 (2) (r).
"prohibiting the picking up and setting
down of passengers by stage or contract carriages at specified places or in specified areas or
at places other than duly notified stands or
halting places and requiring the driver of a
stage carriage to stop and remain stationary for
a reasonable time when so required by a passenger desiring to board or alight from the vehicle
at a notified halting place."
In order to make an effective rule under this
clause under s. 68(2), it is said, it is first necessary to
have duly notified stands. This clause contemplates,
it is urged, that a rule has to first provide for the
notification of certain stands for transport vehicles
and, secondly, for prohibiting the picking up and
setting down of passengers by stage or contract cani,
ages inter alia at places other than the stands which
have been duly notified. The learned SolicitorGeneral has further urged that the question whether
1962
M1micipoi BHrJ.
,,.,~-
rr_,.,,
•"'""·
si.11
v.
!Wj#M
Dos G•fJla, J.
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
l11u,,icipal Board,
Pushkar
v.
Stale Transport
Authority,
Rajasthan
Das Gupta. J.
the fixation or alteration of bus stands can be made
under s. 76 or s. 68 of the Act is no longer res ,integra
and must be taken to have been decided in favour of
his contention in T. B. Ibrahim v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore. (1)
There is, in our opinion, force in this argument.
T. B. Ibrahim, the appellant in that case, had a bus
stand at a site belonging to himself. On February
21, 1950, the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore
declared that bus stand as unsuitable and with effect
from April 1, 1950, altered the starting and terminal
points by means of two resolutions purporting to have
been passed under s. 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
When the validity of these resolutions was challenged before the Madras High Court by a petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution the High Court held
thats. 76 did not authorise the respondent to close
the previous bus stand and quashed the orders. On
November 10, 1950, the Regional Transport Authority
of Tanjore, after hearing the appellant Ibrahim and
the Municipality passed a resolution that for good
and proper reasons, viz., the convenience of the
travelling public the Transport Authority had resolved to alter the starting places and termini of all
public service vehicles, other than motor cabs,
arriving at and proceeding from Tanjore from the
existing bus stand to another area of the town.
Against this resolution a fresh petition under Art. 226
was filed in the High Court but the petition was
dismissed. Against the High Court's order, Ibrahim
appealed to this Court by special leave and it is the
judgment in that appeal which has been reported in
[1953] S. G. H. 290.
The impugned resolution was passed by the
Transport Authority under Rule 268 of the Madras
Motor Vehicles Rules, as amended. The amended
Rule was in these words :268. In the case of public service vehicles
(other than motor cabs) the transport auth?rity
(l) ll953J s.c.R. 200.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
may after consultation with such other authority
as it may consider desirable and after notice to
the parties affected, fix or alter from time to
time for good and proper reasons, the starting
places and termini between which such vehicles
shall be permitted to be used within its j urisdiction. A list of such places shall be supplied
by such authority to every holder of a permit
for such vehicles at the time of grant of or
renewal of permits.
When such places have bcrn fixed every
such vehicle shall start only from such places".
Th•: very first ground that was urged in support
of the second writ petition in the High Court was
that Rule :!li8, as amended, was beyond the rulcmaking power conferred by s. OS(:!)(r) of the l\Iotor
Vehicles Act. This contention was rejected by the
High Court and was repeated before this Court and
was rejected by this Court also. After setting out
the material portion of s. li8, the Court pointed out
that the purpose of Chapter IV was described by the
compendious expression "control of transport
vehicles'', and the Provincial Government was invested with plenary powers to make rule.• for carrying
out that purpose and then observed : •
"Keeping in view the purpose underlying
the Chapter we arc not prepared to hold that
the fixing or alteration of bus-stands is foreign
to that purpose."
Dealing with the contention that s. 68(2)(r) does not
confer the power upon the u·ansport authority to
direct the fixing or the alteration of a bus stand and
therefore Rule 2!i8 of the rules framed under that
section was ultm vires, the Court observed thus : "We are not prepared to accede to this
contention. Sub-section 2(r) clearly contemplates three definite situations. It prohibits the
1962
Municipal Board,
Push/car
v.
State-Tratuport
Au1horit.1 1
Rajasth6n
Das Gupta, J.
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mu11ieip.l B,.,J,
ruilakar
v.
Stall Tra,,,P.rl
AutAoril1 1
RajastluJr1
Das Gupta, J,
picking up or setting down of passengers (i) at
specified places, (ii) in specified areas, and (iii)
at places other than duly notified stands or
halting places."
"If the power to make rules in regard to
these matters is given to the Government, then
it follows that a specified place may be prohibited from being used for picking up or setting
down passengers. This will inevitably result
in the closing of that specified place for the
purpose of picking up or setting down of
passengers. Similarly a specified area may be
excluded for the same purpose. The expres8ion
"duly notified stands" is not defined in the Act,
but it is reasonable to presume that a duly
notified stand must be one which is notified by
the Transport Authority and by none other.
There is no warrant for the presumption that it
must be notified by the Municipality."
The Court then discussed certain provisions of the
Madras District Municipalitie-s Act and said that
these provisions did not affect the power of the
Transport Authority to locate traffic control and
that if Rule 268 was within the rule-making authority, it followed that it could not be challenged as
being void because it was not consistent with some
general law. The discussion on this point was concluded in these words :"Section 68, sub-section (2)(r) involves
both a general prohibition that the stand will
cease to exist as well as a particular prohibition, namely, that passengers shall not be picked
up or set down at a specified point. The order
passed by the Transport Authority properly
construed falls within the ambit of section 68,
sub-section 2(r). Ruic 268 under which the
order impeached was passed is a rule framed
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
under the plenary rule-making power referred
to in section 68, sub-section (1). Sub·section (2) (za) says that a rule may be made with
respect to any other matter which is to be or
may be prescribed. This shows the existence
of residuary power vested in the rule-making
authority. It follows therefore that Rule 268
is within the scope of the powers conferred
under section 68 of the Act."
We have deliberately made these - extensive
quotations from the previous judgment of this Court
because they clearly show, as nothing else can, that
the Court had to consider in that case the question
whether s. 68(2) (r) did confer upon the Transport
Authority the power to direct fixmg or alteration of
a bus stand and answered the question in the affirmative. Ibrahim's case is thus a clear and direct
authority for the proposition that under s. 68(2)(r)
of the Motor Vehicles Act the State Government has
power to frame rules empowering the Regional
Transport Authority to·fix or alter bus-stands. The
notification of June 28, 1960, Qientions Rule 134 of
the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1955, as the
source of the power under which the new bus stand
was fixed, the old bus stand was discontinued and it
was ordered that· no other place except the new bus
stand should be used as a bus stand at Pushkar.
The material portion of Rule 134 reads thus :~
"A Re~ional Transport Authority· by
notification m the Rajasthan Gazette,. or by the
erection of traffic signs which are permitted
for the purpose under sub-stction (1) of section
75 of the Act, or both, may, in respect of the
taking up or setting down of passengers or
both, by ·public service vehicles or by any
specified class of public service vehicles ..•...
........................................... .......... ............ .
....................................... , ....... reciuire that
1962
M.,.;.;fHll B-i,
,..
p.,AJ.n
........i,,
Sfll#TNOIJwl
ltojastltu
DMG.,1., 1.
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M•idfMI Bo•rd,
Pusil•r
v.
SU.II Tr..,porl
..4otliori(1
lloj•sU...
°"' •tta, I.
G
within the limits of any municipality, or within
such other limits as may be specified in the
notification, certain specified stands or halting
places only shall be so used."
This rule clearly empowers the fixation or
alteration of bus stands.
In framing the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules,
1951, of which Rule 134 form part the Rajasthan
Government mentioned the numerous sections which
give the Government the power to frame rules as the
authority under which the rules were being made,
viz., ss. 21, 41, 65, 68, 70, 71, (2), 73, 74, 75, 77,
80, 86, (2), 88, 90 and 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939. In view of this Court's decision in Ibrahim's
Gase (1) it will be proper to hold that Rule 134 was
made in exercise of the powers under s. 68. Accord·
ingly, the order of the Regional Transport Authority
fixing the new bus stand and discontinuing the
old should be held to have been made under a rule
made under s. 68 and thus liable to revision under
s. 64 A.
The learned Attorney-General stressed the
fact that in Ibrahim's case this Court did not in so
many. words say that such an order fixing or alter·
ing a bus stand cannot be made under s. 76 of the
Act and contended that that case is no authority
for holding that the order was not made under s. 76.
Assuming for the sake of argument that that was so
and that the order could also be made under s. 76
that would not affect or weaken the authority of
Ibrahim's Gase in so far as it decided that a rule
empowering the Transport Aurhority to fix or alter
bus stands can be made under s. 68 (2) (r) of the
Act. In that position there will be no escape from
the conclusion that the
Regional Transport
Authority's order · in the present case would be
liable to ·revision under s 64 A.
(!) !1953] s.c.R. 200.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
It a.ppea~ clear to us however that Ibrahim's
case is also authority for the proposition that an
order fixing or altering a bus stand cannot be made
under s. 76. From the summary of what was discussed and decided in that case as has been given
above, it appears that the Division Bench of the .
Madras High Court gave a categorical decision in
the earlier writ petition thats. 76 did not authorise the
Transport Authority to close the bus stand. It appears
to us clear that this view was · approved by this
Court. Indeed, the · reasoning which this Court
adopted for deciding that s. 68 (2) (r) of the Act
contemplates the fixation or alteration of a bus stand
would become considerably weakened and would
not have been accepted by this Court if it thought
that s. 76 itself authorised the Transport Authority
to fix or close a bus stand.
We may make it clear that even if this binding
authority in Ibrahim's Case had not been present
we would have had no hesitation in holding that
the fixation or alteration of a bus stand is made under
a rule made under s. 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act
and cannot be made under s. 76. In our opinion,
Chapter VI which deals with the question of "Coritrol
of traffic" in general has nothing to do. with the
fixation or alteration of bus stands. Section 76 has
no doubt used the words "places at which motor
vehicles may stand" and the learned AttomeyGeneral tried to persuade us that this includes the
fixation of what is known as bus stands. While
the word "bus stand" has not been defined in the
Act, we have no hesitation in accepting the contention of' the respondentS that a bus stand means a
place where bus services commence or terminate. It
is the' place where the buses stand for commencing
its transport service or where they stand after terminating their service, that is popularly known as a
bus-stand. We do not think the words "places at
which the motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely
IHI
Maui,,., BMrl,
....
'''"".dolftml1
r,.,,,.,,
l'ruklc•
I&ii•"-
DosGyui, J.
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1961
M•li:i;.1 &.ri,
l'tuM•r
••
Sl•ll Tr•u;o11
Allt4ori(1
~lluot
DosG•flla, J.
or for a specified period of time" can be reasonably
interpreted to include a bus stand in the above sense.
When it is remembered that Chapter VI in which
s. 76 occurs, is intended to deal with the control of
traffic it becomes clear that the determination
of places at which the Motor Vehicles may stand
either indefinitely or for a specified period of time
means the "dete1mination of parking places" while
the determination of places at which public vehicles
may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the
taking up and setting dow.1. of passengers means
"halting stations for public service vehicles''. It is
well worth noticing that while the determination of
such places for stoppage, in the latter portion of the
section can be in respect of public service vehicles
only the determination of places of standing in the
first part of the section is in resp~ct of motor
vehicles in general.
All things considered, it appears to us clear
that s. 76 has nothing to do with the provision for
bus stands. Section 91 (2) (e) which empowers the
State Government to make rules. for "the mctintenance
and management ofparking places and •tands" docs
not refer, in our opinion, to bus starids but to "stands"
for motor vehicles which are in the nature of parking
places determined under s. 76.
It is equally clear to us that the "control of
transport vehicles" with which Chapter IV purports
to deal should
reasonably be expected
to
contain provisions for fix.ition of places where. the
transport vehicles may commence their journey or
terminate their journey, that is, the fixation o( bus
stands. When therefore we find in s. 68 (2) (r) the
specific clause about "prohibiting the picking up
and setting dciwn of passengers ............;it places
other than duly notified stands," it is reasonabl~ to
think that the word "stand" wa~ used there to rnl'an
"bus stands" in the sense of places where services
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
terminate or commence. The scheme of the subsection clearly shows that bus stands have first to be
notified and regulatory orders can, and have to be
issued thereafter. In the nature of things, the power
to issue the necessary notification is implied in the
provision.
1962
MraticijlOl llH1,,
Plu~ta •
••
Stat• T,..,port
Aa1..n1,
Rljost._
DosGoju,J.
The conclusion that necessarily follows from
this is that the State Government has been given
authority under this clause to make rules for the
fixation of bus-stands by duly notifying the same.
Rule 134 in so far as it empowers the Regional
Transport Authority to fix or alter bus stands is thus
a rule made under the rule-making authority under
s.. 68. Even apart from the authority of Ibrahim's
Gase (') therefore we are of opinion that the order of
the Regional Transport Authority was made in
pursuance of powers conferred on it by a rule made
under s. 68 (2) (r) of the M;otor Vehicles Act and
therefore liable to revision under s. 64A.
This brings us to the question of limitation.
Section 64 A · provides that State Transport
Authority shall not entertain any application (rom
a person aggrieved by an order of the Regional
Transport Authority unless the application ia made
within 30 days from the date of the order. According to the appellant, the impugned order was made ·
by the Regional Transport Authority on December
4, 1959, and consequently the application for revision inade by the respondents on April 13, 1960, was
barred. It was suggested that in. fact the respon·
dents who moved the revision application on April
13, 1960, were aware of the order made by the
Regional Transport Authority
on December
4, 1959; .but assuming that they had no
such knowledge, · the question of knowledge, it
was urged, was totally irrelevant. The section has
provided that no application shall be entertained
unless it is made within 30 days from the date of
(1) (1953] s.c.R. 290.
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
,,. ..
MU11i&i/'al Board,
~
v •.
Stall T nuuport
A•lfrorit7
Rajasthan
Das Gupta, J.
the order and the courts cannot read it as within 30
days from the date of the knowledge of the order.
In this connection the learned Attorney-General
has drawn our attention to the
decisions
of the Privy Council in Nagendranath v. Buresh, (1)
and General Accident Fire & Lije ABsurance C<Wporatian Limited v. Jarmoho1111Jd Abdul Rahim (')
where it has been emphasised that in interpreting
the provisions of limitation, "equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical
meaning of the words is the only safe guide."
There can be no doubt that this principle has always
been acted upon by the courts. This principle
has recently been re-affirmed by this Court in
Boof.a Mal v. The Union of India (1).
We agree therefore that the words "date of
the order" should not be read "as from the date of
knowledge of the order" in the absence of clear
indication to that effect. In this connection the
learned Attorney-General has drawn our attention
to several sections of the Motor Vehicles Act to show
that where the legislature in prescribing the period
of limitation intended that time should run from
some other date than the date when the order was
made clear indication of such intention was given.
Thus s. 13 in providing for an appeal from an
order made refusing or revoking a driving licence
says that an aggrieved person may appeal "within
30 days of the service on him of the order". Section
15 which provides for an appeal from an order
of the licencing authority disqualifying a person
from holding a driving licence lays down that an
aggrieved person may appeal "within :10 days of
the receipt of the order". Section 16 which pro·
vides for an appeal against certain orders of the
Regional Transport Authority says that the aggrieved
person may appeal "within 30 days of the receipt
of intimation of such order". Section 35 which is
another section providing for appeal says that the
( 1) A.J.R. <IS32) P.C. 165
(2) A.I.R. (l!lfl) P. C. 6,
(3) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 70.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 391
appeal may be made "within 30 days of the date of
receipt of notice of the order".
There is considerable force therefore in the
argument that if the legislature had intended that an
application for revision under s. 64A may be made
within 30 days from the date of intimation or know·
ledge of the order . to the aggrieved person it would
have said so; and .in the absence of any such thing
the court is bound to hold that the application will
be barred unless made within 30 days from the date
of the order by which the person is aggrieved. This
still leaves open for investigation the problem as to
what is the date of the order. According to the
appellant the date when the Regional Transport
Authority passed the resolution is the date of the
order. Against this it is urged on behalf of the bus
operators that it.is the date when that resolution was
brought into effect by the publication of the. notifica·
tion which should be considered to be the date of
the order. In our opinion, the respondents' conten·
tion should be accepted. For, it is a fallacy to think
that the date when; the Regional Transport Authority
passed the resolution was the date on which the
fixation of the new-bus-stand or the discontinuance
of the old bus stand was ordered. It has to be
remembered in this connection that Rule 134 itself
contemplates that the fixation or alteration. of bus·
stands would be m<1de by a notification. It is only
on such notification that a notified bus stand comes
into existence. So long as the notification is not
made there is in law no effective fixation of a new
bus stand or discontinuance of the old bus stand.
The matter may be considered from another
aspect. Section 64A provides for an application for
revision by a person aggrieved by an order. It is the
making of the order which gives rise to the grievance.
In this case it is the fixation of the new bus stand
and the discontinuance of the old bus stand by
which the bus operators claim to have been aggrieved,
1962
M111iicipal Board,
Pu1ilk•
••
Stall Tr...,..t
A•tlioril;o
Raj.,,,,_
•
•
i
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1162
Muil:ilol '&.rt/,
p,,,u.,
v.
S111t.Tr..,,1
~111/ttri"
R•ial,,.,.
DuGyta,/;
It is easy to see that there is no real cause for
grievance till such fixation and discontinuance of bus
stands have been made by a notified order. In
other words, the order has not been "made" till the
notification has been published. Before that it is
only an intention to make an order that has been
expressed. That this distinction between the making
of an order fixing or discontinuing a bus stand and
the expression of an intention to make such an Ol'der
was present in the mind of the Regional Trans}>Ol'.t
Authority is abundantly dear from the language
used by. it. The resolution th~.t was passed on
December 4, 1959-which according to the appellant
was the date on which the impugned order was
made-says :"The bus stand for Pushkar will be the plot of
land at the junction of the Hallows Road with
Ganera Road near the Police· Station . and
Kalkaji's Temple. The present btis stand on
the northern Patti between Hanumanrarhi
Temple and Brahamartandji's Baghichi will.
cease to be a bus stand and will be a bus stop
only. The buses will not pass. through the city.
They willgo back from the bus stop to the new
stand. The Municipal Board will provide the
neccsSa!'y facilities. The buses ·will shift to the
new stand· after such facilities are provided."
The Transport Authority . did not follow this up on
that date by a formal order. It is reasonable therefore to consider the passing of the resolution as the
preliminary stage of the making of the order and the
notification by which it was published as the final
making of the order.
Our conclusion therefore is that the order fixing
a new bus stand at Pushkar and discontinuing the
old bus stand was in effect made not on December 4,
1959, but on June 28, 1960, when the notification
about the fixation of a new bus stand was published.
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
It is this order, made on June 28, 1960, that was
liable to revision and as the application for revision
was made before that date -in anticipation of the
notification-the plea of limitation raised on behalf of
the appellant was rightly rejected by the Regional
Transport Authority.
There remains for consideration the last contention raised on behalf of the appellant that
inasmuch as the State Transport Authority rejected by
its order dated February 18, 1960, the first application for revision of the Regional Transport Authority's order fixing or altering the bus stand, the
Regional Transport Authority's order merged in the
order of the State Transport Authority, the second
application for revision was incompetent.
1962
Afunicipol lhard
Pushl;ar
v.
Stat1 Trnsp.rt
A.ulhority
Rajostha
Das a.pr., J,
In Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. The East
India Commercial Co. LU., Calcutta, (') this Court
held that where once an order of original authority
is taken: in appeal to the appellate authority it is the
order of the latter authority which is the operative
order after the appeal is disposed of-whether the
appellate authority reverses the order under appeal
or modifies that order or merely dismisses the appeal
and thus confirms the order without any modification.
In Mad.an Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to the Govt. of
Orissa (') this Court applied this principle of merger
to orders passed by way of review and an order of the
Central Government in effect rejecting the application of the appel!ant for the grant of a mining lease
to him and confirming the rejection of the application of the appellant by the Orissa Government
was held not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High
Court of Orissa under Art. 226 of the Constitution
in view of the fact that the Central Government was
not located within the territories subject to the
jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court on the ground
that the Central Government's order rejecting the
review petition and in effect rejecting the application
of the appellant for grant of a mining lease was the
(1) (19631 3 s.c.a. 338.
(2) (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 906.
..
•
394
1962
MtuticijNJJ Board,
Pusllk•r
••
Stal4 Transport
Authority
Rajtuthon
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SUPP.
operative order. It has been urged on the authority
of these cases that the principle of merger should be
applied to the cases of revision also where the
revising authority reverses the order or modifies it
or merely dismisses the revision application thereby
confirming the order.
Dal C.pto, J.
In our opinion, there is no scope for the appli·
cation of the principle of merger to the facts of the
present case. As we have pointed out above the
order fixing a new bus stand and discontinuing the
old bus stand was in effect, and in law, made not on
December 4, 1959, but on June 28, 1960. The
position therefore was that neither on the date when
the first application for revision was made nor when
the State Transport Authority disposed of that
application, had any order of the Regional
Transport Authority fixing the new bus stand and
discontinuing the old bus stand, come into existence.
The question of merger could only
arise if the revision was of an order that had
come into existence. If even though an a_pplication
for revision was made before the notification but
the State Transport Authority had considered and
disposed of the matter after the notification was made
it would be possible and indeed reasonable to say
that the application for revision should be deemed,
at the time when the State Transport Authority,
dealt with the matter, to be one for this completed
order and the order of the Regional Transport
Authority merged in the revising authority's order.
As, however, the revising authority's order was also
made before the notification had been published
there was no operative order even by the State
Transport Authority's order made on February 18,
1960. The contention that the second revision was
incompetent, must therefore be rejected.
Two points which emerged during arguments
at the Bar however require consideration. The first
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
395
is that the application which the respondents busoperators made on April 13, 1960, was also not for
a revision of a complete order. As it was only this
application for revision which has been dealt with
by the State Transport Authority by its order of
January 6, 1961, the question arises whether that
fact itself makes the order of the State Transpart
Authority bad and entitles the appellant to a drrection quashing this order. It has to be noticed that
the position in law that there. was no complete order
of fixation of a new bus stand and alteration of the
old bus stand at Pushkar till the notification was
made on June 28, 1960, was not present in the minds
of either the applicants or the appellant, Municipal,
Board, which appeared to oppose the application or
even the State Transport Authority. It was not the
appellant's case in the writ petition that the State
Transport Authority's order of January 6, 1961,
should be quashed, because it purported to revise an
order which had no existence in the eye of law. On
a consideration of all the circumstances, we do not
think that the appellant can now claim an order for
quashing the State Transport Authority's decision on
this ground. In our opinion, it would be proper,
in the special circumstances of the case, to hold that
the State Transport Authority could, immediately
after June 28, 1960, when the order was completed
by the notification treat the application for revision
made on April 13, .1960, pending before it on the
date of the notification, as an application for revision
of the order as completed by the notification, and
that, in substance, the order of January 6, 1961,
was an order revising-not the decision of the
Regional Transport Authority's order of December
4, 1959, but the Regional Transport Authority's
order fixing a new bus stand at Pushkar, as completed by the notification of June 28, 1960.
The other point which was brought to our
notice during the arguments at the Bar is that
1962
v.
Sl•ll TraMport
A.utlloti11
Rajalhu
Das G.;1.,1.
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Muoleip.I Board,
Pwhkor
v.
Stat. TrU1JjJorl
Autho1i1-,
Rajast~ an
Das Gupta, J.
the order of the State Transport Authority elated
January 6, 1961, was made without compliance with
the second proviso to s. 64 A.. That proviso is in
these words:"Provided ·further that the State Transport
Authority shall not pass an order under this
section prejudicial to any person without giving
him a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
This appears to us to make it necessary that
before making any revisional order under s. 64A
the State Transport Authority has to see that
a person likely to be affected by that revisional order
receives notice of the matter and is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The requirement of
this proviso was admittedly not complied with before
the State Transport Authority made the order on
January 6, 196!, in the present case. If the High
Court's attention had been drawn to this failure on
the part of the State Transport Authority to comply
with this statutory requirement, we have no doubt
that the High Court would have felt compelled to
quash the revisional order made.
Now, that we find that this statutory requirement was not complied with before the revisional
order was made, we do not think it win be proper
for us to ignore this infirmity in the order.. It is true
that the learned Attorney-General contended that as
soon as the Court accepts the plea that the revisional
order challenged by the appellant by their writ
petition is invalid for the reason that the appellate
authority did not comply with the provisions of
s. 64A, the writ petition ought to be allowed and no
opportunity can or should be given to the said
authority to reconsider the matter. We are not
impressed by this argument. We are satisfied that
in the circumstances of this case, we ought to exercise
our powers under Art. 142 of the Constitution and
2 S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
send the matter back to the revisional authority to
be dealt with in accordance with law, because
there is no doubt that by adopting this course full
justice will be done between the parties.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and quash
the State Transport Authority's order made on
January 6, 1961, and direct that the application for
revision of the Regional Transport Authority's order
a~ notified on June, 28, 1961, be disposed of by the
State Transport Authority in accordance with law
after giving public notice of the matter and there·
after giving every person concerned in the matter
who wishes to be heard a reasonable. opportunity of
being heard. In the circumstances of the case, we
order that the parties will bear their own costs.
SARKAR, .J.-1 have come to the conclusion
that this appeal should be allowed.
The appellant is the Municipal Board of
Pushkar in the State of Rajasthan. It passed a
resolution sometime in 1958 that the bus stand near
the Pushkar lake should be shifted to what it comi,
dered a more suitable place. Now the power to fix
bus stands was given to the Regional Transport
Authorities by r. 134 of the Rules framed by the
Rajasthan Government under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939. That rule provides as follows :
/
..-
Rule 134. "A Regional Transport Authority,
by notifications in the Rajasthan Gazette, or
by the erection of traffic signs which are
permitted for the purpose under sub section
(I) of section 75 of the Act, or both, may, in
respect of the taking up or setting down of
passengers or both, by public service vehieles
or by any specified class of public service
vehicles (i) conditionally or unconditionally pro·
hibit the use of any specified place or of
1962
M~nici"pal Boa.rd,
Pru"'-
••
Stal1 TrOJtSporl
A.111/wit)
R jasl!ta
lJaJ c.p1a, J.
S.rltlf, J.
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
Mu,.ieiJlal Board,
Ptuhkar
v.
Stall Tr1WJlorl
..hlAotity
R.'fiatlta
S.ri111r, J.
any place of a specified nature or class, or
(ii) require that within the limits of any
municipality or within such other limits as
may be specified in the notification, certain specified stands or halting places only
shall be so used:
............................................................
................................. ............ ............ ."
'
'
The appellant Municipality moved the Regional
Transport Authority, Jaipur, for making an order
shifting the bus stand to the place suggested by it.
On December 3/4, 1959, the Regional Transport
Authority passed a resolution accepting the appellant
Municipality's proposal and providing that the bus
stand would be shifted to the place suggested by the
appellant Municipality and the old bus stand would
cease to be used as such but would only be used as
a bus stop. The resolution further provided that the
appellant Municipality would prQYide certain facilities and the new bus stand would start functioning
after the facilities had been provided.
Now s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act provides
as follows:
S. 64A. "The State Transport Authority may,
either on its own motion or on an application
made to it, call for the record of any case in
which an order has been made by a Regional
Transport Authority and in which no appeal
lies, and if it appears to the State Transport
Authority that the order made by the Regional
Transport Authority is improper or illegal,
the State Transport Authority may pass such
order in relation to the case as it deems fit :
Provided that the State Transport Authority)hall not entertain any application from a
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
person aggrieved by an order of a Regional
Transport Authority, unless the application
is made within thirty days from the date of the
order:
....................... ................................. ."
Certain bus operators of Pushkar who are
respondents in this appeal and whom I will refer
to as the respondents, applied to the State Transport
Authority on April 13, 1960, under s. 64A to quash
the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority of
December 3/4, 1959. While this application was
pending disposal by the State Transport Authority,
the Regional Transport Authority issued a notification dated June 28, 1960, finally declaring and
notifying to the public the fixing of the new bus
stand. ' This notification was published in the
Rajasthan Gazette of July 14, 1960. It appears that
there was this delay in issuing the notification of the
Regional Transport Authority's notification of
De::ember 3/4, 1959, because in the ineantime two
other persons had moved the State Transport Authority under s. 64A to quash that resolution and also
because the facilities which the appellant Municipality had heed directed to provide had not till then
been arranged for. That earlier petition under
s. 64A was dismissed by the State Transport Authority
on February-18, 1960, and thereafter the facilities
required had been ·provided by the appellant
Municipality. It is after all this that the notification
of.June 28, 1960, had been issued. The respondent's petition under s. 64A was allowed by the State
Transport Authority by an order made on January 6,
1961. By that order the State Transport Authority
directed that "the decision passed by the R. T. A.
dated 3/4 December 1959 and upheld by the SfA
on 18. 2. 1960 be set aside and cancelled and the old
Bus stand shall continue to be recognised as Official
Bus stand for the Pushkar Town."
1962
Muniiipal BoarJ.
PruhJ.ar
v.
Stat1 Tr111Upott
duthorUy
~·,.,.
400
1962
Municipal Blldrd,
PushJ;ar
••
Sla11 Tr1J1Upo1t
Astllority
R.jllstNJn
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
On February 10, 1961, the appellant Municipality filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Consti·
tution in the High Court of Rajasthan for a writ
quashing the order of the State Transport Authority
of January 6, l!J61. This petition w'as dismissed by
the High Court. The appellant has now appealed to
this Court against the decision of the High Court.
There were various points taken in support of
this appeal, but I think that one of them must succeed
and I propose in this judgment to discuss that point
only. It was said on behalf of the appellant
Municipality that there was an error apparent on the
face of the record because the respondents' petition
to the State Transport Authority under s. 64A had
been filed after the period of thirty days limited for
that purpose by the proviso to that section. It was
contended on behalf of the respondents that this was
not so for under s. 64A the period of thirty days had
to be counted not from the date of the order-in this
case the resolution of December 3/4, l!l59-but from
the date when the respondents had the knowledge of
that order. It was contended that if the period was
counted from such date, then the petition was within
time.
I do not think that under s. 64A the period of
thirty days has to be counted from the date that the
party wishing to move under .that section comes to
have knowledge of the order sought to- be set aside.
My learned brother Das Gupta, J., has in the judg·
ment just delivered by him discussed this que~tion
and with his view on that point I am in entire agree·
ment. It is unnecessary for me to discuss this
question further. Therefore, it would appear that
the respondents' petition under s. 64A to set aside the
order of December 3/4, 1959, was out of time and
should have• been di.smissed. The State Transport
Authority's decision that it was not out of time
because the period of thirty days has to be counted
from the date of the knowledge of the order was
"'"
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
patently erroneous and therefore the al>pellant should
have been held entitled to the wnt by the High
Court of Rajasthan.
JMZ
Muni&i/>Ol Board,
p.,/rl;,,,
v.
StaU T rDllJ/JOrJ
But it was then said that the date of the order Authority
R.jarlha
of the Regional Transport Authority was not
sa,kar, J.
December 3/4, 1959, but June 28, 1960. This was
presumably put on the gro~md that the order could
under r. 134, earlier set out, be made by notification and in this case the notification was made on
June 28, 1900. Under that rule a bus stand could
be fixed by the erection of traffic signs also but I
will leave this method out of consideration. as it was
not followed in this case. I have some doubt whether
the contention that the order mentioned in s. 64 A, is
for the purpose of the present case, the order con·
tained in the notification, is right, but I will assume
that to he so.
If the Regional Transport Authority's order
was made only on June 28, 1960, as the respondents
contend, then their application under s. li44 was not
barred by limitation for in fact it was made before
that date. But that gives the respondents no advantage. They had by their petition under s. 64A a~ked
that the Regional Transport Authority's order of
December 3/4, HJ5!l, be quashed. Now, on the
respondents own argument, that order was not an
order under s. (i4 A at all and could not be set aside
under that section. Therefore, again the order of
the State Transport Authority setting aside the
Regional Transport Authority's resolution of
December 3/4, 19511, was incompetent on the face of
it. That resolution was cxhypothesi not an order
liable to be revised under s: 64A. The State Transport Authority's order of January U, 1961, was even
on this basis patently erroneous and without jurisdiction and so liable to be set aside by a writ.
Then it was said that it was in the power of
the State Transport Authority to treat the petitiop
402 SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
Munici.fJ.J B1crd1
hsfllcM
v.
Stall Transftoll
Authtri!JI RajaJ'lhan
under s. 64A filed on i\pril 13, 1960, and pending on
June 28, 1960, the date of the notification, as an
application to set aside the order contained in that
notification. Now, I do not think the State
Transport Authority suo motu could do so. It is for
the petitioner to decide what relief he would ask in
his application under s. 64A. The State Transport
Authority could not against the wish of the petitioner
alter his prayer. Here the respondents never asked
that their application under s. 64A should be treated
as an application to set aside the order contained in
the Notification of June 28, 1960. However that
may be, even if the State Transport Authority
could treat the petition of April 13, 1960, as askini'
for quashing of the Regional Transport Authority's
order of June 28, 1960, it did not in fact do so.
This is evident from the State Transport Authority's
order of January 6, 1961, where in considering the
question of limitation it proceeds on the basis that
the period of thirty days provided in s. 64A is to be
counted from the date of the knowledge of the order
which would be insensible if it had treated the
petition as one to set aside the order of June 28, 1960.
Nowhere in its judgment of January 6, 11161, does
the State Transport Authority refer to the notification
of June 28, 1960. In the operative part of its order
which I have earlier· set out. it expressly set aside
and cancelled the Regional Transport Authorities
resolution of December 3/4, 1959, and it is only as
consequential thereto that it stated that "the old
Bus stand shall continue." Even in their affidavit in
opposition to the petition under Art. 226 the respondents themselves did not make the case that the State
Transport Authority had treated their application
under s. 64A as an application to set aside the order
contained in the notification of June 28, 1960. In
that affidavit they stated that "the revision filed by
the respondents before the S. T.A. was within the
prescribed time as the same was filed within about a
week of the respondents' knowledge of the R.T.A.'s
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
order." They clearly even then proceeded on the
basis that their application under s. 64A had been an
application to set aside the resolution of December 3/4,
1959. No doubt the High Court did not accept the view
that the period of thirty days provided by s. 64A has
to be counted from the date of the knowledge of the
order sought to be impugned. It said that it was
the notification which was the source of the respon ·
dents' grievance and, therefore, their petition under
s. 64A was not out of time. The High Court wholly
omitted to notice that the petition asked nothing
concerning the notification of June 28, l!l60.
Therefore, it seems to me that it is to no
purpose to consider whether the State Transport
Authority could treat the respondents' petition
under s. 6~ A as having been filed on or after
June ?8, 1960, to cancel the order contained in the
notification of that date. In fact, it did not do
so. It was neither for the High Court nor it is for
this Court now to amend the application under
s. 64A and treat it as one for setting aside the
Regional Transport Authority's order contained in
the notification of June 28, 1960. That application
was never before either of these Courts. If the
respondents themselves had made an application for
such amendment, then the application would have
been dismissed if on its date, thirty days from the
date of the notification had passed. Now on the
dates when the State Tramport Authority and the
High Court passed their orders, the period of thirty
days so counted had passed. On those dates the
respondents could not successfully
ask for an
amendment of their application under s. 64A. I!,
therefore, seems to me that if the order of the
Regional Transport Authority is to be taken as having
been made on June 28, l!J60, then the respondents'
petition under s. 64A was incompetent because it
sought an order for setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's resolution of December 3/4, 19591
1962
Mun;,;pal lioar,,
Pushkar
v.
SllJle T1ansp.r1
A.ut~oril.J R.djastlia
Sark•r, J.
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
Muiei!Jal Board,
Pus/J:.ar
v.
81«/1 Transport
1.11/wil:] RajM than
and under s. !HA that order could not be
a~ec~e~ ~t all. In my yiew,
the . appell~nt
.\<tm1c1pahty was clearly entitled to a wnt quashmg
the order of the State Transport Authority of
January 6, 1961.
Sarlar, J,
l would,
therefore, allow the appeal with
costs.
BY Court·r : By majority judgment the appeals
are allowed and the matter sent back for disposal in
accordance with law. Parties to bear their own
Costs.
1962
Nrv111161r, 22
V. S MENON
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAB,
K. N. WoNcHoo, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
.J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Puhlic Servant-Disciplinary action-Subversive activitiuchntge of a,ssor,ialing with communists-compulsory re.tirementLegality of-Writ Petition-If ma,intainable-Civil Services
(8tifeg1wrding of National Security) Rules, 1949. r. 3Constit11tinn of India, Arts. 2211, 311.
'fhc appellant, a public servant, wa:ii; charged under r. 3,
Civil Services (Safeguarding of Natio'1a1 Security) Rules, 1949,
for associating with communists and others engaged in subver..
sive activities. After enquiry, an order was made compulsorily
retiring the appellant fron1 service.
He filed a writ petition
before. the High Court hut it was dismissed. He appellant
contended that the order of compulsory retirement was illegal
and that the High Court had jurisdiction to quash the same.
Hehl, that the charge against the appellant waa not a
charge under r. 3 and accordingly the order of compulsory
retirement was illegal. The rnle contemplated compulsory
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