THE MYSORE STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD versus BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON AND SILK MILLS LTD. & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 November 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 127 | 1962 INSC 326
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 November 1962
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR, A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 629/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 127
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 326
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
THE MYSORE STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD
1962
N.......r.15
f),
BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON
AND SILK MILLS LTD. & ORS.
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
M. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Ekdricily-Revi8ion of rate8 of supply by Government
afltr expiry of aureemenl-Di8pule raised by C0118Umer-lf
liable to arbitration-Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1.948)
8, 76,49,60, Indian Eledricily Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), 8. 62.
Disputes arose between the respondent mills and the
appellant Board relating to the payment of revised rates to the
appellant or its predecessor, the Government of Mysore under
the Electricity (Supply)-Act, 1948. Prior to the constitution of
the Board under that Act in September, 1957, the Government
of Mysore was generating and supplying electricity under the
Electricity Ac\ of 1910. In 1945 agrccmcnts were entered into
between the Government and the respondents for supply of eler,.
tricity to them at'ccrtain rates for a period of five years. The
agreements expired in 1949-50, In March, 1953, the Government increased the ,rates. It again increased the rates from
April, 1956. These revisions were not made by the Government under s. 49 of the 1948 Act as that section came into
force in 1957. The respondents did not pay at the enhanced
rates and moved the High Court under '1rt. 226 of the Constitution for restraining the Government as also the Board, which
after its constitution was added as a party, from levying at the
increased rates. It was urged on their behalf that the State Government was not entitled to increase the rates and that the dispute
between them on the one hand and the Government and the
Board on the other with regard to increased rates was liable to
be decided by arbitration under s ... 76 of the Act of 1948, ~which
had come into force in the State of Mysore on December 30,
1956. The High Coult decided the first point in favour of the Government but did not l:lecide the second. The respondents did not
pay the arrears at the revised rates and the Board threatened to
cut oft' the supply. The respondents then nominated their
arbitrator under s. 76 of the Act. The Board filed applications
before the DistrietJudgc under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act for
a dei:l..-tion t!Mt tbe difp11te was not refcm1blc to 'P'bitratioll
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M"µtm Sta11
El«trrt.il' Board
v.
Ba.,,1alo'' W, 0!11n,
Collon & Silk
Mills Ltd.
under s. 76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. The additional
District Judge who heard the matter held in favour of the
Board. The respondents moved the High Court in revision.
That Court held that s. 76 applied and the respondents
were entitled to call for an arbitration. The Board appealed
to this Court. It was urged on its behalf that in view of the
decision of the High.Court on the writ petition, the claim of
reference to arbitration under s. 76 of the Act was barred by
res judicata and that the expression "other person'' in sttb-s. (I)
of that section, read ejusdem generis could not include a consumer of electrical energy nor was such a consumer entitled to
the benefit of sub-s. (2) of that section as no provision of the
Act of 1948 read with the Act of 1910 authorised reference of
such a dispute to arbitration.
Held, th&t it was well-settled that in order to judge
whether a decision in an earlier litigation operated as res
judicata the court must consider the nature of the litigation,
the issue raised in it and the actual decision. The right of the
Government or the Board to revise the rates and the right of
the respondents if any, to raise a dispute as to the revised rates
and seek arbitration thereupon, a question which was expressly
left open by the High Court, were two different matters and
the decision on the former could not operate as res judicata in
respect of the latter.
The relevant provisions of the Act of 1910 and the Act
of 1948, read together, made it clear. that the Mysore State
Government in the years 1953-56 was free to contract with the
consumers of electricity to supply at such rates as it thought fit.
When therefore the agreements with the respondents came to
an end in 1949-50 it was not bound to continue the supply at
the old rates. The matter rrsted in the region of contract;
express or implied, and could not i'aise a question under the
Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 so ano attract s. 76 of that
Act.
It was not correct to say that ss. 49 and 60 of the Act of
1948 brought the dispute within the purview of the Aci and
that, therefore, it was to be determined by'arbitration under
s. 76(1) of the Act. The revision of the rates could not be
said to be for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act as required
by s. 60 of the Act nor did s. 49 of the Act, properli construed,
attracts. 76(1).·
Ryota of Garbandlw v. Zamindar oJ Parlakimedi (1943)
L. R. 70 I. A 129, referred to.
28.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
None of the provisions of the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act
under which certain questions were to be determined by arbitration, mention the present dispute as a matter for arbitration
either under s. 52 of the former or s. 76 (2) of the later.
Although the words used by s. 76 ( 1) were of wide ampli·
tude, it obviously implied that the question must be one that
arose under the Act or had relation to it. It would be
anomalous to hold that a dispute regarding revision of rates
made by the Government before the Board was constituted was
one under the .~ct of 1948.
Since the dispute could not be said to have arisen .under
the Act of 1948, it was not neceosary to decide whether the
rule of ejrudtm (1t"'ria applied in interpreting the expression
"other person" ins. 76(1) of the Act.
Per Hidayatullah, J.-The dispute relating to revision
of rate~ was not one that could be referred to arbitration under
s. 76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It was not necessary to invoke the rule of ejmdem gtneria to interpret the
expression "other person" in that section so as to bring a con·
!!Umer disputing the rates there_under since no provision in the
Act permitted such inclusion.
William v. Golding, (1865) L. R. 1 C. P. 69, held inapplicable.
Although s. 76 of the Act is very wide in its language, a
qualification has to be read into it that the dispute it contemplates must be one relating to a matter with the purview
of the Act. The Electricity Act of 1910 and the Electricity
(Supply) Act of 1948, read together, clearly show that a dis··
pute bet"''een the Government or the Board on the one hand
and a consumer on the other relating to rates of supply, apart
from any contract entered into, cannot at all arise nnder the Act
of 1948.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 629 to 632 of 1961.
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated
August 19, 1960, of the Mysore High Court in C.R.P.
Nos. 6ll to 613 and 622 of 1959.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India.
T. Rangaswarni Ayyangar, B. R. L. Iyengar and
P. D. Menon, for the appellants.
1962
M,IOll Sl•ll
El«ltiril)I BH"
••w,.11,.,
B-'-11
Coll"' ti Silk
Mids Lid.
/
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mp11 S1111
El«lrltil)I S.v J
a..,.i.,,v. woo1i..
C.1100 Iii Sill:
MU/1 Lli.
A. V. Visimnatha Baatri, D. N. Mukherju and
B. N. Ghosh. for respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No.
629/61).
N. C. Chatterjee, V. L. Narasimhamoorthy and ·
S. S. Slmlcl,a, for respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No.
630/61).
V. L. Narasi,mhamoorthy and S.S. Shukla, for
respondent No. 1 (in C. A. Nos. 631 and 632/61).
1962. November 15. The Judgment of S. K.
Das, Kapur, Sarkar and Dayal, JJ., was delivered
by S. K. Das, J., Hidayatullah, J., delivered a
separate Judgment.
O.s, I.
S. K. DAS, J.-These are four appeals on a
certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of
Mysore under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution. The
appeals have been heard together and this judgment
will govern them all. The appellant is the Mysore
State Electricity Board, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Board) in all the four appeals. The
respondents are four textile mills, each mill being
respondent in one of the appeals. These four textile
mills are : (I) the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and
Silk Mills Ltd., Bangalore, (2) the Minerva Mills
Ltd., Bangalore, (3) Sri Krishna Rajendra Mills
Ltd., Mysore, and (4) the Mysore Spinning and
Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bangalore.
The appeals raise a common qu.~tion of Jaw,
viz., whether under s. 76 of the Electr1c1ty (Supply)
Act, 1948 (LIV of 1948), the respondents are entitled to call for an arbitration in respect of an alleged
dispute between them and the Board relating
to the revision of rates payable by them for electric
energy supplied by the appellan• or its predecessor.
The provisions of two Acts, the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910 (IX of 1910) and the Electricity (Supply)
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
Act, 1948 (LIV of 1948), have to be considered.in
these appeals, and it will be convenient to cite the
Indian Electricity Act, 1910, as the 1910 Act and
the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, as the 1948 Act.
We proceed first to state the facts which have
led to these four appeals. The 1910 Act and the
1948 Act were extended to the State of Mysore on
April 1, 1951, by the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951
(III of 1951 ). But the sections of the two Acts did not
come into force in the State of Mysore all at once.
Some sections of the 1948 Act came into force at once,
and some came into force on later dates. It is suffici·
ent for our purpose to know thats. 76 of the 1948 Act
came into force in Mysore on December 30, 1956;
and s. 5 thereof came into force on September 30,
1957. The Board was constituted under s. 5 by a
Government notification dated September 27, 1957,
to come into effect from September 30, 1957. Prior
to the constitution of the Board. the Government of
Mysore was generating electric energy and supplying
it to consumers of both high tention and low tension
power. On different dates in the year 1945, written
agreements were entered into between the Govern·
ment of Mysore and the four textile mills for the
supply of electric energy to these textile mills at the
rate of 0. 55, of an anna per unit of day power and
0. 35 of an anna per unit of night power, subject
to the payment of certain monthly minimum charges.
These agreements were for a period of five years and
expired on different dates in 1949-50. By an order
dated March 23, 1953, the Government of Mysore
revised the rates for the supply of electric energy and
increased the same to 0. 65 of an anna per unit of
day power and O. 45 of an anna: per unit of night
power. Subsequently, an expert committee, under
the Chairmanship of Prof. M. S. Thacker, the then
Director of the Institute of Science, Bangalore, was
appointed to go into the question of rationalisation
of the rates for power supply in the State of Mysore.
Mysor1 Stot1
El1clricit1 Boilrd
•.
Banialore Wiwlla,
CotlM & Silk
Mills I.Jd.
Das,J
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963) SUPP.
19f2
M..1"" SI/Ill
El#lri<il,1 Bo¢
y.
,,_.,.,. w..i1..,
C'oUo• Ill Sill;
M.ills LU.
Dos, J.
On the recommendation of that Committee, the rates
for the supply of electric energy were again revised
with effect from April l, 1956. This was done by
means of an order dated March 1, 1956. On April
26, 1956, the four textile mills filed four writ petitions in the High Court of Mysore in which they
prayed that the State Government and the Board
(which Board, after its constitution in 1957, was
added as the second respondent to the pending writ
petitions) be restrained from levying or collecting the
increased rates as per the order of March l, 1956,
and that they be directed to continue to levy the
same rates for the supply of electric energy as were
agreed to between the parties in the agreements of
1945. Two points were urged in support of these writ
petitions. One was that the State Government was
not legally competent to increase the rates for the
supply of electric energy. The second point urged was
that there was a dispute between the textile mills
and Government and later the Board, with regard
to the rates for the supply of electric energy and
such a dispute must be decided by arbitration
as provided under s. 76 of the 1948 Act.
We shall read s. 76 of the 1948 Act at a later
stage. We may here observe that of the two points
urged in support of the writ petitions, the High
Court dealt only with the first point and held that
the Government of Mysore was legally competent
to revise the rates for the supply of electric energy.
The second point arising out of s. 76 of the 1948
Act the High Court did not decide. It said that
it expressed no opinion as to "whether or not the
contention of the textile mills that the dispute was
covered by s. 76 of the 1948 Act and should be
determined by arbitration" was sound. The High
Court expressed the view that that question would
have to be determined if and when the textile mills
wanted to enforce their rights under the procedure
laid down under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of
1940). On the findin~ that the Government of
2 s.c.R.
suPREME COURT REPORTS
133
Mysore was legally competent to revise the rates, the
four writ petitions were dismissed on January 29,
1958. By March 31, 1958, the four textile mills
were in heavy arrears with regard to the payment of
the increa:sed -rates for the supply of electric energy
to them, though they had' paid in full according to
the old rates. After the constitution of the Board
in September, 1957, the Board made repeated
demands on ··the ' basis of the increased rates and
asked the textile mills~ to clear all arrears due by
them according to the revised rates. The textile
mills having failed to do so, they were informed
that the Board would cut off the supply in exercise
of its power under s. 24 of the 1910 Act. The
textile mills thereupon contended that a dispute
had arisen between them on one side and the Board
on the other and the dispute had to be submitted to
arbitration under the provisions of s. 76 of the 1948
Act. The four textile mills then nominated their
arbitrator. On November 13, 1958, the ·Board
filed four applications before the District Judge,
Bangalore, under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, in
which it asked for a declaration that the dispute
between the four textile mills and the Board was not
liable to be referred to arbitration under s. 76 of the
1948 Act and also for a direction to restrain the
four textile mills from seeking arbitration in respect
of the alleged dispute. These four applications gave
rise to four miscellaneous cases which were dealt
with by the learned Additional District Judge,
Bangalore, by a common order. The learned Additional District Judge allowed the petitions and held
that the four textile mills were not entitled to the
benefit of s. 76 of the 1948 Act, because the dispute
between the Board and the four textile mills as to
the rates for the supply of electric energy was not
liable to be referred to arbitration under that section.
The order of the learned Additional Dis rict Judge
by which he dispcsed of the four petitions twas dated
April 17, 1959. From that order the textile mills
19'2
-
M:J,,,,.
Sl•I•
Ehelri<ilJ BHri
v.
a..,.111r1 lv;.iltn,
Co1r.. &.Sill<
MUh LI'Du, J.
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
M,pm $11111
E11~triii1J 8-J
v.
s..,.. Wooll<n,
Cotto• (if sui.
Mills I.ti.
Du, J.
preferred petitions in revision to the High Court of
Mysore. Four such petitions were filed in respect
of the four miscellaneous cases. By a common order
dated August 19, 1960, the High Court allowed
the petitions in revision holding that s. 76 of the
1948 Act applied, and the respondent textile mills
were entitled to call for an arbitration fo respect of
the dispute between them and the Board in the
matter of the revised rates. The Board then asked
for and obtained a certificate of fitness from .the
High Court and on that certificate of fitness, these
four appeals have come to this court from the aforesaid order of the High Court dated August 19, 1960.
It may perhaps be stated here that after, the
constitution of the Board in 1957, anothere xpert
committee was appointed to rationalise the various
tariffs prevailing in the State of Mysore with regard
to the supply of electric energy and on the recommendations of this Committee the rates were
revised a third time. But these last revised rates
came into effect from July 1, 1959, when presumably the revision petitions in the High Court were
pending.
Before we embark on a discussion of the
principal question involved in these appeals, it is
perhaps necessary to say a few words about the interrelation of the two Acts, the 1910 Act and the 1948
Act. Section 70 of the 1948 Act indicates that
relation. It states inte1· alia that no provision of the
1910 Act or any rules made thereunder shall have
any effect so far as it is inconsistent with any of the
provisions of the 1948 Act; where, however, the provisions of the two Acts are not inconsistent, the
provisions of the 1948 Act shall be in addition to,
and not in derogation of, the 1910 Act. It would,
therefore, be necessary for us to refer to the relevant
provisions of the two Acts on two points which bear
upon the principal question mooted before us. These
two points are-( a) what are the powers of the Board
2 s.c.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
or its predecessor Government to revise the rates for
the supply of electric energy and can a dispute be
raised by the textile mills with regard to such revision; and (b) what are the provisions in the two Acts
for the settlement of disputes by arbitration and who
are the persons who can be parties to such a dispute ?
In considering the aforesaid two points, a distinction
has to be kept in mind. · We are concerned in this
case with two periods. The first period is from 1953
to September 30, 1957, when the Board was constituted. The second period is the period of the Board
commencing from September 30, 1957, till November
13, 195t8, when the applications under s. 33 of the
Arbitraion Act were made. As we have stated
earlier, the revision which is in dispute in these cases
took place in the· first period, that is, before the
constitution of the Board. We have pointed out
earlier that the third revision of rates took effect
from July 1, 1959, when the revision petitions in the
High Court were pending.
We think it advisable and convenient to refer
to the relevant provisions of the two Acts at a later
stage and in their relation to the points which we
have stated above. We do not think that quoting
the sections at this stage and out of relation to the
two points which fall for consideration will serve
any useful purpose.- We, therefore, desist from
quoting the relevant sectiom at this stage, but are
content to refer here to the difference in the scheme
of the two Acts, namely, the 1910 Act and the 1948
Act.
Very briefly put, the scheme of the 1910 Act
was to empower the State Government, on an application made in the prescribed form and on payment
of the prescribed fee, if any, to grant a license to any
person to supply electric energy in any specified
area. A person holding such a license was called
the licensee. The State Government had certain
powers to give directions to the licensee in regard to
1"2
M;Jrrl S1.11
Ell<lrici1, B-d
••
0 ..,.1,,1 WHll1n,
C•ll••f Iii Silk
Mil/1 Lti.
D111,J.
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP.
Du, r.
the supply of electric energy, and to control the distribution and consumption of electric energy etc.
Section 28 of the 1910 Act laid down that no person
other than a licensee shall engage in the business of
supplying energy to the public except with the previous sanction of the State Government and in
accordance with such conditions as the State Government may fix in that behalf. Therefore, under the
1910 Act there were two classes of persons who
could supply electric energy, a licensee and a sanction holder. The 1948 Act made some radical
changes in the scheme. One such change was that
the expression 'licensee' was given an extended
meaning to take in not merely a licensee licensed
under Part II of the 1910 Act but also a person who
had obtained sanction under s. 28 of the 1910 Act.
The expression did not, however, include the State
Electricity Board which was constituted for the first
time under the 1948 Act. Next, the 1948 Act brought into existence two important authorities, one
called the Central Electricity Authority under s. 3
of the Act and the other the State Electricity Board
constituted under s. 5 of the Act. Section 26 of the
1948 Act, to which a detailed reference will be made
later, lays down that subject to the provisions of the
1948 Act, the Board shall, in respect of the whole
State, have all the powers and obligations of a
licensee under the 1910 Act, and the 1948 Act shall
be deemed to be the license of the Board for the
purposes of the 1910 Act. There is a proviso which
excepts the Board from the obligation of certain provisions of the 1910 Act. Chapter V of the 1948 Act
contains provisions indicating the nature of the
works which the State Electricity Board may undertake and its trading procedure; it includes provisions
giving the Board power to establish its own generating stations to supply electric energy to licensees and
to other persons requiring such supply. Under the
1948 Act, every licensee has to comply with such
reasonable directions as the Board from time to time
:-
1...
>.'-~--
~""
2 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
may give for the purpose of achieving the maximum
economy and efficiency in the operation of the undertaking. Chapter VI deah with the Bo<1rd's finance,
accounts and audit and in it occurs s. 60 which says
inter alfo that all debts and obligations incurred, all
contracts entered into and all matters and things
engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act before
the first constitution of the Board shall be deemed to
have been incurred, entered into or engaged to be
done by, with or for the Board etc. Chapter VII
deals with miscellaneous provisions one of which is
arbitration under s. 76, a section which we shall
quote so far as it is relevant for our purpose.
"76. ARBITRATION.-(l) All questions
arising between the State Government or the
Board.and a licensee or other person shall be
determined by arbitration.
(2) Where any question or matter is, by this
Act, required to be referred to arbitration,
it shall be so referred(a) in cases where the Act so provides, to the
Authority and on such reference the
Authority shall be deemed to have been
duly appointed . as Arbitrators, and the
award of the Authority shall be final and
conclusive; or
(b) in other cases, to two arbitrators, one to
be appointed by each party to the dispute.
(3). Subject to the provisions of this section,
the proVIsions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10
of 1940) shall apply to the arbitrations under
this Act.
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx."
1962
MJSOfl
s,.,,
Eltdridt1 B•rl
v.
BfJlllo/IWI Woollln,
Collon & Sil•
Mills Lid.
Dos, J.
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SUPP.
1162
MJS011 StDl8
El1drki,, Board
v.
Bonza11J11 Woolhn,
Collon & Silk
Mills Ltd.
Das, J.
The arguments presented before us on behalf
of the appellant may be put in two categories: (I)
the first line of argument is that the question of the
power to revise the rate for the supply of electric
energy to the four textile mills during the first period
(1953 to 1956) by the Government of Mysore having
been decided against the respondents by the High
Court on the writ petitions, that decision is binding
on them and the respondents cannot raise a dispute
as to it by reason of the application of the principle
of res judicata, (2) the second line of argument is
that on a proper construction of sub-section (1) of
s. 76, it should be held that the words "other person"
occurring therein must be read ejusdem generia or
noseitur a sociis with 'licensee' and so read, a consumer of electric energy will not be entitled to the
benefit of that sub-section; furthermore, sub-s. (2) of
s. 76 will not help the respondents, because no provision of the 1948 Act read with the 1910 Act requires to be referred to arbitration a dispute of the
nature which is alleged to have arisen in the present
case between the Government or the Board on one
side and the textile mills on the other.
We shall now deal with these two arguments
in the order in which we have stated them. First,
as to the argument based on the principle of res
judicata. We may first refer to the pleadings in the
writ petitions. In paras. 7 and 8 of the affidavits
which the textile mills filed in support of the writ
petitions, they raised two main contentions : (a)
firstly,· that the Government of Mysore had "no
right to increase the rates for supply of electrical
energy in the manner they have done"; it was stated
that there were prior agreements (referring to the
agreements of 1945) and the supply had to be made
at the same old rates since all the terms and conditions of the agreements were observed by both the
parties; (b) secondly, it was stated that the increase
of rates was arbitrary and unfair by reason
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of
the l!J48 Act. A reference was made to s. 26
of the 1948 Act and the Sixth Schedule
thereof. That Schedule inter alia provides that the
licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of
electricity by periodical revision that his clear profit
in any year shall not, as far as possible, exceed the
amount of "reasonable return" determined in accordance with certain rules laid down in the Schedule.
It was pleaded on behalf of the textile mills that it
was possible to find out from the rules the maximum
rate which a licensee could charge under the rules,
and in view of those rules, the revised rates fixe<l by
the Government of Mysore were unfair and excessive.
The prayer which was made in the writ petitions was in these terms :
"The High Court may be pleased to issue a
writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus or
such other appropriate writ, direction or order
restraining the respondent (meaning the
Government of Mysore and later the Board)
from levying or collecting the increased rates
as per the Government order dated March 1,
1956, and that the respondent be directed to
continue to levy at the rates agreed to between
the parties in the agreements of 1945."
The decision of the High Court on the writ petitions
makes it clear that the only point which was urged
before the High Court on behalf of the textile mills
was that under s. 26 of the 1948 Act the Board had
all the powers and obligations of a licensee under
the 1910 Act and as the provisions of the. Sixth
Schedule and the Seventh Schedule of the 1948 Act
were, under s. 57 of that Act, deemed to be incorporated in the license of every licensee, the Board
which had the same obligations as a licensee could
not demand charges for the supply of electricity
1962
M,sor1 Stal1
Elt<tri<il) Boord
v •.
Baa1olor1 WHllM,
Cott.. & Silk
Mills Ltd.
D41, J.
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M:1so11 SltU1
IJ:letlri<ilJ Board
v.
B mtttlor1 WvtMl1n ~
Cott"" & Silk
Milt. Ltd.
Das, J.
which were not in consonance with the principles
laid down in those Schedules. This argument was
repelled by the High Court, and the High Court
pointed out that the Board was not a licensee within
the meaning of the I 948 Act and was not subject to
the rules of the Sixth Schedule thereof. Section 26
of the 1948 Act is in these terms :
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Board shall, in respect of the whole State, have
all the powers and obligations of a licensee under
the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and this Act
shall be deemed to be the licensee of the Board
for the purposes of that Act."
The High Court expressed the view that having
regard to the definition clause in s.2(6) which in clear
terms stated that the Board was not a licensee within
the meaning of the 1948 Act, s. 26 was of no assistance
to the textile mills. The High Court decided that the
plea of the textile mills based on the .provisions of
s. 26 read with the Sixth Schedule of the 1948 Act
was unsound and could not be accepted.
Now, the question is, does this decision operate
as res judicata in the matter of a reference to arbitration under s. 76 of the 1948 Act when the High Court,
in express terms, left that question open ? The learned
Attorney General appearmg for the appellant has
put his argument in the following way. He has
submitted that s.26 of the 1948 Act came into force
in Mysore on September 30, 1957, and the disputed
revision of rates was made by the Government of
Mysore in 1956 when s.26 of the 1948 Act was not in
force there; but under s.60 of the 1948 Act, all matters
and things engaged to be done by, with or for the
State Government for any of the purposes of the
1948 Act before the first constitution of the Board,
shall be deemed to have been done by, with or for
the Board etc; therefore, the Board was entitled to
ask for payment of all arrears of electric charges at
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
the rates revised by the State Government, provided
the State Government had the right to revise the
rates in 1956. That right having been found for the
State Government and against the textile mills, the
latter could not re-agitate the question and ask for a
reference to arbitration under s. 76 of the 1948 Act.
As against this line of argument, it has been
submitted on behalf of the textile mills that having
regard to the pleadings in the writ petitions and the
decision of the High Court thereon, all that the
High Court decided was that the Sixth Sc}\edule of
the 1948 Act did not apply to the Board and the
revised rates could not be challenged on.the ground
that there was no compliance with the principles
laid down in that Schedule. The question whether
the dispute shall be determined by arbitration under
s. 76 of the 1948 Act was specifically left open by
the High Court and, therefore, that question cannot
be shut out by the operation of the principle of
rea judica ta.
We do not think that these appeals can be decided on the narrow ground of rea judicata. There
was some argument before us as to whether a decision
on a question of law operates as re8 judicata, and
the learned Attorney General relying on the Full
Bench decision in the Province of Bombay v. The
Municipal Oorporalion of Ahmedabad(')has contended
that a decision given by a court on a question of law
may not bind the same parties when they are litigating with regard to a· matter different from the one
on which the decision was given : but a decision of
law would be binding between the same parties as
rea' judkata if the right that a party claimed was the
same in the former litigation as in the later. We do
. not think that it is necessary for us to consider in the
abstract to what extent a decision on a question of
law operates as ru judicata between the same parties.
It is well settle<!. that in order to decide whether •
11> .&;1,a. ...._. 1.
1962
J.f,nore Sllll
El#IM" BOJWtl
v.
Ba•1oktiWoolm,
Cottan & Silt
Mills Lid.
Dos, J.
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
My,.,, Slall
Eketrieity Baard
••
Bllli1alo,. Woo/Un 1
CollM t!I SUk
Mills Lid.
Da,J.
decision in an earlier litigation operates as res
judicata, the court must look at the nature of the
litigation, what were the issues raised therein and
what was actually decided in it. In the cases before
us the High Court decided on the writ petitions · that
the Board was not a licensee within the meaning of
s. 26 of the 1948 Act and was not bound by the
principles laid down in the Sixth Schedule thereof.
This was the actual decision of the High Court. It
is indeed true that what becomes res judicata is the
"matter" which is actually decided and not the
reason which leads the court to decide the "matter."
We find it difficult, however, to agree . with the
learned Attorney General that the matter which was
actually decided on the writ petitions necessarily
embraced or included the question of the right of the
textile mills to call for an arbitration under s. 76 of
the 1948 Act. The right of the State Government
or of the Board to revise the rates, and the right, if
any, of the textile mills to raise a dispute as to the
revised rates, are two different matters and the
decision on one cannot operate as res judicata with
regard to the other. As to the right of the textile
mills to call for an arbitration, the High Court, in
express terms, left that matter open.
While we do not agree with the learned
Attorney General that these cases can be decided on
the narrow ground of res judicata, we do think that
a much larger question arises, and this question has
two facets, namely, whether the alleged dispute
about the revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 is a question which at all comes under
the 1948 Act and if it does, do the textile mills come
within the. category of "other person" occurring in
s. 76(1) of that Act ?
Let us first consider whether the dispute at all
comes under the 1948 Act. What were the powers
of the State Government to revise the rates in
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
1953-1956? No provision of the 1910 Act as it
stood at the relevant time has been brought to our
notice which imp<>Sed any restriction on the State
Government in the matter of charging for the electri!(
energy which it sµpplied, though s. 23 of the 1910
Act and some. of the clauses in the Schedule of that
Act imposed restrictions on a licensee in the matter
of charging for electricity which the licensee supplied. The State Government was not, however, a
licensee, either under the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act,
and was not bound by those restrictions. Speaking
generally, the Board takes the place of the State
Government under the 1948 Act. Section 49 of the
l\!48 Act states.
"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of
any regulations made in this behalf, the Board
may supply electricity to any person not being
a licensee upon such terms and conditions as
the Board may from time to time fix having
regard to the nature and geographical position
of the supply and the purpose for which it is
r,?quired :
Provided that in fixing any such terms
and conditions the Board shall not show undue
preference to any person."
It is worthy of note that this section came into force
in Mysore on September 30, 1957, and the revision
of rates made in 1953-1956 by the State Government
was not in exercise of the powers given to the Board
under s. 49. The position in 1953-1956 was that
the State Government of Mysore was free to contract
with the consumers of electric energy to supply at
such rates as it thought fit. The agreements which
the State Government had entered into with the
four textile mills in 1945 had come to an end in
1949-1950 and the State Government was not bound
to continue to supply electric energy· to those mills
at the old rates. The matter rested in the region of
196l
M710tt Sui.
Eketrltil,J Board
v•.
a.,.,• .,. w..u,.,
Collon i'JI Silk
Mills Lt.I.
Du,J.
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mysor1 Stat•
ElttltH.ity Board
v.
Banzai~'' Woo!len,
Collon & Silk
Mills Ltd.
Das,J.
contract, express or implied, and it could not be
said to raise a question under the 1948 Act. If it
W[lS not a question which arose under the 1948 Act,
s. 76 thereof would not be attracted thereto.
Learned counsel for the respondents has sought
to meet this difficulty in the following way. He
has first referred to s. 60 of the 1948 Act. It is
perhaps necessary to quote sub-s. (1) of that section
here.
"60 ( 1). All debts and obligations incurred,
all contracts entered into and all matters and
things engaged to be done by, with or for the
State Government for any of the purposes of
this Act before the first constitution of the
Board shall be deemed to have been incurred,
entered into or engaged to be done by, with
or for the Board; and all suits or other legal
proceedings instituted or which might but for
the issue of the notification under sub-section
(4) of section 1 have been instituted by or
against the State Government may be continued or instituted by or against the Board."
The argument is that the revision of rates made by
the State Government in 1956, looked at either as
a matter of contract between the parties or as something done by the State .Government in exercise of
its powers to fix such rates as it thought fit, shall be
deemed under sub·s. (1) of s. 60 to have been
done by the Board, and if at the time when the
revision was made there was a dispute between the
parties which dispute has continued with the Board
by reason of the Board demanding the arrears at the
revised rates, it must be held that the .dispute arises
under the 1948 Act and may be determined by
arbitration under s. 76 (1) thereof. Learned counsel
for the respondents has further argued that even if
the Board had revised the rates. in exercise of its
powers under s. 49, a section which we had earlier
-
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
auoted, such power would be subject to the provislons of the 1948 Act and would attract s. 76. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the effect of ss. 60 and 49 is that
the dispute is one which arises under the 1948 Act
and must be determined by arbitration as required
bys. 76 (1).
-
We doubt the correctness of this line of argument. First, as to s. 60 of the 1948 Act. The
revision of rates which was made by the State
Government in 1953-1956 rested, as we have said
earlier, either on contract or on the unilateral action
of the State Government. In either case, it was
outside the 1948 Act and was not referable to any
provision thereof. A pre-requisite condition for the
application of s. 60 is that the contract made by the
State Governmenr or the thing done by it must
be "for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act." If
it was for the purposes of that Act and was entered
into or done by the State Government before the
first constitution of the Board, then the contract or
the thing done shall be deemed to have been made
or done by the Board and all suits or other legal
proceedings which might have been instituted against
the State Government could be instituted against
the Board. We have earlier pointed out that there was
no provision in the 1910 Act as it stood at the
relevant time which applied to the State Government in the matter of the rates which it charged for
applying electricity to consumers. In the 1948 Act
also, there is no section which regulates the State
Government in the matter of what it will charge
for electric energy supplied by it. That being the
position, how can it be "Said that the revision of the
rates by the State Government gave rise to a
question under the 1948 Act ?
We now turn to s. 49. That section came into
force in Mysore, we have said earlier, on September
1962
Mysor1 Stall
El1<1tirii, B..rd
v.
s..1.i.n w.01i..
Colloo & Silk
MUil Ltd.
DM, J.
'
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M.lsoTI Sitt.
E',clrUit• Board
v.
Ban1•lorr Woo'ln,
CotlDn & Silk
Mil/sLld.
!Jds, J.
30, 1957. That section applied to the Board after
is was constituted. It had no application in 1956,
and we are unable to see how it can be said that
any dispute as to the revision of rates made by the
State Government in 1956 was a question which
arose under the 1948 Act. The learned Attorney
General has indeed accepted the position that the
Board is the successor-in-interest of the State Govern·
ment and the supply of electricity is one of the
purposes of the 1948 Act. That does not, however,
mean that the revision of rates in 1956 and a
dispute raised as to such revision, became a question
under the 1948 Act by reason of the demand made
by the Board of the . arrears due in respect of the
revised rate. The true nature of the question remain·
ed what it was in 1956, namely, the right of the
State Government to revise the rates, a right which
has no reference to the 1948 Act.
Furthermore, we are unable to accept the
argument advanced on behalf of the respondents
that the expression "Subject to the provisions of this
Act" occuring in s. 49 attracts s. 76. Section 49
seems to give the BC1ard a right to supply
electricity to any person not being a licensee
upon such terms and conditions ;s the Board
may from time to time fix having regard to the
nature and geographical position of the supply and
the purposes for which it is required. The proviso
to the section states that in fixing any such terms and
conditions, the Board shall not show undue pre·
ference to any person. We are unable to agree with
the learned counsel for the respondents that the
section contemplates that the consumers may raise a
dispute with regard to the terms and conditions
and on such a dispute being raised, it shall be determined by arbitration as required bys. 76 (1) of the
1948 Act. The expression "Subject to the provisions of this Act" merely means that if there are
any provisions regulating the Board in the matter
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 147
of supplying electricity to any person not being a
licensee, then the supply by the Board will be subject
to those provisions. No provision has been brought
to our notice which regulates the Board in the matter
of the charges which it' may fix for the supply of
electricity. It has been argued before us that the
expression "having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and the purposes for
which it is required" indicates that a dispute may
arise between the Board and the consumer of electricity in the sense that the consumer may allege that
in fixing the charges for the supply of electricity the
Board had no regard to the nature and geographical
position of the supply and the purposes for which
it was required. The expression "have regard to"
or "having regard to" has been the subject of judicial interpretation. In Ryots of Garbandho v.
Zamindar of Parlakimedi (') their Lordships, of the
Privy Council dealt with the meaning of the expression. They said :
"The view taken by the majority of the
Collective Board of Revenue in making the
order dated October 19, 1936, which is now
complained of, is that the requirement to
"having regard to" the provisions in question
has no more definite or technical meaning than
that of ordinary usage, and only requires that
these provisions must be taken into consideration."
We do not therefore think that that expression contemplates that a consumer of electricity can raise a
dispute as against the Board on the footing that the
Board did not pay due regard to the nature and
geographical position of the supply and the purposes
for which it was required.
It is necessary here to refer to those provisions
of the 1910 and 1948 Acts which require certain
questions to be dctennined by arbitration. In the
(I) (194') L.R. 70 I.A. 129, 168.
1962
MJsor1 Slot1
EUet,i&i'.1 Boord
••
Banialor1 U'oollm,
Col'.. & Silt
Mills Ltd.
Das, J
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
· M 1sor t Statl
Elteiricil,1 Board
v.
9antalore Waolllfl,
Cotton & Silk
Mills Ltd.
Das,J.
1910 Act, the main section dealing with arbitration
is s. 52 which was in these terms at the relevant time.
"Where any matter is, by or under this Act,
directed to be determined by arbitration, the
matter shall, unless it is otherwise expressly
provided in the license of a licensee, be deter·
mined by such person or persons as the State
Government may nominate in that behalf on
the application of either party; but in all other
respects the arbitration shall be subject to the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx."
The section lays down that where any matter is by
or under the 1910 Act directed to be determined by
arbitration, the matter shall be determined by arbitration in the manner laid down in that section. The
scheme is that arbitration will take place only when
any matter is by or under the 1910 Act directed to be
determined by arbitration. There are several sections,
such ass. 7-A, s. 13(2), s. 14 (3), s. 15 (5), s. 16 (3),
s. 19 (2), s. 21 (4), s. 22, SS. 22-A (2) and s. 32 (3)
which require certain matters to be determined by
arbitration. None of these, however, relate to the
rates for the supply of electricity by the State
Government. In the 1948 Act the main section dealing with arbitration is s. 76 'which we have already
set out earlier in this judgment. There is some
difference in the scheme of s. 76 from that of s. 52.
Section 76 is in two parts : the first sub-section states,
in generiil terms, that all questions arising between
the State Government or the Board on one side and a
licensee or other person on the other shall be deter·
mined by arbitration; the second sub-section states
that where any question or matter is by the 1948 Act
required to be referred to arbitration, it shall be so
referred to the persons specified in els. (a) and (b); in
cl. (a) the authority named by the Act shall be the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
arbitrator and in cl. (b) the reference shall be to two
arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party to the
dispute. Sub-section 12) to s. 76 corresponds, more
or less, to s. 52 of the 1910 Act, but sub-sec. (1) of
s. 76 is more general in nature. The 1948 Act also
contains several provisions besides s. 76 {l) which
require certain matters to be referred to arbitration.
These provisions ares. 19 (4), s. 40, s. 44 1(3), s. 45(3),
s. 55 (2) and some clauses of the First and the Fourth
Schedule. Some of these provisions constitute the
Central Electricity Authority, constituted under s. 3
of the 1948 Act, as the arbitrating authority.
Section 19 (4) states that if any question arises under
su b-s. ( 1) thereof as to the reasonableness of the terms
or conditions or time therein mentioned, it shall be
determined as provided ins. 76. Now, s. 19 (1) deals
with the powers of the Board to supply electricity to
any licensee or person requiring such supply in any
area in which a scheme sanctioned under Ch. V is in
force. It is clear that s. 19 (4) does not apply in the
present case. If it did, then the respondents might
be entitled to claim an arbitration under sub-s. (2) of
g, 76.
Thus, it appears from what we have stated
above, that none of the provisions of the 1910 Act or
the Hl48 Act make the present dispute a matter
directed or required to be referred to arbitration
either under s. 52 of the 1910 Act or s. 76 (2) of the
1948 Act. Therefore, the respondents can call for
an arbitration under s. 76 (1) of the Act, if they can
establish that the dispute in the present case is a
question which arises under the 1948 Act. It is
indeed true that sub-s. (1) of s. 76 uses words of wide
amplitude. It states that "ail questions arising bet·
ween the State Government or the Board and a licensee or other person shall be determined by arbitra ·
tion." We, however, think that it is implicit in the
sub-section that the question is one which arises
under the 1948 Act. Obviously, it could not have
1962
M:µor• Stal•
El•ctTr&.ily Board
v.
&nt1alor1 Wo0!l111,
Collon & Silk
Mills Lid.
Da1,J.
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
MJsor1 Stall
Ei..v;,ity a..,,
v.
Bangalor1 Woolltn.
Cotton & Silk
Mills Ltd.
been contemplated that any question arising between
the State Government on one side and any person
on the other shall be determined by arbitration. If
that were the meaning of the sub-section, then all
litigation between the State Government on one side
and any person on the other will have to be referred
to arbitration. We do not think that that can be the
meaning of the sub-section. When the sub-section
states "all question~ arising between the State Govern·
ment etc.," it must lnean questions which arise under
or have relation to the 1948 Act. A dispute between
the Government and a private citizen or a dispute
between the Government and its employee, unrelated
to the 1948 Act, cannot be subject of an arbitration
under this sub-section. If that be the correct interpretation, then the respondents, before they c~n succeed, must establish that the dispute as to revision of
rates made by the State Government in 1956 is a
dispute which arises under the 1948 Act. It would
be anomalous to hold that a dispute regarding revision or fixing rates of supply made by Government
before the Board was constituted arises under the
1948 Act, when eve~ a revision of rates made by the
Board under s. 49 of the 1948 Act will not be referable to arbitration. We are, therefore, of the view
that the dispute in these cases is not one which arises
under the 1948 Act.
Now, we proceed to the third and the last
question. Assuming that the dispute is one which
arises under the 1948 Act, do the respondents, viz.,
the four textile mills, come within the expression
"other person" occurring in sub-section (J) of s. 76?
The learned Attorney General has very strenuously
contended that the scheme of s. 76 (1) is that in the
matter of a dispute, the State Government or the
Board is placed on one side as a party to the dispute
and the licensee or other person is placed on the
other, and having regard to the entire scheme of the
1948 Act, the expression "other person" must take
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
colour from the word 'licensee' preceding it.
He has further contended that the word 'licensee'
in the context of the 1910 and the 1948 Acts
denotes a genus or category and on the application
of the principle of ejusdem generis the expression
"other person" means persons who are of the same
genus or category. He points out that under the
1910 Act, 'licensee' means a person licensed under
Part II of that Act to supply electric energy and
'consumer' means any person who is supplied with
energy by a licensee or the Government or by any
other person engaged in the business of supplying
energy tc the public under the 1910 Act or under
any other law for the time being in force.
'">
There is, however, another class of persons who
may supply electric energy and that class consists of
persons who may be called sanction-holders under
s. 28 of the 1910 Act. The 1948 Act includes both
these classes of persons in the definition of licensee,
but does not include the Board. The argument of
the learned Attorney General is that having regard
to these definition clauses, the word 'licensee' denotes
a genus or category of persons who supply electric
energy to consumers; There is a third class of persons
(other than the Board) who may supply electric
energy and it is this class of persons who are sought
to be included by the expression "other person"
occuring after the expression 'licensee'. It is clear
from s. 49 of the 1948 Act that the Board may supply
electricity to any person not being a licensee upon
such terms and conditions as the Board may from
time to time fix. A similar power is given to the
Board also under ss. 18(c) and 19(1) of the Act.
These persons to whom the Board may supply
electricity may, in their turn, supply electricity to
consumers on such terms and conditions as the Board
may lay down. It is clear, therefore, that the 1948
Act contemplates a class of persons (other than
licensees) who may get their supply of electricity
1'62
Mysor, Stoll
EIHlriei'.> Board
v.
&nza/011 Woo/Im,
Corton & Silk
Mills Ltd.
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1961
M,..,,s1au
Ekeltiett.1 Board
••
Bonialor1 Woolln,
Lolton & Silk
Mills Ltd.
Da,I.
from the Board and may, in their turn, supply the
same to consumers within the meaning of the definition of that word in the 1910 Act. The argument
of the learned Attorney General is that it is this class
of persons who are contemplated by the expression
"other person" occurring in sub-s. (1) of s. 76.
The learned Attorney General has sought to
fortify his argument by the further circumstance that
s. 76(1) obviously does not contemplate that as between a licensee and a consumer, there can be a dispute in respect of which the consumer can call for
an arbitration. · It is argued that this is obvious
from the scheme of s. 76( l) because the licensee or
other person is put on the same side, vis-a-vis, the
State Government or the Board. The argument of
the learned Attorney General is that it will be
incongruous to hold that s. 76(1) does not take in a
dispute detween a licensee and a consumer, but takes
in a dispute between the State Government or the
Board on one side and a consumer on the other, and
he points out that so to hold will be to put the
Government or the Board in a much worse, position
than the licensee. He has drawn our attention to
the proviso to s. 26 of the 1948 Act which excludes
the Board from certain clauses of the Schedule to the
1910 Act and thereby exempts the Board from
arbitration in respect of matters referred to therein.
The argument is that in view of the proviso to s.26
of the 1948 Act, it could not have been contemplated
by the Legislature that the Board would be in a worse
position than a licensee.
The learned Attorney General has also drawn
our attention to ss.75 and 77 of the 1948 Act.
According to him, sub~s. (3) of s. 75 gives a clue to
the meaning of the expression "other person" occurring in s. 76 (1). Sub-section (3) of s. 75 states
inter alia that the Board may require any licensee
or person supplying electricity for public or priv.ate ·
purposes or generating electricity for his own use to
'
[,
I
f[
i
I'
~'-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
153
furnish it with such.information and accounts rc. lating to such supply or generation and in such form
and manner as the notice may specify. This subsection, so the learned Attorney General has argued,
shows that there are persons other than licensees who
may, as required by the Board, supply electricity
for public or private purposes or even generate
electricity for their own use. According to the
learned Attorney General, these are the persons who
are referred to as 'other persons' in s. 76 (1). Section 77 is the penal section and read with s.4 it
makes it clear that there is a third class of persons
besides licensees· or .sanction-holders who may supply
electricity for public or private purposes. Section 4
states that it shall be the duty of each State Electricity Department or other licensee or person supplying
electricity for public or private purposes or generating electricity for its or his own use, to furnish to
the Central Electricity Authority such accounts,
statistics and returns as may be required. All these
sections indicate clearly enoll'gh that besides licensees
holding a licence under Part II of the 1910 Act and
sanction-holders holding a sanction under s. 28 of
the 1910 Act, there is a· third class of persons who
may supply electricity for public or private purposes.
This third class of persons is subject to control by the
State Government, The Central Electricity Authority
or the Board. The contention of the learned Attorney
General is that ,a dispute between this third class of
persons on one side and the. State Government or
Board on the other is the dispute contemplated by
the use of the expression "other person" occurring
in sub-s.(l) ofs. 76. The learned Attorney General has
placed reliance on the decision in Williams v. Golding('). There the question for consideration was
the meaning to be given to the expression "or other
person" in the 108th section of the l\1etropolitan
Building Act, 1855 (18th and 19th Viet. c. 122). It
was held that the expression "or other person" meant
persons ejuadem generis with a district surveyor. that
(I) 1865 (I) L.11..c.P, 69.
1962
MJsor1 Stat1
El«tridlJ Boord
v.
Ba,,1alor1 Woollen,
CollM (!/ Silk
Mil/1 Ltd.
IG4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1912
M,sor1 Sto~
El1d1ility Boartl
v.
Banio/011 Wool/111,
c.11.. 111 Silk
Mi//J Ltd.
Du I.
is, persons having an official duty.
The decision in
United Towns Electric Oo. v. Attorney·GeneralNewfoundland (') explains the application of the
principle of ejus<lem generiB, and it was held that
there is no room for the application of ,that principle
in the absence of any mention of genus, since the
mention of a single species does not constitute a
genus.
As against these contentions of the learned
Attorney General, it has been argued on behalf of
the respondents that the main principle on which we
must proceed is to give to all the words of s. 76 their
common meaning ; and the ejus<lem generiB rule
which is not automatically applicable really means
that there is implied into the language some restriction which is not there ; it is argued that no restriction can be implied from the language of s. 76 so
as to exclude a consumer from the expression "other
person" occurring in sub-s. (1) of s. 76. Ithas been
further submitted .that the word 'licensee' preceding
the expression 'other person' does not denote a genus
or category of suppliers of electricity so as to attract
the operation of the rule of ejus<lem generiB. In this
connection our attention has been drawn to ss. 28,
34, 39, 41 and 43 of the 1948 Act.
These contentions urged on both sides would require careful consideration in a more appropriate case
where a dispute arises under the 1948 Act. In view
of our finding, however, that the dispute in the
.present case does not arise under the 1948 Act, the
question whether the rule of ejuadem generis
applies or not in interpreting s. 76 is purely academic.
We do not propose to determine that academic question here.
Before we conclude, we may refer to another
argument advanced by the learned Attorney General.
The learned Attorney General has submitted that if a
question between the Board and a consumer is to be
( 1) 1939-1 All. E.R. 423.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURTS REPORTS
155
referred to arbitration, then in cases where the Board
itself supplies electric energy there may be thousands
of consumers each of whom may raise a dispute and
call for arbitration. In that event, there will be
thousands of arbitrations and the legislature could
never have contemplated such a situation. This is
really an argument based on inconvenience, and we
do not think that inconvenience is a decisive factor in
interpreting a statute.
1962
-
Myso11 Staid
E/1clridty BoarJ
v.
Bangalorl Wooll1n
Cou.. & Silk
-
Milli Ltd.
l h!, J.
Learned counsel for the respondents drew our
attention to s.51-A of the 1910 Act. That section
states that where the State Government engages in
the business of supplying energy to the public, it
shall have all the powers and obligations of a licensee
under the 1910 Act. There is a proviso similar to
the proviso to s.26 which excludes the State Government from the operation of some of the provisions of
the Act. This section is of no materiality for the
consideration of the cases before us, for it was inserted
in the 1910 Act in 1959.
For the reas9ns given above, we allow these
appeals, set aside the orders of the High Court dated
August 19, 1960, and restore those of the Additional
District Judge, Bangalore dated April 17, 1959.
The appellant will be entitled to its costs throughout,
one hearing fee.
HIDAYATULLA.H, J .-I agree that this appeal
should be allowed, I am of the opinion that this is
not the kind of dispute which can come within s. 76 of
the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. · That section
provides:"76. Arbitration.-(1) All questions ar1smg
between the State Government or the Board
and a licensee or other person shall be determined by arbitration."
Hiday•tullafl, J.
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mysor1 Stat1
E!1ctrieity Board
v.
Bangofor1 Wooll111,
CollDll Bf. Silk
Mills Ltd.
I am of opinion that the ejusdem ge:neria
rule invoked by the apellant to interpret 'other person'
in the section is not required to limit the generality
of the expression because a consumer disputing rates
cannot come within the expression "other person",
regard being had to the provisions of the Act.
Hidayatllllah, J,
The facts of the case have been set out exhaustively by my brother Das and for my purpose
I need only mention that the respondents in these
appeals are four companies receiving electrical energy
in their mills from the appellant. Formerly there
was a contract under which the rate was fixed but
the contract expired sometime in 1949-50 and the
State Government has now· fixed the rates higher. The
respondents have paid the charges for the energy
consumed by them at the old rates and large arrears
have accumulated representing the difference
between the charge at the old and the new rates.
The first revision of rates, it may be mentioned, was
in 1953 and the second in 1956. The present appellant was constituted in 1957 and in all proceedings
to which reference has been made in the judgment
of my learned brother, the appellant has been joined. The respondent companies admit that they are
liable to pay for the energy consumed by them at
the rates agreed in the expired agreements but demur
to payment at the new rates and this has raised a
dispute which they claim must be referred to arbitration as required by s. 76.
The short question in this appeal is whether
such a dispute is compulsorily referrable to arbitra•
tion. Of course, if the dispute is one to which s. 76
applies and the respondent companies in their posi"
tion as consumers, are proper parties to take advant"
age of s. 76, then the dispute, such as it is, must be
referred. The language of s. 76 is both wide and
intractable. But a dispute need not go to arbitra"
tion if it is not a dispute to which s. 76 can apply.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
Also, the section can hardly be invoked if consumers
(such as the respondents) do not come within the
expression "other person", on the principle of ejus.
dem generis or otherwise.
The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948)
was passed in 1948 and it was a measure, as the
long title and the preamble show, to rationalise tl)e
production and supply of electricity and generally
for taking measures c.onducive to electrical develop·
ment. The Act deals with the supply of electrical
energy and its rationalisation, whether such energy
be generated by. a State Government, State Electri·
city Board, a licensee under the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) or a person who, having obtained sanction under section 28 of the 1910 Act,
engages in the supply of electrical energy. The
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, does not deal with
other matters relating to the supply and use of electri·
cal energy which, are, governed by the earlier Act of
1910. The latter Ac~ deals with the grant of licenses
to produce electricat encrgy,and contains provisions
for the supply, transmission and use of electrical
energy by licensees l;}nd non-licensees and generally
with matters connected thereto. Both the Acts are
required to be read together but where they differ
the later Act .prevails,, Both the Acts provide for
arbitration in disputes. The Act of 1910 provides
this by s. 52 which reads : "52. Where any matter is, by or under this
Act, directed to be determined by arbitration,
the , matter shall, unless it is otherwise
expressly provided in the license of a licensee,
be determined by such person or persons
as the State Government may nominate
in that behalf on the application of either
party; but in all other. respects the arbitration
shall be subject to the provisions of the Arbitra·
tion Act, (1940).
1952
Mys(Jfl Stale
ElulricilJ Board
v.
Bant•lo.e Woo/Im
CoU01t & Silk
Mills Ltd.
Hidaya1~ua1r., J.
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Myjor1 Stall
El1~tricity Boa'd
v.
Bangafofl Woollen,
Cotton & s;l/c
Mills Ltd.
Hid~va1111/al, J.
Provided that where the Government or
a State Electricity Board is a party to a dispute,
the dispute shall be referred to two arbitrators,
one to be appointed by each party to the
dispute."
This section enjoins arbitration only in disputes
which arc expressly directed by the 1910 Act to be
determined by arbitration and admittedly none of
those provisions applies. Section 76 is more general.
It enjoins that "all questions" arising between
the State Government or the Board on the one hand
and a licensae or other person on the other shall be
determined by arbitration. Though the section does
not say this, the question must be one which can
arise under the Supply Act. The section does not
mean, notwithstanding its extreme width, that disputes which have no relation to the Supply Act or
its provisions must also be resolved by arbitration
for to hold so would mean that neither the State
Government nor the Board can sue or be sued in
courts. It is, therefore, quite plain that one must
read a qualification into the section that the dispute
must be one touching a matter within the Supply
Act. Some of these disputes are required by the Act
itself to go before the Central Electricity Authority,
one of its duties being to "act as arbitrators in
matters arising between the State Government or the
Board and a licensee or other person as provided
in this Act", vide s. 3 (1) (II). Other disputes are
required to go before two arbitrators : one to be
appointed by each party.
Indeed the four
companies have nominated their arbitrator, given a
notice to the Board and the Board has filed in the
District Court four applications under s. 33 of the
Arbitration Act, in which it has asked for a declaration that the dispute is not liable to be referred to
arbitration. This declaration was given by the
Additional District Judge, Bangi;ilore, but it was
~I
i
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
disallowed by the High Court of Mysore by an
order passed on revision. The High Court granted
certificates on which the present appeals were
filed.
Before dealing with the arguments, it is necessary to refer brief! y to the scheme of the two Acts
to discover whether this kind of dispute as to rates
can arise between the State Government or the State
Electricity Board on the one hand and the consumer on
the other, so as to require a reference to arbitration.
The 1910 Act deals with the supply of energy by
licensees and the transmission and use thereof. It
regulates the grant of licenses to licensees and confers
on the Government the right to control the distribution, supply and consumption of electrical energy.
In addition to the licensees the 1910 Act gives power
to the State Government (s. 28) to sanction generation, supply, transmission and use of electrical energy
by persons other than the licensees. The 1910 Act
also contains provisions for supervising the work of
licensees and persons given sanction under s. 28 with
a view to seeing that they observe the provisions of
the Act .. The 1910 Act contains a schedule divided
to-day into XVI clauses. Formerly, two more
clauses which were numbered XI and XIA were also
in the schedule bringing the· number of clauses to
XVIII. Clauses XI and XIA were omitted by the
Indian Electricity (Amendment) Act 1959 (32 of
1959). Clauses IX,X, XI, XIA and XII deal with
charges for the supply of electrical energy and the
fixation of the rates.
Under the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 the
State Electricity Board. has all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act,
1910, and under s. 26 of the 1948 Act that Act itself is
deemed to be the license of the Board for the purpose
of that Act. There are, however, two exceptions to
this. The first exception is mentioned in the proviso
1962
M710r1 Slall
...
El"trieilJ Boord
Ban1alo11 Woollen,
Cotton fl SUk
Mills Ltd.
Hidoyalullah. J.
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M1sor1 Stall
Eltciricity B .ard
v.
Bangalore Wooltn.,
Cotton & Silk
Mills Lid.
Hid .1_1atullah, J.
to s. 26 by which certain provisions of the 1910 Act
are made inapplicable to the Board and these include
clauses IX to XII of the schedule which deal with
charges for the supply of electrical energy. The
other exception is in the definition of "licensee" in
which it is said that notwithstanding the provisions
of s. 26 the term "licensee" as used in the Supply Act
1948, docs not include the Board. In other words,
though the Board carries on work as a licensee for
the purposes of· the 1910 Act, it is not a Hcensee in
the true sense of the word and duties and obligations
of a licensee in the matter of charges and fixing of
rates for consumption of electrical energy are not
applicable to the Board. It is, therefore, quite clear
that no dispute between a consumer and the State
Electricity Board can arise under the 1948 Act in the
matter of the rates at which the Board supplies
electrical energy. In the present cases, there is a
still stronger reason for coming to the conclusion that
there was no dispute under the Act which could be
referred to arbitration because the rates were fixed by
the State Government in 1953 and 1956 and the
Board itself came into existence in 1957. When we
questioned Mr. Vishwanath Sastri, how he said that
this was a dispute arising under the 1948 Act, he
referred us to s.60 of the Supply Act which makes the
Board a successor of the State Government in respect
of the matters to which the Act applies. He said
that if the State Government was incompetent to
revise the rates in 1953 and 1956, the Board as its
successor would be the appropriate party with which
the dispute can be raised. In my opinion such a
dispute between the State Government and or Board
ori: the one hand and a consumer on the other in respect of the rates of electrical energy (apart from any
contract that might have been entered into) does not
arise under the 1948 Act at all. No provision of the
1948 Act has been brought to our notice which would
embrace such a dispute and as I have already point·
ed out above that it is only a dispute arising under
2 S.C.R.
SUi.>REM"E COURT REPORTS
161
the 1948 Act which can be compulsorily referred to
arbitration.
The next .question is whether a consumer is
included in the expression "other person". The
learned Attorney-General seeks to apply the ejusdem
generis rule. and argues that the expression "other
person" must take its colour from the word immediately ,prei:ed_ing, i. e., licensee. He took us through
the two Acts to show who were the persons who
could be said to belong to the genus "licensee" and
said that persons generating electricity with the
sanction of the State Government under s. 28 of the
1910 Act would be another such class belonging to
the same genus. He relied upon the case of Willium
v. Golding ('), · to support his contention that even
a single category may be regarded as a genus to
control the amplitude of the general words next
following. That case arose under an Act in which
the expression "District Surveyor" was followed by
the words "other person" and the words "other
person" were given a limited meaning on the ejusdem
yeneris principle. The section gave protection to
persons .exercising official duties and was in the
nature of a public authorities protection clause and
the words "other person" could not be extended to
cover a private party not performing official duties.
I doubt whether that ruling can be applied to the
present case. I have already stated that the dispute
must be one which can arise under the Act. If the
whole Act is scanned it will be found 'that consumers
have no place in lt. Wherever the Act uses the word
"other ·person" it invariably means persons who
generate and supply electrical energy and not those
who consume it. The only section to which our
attention was drawn in which a dispute was likely to
arise between the Electricity Board and a possible
consumer (not a licensee as defined in the Act) is s.49.
That section requires that the Board may supply
electricity to any person not being a licensee upon
(I) (1116.!1) L. IL IQ, P.19.
1962
Ai_,,.,, St•l1
El#lri<ilJ Board
v.
Banz.i,,, Woolle•,
C.1t1n Iii Sill:
Mills Ud.
Hi,•yotull.U., J.
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
such tem1s and conditions as the Board may from
time to time fix having regard to the nature and
81111
geographical position of the supply and for purposes
l!/t<lriril.'I s-d
v.
for
which it is required without showing undue pres..1.i.r. w•.u..,
c.11.. (// Si/I;
ference to any person. Mr. Vishwanath Sastri
MU/s LU.
contended that a dispute might arise if the Board
unreasonably refused to supply electricity to a priHU/ay•lwlW., I.
vate consumer or showed undue preference to someone else and such a dispute might be taken to arbitration under s. 76. I do not wish to pronounce any
opinion upon this matter because the present dispute
is not a dispute of this character. For these reasons
I am of opinion that the Additional District Judge,
Bangalore, was right in granting the declaration
sought by the appellants. I would, therefore, set
aside the order of the High Court and restore that
of the Additional District Judge, Bangalore, with
costs on the respondents throughout. One hearing
fee.
Appeals allowed.
M,,.,.
J9fl
Nootmln, J5.
INCOME-TAX OFFICER & ANOTHER, BOMBAY
fl.
THE SIMPLEX MILLS LTD., BOMBAY
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
M. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
I11.C0111£ Taz-ReMsessment-Validity-Admnce payment of
tax found refundable in part on M•mme11l-Paymenl of l.tgal
intereal ta M8esBee-Amendmenl of Tatu redvcing amountRtcovery of excess-Indian Income-tax Acl, 1922 (11of1922),
ss. 34, 18 A (1), (6), (8), (11).
The assessee respondent made advance payment of tu
under s. 18 A(!) of the Income-tax Act for the asscumctn
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