MAHENDRA LAL JAINI versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 November 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 912 | 1962 INSC 312
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 November 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 59/1962
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 912
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 312
Text of the judgment
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
J:J62
Prem Chand Garg
v.
'xcis1 Commissiona,
U. P., A//ah•b•d
calling upon the petitioners to furnish security of
Rs. 2,500/- is set aside. There will be no order as to
costs.
Shah, J.
1962
MAHENDRA LAL JAIN!
November, 7.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND OTHERS
(B. P. StNHA, c. J., P. B. GA.TENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WA'WHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA
and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Compulsory
acquisition--J>ernianent
Lease-Statute
declaring transfer vaid-1Vo provision for cornpensation-F/tatute,
if provides for compulBOry acquisition-Gonstituti'.onality ofDoctrive of eclipse-If not applicable to post-Gon.stitution
stat11tes-U.P. L1ind Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act,
1952 (U.P. I5. of J.1152), s. 3-Gonstitution of India Arts. 13,
JI-Constitution (1i'ourth Amendment) Act, J9,55.
Forest-Declaration as resuve forest-Statute providing
for interim confrol-Gonstitntionality of-Indian /i'orest Act;
1.927 (IU of 1.927), Ghs. lI and JI-Indian 1i'ore$t (U.P. Amen.dment) Act, 1.956 (U.P. ,; of l.9!jli), s. 3.
By a registered lease dated June l 4, 1952, one M granted
a perpetual lease of certain lands to the petitioner. Formally
a large nun1ber of trees ~tood on these lands and the lease deed
recittd that the entire land had been cleared of the trees and
possession given to the petitioner who was made a hereditary
tenant of the land. The U. P. Zamindari .,..bolition and Land
Refarms Act, 195 l, (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition
Act) was made applicable from July I, 1952, In the meantime the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act,
i952 (hereinafter referred to as the Transfer Act) ~'as passed
which came into force with retrospective effect from May 21,
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
913
1962
1952. By this Act all transfers made hy intermediaries after
May 21, 1952, were declared void. The petitioner was ordered
Mah~11dra Lal Jami
to desist from clearing the land and from doing anything
v.
contrary to the U. P. Private Forests Act, 1948. On March 23,
State of U. P.
1955, the respondent issued a notification under s. 4 of the
Indian Forests Act 1927, decla.ring that it had been decided to
constitute certain lands including the lands in dispute a "reserve
forest'". Later, a proclamation under s. 6 was issued calling
for objections from claimants but the petitioner did not file any
objections. In March 1956, the Indian Forest (U. P. Amend·
ment) Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the Forest Amendment Act) was passed which introduced a new Ch. VA consisting ss. 38A to 38G in the Forest Act. A fresh notification was
issued prohibiting variou' acts mentioned in s. 38B. The
petitioner contended that the Transfer Act and the Forest
Amendment Act were unconstitutional and that the restrictions
imposed upon him under these two Acts were illegal. The respondent contended that the two Acts were valid and that the
petitioner acquired no right under the lease and had no right to
maintain a writ petition under Art. 32.
Held, that so long as the lease stood, the petitioner had a
right to maintain the petitio!L The lease created a right in
presenti and not merely some future right. The fact that the
nature of the right was disputed did not affect the right to
maintain the petition.
Held, further, that the Transfer Act was unconstitutional.
It deprived the petitioner of his property without providing for
payment of any compensation and contravened Art. 31.
The Transfer Act was law for acquisition of property when it
was passed in 1952 and the constitution (Fourth Amendment)
Act, !955, which laid down that a law which did not provide
for the transfer of ownership or right to possession to the State
was not a law for the compulsory acquisition or requisition of
property, was not applicable to it. The constitutionality of a
law had to be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood
at the time the law was passed, subject to any retrospective
amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, could not be applied to the Transfer
Act by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse. This doctrine was
applicable to pre-Constitution laws but not to post-Constitution
laws.
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose fl954/
S.C.R. 587, Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P., [1955],I S.C.R.
707, Karam Singh v. Nilial Khan, A. I. R. (1957) All. 549.
{3umhay Dyeing and Manufacturing Go. Ltd. v. The State of
914
1962
·lahendra Lr1[ Jaini
v •.
St•t' of U. P.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
Bombay, [1958] S. C. R. 1122, Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v.
Ths Slate of Bombay, [1955] I S. C.R. 613, Keshavan Madhava
Meno~ v. The State of Bombay, [1951] S. C.R. 228, Bhikaji
Narain Dhr:has v. 1'he State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955]
2 S. C.R. ~89 ancf Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
(1959] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 8, referred to.
Held, further, that the Forest Amendment Act was not
unconstitutional. Chapter VA introduced by Ch. II in the
Indian Forest Act was ancillary to Ch. II and not to Cb. V.
Chapter VA was a mere interim measure to deal with the
situation arising after the Abolition Act while steps were being
taken to constitute reserved forests under Ch. II. As originally
enacted. Ch. VA was ancillary to Ch. II and gave further
powers of control besides those contained in Ch. II. during the
period that proceedings under Ch. II were pending. These provisions which were for the interim protection of the forests pending
declaration of forests as reserved forests were in the interests of
the general public. The Amendment Act of 1960 which
enacted ss. 38H to 38M made no difference to the position that
ss. 38A to 38G as originally enacted were ancillary to Ch. II.
Held, further, that ss. 38A to 38G of the Forest Act were
applicable to the lands in dispute. Chapter II to which these
sections were. ancillary, dealt inter alia with forest and waste
land belonging to the Government. After the Abolition Act.
the proprietary rights in the land vested in the Government and
the petitioner who claimed to have become a bhumidar could
not be a proprietor but only tenure-holder.
ORIGINAL .JURISDICTION :
Petition No. 59 of
1962.
Petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Wanchoo, J.
C. B. Agarwala and J(. P. Gupta, for the
petitioner.
G. S. Pathalc, K. S. Hajela and C. P. Lal, for
the respondents.
1962. November 7. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
W ANCHOO, ].-This petition un~er ;'\rt.. 32 of
the Constitution challenges the constltutlonahty of
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
915
1962
U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers)
Act 1952, (U. P. XV of 1952), (hereinafter called the Mahendra I.al Jaini
Transfer Act) and the Indian Forest (U. P. Amendv.
State of U. P.
ment) Act 1956, (U. P. V of 1956), (hereinafter
referred to as the Fotest Amendment Act.) The case
Wanc~oo, J.
of the petitioner is that he obtained a permanent
lease from the Maharaja Bahadur of Nahan of certain
land known as "asarori" land, situate in the district
of Dehra Dun, in U ttar P~adesh. The area leased
out to him was 1069.68 acres in Khewat No. 1,
Mahal No. 8, Khasra Nos. IA, 1-B and ·2. This
land was originally a Crown grant and had been free
from revenue since 1866. Initially, it belonged to
Major P. Innes· but was subsequently transferred to
the Maharaja Bahadur of Nahan. On January 25,
1951, an agreement was executed by the Maharaja
Bahadur in favour of the petitioner and one Virendra
Goyal for lease of this land for a consideration of an
annual rent of Rs. 2,200/- and a premium of
Rs. 64,000/-. The petitioner's case further is that
the possession of the land in dispute .was delivered to
him at the time the agreement to lease was executed.
It appears tl_iat at that time a large number of trees
were standing on this land and the Maharaja Bahadur
had give,n a contract for the removal of the trees to
another person with a view to making the land culturable, and the intention of the lessor was to demise the
land to the petitioner after the trees were removed,
so that the petitioner may carry on agricultural operations thereon. On June 14, 1952, a registered lease
was executed by the Maharaja Bahadur in favour of
the petitioner and Virendra Goyal and it was recited
therein that the entire land had been cleared of the
trees and had been in possession of the lessees from
the date of the agreement referred to above. Therefore, in fulfilment of the agreement, the lease was
executed demising to the lessees the land in question
on an annual rent of Rs. 2,200/-. The lease was
permanent, heritable and transferable. The lease
also provided that the lessor hacl given the right of
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
..ta/undra Lal Jaini
v.
State of U. P.
Wanchoo, J.
hereditary ten'!ncy within the meaning of the U. P.
Tenancy Act, l!l89 to the lessees. The lessees were
also given the right to put the land to any other use
whatsoever besides agriculture and subterranean
rights were also confer~ed. Tliey had also the right
to sub-let and assign the land.
·
The petitioner's case further is that Virendra
Goyal is merely a benamirlar and has no right, title
or interest in the land in dispute and that a suit for
declaration in that behalf is pending in the Civil Court
at Dehra Dun between the petitioner and Virendra
Goyal. A day after the agreemept of lease was
executed, the U. P Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, No. 1of19fil, (hereinafter referred to
as the Abolition Act), came into force on January 26,
195], and the land in dispute is land within the
meaning of this Act. The Abolition Act was actually
applied to this area by a notification issued under s. 4
thereof from July ] , l 9fi2, shortly after the registered
lease in favour of the petitioner and another had been
made. The contention of the petitioner is that in
consequence of the application of the Abolition Act
to this ar~a, the petitioner became a bhurnidhar of
the land under s. 18 (d) (iii) of the Abolition Act and
that his bhurnidhari rights still subsist. On July 5,
1952, the petitioner and his employees went to the
land to carry on agricultural operations, but they
were stopped from doing so by the City l\1agistrate,
Dehra Dun along with the Divisional Forest Officer
and the Tehsildar, Dehra Dun. He was ordered to
desist from clearing the land until further orders. The
matter was then referred to the Government of l1ttar
Pradesh, and the petitioner was ordered to desist from
doing anything, which was contrary to the U. P.
Private Forests Act, 1948 (U. P. VI of 1949). It may
be mentioned that in the meantime the Transfer Act
which was passed on June 28, J 952, came into force
with retrospective effect from May 21, 1952. By this
Act all transfers made by intermediaries after May 21,
,.
'
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•"'
917
1952, were declared void. The petitioner was therefore asked by the City Magistrate not to do anything
contrary to the Transfer Act until the orders of the
Government were received or the matter was decided
by a court of law. The petitioner's case is that the
land was no longer forest land when the registered
lease in his favour was made in June 1952. The
petitioner then took up the matter with the Government but his representation in that behalf was reject' ed in September 1952.
Thereupon in November 1952, the penuoner
filed a writ petition in the High Court at Allahabad
challeging the applicability of the U. P. Private
Forests Act to the land in dispute and also challenging
the constitutionality of the Transfer Act. An ad
interim order was passed by the High Court in December 1952 restraining the respondents from interfering
with the possession of the petitioner over the land in
dispute and directing that the parties should maintain
the status quo. In February 1955, the petitioner
withdrew the petitoin filed in the High Court for
various reasons into which it is unnecessary to go.
Thereafter the petitioner requested the Collector,
Dehra Dun, to allow him to carry out agricultural
operations over the land in dispute and he supported
this prayer by a further allegation that he had at any
rate become a sirdur within the 1111.:aning of s. :!l 11 of
the Abolition Act and was thus entitled to retain the
land in dispute. The Collector again informed thl'
petitioner that the matter had been 1:cfen cd to the
Government and in the meantime the st11.tas rtno
should be maintained. In his present petition also,
the petitioner in the alternative raises the plea that
he has become a .sfrdar of the land in dispute and as
no steps were taken by the State to eject him within
two years of the date of vesting, namely, July I, 1952,
he was entitled to retain the possession of the land as
8irdf4r.
1962
.Wahendra Lal Jain•
v.
State of U. P.
~Vanchoo, J.
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I963]SUPP.
1962
Mahendrtl Lal Jaini
v.
'Stat4Df U. P.
Wanrhoo, J.
On March 23, 1955, the Government of Uttar
Pradesh issued a notification under s. 4 of the Indian
Forest Act, 1927, (XVI of l.927), (hereinafter referred
to as the Forest Act), declaring that it had been
decided to constitute Asarori village including the
land in dispute a "reserved forest", and appointing
the Forest Settlement Officer Dehra Dun to call for
objections from claimants under ·Chap. Il of that
Act. On April 26, 1955, a proclamation was issued
under s. 6 of the Forest Act, calling for objections
from claimants. The petitioner, however, has made
no claim so far in persuance of the proclamation
issued under s. 6 of the Forest Act, and his reason for
this is that his matter was still under the consideration
of the Government as intimated to him by the Collector of Dehra Dun, and no orders had been passed by
the Government thereon.
On December 3, 1955, the Governor of Uttar
Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance, named as "The
Indian Forest (U. P. Amendment) Ordinance, 1955"
adding Chap. V-A to the Forest Act, and a notification was issued thereunder restraining the claimants
as defined in s. 38-A from doing acts prohibited under
s. 38-B. This Ordinance was made into an Act in
March 1956, namely, the Indian Forest (U.P.
Amendment) Act, 1956 (U. P. V of 1956) by .which
Chap. V-A was introduced into the Forest Act, and
a fresh notification was issued under the Act prohibiting various acts mentioned in s. 38-B thereof. This
is one of the Acts which. the petitioner challenges as
unconstitutional. The petitioner asserts .that the
notification, of March 17, 1956, was cancelled on
December 19, 1956, and thereupon he applied to the
Collector again to.allow him to reclaim the land. The
Collector told him in reply that the orders of the
Government were awaited in that connection. The
petitioner further alleges that in November 1957 the
State of Uttar Pradesh released over 293 acres out of
the land in dispute in favour of Yirendra Goyal, his
f
~
1.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
919
benamidar. The petitioner then made a representa·
1962
tion to the Government in that behalf protesting A1ahendra Lal Jaini
v.
against the release of land in favour of Virendra
State of U. P.
Goyal, and was informed that order had been canWanchoo, J.
celled on August 14, 1958. In May 1959, the legislature ofUttar Pradesh passed another Act known as
the Government Grants (U. P. Amendment) Act,
No. IX of 1959, and the petitioner contends that by
virtue of this Act all other laws ceased to apply to the
land in dispute but as this Act was admittedly repealed by the Government Grants (U. P. Amendment)
Act, No. XIII of l 960, with retrospective effect, nothing turns on this Act now, though the petitioner
approached the Collector of Dehra Dun immediately
after U. P. Act No. IX of 1959 was passed to be allowed to carry on reclamation operations. The Collector
however told him that he should do nothing till specific orders were received from the Government or the
matter was decided by a court of law.
Thereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in
this Court under Art. 32 which was admitted in
February 1960. When this writ petition cam~ up
for hearing on October 25, 1961, this Court was
informed that certain notifications had been issued
under ss.38-B and 38.C of the Forest Amendment
Act. The petitioner was then.. fore allowed on March
19, 1962 to withdraw that petition with liberty to
present a fresh writ petition and thereupon the
present petition was filed in April 1962.
The main contentions of the petitioner with
respect to the two Acts, the constitutionality of which
he challenges, are these. He con tends that the
Transfer Act .is unconstituti~mal, as it deprives the
l~s~ees of thell' lease-hold nghts without any prov1s1011 for payment of compensation in violation of
Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution as it stood before the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. In the
alernative, he claims that even if the Transfer Act
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mahindra Lal Jaini
v.
State of U. P.
Wanchoo, J.
is valid, he has become a sirdar under s. 210 of the
Abolition Act. As to the Forest Amendment Act it
.
'
1s contended that it is unconstitutional as it imposes
unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of
the petitioner enshrined in Art. 19 (1) (f) of the
Constitution. Besides these two main objections,
the petitioner further contends that the notification
under s. 4 of the Forest Act dated March 23, 1955,
was cancelled so far as the land in dispute was con·
cerned and therefore would not affect the petitioner's
case. It is also urged that as no notification under
s.20 of the Forest Act has been issued, it must be held
that the purpose of the notification under s. 4 had
been abandoned. As to the notification under s. 38-B
of the Forest Amendment Act, it mav be mentioned
that the petitioner made no objections as required
under that Act; but he claims that he could not do
so because before the time within which he had to
file objections had expired, U .P. Act IX of J 959 had
come into force and it was not necessary for him to
file any objection in view of that Act. The petitioner therefore p~ays that the Transfer Act and the
Forest Amendment Act be declared ultra vires and
all actions taken thereunder be held to be void as
against the petitioner. He further prays that he
may be declared a bhumidhar or in the alternative a
sirdar under the provisions of the Abolition Act and
the respondents be restrained from interfering with
his possession of the land. He also prays that in
case it is found that he has been dispossessed, a writ
in the nature of inandarnus or any other appropriate
direction be issued against the respondents directing
them to withdraw from possession of the land in
dispute and to permit the petitioner to enjoy such
rights to which he may be found entitled.
The petition has been opposed on behalf of the
State of U ttar Pradesh and it is maintained in the
first place that t.he Transfer Act is valid and constitutional. If that is held in favour of the respondent,
,.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
921
1962
nothing else will survive. for no rights would then
arise in favour of the peritioner under the registered Mahmdra L.t J ainl
••
lease of June 1952. Further, it has been strenuously
Stat• of U. P.
contended on behalf of the state that the petitioner
Wanchoo, J,
never obtained possession over the land in dispute.
It has also been contended that the land in dispute
was never denuded of trees and that it is still forest
land on which a large number of trees are standing.
The petitioner's claim that he has become a
bhurnidhar under the Abolition Act is also denied.
His further claim that he has become a sirdar is also
repelled. The case of the State is that the petitioner
acquired no rights under. the registered lease of June
l952 and has no right to maintain the present petition
n consequence, irrespective of whether the Transfer
\ct is valid and constitutional or not. It is also
contended that the Forest Amendment Act is a valid
and constitutional piece of legislation and the various
notifications issued under the For est Act and the
Forest Amendment Act are perfectly good. Lastly
it is contended that the notification under s. 4 of the
Forest Act has never been withdrawn though no
notification under §. 20 has yet been issued in deference to the fact that the writ petitions filed by the
petitioner one after the other were pending either in
the High Court or in this Court. The three main
points therefore which arise for decision in the present
petition are these : --
Has the petitioner no right whatsoever to
any property by virtue of the registered
lease deed of June 1952 in his favour
irrespective of whether the Transfer Act is
valid and constitutional or not, and therefore has no locns stwndi to maintain the
present petition ?
(2) Is the Transfer Act, 1952, valid and cons··
titutional ?
(3) Is the Forest Amendment Act of l!J5G valid
and constitui:imrnl ?
(I)
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mahnidra lAI Jaini
v.
Stale of U. P.
Wanehoo, J.
There are ·some subsidiary points with respect
to the notifications issued which also arise for consideration with which we shall deal when considering
the three main points mentioned above.
Re. (1).
The petitioner bases his right to move this Court
to protect his fundamental right on the basis of the
registered lease in his favour of June 14, 1952. There
can be no doubt after a perusal of that lease which is
not said to be a fictitious document, that if various
laws had not been passed and had not come into
force that might have affected this land, it would have
conferred a right of property on the petitioner, and
he would be entitled at least to be a permanent lessee
of the land in dispute with such rights as the lease
confers upon him. It is therefore difficult to understand how it can be said in the face of this lease that
the petitioner has no right to maintain the present
petition. It may be that the lease may be of no force
and effect, if the Transfer Act is held valid--which
is a question we shall consider later-; but once it is
conceded that the lease is not fictitious, it does confer
rights in the land affected by it on the petitioner. We
cannot see how the petitioner would have no right to
maintain the present petition irrespective of whether
the Transfer Act is valid and constitutional or not.
What rights are conferred on the petitioner by this
registered lease is a different matter. The petitioner
claims that he has become a bhumidhar under the
Abolition Act by virtue of this lease; in the alternative he claims that he has become a sirdar, as he is in
possession. The State however denies that the petitioner has become a bhumidhar under the Abolition
Act; it also denies that the petitioner is in possession
and in consequence has become a sirdar, under the
Abolition Act. The petitioner prays that his rights
as a bhnmidhar or a sirdar, may be decided in the
present petition. We are however of opinion that it
(
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
923
/
1962
will' not be fair to either party to d.ecide the question
whether or not the petitioner is either bhumidhar or Malundra LIJI Jaial
v.
sirdar by virtue of the registered lease or the possessStau of U. P.
ion of the land demised which he claims, in view of
Wanchao, J,
the provisions of the Abolition Act. The petitioner's
status as bhumidhar or sirdar will depend upon the
decision of various questions of fact, and we do not
think that it will be fair to either party to decide
those questions of fact merely on the scanty documentary evidence available on this record, in particular
as the question of possession is also seriously disputed
and further there is a serious dispute as to whether any
trees stand on this land even now or whether trees
had been cleared as recited in the registered lease,
before that lease was registered; these are all questions
of fact on which oral evidence will be necessary.
There is a provision in the Abolition Act, s. 229-B,
which allows a person claiming to be a bhumidhar or
sirdar under it to file a suit to establish that right.
We think, considering the serious dispute as to facts
which exists in this case between the parties both as to
the nature of the land and as to the possession of the
petitioner, that the petitioner should be left to establish his rights as bhumidhar or as sirdar by suit, or it
may also be possible for him to establish that right by
fling objections in response to the proclamation under
s. 6 of the Forest Act with which we shall deal in
detail later. Therefore even though we are not
prepared to decide the question whether the petitioner
is a bhumidhar or a sirdar, it seems to us that in the
face of the deed of lease in favour of the petitioner,
it cannot be said that he has no right to maintain the
pr.esent petition (irrespective of whether the Transfer
.\ct is valid or not). As we have already indicated,
if the Transfer Act is valid, then the lease in favour
of the petitioner will confer no right on him and in
that case his petition must fail. But if the Transfer
Act is not a valid piece of legislation, the lease will
stand and so long as it stands, the petitioner would in
our opiniort' be competer, :o ~aintain the present
924 SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mahm;;;;z;; Jaini
••
State of U. P.
Wanclzoo 1 J.
petition, though we make it clear that we do not
decide in this petition what right is conferred on the
· petitioner by the lease and whether he is a bhumUlhar
or a sirdar by virtue of the lease and his alleged
possession over the land demised therein. We are
therefore of opinion that so long as the lease s'tands,
the petitioner would have a right to maintain the
present petition, though we express no opinion as to
the nature of that right and leave it to the petitioner
to have that determined in a proper forum.
It is also urged that no present tenancy right
was conferred by the lease on the petitioner though
cl. (2) of the lease purports to confer hereditary
tenancy rights within the meaning of U. P. Tenancy
Act, as the land was at the time covered by trees and
was not fit for cultivation. This again raises the
same question of fact, namely, the nature ofland at
the time of the execution of the lease. It may be
that no tenancy rights may be created in favour of
the petitioner by the lease, if it is found that the land
in dispute was not land within the meaning of the
U. P. Tenancy Act. But that again is a question
which will have to be decided in· the proper forum as
indicated above by us. There can however be no
doubt that the lease did create some right, whatsoever
be its nature, iq. presenti and though the nature of
that right may be disputed, it js not a case where only
some future right is conferred. In the circumstances,
it cannot be said that no right whatever in presenti
was created by the lease, and therefore the petitioner
is not entitled to maintain the present petition.
Lastly, it is urged that the lease was in favour
of two persons, namely, the petitioner and Virendra
Goyal, and the present petition has been filed only by
the petitioner and Virendra Goyal has not been made
a party to it, even as respondent. It is urged therefore that the present petition is not maintainable on
that ground aiso, and reliance in this connection is
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
925
1962
placed on the analogy of suits, where all co·owners
must join in a suit to recover property unless the law A1afundra f,aJ Jait
v.
otherwise provides, and if some co-owners refuse to
Stale nf U. P.
sue, the proper course to adopt ,;is to the rest is to
H'.ini:hoo, J.
make them defendants in the suit. It is enough to say
that this principle applicable to suits for possession caa
have no application to a petition under Art. 32, which
is not a suit for possession. Besides the case of the
petitioner is that the other lessee was a mere
beru.imidar and if that case is right (on which again we
express no opinion, as the matter is 8Ub judice in a
civil court at Dehra Dun), it would be unnecessary
to make Virendra Goyal even a respondent. If the
petitioner has a right to maintain the present petition,
the fact that he has not made another person who
would have equal right with him to maintain the
petition, even a party to the petition, would not in
our opinion entail that his petition should be thrown
out on that ground alone and he should not be grant·
ed any relief in the matter of enforcing his fundamental right. We are therefore of opinion that the
petitioner has a right to maintain the present petition,
though we express no opinion as to the nature of that
right.
Re. (2).
The Transfer Act is a short Act of three sections.
The preamble to the Act says that as the Abolition
Act !1as come into force and it is expedient for the
avoidance of transitional difficulties consequent upon
the said enforcc~ent to regulate certain transfers of
land by intermediaries, the Act was enacted. Section
1 gives the short title, the extent to which the Act
extends and the date from which it came into force,
namely, :May 21, 1952.. though it was actually publi·
shed on June 23, 1952. Section 2 is the definition
section. Section 3 is the main section, which lays
down that notwithstanding anything contained in any
law or contract to the contrary, a lease of land by
an intermediary either granted or registered on or
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
after May 21, 1952 shall be and is hereby declared
.falwndra Lal Jaini null and void from the date of the execution and the
v.
lessee shall for purposes of s. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy
Stai. of U. P.
Act and s. 209 of the Abolition Act be deemed to be
Wanehoo, J,
a person in possession of the land otherwise than in
accordance with the provis10ns of the law for the time
being in force. It is further provided that a transaction between an intermediary and a tenant conferring
on the tenant a right to transfer by sale his holding or
any part thereof either made or entered into or registered on or after May 21, 1952 shall be and is hereby declared null and void from the date of execution.
It will thus be seen that the Transfer Act makes two
kinds of transfers made on or after May 21, 1952 null
and void and thus deprives the transferee of the right
which he ,would otherwise acquire under the transfer.
The contention of the petitiorn;r is that the Transfer
Act contravenes Art. 31 of the Constitution, as it was
at the time the Act was passed, and therefore is unconstitutional, for though the transferee is deprived
of his property, no compensation is provided in the
Act as required by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
Reliance in this connection is placed on the State of
West Bengal v. Suhodh Gopal Bose( 1), where dealing
with Art. 31, the majority of the Court held that Art.
31 protects the right to property by defining the limits
on the power of the State to take away private
property. It was further held that clause (1) and (2)
of Art. 31 were not mutually exclusive in scope and
content, but should be read together and understood
as dtaling with the same subject, namely, the protection of the right to property by means· of the limitations on the State power referred to above, the
deprivation contemplated in cl. t l) being no other
than the acquisition or taking possession of property
referred to in cl. (2). The decision in Subodh Gopal's
case(1) was refered to in Saghir Ahmad v. The State
of U. P.('), and it was pointed out that in view of the
majority decision in that case, it must be taken to be
settled that "clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 are not
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R, 707.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
927
1962
mutually exclusive in scope but should be read to.gether as dealing with the same su~ject, namely, the Mahendra Lal Jair
v.
protection of the right to property by means of limiStall of U. P.
tations on the State's powers, the deprivation contemWanchoo, J.
plated in clause (1) being no other than acquisition or
taking possession of the property referred to in clause
(2)". Soon after the decision in Suhodh Gopal' s case('),
Art. 31(2) was amended by the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, and cl. (2A) was introduced
in Art. 31, the amendment being prospective. The
new cl. (2-A) of Art. 31 lays down that "where a law
does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or
right to possession of any property to the State or to
a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it
shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory
acquisition or requisition of property, notwithstanding
that it deprives any person of his property." This
amendment thus accepted the minority view of
Das, J., as he then was, in l:Jubodh Gopal's case(') and
made it clear that mere deprivation of property,
without the ownership or right to possession being
transferred to the State, would not attract the provisions of Art. 31(2). The contention on behalf of the
petitioner is that the amendment to Art. 31 being not
retrospective would not apply to the consideration of
the constitutionality of the Transfer Act, which would
have to be considered on the basis of the Constitution
as it ~.tood in 1952. It is not seriously disputed on
behalf of the respondents that if the Constitution as
it stood in. 1952 has to be applied to judge the constitutionalitv of the Transfer Act, the case would be
completely' covered by the decision in Subodh Gopal's
case('), and the Transfer Act not having provided
for payment of compensation, as required by Art.
31(2), as it stood in 1952, would be unconstitutional.
We are unable to agree with the view taken by the
High Court at Allahabad in Karam Singh v. Nihal
Khan(') insofar as it upholds the validity of the
Transfer Act.
·
'11·'
.
(I} [l 954) S.C.R:: 587,
(2) A.I.R. (1957) All. 549,
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
-MaMndra Lal laid
v.
Stal• oJ U. P.
Wanchoo, J.
The contention on behalf of the respondents in
support of the constitutionality of the Transfer Act
is, however, two·fold. In the first place, it is urged
that the constitutionality of the Transfer Act must
be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood
on the date of the present petition and not as it stood
on the date of the Transfer Act. Reliance in this
connection is placed on Bombay Dye·inq and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay (1), where
it was observed at p. 1131, that it was not disputed
that the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act which
introduced cl. (2-A) in Art. 31 was not retrospective,
and that the rights of the parties must be decided in
accordance with the law as on the date of the writ
petition. It is urged that this observation is an
authority for the proposition that in every case the
constitutionality of an Act has to be judged by the
Constitution as it stood on the date of the writ petition. We are of opinion that this observation is not
capable of this interpretation and could not have
intended to lay down any such proposition. The
judgment in the Bombay Dyeing case (') nowhere
considers the question whether the constitutionality of
an Act has to be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood on the date on which the Act was
passed or on the basis of the Constitution as it stood
on the date the writ petition was made. In that case
it made no difference whether the Constitution as it
stood on the date the Act was passed or on the date
when the writ petition was filed, was applied, for the
writ petition was filed long before the Constitution
Fourth Amendment was enacted. The observation
therefore in that case that the constitutionality of an
Act has to be judged on the basis of the Constitution
as it stood on the date of the writ petition,
cannot be ·given the meaning which the learued
counsel for the respondents put on it,, particularly, as
the context shows that the amendment of the Article
by the Constitution (~ourth Ame?d~ent). Act was not
retrospective. Now, if the const1tutionahty Wall to be
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1122.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
1962
judged by the date of the writ petition, the result
would be that sometime the Fourth Amendment of J.fakndra la! Jaini
v.
Art. 31 would become retrospective and sometimes it
Slate of U. P.
would not, depending upon whether the writ petition
Wanehoo .I.
was filed before the Fourth Amendment Act was
passed or after the said amendment. If the writ
petition was filed before the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, the same provision of an Act would
be unconstitutional while if it was filed after the
Fouth Amendment Act, it may be constitutional.
.Such a result is obviously impossible to accept and
could not have been meant by the observation in
Bornhay Dyeing case (1). It is in our opinion absolutely elementary that the constitutionality of an Act
must be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it
was on the date the Act was passed, subject to any
retrospective amendment of the Constitution. Therefore, the argument that the constitutionality of the
Transfer Act must be judged on the basis of the
Constitution as it stood on the date of the present writ
petition has no force and must be rejected. We have
already indicated that if the constitutionality is to be
judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood
when the Transfer Act was passed, it is not seriously
disputed that the Transfer Act would be unconstitutional, in view of the decision of this Court in Subodh
Gopal's case (').
1
The secon~ contention on behalf of the respondents is that even if the Transfer Act was unconstitutional, when it was passed, the inconsistency having
been removed on the enactment of the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act by which Art. 31 was
amended, the Transfer Act revived and became effective, at any rate from the date the Fourth Amendment Act came into force. This brings us to a consideration of the doctrine of eclipse, on which the contention is based. This doctrine first came to be
considrred in Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The 8t,ate
of Bomby (3) where Venkatarama Aiyar, J. drew a
(I) (1958] s.C.R. 1122.
•
(2) (1954] s.c.R. 587.
(31 (1955] I S. C. R, 6131
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
fahenndra L21 Jaini
v.
State of U. P.
Wanchoo, J.
distinction between the invalidity arising out of lack
of legislative competence and that arising by
reason of a check imposed upon the legislature
by the provisions contained in the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights. He relied on an earlier
decision of this Court in Keshavan ]}fadhava ,~fenon
v. The State of Bombay (1) and was of the view
that the word "void" in Art. 13 (1) should _be construed as meaning in the language of the American
Jurists as "relatively void". It may however be
observed that the laws under consideration in
Keshavan Madhava JJ!enon's case (') as well as in
Behram Khurshed Pasikaka (') were both pre-Constitution laws, and the effect of Art. 13 (1) had to be
considered with respect to their constitutionality.
llehrnm Khurshed Pesikaka's (')case was later referred to a larger Bench in view of the constitutional
questions involved and in the majority judgment of
the Constitution Bench, Ivfahajan, C. J., pointed out
that there was no scope for introducing terms like
"relatively void", coined by AmericanJurists in construing a Constitution . which is not drawn up in
similar language. The majority also observed that
they were not able to endorse the opinion expressed
by Venkatarama Aiyar, J., that a declaration of unconstitutionality brought about by lack of legislative power stood on a different footing from a declaration of unconstitutionality brought about by reason
of abridgement of fundamental rights, and that it
was "not correct to say that constitutional provisions
in Part III of the Constitution merely operated as a
check on the exercise of legislative power. It was
also observed that when the law-making power of a
State is restricted by a written fundamental law, then
any law enacted, which is opposed to the fundamental law was in execs~ of the legislative authority
and was thus a nullity. Both these declarations of
unconstitutionality go to the root of the power itself
and there was no real dtstinction between .them and
they represent two aspects of want of legislative power.
(I) (1951) s. a. R. 228.
(2~ (1955] 1
s. a. R. 613,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
1962
Finally, it was added that a mere reference to the
provisions of Art. 13 (2) and Arts. 245 and 246 was Mahendra Lal Jai1
sufficient to indicate that there was no competency
v.
State of U. P,
in Parliament or a State legislature to make a law
which comes into clash with part III of the ConstituWanchoo, J.
tion after the coming into force of the Constitution.
Then came the decision in Saghir Ahnwd's
case (1). In that case the law under consideration had
been pased after the coming into force of the Consitution, and the judgment of the Constitution Bench
was unanimous.
The question there to be
considered was the effect of the Constitution (First
Amendment} Act, which was passed shortly after the
Act under challenge there was pas~ed. It was observed that "amendment of the Constitution which
came later cannot be invoked to validate an earlier
legislation which must be regarded as unconstitutional when it was passed", and the observation of
Prof. Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations to the effect that "a statute void for unconstitutionality is dead and cannot be vitalised by a
subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing
the constitutional objection but must be re-enacted"
was accepted as sound, and the Court therefore came
to the conclusion that the legislation in question
which violat-ed the fundamental right of the appellants under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and
was not shown to be protected by cl. 6 of the Article,
as it stood at the time of the enactment must be held
to be void under Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution. The
Court further held that the Act then under consideration also violated Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution and
thus was invalid. It will be seen therefore th~t the
doctrine of eclipse was not applied to the case of a
post-Constitution law, which was unconstitutional as
it was in violation of the Art. 17 (1) (g) and was not
protected by Art. 19 (6) and also because it was in
violation of Art. 31 (2) .. Saghir Ahmad's case(') in
effect completely demi:ihshes the argument raised on
(I} [1955] I S.C.R. 707.
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
1ahendra Lal Jaini
v.
Staie of[) P.
Jt'anchoo 1 J.
behalf of the respondents that a post-Constitution
law which is void under Arts. 19 (1) and 31 (2) of the
Constitution and is thus void from birth can be
revived under the doctrine of eclipse.
The respondents, however, rely on the next
case in this seriet, namely, _Bhikaji Narain Dhakaras
v. 'Phe State of Jlrfadhya Pradesh('). That case was
however dealing with a pre-Constitution law and
not with a post-Constitution law. In that case an
argument was put forward that Saghir Ahmad's
case(') would apply. But it was held that thatwould not
be so far the simple reason that Saghir Ahmad's
case (') was dealing with a post-Constitution law,
while that case was concerned with a pre-Constitution
law. It was in that connection that Art. 13 (1) came
to be considered, and it was observed that tr.e true
cffcct of the Article is to render an Act, inconsistent
with a fundamental right, inoperative to the extent
of the inconsistency. It was further observed that
"it is overshadowed by the fundamental right and
remains dormant but is not dead". With the
amendment made in the Constitution, it was pointed
out, the provisions of the particularAct were no Jonget
inconsistent therewith and the result was that the
impugned Act began to operate once again from the
date of such amendment. In that connection, it was
observed at p. 599 that "the true position is that the
impugned law became, as it were eclipsed, for the
time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of
the Constitution (First Amendment), Act, 1951, was
to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act
free from all blemish or infirmity". It was further
pointed out that "the American authorities refer only
to post-Constitution laws which were inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution. Such laws never
came to life but were still-born as it were. The
American authorities therefore cannot (ully apply to
pre-Constitution laws which were perfectly valid
before the Constitution". The respondents, however,
(IJ [1955] 2 s.c.R. 589.
(2) [1955) 1 s.c.R. 101.
,. _
,
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
933
rely on the following passage at p. 599 : "But apart from this distinction between pre·
Constiution and post-Constitution laws on which,
however, we need not rest our decision, it must be
held that these American authorities can have
no application to our Constitution. All laws,
existing or future, which are inconsistent with
the provisions of Part III of our Constitution
are, by the express provision of article 13, ren·
dered void 'to the extent of such inconsistency'.
Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They
existed for the purpose of pre-Constitution rights
and liabilities and they remained operative,
even after the Constitution, as against 1,on citizens. It is only as against the citizens that they
remained in a dormant or moribund condition".
It is true that the learned Judges did say that they need
not rest their decision on the distinction between pre·
Constitution and post-Constitution laws ; but the later
part of these observations where the learned.Judges say
that such laws are not dead for all purposes shows
that they had in mind pre-Constitution laws, for otherwise they could not have said that they existed for the
purpose of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and
they remained operative even after the Constitution
as against non-citizens. We are therefore of opinion
that the decision in Bhikaji Narain's case (')must be
confined to pre-Constitution laws to which the doctrine
of eclipse would apply. We are fortified in this
opinion by the fact that the learned Judges in
Bhikaji Narain's case(') themselves distinguished the
earlier decision in Saghir Ahmad's case('), to which
Das Acting C. ], who delivered the judgment in
Bhikaji Narain's case(') was also a party.
Next we come to the last case on the point,
namely, Deep Ohandv. The Stateo.fUttar Pradesh(").
In that case, the majority after referring to all these
(ll [1959] 2 s.c.R. 589.
12) [1955] l s.c.R. 101.
(3) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. B.
1962
Mahendra Lal Jaini
v.
Stattof U. P.
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Mahend1a Lal Jaini
v.
Stale of U. P.
Jt'anchoo, J.
cases pointed out the distinction between Arts. 13(1)
and 13(2), and further held that the limitations imposed by Chap. III on legislative power were on the
same level as the competence of the legislature to
make laws. The following observations at p. 20 will
bring out the position clearly :"Parliament and the Legislatures of States have
power to male laws in re~pect of any of the
matters enumerated in the relevant Lists in the
Seveth Schedule and that power to make laws is
subject to the provisions of the Constitution,
including Art. 13., i.e., the power is made subject
to the limitations imposed by Part III of the
Constitution. The general power to that extent
is limited. The Legislature, therefore, has no
power to make any law in derogation of the
injunction contained in Art. 13. Art. 13(1)
deals with laws in force in the territory of India
before the commencement of the Constitution
and such laws insofar as thev are inconsistent
with the provisions of Part, III shall to the
extent of such inconsistency be void.
The clause, therefore, recognises the validity
of the pre-ConstitUtion laws and only declares
that said laws would be void thereafter to the extent of their inconsistency with
Part III ; whereas clause (2) of that Article
imposes a prohibition on the State making laws
taking away or abridging the rights conferred
by Part III, and declares that laws made in
contravention of this clause shall to the extent
of the contravention be void. There is a clear
distinction between the two clauses. Under
clause (1) a pre-Constitution law subsists except
to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III, whereas no post-Constitution
law can be made contravening the provisions of
Part III and therefore the law to that extent,
though made, is a nullity from its inception".
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
The minority however thought that it was not necessary to decide this question in that case, and therefore
did not finally express its views.
,
A review of these authorities therefore in our
opinion elearly shows that the doctrine of eclipse will
apply to pre-Constitution laws which are governed
by Art. 13(1) and would not apply to post-Constitution
laws which are governed by Art. 13(2). It is, however, urged bn behalf of the respondents that on the
language of Art. 13(1) and (2) there should be no
difference in the matter of the application of the
doctrine of eclipse. It is said that Art .. 13(1) prescribes that insofar as the existing laws are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, they shall to the
extent of such inconsistency be void. Similarly, Art.
la(2) provides that any law made in contravention of
this clause shall to the extent of the contravention be
void. The argument is two-fold. In the first place,
it is urged that the words "to the extent of the inconsistency" or "to the extent of the contravention"
mean '·so long as the inconsistency continues or so
long as the contravention continues." We are of
opinion that this is not the meaning of these words
in Art. 13(1) and (2). Obviously, the Constitution
makers when they used the words "to the extent of"
in both clauses intended that the pre-existing law or
the post-Constitution law should only be void as far
as the inconsistency or the contravention went i.e. if
only a part of the law was inconsistent or contravened the constitutional prohibition, that part alone
would be void and not the entire law. The obvious
intention behind the use of the words "to the extent
of" was to save such parts of a law as were not inconsistent with or in making which the State did not
contravene the prohibition against infringement of
fundamental rights and that distinction may conceivably introduce considerations of severability ; it has
in our opinion no reference to the time for which the
voidness is to continue. Where the Constitution
1962
Mahenrfro I.al Jain:
"'
State of U P.
Wanchoo J.
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
Mah1ndra L2l Jaiui
v.
Stal• of U. P.
Wuncho°' J.
makers intended to refer to time they have used specific words for that purpose ; as, for instance, in Art.
251. That Article deals with "inconsistency between
laws made by Parliament under Articles 249 and 250
and laws made by the Legislatures of States", and
provides that" ........... the law made by Parliament,
whether passed before or after the law made by the
Legislature of the State, shall prevail, and the law
made by the Legislatur11 of the State shall to the
extent of the repugnancy but so long only as the law
made by Parliament continues to have effect, be inoperative." If therefore the Constitution makers
intended that the provisions in Art. 13(1) and (2)
would only affect laws so long as inconsistency
continued or contravention lasted, they could have
provided specifically for it. On a plain construction
of the clause, the element of time must be excluded.
We cannot therefore accept the contention that the
words "to the extent of" import any idea of time. In
our opinion, they only import the idea that the law
may be void either wholly or in part and that only
such portions will be void as are inconsistent with
Part III or have contravened Part III and no more.
We may in this connection also refer to the difference in the language and scope of Art. 13(1) and
13(2). Art. 13(1) clearly recognises the existence of
pre-existing laws in_ force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of the Cons·
titution and then lays down that in so far as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, they shall
be void to the extent of such inconsistency. The pre·
Constitution laws which were perfectly valid when
they were passed and the existence of which is recognised in the opening words of Art. 13( 1) revive by
the removal of the inconsistency in question. This in
effect is the doctrine of eclipse, which if we may say
so with respect, was applied in Bhikaji Narain's
case.(')
!Il [1955] 2 s.c.R. 589.
r-
,
l S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
937
Art. 13(2) on the other hand begins with an
injunction to the State not to make a law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III.
There is thus a constitutional prohibition to the State
against making laws taking away or abridging fundamental rights. The legislative power of Parliament
and the Legislatures of States un<ler Art. 245 is subject
to the other provisions of the Constitution and therefore subject to Art. 13(2), which specifically prohibits
the State from making any law taking away or
abridging the fundamental rights. Therefore, it seems
to us that the prohibition contained in Art. 13( 2)
makes the State as much incompetent to make a law
taking away or abridging the fundamental rights as
it would be where law is made against the distribution
of powers contained in the Seventh Schedule to the
Consittution between Parliament and the Legislature of a State. Further, Art. 13(2) provides that the law shall be void to the
exte11t of the contravention. Now contravention
in the context takes place only once when the
law is made, for the contravention is of the
prohibition to make any law which takes away or
abridges the fundamental rights. There is no question of the contravention of Art. 13 (2) being a continuing matter. Therefore, where there is a question
of a post-Constitution law, there is a prohibition
against the State from taking away or abridging
funJamen ta! rights and there is a further provision
that if the prohibition is contravened the law shall be
void to the extent of the contravention. In view of
this clear provision, it must be held that unlike a law
covered by Art. 13(1) which was valid when made,
the law made in contravention of the prohibition
contained in Art. 13 (2) is a still-born law either
wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the
c<;>ntravention. Such a law is dead from the beginnm·~ and there can be no question of its revival under
the doctrin~ of eclipse. A plain reading therefore of
the words m Art. 13(1) and Art. 13(2) brings out a
1962
Maherulr4 Lal J11ir1
v.
Si.te of U. P
U112nchoo J
938 SUPREME GOURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
clear distinction between the two. Art. 13( 1) declares
.\fahendrtt Lal Jaini such pre-Constitution laws as are inconsistent with
v.
fundamental rights void. Art. 13 (2) consists of two
Slat# of U.P,
parts; the first part imposes an inhibition on the power
Wanchoo, f.
of the State to make a law contravening fundamental
rights, and the .second part, which is merely a consequential one, mentions the effect of the breach. Now
what the doctrine of eclipse can revive is the operation of a law which was operative until the Constitution came into force and had since then become
inoperative either wholly or partially; it cannot confer
power on the State to enact a law in breach of Art.
13(2) which would be the effect of the application of
the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws.
Therefore, in the case of Art. 13(1) which applies to
existing law, the doctrine of eclipse is applicable as
laid down in Bhikuji Narain's case (1), but in the
case of a law made after the Constitution came into
force, it is Art. 13(2) which applies and the effect of
that is what we have already indicated and which was
indicated by this Court as far back as Saghir Ahinvd' s
cuse (").
It is however urged on behalf of the respondents that this would give a different meaning to
the word "void" in Art. 13 (1). as compared to
Art. 13 (2). We do
not
t1iink so. The
meaning of the word "void" in Art .. 13 (1) was considered in Keshava Madhava Menon's case (8) and
again in Behrain Khurshed Pesikaka's case ('). In
the later case, Mahajan, C. J., pointed out that the
majority in Keshava JJ1adhava Menon's case (3) clearly
held that the word "void" in Art. 13(1) did not mean
that the statute stood repealed and therefore obliterated from the statute book; nor did it mean that the
said statute was void ab initio. This, in our opinion,
if we may say so with respect, follows clearly from
the language of Art. 13(1), which pre-supposes that
the existing laws are good exc~pt to the extent of the
inconsistency with the fund2mental rights. Besides
(I) [1955) I S.C.R. 589
cs) (1951) s.c.R. 288.
(2) [1935) I S.C.R. 7!Y/.
c+i (1955] 1 s.c.a. &1s.
I S.C.R.
·,
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
939
1962
there could not be any question of an existing law
being void ab initio on account of the inconsistency Mahendrs Lal l•iri·
with Art. 13(1), as they were passed by competent Stai- ofv. U. P.
legislatures at the time when they were enacted.
Wanchoo, J.
Therefore, it was pointed out that the effect of
Art. 13(1) with respect to existing laws insofar as they
were unconstitutional was only that it nullified them,
and made them "ineffectual and nugatory and devoid
of any legal force or binding effect". The meaninl:(
of the word "void" for all practical purposes is the
same in Art. 13(1) as in Art. 13(2), namely, that the
laws which were void were ineffectual and nugatory
and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. But
the pre-Constitution laws could not become void from
their inception on account of the application of
Art. 13(1). The meaning of the word "void" in
Art. 13 (2) is also the same viz., that the laws are
ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal
force on binding effect, if they contravene Art.
13(2). But there is one vital difference between
pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws in this
matter. The voidness of the pre-Constitution
laws is not from inception.
Such voidness
supervened when the Constitution came into force;
and so they existed and operated for sometime and
for certain purposes; the voidness of post-Constitution
laws is from ~heir very .inception and they cannot
t~e~efo~e contmue to cxISt. for any purpose. This
d1stmct10n between the v01dness in one case and the
voidness in the other arises from the circumstance
that one is a pre-Constitution law and the other is a
post-Constitution law; but the meaning of the word
"voi?" ~s the same in either case, namely, that the
law 1s meffectual and nugatory and devoid of any
legal force or binding effect.
Then comes the question asto what is the
effect of an amendment of the Constitution in the
two types of cases. So far as pre-Constitution
lav.:s are ~oncerned, the amendment of the Constitution which removes the inconsistency will result
940 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
in the revival of such laws by virtue of the doctrine
of
eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji Narain' s case (1)
Molundra Lal Jaini
v.
for the pre-existing laws were not still-born and
State of U. P.
would still exist though eclipsed on account of the
inconsistency to govern pre-existing matters. But in
Wanchoo, J,
the case of post-Constitution laws, they would be
still born to the extent of the centravention. And
it is this distinction which results in the impossibility
of applying the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws, for nothing can be revived which never
had any valid existence. We are therefore of
opinion that the meaning of the word "void" is the
same both in Art. 13 (1) and Art. 13 (2), and that
the application of the doctrine of eclipse in one case
and not in the other case does not depend upon
giving a different meaning to the word "void" in
the two parts of Art. 13; it arises from the inherent
difference between Art. 13 (1) and Art. 13 (2) arising from the fact that one is dealing with pre-Constitution laws, and the other is dealing with postConstitution laws, with the result that in one case
the laws being not still-born the doctrine of eclipse
will apply while in the other case the laws being stillborn-there will be no scope for the application of the
doctrine of eclipse. Though the two clauses form
part of the same Article, there is a vital difference
in the language employed in them as also in their
content and scope. By the first clause the Constitution recognises the existence of certain operating
laws and they are r'eolared void, to the extent of their
inconsistency with fundamental rights. Had there
been no such declaration, these laws would have continued to operate. Therefore, in the case of preConstitution laws what an amendment to the Constitution does is to remove the shadow cast on it by
this declaration. The law thus revives. However,
in the case of the second clause, applicable to postConstitution laws, the Constitution does not recognise
their existence, having been made in defiance of a
prohibition to make them. Such defiance makes the
11) [1955] 2 s.a.R. 589,
I
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•
I S.C.R.
.l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9-!l
law enacted void. In their case therefore there can
be no revival by an amendment of the Constitution,
though the bar to make the law is removed, so far as
the period after the amendment is concerned. In
the case of post-Constitution laws, it would be hardly appropriate to distinguish between laws which arc
wholly void-as for instance, those which contravene
Art. 31-and those which are substantially void but
partly valid,-as for instance, laws contravening
Art. 19. Theoretically, the laws falling under the
latter category may be valid qua non-citizens; but
that is a wholly unrealistic consideration and it seems
to us that such notionally partial valid existence of
the said laws on the strength of hypothetical and
pendantic considerations cannot justify the application of the doctrine of eclipse to them. All postConstitution laws which contravene the mandatory
injunction contained in the first part of Art. 13 (2)
are void, as void as are the laws passed without
legislative competence, and the doctrine of eclipse
does not apply to them. We are therefore of opinion
that the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act
cannot be applied to the Transfer Act in this case
by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse It follows therefore that the Transfer Act is unconstitutional because
it did not comply with Art. 31 (2), as it stood at the
time it was passed. It will therefore have to be
struck down, and the petitioner given a declaration
in his favour accordingly.
Re. (3).
'
We now come to the constitutionality of the
Forest Amendment Act. By this Act, Chap. V-A
was added to the Forest Act, and the main provision
of it which has been attacked is s. 38-B. It lays
down that the State Government may by notification
regulate or prohibit in any forest situate in or upon any
land of a claimant the doing of certain acts where
.Jluch regulation or prohibition appears necessary.
1962
A1ahtndra Lal Jain
v.
Stale of U. P.
JJ'ancboo, J.
942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Claimant is defined in s. 38-A as meaning a
MaluttJr• Lal J aini person claiming to be entitled to the land or any intev.
rest therein acquired, owned, settled or possessed or
Stale •f U. P.
purported to have been acquired, owned. settled or
Hanchoo, J.
possessed whether under, through or by any lease or
licence executed prior to the commencement of the
Abolition Act or under and in accordance with any
provision of any enactment, including the Abolition
Act. It may be added that in 1960 there was an
amendment to this Act by which certain other sections
have been added in Chap. V-A. We shall deal with
the effect of that amendment later; for the present we
are dealing with the attack on s.. 38-B. It is contended
that the regulation or prohibition contemplated in
s. 38-B is of a permanent nature and interferes even
with forestry operations. It is also contended that
it takes away rights without any provision for
compensation. In short, the attack on Chap. V-A,
as originally enacted, is based on a contrast of its
provision with Chap. V of the Forest Act. Now if
this is really so, there may be something in favour of
the petitioner's contention that certain parts of
Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, are unconstitutional.
But the contention on behalf of the respondents is
that Chap. V-A, as originally enacted (i. e. ss. 38-A
to 38-G) is not supplementary to Chap. V, but is
supplementary to Chap. II of the Forest Act, and is
thus intended to serve as a temporary provision for
protection of forests while proceedings under Chap. II
are going on. If this contention on behalf of the respondents is correct, the attack of the petitioner on
Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, would lose all force
because that attack is based on the assumption that
Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, allows the State to
make permanent orders under it and then the contrast
between Chap. V-A as originally enacted and Chap.
V would bring out the infirmities in Chap. V-A.
1
It is necessary therefore to look at the scheme of
Chap. Il of the Fo.rest Act, which contains sections 3
••
'
-
I S.C.R.
...
'
SUPREME COURT REPOR1 c
01~
to 27 and deals with reserved forests. Section 3 provides that the State Government may constitute any
forest land or waste land which is the property of
Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the
forest produce of which the Government is entitled, a
reserved forest. Section 4 provides for the issue of a
notification declaring the intention of the Government
to constitute a reserved forest. Section 5 bars accrual
of forest rights in the area covered by notification
under s. 4 after the issue of the notification. Section
6 then inter ali({, gives power to the Forest Settlement
Officer to issue a proclamation fixing a period of not
less than three months from the date of such proclamation and requiring every person claiming any right
mentioned in s. 4 and s 5 within such period either
to present to the Forest Settlement Officer a written
notice specifying or to appear before him and state
the nature of such right and the amount and particulars of the compensation (if any) claimed in respect
thereof. Section 7 gives power to the Forest Settlement Officer to make investigation himself to discover
these rights. Section 8 prescribes the powers of the
Forest Settlement Officer, and lays down inter az.ia
that he will have the same powers as a civil court has
in the trial of suits. Section 9 inter alia provides for
the extinction of rights where no claim has been made
under s. G c.ll the making of a notification under s. ~II.
Section 11(1) lays down that ''in the case of a claim
to a right in or over any land, other than a right-ofway or right of pasture, or a right to forest-p~·oducc
or a water-course, the Forest Settlement Officer shall
pa~s an or~,er admitting or rejecting the same in whole
or m. part:
Section 11 (2) lays that "if such claim is
admitted m whole or in part, the Forest Settlement
~~cer shall either (i) exclude such land from the
hm1ts o~ the proposed forest, or (ii) come to an agrecn_1ent with th~.owner thereof for the surrender ~f his
nghts ; or (!11) proceed to acquire such land in the
manner provided by the ,Land Acquisition Act, 189;!."
1962.
1\lahendra Lal Jain
v.
Stat• of U.P.
iranchoo, J.
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
;
1962
Sections 12 to 16 provide for the determination of
All1htndra Lal Jaini rights other than rights in or over any land, including
commutation by the payment of a sum of money or
v.
.'tt1tc af !J.P.
by the grant of land, or in such other manner as he
IVanch110 J.
thinks fit. Section 17 provides for appeals from orders
passed under ss.11, 12, 15 and 16, whiles. 18(4) provides for revising an appellate order by the State
Government. Section 19 permits lawyers to appear
before the Forest Settlement Officer or in appeal.
When all these proceedings are over, the State
Government has to publish a notification under s. 20
specifying definitely the limits of the forest, which is
to be reserved and declaring the same to be reserved
from the date fixed by the notification, and from such
date the forest shall be deemed to be a reserved forest.
We need not refer to the remaining sections which
provide for ancillary matters after the notification
under s. 20.
1
It is clear from this review of the provisions of
Chap. II that it applies inter alia to forest land or
waste land which is the property of the Government
or over which the Government has proprietary rights.
By the notification under s. 4, the Forest Settlement
Officer is appointed to inquire into and determine the
existence, nature and extent of any rights alleged to
exist in favour of any person in or over any land
comprised within such limits, or in or over any forest
produce, and to deal with the same as provided in
this Chapter. Section 11 then provides for the adjudication of rights in or over land, and provides that
if it is held that rights in or over land exits, the land
may be excluded from the limits of the proposed
forest or there may be some agreement lnetween the
owner of that right and the Government with respect
to it, or the Forest Settlement Officer may proceed to
acquire such land in the manner provided in the Land
Acquistion Act.
It will be clear therefore that
Chap. II contemplates that where forest land 01: waste
land is the property of Government or over which the
I
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I S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
945
1962
Government has proprietary rights, the Forest Settlement Officer shall proceed to determine subordinate Mllr•nd,. Lal Jain i
rights in the land before a notification under s. 20 is
v.
$14'4 of U. P.
issued making the area a reserved forest. In the determination of these rights, the Forest Settlement Officer
Wolll<l\to;J.
has the same powers as a civil court has in the trial of
suits, and his order is subject to appeal and finally
to revision by the State Government. Section 5 also
shows that after a notification under s. 4, no further
forest rights can accrue. It appears, however, that
after the Abolition Act came into force, it was felt
that more powers should be taken to control forests
than was possible under s. 5 as under the Abolition
Act all lands to which the Abolition Act applied had
vested in the State and become its property. That is
why, according to the respondents, the Forest Amendment Act was passed in 1956, and though there is no
express or specific provision therein to show that as
originally enacted it was a mere provision to tide over
the difficulties arising during the time proceedings
under Chap. II were pending, it appears that there is
force in the contention of the respondents that this was
a mere interim measure to deal with the situation
arising after the Abolition Act came into force while
steps were being taken to constitute reserved forests
under Chap. JI, as all lands had become the property
of the State in the area to which the Abolition Act
applied. This is in our opinion made clear by the
definition of the word "claimant" in s. 38-A, and the
rest of the Chapter, as originally enacted, deals with
claimants. The heading of the Chapter does appear
to be somewhat ambiguous inasmuch as it says "of the
Control over Fores ts of Claimants." The idea one
gets prirn<S faeie from this heading is that the forests
belong to claimants and the intention is to control
such forests. This heading is in line with the heading
of Chap. V of the Forest Act, which is "Of the
control over Forests and Lands not being the property
of Government", and so the first impression created
on one's mind is that just as Chap. V deals w}tl;i
946 SUPREi\JE COURT REPORTS [HJ63) SUPP.
1962
Mahendra la.J Jaini
v.
Stattof U. P.
H'anchoo, J.
fore5ts and lands not being the property of Govern·
ment, Chap. VA aho deals with forests which are
not the property of Government but of claimants.
But the definition of "claimant" in s. 38-A clearlv
shows that the claimant therein is a person making ~
claim and not a person whose claim has been recognised. Therefore it would not in our opinion be in·
correct to connect Chap. V-A, as originally enacted,
with Chap. IT of the Forest Act, which clearly deals
with claims and has here and there usecl the word
"claimant" (as for instance in s. ll(b) ), though the
word · "claimant" has not been defined in that
Chapter. It seems to us therefore that Chap. V-A, as
originally enacted (ss. il8-A to :18-G) was only dealing
with claimants who were making claims under
Chap. II and whose claims would be dealt with thereunder, and so the heading of Chap. V-A rea!ly means
control of forests in respect of which claims arc made
by claimants. If these claims arc with respect to
rights in or over land, they would be dealt with under
s. 11 and if they arc claims with respect to other
matters, thcv would be dealt with under ss. 12 to 16.
It seems to us that if the claimant defined in s. 38- A
was not the person making a claim under Chap. II,
Chap. V -A, as originally enacted, would have little
sense, for it provides no machinery for dealing with
claims of claimants. Further, it is on this basis that
one can understand the use of the word "prohibition"
tn s. 38-B, which even restricts genuine forestry operations. It seems to us unthinko.ble that genuine
forestry operations should be restricted permanently
without any procedure for deciding the claims of
claimants. Therefore Chap. V-A, as originally enact·
ed, is ancillary to Chap. II and gives further power of
control besides those contained in Chap. II, during
the period that proceedings under Chap. II are pending. Looked at in this way Chap. V-A as originally
enacted would be constitutional, as it will be in the
interest of the general public to provide for interim
protection of the forests pending disposal of claims
' ·
-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
947
under Chap. II and the declaration of the forest as
reserved forest under s. 20 thereof.
1962
Mahmdr• Lal J 11ini
v.
-
But it is urged that the amendment in Chap.
V-A by the Indian Forest (U.P. Amendment) Act
1960, (U.P. XXI o'f 1960) destroys this character of
the Forest Amendment Act, as originally enacted. By
this amendment, ss. 38-H to 38-M were added to
Chap. V.A. Section 38-H (1) provides for taking over
the management of any particular forest or forest land
for a period not exceeding fifteen years. Sub-section
(2) thereof says that no notification under sub-s. (I)
shall be issued unless notice is issued to a claimant,
owner or tenure-holder of the forest or forest land.
Obviously, therefore, the provisions of s. 38-H and the
subsequent sections are wider than the provisions of
ss.38-A to 38-G, which were originally enacted. We are
not actually concerned with the provisions of s.38-H
onwards, for no action has been taken under those
provisions; nor has the petitioner alleged that there
is any threat of such action. The argument, however
is that this new provision shows that ss.38-A to 38-G
are not connected with Chap II and really go with
this new provision. We cannot accept this argument,
for, in the first place, the lagislature when it passed
ss. 38-A to 38-G never had ss. 38-H to 38-M in mind.
In the second place, s. 38-H also deals with the land
of claimants though it further deals with the lands of
tenure-holders_ or owners. So far as the claimants are
concerned, the position still remains that there must
be some provision for deciding their claims and no
such provisions are found up to s. 38-M, and we are
therefore thrown back on Chap. II so far as the claimants are <:oncerned. It must therefore be held that
the enactment of new ss. 38-H to 38-'M made no
difference to the position that ss. 38-A to 38-G as
originally enacted, are supplementary to Chap. II,
though s. 38-H onwards may not be so and may stand
by themselves, so far as owners or tenure-holders are
concerned. There is no doubt, however, that ss. 38-A
State of U. P.
Wanchoo, J.
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Jahendra Lal laini
v.
Stall of U. P.
Wancho11, J.
to 38-G are ancillary to Chap. II and must be read as
such and in this view their constitutionality as interim
provisions cannot be successfully assailed.
It is next urged that even if ss. 38-A to 38-G
are ancillary to Chap. II, they would not apply
to the petitioner's land, as Chap. II deals inter alia
with waste land or forest land, which is the property
of the Government and not with that land which is
not the property of the Government, which is dealt
with under Chap. V. That is so. But unless the
petitioner can show that the land in dispute in this
case is his property and not the property of the State,
Chap. II will apply to it. Now there is no dispute
that the land in dispute belonged to the Maharaja
Bahadur of Nahan before the Abolition Act and the
said Maharaja Bahadur was an intermediary. Therefore, the land in dispute vested in the State under s. 6
of the Abolition Act and became the property of the
State. It is however, contended on behalf of the
petitioner that if 'he is held to be a bhumidhar in
proper proceedings, the land would be his property
and therefore Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, if it
is ancillary to Chap. II would not apply to the land
in dispute. We are of opinion that there is no force
in this contention. We have already pointed out that
under s. 6 of the Abolition Act all property of inter~ediaries including the land in dispute vested in the
State Government and became its property. It is true
that under s. 18, certain lands were deemed to be
settled as bhumidhari lands; but it is clear that after
land vests in the State Government under s. 6 of the
Abolition Act, there is no provision therein for divesting of what has vested in the State Government. It
is however urged on behalf of the petitioner that he
claims to be' the proprietor of this land as a
bhumidhar because of certain provisions in the
Act. There was no such proprietary right as
bhumidhari right before the Abolition Act. The
Abolition Act did away with all proprietary
,..
l s.c.R.
'
'
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
1962
rights in the area to which it applied and created
three classes of tenure by s. 129: bhumidhar, sirdar NJ alundra Lal Jai11i
v.
and asami, which were unknown before. Thus
Slat1 of U. P.
bhumidlw,r, sirdar and asarni are all tenure-holders
under the Abolition Act and they hold their tenure rYanchoo, J.
under the State in which the proprietary right vested
under s. 6. It is true that bhumidhars have certain
wider rights in their tenures as com pared to sirdars ;
similarly sirdars have wider rights as compared to
asamis ; but nonetheless all the three are mere tenureholders-with varying rights-under the State which is
the proprietor of the entire land in the State to which
the Abolition Act applied. It is not disputed that
the Abolition Act applies to the land in dispute and
therefore the State is the proprietor of the land in
dispute and the petitioner even if he were a bhumidhar
would still be a tenure-holder. Further, the land in
dispute is either waste land or forest land (for it is so
far not converted to agriculture) over which the State
has proprietary rights and therefore Chap. II will
clearly apply to this land and so would Chap. V-A.
It is true that a bhumidhar has got a heritable and
transferable right and he can use his holding for any
purpose including industrial and residential purposes,
and if he does so that part of the holding will be demarcated under s.143. It is also true that generally speaking, there is no ejectmant of a bhumidhar and no forfeiture of his land. He also pays land revenue (s.241)
but in that respect he is on the same footing as a sirdar
who can hardly be called a proprietor because his
interest is not transferable except as expressly permitted by the Act. Therefore, the fact that the payment
made liy the bhmmidhar to the State is called land
revenue and not rent would not necessarily make him
a proprietor, because sirdar also pays land-revenue,
though his rights are very much lower than that of a
bhumidlw,r. It is true that the rights which the
bhumidhar has to a certain extent approximate to the
rights which a proprietor used to have before the
Abolition Act was passed; but it is clear that rights of
950 SUPRl<:ME COURT REPORTS [i963]SUPP.
1962
Ma"'ndra Lal Jaini
v.
Sta/t of U. P.
Warrchoo, J.
a bhumidhar are in many respects less and in many
other respects restricted as compared to the old
proprietor before the Abolition Act, For example,
the bhumidhar has ro right as such in the minerals
under the sub-soil. Section 154 makes a restriction on
the power of a bhumidhar to make certain transfers.
Section 155 forbids the bhumidhar, from making
usufructury mortgages. Section 156 forbids a
bhumidhar, sirdar or asami from letting the land to
others, unless the case comes under~- 157. Section
189 (aa) provides that where a bhumidhar lets out his
holding or any part thereof in contravention of the
provisions of this Act, his right will be extinguished.
It is clear therefore that though bhumidhar have
higher rights than sirdars and asamis, they are still
mere tenure-holders under the State which is the
propri~tor of all lands in the area to which the Abolition Act applies. The petitioner therefore even if he
is presume::! to be a bhumidhar cannot claim to be a
proprietor to whom Chap. II of the Forest Act does
not apply, and therefore Chap. V-A, as originally
enacted, would not apply: (see in this connection,
Mst. Govindi v. The State of Uttar Pradesh)(1). As
we have alrcay pointed out ss. 4 and 11 give power
for determination of all rights subordinate to those of
a proprietor, and as the right of the bhumidhar is
t)lat of a tenure-holder, subordinate to the State, which
is the proprietor, of the land in dispute, it will be open
to the Forest Settlement officer to consider the claim
made to the land in dispute by the petitioner, if he
claims to be a bhumidhar. This is in addition to the
provisior.. of s.229-B of the Abolition Act. The petitioner
therefore even if he is a bhumidhar cannot claim that
the land in dispute is out of the provisions of Chap. II
and therefore Chap. V-A, even if it is ancillary to
Chap.II would not apply. We must therefore uphold the
constitutionality of Chap. V-A, as originally enacted,
in the view we have taken of its being supplementary
to Chap. II, and we further hold that Chap. II and
Chap. V-A will apply to the land in dispute even
(I) A.l.R. (1952) AU.88.
,
(
'
.,.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
if the petitioner is assumed to be the bhumidhar, of
1962
that la:id.
M•lundra Lal Jaini
v.
'
The only other question that remains to be
considered is whether the notification under s. 4 is
still in force. That ·notification was issued under
Chap. II of the Forest Act on Mareh 23, 1955 and
thereafter a proclamation under s. 6 ibid was issued
on April 26, 1955. The petitioner contends that the
notification under s. 4 was withdrawn so far as his
land was concerned by notification dated December
19, 1956. That is however not a notification at all.
It is a mere government order issued to all Conservators of Forests, Divisional Forest Officers and District
Officers as well as the Secretary, Board of Revenue,
and all that is stated there is that a number of representations had been made to the Government by
claimants of lands situated in the erstwhile private
forests under agreements executed before July 1952
by them with their owners, and the Governor, on
careful consideration, had decided that all such lands
in respect of which valid legal reclamations leases
were executed by the owners should be released in
favour of the lessees. It was also pointed out that if
such land was included in any of the notifications
issued under s. 4 of the Forest Act, it should be deemed to have been excluded from that notification. It
may be mentioned that this government order was
cancelled. by a later government order dated July 7,
1958, which was also not published. Now a notification . unde~ s. 4 of the Forest Act is required to be
pu~l1Shed m the Gazette and unless it is so published,
1t 1s of no effect. The notification of March 23
1956, was published in the Gazette and was therefor~
a proper notification. It is also not disputed that
in view of s. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act
(No. I of 1904) a notification issued under s. 4 could
!rnve be~n cancelled or modified but it could be done
m thr hk~ . man~er and subject to the like sanction
and cond1t1ons, 1. e. by notification in the gazette.
Stat• of U. P.
Wanclwo, J.
952 StJl>REMF. COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
191i2
1ahmdra Lal Jaini
v.
Stateof U. P.
Wanci\oo, J.
The Government order of December 1956 therefore
cannot amount to excluding anything from the notification issued under s. 4, for it was never published;
it was a mere departmental instruction by Government
to its officers which was later withdrawn. The notification therefore stands as it was originally issued
and the petitioner cannot claim any benefit of the
government order of December 1956, which was later
cancelled. Further in view of the fact that we have
held that Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, is valid,
being a measure supplementary to Chap. II, the
notification issued under Chap. V-A must also be
upheld.
In the result therefore the petition is allowed
to this extent that the Transfer Act No. XV of 1952
is struck down as unconstitutional and of no force and
effect. We may add, however, that learned counsel
for the respondents has stated before us that if a claim
is made even now under Chap. II by the petitioner
within thirty days of our judgment, even though it
may be time-barred as from the date of the proclamation issued under s. 6, the Forest Settlement
Officer will entertain it and consider the claim as required under Chap. II.
We therefore allow the petition in part and
strike down the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of
Transfers) Act, No. XV of 1952 as unconstitutional.
The rest of the prayers in the petition are rejected,
subject to the petitioner being free to take such steps
as may be open to him in law to establish his right
whatever it may be under the registered lease of June
1952 and subject to the State having the right to
contest the said claim. In the circumstances, the
parties will bear their own costs of this petition.
'
'
Petiti<m allowed in part.
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